A Social Science Plan

for

Employee Safety

in the

National Park Service

NATIONAL

PARK

SERVICE

DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR
A Social Science Plan

for

Employee Safety

in the

National Park Service

Gary E. Machlis

National Park Service

Seth P. Tuler

Clark University

June 1998
Table of Contents

I. Introduction............................................................................................... 1

Challenges to NPS Employee Safety ....................................................... 2

Overview of the Report ............................................................................. 5

The Social Sciences Defined and Described............................................ 6

II. Policy Rationale for NPS Social Science Research on

Employee Safety....................................................................................... 9

The Federal Mandate for Employee Safety Research ............................ 9

The Department of the Interior Mandate for Employee

Safety Research ......................................................................................... 12

The NPS Mandate for Social Science Research .................................... 14

Summary ...................................................................................................20

III. Prior Social Science Research ............................................................ 21

How Accidents Happen ........................................................................... 21

Individual Characteristics ........................................................................ 27

Group Characteristics .............................................................................. 37

Organizational Characteristics ................................................................39

Employee Safety in the National Park Service ......................................44

Current Research Needs on Employee Safety....................................... 51

IV. Views and Opinions from the Field.................................................. 53

Group Workshop ......................................................................................53

Workshop Results .....................................................................................54

Telephone Interviews ...............................................................................55

Telephone Interview Results ...................................................................56

Summary ................................................................................................... 61

V. Research Agenda ...................................................................................63

Baseline Inventory Projects .....................................................................64

Strategic Science Projects ......................................................................... 67

On-going Technical Assistance................................................................69

VI. Action Plan .............................................................................................. 71

Stage 1: Organizing for Science ............................................................. 73

Stage 2: Baseline Inventory .................................................................... 74

Stage 3: Strategic Science and Technical Assistance ............................ 74

Stage 4: Program Review ........................................................................ 74

Appendices ..................................................................................................... 77

I: References Cited .................................................................................. 79

II: Questions Identified During Nominal Group Process ...................95

III: Individuals Interviewed ...................................................................99
I

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide a plan for social science

research on employee safety in the National Park Service (NPS).

Employee safety is essential to the mission of the NPS; a primary

responsibility of all organizations is to protect its employees from

harm. NPS employees are injured and sometimes killed in a

variety of ways (Baylosis 1997, Halainen 1997, Rozas 1997).

Accidents and incidents have occurred to NPS park managers,

maintenance workers, motor vehicle operators, laborers, interpreters, scientists, and law enforcement officers (Rozas 1997).

Hence, improving employee safety is a major responsibility of

the NPS.

The plan was commissioned by the Risk Management Division

of the NPS. It was prepared by Dr. Gary Machlis, NPS Visiting

Chief Social Scientist, and Dr. Seth Tuler. The plan is based on:

a) an analysis of federal, department and agency policies and

regulations concerning employee safety, b) a detailed review of

the social science literature relevant to employee safety, and c) a

workshop and interviews with NPS officials and employees. The

draft plan was reviewed by NPS safety managers and peer

reviewed by external social scientists. The plan was produced by
2

the NPS Social Science Program, as part of its technical assistance activities to the NPS.

Since the mid-1970s, studies of high-risk activities and employee

safety have been performed by psychologists, geographers,

engineers, and sociologists. Risks from natural disasters, occupational accidents, household accidents, and large-system failures

have been examined. Research has been conducted on highprofile events such as the Mt. St. Helens eruption, forest fires,

and the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, and Challenger accidents. Research has also been conducted on more

common activities, such as vehicle operation, logging, equipment

inspection and maintenance, and handling of hazardous materials.

Results from these studies have pointed to the importance of

social factors—the social, psychological, cultural, managerial, and

organizational variables that influence employee safety. Knowledge of social factors has proven useful in improving safety and

reliability in a variety of occupational settings. Understanding

social factors is important to the mitigation and prevention of

accidents to NPS employees.

This understanding requires a sound scientific basis. Hence,

social science is a necessary and important component of NPS

efforts to improve employee safety. A plan for NPS employee

safety research can identify and prioritize research needs, increase the usefulness of research results, improve the delivery of

information, and reduce costs. The objectives of this plan are to:

• identify the needs for social science research related to NPS

employee safety,

• propose a research agenda and specific research projects, and

• propose an action plan, schedule, and budget for implementing the research.

Challenges to NPS Employee Safety

The NPS faces important challenges to ensuring employee

safety, including:
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 3

• a higher accident rate than other federal agencies with similar

responsibilities,

• increasingly complex work tasks that emerge from the NPS

mission,

• evolving Department of Labor and Department of the Interior

(DOI) regulations,

• significant organizational change within the NPS, and

• limited budgets, resources, and staff at all levels of the NPS.

NPS employee accident rates are higher than those in other

federal bureaus within the DOI and in the US Forest Service

(Baylosis 1997, Rozas 1997). According to the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs (OWCP) Lost Time Data Reports,

injuries per 100 employees in the NPS were approximately

double the DOI-wide rate in 1992-1996; NPS employees had 6-7

accidents per 100 employees annually during these years (Rozas

1997). In some regions and in some park units, the accident rates

were higher. For example, the Western Region and the National

Capital Region had higher accident rates than other regions;

Yosemite NP and Rock Creek Park had higher rates than other

units within their regions (Rozas 1997).

The activities during which accidents occur are varied (Rozas

1997, Halainen 1997). According to DI-134 reports (available

only through 1994) and NPS Morning Reports, accidents occur

in the NPS for many of the same reasons they occur in all

workplaces (Rozas 1997, Halainen 1997). NPS accidents have

occurred during equipment maintenance and repair, vehicle

operation, law enforcement, landscaping, animal handling,

materials handling, and trail maintenance activities. Accidents

have occurred both on and off the job.

In addition, NPS accidents occur in activities that result from the

unique combination of organizational culture, work environment, and job requirements of NPS employees. These include

(but are not limited to) search and rescue, visitor services, and

firefighting. Unlike many employees of other bureaus and

agencies, NPS employees have more interactions with the
4

public, and must balance preservation of natural resources with

visitor enjoyment (Singer 1997). Such interactions can create

unique work requirements.

The types of accidents occurring to NPS employees are varied,

based on DI-134 data, Lost Time Data, and NPS Morning

Reports (Rozas 1997, Halainen 1997). Employees have suffered

cuts and lacerations, sprains and fractures, and discomfort (such

as backaches and fatigue). Serious permanent injuries and deaths

have also occurred. Full-time, seasonal, and contractor employees have been involved in accidents. Safety problems are not

isolated within divisions, regions, or units; accidents are occurring to many types of employees and throughout the NPS.

In response, some national, regional, and park managers have

become involved in a variety of efforts to understand and address the causes of employee accidents, injuries, and deaths

(Peterson 1997, Seely 1997, Siler 1997). These activities are partly

a response to federal policies toward employee safety. Federal

policy is evolving, as the Department of Labor and the Environmental Protection Agency promulgate new regulations that

impact employee safety. Examples include new regulations for

the handling and disposal of hazardous materials (Singer 1997,

Hurt 1997), and an extensive interagency effort to address risk

and safety in wildland firefighting (Broyles 1997).

In addition, organizational change within the NPS affects employee safety. The Risk Management Division is revising the

primary NPS policy document, NPS-50, to emphasize safety

issues (Seely 1997). Reorganization has decentralized many

initiatives. Several parks have implemented innovative safety

programs (Belden 1997, Siler 1997, Singer 1997), including

Yellowstone NP, Olympic NP, Lake Mead NRA, Grand Canyon

NP, Carlsbad Caverns NM, Bandelier NM, and others. Initial

reports suggest that these new and modified programs may be

effective in reducing accident and injury rates (Siler 1997, Seely

1997, Singer 1997, Bornholdt 1997, Belden 1997). For example,

at Grand Canyon NP OSHA-reportable accidents have dropped

by over 30% (Singer 1997).
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 5

However, these are new programs, and their long-term effectiveness have yet to be proven. In most cases, parks are continuing

with “business as usual.” In response to a Director’s request for

information, only 10% of parks indicated they had adopted a

new approach to risk management (NPS 1996a). The effectiveness of both old and new approaches is inconsistent across the

National Park System. There are important differences in park

characteristics, the degree of management attention to safety,

and the kinds of employee activities at different units (Peterson

1997, Seely 1997, Siler 1997). The effectiveness of current safety

approaches is difficult to measure. And while some statistics on

employee safety and accident rates are available, there are

important gaps in information (Bornholdt 1997, Seely 1997, Siler

1997).

Overview of the Report

In this introductory chapter, the purpose and scope of the social

science plan are outlined. The social sciences included in the

plan are briefly defined and described. The objective of the plan

is to identify the needs for NPS social science research on

employee safety. The plan is applicable Service-wide. Its scope is

limited to research critical to providing a safe working environment for all NPS employees.

Chapter 2 provides a policy analysis of NPS requirements and

rationale for social science research on employee safety. Legislative statutes, policy documents, and management plans are

reviewed. They reveal a formal mandate and specific responsibilities for conducting social science in support of NPS employee

safety.

Chapter 3 provides a review of social science literature relevant

to employee safety in the NPS. The chapter begins with a broad

overview of research literature generally relevant to employee

safety. Then, the review focuses on literature related to safety of

activities similar to those performed by NPS employees, as well

as research conducted on NPS safety issues.

Chapter 4 describes the research priorities of NPS management,

supervisors, and other employees. Information was obtained
6

during a workshop with the Risk Management Council and

telephone interviews with other individuals involved in employee safety.

Chapter 5 provides a social science research agenda on NPS

employee safety. The agenda is organized around a series of

interdependent research projects. Each project has an estimated

budget and schedule.

Chapter 6 presents a comprehensive action plan to accomplish

the research needed to improve NPS employee safety. The

action plan is organized into several stages, so that critical work

can be accomplished as funds become available.

The report includes several appendices. These present employee

safety research questions identified through a nominal group

process, a list of individuals interviewed, and references.

The Social Sciences Defined and Described

The social sciences are those disciplines of science that study

humankind in relation to its cultural, social, and physical environment. They are one of the three main divisions of knowledge,

the others being the natural sciences and the humanities. There

is considerable overlap. History, for example, involves elements

of both humanities and social sciences; geography includes both

physical geography (a natural science) and human geography (a

social science).

While formal listings and opinions vary, several disciplines are

commonly considered as social sciences: anthropology (and

closely related ethnography), archeology, economics, geography

(human rather than physical), psychology, political science, and

sociology.

The NPS currently has programs in anthropological and historical archeological research, as well as an established Applied

Ethnography Program. Much work is conducted by these programs in support of NPS cultural resource management, and in

response to legal requirements such as the National Historic

Preservation Act (1966, amended 1992), and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990). The above
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 7

programs are essential to the NPS, however, their research

agenda and organization are beyond the scope of this plan.

Hence, this plan for social science related to NPS employee

safety focuses on the following social sciences: economics,

geography, psychology, political science, and sociology. While

these disciplines interact, each focuses upon certain units of

study and driving forces important to understanding human

behavior. Each has usefulness to the NPS; several are of direct

importance to ensuring employee safety in the NPS.

Economics (both macro- and micro-economics) treats markets,

industries, and economies as key units of study; the driving force

of change is economic value broadly defined. Economics can aid

NPS managers through studies of costs and benefits of different

employee safety management strategies and the resource requirements for promoting effective employee safety programs in

different types of NPS units.

Geography (specifically human geography) treats regions, landscapes, and other spatial units (governmental, organizational,

ecological, and so forth) as critical. The central concern is the

spatial distribution of people, resources, and culture. Geography

can aid NPS managers through studies of hazard management

strategies, spatial patterns of risk, and the role of environment in

accidents.

Psychology has the individual as its key unit, and decisionmaking, behavior, and communication are central driving forces.

Psychology can aid NPS managers through studies of factors that

contribute to the stress and fatigue of individuals and teams,

factors that encourage risk-taking behaviors by individuals, the

role of attitudes and incentives on employee decisions, and the

effectiveness of training procedures.

Political science focuses on institutions of the state (at many

levels); the central engine of change to many political scientists is

power and its use. Political science can benefit NPS managers

through studies of employee participation in worker safety

programs and management policies that support employee

safety.
8

Sociology treats social groups, organizations, and communities as

key units of study, with human behavior as its central concern.

Sociology can aid NPS managers through studies of demographic trends in the workforce, organizational culture, and

employee behavior and opinions regarding safety policies.

These social sciences are also important partners in interdisciplinary research. New disciplines such as environmental economics,

organizational psychology, industrial ecology, and human factors

research have emerged as important scientific fields relevant to

the NPS and employee safety.

Economics, geography, psychology, political science, and sociology form the core social sciences discussed in this plan.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 9

II

Policy Rationale for NPS

Social Science Research on

Employee Safety

The NPS has a strong mandate to conduct social science research on employee safety. The rationale can be found in general

and specific policies directing the management of the NPS, and

in national, regional, and individual park unit planning documents.

The Federal Mandate for Employee Safety Research

The national mandate for employee safety research emerges

from the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), which

states:

It shall be the responsibility of the head of each Federal

agency to establish and maintain an effective and comprehensive occupational safety and health program...The head

of each agency shall (after consultation with representatives

of the employees thereof):

1) provide safe and healthful places and conditions of

employment...
10

2) acquire, maintain, and require the use of safety equipment, personal protective equipment, and devices reasonably necessary to protect employees;

3) keep adequate records of all occupational accidents and

illnesses for proper evaluation and necessary corrective

action... (P.L. 91-596, Sec. 19(a)).

OSHA has been codified by the Department of Labor in 29

CFR part 1960. In accordance with OSHA, the head of each

federal agency is required to designate a Safety and Health

Official, establish Safety and Health Committees, implement

training programs, and keep records. For example, the Safety

and Health Official has a variety of responsibilities, including the

development of:

a) plans and procedures to evaluate occupational safety and

health program effectiveness at all operational levels (29

CFR 1960.6(b)(5)),

b) priorities with respect to the factors which cause occupational accidents, injuries, and illnesses in the agency’s

workplaces so that appropriate corrective actions can be

taken (29 CFR 1960.6(b)(6)).

Social science research on employee safety is clearly mandated

by OSHA, as it is a necessary tool for:

• developing effective employee safety programs (such as

studies of training effectiveness, employee motivation, and risk

communication),

• applying activity/job hazard analysis (such as studies of hazards and their control through behavioral modification),

• conducting rigorous incident and accident investigations (such

as studies of the behavioral causes of accidents), and

• evaluating the performance of safety programs and policies

(such as studies of lost-time accident frequencies, commitment

of management to a safety culture, and the reliability of

inspection and maintenance activities).

The requirements of OSHA as they pertain to the DOI are

addressed in the Safety and Health Handbook (DOI 1991). The
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 11

Handbook defines requirements, both generally and for specific

activities (such as aviation, motor vehicle, and watercraft operation), in the areas of:

• personnel responsibilities,

• standards, procedures, and guidelines,

• training,

• job hazard analysis,

• data collection,

• program and management evaluation, and

• accident investigations and reporting.

The requirements create a mandate for social science research

on employee safety. Social science is necessary, for example, to

conduct:

• hazard analysis (such as studies of behavioral safeguards to

prevent or mitigate hazards),

• training (such as training for team leadership skills),

• program and management evaluation,

• data collection, and

• accident investigations (such as studies to evaluate individual

and group behaviors in near-accident situations).

Furthermore, as part of its compliance with OSHA, a Supervisor’s

Annual Job Safety Interview Guide was developed by the Designated Agency Safety and Health Official. The interview guide is

a tool for supervisors to collect important information from their

employees about safety and health. It is intended to support

supervisor’s efforts to identify problems, take corrective actions,

and train and motivate employees to act safely. Specifically, the

policy implemented by the Guide is intended to:

• facilitate accountability and program improvement,

• increase organizational safety and health awareness,

• support the creation of a safety culture inclusive of all employees and activities, and
12

• assist in the recognition of quality safety and health performance.

Social science research is required to achieve such policy goals.

The Department of the Interior Mandate for Employee

Safety Research

Employee safety research is also mandated in Federal legislation

pertaining to the DOI. The mission of the Department is “to

protect and provide access to our Nation’s natural and cultural

heritage and honor our trust responsibilities to tribes.” In accomplishing this mission, the DOI has committed to:

• advancing scientific research and monitoring to improve our

understanding of the interaction of natural and human systems

and to reduce the impacts of hazards caused by natural processes and human actions,

• providing useful scientific information for sound resource

decision-making, and

• applying laws and regulations fairly and effectively, placing

priority on compliance and enforcement, prevention and

problem-solving.

By establishing these commitments, the DOI acknowledges the

importance of research on employee safety. For example:

• to reduce the impacts of hazards caused by human actions

requires attention to the role of management and employees

in accidents,

• to provide useful scientific information for resource decisionmaking requires an understanding of how employees can do

their jobs effectively and safely, and

• to apply laws and regulations effectively and promote compliance, enforcement, prevention, and problem-solving requires

input on employee behaviors, motivations, education, and

training, as well as commitment to safety by managers.

In some cases, policies are created by the DOI and apply to the

NPS. These policies provide further rationale for research on
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 13

NPS employee safety. In two occupational groups, Departmentwide activities have particular relevance to NPS employee safety

and social science research: aviation and firefighting.

The Office of Aircraft Services develops and implements aircraft

safety policies and procedures for all bureaus within the DOI.

For example, the policy of the Aviation Safety Program is:

Supervisors and managers at all levels are responsible for

the safety of aviation operations under their control. Within

this policy are the practical requirements to provide safe

working conditions, prevent injuries to employees, and

protect property from damage (Office of Aircraft Service,

352 DM 1.3A).

This policy provides rationale for social science research on

employee safety, as there is a long tradition of applying social

science to the improvement of safety in the field of aviation.

The DOI Aviation Safety Program includes requirements for

training, staffing, accident and mishap reporting and investigation. The requirements provide rationale for research that can

improve safety in helicopter and fixed-wing aviation for all

bureaus in the DOI. In addition, the Aviation Safety Program

provides technical assistance for special activities. Such activities

may also require additional training, and it is the responsibility

of the bureau (such as the NPS) to identify and present additional training needs and research unique to their specific programs, for example, short haul flights to move wildlife

(Brugeman 1997).

Furthermore, the Secretary of the Interior was required “to

conduct a study to determine the appropriate minimum altitude

for aircraft flying over National Park System units” (P.L. 100-91,

18 August, 1987). This legislation can be interpreted as mandating social science research related to employee safety, as these

concerns are critical issues in the design and implementation of

search and rescue and firefighting activities. This Act required

that research be conducted in specific units of the National Park

System on the effects of fixed wing and helicopter over-flights.
14

The research was to address, among other issues, “the values

associated with aircraft flights over such units of the National

Park System in terms of visitor enjoyment, the protection of

persons or property, search and rescue operations, and

firefighting” (P.L. 100-91, Sec. 1(c)(4)).

The Interagency Task Force on Firefighting develops and implements firefighting safety policies and procedures for all bureaus

within the DOI and the US Forest Service. The policy of the

Interagency Task Force on Firefighting establishes rationale for

social science in employee (and volunteer) safety; there is a

history of applying social science to firefighter safety in urban,

rural, and wildland environments.

In addition, Congress has enacted legislation concerning forest

firefighting planning, training, and interagency cooperation (16

U.S.C. 551b, 1990). As part of this legislation,

Secretaries [of Agriculture and the Interior] should assess the

capabilities of educational institutions and other public and

private organizations to provide such training programs.

The legislative requirement for training and training center

program assessment clearly mandates social science for employee safety.

The NPS Mandate for Social Science Research

National Policies and Plans for Social Science Research

There is a viable national mandate for social science research to

be conducted by the NPS. It emerges from the NPS Organic Act

and NPS mission, enabling legislation, management policies of

the agency, agency-wide initiatives, regional initiatives, and park

unit initiatives. The Organic Act of 1916 established the NPS and

set forth its mission:

to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects

and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of

the same in such manner and by such means as will leave

them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations

(16 U.S.C. Sec. 1).
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 15

Social science research is clearly mandated by the NPS mission

statement as it is a necessary tool for protecting resources and

providing for enjoyment. The mandate extends to research on

employee safety. The NPS Risk Management Division and

safety managers need social science research to ensure employee

safety while accomplishing the NPS mission.

Policies in the National Park Service are governed by the NPS

Management Policies (NPS 1988). This document is the basic

Service-wide policy document of the NPS. A general mandate

for social sciences emerges from the manual. It contains specific

guidelines regarding the role of science in fulfilling the NPS

mission. The manual states:

The Service will develop, gather, compile, store, analyze,

update, and employ adequate natural, historic, social,

economic and demographic data relevant to planning and

management at each park (2:5; italics added).

To gather this information, a systematic program of research is

authorized:

A program of natural and social science research will be

conducted to support NPS staff in carrying out the mission

of the National Park Service by providing accurate scientific

basis for planning, development, and management decisions. The science program will be focused on applied

research necessary to direct management actions in pursuit

of park objectives as stated in legislation and planning

documents. (4:2-3; italics added).

This authorization applies to social science research on employee safety because the provision of employee safety is federally mandated. Furthermore, such research is a component of

fulfilling the NPS mission and making sound management

decisions. Examples are studies of employee safety implications

in alternative management plans for the removal of exotic

species in parks.

Issues related to employee safety appear in a number of specific

areas of the policy manual. For example, employee safety is a

stated component of planning for wildland firefighting (4:15),

emergency preparedness and emergency operations (8:6),
16

aircraft use (8:8), maintenance (9:5), solid waste management

(9:5), and hazardous materials and toxic waste (9:6). In addition,

employee safety is a component of the policy statement on

Visitor Safety and Protection (8:5), where it is stated that:

The National Park Service will strive to identify recognizable

threats to the safety and health of persons and to the protection of property, by applying nationally accepted codes,

standards, engineering principles, and the requirements of

the Loss Control Management Program Guideline (NPS 1991).

Social science is a necessary component of identifying threats to

employee safety and health. Examples are studies to identify

behavioral, communication, social, and organizational factors

that contribute to safety in hazardous activities.

More recently, Risk Management in the National Park Service

contains the following policy statement:

It is the policy of the National Park Service to establish and

effect a risk management process to ensure the safety and

health of its employees and the public, to maximize the

utilization of its human and physical resources, and to

minimize monetary losses thereby advancing the mission of

the Service (NPS 1994).

To carry out this policy, goals are identified that provide rationale for social science to secure employee safety and health.

These goals are to:

1. Create a safety and health culture inclusive of all employees

and activities.

2. Improve our ability to identify and abate unsafe practices and

conditions.

3. Implement effective safety and health resourcing strategies.

4. Facilitate accountability and program involvement through

evaluation and monitoring.

5. Increase organizational safety and health awareness and

program communication.

In addition, the 1997 Strategic Plan, Interim Service-wide Mission
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 17

and Long-term Goals states as Mission Goal IVa: “The National

Park Service uses current management practices, systems, and

technologies to accomplish its mission” (NPS 1997). Social

science research is needed to effectively meet this goal.

More specific guidance about NPS social science is derived from

other NPS policy documents. The basic policy document related

to employee safety for the NPS is the Loss Control Management

Guideline (NPS 1991), which defines requirements for achieving a

safe and healthy work environment for NPS employees. A basic

program requirement for managers and supervisors is to:

Establish and maintain a staff of safety and health professionals in the Washington and Regional Offices, and at

major operating units, as well as appropriate collateral-duty

personnel at all other sites, to advise management in the

development and implementation of an effective safety and

health program (1:1).

The requirement that management obtain advice provides

rationale for social science activities related to employee safety.

Additional requirements, related to training, inspection, monitoring, and evaluation suggest additional needs for social science

research on employee safety.

Usable Knowledge: A Plan for Furthering Social Science and the

National Parks provides further rationale for NPS social science

(Machlis 1996). This planning document identifies eight major

topic areas that require social science research. One of these

topics—What organizational and employee issues face the NPS?—

suggests a need for social science research on NPS employee

safety. Examples include conducting demographic analyses of

employees having accidents and studying factors that influence

job satisfaction, risk perceptions, employee motivations, and

organizational safety culture.

NPS Regional Policies and Plans for Social Science Research

Regional management plans for the NPS also reflect the need for

social science as a necessary component to managing for NPS

employee safety. For example, in a 1996 memo, the Intermountain Field Area Director wrote:
18

Safety, for the most part, has been managed as a reactive,

crisis-driven program. We wait for the accident and then

take action to “do safety.” As we examined park responses

[to a request for information about safety programs], we

found that what seems to be missing is a safety process

within the management system that drives safety improvements and holds management accountable for measurable

results. As one Superintendent put it, “It is rhetoric without

responsible recourse.” We have provided lots of safety

programs for parks to administer, but we have not provided

managers with the processes to make safety a daily reality in

their work environments.” (6/3/96; these policy goals were

repeated in the Denver Service Center Safety Program Action

Plan (June 1996).

Consequently, the Intermountain Field Area (now Intermountain Region) circulated a Risk Management Strategy for the Intermountain Field Area which expresses a purpose “to improve

performance, prevent accidents and losses, and reduce costs”

and a mission “to have an organizational culture that values and

has the will to create and sustain a safe and healthy environment

with a goal of zero loss of human and material resources” (NPS

1996b).

Regional policies establish a mandate for social science on

employee safety, such as research on creating and maintaining

“safety cultures,” testing the effectiveness of safety programs, and

mechanisms for management accountability. For example, the

Intermountain Region has adopted an Action Plan (Siler 1997).

The plan contains activities to:

• transfer safety programs developed in the private sector to

park units,

• evaluate pilot projects,

• design and implement training programs, and

• develop baseline surveys on safety.

As part of the approach, a Key Elements Survey is applied as part

of a “behavior modification” strategy (Siler 1997). The survey is

an evaluation system and provides a method for systematic
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 19

analysis of each job or activity performed. The objectives of the

Survey are to identify and prioritize safety program deficiencies,

establish an action plan to correct deficiencies, and enable

management to monitor and measure improvement. For example, a Safety Key Element Action Plan has been designed for use

in Rocky Mountain NP. The need for social science is reflected

in this approach, as it is an important element in workplace

safety identification, modification, evaluation, and monitoring

activities.

NPS Park Unit Policies and Plans for Social Science Research

Policies and plans for social science research on NPS employee

safety exist at the unit level within the National Park System. The

Grand Canyon NP Superintendent expresses the rationale for

social science research on employee safety:

Accidents are preventable occurrences, and all accidents

have multiple causes. By aggressively investigating and

correcting basic or root causes of all injuries and nearmisses, our system will be improved and future incidents

will be prevented. Supervisors are responsible for ensuring

that all accidents are investigated, root causes identified, and

opportunities for improvement are implemented (NPS

1996c).

An alternative approach that is being adopted in several parks is

based on the reduction of lost-time accidents through a “structured return to work program” (Belden 1997). Such a plan has

been implemented at Lake Mead NRA. The plan calls for

modifying the work activities of individuals that have been

injured. Employees are given new activities they can perform

even with their current injuries (such as a desk job). The plan has

included a process for identifying “modified work assignments”

that can be performed by people with different kinds of injuries.

In the past, such individuals would have been part of the workers compensation claims process and would not have been

brought back to work as early. Such an approach to managing

lost time accidents provides rationale for social science research.

For example, structured back-to-work plans can require an

understanding of how to motivate employees and how to apply
20

programs to park units with different conditions (such as management styles and work assignments).

Summary

Legislation, policies, and plans provide a mandate for social

science research on employee safety in the NPS. The rationale

emerges from two streams of policy. First, the NPS is required to

provide a safe work environment for its employees. This requirement emerges from federal legislation and DOI policies and

planning documents. Second, the NPS has a responsibility to

conduct social science. This responsibility emerges from national

legislation, DOI and NPS policies, and from regional and park

unit plans. The combination of responsibilities to provide a safe

work environment and to conduct social science provides a

mandate to conduct social science research on NPS employee

safety.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 21

III

Prior Social Science

Research

This chapter reviews prior social science research relevant to

employee safety in the NPS. The goal of the review is to summarize what is known and to identify additional research needs.

The review is based on a representative sample of social science

work generally relevant to employee safety, and a comprehensive review of research that is directly relevant to NPS employee

safety. A bibliography is included (Appendix I).

A framework for understanding the factors that influence safety

is presented in the following sections. First, research on how

accidents occur is reviewed. Then, research on key social factors

that contribute to accidents are reviewed. These social factors

can be categorized in terms of influences that come from:

• the characteristics of individuals,

• the characteristics of groups, and

• the characteristics of organizations.

How Accidents Happen

A “technical task” is defined as a set of practices combining
22

people and technologies to fulfill specific management objectives. For example, firefighting, search and rescue, trail maintenance, and road maintenance are technical tasks performed by

employees of the NPS. Efforts to improve occupational safety

must consider technical tasks as a “total system” in which individual components interact (National Research Council 1988,

Robinson 1982). Such systems can be characterized as having

five parts:

• mechanical components,

• system personnel (individuals and groups),

• organizational and institutional factors,

• social and economic factors, and

• the environment in which activity occurs.

These features are represented in Figure 3.1. At each level, and

for the interactions among them, there are social factors that can

cause or contribute to accidents/incidents (Rasmussen 1982,

Hoffman et al. 1995). For example, inadequate administrative

support may lead to faulty plans or use of inappropriate equipment. Similarly, improper or inadequate actions of employees

may lead to accidents.

Figure 3.1 Technical tasks as total systems

Mechanical

Components

Environment

Social and Economic Factors

Organizational and Institutional

Factors

System Personnel
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 23

Organizational, social, and environmental characteristics may

have significant influences on safety and reliability in technical

tasks. These features of employee work environments can

contribute to accidents because they influence how the work is

done (Hoffman et al. 1995, Perrow 1984). Managerial and

political pressures can directly affect safety and reliability in

performance. Weather conditions can influence the safety of

performing tasks (Mekjavic et al. 1988). For example, administrative pressures to finish trail and building maintenance before

peak tourist season begins can influence safety of personnel in

the NPS. Harsh winter weather conditions can similarly influence safety of NPS personnel in work activities, such as road

maintenance and search and rescue activities.

A broad view of safety that looks at the relationships among

individuals, institutions, and social and environmental features

has proven useful in the design, evaluation, and management of

safety in a variety of large-scale technological systems. Examples

of such systems include nuclear power plants, chemical processing plants, offshore oil platforms, and air, marine, and vehicle

transportation systems (Reason et al. 1990, Slappendel et al.

1993, TriData 1996, Tuler 1988). This broad perspective “has

great potential for delivering results that yield useful recommendations for safety improvements” (National Research Council

1988:12). Employee safety in a wide variety of NPS activities can

be usefully addressed by considering the behaviors of individual

employees, the influences of management on the way work is

performed, and work conditions. For example, wildland

firefighting safety is influenced by the ways that individual

employees behave, the quality of their equipment, political

pressures to control fires in park units, administrative planning,

and the conditions of the fire and terrain. These kinds of issues

and interactions can be found in many of the work tasks found in

the NPS.

Frequently, analyses of accidents use “human error” as a catchall term for unexplained causes of accidents. Such analyses are

not very helpful in understanding why certain events occurred
24

and can focus blame on specific individuals not necessarily at

fault (Rasmussen 1982, Svenson 1986). Recent research suggests

that “human errors” are a result of many interacting elements in

a technical task. Errors may be characterized as mismatches

between humans and their tasks or machines (Rasmussen 1982).

Mismatches can occur as a result of:

• human variability,

• technical variability or failure,

• required interactions that are incompatible with human

physical or psychological limitations, and

• required interactions that are incompatible with organizational

and environmental constraints.

Mismatches may change as employees develop skills, knowledge, and experience (Rasmussen 1990); prior experience is an

important part of safe and reliable performance (Brown and

Groeger 1988, National Research Council 1993).

Many “human errors” or mismatches occur every day during

people’s normal activities. Behaviors of individuals play an

important role in most accidents, “typically not due to particularly exotic errors or mistakes, but to slips and misunderstandings which are commonplace in normal human activity and

which have their tragic effects only under particular circumstances” (Holmes 1987). Mismatches are often the result of many

interacting individual and contributing factors. Causes of malfunctions combine with additional factors that contribute to an

“error” in human action (see Figure 3.2). The final results of the

mismatch will depend on the nature of the task. For example,

project designers, supervisors, and operator and maintenance

crews may each make independent and small errors that cumulatively result in an accident. Thus, attempts to improve safety,

reliability, and performance in technical tasks are fundamentally

linked to the elimination or control of contributory factors.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 25

Factors that contribute to employee accidents have been studied

in many situations. For example, Table 3.1 shows factors that

may contribute to human errors in nuclear power plant emergency response systems. Similarly, analyses of forest-work

injuries have often found the items listed in Table 3.2 as contributory causes to accidents.

Figure 3.2 A model of error in human action

 Cause of Malfunction

• external event

• excessive demands

on operator

• actual human variability,

operator incapacitated,

etc.

 Final Observed Malfunction

• specified task not performed

• timing incorrect

• wrong act performed, etc.

 Personnel Task

• design

• inspection

• orientation

• maintenance

• supervision

• management, etc.

 Contributing Factors

• organizational demands

• group pressures

• work time and

environments

• emotional and physical

stress

• inadequate resources

and equipment, etc.

Type of Human Malfunction

• error in information

processing

• error in recall

• error in judgement

• error in physical act

• failures in detection,

comprehension, decision, action,

etc.

▲ ▲

▲ ▲

Table 3.1 Factors contributing to errors in nuclear

emergency response systems

• administrative constraints in the sharing of information

• rigidity in plans, procedures, and command structure

• varying degrees of delay in communications

• organizational and personnel rivalries and conflicts

• excessive cognitive and physical workload and time pressure

• hazardous working conditions

• transitions from low to high activity and vice versa

• large population potentially affected

• public response unpredictable

• high volumes of indirect, abstract, and technical information

• uncertainties in information

• lack of direct control over plant components

• unfamiliarity of tasks and decisions

• simultaneous needs for limited and dispersed resources

[Source: Tuler 1988]
26

Research has shown that it is possible to control factors that may

contribute to accidents. Because mismatches may occur at any

time, the best way to decrease their effects are to design systems

that remove the opportunities for weaknesses to matter. Such

systems provide a “buffer zone” for human variability in performance (Pitz 1993, Rasmussen and Goodstein 1987). These

controls can be achieved by removing the contributing factor, by

making the “total system” less sensitive to errors, and by providing opportunities to correct errors before they result in an

accident. These are all options that can be important to the

promotion of NPS employee safety.

Factors that may contribute to mismatches and error recovery

are found at all levels of the “total system” (Rasmussen 1982,

Table 3.2 Contributory causes to forest-work injuries

Machinery, Tools, and Equipment

chain saw vibration and noise

chain saw kickback

forest machine design

protective equipment

maintenance

Personnel Characteristics

sensory capacities

perception and decision-making

skill and technique

experience, education, and training

physiological work capacity

age

Work Organization

task demands

task variety

rest breaks

hours of work

supervision

mechanization

payment method

contracting

safety organization

Physical Environment

climate lighting

terrain and flora

[Source: Slappendel et al. 1993]
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 27

Reason et al. 1990, Slappendel et al. 1993). Key contributory

factors from individual, group, and organizational characteristics

are discussed in the following sections.

Individual Characteristics

The way an individual behaves in a specific situation is related to

many factors that influence the physiological and/or psychological characteristics of the individual. Physiological factors are

related to such aspects of a person as strength, hearing, and

visual perception. Psychological factors are related to a person’s

comprehension, judgment, communication, and decision-making

skills. These factors can influence the safety and reliability of

decisions, judgments, and actions.

The ways that people make judgments and decisions in a variety

of situations have been extensively studied (Slovic et al. 1988,

Keinan et al. 1987). The primary generalizations from this

research are that:

• People often have difficulties making decisions, inferences,

and judgments in complex situations (Slovic et al. 1988). For

example, in complex situations there is often one simple and

obvious solution that is selected. It is, however, sometimes

incorrect or inefficient.

• Different decision strategies may greatly affect outcomes. Poor

decisions can lead to the addition of small errors that can

cause a future accident (Telfer 1989).

Research on human problem-solving and decision-making

suggest that people do not always use all the information available to them (Fischhoff 1986, van der Colk 1988). Among the

most important reasons are:

• information quality is often inadequate to fulfill requirements

for appropriate decisions and judgments,

• an individual’s capacity for processing large amounts of

information is limited,

• time delays can be important, and

• decisions are frequently made in situations that allow only

limited attention to any particular item or issue.
28

In addition, decisions and judgments may be based on issues

beyond those of “correctness,” “effectiveness,” or “safety.” Safe

choices may actually be of secondary importance relative to

other goals. Other motivating factors may be equally or more

important—such as speed of performance, financial cost, fulfilling

role expectations, and emotions. For example, NPS employees

may believe it is necessary to conduct potentially dangerous

activities because they improve visitor experiences or protect

resources.

Research on human decision-making indicates that predictable

mistakes occur because individuals develop biases and “rules of

thumb” to simplify a complex world and guide judgments

(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Fischhoff 1986, Tuler 1988).

While there is some debate over how strongly such biases

influence behaviors in real-world settings, patterns which are

often observed include:

• overconfidence in estimations, plans, and skills,

• underestimation of time constraints and risks,

• attempts to verify previously held beliefs by searching for and

accepting confirmatory evidence and ignoring or forgetting

contradictory evidence,

• exaggeration of personal immunity from threats,

• oversimplification of others’ behavior,

• limited examples used to make statistical inferences,

• difficulties assessing probabilities and exponential processes,

• ignorance of subtleties,

• tendency toward conservatism,

• thinking in causal series and ignoring side effects,

• previous experiences often used as basis for future choices,

• options which are not readily observable may not be considered, and

• complacency in familiar situations.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 29

Because biases and “rules of thumb” serve the important function of allowing people to operate with limited information in

different situations, they cannot be dismissed as dangerous or

useless. For example, during emergency search and rescue

operations such strategies can help save time that can make a

difference between life and death. However, in certain unfamiliar situations they may lead to inappropriate choices or actions.

“Over-training” may create problems in novel situations where

skills and unconscious reactions suddenly become irrelevant or

even detrimental (Holmes 1987). For example, search and rescue

personnel may respond to a unique situation using prior experience and “rules of thumb” that can result in increased risk of

harm because they are not applicable to the current situation.

The problems related to effective decision-making and judgments are compounded in decision environments where:

• a series of interdependent decisions are required,

• task specifications and the situation can change rapidly,

• available information may be dependent on prior outcomes,

and

• decisions alter the environment and context of operations

(Slovic et al. 1988, Brehmer 1987).

Such decisions reach their conclusion in actual behavior. Three

levels of behavior have been identified in human action

(Rasmussen 1990). These are behaviors based on these kinds of

activities:

• Automatic or routine activities: performance is automatic, controlled, and skilled (e.g., how to shift gears or use brakes,

operate chain saws),

• Familiar activities: performance is based on remembered rules

and procedures applied in familiar situations (e.g., how to pass

a car, dispose of wastes, operate heavy machinery), and

• New and unfamiliar activities: performance is based on the use

of prior knowledge and may require complex processing of

information (e.g., driving in severe weather in an unfamiliar

location, carry out search and rescue and firefighting).
30

Incorrect or faulty implementation of decisions are not uncommon (Fell 1976). They may occur because there may be obstacles

to the intended action (Reason et al. 1990). For example, the

handling characteristics of a vehicle may not be responsive to the

demands of a driver and/or insufficient safety margins may not

allow a slow vehicle to be avoided. These types of problems are

typically the focus of human factors engineers that attempt to

design human-machine systems to minimize risk. Actions made

at the highest level of behavior (i.e., new and unfamiliar behaviors) are susceptible to error because of lack of time, inadequate

information, and other similar constraints.

In addition, there may be unintended departures from a planned

action or desired goal (Reason et al. 1990). For example, drivers

may unintentionally accelerate when their intention was to

brake. Similarly, driver fatigue may slow reaction times needed

for difficult maneuvers. Behaviors related to routine and familiar

actions may be inappropriately executed because the context is

not appropriate for the selected action.

The ability of individuals to detect, comprehend, judge, decide,

and act may be influenced by a variety of stress factors associated with a technical task. In some cases, researchers have

argued that stress factors can positively influence behaviors and

decision-making (Klein 1996). However, much research has

focused on the ways that stress factors can compound difficulties

of performing routine, familiar, and unfamiliar actions.

A variety of stress factors can affect NPS employees, ranging

from characteristics of the tasks they must perform, the physical

conditions in which they work, and the social environment in

which they work. Examples that have been observed in many

types of work are listed in Table 3.3. Stress factors result from

differences between task demands and an individual’s ability to

respond. Stress factors have been documented and studied in a

large number of contexts and include physical, physiological,

psychological, and social factors (Anderson et al. 1995, Faff and

Tutak 1989, Hockey 1983).
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 31

Time pressure is a very important stress factor. It has been

studied in a number of situations, including aviation, vehicle

operation, emergency response, and nuclear power accidents

(Edland and Svenson 1993). Important effects of time pressure

on individual decision-making and judgments include:

• impeding the use of available information,

• increasing reliance on simpler decision rules,

• increasing risk-averse behavior,

• reducing use of information sources,

• increasing dependence on rules of thumb,

• causing oversampling of data,

Table 3.3 Factors contributing to employee stress during work

Physical/Physiological

noise

vibration

hot or cold (e.g., protective clothing)

temperature

comfort (e.g., backache)

visual illusions (e.g., “flicker”)

disorientation

inadequate nutrition

dehydration, heat exhaustion

caffeine, alcohol, nicotine

muscle fatigue

sleep cycle disruption, inadequate rest

Psychological/Social

mental workload, mental fatigue

boredom

anxiety, concern for safety

anger, frustration

sensory overload, sensory deprivation

time pressure

previous errors

domestic social problems

marital/family problems, separation from family

financial problems

legal problems

paperwork, irksome tasks, reporting requirements

liaison with supervisors

safety/organizational culture
32

• affecting the logical analysis of inputs,

• causing “tunnel vision” and perceptual narrowing,

• decreasing the use of comparative or evaluative decision

strategies,

• increasing attention in tasks with closest deadlines regardless

of importance,

• increasing weight to negative or most important factors, and

• considering fewer alternatives (Tuler 1988).

Additional problems can result when time pressures reduce an

individual’s ability to recover from accidents and mistakes.

Other features of a technical task may also impose stress. For

example, the wearing of fire, heat, and chemical protective

clothing can lead to physical stress (Faff and Tutak 1989). Working in hot and cold climates can increase stress (Mekjavic et al.

1988). Task requirements such as mountain climbing and activities at high altitudes can lead to hypoxia and physiological stress

that can degrade performance in physical activities (Skjenna

1981). Alcohol, caffeine, and nicotine can have similar effects on

a person (Oborne and Rogers 1983). Previous experience with

injuries or accidents can increase job stress (Rundmo 1995).

These are all features of many activities performed by NPS

employees on a regular basis.

Current research is inconclusive on the role of stress. The ambiguity of research results arises in part because the stress felt by

individuals depends on perceptions and specific contexts of the

situation. People respond to stress in a variety of ways (Mann

1993). For example, dangerous situations can cause personal

anxiety (Idzikowski and Baddeley 1983), though it has also been

reported that experience with stressful situations/activities can

reduce stress in activities that occur at a later time (Ursin et al.

1978). Stress levels can differ among individuals in the same

situation (Luczak 1991). For example, one person may be afraid

of heights, while another is not. Moreover, multiple stress factors

are often simultaneously present in a situation; NPS employees
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 33

are frequently exposed to multiple stress factors such as dangerous working conditions, time pressures, fatigue, and unfamiliar

situations.

Stress combinations depend on the key elements of a technical

task: mechanical components, system personnel (individuals and

groups), organizational and institutional infrastructure, social and

economic factors, and the natural environment in which activity

occurs. For example, stress combinations can include:

• background stress from day to day living,

• characteristics of the task,

• characteristics of the work environment, including management and external pressures, and

• characteristics of the equipment used in the technical task.

The importance of stress factors results from their ability to:

• increase workload and decrease coping ability,

• impair the perception of hazards,

• impair decision-making and judgments,

• lead to inappropriate avoidance behavior, and

• lead to fatalities or injuries.

All these outcomes have important implications for employee

safety in the NPS.

In part, the affect stress has on an individual is related to characteristics of that individual. Human factors and occupational

safety research have extensively studied the ways that personalities and attitudes contribute to accidents by influencing the ways

that people make judgments, decisions, carry out actions, and

react to stress (Dedobbeleer and German 1987, Geller et al.

1996, Lester and Bombaci 1984). Personality traits refer to

relatively enduring characteristics that can affect judgments and

decisions (Helmreich 1984). Attitudes are less deeply held

aspects of a person than personality traits, and are thought to be

modifiable by training and experience.
34

Interest in these issues stems in part because of their influence on

motivation. For example, hazardous thought patterns or attitudes

that are thought to influence individual judgments in aviation

include:

• anti-authoritarian attitudes (‘don’t tell me what to do!’),

• impulsiveness (‘do something now!’),

• beliefs of invulnerability (‘nothing can happen to me’),

• ‘macho’ attitudes (‘I can do this’),

• feelings of resignation (‘what’s the point of trying?’), and

• deference (‘I will do what you suggest’)

These kinds of attitudes have been observed in many work

situations, including the NPS (Tuler et al. 1992). However, few

studies have been completed on the prevalence and impacts of

such attitudes (Lester and Bombaci 1984, Telfer 1989, Telfer and

Ashman 1986).

In some cases, motivations and attitudes are linked to risk-taking

orientations of individuals (Machlis and Rosa 1990, Tuler et al.

1992, Yates 1993). The propensity for employees to adopt selfprotective behaviors has been a long-standing area of research

(Cohen 1993, Geller et al. 1996, Weinstein 1987). An understanding of when and why individuals adopt self-protective behaviors

is important to improving safety in NPS work environments.

Cohen (1993) has proposed several categories of self-protective

behaviors, all of which are relevant to NPS employees. They

include:

• proper use and operation of the hazard control systems (e.g.,

helmets, ventilators),

• good work habits in performing job tasks (e.g., using seat

belts),

• increased awareness and recognition of workplace hazards,

• acceptance and use of personal protective equipment,

• observance of housekeeping and maintenance measures to

keep work areas,
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 35

• proper response to emergency situations, and

• self-monitoring and early recognition of any signs or symptoms of hazardous exposures or activities.

Researchers have found that individuals can maintain high levels

of performance (e.g., detection, comprehension, problemsolving) while working on tasks even as demands and mental

effort increase. However, as effort continues to increase, a point

will be reached where the individual cannot continue to maintain the same level of performance. As shown in Figure 3.3, the

result can be an abrupt deterioration in performance. Thus,

“mental workload” of employees has been extensively studied

(Gopher and Donchin 1986, Kirk and Parker 1994, National

Research Council 1993). Mental workload has been noted as an

important factor in the safety of diverse activities, including

driving, power plant operations, emergency medical service, and

natural disaster relief (National Research Council 1993). Mental

workload can be an issue for NPS personnel who must, for

example, work long hours during peak seasons or during emergency situations.

Figure 3.3 Individual performance as a function of mental workload

▲

▲

High

Low Work load High

Performance

Task demand

A variety of factors have been suggested as contributing to

mental workload in technical tasks. As Table 3.4 shows, they

include factors that increase levels of stress, affect operator

capabilities, and increase task demands. In fact, many of the

Work

quality
36

factors are the same as those identified as contributing to accidents and “human error.”

Table 3.4 Factors contributing to employee mental workload

Personal Characteristics

temperature (hot or cold)

comfort (e.g., backache)

inadequate nutrition

dehydration, heat exhaustion

caffeine, alcohol, nicotine

disorientation (e.g., whiteout)

sleep cycle disruption, inadequate rest

muscle fatigue, mental fatigue

boredom

anxiety, concern for safety

anger, frustration

sensory overload, sensory deprivation

Task Variables

visual constraints (visibility)

vibration, noise, jolting

degree of risk/danger

continuous need for concentration and monitoring

time to complete task

number, complexity, urgency, variety of subtasks

reaction effort required

unavailability of resources

familiarity with procedures, familiarity with environment

Closely related to mental workload and stress are feelings of

fatigue. While most people associate fatigue with feeling physically tired or not enough sleep, fatigue can also be associated

with mental activity (Holding 1983). Subjective feelings of fatigue

have been suggested as contributory causes to accidents and

failures in a variety of mental and physical activities (Holding

1983, National Research Council 1993). Prior research has

suggested:

• linkages between fatigue and perceptual tasks, including visual

sensitivity, concentration, and monitoring tasks,

• a strong relationship between types of shifts or work hours and

accident frequencies,

• performance deterioration with the onset of fatigue, and
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 37

• changes in risk-taking behavior may occur as fatigue increases

or decreases.

In some cases, the effects of fatigue on performance have been

ambiguous (Borowsky and Wall 1983). Some studies of air pilot

performance have found little correlation among factors commonly thought to lead to fatigue and degraded performance. In

addition, the impact of individual differences with respect to

sensitivity to fatigue is not well documented or studied

(Chidester 1990). In spite of conflicting results, fatigue is thought

to be an important factor in the safe performance of technical

tasks.

Group Characteristics

In many systems, groups of people must interact to perform a

task. In the NPS, groups and teams of employees play a role in

the performance of many activities, including trail and building

maintenance, visitor services, search and rescue operations,

firefighting, and law enforcement. While necessary, interactions

of people in groups can also create conditions that lead to

accidents or mishaps. Group interactions can lead to risk-taking

or incorrect decisions in different situations (Hare et al. 1997,

Hirokawa and Scheerhorn 1986). These results can occur during

the planning, operational, maintenance, and emergency response phases of technical tasks. This section summarizes research on group decision-making and safety.

Researchers have suggested several factors that may lead to

faulty decisions in a group or team. They include:

• improper assessment of a situation,

• establishment of inappropriate goals and procedures,

• improper assessment of alternative decisions,

• establishment of faulty information on which to base a decision, and

• faulty reasoning.

Individuals can enable faulty decisions in group decision-making

(Hare et al. 1997). In particular, faulty group decision-making
38

can often be traced to the influences of specific group members

on communication and social factors such as deferment to peers.

However, individuals also can prevent faulty decisions by

counteracting negative influences, such as by convincing others

to reject flawed beliefs, perceptions, and inferences.

Faulty decisions by groups may be a result of different kinds of

group behaviors (Hare et al. 1997). They include:

• the “risky shift” phenomena, in which a group chooses more

risky alternatives than its individual members,

• group polarization, where the choice of a group is more

extreme than the individual choices,

• “group think,” where a group arrives at a consensus decision

without adequately evaluating all alternatives,

• false consensus, where individuals of a group falsely believe

that a consensus has been reached, and

• pluralistic ignorance, where group members believe that they

are alone in their beliefs.

In some cases, pressures for group consensus may be very

strong. Such pressures result from the characteristics of the group

and the social environment in which they interact (Swap 1984).

The characteristics fall into several categories:

• composition (e.g., group size, individual personalities, isolation

of a group),

• leadership characteristics (e.g., centralization of authority, style

of leadership),

• task characteristics (e.g., demands and requirements of task,

timing of task demands, interdependencies among different

tasks), and

• decision rules (e.g., ability to reverse decisions, criteria used

for making decisions, social context of group decision-making).

The form of consensus generated by group think is of particular

concern because it may contribute to more risky decisions (the

“risky shift” phenomenon). In groups experiencing group think
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 39

“the powerful forces of perceived ‘togetherness’ act in concert to

render the possibility of failure unthinkable—and if not unthinkable, then certainly unspeakable” (Reason 1987:124). For example, accidents in nuclear power plants have occurred after

frequent statements by employees that they were impossible.

General beliefs that severe accidents are not possible or rare may

lead to inadequate planning for safety.

In some cases, familiarity among members of a group may result

in negative consequences, such as group think. However, research also suggests that familiarity is important in group behavior because it can reduce misunderstandings between individuals

and improve the reliability of communications. Such a view has

contributed to recent research on crews and teams (Guzzo and

Dickson 1996).

Organizational Characteristics

Much research has focused on the ways that organizational

characteristics can influence individual behavior (Mitroff et al.

1989, Rochlin et al. 1987, Wilpert 1995). Incorrect perceptions

and poor choices may result from:

• rigid organizational beliefs and practices,

• restrictions of the social and cultural environment,

• political interests,

• supervisor-subordinate relations and responsibilities,

• institutional constraints, and

• communication constraints.

In turn, such incorrect perceptions or poor choices may influence the behavior and effectiveness of a group’s individual

members, and ultimately employee safety.

The dynamics of individual interactions in organizations depend

partly on the organizational culture, work situation (e.g., management-employee relations, job requirements), and organizational structure. Research has addressed issues of incentives,

disciplinary actions, information and education, as well as
40

behavior modeling to encourage safe work practices and to

avoid risk-taking (DeJoy 1996, Peters 1991, Stetzer and Hofmann

1996). Factors that appear in the research literature include:

• pressure (authority, peer, heavy responsibility),

• job requirements (ill-defined job requirements, lack of resources, expectations too high or impossible, multiple tasks—

selective attention by workers and management),

• conflicts among personnel (personality, procedural, substantive),

• conflicting assumptions related to tasks or roles (management

vs. designer, management vs. operating personnel),

• rigid organizational beliefs, assumptions, and rules,

• rules and procedures not maintained,

• communication systems not adequate or unavailable,

• quality of work environment (lack of job satisfaction),

• industrial actions (slow-downs, strikes),

• systems (or co-workers) considered unreliable or untrustworthy,

• mindsets (attitudes toward safety, professionalism, productivity), and

• lack of coordination, trust, understandings among organizations.

The concepts of “organizational culture” and “safety culture” are

receiving much attention (Schein 1990, Weick 1987). Interactions

among individuals within an organization are partly a result of

how the individuals believe the organization functions. These

beliefs arise through an organizational culture. Organizations

may create specific standards, rules, traditions and roles to which

employees must adhere. Recent research has focused on the

institutionalization of “safety cultures” to establish standards for

safety and reliability (INSAG 1991, Dedobbeleer and Beland

1991). Research has specifically addressed the ways that “high

reliability” organizations are created, maintained, and function
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 41

(Rochlin et al. 1987, Roberts 1989, Weick 1987). High reliability

organizations are particularly good at avoiding errors and

accidents, and recovering from them if they do occur.

In addition, studies suggest that organizational culture can play

an important role in motivation, commitment, and performance

of risky activities (Mitroff et al. 1989, Tuler et al. 1992). Organizational culture may alter employee perceptions of activities and

the way that potential costs and benefits are weighed. Organizational culture may lead to performance of an activity even when

workers may feel their personal risks are high. Moreover, personnel may “voluntarily” increase their risks in order to perform

the activity according to institutionally established standards and

expectations. Wilpert (1995) notes that a basic tenet of highreliability organizations is a strong organizational culture—but

this can actually increase risk-taking and encourage cover-ups

when official safety rules are violated.

Deliberate deviations have also been the subject of research on

occupational safety and related activities (Klen and Vayrynen

1984, Reason et al. 1990, Wagenaar 1993). For example, investigators of traffic accidents have considered the role of deliberate

deviations from practices considered necessary for safe operation

of vehicles (Reason et al. 1990). Such “violations” are not necessarily illegal or reprehensible. Moreover, interpretations of what

are considered violations are likely to differ among people. Thus,

“violations can only be described with regard to a social context

in which behavior is governed by operating procedures, codes of

practice, rules, norms, and the like” (Reason et al. 1990:1316).

In many instances, organizations must manage hazards associated with technical tasks. For example, NASA needs to maintain

safety of the space shuttle missions and the Department of

Transportation needs to maintain safety in the transportation of

hazardous materials. “Hazard management” is concerned with

the prevention, mitigation, and recovery of technological accidents and natural disasters through the management of potential

mismatches and social risk factors. Such activities are intended

to:
42

• improve situational awareness,

• improve knowledge of rules, alternative actions, and possible

consequences,

• enhance coordination,

• improve correspondence between plans and implementation,

• ensure that individuals and organizations are capable of

coping with time constraints and unexpected situations, and

• identify gaps and inadequacies in existing procedures and

plans.

Possible strategies for hazard management include eliminating

exposure to the risk, limiting exposure to the risk, and mitigating

or controlling the consequences of the risk (Kasperson et al.

1985). For example, in road maintenance tasks, safety can be

increased by:

• reducing the times or distances to which operators are exposed to dangers,

• establishing administrative limits on the roadway mileage to

be maintained or the lengths of work shifts, and

• installing additional safety equipment, such as airbags.

Risks are reduced because drivers’ exposure to dangers is decreased and the potential consequences of an accident are

reduced.

One widely discussed approach to changing safety-related

behaviors is “performance-based feedback” (Geller et al. 1996).

A performance-based feedback approach uses observation and

measurement techniques to monitor behaviors and to provide

feedback for modifying unsafe work practices. This approach to

training for safety has been widely applied, including driving

and industrial settings. It is also being applied to manage employee safety in several NPS units (Siler 1997). However, researchers have noted that there are limits to behavioral approaches to controlling work place hazards (Cohen and Jensen

1984, Geller et al. 1996). As Geller et al. note:
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 43

The research demonstrating the beneficial impact of behavioral observation and feedback on occupational safety has

usually been short-term and small-scale, requiring outside

agents (or consultants) to help implement the process.

Large-scale and long-term application of behavior-change

techniques requires the employees themselves to apply the

effective intervention techniques (e.g., systematic behavioral

observation and feedback) throughout the workplace

(1996:1).

A critical observation from prior research is that activities should

only be undertaken when operational capabilities for people and

their equipment are not to be exceeded. Such lessons can be as

simple as having enough drinking water to avoid dehydration or

suitable protective clothing to prevent hypothermia. However,

there are many examples of inadequate planning for normal as

well as emergency situations that have lead to accidents, including nuclear power plant, aviation, hazardous material transport,

and military operations. In addition, organizations often fail to

learn from prior mistakes and accidents. Effective hazard management requires that accidents and failures in plans be evaluated and lessons learned (England 1981, Malaterre 1990).

Researchers have considered the role of employee participation

in planning of technical tasks; it is thought to increase safety,

reliability, and performance (Cohen 1983, May and Schwoerer

1994). Employees that are actively engaged in technical tasks

have first-hand knowledge about the psychological, physical, and

material demands of the task. From personal experience they

can develop and provide understandings that are otherwise

unavailable to administrative planners and supervisors. Studies

suggest that increased participation of employees in task design

can lead to improvements in safety and reliability. Similarly,

participation in planning of occupational tasks can improve work

and task motivations and attitudes.

Personnel training in teams has been observed to be important

preparation for any hazardous activity (Pitz 1993, Tannenbaum

and Yukl 1992, Vojtecky and Schmitz 1986). Training may

reduce the potential for decision and action failures by:
44

• improving awareness of the work environment,

• improving knowledge of rules, alternative actions, and possible consequences,

• enhancing coordination and group interactions,

• improving correspondence between plans and implementation, and

• ensuring that organizations are capable of coping with time

constraints.

However, research suggests that in general, training may be of

limited utility in improving performance in complex and unfamiliar situations (Pitz 1993, Vojtecky and Schmitz 1986). For

example:

• unconscious use of “rules of thumb” learned over time may

create problems where they suddenly become irrelevant or

even detrimental in new situations (Svenson 1979),

• short decision times have been shown to cause individuals to

revert to decision rules used before training (Zakay and

Wooler 1984), and

• training has been observed to have only short-term and

limited effects.

One solution proposed is for training to occur repeatedly. Another is to provide extensive training for unfamiliar or emergency situations (National Research Council 1993, Tuler 1988).

Employee Safety in the National Park Service

This section describes research that has explicitly addressed

employee safety in the NPS. The literature is limited; few studies

have been conducted. Several case studies are discussed.

Olympic National Park Mountain Goat Removal Project

Mountain goats were introduced to the Olympic Peninsula in the

1920s and have been causing damage to portions of Olympic NP

(Olympic National Park 1987, 1995). To prevent further damage,

Olympic NP personnel began in the early 1980s an experimental program to rid the park of the mountain goats. In 1988, a live

capture and removal program was initiated.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 45

The Olympic NP Mountain Goat Removal Project was based on

a set of unique requirements and activities. The effort required

innovative and difficult activities in some of the most remote and

rugged backcountry areas of Olympic NP. Complex helicopter

flights, difficult capture of goats from the air, and handling of

goats on rugged terrain combined with social factors that influenced the capabilities of personnel to operate safely and reliably

for intensive periods. The combination of these specific factors

created physical and social hazards to personnel.

Research reviewed the risks that were related to the social

context of the project and provided recommendations for their

mitigation (Machlis et al. 1990, Tuler et al. 1992). Risks were

involved in the nature of equipment used, characteristics of the

animals, method of capture and removal, and drugs used to

sedate the animals. Social factors created and contributed to a

variety of safety risks to both personnel and mountain goats.

Such social factors included overlapping organizational planning, authority, decision and judgment errors due to fatigue and

stress, and employee values, attitudes, and behaviors.

In particular, the researchers found organizational culture to be

an important mediating factor in determining both risk decisions

of the team members as well as the level of their performance of

risky activities (Tuler et al. 1992). The organizational culture of

the NPS enabled the extraordinary performance of risky activities beyond what traditional approaches to risk-taking behavior

would suggest. Although organizational culture may not have

been the only factor that mediated the outcomes, it was observed

to be critical in the Olympic NP Mountain Goat Removal

Project.

The analysis concluded that specific changes to the program

could enhance safety, reliability, and performance. Recommendations were related to:

• altering the project to reduce social risk factors,

• altering the social environment to reduce social risk factors,

• monitoring social risk factors associated with the project, and
46

• additional options, such as increased training.

The research did not evaluate specific risks associated with

mechanical failure or provide a quantitative risk assessment of

the project. While safety to the mountain goats was of much

import and concern, it was not examined in the research. The

research findings were part of the evidence used in the Draft

Environmental Impact Statement for Mountain Goat Management (Olympic National Park 1995).

Mt. Rainier National Park Winter Snow Removal Program

Access to the Paradise Visitor Center of Mt. Rainier NP requires

a continuous and sophisticated program of snow removal during

the winter season. The program to maintain an open and safe

road requires innovative skills and difficult activities in often

unpredictable and harsh winter weather. The Mt. Rainier NP

Winter Snow Removal Program is based on the use of several

snow removal vehicles to remove snow between the Nisqually

Entrance and Paradise Visitor Center. Performance of the

needed activities results in the exposure of park personnel and

visitors to a number of safety hazards. At several stages of the

program, individuals could be and have been injured or involved in accidents causing property damage. A study to assess

the social risks in the Snow Removal Program was conducted

(Tuler et al. 1993).

In general, the authors found that snow removal activities were

performed safely and efficiently. However, there was room for

additional safety improvements. The analysis concluded that:

1. Catastrophic accidents that resulted in fatalities or severe

injuries were relatively rare.

2. Accidents that resulted in minor or moderate injuries to park

personnel or visitors or property damage were common. In

many cases, the combination of changing weather and difficult

working conditions with little room for error created accident

situations, despite the best efforts of equipment operators. The

characteristics of activities required to remove snow may

change everyday because weather, road surface, and equipment may be different every day.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 47

3. Visitors were a main source of risk. Unexpected encounters

with snow removal equipment combined with insufficient

visitor experience in winter driving lead to a relatively large

percentage of accidents.

4. Sources of management-employee tensions were found in the

organization of the program. Opportunities were available to

reduce tensions with policy changes, monitoring and evaluation activities.

5. Vehicles used for the winter snow removal program were not

always suitable for the required tasks. Frequent equipment

breakdown often required operators to use vehicles inappropriate for the specific conditions.

6. Inadequate attention to safety problems may have contributed

to safety hazards. Adequate data were not always available for

accurate risk analysis and program evaluation.

The authors identified specific changes useful to enhance safety,

reliability, and performance. Recommendations were based on:

• altering tasks to reduce social risk factors,

• altering the social environment to reduce social risk factors,

• monitoring social risk factors associated with program activities, and

• additional options, such as increasing training and providing

information to visitors.

Wildland Firefighting Safety

A study of wildland firefighting safety is currently underway,

sponsored by the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC). The

NIFC includes the NPS, US Forest Service, Bureau of Land

Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and US Fish and Wildlife Service. The study is being conducted with the close collaboration of NIFC, the five federal agencies, and TriData (a private

contractor). The study is being conducted in four phases; Phases

1 and 2 have been completed (TriData 1996, 1997). The four

phases are to:

• identify existing organizational cultures and their contribution

to safety problems,
48

• identify the elements of the desired organizational culture of

the future to enhance safety,

• develop an implementation plan to create the desired organizational culture, and

• assist, monitor, and evaluate implementation of the plan.

The information for Phase 1 was generated through a literature

review, interviews with federal and state wildland firefighters,

and a national survey of a sample of federal wildland firefighters.

Over 1,000 people have been contacted as part of the study.

A list of approximately 250 issues were identified as affecting

firefighter safety. The issues fall into five general categories:

organizational culture, leadership, accountability, human factors,

and external influences that affect wildland firefighter safety (see

Table 3.5). There was general consensus about the most pressing

problems across agencies, ranks, gender, and ethnic groups. The

high-priority needs related to firefighter safety were identified as:

• improving the experience level, training, and physical fitness

of individual firefighters,

• improving attitudes toward safety, particularly in the minority

of firefighters who do not seem adequately concerned about

safety,

• ensuring that crew and division supervisors have the required

characteristics, training, and experience to supervise during

emergencies, and

• holding all ranks accountable for unsafe performance decisions.

A general conclusion of the Phase 1 report is that:

virtually every problem raised by firefighters had one or

more solutions offered by firefighters to solve it. There is no

need for a massive change in the approach to wildland

firefighting. Rather, attention must be given to making the

current approaches work better. The one big caveat to this is

the availability of resources relative to expectations and the

condition of the wildlands (TriData 1996:202).
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 49

Table 3.5 Factors in wildland firefighter safety

Organizational Culture

attitudes

composition of the workforce

experience of the workforce

certifications

symbols and insignia

information flow

dispatching

equipment and protective clothing

equipment of non-federal crews

transportation to fires

reporting and investigating safety problems

rescues

ethnic and gender issues

Leadership

fire management policy

situational awareness

appropriate use of various crews

strategy and tactics issues affecting safety

leadership experience and competence

briefing and plans

accountability

challenging ones assignments

safety officers

Human and Psychological Factors

self-image, self-esteem, self-assurance

personnel practices: rewards, penalties, feedback

training

crew supervisors and firefighters ability to cope

fatigue

over-reliance on tools and shelters

crew dynamics

physical fitness

External Influences that Affect Wildland Firefighter Safety

political pressures

public awareness and code requirements

fuel build-up

[Source: TriData 1996]
50

The completion of Phase 2 of the study has resulted in the

ranking of proposed “solutions” to the identified safety-related

problems. The general approach to identifying solutions was

based on a concern for the entire wildland firefighter system (or

technical task) and the basic elements related to: 1) reducing

exposure to fires, 2) increasing safety behavior at fires, and 3)

escaping when necessary.

Law Enforcement and Threats to NPS Employees

In 1993, two employees of the NPS Southwest Region began a

research project to assess the violence-related hazards to noncommissioned employees. The authors wrote:

acts of aggression and violence toward uniformed National

Park Service personnel in the performance of their duties is

increasing. These acts range from verbal abuse to threats to

physical attacks, some of which have resulted in death. This

violence is not gender specific...(Sikoryak and Dec 1994:1).

The evidence for these conclusions is based on a survey administered to Southwest Regional non-commissioned employees

during 1994. At that time, there were 7,351 rangers employed by

the NPS, 1,520 held permanent commissions, and approximately 900 held seasonal commissions. The authors estimated

that approximately half of the non-commissioned rangers reported being harassed, threatened, or attacked during their work.

The results of the survey are shown in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6 Survey results about acts of aggression to

Southwest Region NPS employees

% of respondents

experiencing situation Situation

61 felt threatened

77 been verbally attacked

19 been touched or grabbed in an inappropriate manner

44 felt threatened or in danger by someone they knew

75 dealt with those under the influence of drugs or alcohol

50 dealt with groups such as gangs, political activists, etc.

57 felt unable to handle interpersonal situations due to lack of

training

14 been threatened or physically attacked going to or from work

 [Source: Sikoryak and Dec 1994]
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 51

In spite of these statistics, the authors observed that little focus

had been placed on training of non-commissioned personnel.

Situational awareness, stress management, risk assessment, fear

management and response, and other strategies were not part of

training programs. Respondents to the survey also provided

information about the kinds of skill training that would be

beneficial to help cope with threatening and violent situations,

such as:

• how to assess a situation and determine when an unusual or

uncomfortable situation is becoming dangerous,

• how to minimize or avoid risk, including how to defuse hostile

situations or prevent them from escalating,

• how to converse without being argumentative,

• how to escape a dangerous situation and “buy time,” and

• how to identify individuals and groups that may present

problems.

Current Research Needs on Employee Safety

What is known about employee safety, and what further research

is needed? There has been considerable research on individual,

group, and organizational factors that contribute to failures in

technical tasks. Much of this work is concerned with factors that

influence perception, judgment, comprehension, communication, decisions, and behavior of employees. The social sciences

have devoted much attention to these issues and they provide a

useful perspective from which to assess and improve employee

safety in technical tasks, including those performed by the NPS.

An important lesson from prior research is that technical tasks

must be analyzed in terms of the “total system.” Individuals

interact within the context of equipment, other personnel,

organizational cultures, social and economic factors, and the

environment.

Studies on “human errors” and their causes are not capable of

explaining exactly why or when “mismatches” may occur, how

the effects of stress, fatigue, and workload influence particular
52

individuals or groups. Nor can it fully explain why the reactions

of individuals and groups can vary when exposed to similar

factors. For example, there continues to be considerable debate

over the exact definition of mental workload, models of

workload, effective measurement techniques, and its implications. Much of the difficulty occurs because imposed workload is

not the same as experienced workload.

Similarly, research on risk-taking, stress and fatigue is inconclusive. For example, Yates (1993:321) has noted that:

implicit in the term risk-taking is the idea that people are

making conscious decisions to make a risky choice or

engage in a risky activity. However, research has shown that

in many accidents, that at first glance look like risk-taking

behavior, the individuals did not take risk into account. It is

as if risk-taking was inadvertent.

Knowledge of effective hazard management strategies remains

limited. It is known that organizational cultures can be created

and maintained that enhance safety and reliability. Furthermore,

management commitment, training, and formal evaluation and

monitoring programs have been found to improve hazard

management, and thus, safety. However, the conditions under

which safety cultures are created and sustained, and the different

strategies for maintaining and improving employee safety that

work best, are not completely understood.

Much of what is unknown is related to the many variables that

influence the reactions of individuals in specific situations.

Limitations in research occur because certain behaviors or

situations have not been studied in detail. Limited research has

addressed the unique combinations of work requirements, social

and physical work environments, management commitment,

organizational culture, and individual and group behaviors that

occur in many of the tasks performed by NPS employees.

Hence, the current research literature offers an extensive body of

findings, with many important gaps. These gaps suggest a research agenda for social science research related to NPS employee safety.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 53

IV

Views and Opinions from

the Field

A key source of information on NPS employee safety research

needs are NPS safety managers and employees, as well as safety

managers from other DOI bureaus. A formal survey was not

conducted. Rather, views of key individuals were sought to add

to the development of a research agenda. One group workshop

and 19 telephone interviews were conducted to obtain input

from NPS safety and maintenance supervisors, NPS program

specialists at the regional level and at specific park units, and

safety managers from other agencies such as the US Fish and

Wildlife Service and Bureau of Land Management. Participants

identified key research questions relevant to employee safety.

In this section, the procedure and results of the group workshop

are presented, followed by the procedure and results of the

telephone interviews. A wide range of research questions

emerged. The questions revealed several key areas of social

science research needed to improve on NPS employee safety.

Group Workshop

A workshop was held during the NPS Risk Management
54

Council meeting in Lakewood, Colorado on 5 March 1997. A list

of participants is available from the NPS. The workshop was

conducted by a moderator using a nominal group process. First,

the purpose for developing a social science plan for NPS employee safety was presented. Second, the social sciences represented in the plan were listed (economics, geography, political

science, psychology, sociology, and interdisciplinary research),

along with examples of potential research questions. Third,

participants were guided through three different worksheets in

which they generated, selected, and ranked research questions.

On the first worksheet, each participant was asked to respond to

the following question:

What social science questions must be answered to improve employee

safety and risk management in the NPS?

Each participant wrote a list. Then, participants presented their

research questions to the group. The moderator helped clarify

each question, and the responses were recorded on flipcharts.

Participants were then given a second worksheet which instructed, “From the posted list, please choose the five questions

you believe are most important.” The moderator tallied the

results of the second worksheet and identified the research

questions that were chosen most often by the participants.

Finally, participants were given a third worksheet which instructed, “From the final list, please give each question a share of

100 points. The more important you think the question is, the

more points it should receive.” The moderator then tallied the

results, and a final list of top research questions—with total scores

and rank as determined by the group participants—was presented

to the group.

Workshop Results

Workshop participants identified, prioritized, and scored the

following social science research questions as most important.

They are presented in rank order, with the total score in parentheses.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 55

1. What can motivate NPS employees to be involved in risk

management on a sustained basis? (410)

2. Why do NPS employees place themselves at risk when they

know they are doing so? (240)

3. How can prevailing NPS attitudes be altered to encourage

safety? (240)

4. What are the most effective ways to change attitudes and

cultures in organizations and how can such change be effectively measured? (235)

5. Are there demographic differences among NPS employees in

the perception of risk? (185)

6. What balance of incentives and discipline is most effective in

motivating safe behaviors by NPS employees? (160)

7. What are the best available training strategies for changing

safety attitudes? (160)

The questions revealed several key research topics. All of the

questions on the list are related to the need to understand employee motivations for safe and unsafe behaviors. Several questions are related to the need for a better understanding about

how and why employee perceptions of risks vary. Several questions reveal a desire to know more about what can be done to

discourage unsafe behaviors and encourage safe behaviors. Two

of the questions are concerned with the measurement of safety

program effectiveness. Finally, several of the questions are

concerned with the role of management in ensuring employee

safety. A complete list of the research questions generated by the

workshop is in Appendix II.

Telephone Interviews

To obtain additional input, a series of telephone interviews were

conducted with national, regional and park unit NPS employees,

safety managers from the Bureau of Land Management and US

Fish and Wildlife Service, and safety managers from the DOI

with jurisdiction over activities conducted by the NPS (such as

aviation and wildland firefighting). The individuals were asked a
56

series of questions about information needs for improving

employee safety at individual, group, and organizational levels.

They were also asked questions related to training,

recordkeeping, and data analysis. Finally, they were asked what,

in their view, are the most significant barriers to improving

employee safety in the NPS. Nineteen individuals were interviewed between March and June 1997. Those contacted were

safety officers at individual park units, regional safety managers,

maintenance managers, interpretive specialists, fire safety managers, aviation safety managers, and training managers. NPS

employees represented a diversity of park unit sizes and geographical locations. Appendix III lists the individuals contacted.

All interviews were conducted by the same researcher. Interviews with NPS employees followed the same format. First, the

interviewer identified himself, and explained the reason for the

call. Second, the purpose for developing a social science plan for

NPS employee safety was presented. Third, the interviewee was

asked a series of questions designed to solicit opinions and ideas

regarding NPS employee safety research needs. Interviews with

DOI, USFWS, and BLM employees followed a somewhat

different format. Again, the interviewer identified himself, and

explained the reason for the call. Then, the interviewee was

asked a series of questions about their activities and how they

related to or compared with NPS activities.

Telephone Interview Results

Several themes emerged from the interviews. Several NPS

employees were concerned with questioning what they viewed

as untested assumptions about NPS employee safety. For example, one individual questioned the assumption that traditional

approaches to safety management are not working; instead, he

wanted to know what impact lack of resources has had on the

ability to implement safety programs. Another individual was

interested to know whether the NPS really has an employee

safety problem that is worse than other bureaus in the DOI—or

whether the seemingly high accident rates are related to the

different kinds of work tasks and conditions that NPS employees
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 57

face. Several individuals questioned the assumption that safety

program interventions developed in the private sector can be

easily transferred to the NPS context.

Several research questions emerged from the interviews. They

include:

• What are current employee safety conditions in the NPS—

including accident causes and contributory factors, employee

attitudes and perceptions, management attitudes and perceptions, and the effects of safety programs?

• What are the factors that influence employee motivations and

attitudes, and how can safe work-practices be promoted

through the use of incentives and penalties?

• What are the different approaches available to improve

employee safety?

• What is the role of management in fostering employee safety?

• What is the role of organizational culture in promoting or

discouraging safety?

• How can communication and sharing of safety information be

improved?

Each of the questions is presented in more detail below.

What are current employee safety conditions in the NPS—including

accident causes and contributory factors, employee attitudes and perceptions, management attitudes and perceptions, and the effects of safety

programs?

All interviewees were concerned about a lack of information to

assist in safety planning and evaluation. Most expressed a need

for better understanding of the similarities and differences

among parks and among DOI bureaus. Characteristics of bureaus and park units that were suggested as relevant to NPS

employee safety included:

• mission and variety of activities,

• size,
58

• management styles,

• type of unit (such as national park, monument), and

• resources (such as having a full-time or collateral duty safety

officer).

Other needs that were mentioned by interviewees included

information about whether 1) gender is related to safety behaviors and accident rates, 2) “near accident” data can be useful, 3)

accidents occur from unsafe conditions or a disregard of procedures, and 4) the use of checklists reduces accident rates.

What are the factors that influence employee motivations and attitudes,

and how can safe work-practices be promoted through the use of incentives and penalties?

All of the individuals interviewed suggested research questions

about the behaviors, motivations, and attitudes of individual

NPS employees. Topics included:

• how to “internalize” concerns for safety on and off the job,

• the reasons individuals use or do not use protective equipment,

• the reasons individuals follow safety procedures,

• the different roles that “carrot and stick” approaches can play

in promoting safety,

• how employees can be kept vigilant about safety, and

• the role of peer pressure.

For example, one individual asked whether “safety recognition

programs” actually improve attitudes toward safety or cause

discontent. Several individuals asked if it is possible to know

when incentives and rewards are more appropriate than penalties in promoting safe work practices. One person wondered

whether “mentoring” between old and new employees can

effectively promote safe work practices.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 59

What are the different approaches available to parks to improve employee

safety?

This question was suggested by all the NPS safety managers

interviewed. Three topics were brought up in the interviews.

First, the safety managers all asked for more information about

the kinds of information collection and analysis techniques that

are available. Specific questions included:

• What are the most important types of information to collect?

• Should there be minimal requirements for data collection,

analysis, and reporting?

• How can specific techniques be useful in improving employee

safety (such as, perception surveys and job hazard analyses)?

For example, one individual asked about the different techniques

that are available for analyzing accidents, so that contributory

factors and “corrective opportunities” could be identified.

A second set of concerns were related to safety management

approaches that are available to NPS managers. NPS safety

managers expressed considerable interest in learning about the

conditions at specific parks that can affect the appropriateness of

different safety approaches. Currently, there is much attention

on behavior-based safety programs that were initially developed

in the private sector. Both proponents and critics of this general

approach sought more information about how behavior-based

programs can be transferred to the NPS. They wanted to know

how different approaches can be compared, especially in relation to more “traditional” approaches toward employee safety.

Also, several individuals were concerned about how managers

and supervisors can determine what conditions need to be met

before a particular approach is appropriate. A few would like

more information about how differences among NPS units (such

as size, centralization of management, full-time or collateral duty

safety officers, types of units) can affect decisions about the

effectiveness of safety strategies.
60

A third set of concerns was related to the role of training as a

technique to improve employee safety. There are many types of

training programs available to NPS employees. However, it was

unclear to most of the NPS safety managers whether these

programs effectively train in ways that promote safe practices.

They sought information about:

• “state-of-the-art” training techniques,

• mechanisms to speed up training for newly identified hazards,

• how to use computer technology and the internet,

• how to train teams, and

• the role of periodic training.

What is the role of management in fostering employee safety?

Many of the interviewed individuals felt that efforts to improve

safety should not focus only on the behaviors of the employees.

Many wanted to know more about the ways that management

supports or hinders employee safety programs. For example, one

individual stated that the NPS “needs to look at the role of

management and supervisors in contributing to safety problems,

and not to focus only on what individuals are doing wrong.”

There were questions about how to do this, expressed somewhat

differently by the interviewees. For example, one individual

asked how supervisors can set the “right example.” Another

asked how accountability of managers can be established, and

how managers can be more responsive to the concerns and

needs of employees. Many of those interviewed were concerned

about a lack of resources, and whether or not the availability of

resources for safety programs is a condition that NPS management can change.

What is the role of organizational culture in promoting or discouraging

safety?

Many of the interviewees from the NPS suggested that “safety

culture” was a topic in need of further study. They wanted to

know how safety can be embedded and reinforced within the
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 61

NPS organizational culture. In particular, they wanted to better

understand different approaches to creating a “safety culture,”

and what the effectiveness is of the different approaches toward

establishing such a culture.

How can communication and sharing of safety information be improved?

A few of the interviewees were particularly concerned that safety

information is not distributed and shared effectively among NPS

divisions and DOI bureaus. For example, one individual was

concerned about the difficulty of raising safety concerns that

occur in other divisions or units because of an attitude that “it’s

none of my business.” A few interviewees expressed similar

concerns about how individuals can raise safety issues with peers

and management in “non-confrontational” ways. These concerns

led to questions about how such problems can be addressed

within the NPS. A second set of issues raised by many of the

interviewees was related to how safety information can be

efficiently shared and how to communicate safety messages most

effectively. They were especially interested in the effectiveness of

“tail-gate safety” sessions, written materials, and face-to-face

discussions.

Summary

Several important themes for social science research on NPS

employee safety can be identified from the group workshop and

interviews. First, there is widespread acknowledgment that a lack

of information about current conditions, practices, attitudes, and

innovations is a barrier to improving employee safety. There is

no firm understanding of baseline conditions from which meaningful comparisons can be made. Many of the interviewees

expressed the opinion that assumptions about the driving forces

and conditions of employee safety are untested. A variety of

research questions were proposed to develop necessary baseline

information for effective planning, safety activities, and evaluation.

Second, the Risk Management Council proposed research

questions oriented toward the attitudes and behaviors of employees. Other individuals emphasized that NPS management plays
62

an important role in the current situation and must be a central

focus of efforts to improve employee safety. A broader understanding is necessary about the ways that different ranks, units,

regions, and divisions interact within the NPS. Essential to the

success of a research program is an effort to understand roles of

individual employees and management and the interaction

between them.

Third, training was recognized as a vital component of efforts to

improve employee safety. At the same time, there are many

questions about the best ways to train. When and how to use

different approaches is not well understood, and there is a strong

desire to know more about effective safety training.

Fourth, the issue of “organizational culture” is a recurring theme.

There is a strong recognition that safety is not something that is

“added on” to work tasks. Rather, work must occur within a

culture that emphasizes safety at all levels in all situations and at

all times. How to create, maintain, and reinforce a “safety culture” within the NPS is an important question; those interviewed

sought information about how to best establish an organizational

culture that makes for a safe work environment and work practices. Importantly, there was no clear agreement among the

interviewees about what such an “appropriate” culture might be.

These themes provide a significant and extensive set of topics

and questions relevant to the development of a social science

research plan for NPS employee safety.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 63

V

A Research Agenda

In this chapter, a social science research agenda for NPS employee safety is proposed. It is based on the policy analysis,

literature review, workshop and interviews described in the

previous chapters. It is organized around a series of specific

research projects. The research projects are organized into three

categories.

The first category of research involves baseline inventory. These

projects are designed to document current conditions of employee safety—such as accident rates, causes, perceptions of

employees and management. In addition, a baseline inventory of

safety activities, including full-time and collateral personnel,

safety programs, and financial resources is necessary to understand the relationships between organizational factors and

individual behaviors. This research provides a necessary foundation for safety education, the development of effective safety

programs, and changes in NPS organizational culture needed to

establish employee safety as a top priority at all levels of the

agency.

The second category of research involves strategic science. That is,

it includes projects designed to help the NPS meet important
64

strategic goals related to employee safety. Projects include

technology transfer and application of available research to

improve training, a safety culture, and carefully evaluate safety

programs to assess their effectiveness.

The third category of research involves on-going technical assistance. It includes projects that provide technical assistance to

parks, clusters, regions and WASO-level divisions. Such technical assistance is focused on keeping managers up-to-date with

new research findings, and assisting parks with specific, unique

or unusual safety situations.

All three categories of research are necessary and important to

improving employee safety in the NPS. The proposed work is

cumulative; that is, the baseline inventory leads to strategic

science which leads to on-going technical assistance. Hence, the

research agenda consists of a set of interdependent research

projects. Each are discussed below. For each project, an objective, general description, estimated budget, and schedule are

described.

Baseline Inventory Projects

Employee Accident Profile

One foundation of an effective employee safety program is a

comprehensive, accurate and detailed understanding of the

factors contributing to employee accidents. An NPS Employee

Accident Profile is proposed. The Employee Accident Profile

would focus on questions such as: Which employees (by age,

region, technical task and so forth) are most at risk? What factors

contribute to NPS employee accidents? Which factors are most

critical? Which are most amenable to mitigation by NPS employee safety programs? What is the perceived role of management? The objective of the Employee Accident Profile would be

to answer these questions.

Such questions were identified as critical in the workshop and

employee interviews. The review of the literature suggests that

effective safety programs are dependent upon an accurate and

complete understanding of which accidents are occurring to
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 65

whom and the ways in which they occur. Finally, a comprehensive reporting system for employee accidents is mandated by

federal legislation (OSHA).

An historical analysis of existing employee accident reports

would be conducted, using statistical techniques borrowed from

the fields of risk assessment, epidemiology and human factors

research. An efficient and comprehensive accident profile form

would be developed, in close consultation with the NPS Risk

Management Division. The form would include data needed to

examine contributory factors, and would be reviewed by experts

in risk assessment and employee safety research. Data from the

accident profile form would be used to create accident profiles

for the NPS on an annual basis. Analysis should identify a set of

key factors influencing accident rates as opposed to searching for

single causes. Results should be benchmarked and compared to

organizations that involve similar work and work conditions.

The accident profiles would be used to target other research

efforts, identify employees at risk (not individuals, but generic

categories), identify contributory causes, and create effective

training and safety programs.

An annual technical report and a brief report for employees

would be prepared. A workshop for RMD managers would be

conducted. Each year, the data would be integrated into a

cumulative accident profile, so that trends in accident rates and

contributory factors (needed to evaluate the effectiveness of

safety programs) could be documented.

Approximate cost: $50k the first year, 15k each additional year

Duration: 12 months to develop and establish; continued monitoring in following years.

NPS Employee Safety Survey

The second foundation of an effective employee safety program

is a comprehensive and accurate understanding of how employees and managers perceive safety issues, and how their attitudes

and behaviors influence safety on the job. An NPS Employee

Safety Survey is proposed. The Employee Safety Survey would
66

focus on the following and similar questions: What are the

perceptions of NPS employees and managers regarding safety

issues? Are there important differences in these perceptions—

among grade levels, positions, regions, kinds of parks, experience levels and age? The objective of the Employee Safety

Survey would be to answer these and similar questions.

The need for an employee safety survey is based on the workshop, interviews, and literature review. For example, NPS risk

managers expressed a strong interest in understanding the

perceptions, attitudes, and values of employees and managers

and how they influence safe work practices. The literature

review reveals that attitudes, motivations, and perceptions play

important roles in risk-taking behaviors, organizational culture,

and the adoption of self-protective behaviors.

A survey of NPS employees (including managers) would be

conducted. The survey would be designed in close consultation

with RMD managers, risk managers at the region, cluster and

park level, and employee organizations (such as the National

Association of Park Rangers). The survey would be reviewed by

experts in risk perception and employee safety research. The

survey would include a large sample of full-time and seasonal

employees, to provide a sufficiently detailed data set for in-depth

analyses. The survey should be stratified by type of park unit—

large natural areas, small historic sites, recreation areas, and so

forth. The results would be used to identify critical safety needs,

target employee safety programs, assist safety officers in working

with managers and employees, and guide NPS policy regarding

employee safety.

A technical report, brief report for employees, training materials

and a workshop for RMD managers would be produced. The

survey could be repeated in 5 years, so that changes in employee

perceptions could be documented, and the effectiveness of NPS

safety programs assessed.

Approximate Cost: $75k

Duration: 9 months
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 67

Strategic Science Projects

Research Applications Project

The accident profile and employee survey described above will

provide the NPS with a comprehensive and accurate understanding of employee safety issues. It will identify contributory

factors that are common to other organizations and technical

tasks, as well as factors that are relatively unique to the NPS.

Based on these results, a Research Applications Project is proposed. The Research Applications Project would focus on the

following question: What social science research being conducted for other organizations can contribute to improving the

NPS safety culture, and ultimately employee safety? The objective of the Applications Project would be to fully exploit available research that addresses the specific needs of the NPS

derived from the baseline inventory research. For example, the

Armed Services may have research results directly applicable to

specific NPS technical tasks, such as search and rescue operations. Joint funding with other organizations and agencies should

be pursued. Such an applications project is a cost-effective way

of integrating social science research into NPS employee safety

programs.

There is a lack of existing research on NPS-specific activities.

Much of the literature is helpful. Yet it is limited because it does

not address conditions that combine the complexity of the NPS

work environment—tasks characteristics, employee and manager

attitudes, social/political factors—and the physical work environment. Interviewees, especially risk managers, expressed an

interest in applying available research/information more efficiently, developing better information sharing, and communication mechanisms.

A detailed literature review would be conducted, targeted at

factors identified in the accident profile and employee survey.

The review would include research being conducted by industry,

government, defense and other sectors. Interviews with safety

officers in industry, government, defense and other sectors

would be conducted again, targeted at specific NPS needs.
68

Results would be used to provide practical applications to NPS

employee safety programs—new safety procedures or policies,

new training approaches or materials, and so forth.

A technical report and workshop for RMD managers would be

produced. Once conducted, the applications project should be

updated every two years to ensure that NPS employee safety

programs take advantage of the most recent and relevant research.

Cost: $25k for the first year; $10k each additional year

Duration: 6 months

NPS Safety Programs Evaluation

Improving employee safety is a critical challenge for the NPS,

and this challenge is part of the NPS Strategic Plan, its Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requirements, and

several other NPS plans at all levels of the agency. A growing

number of employee safety programs are being implemented at

the park, cluster, region and national level. Early evaluation of

these pilot programs is important, and an NPS Safety Programs

Evaluation is proposed. The project would focus on questions

such as: Which existing NPS safety programs are effective,

which are not, and why? Which programs are most effective,

and why? What safety programs, not currently used by the NPS,

might be effectively applied to the NPS? The objective of the

Safety Programs Evaluation would be to develop criteria and

measurement tools to carefully evaluate NPS safety programs,

and conduct evaluations of several existing and potential programs.

The research literature demonstrates that maintaining employee

safety requires on-going evaluations and monitoring of employee

accidents. Interviewees expressed great interest in knowing what

works when—what options are available to different parks, for

different employees, and for different tasks. To do this requires

evaluation of existing and pilot projects. There is also a policy

rationale: OSHA requires evaluation, such as job/hazard analysis and evaluation.
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 69

Criteria and measurement tools would be developed in close

consultation with the RMD and experts in safety program

evaluation. three to five on-going NPS safety programs would be

evaluated—at least one at the park, regional and national levels.

One or two safety programs currently available but not yet used

by the NPS would be evaluated, using the same criteria and

measurement tools.

Approximate Cost: $40k per year for two years

Duration: 2 years

On-going Technical Assistance

Many of the safety issues in the NPS are relatively unique, and

specific to an individual park unit or a specialized technical task.

Technical assistance is often required in developing effective

safety procedures related to these special safety concerns—

helicopter removal of goats in Olympic NP and snow removal

operations at Mt. Rainier NP are examples. Special problems

assistance would enable the RMD and park managers at all

levels to have access to technical assistance in dealing with the

social factors associated with specialized safety concerns. Application of results from baseline inventory and strategic science

projects would be emphasized. Approximately two or three

small projects, from literature reviews to on-site consultations,

would be conducted each year, depending upon NPS needs.

Approximate Cost: $20k per year

Duration: 12 months

These projects represent a social science agenda on employee

safety for the NPS. The next chapter recommends an action plan

for accomplishing the research.
70
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 71

VI

Action Plan

The research agenda described in the previous chapter is critical

to improving employee safety in the NPS. There are several

alternative ways the agenda can be realized; that is, the necessary

research designed, conducted, completed, and the results integrated into NPS safety programs. Three approaches are practical.

The first approach is to treat each of the research projects as a

separate effort, and contract them separately through competitive

process. Universities, consulting firms, insurance companies

(specializing in risk management), and non-profits (such as the

National Safety Council) would be eligible to compete for the

contract. Requests for Proposals (RFP) would be created for each

project (with assistance from the NPS Social Science Program),

and a panel of social scientists and NPS risk managers would

review proposals and select a winning contractor for each

project. An advantage of this approach is that each project could

attract specialists with unique skills relevant to the project. A

disadvantage is the increased administrative effort in preparing

the RFPs, selecting the contractors, and overseeing the various

contracts and projects.
72

A second approach is to hire—as an NPS employee—a researcher

with experience in employee safety research. A job description

would be created around the research tasks associated with the

research agenda described earlier. The position would likely be

at the GS-12/13 level (based on similar positions in other agencies and the private sector), and would report to the Risk Management Division. The individual hired would be responsible for

conducting research, communicating the results to managers,

providing technical assistance and training, and assisting in

special safety projects as requested. The advantage to the NPS

would be increased access to safety research expertise, continued

research effort over the long-term, and reduced cost for small

projects and technical assistance. Disadvantages include the need

for a wide range of skills (from program evaluation to survey

design) in one individual, an increase in NPS FTE requirements,

and higher costs for large research projects involving staff and

field expenditures.

A third approach is to create a long-term working relationship

with a university and university faculty with expertise in safety

research. In this approach, an RFP would be developed for the

employee safety research as a package of projects, to be awarded

under a cooperative agreement between the NPS Risk Management Division and the winning university. The cooperative

agreement would be for a term of 3-5 years, and funds would be

provided to conduct the research and technical assistance described in this plan. The advantages of this approach include

access to wide scientific expertise, university resources (such as

libraries), graduate student assistance, continuity and interdependence of the research projects, objectivity of findings, publication

of results in peer-review journals, and increased accountability.

Disadvantages include administrative requirements associated

with the cooperative agreement, and the need to find a university (or consortium of universities) with the requisite expertise.

It is recommended that the latter approach—a 3-5 year cooperative agreement with a university or consortium of universities—be

pursued. The benefits are significant, including lowered costs,
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 73

flexibility, accountability, and access to state-of-the-art employee

safety research. The following action plan is based on this

approach. It is organized around several stages, which can be

accomplished as funds are available.

Stage 1. Organizing for Science

1.1 A social science liaison should be appointed for the Risk Management Division. This individual would be responsible for coordination of the research program with the NPS Social Science Program, and for communication and coordination of social science

research with the safety managers of the NPS. The work would

require .15 FTE, and the individual should be located at Denver,

WASO or in a regional office.

1.2 A Request for Proposals (RFP) should be prepared. The RFP

would seek to establish a 3-5 year cooperative agreement with a

university or consortium of universities. The cooperative agreement would cover social science research on NPS employee

safety as described in this plan. It would describe the responsibilities of both the university and the NPS. The NPS Social

Science Program would assist in the preparation of the RFP, as

requested. The RFP should be widely distributed to universities,

with a special emphasis on universities with research programs

on risk, employee safety, and hazards management.

1.3 A cooperating university or university consortium should be selected.

A review panel would be assembled to review submitted RFPs.

The panel should include representatives of the Risk Management Division, NPS safety managers at the region and park

level, and social scientists. The NPS Social Science Program

would assist as requested. Based on submitted RFPs, a winning

cooperator would be identified. A site visit would be held, and a

final cooperative agreement would be prepared and signed.

1.4 The cooperating university or university consortium should appoint

a project leader. This individual would serve as project leader for

all research projects conducted under the cooperative agreement, and would be a liaison to the NPS Risk Management

Division and the NPS Social Science Program.
74

Stage 2. Baseline Inventory

2.1 The Employee Accident Profile should be initiated. The Employee

Accident Profile is a critical foundation to further research and

improvement of NPS employee safety. It should be conducted

by the university project leader, in coordination with the NPS

liaison. The NPS Social Science Program should provide peer

review and other assistance as requested.

2.2 The NPS Employee Safety Survey should be conducted. The survey

is a critical foundation to further research and improvement of

NPS visitor safety. It should be conducted by the university

project leader, in coordination with the NPS liaison. The NPS

Social Science Program should provide peer review and other

assistance as requested.

Stage 3. Strategic Science and Technical Assistance

3.1 Based on the results of Stage 1 research, the Research Applications

Project should be initiated. It should focus on employee and management safety issues identified in the Employee Accident Profile

and the Employee Safety Survey. It should be conducted by the

university project leader, in coordination with the NPS liaison.

3.2 The NPS Safety Programs Evaluation should be initiated. It

should focus on several pilot NPS safety programs, and provide

evaluation information useful in meeting GPRA requirements,

improving existing programs, and expanding efforts to other

units or regions of the NPS. It should be conducted by the

university project leader, in coordination with the NPS liaison.

The NPS Social Science Program should provide peer review

and other assistance as requested.

3.3 The cooperating university or consortium of universities should

initiate a program of on-going technical assistance. It should include

special problem assistance as described in this plan. It should be

conducted by the university project leader in coordination with

the NPS liaison.

Stage 4. Program Review

4.1 The program of employee safety research conducted under the

cooperative agreement should be reviewed. The review should focus
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 75

on both the scientific merit of the work accomplished and the

practical usefulness of the work to the NPS. A review panel

should be assembled and include representatives of the Risk

Management Division, NPS safety managers, and social scientists with expertise in employee safety. The review panel should

make recommendations on improving, reducing, extending or

expanding the program of employee safety research.

4.2 If continued research on NPS employee safety is recommended by the

review panel, a new social science plan should be prepared, and a new

cooperative agreement established.

Table 6.1 provides an estimated budget for completing this

action plan in four years.

Table 6.1 Estimated budget for four-year NPS research

program on employee safety (in thousands of dollars)

Year

Project 1 2 3 4 Total

Baseline Inventory

Employee Accident Profile 50 15 15 15 95

Employee Safety Survey 75 — — — 75

Strategic Science

Research Applications Project — 25 10 10 45

Safety Programs Evaluation — 40 40 — 80

On-going Technical Assistance — — 20 20 40

TOTAL 125 80 85 45 335
76
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 77

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78
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 79

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Appendix II. Questions Identified During Nominal

Group Process

NPS Risk Management Division Meeting, Lakewood, CO,

March 1997

1) How do organizations behave so as to achieve funding goals?

2) What can motivate NPS employees to be involved in risk management on a

sustained basis?

3) Why have NPS employees NOT used available information to reduce

employee accidents?

4) Why is safety not considered a value in the NPS?

5) Is safety a concern within the NPS (broadly)?

6) What ways are there to change attitudes about an inherently dangerous

workplace?

7) Why do NPS employees resist change?

8) Why do NPS employees place themselves at risk when they know they are

doing so?

9) How can we reduce macho attitudes (broadly) among employees that lead to

unsafe behavior?

10) Do our employees value their own safety?

11) How do workers develop their perceptions of acceptable risk?

12) Are there gender differences in the perception of risk among employee

safety?

13) Does personal career development take priority over safety concerns?

14) What qualities are most important in safety professionals in communicating

and managing risk, particularly assisting others in doing so?

15) How do we receive and maintain NPS leadership support for risk management when such leadership is continuously changing?

16) What are the values and norms of both ranger and maintenance cultures

that result in decisions that lead to at-risk behaviors?

17) Are there demographic differences among NPS employees in the perception of risks?

18) What controllable factors (e.g., scheduling, preparation) influence outcomes

in life-threatening conflicts?
96

19) Why does NPS culture require employees to make significant sacrifices

(broadly)?

20) How can prevailing NPS attitudes be altered to encourage safety?

21) How do “life conditions” of individual employees affect safety and can such

conditions be monitored?

22) What are the best available training strategies for changing safety attitudes?

23) How can passive employees be encouraged to be assertive?

24) Why do supervisors frequently ignore unsafe behavior?

25) What balance of incentives and discipline is most effective in motivating

safe behaviors by NPS employees?

26) What is the relationship between visitor risk communication and employee

safety?

27) What is the existing perception of safety in the NPS?

28) What is the education difference between the NPS and other comparable

federal agencies?

29) Which NPS positions are perceived to have high levels of acceptable risk?

30) What factors in NPS history have had the most influence on NPS attitudes

toward safety and how can the negative factors be overcome?

31) How can the NPS distinguish between legitimate and false injuries and do

so effectively and while protecting the rights of employees?

32) How do NPS subcultures lead to unsafe practices?

33) Is there a relationship between training of risk managers and the accident

rate?

34) What role does politics play in creating risk situations and what can be

done to manage that?

35) Why do some NPS functions achieve adequate budgets while risk management does not?

36) How can employee safety research be applied to visitors?

37) Are supervisors acting as safety role models, and if not, why not?

38) Where and when are most accidents?

39) Why doesn’t the NPS learn from past risk accidents?
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 97

40) How can management best communicate to employees a concern for

individual safety as opposed to program?

41) How can we encourage employees to care about co-worker safety?

42) How do NPS managers value and perceive the safety of full-time, seasonal,

and volunteer employees?

43) What is the existing NPS manager’s perception of risk in the NPS workplace?

44) What is the NPS visiting public’s perception of employee safety (general

and specific)?

45) How do time pressures impact risk situations?

46) How do workplace physical factors impact attitudes and behaviors?

47) What are employee’s attitudes toward employee safety programs?

48) Is there a relationship between NPS lack of workers compensation case

management and long-term disability claims, and if so, what is it?

49) Are there multiple strategies for risk communication that can be best

applied to specific NPS employees and are they being used?

50) How can the NPS define “acceptable risk?”

51) Is there a perceived need for professional risk managers at some or all levels

of the NPS?

52) How do NPS employees value and perceive full-time and part-time

(collateral duty) safety managers?

53) Why do NPS employees resist safety?

54) How can managers maintain quality control of the risk management

program while preserving local manager options?

55) What are the most effective ways to change attitudes and cultures in

organizations and how can such change be effectively measured?

56) Do demographic differences among employees lead to different responses

to discipline and incentives related to safety?

57) What are the major elements in our society that affect employee’s attitudes

and perceptions about risk?

58) What are the factors that influence managers to make decisions that put

employees at risk?
98
A Social Science Plan for Employee Safety 99

Appendix III. Individuals Interviewed to Gather Views

and Opinions from the Field

Park units

Robert Belden, Safety Specialist, Lake Mead National Recreation Area, NV

Gary Bornholdt, Safety Manager, Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks,

CA

Myra Dec, Chief Interpreter, Grand Portage National Monument, MN

Steve Iobst, Chief of Park Maintenance, Rocky Mountain National Park, CO

Don Singer, Safety & Occupational Health Manager, Grand Canyon National

Park, AZ

Regional

Deanne Adams, Team Leader for Education and Visitor Services, Columbia

Cascades Support Office, NPS

Paul Broyles, NPS Fire Operations and Safety Specialist, Fire Management

Program Center, NPS

Ruth Brugeman, Office of Aircraft Services, Department of the Interior

Doug Erskine, Operations Director, Fire Management Program Center, NPS

Mike Fees, Program Manager, Great Lakes System Support Office, NPS

Bill Halainen, Management Assistant, Delaware Water Gap NRA, NPS

Stephen Hastings, Service-wide Maintenance Training Manager, Horace M.

Albright Training Center, NPS

Vern Hurt, Regional Risk Manager, Midwest Regional Office, NPS

Ray Peterson (retired), Regional Safety Manager, Pacific Northwest Region,

NPS

Richard Powell, Chief, Risk Management Office, NPS

Mark Seely, Regional Safety and Occupational Health Specialist, Pacific West

Region, Columbia Cascades Support Office, NPS

Nelson Siler, Regional Safety Manager, Southwest Region, NPS

Other Agencies

Ken Rozas, Bureau Safety Manager, US Fish and Wildlife Service, Lakewood,

CO

Kathy Shell, Bureau Safety Manager, Bureau of Land Management, Lakewood,

CO