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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES MELTON, : CIVIL ACTION

: No. 05-366

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

OFFICER MICHAEL MURPHY, :

:

Defendant. :

M E M O R A N D U M

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J. JULY 9, 2008

Charles Melton has brought this case against Officer

Michael Murphy of the Philadelphia Police Department under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Melton alleges that Murphy violated his rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive

force while arresting Melton. Currently before the Court are two

motions in limine.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an altercation between Melton

and two police officers that resulted in Melton being convicted

of simple assault, reckless endangerment, and possession of an

instrument of crime. While sitting in his car, Melton reached

out the window, grabbed a civilian named Miranda Coley, and began

driving in reverse, dragging the woman along. Officer Murphy

intervened to help free Coley and was also dragged by Melton. He

Case 2:05-cv-00366-ER Document 75 Filed 07/10/08 Page 1 of 6
Officer Murphy claims to have punched Melton only once. 1

Melton claims that Officer Murphy punched him multiple times

after Coley also punched Melton more than ten times.

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punched Melton in the face to free himself and Coley.1

Melton originally sued Officer Murphy; Murphy’s

partner, Officer Hudecki; the City; and several other parties on

a variety of claims. All claims were dismissed by agreement of

the parties except for Melton’s § 1983 claim of excessive use of

force against Officer Murphy.

Officer Murphy moved for summary judgment on the ground

that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Melton’s claim

because, in support of his claim, Melton will testify that he was

not dragging anyone from his car, but was rather sitting

peacefully when Murphy punched him. The motion was denied. 

“Claims for excessive use of force are not barred under Heck

because a plaintiff does not necessarily have to prove the

unlawfulness of his conviction to succeed.” Order, June 27, 2008

(doc. no. 68) (citing Lora-Pena v. FBI,-- F.3d --, 2008 WL

2468569, at *2 (3d Cir. June 20, 2008)). 

II. MOTIONS IN LIMINE

A. Motion to Exclude Prior Conduct by Officer Murphy

Officer Murphy moves to exclude evidence of prior

police Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) investigations into his

conduct. “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not

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The cases cited by Melton do not support his position. 2

In Ismail v. Cohen, the Second Circuit upheld the admission of

evidence of past wrongs because the district court had issued a

detailed memorandum determining that the evidence was admissible

for permissible purposes under Rule 404(b), including to prove

intent and absence of mistake. 899 F.2d 183, 189-90. Here,

Melton has not shown how the past investigations are relevant to

any of the Rule 404(b) permissible purposes. 

Borenstein v. City of Philadelphia, the other case

cited by Melton, decided a motion to dismiss and has no bearing

on the admissibility of evidence of past misconduct. 595 F.

Supp. 853 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

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admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show

action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible

for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 

In his memorandum of law, Melton does not identify any

purpose for which prior IAD investigations of Murphy would be

relevant. Murphy’s identity is undisputed and Murphy does not 2

dispute that he used force against Melton. The only question for

trial is whether the force used by Murphy was reasonable. Melton

has not shown that the prior IAD investigations would help prove

that the amount of force used was unreasonable. Therefore,

Officer Murphy’s motion in limine be granted.

B. Motion to Exclude Evidence that Undermines Melton’s

State Convictions

Officer Murphy moves to exclude Melton’s testimony

regarding the events preceding his arrest to the extent that the

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testimony will contradict facts that provided the basis for his

state convictions. Specifically, Melton will testify that his

car was not moving at the time Murphy punched him and that he did

not assault anyone, but instead was himself the victim of an

assault by Officer Murphy and Coley. Murphy argues that,

although Heck v. Humphrey does not normally bar § 1983 claims for

excessive use of force, Melton’s testimony should be barred here

because it would directly contradict Murphy’s version of events,

which is the version that was accepted by the finder of fact at

Melton’s state trial.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently

considered the very question posed by this case: whether Heck v.

Humphrey acts as an evidentiary bar in situations where testimony

in a federal civil case will contradict facts established at the

state court criminal trial. Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 691

(9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit concluded “that Heck does not

create a rule of evidence exclusion.” Id. In reaching this

conclusion, the Court noted that the Heck doctrine grew out of an

effort to reconcile § 1983, which creates a broad right of action

for unconstitutional acts by state or municipal actors, with 28

U.S.C. § 2254, which places strict limitations on the use of

federal challenges to state criminal convictions. “[T]he Supreme

Court’s intent in announcing the rule in Heck was to prevent

prisoners from subverting the requirements of § 2254 by filing

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suit under § 1983.” Id. at 695. Thus, the application of Heck

focuses only on whether a claim itself is viable, not on whether

a particular piece of evidence is admissible. Id.

Finding the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit persuasive,

the Court concludes that Heck does not create an evidentiary bar. 

Therefore, Officer Murphy’s motion to exclude Melton’s testimony

because it contradicts facts underlying his state conviction will

be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Officer Murphy’s motion

to exclude evidence of prior IAD investigations into his conduct

is granted. Officer Murphy’s motion in limine to exclude

Melton’s testimony as barred by Heck v. Humphrey is denied.

Case 2:05-cv-00366-ER Document 75 Filed 07/10/08 Page 5 of 6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

: CIVIL ACTION

CHARLES MELTON, : NO. 05-366

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

:

MICHAEL MURPHY, :

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 9th day of July 2008, for the reasons

stated in the attached memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that

defendant Murphy’s motion to exclude evidence of past Internal

Affairs Division investigations (doc. no. 45) is GRANTED.

It is further ORDERED that defendant Murphy’s oral

motion to exclude evidence that contradicts facts underlying

plaintiff Melton’s criminal convictions is DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

 S/Eduardo C. Robreno 

 EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

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