NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0709n.06 F iled: Novem ber 18, 2008 Case No. 07- 6348 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT JAMES WHITE HEAD, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. NEIL BO WEN, Defendan t-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DI S TR IC T O F K

EN TU CKY

BEF ORE: G UY , BA TC HELD ER , a nd M CK EA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. AL ICE M. BATCHELDE R, Circ uit Jud ge. Plaintiff–Appellant J ames Whitehead (“Whitehea d”) a

ppeals the district court’s gra nt of sum mary judgme nt in favor of Def endant Pioneer Va lle y Pol ic e Of fi c e r N e il B ow e n ( “ B ow e n” ) i n th is ac tio n bro ug ht und e r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 and state law s e e kin gdama g e s f

or B ow e n’ s a lle g e d u se of e xce ssi ve fo rc e in t

he c ours e of

an arr e st. Whit e he a d a

pp e a ls a s w e ll the c ourt ’s de nia l of his Rul e 59 (e ) M oti on

to A lte r, Am e nd

or Va c ate that de c isi on . F or

the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e AF F I RM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACKG ROUND At 8:40 AM on Marc h 17, 2005, an off icer of the Pioneer

Valley Police Depa

rtment stopped the vehicle in which Whitehead wa s a passe ng er. U pon discoveringthat th er e were outstanding

war rants for Whit ehea d, the offic er a

rre sted him. Duringthe cour se of the arre st, W hitehead suf fer ed2

a br ok e n wri st. On Marc h 17 , 20 06 , Whit e he a d fi le d thi s § 19 83 a c tio n, namin gOf fi c e r B ow e n a s th e so le defe ndant. Whitehead cla imed that Bow en had be en the of fice r who “ detained, se ized and arr ested Whit ehea d,” and that “[d] uringthis detention, seizure, char g e, an d arr est, Bow en, used e x cessive forc e, bre akingWhit ehea d’s wrist, causing Whit ehea d to sustain phy sical pain a nd injury .” B owen timely filed an a nswer to t h e compl aint, specific ally denying the se alleg ations and stating , among other thing s, that he “ha d no contac t with nor did he detain Plaintiff on the date that is the subjec t of Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Bow en commenced document discovery in April of 2006, but the docke t ref lects no discover

y undertaken by Whit ehea d; inde ed, the docke t refle cts no other a ctivity in the

case until the parties held planningand sche duling confer ence s in late November and mid-Dece mber of that y ear . Whit ehea d submitt ed his initial disclosu re s o n Dec ember 29, 2006, and B owen submitt ed his on J anuar

y 9, 2007. Notably , Bow en’s disclosure specifie d that he would defe nd on the basis that he wa s not the individual who arre sted the plaintiff. On J anuar y 12, 2007, some ten m onths afte r Whitehead initiated this lawsuit, Bowe n moved for summary

judgme nt, arguing that he was not the office r who a rre sted Whit ehea d; that at 9:15 AM on the morningin question he had in fa ct bee n in court testifyin g i n an unre lated matter , Commonwealth of Kentucky v . VanceC. Green ; and that the ar restingoffice r wa s Dale Elliot, Chief of the Pioneer

Villag e Police De partment. B owen supported his moti on with his own signed aff idavit stating, among othe r thing s, that he was “not the police of fice r who a

rre sted Mr. Whitehead

on Marc h 17, 2005, as alleg ed in his Complaint”; a copy of the subpoena for his a ppear ance to testifyO n t he do cke t s hee t , B owen’ s na me i s mi s s pel l ed as “ B ol i n, ” but W hi t ehe ad do es not cont end t hat B owen 1 di d not t es t i f

y i n t he G r een ca s e a t t he t i me s peci f i ed i n t he s ubpo ena . 3 in the Gree n case ; a

nd a docket sheet showing that he had testified in the Gree n c a se . B ow e n a lso 1 provided the c itation that had been issued t o Whit ehea d on the morningof Mar ch 17, 2005, and Whi t eh ea d ’s j ail rec ord fr om that date, ea ch of which shows Chief Elliot as the ar restingoffice r. Whit ehea d, on the other ha nd, submitt ed no af

fidavit or other

evidenc e in re sponse to Bow en’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. The district cour

t gr anted summary

judgme nt to Bowe n on April 5, 2007, finding that Bow en had set out deta iled fac ts demonstrating “that he w as not the ar resting office r . . . [and] uncontra dicted proof

that he wa s somewher e entirely differ ent at the time of the incident,” a nd that Whit ehea d had fa iled t o p ro vide suffic ient evidenc e to withstand summary judgme nt. The cour

t noted that “‘ [a] plaintiff may not, in defe nding ag ainst a mot ion for summary judgme nt, rest on the

mere alleg ations or denials of his plea dings,’ ” W hitehead v. B owen , 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 25468 at* 3 (W

. D. Ky

. Ap r. 4 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 259 (1986)) , and that White he a d ha d pro vid e d no ev ide nc e that Bo we n ha d any pe rs on a l or s up e rv iso ry ro le in the alleg ed depr ivation of Whit ehea d’s constitutional right to be fre e from the us e of e x cessive f orce , and the re fo re , n o g e nu ine iss ue of mate ri al fact existe d und e r h is § 19 83 or state law c la ims , W hitehead , 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 25468 at *1-5. On April 23, 2007, pursua nt to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Whitehead f iled a Motion to Alter, Amend or V aca

te the cour

t’s summary

judgme nt order. Whitehea d claimed that at the time B owen filed for summary judgme nt Whi tehea d had not ha d the opportunity to c onduct any discovery

and thus could not prese nt evidenc e contradicting Bow en’s assertion that he was not the arr esting office r.U nder Rul e 4( 1)( A ) of t he Federa l Rul es of

Ap pel l at e Procedur e, W hi t ehe ad was r equi r ed t o f i l e h i s appeal 2 wi t hi n t hi rt y da y s f

rom t he ent ry of judgm ent
. T he d i st ri ct co urt grant ed D ef end ant B o wen’ s M o t i o n f o r Sum m ary Jud gm ent on A p ri l 5, 20 0 7 , and W hi t ehead did no t ap p eal t hat de ci si o n unt i l N o vem b er 2, 2 0 0 7 — wel l be y o nd t he thirty-d a y ti m e li m it. W h ile a p ro p e rly fi le d m o tio n un d e r R u le 5 9 (e ) w ill to ll the p e rio d fo r fil ing a no tice o f ap p e a l, Fed. R. Ap p. P

. 4(a ) ( 4)( A ) ( i v) , W hi t ehe ad di d not f i l e h i s M ot i on t o A l t er , Am end, or V aca t e u nder Rul e 59(e) wi t hi n t en d ays of t he o rder grant i ng s um m ary judgm ent as requir ed by R ul e 5 9 (e). T he reco rd i nd i cat es t hat he reque st ed an ext ensi o n of t i m e t o f i l e t he m o t i o n, but t he m agi st rat e d i d not rul e o n t hat m o t i o n and ul t i m at el y f o und i t m o o t
. A t an y rat e, we p rev i o usly ha ve he l d t ha t t he t i m e li m i t f o r f i l i ng und er R ule 5 9 (e) is an a f f i rm ati ve d efen se t o an unt i m el y m o t i o n; t he p art y op p o si ng t he m o t i o n m ust rai se t he af f i rma t i ve d ef

ense before t he co urt res o l ves t he mot i on on i t s me r i t s or t h e def en s e wi l l be f

or f ei t ed, a n d t h e u n t i mel y mot i on w i l l s t i l l s er v e t o t ol l t h e per i od f or fil ing a no tice o f ap p e a l. See Na t ’ l E col og i cal F ou nd

. v. A l exand er , 4 9 6 F .3d 4 6 6 , 4 7 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ). B ec au se B o w e n d id no t ar g u e b e lo w tha t W h iteh e a d ’s 5 9 (e ) M o tio n w a s u n tim e ly, w e ha v e the a u tho rity to e n te rta in h is a p p e a l o f t h e m a g istra te ’s o rd e r g ra n ting the m o tio n fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t. See i d. 4 Whit ehea d tender ed with the motion a n aff idavit stating that, duringthe traf fic stop, he wa s asked to e xit th e v e h i c l e b y an o f f i c e r w i th a n am e p l at e b e ar i n g th e n am e “ B o w e n , ” an d th at d ur i ng his

“ de te nti on , s e izur e , c ha

rg e and arr e st” thi s of

fi c e r us e d e xce ssi ve fo rc e , br e akin g Whit e he a d’ s w ri st. Whit ehea d argued that this “direc t evidence ” showe d that a g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sted, and ther efor e, the Court should g rant his Rule 59(e) motion. On Octobe r 3, 2007, the district cour t denied Whitehead’ s Rule 59 ( e) motion. W hitehead v. Bowen , 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 74875 (W.D. Ky . Oct. 2, 2007). The court found insuff icient and untimely Whit ehea d’s post-judg ment aff idavit, and unpersuasive hi s claim that summary judgme nt had bee n prematurely

enter ed. The court noted that Whi tehea d had commenc ed the a ction ten months prior to Bowe n’s motion for summary judgme nt, but had offere d no explanation as to why he ha d f a ile d to un de rt ake any

dis c ov e ry or wh at sp e c if

ic fa c ts h e might h ave dis c ov e re d th at w ou ld

c re ate g e nu ine iss ue s f

or tr ia l. On Novembe r 2, 2007, Whitehead a ppeale d both the District Court’s Orde r Gra nting Bow en’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and the subsequent Orde r Denying Whitehea d’s Motion to Amend Alter or

Vac ate. 2 II. STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW5

We reviewde novo a district c ourt’s dec ision g rantingsummary judgme nt. Sm ith W

ho le sa le Co., Inc., v. R .J. Re

ynolds Tobacco, Inc

. , 4 7 7 F. 3 d 8 5 4 , 8 6 1 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Kessler v. Visteon Corp. , 4 4 8 F.3d 326, 329 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). Summary judgme nt is proper “ if the plea dings, the discovery and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P 56(c) . We must view the evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to the nonmovingparty
. Ma tsh us hit a Elec. I nsus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). To wi ths tand summa

ry jud g me nt, the no nmo va nt mus t pre se nt suf

fi c ie nt ev ide nc e to c re ate

a genuine issue of

materia l fac t. Ce lote

xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 7 7 U

. S. 3 1 7 , 3 2 2 ( 1986). A mer e scintilla of evidenc e is insufficient; “the re must be e vidence on which the jury could re asonably find for the [nonmovant].” Anderson , 477 U.S. a t 252. A party

opposing a

proper ly supported motion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt may no t re st up on the me re a lle g atio ns or

de nia ls o f h is p le a din g s, but mu st set forth spec ific fa cts showingthat there is a g enuine issue f or trial. Id . at 248. “W e t y pically revie w the denia l of a motion to reconside r usingthe ‘a buse of discr etion’ sta nd ard , ‘ but w he re re c on sid e ratio n o f su mm ary judg me nt w a s so ug ht,

. . . a de no vo re vie w’ is appropr iate.” So mm e rs v . D av is , 3 1 7 F. 3 d 6 8 6 , 6 9 1 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g United St ates v. $515, 060.42 , 152 F.3d 491, 497 ( 6th Cir. 1998)). A dis trict court may g rant a Rule 59(e) motion if there exis ts a clea

r error of law, newly discovere d evidenc e, or an int erve ning c hang e in controllinglaw, or to preve nt manifest injustice. See Ge nc or p, In c . v . A me ric an In t’ l U nd e rwr ite rs , 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). III . A NA LY SIS A. Summ ary judgm ent.6

In his unverified c omplaint, W hitehead a lleg ed that B owen “deta ined, seized, and a rre sted” him, and in that proce ss, Bowe n injured him. Wit h his moti on for summary judgme nt, Bowe n filed an af fidavit stating that he was “ not t h e o ffice r that ar rested Mr . J ames Whitehead on Ma rch 17, 2005, as allege d in his Compl aint,” and f urther, that at 9:15 AM on the morningin question he was actua lly in court, testifying in a

n unrelated matter. B owen c orrobor ated these sworn stateme nts by attachingto his affidavit Whitehead’s a rre st and j ai l rec ords, which c lear ly establish that the

arr e sti ngof

fi c e r w a s th e Chi e f o f P oli c e , n ot O ff ice r Bowen , an d th e do c ke t sh e e t f ro m B ull itt Di str ic t Co ur

t sh ow ingthat B ow e n d id i n f a c t te sti fy

the mor nin gof Mar ch 17. Wit h th e se

su bmi ssi on s, B ow e n p ro vid e d a ff idavi t do c ume ntatio n s uf fi c ie nt t o r e but th e c la ims ma de in Whit ehea d’s complaint, there by shifting the bur den to Whitehead to show t hat there rema ined a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t for trial. See Ce lotex , 477 U.S. at 322. To meet this burden, Whitehea d could “not rely mere ly on alleg ations or denials in [ his] own pleading s; rather , [hi s] response must — by aff idavits or as otherwise provided i n [Rule 56] — set

out sp e c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ng

a g e nu ine iss ue fo r tr ia l.” F e d. R. Civ. P. 56 ( e )( 2) ; see also Ande rson , 477 U.S. at 259 (nonmovant “ma y not . . . rest on mer e alleg ations or denials of his plea dings” ); Miller v. L orain County Bd. of Elections , 141 F.3d 252, 256 (6th Cir. 1998) (nonmovant “must set forth throug h competent and materia l e vidence specific fac ts showingthat there is a g enuine issue fo r t ri a l” ). De sp ite the c le ar r e qu ir e me nts of Rul e 56 and

the c a se law , Whit e he a d’ s r e sp on se to B ow e n’ s mo tio n f

or summa ry jud g me nt —

a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c or re c tly ob se rv e d — “ re lie [d] so le ly on the alleg ations in the complaint that [Bowen] detained, seized and ar rested [Whit ehea d] on March 17, 2005, and is responsible f or the e vents alleg ed in the complaint.” W hitehead , 20 07 U. S. D ist

. L EXI S 25468 at *2. Whi tehea d argued that his complaint, by itself, cre ated a

g enuine issue of7

materia l fac t, and he d i d n o t s up port the alleg ations made in his complaint with affidavits or any other evidenc e sufficie nt unde r Rule 56 to withstand a motion for summary judgme nt. Id . In s ho rt , the re cord be fore the district c ourt provided no evidenc e sufficie nt to demonstrate a ny g enuine issue of mate ri a l f

a c t. On appe al, Whitehead aga in argues t hat he was arre sted and inj ured by Bow en. But now, f or the first time, Whit ehea d argues t hat t here wer e two office rs on the sce ne — the Chief a nd Bow en — and while the Chief

may have be en the a

rre sting of

fi cer for r ecor ds’ purposes, B owen a ssisted the C h i ef i n makingthe ar rest and injure d Whit ehea d while doingso. Furthe rmore, Whitehea d argues, he was arre sted at 8:40 AM , so Bow en could have pa rticipated in his ar

rest prior to a

ppear ing in court to testify

at 9:15 AM . Whit ehead argue s th at summa ry jud g me nt w a s n ot p ro pe r b e c a us e B ow e n’ s a ff

ida vit and oth e r do c ume ntatio n do no t c on c lus ive ly pr ov e that th is v e rs ion of e ve nts is inc or re c t. E sse nti a lly , Whit e he a d argue s that be c a us e B ow e n’ s a

pp e llate br ie f d oe s n ot sp e c ifi c all y deny Whit ehea d’s new version of events, but instead f ocuses on the f

acts a nd arguments befor e the district court at the time summary judgme nt was ente red, this cour t should draw the infer ence s that Whit ehea d contends a

re “ war rante d.” Had Whit ehea d prese nted this ne w version of events to the district c ourt in a ffidavi t or otherwise pr oper f

orm, he might well have survived B owen’ s motion for summary judgme nt. But thi s v e rs ion

of the fa c ts w a s neve r

prese nted to the di strict court, let alone in proper for m. Nothing in the rec ord bef

ore the district court eve r hinted at the “ fac t” on which Whitehead’ s brief on a ppeal

now relies — that there wer e two office rs at the scene . We w ill not reve rse a gra n t o f s u m m ary judgme nt o nth e s tr e n g th o f a n e g ati v e in f

e r e n c e f r o m B o w e n ’ s a f

f id av it an d “ f a c ts ” n o t o nthe

rec ord bef

ore the district court, eve n if Bow en does not spec ifically deny them in his appellate brie f.8

Nor a re w e per suaded by Whit ehea d’s arg ument that the di strict court pre maturely g rante d Bow en’s Motion for S u m m ar y J udg ment. To be sure , prior to entry of summary

judgme nt, the parties must ordina

rily be af forde d adequate time for discove ry . Plott v. Ge neral Motors Corp. , 71 F .3 d 1 19 0, 11 95 (6 th C ir . 1 99 5) ; Vaughn v. U.S. Sm all Business Admin. , 6 5 F .3 d 13 22 , 1 32 5 n .1 (6 th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Howe ver, a s we have pre viously stated, in o rd e r to pr e se rv e the argume nt that the g ra nt of summa

ry jud g me nt w a s to o h a sty and pr ec l u ded nec essar

y discovery , the appe llant must have complied with the s tr ic tu r es of [ F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(f)], under whic h the district court may defe r summary judgme nt, pendingdiscovery , if the non-movant submits af fidavits stating that the par

ty cannot f or re asons stated pre sent by aff idavit fac ts essential to justify the par ty ’s opposition. Plott , 71 F.3d at 1196 (interna l quotations omitted). “In other wor ds, if the appe llant has not filed either a Rule 56(f) a ffidavit or a

motion that g ives the di strict court a chanc e to rule on the ne ed for additional di s co v er y , this court will not normally addre ss whether

there was a dequate time for discovery .” Id

. (c i t i n g Klepper v. First Am. Bank, 916 F.2d 337, 343 ( 6th Cir. 1990)). Whit e he a d ma de no e ff

or t to c omp ly wi th Rule 56 (f ). Ins te a d, he sim

ply c omp la ine d in hi s Memorandum in Re sponse to B owen’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment that he wa s “at lea st entitled to depose Of

fice r B owen to dete rmine his wher eabouts that mor n in g , to d e pose individuals who wer e also prese nt at Plaintiff’s arr est and to conduct discovery to deter mine whether

Offic er B owen wa s

on his wa y to B ull itt Di str ic t Cour

t whe n he arr e ste d the Pla int if f. ” I t is wo rt

h n oti ngtha

t e ve n in his description of the discovery he wa s “entitled” to pursue , Whit ehea d g ave no hint at the “ fac t” that he prof fer s on appea l , n amely , that Bow en wa s not the only office r on the sce ne whe n Whit ehea d

was a rre sted. More importantly , counsel’s argument is not a substitut e for the af fidavit requir ed by Rule 56(f), a

nd in any event, B owen did not move for summary j u d gm en t u n t i l ten months after9

W h i t e h e a d

f i l e d th i s a c t i o n . D ur i n gth at t i m e W h i t e h e a d h a d amp l e o p p o rtun i ty t o b e g i nd i s c o v e r y; indeed, Bowe n’s t imely filed Answer put Whit ehea d on notice that Bow en denie d that he wa s the of fi c e r who arr e ste d a

nd inj ur e d Wh ite he a d, and

the re c ord re fl e c ts n o im pe dim e nt whatso e ve r t o W h i t eh ea d ’s undertaking the nece ssary discovery

prior to the filingof the summary judgme nt mot ion . H e fa ile d to do so at hi s o wn pe ri l. We find no err or in the district court’ s enteringsummary judgme nt in favor of

Bow en. B. Whi tehead’s Rule 59(e ) Mot ion Whit ehea d contends that the district c ourt err ed in c oncludingthat he had f ailed to cr eate a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t. Accor ding to Whitehead, both his unsworn a lleg ations in the complaint — which he say s wer e “dire ct evidenc e” that the district court wa s bound to acc ept as true for pur poses of t h e s ummary

judgme nt motion — and his post -judg ment aff idavit detailing how Offic er B owen had detained, seized, and ar rested him we re suf

ficient to cr eate that fac tual issue, and require d that the district court va cate the orde r g rantingsummary judgme nt. We disagr ee. A m oti on un de r R ule 59 (e ) doe s not simp ly pr ov ide an opp or tun ity to r e argue a

c a se , a nd it

mus t b e s u

p p o rt e d e i th e r b y a s h o w i n g th at th e d i s tr i c t c o urt m a d e an e r r o r o f l aw o r by

ne wl y discovere d evidenc e. Sault Ste M arie Tribe of Chi

ppewa Indians v. Engler , 1 46 F .3 d 3 67 , 3 74 (6 th Cir . 1 99 8) ; se e als o Roge r Mi lle r M us ic, I nc . v . S on y /A TV P ub lis hing, LLC , 477 F .3 d 383 , 3 95 (6 th Cir . 2 00 7) (“ a

mot ion un de r R ule 59 (e ) m

us t e ith e r c le arl y

e sta bli sha manif e st e rr or of law o r m us t prese nt newly

discovere d evidenc e” ). Even if Whi tehea d’s af fidavit wer e suff

icient to cre ate a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t, i t me re ly

se t f or th h is ow n accou nt of

the e ve nts surr ound inghis

ar r e s t , an d w a s , at b e s t , n e w l y submitted

e v i d e n c e , n o tn e w l y discove red ev id e nce. And Whit ehea d’s insistence that his unsworn a lleg ations in the complaint wer e “dire ct evidenc e” that the district court10

was bound to ac cept a s true for purposes of the summary judgme nt motion i s entirely without lega l support. There fo re , we fi n d no err or in the district court’ s ref using to va cate its earlier g rant of

summa ry jud g me nt. C. Le av e to Am e nd Whit ehea d also claims that if B owen wa s not the office r who a rre sted and injured him, then Whit ehea d was entitl ed to amend his complaint to name the corr ect of fice r. Howe ver, Whitehea d

never attempted to amend his c omplaint in the district court, and we decline to c onsider the issue for the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.