2022 UT App 76

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LEE STAFFORD,

Appellant,

v.

SANDY PAYDIRT LLC,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20210443-CA

Filed June 24, 2022

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Kara Pettit

No. 180903143

Alan Tucker, Parker A. Allred, and Colby B. Vogt, 

Attorneys for Appellant

Cory D. Memmott, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 When Lee Stafford encountered a puddle on a hotel 

elevator’s tile floor, he slipped, caught himself, and later sought

compensation for a back injury that he believed resulted from the 

strain. However, after determining that the undisputed facts of 

the case revealed that the hotel (Hilton)1 had not breached any

duty to Stafford under Utah premises liability law, the district 

court granted summary judgment in favor of Hilton. Stafford now 

appeals, and we affirm.

1. Sandy Paydirt LLC, the appellee in this case, is a business entity 

operating a Hilton Garden Inn.
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BACKGROUND2

¶2 As Stafford stepped into the elevator on Hilton’s fifth floor,

his foot slipped out from under him. Stafford regained his 

balance, a feat that kept him from actually falling to the ground. 

Afterward, in the middle of the elevator’s tile floor, he discovered 

a puddle of water that seemed to smell of chlorine and was only 

a “[c]ouple of inches across.” After Stafford rode the elevator 

down to the lobby, he found a trail of water leading toward 

Hilton’s pool—a pool separated from the elevator by about one

hundred feet of carpeted hallway. Stafford reported the incident 

to Hilton’s staff and his stay at Hilton soon ended. But the lower 

back pain resulting from the incident did not. Seeking relief from 

the pain, Stafford incurred substantial medical expenses and 

sought recovery from Hilton.

¶3 Discovery reflected that the tile installed by Hilton in the 

elevator was “nonslip” and that Hilton had no knowledge of any 

other person ever slipping on the hotel’s tile generally, and 

specifically the tile in the elevator. Hilton’s representative testified 

in a deposition about mats found at the hotel entryways and at 

the pool entry. That testimony included statements that the mat

near the pool entry “would help with people walking in and out 

if they are wet, I guess,” but that the mat had not been placed there

for “[e]ssentially, slipping purposes.” Rather, the mats’ “specific 

purpose” was unknown other than that they were a corporate 

“require[ment]” and a “welcome touch point . . . as people are 

walking in.”

¶4 Hilton filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that 

Stafford had failed to present evidence that Hilton “had either 

2. “In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, we 

view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and recite the 

facts accordingly.” NetDictation LLC v. Rice, 2019 UT App 198, n.1, 

455 P.3d 625 (cleaned up).
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20210443-CA 3 2022 UT App 76

actual or constructive notice” of a “condition of unsafe nature and 

a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition prior to the 

accident.” Specifically, Hilton asserted that Stafford had not 

presented evidence that Hilton had any notice of the water on the 

floor before Stafford slipped and that he therefore could not 

demonstrate that the hazard had existed long enough to establish 

that Hilton had a duty to remedy it. In response, Stafford 

conceded that Hilton did not have actual or constructive notice of 

the water he slipped on. Instead, Stafford argued that “the 

dangerous condition that existed in the elevator was the 

foreseeable result of decisions that [Hilton] made and for which 

[it was] responsible.” In other words, Stafford argued that the 

hazard was not a temporary condition that Hilton was obligated 

to remedy upon notice, but rather, that it was an inherently 

dangerous and foreseeable permanent condition that required no 

proof of notice.

¶5 Based on Stafford’s concession, the district court granted 

summary judgment on the temporary condition theory. As to

Stafford’s claim based on the presence of a “permanent unsafe 

condition,” the court granted summary judgment because 

Stafford failed to present evidence that Hilton could reasonably 

foresee that people would come from the pool, cause the tiles to 

become slippery when wet, and create a dangerous condition.

¶6 Stafford now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 “Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,” and “the appellate 

court reviews a summary judgment for correctness, giving no 

deference to the trial court’s decision.” Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, 

¶ 15, 250 P.3d 56 (cleaned up).
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ANALYSIS

¶8 The key dispute here is whether Hilton, by setting up its 

hotel with the pool and the elevator in close proximity and by not 

putting a mat in the elevator, “chose a mode of operation that 

foreseeably could result in an inherently dangerous condition.” 

See Jex v. JRA, Inc. (Jex II), 2008 UT 67, ¶ 11, 196 P.3d 576. “In Utah, 

a business . . . is not required to ensure that . . . business invitees 

will not slip and fall. Instead, a business . . . is charged with the 

duty to use reasonable care to maintain the floor of [its] 

establishment in a reasonably safe condition for [its] patrons.” Jex 

v. JRA, Inc. (Jex I), 2007 UT App 249, ¶ 9, 166 P.3d 655 (cleaned up), 

aff’d, 2008 UT 67. And “the construction and maintenance of a 

slippery-when-wet floor surface does not of itself constitute 

negligence in premises liability cases.” Jex II, 2008 UT 67, ¶ 14 

(cleaned up). Accordingly, to prevail on a permanent unsafe 

condition theory, Stafford needed to demonstrate more than the 

mere existence of potentially slippery flooring, and this is 

something he has not done.

¶9 Stafford asserts that the district court failed to give 

credence to the portion of the Hilton representative’s testimony 

that the mats “would help with people walking in and out if they 

are wet, I guess.” He argues that the court should have viewed 

this testimony “in the light most favorable to [him,] the nonmoving party,” as evidence that Hilton knew that water on the tile 

would cause a slipping hazard. If the court had viewed the 

testimony this way, Stafford asserts that it would constitute

“evidence to show that Hilton had notice that the tile floors in its 

elevators would present a foreseeable slipping hazard when 

water from its swimming pool was dripped on it.”

¶10 But even viewing this fact as argued by Stafford—that the 

mats were meant to help wet guests walking in and out of the 

hotel entrances and pool entry—does not lead us to the conclusion 

Stafford advances, i.e., that Hilton caused a permanent unsafe 
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condition by its method of operation. Hilton is therefore still 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a).

¶11 “To recover under a permanent unsafe condition theory, a 

plaintiff must show that an owner chose a mode of operation that 

foreseeably could result in an inherently dangerous condition.” 

Jex II, 2008 UT 67, ¶ 11. This includes “cases where the 

storeowner’s method of operation creates a situation where the 

reasonably foreseeable acts of third parties will create a dangerous 

condition.” Price v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 2011 UT App 

66, ¶ 9, 252 P.3d 365. “In such circumstances,” as opposed to a 

situation in which a plaintiff is alleging a temporary unsafe 

condition, “where the defendant either created the condition, or 

is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and 

no further proof of notice is necessary.” Schnuphase v. Storehouse 

Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (cleaned up). Rather, 

“foreseeability and inherent danger are key elements of a 

negligence action under [a permanent unsafe condition] theory of 

liability.” Id. at 479.

¶12 Here Stafford has presented insufficient evidence to 

support either of those elements.

¶13 Aside from Stafford’s contentions about the purpose of the 

mats Hilton used at its entrances and pool entry (which, for 

purposes of our analysis, we assume were meant to help wet 

guests), the remaining facts are undisputed. These facts include

that the tile inside the elevator was “nonslip,” that the entryway 

to the pool (from which the water was believed to have come) was 

separated from the elevator by around one hundred feet of

carpeted hallway, and that, to Hilton’s knowledge, no person had 

ever slipped on the tile in the elevator before. These facts do not 

demonstrate either the foreseeability of Stafford’s slip or any 

inherent danger in installing nonslip tile in the elevator without a 

mat. And assuming that Hilton did in fact use mats to assist wet 

guests when entering the hotel or leaving the pool area does not 

tip the scales in Stafford’s favor.
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¶14 Jex II, 2008 UT 67, 196 P.3d 576, controls here. In that case, 

a plaintiff entered a deli on a snowy morning, and after stepping 

off the floor mats that led from the door to the cash register, she 

slipped and sustained injuries. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. The plaintiff sought 

recovery under a “permanent unsafe condition theory” because 

the deli “chose to employ a floor surfacing that was inherently 

dangerous when wet.” Id. ¶¶ 11–12 (cleaned up). But the plaintiff 

otherwise “offered no evidence that [the deli] did anything more 

than install a standard wood floor,” such as evidence that the deli 

“installed an unusually slippery wood floor or that it installed its 

wood floor negligently.” Id. ¶ 14. Because “the construction and 

maintenance of a slippery-when-wet floor surface does not of 

itself constitute negligence in premises liability cases,” the lack of 

additional evidence proved fatal to that plaintiff’s claim, and the 

same is true in this case. Id. (cleaned up). Here, like the plaintiff in 

Jex II, Stafford has offered no evidence to demonstrate negligence. 

See id. ¶¶ 14–15. The fact that Hilton installed tile in its elevator, 

operated a pool, and placed mats at its entryways and the entry 

to the pool simply “does not constitute a mode of operation that 

foreseeably could result in an inherently dangerous condition.” 

See id. ¶ 15. Further, the additional fact of Hilton’s installation of 

nonslip tile undercuts Stafford’s argument even more than the 

existence of a “standard” wood floor in Jex II. Accordingly, 

Stafford’s claim falters on this precedent alone.

¶15 But our relevant caselaw does not end there. In Schnuphase 

v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), while visiting the 

deli section of a grocery store, a plaintiff incurred injury when she 

fell after slipping on a scoop of ice cream dropped by another 

customer. Id. at 477. That plaintiff argued that “it was foreseeable 

that the ice cream would occasionally fall to the floor” and that 

the store thus “had a duty to take precautions against the 

foreseeable danger that someone would slip and fall,” including 

things such as “installation of nonskid mats or any other tractionenhancing coverings, placement of warning signs indicating the 

possibility of encountering spilled ice cream, appointment of a 
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spill monitor in the deli section, or installation of a lower counter 

to facilitate employee monitoring of the area.” Id. at 479. The Utah 

Supreme Court disagreed, stating that although a business 

“owner is charged with the duty to use reasonable care in 

maintaining the floors of his or her establishment[,] . . . if the 

[business] owner’s duty required further safety measures” to 

avoid breaching that duty, it is unclear “how far the defendant 

would have to go in protecting the customers, both in method and 

in area.” Id. (cleaned up). The court continued, “There does not 

appear to be any reasonable and practical answer to that inquiry.” 

Id. (cleaned up).

¶16 Like the deli customer who spilled ice cream in Schnuphase, 

an unknown third party is alleged to have dripped water onto the 

floor of Hilton’s elevator. And Hilton’s measures convince us that 

“reasonable minds could not differ on the question of whether 

[Hilton] took reasonable precautions to protect its customers” and 

avoid breaching any duty owed to Stafford. See id. Hilton placed 

the mats where guests were likely to be wet and outside the pool,

which led to a carpeted hallway nearly one hundred feet long 

before transitioning to tile. Under controlling precedent, Hilton is 

not required to cover the entirety of its tile flooring with mats or

use carpet in place of tile. The choice to assist wet guests by 

placing mats only in areas where they were likely to be wet does 

not demonstrate a method of operation that causes foreseeability 

of injury or an inherent danger; to the contrary, it cuts against that 

conclusion by reducing the likelihood that water would be spread 

on the tile. And as to the choice of the tile itself, Stafford does not 

dispute that the tile is nonslip.

¶17 In short, “it is regrettable that [Stafford] suffered injuries. 

However, not every accident that occurs gives rise to a cause of 

action upon which the party injured may recover damages from 

someone. Thousands of accidents occur every day for which no 

one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame, not even 

the ones who are injured.” See id. at 479–80 (cleaned up).
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20210443-CA 8 2022 UT App 76

CONCLUSION

¶18 Under the undisputed facts of this case, Stafford’s claim 

fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court did not err 

in granting summary judgment.