UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6971

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner – Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ANTHONY TAYLOR,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior

District Judge. (5:08-hc-02009-BR)

Submitted: March 31, 2016 Decided: April 8, 2016

Before WILKINSON and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Joseph Bart 

Gilbert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States 

Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Jennifer D. Dannels, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Michael Anthony Taylor appeals from the district court’s 

order revoking his conditional release and remanding him to the 

custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246 

(2012). On appeal, Taylor contends that the court erred in 

finding that he violated the terms of his conditional release 

due to an arrest for driving under the influence when he was not 

adjudicated guilty of that offense. He also maintains that the 

court should not have revoked his conditional release after he 

mailed threatening letters. Finally, Taylor alleges that his 

original civil commitment was improper because his due process 

rights were violated during the original criminal investigation. 

Finding no error, we affirm.

When, as here, a district court is asked to revoke an 

individual’s conditional release granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4246(e), it must hold a hearing to 

determine whether the [individual in question] should 

be remanded to a suitable facility on the ground that, 

in light of his failure to comply with the prescribed 

regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care 

or treatment, his continued release would create a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or 

serious damage to property of another. 

18 U.S.C. § 4246(f). Accordingly, a district court may revoke 

conditional release upon two findings: “that the individual 

failed to comply with his treatment regimen and that his 

continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily 
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injury to another.” United States v. Mitchell, 709 F.3d 436, 

443 (5th Cir. 2013). 

Generally, a district court’s findings of fact under 18 

U.S.C. § 4246(f), including an individual’s risk to other 

persons or property, are reviewed for clear error. See United 

States v. Woods, 995 F.2d 894, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1993); United 

States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992) (indicating 

similar standard in review of denial of unconditional release). 

Although the district court’s explanation of its reasoning was 

brief, we conclude that Taylor’s admission that he wrote and 

mailed threatening letters, in addition to the information 

submitted with the Government’s revocation motion, adequately 

supported the conclusion that Taylor’s continued release posed a 

substantial risk to other persons or property. See Mitchell, 

709 F.3d at 443 (considering probation officer’s report attached 

to government’s motion for revocation of conditional release

when determining whether district court’s factual findings were 

clearly erroneous). Taylor’s mental health records indicated 

that he had a history of violence, and had a previous arrest for 

being “under the influence of a controlled substance.” 

Taylor’s significant threat to others was clearly exhibited 

by his willingness to engage in noncompliant behavior, such as 

consuming alcohol, and mailing threatening letters to various 

individuals and law enforcement. See United States v. Sahhar, 
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917 F.2d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A] finding of 

‘substantial risk’ under section 4246 may be based on any

activity that evinces a genuine possibility of future harm to 

persons or property.”); see also United States v. Williams, 299 

F.3d 673, 677-78 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding of substantial risk

supported by evidence of delusions and refusal to participate in 

mental health assessment); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 

970 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding actual violent conduct, threatening 

letters, history of drug abuse, weapons possession, and failure

to take prescribed medication supported finding of probable 

dangerousness). 

Although Taylor claims on appeal for the first time that 

there was insufficient evidence of his use of alcohol because he 

was arrested, but not convicted, for driving under the 

influence, this claim fails. There was sufficient evidence to 

conclude that Taylor had used alcohol without a conviction for 

driving under the influence. Thus, there is no clear error in 

the court’s finding of a violation of a release condition. 

Finally, Taylor contends that his original commitment order 

was invalid because it resulted from an arrest and indictment 

based on an affidavit containing false information and 

misrepresentation of the law. Taylor did not raise these issues 

at the revocation hearing. Further, he had an opportunity to 

challenge the initial commitment on a direct appeal. Therefore, 
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these issues are not before us on this appeal from revocation of 

conditional release.

 We therefore conclude that there was no reversible error in 

the revocation of Taylor’s conditional release and affirm the 

district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED