Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Defense, Committee on

Appropriations, House of

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2001 DEFENSE

ACQUISITIONS

Higher Level DOD

Review of Antiarmor

Mission and Munitions

Is Needed

GAO-01-607
Page 1 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

June 8, 2001

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) issued antiarmor munitions master

plans beginning in 1985 and updated the plans annually until 1990. These

antiarmor plans focused on the Cold War armored threat and on the

weapons that would be needed to prevail in a Central European scenario.

In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill,1

 the

House Committee on Appropriations expressed concern that the military

services were continuing to develop and procure an increasing number of

tank-killing weapons at a time when potential adversaries have smaller

numbers of armored forces. We previously reported that the number of

potential enemy armored targets under current warfighting scenarios is

less than 20 percent of the number considered in 1990.2

 Since 1990, the

military services have maintained and improved their inventories of about

40 different types of antiarmor weapons. The military services currently

have 13 new antiarmor weapons acquisitions programs with a total cost of

about $14 billion.

The Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to develop an Antiarmor

Munitions Master Plan to identify the projected armor threat and the

projected quantity of all antiarmor weapons, with the purpose of

identifying and eliminating excess antiarmor capability. In response, DOD

prepared a new master plan and issued it in August 1999. In 2000, we

reviewed the plan and reported3

 that it did not identify any excess

antiarmor weapons or provide the data and analysis needed to identify

such excesses. It also did not provide the data and analysis necessary to

support the services’ plans to acquire new antiarmor weapons.

 1

 House of Representatives, Report 105-591, June 22, 1998.

2 Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapons Acquisitions,

(GAO/NSIAD-99-105, July 22, 1999).

3 Defense Acquisitions: Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan Does Not Identify Potential

Excesses or Support Planned Procurements (GAO/NSIAD-00-67, May 5, 2000).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

Subsequently, the October 1999 Conference Report accompanying the

Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill4

 noted shortfalls in the plan

and directed the Secretary of Defense to provide another antiarmor master

plan. The conference report specified that the plan (1) evaluate the joint

effectiveness of the existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the threat

depicted in the defense planning guidance, (2) describe how planned

antiarmor weapons could meet shortfalls in current capability in the

defense planning guidance scenarios, and (3) prioritize DOD’s antiarmor

weapons acquisition programs based on this analysis. In July 2000, DOD

submitted its revised antiarmor munitions master plan. At your request, we

have reviewed the revised plan to determine if (1) it provides the data and

analysis specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations

conference report, and (2) provides data and analysis needed to support

the services’ current antiarmor acquisition plans.

DOD’s July 2000 Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data

and analysis specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations

conference report. Specifically, the plan did not include a joint

effectiveness analysis, describe how planned antiarmor weapons could

meet shortfalls in current capabilities, or provide a prioritization of

antiarmor weapon needs and requirements. According to the Office of the

Secretary of Defense official in charge of preparing the antiarmor master

plan, his Office did not require the services to jointly analyze their

antiarmor munitions capabilities because of past difficulties obtaining

service-wide agreement on results from joint analyses. Without a joint

effectiveness analysis, DOD could not evaluate shortfalls in current

capabilities or prioritize antiarmor weapons acquisition programs on a

DOD-wide basis.

The plan provided limited data and analysis to support the services’

current antiarmor acquisition plans. Instead of a joint effectiveness

analysis, the plan relied on two individual service analyses that did not

consider the weapons capabilities of the other services. The master plan

included the results of separate Army and Air Force weapons effectiveness

analyses based on each service’s modeling of the current two regional war

scenario. The analyses showed that each service achieved favorable

warfighting outcomes with or without their planned new antiarmor

weapons. With the new weapons, the analysis showed that the favorable

outcomes were achieved slightly sooner in some cases and/or with a few

 4

 House of Representatives, Conference Report 106-371, October 8, 1999.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

percent less casualties in others. These analyses provided useful data on

each service’s collective antiarmor capabilities but did not assess the

relative warfighting impact of individual new systems in a joint service

warfighting environment. Knowledge of the relative warfighting

contributions of each new system is critical to determining and comparing

cost effectiveness and establishing priorities among the new weapons

programs. Such an analysis is needed to assure that the mix and quantities

of new weapons being acquired provide the greatest increase in capability

for the dollars spent.

In January 2001, following the August 2000 submission of the revised

antiarmor master plan, DOD notified us that, in anticipation of the

Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army has initiated a number of studies

and analyses to more clearly define an economically sound and

operationally effective mix of munitions. While we welcome the Army’s

studies and analyses of its munitions mix, there continues to be a need for

a joint service assessment of current and future munitions requirements

and priorities. Accordingly, we are recommending that the Secretary of

Defense include in the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review an

examination of joint service antiarmor munitions capabilities,

requirements, and priorities.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed and stated that they

will examine requirements, plans, and priorities for antiarmor weapons as

part of the Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD’s comments are reprinted in

Appendix I.

The armored threat has declined significantly since the end of the Cold

War. Nevertheless, the overall size of the U.S. inventory of antiarmor

munitions has remained fairly constant since 1990, while U.S. weapons

have become more sophisticated, lethal and effective. Currently, DOD has

a large inventory of about 40 different types of antiarmor weapons capable

of destroying tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery. These

weapons include various types of ground- and air-fired guided missiles,

tank rounds, rockets and mines. DOD is currently funding the acquisition

of 13 new antiarmor weapon systems, at a projected cost to completion of

almost $14 billion. Table 1 below shows the funding levels for the planned

procurements from fiscal year 2001 to completion.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

Table 1: Procurement Cost of Planned Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions5

Millions of then-year dollars

Weapon Service Total Procurement Cost

Procurement Cost Fiscal

Year 2001 to Completion

BAT/Army Tactical Missile System Army $4,171 $3,792

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Army 3,369 3,369

Joint Stand-off Weapon (BLU-108) Navy/Air Force 1,571 1,559

Javelin Army/Marine Corps 3,012 1,129

Sense and Destroy Armor Army 295 15

Wide Area Munition Army 1,733 1,669

Longbow Hellfire Army 2107 799

Sensor Fuzed Weapon Air Force 709 506

Predator Marine Corps 592 592

Tank Round M829A2/E3 Army 1,613 144

Remote Area Denial Munition Army 151 143

25-mm Gun Round, Army M919 Army 242 24

Multipurpose Individual Munition Army 141 141

Total $19,706 $13,882

The Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations conference report specified

that DOD’s antiarmor master plan (1) evaluate the joint effectiveness of

the existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the threat depicted in the

defense planning guidance, (2) describe how planned antiarmor weapons

could meet shortfalls in current capability in the defense planning

guidance scenarios, and (3) prioritize DOD’s antiarmor weapons

acquisition programs based on this analysis. DOD’s July 2000 antiarmor

master plan does not provide the data and analysis specified in the

conference report.

Instead of evaluating the joint effectiveness of existing antiarmor

weapons, the plan presented a separate effectiveness analysis of Army and

Air Force antiarmor weapons. The analyses showed the separate modeling

results of each services’ antiarmor weapons in the current two regional

war-planning scenario. The plan noted that Navy and the Marine Corps

weapons were not included because the Army and Air Force represent

tactical air and ground forces that account for 87 percent of planned

antiarmor expenditures.

 5

 The Multiple Launch Rocket System, the 25-mm Gun Round and the Multipurpose

Individual Munition are used against light armor, but not heavy armor.

The Master Plan Does

Not Provide Data and

Analyses Specified by

Congress
Page 5 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

The Office of the Secretary of Defense did not require the individual

services or anyone else to provide a joint weapons effectiveness analysis.

According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense official in charge of the

antiarmor master plan, his office did not require such an analysis because

of the past difficulties in getting the services to accept the results of a joint

analysis. He cited the difficulties his office has had in achieving DOD-wide

consensus in other studies, such as the 1997 Deep Attack Weapons Mix

Study. 6

The conferees also requested that the plan describe how planned

antiarmor weapons are expected to fill shortfalls in current capabilities in

the two defense planning scenarios. The plan did not identify any specific

capability shortfalls or describe how individual new weapons would

impact current capabilities. The plan compared the capabilities with and

without the planned new antiarmor munitions. Because the services were

not directed to do a joint analysis, each service focused on the

effectiveness of their own weapons. These separate analyses showed that

each service clearly achieved their objectives with or without their

planned antiarmor procurements, but with the new weapons added, there

was some reduction in casualties and time required to achieve the

objectives. These reductions reflected the collective impacts of the

planned antiarmor weapons procurements. The impacts of individual new

weapons were not identified.

Finally, the conferees requested that the plan prioritize the Department’s

antiarmor weapons acquisition programs. The purpose of such a

prioritization would be to identify and eliminate excess capabilities. The

plan does not provide a joint service prioritization or individual service

prioritization of antiarmor weapons. Instead, the plan describes each type

munition and its capabilities. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

official in charge of the plan told us that the individual services would not

agree on a joint prioritization. Additionally, he stated that release of such

analysis, unless all weapon systems are supported, is unlikely since the

services would have to agree on the final report. Without the joint

effectiveness analysis, the Department of Defense cannot provide either a

description of how the planned antiarmor weapons could fill shortfalls

across service lines or a prioritization of the antiarmor munitions.

 6

 The results of the study were issued in two parts. Part 1 is the Weapons Mix Analysis and

Part 2 is the B-2 Force Tradeoff Analysis.
Page 6 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

The master plan does not provide data and analysis needed to support the

services’ acquisition plans for individual antiarmor weapons. However, the

plan does provide some insight into the collective value of planned

antiarmor procurements. At the direction of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, the Army and the Air Force compared the effectiveness of their

forces with and without the planned procurements. Our analysis of the

results show that for the projected $14 billion cost of these new

procurements, some improvements were realized in an already favorable

situation. However, the effectiveness analysis leaves many questions

unanswered, particularly about the significance of the improvements

realized and whether this amount of improvement warrants the

investment.

The Army’s analysis compared the outcomes of the two regional conflicts

with and without the planned antiarmor procurements. The Army analysts

chose three measures to evaluate the effectiveness of these planned

procurements: attrition of U.S. forces, attrition of enemy forces, and days

of combat to achieve campaign success. The two regional conflict

scenarios were modeled against a 2007 threat and were evaluated both

with and without the planned new antiarmor procurements. In the first

regional scenario, the attrition rate of U.S. forces decreased slightly with

the addition of the planned antiarmor procurements. Enemy kills by U.S.

forces were increased and the days of conflict were somewhat shorter

with the addition of these weapons. In the second regional scenario, the

attrition of U.S. forces also decreased with the addition of the planned

procurements. Enemy kills by U.S. forces increased slightly with these

planned antiarmor procurements, but the days of conflict remained the

same. The specific numbers associated with attrition, enemy kills and days

of combat are classified.

The Army official in charge of the analysis acknowledged that the planned

procurements provide a modest increase in mission effectiveness, but he

considered the funding requirements—about $11 billion for 10 programs—

only moderate as well. He noted that larger expenditures would provide

greater improvements.

Like the Army analysis, the Air Force analysis shows that the planned

antiarmor procurements provide some improvements in the expected

battle outcomes. Similarly, the analysis shows that the Air Force is capable

of killing its allocated armored targets with or without the planned

antiarmor procurements. The Air Force also chose three measures to

evaluate the effectiveness of these procurements: attrition of U.S. aircraft,

number of aircraft sorties, and days to complete the Air Force campaign.

The Master Plan

provides Only Limited

Insight into the

Capabilities Provided

by the New Antiarmor

Munitions
Page 7 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

The two regional conflict scenarios were modeled against a 2007 threat

and were evaluated both with and without the planned procurements. Our

analysis of the Air Force data shows that the improved weapons slightly

decreased attrition of U.S. aircraft and the number of aircraft sorties

required to defeat the enemy. Additionally, the improved weapons slightly

decreased the days of combat. The specific numbers associated with

aircraft attrition, aircraft sorties, and days of combat are classified.

Air Force officials told us that the planned antiarmor procurements do not

result in additional enemy losses, since the target set is neutralized with or

without these weapons. They stated that the real significance of these

improved weapons is that they help the Air Force kill its allocated target

set more quickly and thus gain ground for allied forces. We were unable to

determine how much ground would be gained because the Air Force did

not model the movement of U.S. troops. Instead, the Air Force analysis

showed the effects on use and/or attrition of aircraft and weapons as well

as on the length of the campaign.

Both the Army and Air Force analyses provided useful data on each

service’s collective antiarmor capabilities but did not assess the relative

warfighting impact of individual new systems in a joint service warfighting

environment. Knowledge of the relative warfighting contributions of each

new system is critical to determining and comparing cost effectiveness

and establishing priorities among the new weapons programs. Such an

analysis is needed to assure that the mix and quantities of new weapons

being acquired provide the greatest increase in capability for the dollars

spent.

In January 2001, following the August 2000 submission of the revised

antiarmor master plan, DOD notified us that the Army has initiated, in

anticipation of the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review,7

 a number of

studies and analyses to more clearly define an economically sound and

operationally effective mix of munitions. Further, the Vice Chief of the

Army has directed a munitions assessment be performed to determine if

the Army has the appropriate munitions mix capable of meeting legacy

and objective force8

 operational requirements. While we welcome the

 7

 The Quadrennial Defense Review is expected to be a comprehensive and fundamental

examination of the national defense strategy, including force structure and modernization

plans.

8

 The legacy force is the force as it exists today and the objective force is the force

designed to meet future operational needs.
Page 8 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

Army’s assessments of its munitions mix, there continues to be a need for

a joint service assessment of current and future munitions requirements

and priorities.

The July 2000 antiarmor master plan does not provide the data and

analysis specified in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations

conference report. DOD’s 1999 antiarmor master plan also did not provide

the data and analysis required by the report of the House Committee on

Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill. The

Office of the Secretary of Defense continues to experience difficulties in

providing joint service weapons effectiveness analyses and did not require

the services to jointly analyze their antiarmor munitions. However, such

analyses are critical to determining cost effectiveness and establishing

priorities among new antiarmor weapons programs.

Given the difficulties the Office of the Secretary of Defense has had in

providing antiarmor weapons data and analyses as directed by

congressional reports, we recommend the Secretary include, in his

forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, an independent cross-service

examination of antiarmor weapons requirements, plans, and priorities.

In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD agreed and stated that the

Department will examine its requirements, plans, and priorities for

antiarmor weapons as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review

To determine if DOD’s July 2000 Antiarmor Master Plan provided the

analysis directed by the Committee, we evaluated the information in the

plan and discussed the plan with representatives from the Office of the

Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology, Washington,

D.C.; the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.;

and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. We discussed

the separate service analyses contained in the report with representatives

from the Center for Army Analysis, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia and the Air Force

Studies and Analysis Agency.

To determine whether the Master Plan provided the necessary data and

analysis to support the planned antiarmor procurements, we reviewed and

analyzed the data from the master plan as well as the Army and the Air

Force analyses to determine the degree of improvement provided by the

planned procurements. We reviewed the fiscal year 2001 budget

submission; the Commanders-in-Chief’s target allocations, past antiarmor

master plans and our prior reports. We reviewed available information on

the upcoming Quadrennial defense Review.

Conclusion

Recommendation for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

Scope and

Methodology
Page 9 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

We conducted our review from September 2000 to April 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Thomas White, Secretary of the

Army; the Honorable James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force; and to

interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available

to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 or Bill Graveline on (256) 650-1400, if

you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major

contributors to this report were Beverly Breen and Tana Davis.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Wiggins,

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 10 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

(707544) Page 11 GAO-01-607 Defense Acquisitions

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