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No. 99-294 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2000 MT 188 

300 Mont. 405

4 P.3d 1204

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

COREY ALAN SPRINKLE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,

The Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Judge presiding.

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COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Jeremy Gersovitz, Lewis and Clark County Assistant Public Defender,

Helena, Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell,

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Mike McGrath, Lewis and Clark County Attorney; Lisa Leckie, Deputy

County Attorney, Helena, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: May 25, 2000 

Decided: July 18, 2000

Filed:

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__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. ¶By Information filed in the District Court for the First Judicial District in Lewis 

and Clark County, the State charged the Defendant, Corey Alan Sprinkle, with 

criminal sale of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of § 45-9-101, MCA; 

criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-9-102, 

MCA; and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in violation 

of § 45-10-103, MCA. Sprinkle pled guilty to each offense. The District Court 

sentenced Sprinkle to a term of 20 years in prison pursuant to § 45-9-101(3), MCA. 

Sprinkle appeals the District Court's sentencing order. We vacate and remand for 

findings of fact. 

2. ¶Although Sprinkle raised two issues on appeal, the following issue is dispositive: 

3. ¶Did the District Court err when it failed to enter findings of fact to support its 

conclusion that Sprinkle was not excepted from the mandatory minimum sentence 

required by § 45-9-101(3), MCA?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. ¶Following Sprinkle's involvement in a drug transaction, the State charged Sprinkle 

with several offenses including criminal sale of dangerous drugs, a felony, in 

violation of § 45-9-101, MCA. Sprinkle pled guilty to each offense.

2. ¶On February 18, 1999, the District Court, following a sentencing hearing, 

sentenced Sprinkle to a prison term of 20 years for the felony conviction pursuant to 

the mandatory minimum sentence requirement found at § 45-9-101(3), MCA. The 

District Court concluded that none of the exceptions to the mandatory minimum 

sentence found at § 46-18-222, MCA, applied to Sprinkle. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. ¶ Sentencing is based on statutory law. See State v. Stevens (1993), 259 Mont. 114, 

115, 854 P.2d 336, 337. We review the district court's application of the sentencing 

statutes to determine whether the district court was correct. State v. LaMere (1995), 

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272 Mont. 355, 358, 900 P.2d 926, 928. 

DISCUSSION

1. ¶Did the District Court err when it failed to enter findings of fact to support its 

conclusion that Sprinkle was not excepted from the mandatory minimum sentence 

required by § 45-9-101(3), MCA?

2. ¶Section 45-9-101(3), MCA, provides the following mandatory minimums:

A person convicted of criminal distribution of a dangerous drug included in Schedule I or 

Schedule II pursuant to 50-32-222 or 50-32-224, except marijuana or 

tetrahydrocannabinol, who has a prior conviction for criminal distribution of such a drug 

shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not less than 10 years or more than life 

and may be fined not more than $50,000, except as provided in 46-18-222. Upon a third or 

subsequent conviction for criminal distribution of such a drug, the person shall be 

imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not less than 20 years or more than life and 

may be fined not more than $50,000, except as provided in 46-18-222.

Section 46-18-222, MCA, provides:

Mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the laws of this state, . . . do not apply if:

. . . .

(4) the offender was an accomplice, the conduct constituting the offense was principally 

the conduct of another, and the offender's participation was relatively minor . . . .

1. ¶It is conceded that Sprinkle had the necessary number of prior convictions to 

qualify for the mandatory minimum sentence, however, Sprinkle contends that he is 

excepted from the mandatory minimum sentence because his participation in the 

drug transaction was relatively minor, which he asserts qualifies him for the 

exception provided at § 46-18-222(4), MCA. Sprinkle also contends that the District 

Court erred when it did not enter findings of fact to support its conclusion. The State 

responds that substantial evidence supports the District Court's conclusion that 

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Sprinkle did not qualify for the exception, but concedes that the District Court 

should have entered findings of fact to support its conclusion.

2. ¶Section 46-18-223, MCA, provides:

(1) When the application of an exception provided for in 46-18-222 is an issue, the court 

shall grant the defendant a hearing prior to the imposition of sentence to determine the 

applicability of the exception.

(2) The hearing shall be held before the court sitting without a jury. The defendant and the 

prosecution are entitled to assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and crossexamination of witnesses who appear at the hearing.

(3) If it appears by a preponderance of the information, including information submitted 

during the trial, during the sentencing hearing, and in so much of the presentence report as 

the court relies on, that none of the exceptions at issue apply, the court shall impose the 

appropriate mandatory sentence. The court shall state the reasons for its decision in 

writing and shall include an identification of the facts relied upon in making its 

determination. The statement shall be included in the judgment.

(Emphasis added.)

1. ¶In this case, the District Court did not comply with the requirements of § 46-18-

223, MCA. The purpose of findings is to demonstrate the factual basis for the 

district court's judgment. See Jones v. Jones (1980), 190 Mont. 221, 223-24, 620 

P.2d 850, 851. Without findings we have no basis upon which to review that 

judgment. We, therefore, cannot review the merits of Sprinkle's first issue until the 

District Court complies with § 46-18-223, MCA. Accordingly, we hold that the 

District Court erred when it failed to enter findings of fact to support its conclusion 

that Sprinkle was not excepted from the mandatory minimum sentence found at § 

45-9-101(3), MCA. 

2. ¶We remand this case to the District Court for entry of findings to support its 

conclusion that the exception found at § 46-18-222(4), MCA, does not apply to the 

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mandatory minimum sentence required by § 45-9-101(3), MCA.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

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