UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4841

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NEIL P. SHUTTLEWORTH,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-4844

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NEIL P. SHUTTLEWORTH,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-4845

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NEIL P. SHUTTLEWORTH,
2

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-4846

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NEIL P. SHUTTLEWORTH,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-4848

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NEIL P. SHUTTLEWORTH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District 

of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. J. Michelle Childs, District 

Judge. (7:12-cr-00242-JMC-1; 7:11-cr-00161-JMC-1; 7:11-cr00755-JMC-1; 7:11-cr-02070-JMC-1; 7:11-cr-02182-JMC-1)

Submitted: June 24, 2013 Decided: July 25, 2013

Before WYNN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
3

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Chesser, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
4

PER CURIAM:

Neil P. Shuttleworth pled guilty to five separate 

indictments charging him with six counts of unarmed bank 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). His cases 

were consolidated pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 20.* At 

sentencing, the district court granted Shuttleworth a downward 

departure based on his assistance to authorities, and he 

received a below-Guidelines sentence of 120 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, Shuttleworth’s counsel has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Shuttleworth has filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing that 

(1) the district court erred in imposing a sentencing 

enhancement based on Shuttleworth’s alleged threat of death to a 

bank teller, and (2) the Government used information he shared 

under his cooperation agreement to enhance his sentence, in 

violation of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.8(a) 

(2011). Finding no error, we affirm.

We review Shuttleworth’s sentence for reasonableness, 

applying a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.

 * Under Rule 20, transfer of prosecution is permitted from a 

district where an indictment is pending to a district court 

where a defendant is arrested upon consent by the defendant and 

agreement by the United States attorneys.
5

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We begin by reviewing 

the sentence for significant procedural error, including 

improper calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range, failure 

to consider sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), 

sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failure to 

adequately explain the sentence imposed. Id. at 51. Once we 

have determined that the sentence is free of significant 

procedural error, we must consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the 

totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the 

sentence is within the appropriate Guidelines range, we apply a 

presumption on appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United 

States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Such a presumption is rebutted only when the defendant 

demonstrates “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Shuttleworth first contends that the district court

improperly imposed a two-level enhancement based on his alleged 

death threat to one of the bank tellers. In assessing the 

district court’s application of the Guidelines, this court 

reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error 

and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Layton, 564
6

F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2009). Generally, the test is an 

objective one—whether the defendant’s statement would “instill a 

fear of death in a reasonable victim, not the reaction of the 

particular teller[.]” United States v. Jennings, 439 F.3d 604, 

613 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Franks, 183 F.3d 

335, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gibson, 155 F.3d 

844, 846 (7th Cir. 1998). We conclude the enhancement was 

appropriately applied. To the extent Shuttleworth argues 

counsel was ineffective in this regard, ineffectiveness does not 

conclusively appear on the record. United States v. Powell, 680 

F.3d 350, 359 (4th Cir. 2012).

Shuttleworth also argues in his pro se supplemental 

brief that the Government used information he shared under his 

cooperation agreement to enhance his sentence, in violation of 

USSG § 1B1.8(a). Because Shuttleworth did not preserve this 

issue in the district court, we review for plain error. United 

States v. McQueen, 108 F.3d 64, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1997). We 

summarily dismiss this claim, and the attendant ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, because Shuttleworth had neither a 

plea agreement nor a cooperation agreement in these cases.

Our review of the record indicates no procedural error 

in the imposition of Shuttleworth’s sentence. Further, the 

district court adequately explained the basis for Shuttleworth’s 

below-Guidelines range sentence based on the goals of 18 U.S.C. 
7

§ 3553(a), and we find nothing to rebut the presumption of 

substantive reasonableness.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in each case and find no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm Shuttleworth’s convictions and sentence. 

This court requires counsel to inform Shuttleworth, in writing, 

of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States 

for further review. If Shuttleworth requests that a petition be 

filed but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Shuttleworth. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED