conviction for arson. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court 

denied the motion. Collins also filed a motion to disqualify the Clark 

County District Attorney's (CCDA) Office because his two former 

attorneys who represented him in his arson case currently work for the 

CCDA's Office, creating a conflict of interest that will preclude him from 

receiving a fair trial in the murder prosecution unless the CCDA's Office is 

disqualified. The district court denied the motion. This original writ 

petition followed. 

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of 

an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or 

station, NRS 34.160, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of 

discretion, Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 

603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). A writ of mandamus will not issue, 

however, if petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the 

ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170. Further, mandamus is an 

extraordinary remedy, and it is within the discretion of this court to 

determine if a petition will be considered. See Poulos v. Eighth Judicial 

Dist. Court, 98 Nev. 453, 455, 652 P.2d 1177, 1178 (1982); see also State ex 

rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Thompson, 99 Nev. 358, 360, 662 P.2d 1338, 1339 

(1983). 

As to Collins' challenge regarding the admission of prior bad 

act evidence, he has an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal 

should he be convicted, see NRS 177.015(3); NRS 177.045, and therefore 

writ relief is not appropriate. NRS 34.170. Accordingly, our intervention 

is not warranted on this ground. 

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As to Collins' challenge to the district court's denial of his 

motion for disqualification, this court has held that "mandamus is the 

appropriate vehicle for challenging attorney disqualification rulings." 

State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Zogheib), 130 Nev. , 321 P.3d 

882, 884 (2014). "The disqualification of a prosecutor's office rests with 

the sound discretion of the district court," Collier v. Legakes, 98 Nev. 307, 

309, 646 P.2d 1219, 1220 (1982), overruled on, other grounds by Zogheib, 

130 Nev. at , 321 P.2d at 886, but "where the district court has 

exercised its discretion, mandamus is available only to control an 

arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion," Zogheib, 130 Nev. at , 

321 P.3d at 884. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 

Nev. „ 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (defining arbitrary or capricious 

exercise of discretion). We conclude that extraordinary relief is not 

warranted. 

Collins argues that his former attorneys' representation of him 

in his arson case creates a conflict of interest due to their employment 

with the CCDA's Office and that conflict of interest must be imputed to 

the CCDA's Office. The core of his argument is that his former attorneys 

will likely participate in post-conviction proceedings related to his arson 

conviction that are currently pending in district court—namely by 

testifying at an evidentiary hearing—and that their employment with the 

CCDA's Office calls into question their credibility and bias because their 

testimony might be influenced by pressure to protect their jobs and career 

advancement given the CCDA's desire to secure a conviction at Collins' 

murder trial and efforts to ensure that his arson conviction is upheld. 

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We must first consider whether Collins has established that 

his former attorneys' employment with the CCDA's Office created a 

conflict of interest due to their prior representation of him in his arson 

case. We conclude that he has not. RPC 1.9(a) provides: "A lawyer who 

has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter 

represent another person in the same or substantially related matter in 

which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the 

former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in 

writing." Collins has presented nothing establishing that the arson 

conviction is the "same or substantially related" to the murder 

prosecution. That the State intends to present evidence concerning his 

arson conviction is not a sufficient link to establish a conflict of interest 

under the rules. See Waid v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 605, 

610, 119 P.3d 1219, 1223 (2005) ("A superficial similarity between the two 

matters is not sufficient to warrant disqualification."). Because Collins 

has not satisfied his burden of establishing that his arson case is the 

"same or substantially related" to the murder prosecution, he cannot show 

that a conflict of interest and therefore disqualification of the CCDA's 

Office is unwarranted. See Robbins v. Gillock, 109 Nev. 1015, 1017, 862 

P.2d 1195, 1197 (1993) (observing that burden of proving two matters are 

"same or substantially related" rests on party seeking disqualification and 

"that party must have evidence to buttress the claim that a conflict 

exists"). 

Even assuming that a conflict of interest exists, extraordinary 

relief is not warranted. As Zogheib instructs, "an individual prosecutor's 

conflict of interest may be imputed to the prosecutor's entire office in 

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extreme cases," but "the appropriate inquiry is whether the conflict would 

render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial unless the 

entire prosecutor's office is disqualified from prosecuting the case." 130 

Nev. at , 321 P.3d at 886. Collins has not made this showing. Again, 

the arson and murder prosecutions are unrelated and no argument he 

advances suggests that it is unlikely that he will receive a fair trial in his 

murder case simply because his former attorneys in his arson case are 

employed by the CCDA's Office and he has a pending post-conviction 

proceeding in which former counsel might participate as witnesses. 

Moreover, the impetus behind his disqualification motion—his former 

attorneys' credibility and bias relative to the post-conviction proceedings 

in his arson case—will exist even if the CCDA's Office is disqualified in 

this case. Disqualifying the CCDA's Office in this case will not remedy 

those concerns. 2Issues of bias and credibility concerning his former 

2Collins argues that the district court erred by denying his 

disqualification motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We 

conclude that he failed to show that the district court manifestly abused 

its discretion in this regard, as he failed to make an adequate showing 

that disqualification was necessary such that an evidentiary hearing was 

warranted. He also argues that the CCDA's Office has not complied with 

the screening and notice requirements mandated by RPC 1.11. Because 

we conclude that Collins failed to show that his former attorneys had a 

conflict of interest, the screening and notice requirements under RPC 1.11, 

are irrelevant, assuming that provision applies here. We note that the 

record indicates that the CCDA's Office has undertaken screening 

measures and Collins' former attorneys have not communicated with the 

prosecutors involved in the murder prosecution about the murder case. 

We further reject Collins' contention that the district court manifestly 

continued on next page . . . 

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Cherry 

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6 

attorneys are irrelevant to his murder prosecution and may be 

appropriately vetted in post-conviction proceedings related to his arson 

case. 

Because we conclude that Collins has an adequate remedy at 

law to challenge the district court's evidentiary ruling and he has not 

demonstrated that the district court manifestly abused its discretion by 

denying his disqualification motion, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 3 

It 

Hardesty 

Douglas 

continued 

abused its discretion by orally denying his disqualification motion before 

receiving affidavits confirming what it believed was true from the 

pleadings—that Collins' former attorneys had no contact with the 

prosecutors involved in the murder prosecution. Nothing in the district 

court's comments suggest that it would not have reconsidered its oral 

ruling had the affidavits revealed contact between former counsel and the 

prosecuting attorneys or some violation of the screening measures. 

3We lift the stay of the trial imposed on August 29, 2014. 
cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge 

Special Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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