SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

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- 17T2 FATMATA KAMARA, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, DIVISION OF STATE POLICE, Defendant

- Respondent.

_____________________________

Submitted September 16, 2019

– Decided Before Judges Rothstadt and Mitterhoff. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division , Mercer County, Docket No. L

- 0100

- 18. Fatmata Kamara, appellant pro se. Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, att orney for respondent ( Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Marvin L. Freeman, Deputy Attorney General , on the brief).
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36

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September 30, 20192 A

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Plaintiff Fatmata Kamara appeal s the trial court's May 25, 2018 order granting defendant State of New Je rsey 's motion to set aside entry of default and granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as time

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. Having reviewed the record in light of the governing legal principles, we affirm. We discern the following facts from the record. Plaintiff formerly worked as a clerk typist for the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) . She was terminated on August 13, 2014 after a hearing regarding her behavior at work. 1 Plaintiff participated in an arbitration with the State, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the State, issuing a report on October 11, 2017. 2 On January 9, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against the State, alleging that the State subjected her to "retaliation, harassment, transfer and then sent [her] for fitness for duty, that resulted [in] remo[val] without a just cause," after she reported an overtime record that she believed was inappropriate. Plaintiff served defendant at the NJSP h eadquarters on February 2, 2018. On April 4,

1 The facts leading to plaintiff's termination have not been verified. At the May 25, 2018 motion hearing, defendant's counsel stated, "The State takes no position on the merits of [plaintiff's] termination."

2 Plaintiff states that she participated in arbitration to "seek[] restoration with the State." Defendant has not verified the purpose of the proceeding, and there is nothing else in the record that discusses it.3 A

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2018, she requested entry of default after receiving no answer from defendant. Default was entered on the same d ay . On May 25, 2018, the trial judge entered an order vacating default because plaintiff failed to effect service on th e Attorney General's office as required by
R ule 4:4

- 4(a)(7). Regarding the motion to dismiss, the judge determined t hat plaintiff's complaint assert ed claims arising under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act ("CEPA"), N.J.S.A. 34:19

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- 8, and the Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5

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- 42 , based on the allegations of harassment and retaliation. Applying the ap plicable statutes of limitations, the judge concluded that plaintiff's claims were not timely filed, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. This appeal ensued. On appeal, plainti ff contends that the trial judge 's dismissal of her complaint should be rever se d because her union contract provided her with access to arbitration procedures to seek reinstatement, and until the arbitration was concluded, her claims for retaliation and harassment did not accrue

. This court reviews a grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo and applies the same standard under Rule 4:6

- 2(e) that governed the trial court. Frederick v. Smith , 416 N.J. Super. 594, 597 (App. Div. 2010). The court must "search[] the complaint in depth and with libera lity4 A

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to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim . . . ." Printing Mart

- Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. , 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park , 43 N.J . Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). This review "is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Ibid. A claim alleging a CEPA violation must be brought within one year of the alleged violation. N.J.S.A . 34:19

- 5. A claim alleging a LAD violation must be brought within two years of the cause of action accruing. Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co. , 225 N.J. 343, 356 (2016) (citing Montells v. Haynes , 133 N.J. 282 (1993)). The time of accrual depends on the type of conduct that the plaintiff alleges violated the LAD. Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ. , 204 N.J. 219, 228 (2010). "A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act occurs on the day that it happens." Ibid. (quoting Roa v. Roa , 200 N.J. 555, 567 (201 0)). Such acts include "[d]iscriminatory termination and other similar abrupt, singular adverse employment actions" resulting from discrimination in violation of the
LAD. Ibid. (citing Roa , 200 N.J. at 569). Plaintiff contends that her claims are timel y be cause her union contract permitted her to seek a r emedy for her alleged wrongful termination through5 A

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arbitration

. Plaintiff argues that because she participated in arbitration with the State on October 11, 2017, her claims accrued on that date. There is no legal support for plaintiff's contention that her obligation to file a timely complaint against the State had to await the outcome of the arbitration. Although based on similar facts, her complaint in this case is independent of the arbitration
pro ceeding. W e conclude that the trial judge correctly determined that plaintiff's claim s arose under CEPA and LAD , as there are no other supporting causes of action, and properly applied those statutes of limitations to her complaint. Plaintiff's retaliation and harassmen t claims arise out of conduct that would have occurred through the end of her employment, which terminated on August 13, 2014. Plaintiff 's complaint does not allege any adverse employment action that occurred after her termination . Consequently, under either CEPA or LAD, plaintiff's claims accrued, at the latest, on August 13, 2014. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that when plaintiff filed her complaint on January 9, 2018, both the one

- year st atute of limitations that applies to CEPA claims and the two

- year statute of limitations that applies to LAD claims had expired.6 A

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To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining arguments raised by plaintiff , we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant di scussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11

- 3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed.