Page 1 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

June 1, 2001

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Member

Armed Services Committee

United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Subject: Department of Energy: Follow-Up Review of the National Ignition Facility

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, operated by the University of

California under contract with the Department of Energy (DOE), is constructing the

National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Livermore, California. In this stadium-sized laser

facility, DOE’s goal is to simulate, in a laboratory setting, the thermonuclear

conditions created in nuclear explosions. This will allow scientists to evaluate the

behavior of nuclear weapons without explosive testing. DOE considers NIF an

essential element of its multi-billion-dollar Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is

responsible for ensuring the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the absence

of nuclear testing.

On August 8, 2000, we issued identical reports on NIF to the Subcommittee on

Military Procurement, House Committee on Armed Services, and to the House

Committee on Science.1

 These reports highlighted the reasons for NIF’s cost and

schedule overruns, the effects of cost and schedule problems on other weapons and

science programs, and the effectiveness of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's

actions to correct its project management problems. In our reports, we

recommended that the Secretary of Energy arrange for an independent outside

scientific and technical review of NIF’s remaining technical challenges as they relate

 1

 See National Ignition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures Caused Major Cost Overruns and

Schedule Delays (GAO/RCED-00-141 Aug. 8, 2000) and National Ignition Facility: Management and

Oversight Failures Caused Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays (GAO/RCED-00-271 Aug. 8,

2000).
Page 2 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

to the project’s cost and schedule risks. In addition, we recommended that the

Secretary not reallocate funds from nuclear weapons programs to NIF until DOE

evaluates the impact of NIF’s cost and schedule plan on the overall weapons program

and certifies that the selected NIF plan will not negatively affect the balance of the

Stockpile Stewardship Program.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 directed the General

Accounting Office to review the NIF and to report to the House and Senate

Committees on Armed Services by March 31, 2001. The review was to include

the role of NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program,

the relationship of NIF to other Stockpile Stewardship Program elements,

the impact of delays in constructing NIF on the Stockpile Stewardship

Program,

a description of funds spent to date on the project, and

an assessment of whether the new baseline has clear goals, adequate and

sustainable funding, and achievable milestones.

In discussions with the staff of both committees, it was agreed that a formal briefing

by March 31, 2001, would meet the congressional mandate. We provided a briefing

for the staff on March 30, 2001, using the enclosed briefing slides. (See enc. I.) This

letter summarizes the briefing.

The following summarizes our findings:

The Role of NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program

NIF is expected to contribute to DOE's Stockpile Stewardship Program in three ways:

by attracting new weapon scientists, supporting the stockpile's refurbishment,2

 and

supporting research to improve the understanding of weapons science. Los Alamos,

Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore laboratory officials have a general consensus that

NIF, along with other scientific facilities, can attract new scientists to the

stewardship program. However, because of the timing of planned stockpile

refurbishments, NIF will not make any contribution to the refurbishment of W76 and

W80 warheads or the B61-Mod 7 and 11 bombs in the stockpile. Although NIF is

expected to support research efforts to develop the capabilities needed to certify the

stockpile's safety and reliability, including the validation of computer codes for the

Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative,3 the three laboratories lack a complete

consensus on NIF’s research contribution. While all of the three weapons

laboratories agree that NIF is one of several important facilities needed to

successfully support weapons science research, Los Alamos National Laboratory

officials believe that using plutonium in NIF and achieving robust (repeatable)

thermonuclear ignition are key to NIF’s value in the area of studying weapons

primaries. However, NIF has not been approved for using plutonium, and the

achievement of ignition is not guaranteed. Moreover, Sandia National Laboratories

 2

 Refurbishment activities include extending the life of existing weapons through scientific study and

replacing parts.

3

 The Initiative aims to develop advanced computer models that will simulate nuclear explosions in

three dimensions with higher resolution than previous models.
Page 3 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

officials believe that NIF will not contribute to certifying whether weapons can

survive hostile environments (those where radiation is present), and intend to rely

instead on existing research facilities and computer simulations.

The Relationship of NIF to Other Stockpile Stewardship Program Elements

DOE has yet to certify that the completion of NIF will not negatively affect the

balance of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. NIF is one of numerous facilities

needed to successfully conduct the program. For example, other scientific research

facilities will be needed to conduct weapons science research, and functioning

production facilities will be needed to refurbish the stockpile. Although we

recommended in our August reports that DOE evaluate and certify that NIF’s cost

and schedule would not negatively affect the balance of the program, the Department

has not done so.

The Impact of Delays in Constructing the NIF on the Stockpile Stewardship

Program

Future delays in constructing NIF may adversely affect DOE's ability to conduct

weapons science research. DOE and laboratory officials agree that delays in

constructing NIF to date will not affect meeting its current weapons science research

milestones but that any additional delays may affect the ability to attract and retain

scientists who desire to work on sophisticated science facilities such as the NIF. In

addition, NIF delays would postpone certain weapons-related experiments, which

would increase, to some extent, the uncertainties associated with understanding how

weapons function.

A Description of Funds Spent to Date on the Project

Through fiscal year 2000, DOE had spent $1.3 billion on the NIF project, plus another

$250 million in related costs (mostly those supporting research and development).

NIF's completion is expected in 2008 at a cost of almost $4.2 billion ($3.5 billion in

the NIF project's costs and about $700 million more in related costs). This would

result in a schedule that is 6 years longer than originally planned and a cost that is

about $1.4 billion higher than originally estimated. NIF's cost increases and delays

were caused by a combination of poor Lawrence Livermore management and

inadequate DOE oversight.

An Assessment of Whether the New Baseline Has Clear Goals, Adequate and

Sustainable Funding, and Achievable Milestones

New baseline goals for NIF are clouded by a lack of consensus among the three

laboratories about what size NIF should be and how it should be deployed.

Proposals from DOE's Los Alamos and Sandia laboratories would limit NIF’s size

to 48, 96, or 120 laser beams until NIF's performance could be assured. Livermore

states that building a smaller NIF would not be cost-effective, since most of the

infrastructure supporting the full 192-beam design will soon be completed.

Livermore estimates that pausing at 48, 96, or 120 beams, to assess NIF

performance before restarting, could add up to nearly $600 million in increased
Page 4 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

project costs. Livermore’s cost estimates for alternative deployment options have

not been independently reviewed by DOE or others.

Optimistic assumptions about NIF’s annual operating costs may compromise

budget projections. Livermore’s projected annual NIF operating cost of $108

million is based on some optimistic assumptions. The major assumption is that a

fourfold increase can be achieved in the performance of NIF’s final optics laser

glass. Replacing glass more often will significantly increase the cost of operating

the laser. Although the laboratory states that it has a scientific solution to the

technical problem of damage growth in the final optics when laser light strikes the

glass surface, the concept has yet to be tested in an engineering and production

environment. Other optimistic laboratory assumptions include NIF's obtaining

reduced Livermore overhead rates and being excused from contributing project

funds to support Livermore’s Laboratory Directed Research and Development

program--normally a 6-percent charge levied on all laboratory programs.

Although past internal reviewers concluded that NIF’s milestones are challenging

but doable, most major performance milestones will not occur until fiscal year

2004, when the first test of a laser beamline is to be made. Livermore has

developed a detailed plan of NIF's milestones, including a revised comprehensive

work breakdown structure. Past internal reviewers concluded that NIF could be

built within the cost and schedule represented by these milestones. However, to

better ensure tracking of progress, other laboratories and program reviewers

recommended that more near-term milestones be added in order to assess NIF

laser performance.

Other Issues–Continuing Problems with DOE Oversight, Project

Management, and the Lack of an Independent External Review Process Add

to the NIF Project's Risks

Persistent DOE oversight problems continue to place the NIF project at risk. The

NIF project office at DOE's headquarters is still not fully staffed, and the

laboratory’s monthly NIF reports to DOE do not summarize technical project

risks.

The NIF project does not manage about $700 million in research and development

that directly supports NIF. This research primarily involves activities related to

target physics and is considered crucial to NIF’s success. This research is

managed outside the NIF project and is not included in NIF's monthly reporting.

DOE is currently studying how these activities might be brought under the NIF

project's control so that the project and its supporting research are fully

integrated under a single management structure.

NIF still lacks an independent external review process. Independent external

reviews are valuable for measuring cost, schedule, and technical success in any

large and ambitious science project. Yet, no such external independent reviews of

NIF have been conducted or planned. DOE’s own orders state that external

independent reviews are beneficial; however, DOE plans to continue its own

internal review program--allowing Defense Programs officials to manage the
Page 5 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

process themselves. An external cost review conducted in August 2000 was not

independent, according to both the contracted reviewer and a DOE official

overseeing the review. The review was conducted in support of an internal

review, not as a separate effort. While DOE's current internal reviews are

valuable, an external independent review, as we recommended in our August 2000

reports, would provide the confidence that the NIF project is technically feasible

and reasonable with respect to cost and schedule.

Agency Comments

We met with Department of Energy officials and provided them with a draft of our

briefing slides for comment. The Department generally agreed with our findings and

offered several clarifying changes, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and Methodology

To address our objectives, we interviewed Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

and DOE officials responsible for NIF and officials from other DOE laboratories and

scientific institutions whose programs are affected by NIF. In addition, we obtained

the latest cost and schedule data from DOE, Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, and other laboratories conducting research in support of the NIF project.

We conducted our review from October 2000 through March 2001 in accordance with

generally accepted government audit standards.

_ _ _ _ _

This letter will also be available on GAO’s home page at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this letter or need additional information, please call

me on (202)-512-3464 or Gary Boss on (202) 512-6964. Key contributors to this report

were Gary Boss, James Noel, Thomas Kingham, and William Lanouette.

(Ms.) Gary Jones

Director

Natural Resources

 and Environment

Enclosure
Enclosure I

Page 6 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

Briefing Charts on NIF

Status of GAO’s Followup Review of the

Department of Energy’s National Ignition Facility

Prepared for the House and Senate Armed Service

Committees

March 30, 2001

GAO’s Objectives

• The National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 required a

GAO review of the following:

• Role of NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)

• Relationship of NIF to other SSP elements

• Impact of delays in NIF on SSP

• Description of funds spent to date

• Assessment of whether the new baseline has

• clear goals

• adequate and sustainable funding

• achievable milestones
Enclosure I

Page 7 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

Background

• NIF completion is expected in 2008 at a cost of $3.5 billion,

with another $700-plus million in related research and

program costs

• NIF is taking 6 years longer and $1.4 billion more to

complete than was originally planned

NIF’s Role in the Stockpile

Stewardship Program

• NIF is part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program--an

integrated program to maintain the nation’s nuclear

weapons in a safe and reliable state

• NIF is expected to contribute to stockpile stewardship by

• Attracting and training new weapon scientists

• Supporting and refurbishing the stockpile

• Supporting research “campaigns” to improve

understanding of weapons science

• Although funded by the Energy Department’s Defense

Programs, NIF is also expected to make contributions to

basic science
Enclosure I

Page 8 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

NIF’s Role--Attract Scientists

• NIF can contribute to attracting new scientists

• By providing a scientific challenge, NIF, along with other

facilities and activities, is an important factor in attracting

and retaining scientists

• Prior to the end of testing, a nuclear weapon test was the

primary method for training weapons designers

• Absent testing, multiple scientific facilities, like NIF,

will be needed to train and evaluate new weapons

designers

NIF’s Role--Refurbish Stockpile

• NIF will not make any contribution to planned stockpile

refurbishments

• DOE plans to rebuild the W76 and W80 warheads, and

the B61-Mod 7 and 11 bombs, in order to extend their

lifetimes

• Because of the timing of these refurbishments and the

approach being taken to refurbishment, NIF will have no

role in meeting production deadlines

• NIF also will not contribute to certifying the

remanufactured W88 pit
Enclosure I

Page 9 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

NIF’s Role--Support Campaigns

• NIF is expected to support four weapons science

“campaigns”

• “Campaigns” are research efforts to develop capabilities

needed to certify stockpile safety and reliability

• NIF is expected to support campaigns on:

• Weapon secondaries (thermonuclear explosive)

(including ignition)

• Weapon primaries (nuclear explosive)

• Dynamic properties of materials in weapons

• Hostile (radiation) environments

• NIF experiments also will help validate computer codes for

the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI)

NIF’s Role--Support Campaigns

• Complete consensus among laboratories is lacking on NIF’s

contribution to weapons science “campaigns”

• All labs agree that NIF is important for supporting the

weapon secondaries campaign

• The labs do not fully agree on NIF’s value to the primary

and materials campaigns

• Los Alamos believes that, while NIF can be useful, using

plutonium in NIF and achieving robust (repeatable)

ignition are key to NIF’s value for supporting the

primaries campaign

• Livermore agrees ignition is key to NIF’s value

• However, NIF has not been approved for using

plutonium, and achieving ignition is not guaranteed
Enclosure I

Page 10 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

NIF’s Role--Support Campaigns

• Los Alamos believes other facilities, such as the Z

pulsed-power machine, are better for studying

materials

• Sandia believes NIF will not contribute to certifying that

weapons can survive hostile environments

• Sandia officials intend to rely on existing facilities,

such as the Saturn pulsed power machine, and

weapons simulation through computer modeling

NIF’s Relationship to other Elements of

Stockpile Stewardship

• While NIF is important, other facilities are needed to

successfully support weapons science campaigns

• For example, the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic

Test facility (Los Alamos) is needed to assess the

condition and behavior of nuclear weapon primaries--

however, this facility is still under construction

• In addition, operational weapons production facilities are

needed to refurbish the stockpile

• For example, a functioning Y-12 Plant (Oak Ridge) is

needed to refurbish weapon secondaries—currently,

portions of Y-12 are shut down for safety reasons
Enclosure I

Page 11 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

NIF’s Relationship to other Elements of

Stockpile Stewardship

• Because all aspects of Stockpile Stewardship are important,

we recommended, in August 2000, that DOE evaluate and

certify that the NIF’s cost and schedule problems would not

negatively affect the balance of the Stockpile Stewardship

Program

• DOE has not evaluated the impact of NIF’s cost and

schedule problems on the balance of the SSP, especially

the need to refurbish the stockpile and rebuild its

infrastructure

The Impact of NIF Delays On

Stockpile Stewardship

• NIF’s original delays will not affect meeting current weapons

science campaign milestones

• According to DOE officials, additional delays may affect their

ability to attract and retain scientists

• According to Los Alamos and Livermore weapons scientists,

additional delays or NIF’s termination will increase, to some

degree, the uncertainties associated with their

understanding about how weapons function
Enclosure I

Page 12 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

Description of Funds Supporting NIF

Cost Category Prior Years FY 2001 FY 2002-2008 Totals

TPC 916.3 290.1 1041.7 2248.1

R&D (ICF) 402.7 75.9 721.4 1200.0

REBASELINE

TOTAL 1319.0 366.0 1763.1 3448.1

Target Physics

(LLNL)

173.0 30.0 291.0 494.0

TOTAL LLNL 1492.0 396.0 2054.1 3942.1

Other labs/

contractors 71.3 14.7 105.6 191.6

UK

Contribution 0.0 9.2 36.8 46.0

TOTAL 1563.3 419.9 2196.5 4179.7

New NIF Baseline--Clarity of Goals

• New baseline goals are clouded by the lack of consensus

among the weapons labs--the users of NIF--on what size

NIF should be or how it should be deployed

• While agreement exists that NIF should be built, the three

nuclear weapons labs provided alternative to DOE

• Livermore advocated an accelerated schedule for

completing NIF with all 192 beams

• Los Alamos proposed limiting NIF to 120 beams until

NIF performance could be successfully demonstrated

• Sandia proposed a 48-96 beam NIF until specific

milestones could be met

• DOE is attempting to reconcile these different views
Enclosure I

Page 13 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

New NIF Baseline--Clarity of Goals

• According to Livermore Lab

• Building a smaller NIF is less costly, but this is not a cost

effective strategy since the infrastructure for a full NIF is

to be built early

• Pausing the NIF for tests after 48 or 120 beams, and

then restarting later, makes the NIF more costly to build

and causes a multi-year delay

• Accelerating the schedule for completing NIF would save

$219 million

• Importantly, Livermore Lab estimates have not been

independently reviewed or carefully studied by DOE

New NIF Baseline--Clarity of Goals

Options Savings/Added

Cost

48 Beams only Savings = $540 M1

96 Beams only Savings = $442 M1

120 Beams only Savings = $388 M1

48 Beams (3 year pause) Full NIF Added Cost = $583M2

96 Beams (3 year pause) Full NIF Added Cost = $379M2

120 Beams (3 year pause) Full NIF Added Cost = $272M2

1 

These represent theoretical savings in budget authority by

terminating NIF. They do not include termination expenses.

2 These figures were developed by NIF managers at Lawrence

Livermore and presented to DOE. They were not independently

verified.
Enclosure I

Page 14 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

New NIF Baseline--Adequate

and Sustainable Funding

• NIF’s internal reviewers concluded that Livermore’s new

baseline for NIF is challenging, but doable

• None of NIF’s reviewers reported on project risks in the

context of future cost and schedule impacts

New NIF Baseline--Adequate

and Sustainable Funding

• An important funding issue is the cost to operate NIF once it

is completed

• Livermore estimates NIF annual operating costs of $108

million (FY 2001 dollars) when NIF is fully operational in

FY 2011

• Livermore says its estimate is a detailed, bottom-up

review based on prior experience operating laser

machines

• Livermore’s operating cost estimates have not been

reviewed by us, DOE, program reviewers, outside peers,

or by independent cost reviewers
Enclosure I

Page 15 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

New NIF Baseline--Adequate and

Sustainable Funding

• Livermore’s operating cost estimate contains optimistic

assumptions

• A 4-fold improvement in the useful life of its most

sensitive optics (final optics)--saving about $50 million

annually

• Lab claims it has a plan for making optics last

longer--internal program reviewers agreed but want

more research to confirm success

• Reduction from Livermore’s normal overhead rates

• Exclusion from the Laboratory Directed Research and

Development tax (6 %), which is assessed on all

laboratory programs for sponsoring independent

research

New NIF Baseline--Achievability of NIF’s

Milestones

• Livermore has a detailed plan of NIF’s milestones, including

a comprehensive work breakdown structure

• Past internal reviewers concluded that NIF’s milestones are

challenging but doable and that NIF can be built on cost and

schedule

• While NIF’s milestones are detailed and well developed

• The first milestone that demonstrates machine

performance isn’t until FY 2004 when “first light” is

expected

• The first weapons experiments with beams aren’t

scheduled until FY 2006, when 48 beams are installed

and commissioned

• Other labs and reviewers suggested that more near-term

milestones be added to assess laser performance
Enclosure I

Page 16 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

Other Issues

• Continuing oversight concerns

• Although DOE’s federal staff in Livermore now report

directly to the NIF Project Office in headquarters, the

same people have performed oversight since 1999 when

NIF’s cost and schedule grew unnoticed

• The NIF Project Office in DOE is not fully staffed, further

limiting DOE’s ability to oversee the NIF project

• Livermore’s monthly status reports on NIF do not

summarize project risks, the absence of which prevents

more effective oversight by DOE and others

Other Issues

• Project management issues

• Nearly $700 million in NIF research and development

work is still managed outside the control of the NIF

Project

• These activities are not part of monthy NIF reporting,

even though it is crucial for NIF success

• DOE is considering placing this research and

development under the control of the NIF Project
Enclosure I

Page 17 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

Other Issues

• Project management issues (continued)

• DOE stated, in its September 2000 certification to

Congress, that it will prepare a “report” on how it intends

to address issues raised in two prior NIF reviews (the

Carlson-Lehman Defense Program Review and a cost

review by the Burns and Roe engineering firm)

• DOE has not fully documented how it has responded

to past review findings and recommendations

• Without full documentation, it is unclear if the results

from prior reviews have been fully addressed

Other Issues

• Independent review issues

• Independent NIF external review is still needed

• Independent reviews are crucial to NIF cost, schedule,

and technical success

• Internal program reviews have been useful, but are no

substitute for independent external review

• DOE intends to continue its internal program review of

NIF but will allow Defense Program officials to manage

the process

• Internal program reviews would have more credibility

if managed by officials outside of Defense Programs,

which sponsors NIF
Enclosure I

Page 18 GAO-01-677R Follow-up Review of DOE’s National Ignition Facility

Other Issues

• Independent review issues (continued)

• An external review conducted in August 2000, claimed

by DOE to provide an independent review, was not

independent according to both the reviewers and a DOE

official

• As we recommended in August 2000, an external

independent review of NIF is still needed to provide

confidence that the project is technically feasible and

reasonable with respect to cost and schedule

DOE Comments

• We asked DOE to review this briefing document

• DOE provided clarifying comments which have been

incorporated into this document

(360016)