Plaintiff has objected to the Report and Recommendation, 1

arguing that Magistrate Judge Strawbridge erred in two ways: (1) by

finding that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not fail to

develop the record adequately in regards to plaintiff’s alleged mental

impairment and its effect on her functionality; and (2) by finding

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TERRI L. LAWRENCE, : CIVIL ACTION

: NO. 04-4682

Plaintiff, :

: 

v. :

:

JO-ANNE B. BARNHART, :

Commissioner of the :

Social Security :

Administration, :

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 14th day of October 2005, after considering

the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, and after careful

review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate

Judge David R. Strawbridge, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED;

2. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 9) is

DENIED; and

3. The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 12) is

GRANTED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 58, JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in favor of the Commissioner

affirming the administrative decision of the Commissioner that denied

benefits to plaintiff Terri L. Lawrence. This case shall 1

Case 2:04-cv-04682-ER Document 18 Filed 10/14/05 Page 1 of 3
that the limitations factored into the hypothetical given by the ALJ

to the vocational expert (“VE”) were appropriate.

This Court undertakes a de novo review of the portions of a

Report and Recommendation to which the plaintiff has objected. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 150

F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing U.S. Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO

v. N.J. Zinc, Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1005 (3d Cir. 1987)). The Court

“may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Decisions of an ALJ are upheld if supported by substantial

evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002).

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); Burns, 312 F.3d at 118. “It is

less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere

scintilla.” Jesurum v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114,

117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971)). If the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,

the Court may not set it aside even if the Court would have decided

the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358,

360 (3d Cir.1999) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff argues that because there was “insufficient evidence in

the file regarding Ms. Lawrence’s mental impairment and its impact on

her functional abilities,” the ALJ had a duty to supplement the

record. Pl.’s Objs. at 2. Plaintiff states that she had been

prescribed an anti-depressant, had been referred to a psychiatric

specialist, and had suffered from symptoms of depression. The

magistrate judge concluded that the record, including plaintiff’s own

testimony, did not contain any evidence that her depression

contributed to her functional limitations. Specifically, the

magistrate judge also noted that although plaintiff’s counsel asked

that the record be left open at the end of the hearing for

supplemental material regarding plaintiff’s functional limitations as

related to her cervical condition, plaintiff’s counsel did not suggest

the record was incomplete regarding plaintiff’s depression or that she

had an upcoming appointment with a psychiatric specialist. For these

reasons, the magistrate judge found no reversible error in the ALJ’s

determination that the record of the case was complete. 

The ALJ adequately developed the record in this case. The record

shows that plaintiff was prescribed the anti-depressant Zoloft in or

about June 2003, because, according to plaintiff, “since the injury

I’ve become very stressed.” Plaintiff was removed from the medication

because it was not effective, and referred to a psychiatric

specialist. Tr. 199. Plaintiff’s own testimony, therefore, shows

that the alleged mental disorder is a result of the alleged functional

limitation, not part of the limitation. Nothing here indicates that

the record lacked enough data for the ALJ to make a sound

determination. See, e.g., Money v. Barnhart, 91 Fed. Appx. 210, 216

(3d Cir. 2004). The record in this case does not fairly raise a

question regarding the impact of any mental impairment on plaintiff’s

2

Case 2:04-cv-04682-ER Document 18 Filed 10/14/05 Page 2 of 3
functional abilities, and the ALJ was therefore not under a duty to

supplement this record. See, e.g., Diehl v. Barnhart, 357 F. Supp.2d

804, 815 (E.D. Pa. 2005).

Plaintiff’s second objection to the Report and Recommendation is

that the hypothetical given by the ALJ to the VE was inappropriate

because it did not include certain limitations plaintiff has in using

her left upper extremity. Pl.’s Objs. at 2. A hypothetical need only

contain impairments that are supported by the record. See, e.g., Page

v. Barnhart, 108 Fed. Appx. 735, 738-39 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, the ALJ

determined that plaintiff “has a severe impairment which causes

significant limitations on her ability to perform work-related

activities,” but concluded that she retains the residual functional

capacity to perform sedentary work. Tr. 21-22. This determination is

supported by substantial evidence, and the magistrate judge properly

concluded that nothing in the record undermines this finding. 

Plaintiff also comments that the magistrate judge improperly

provided his own interpretation of the record in regards to the

appropriateness of the VE’s assessment. Pl.’s Objs. at 4. While it

is true that such a substitution would be improper, it is not what

happened below. A court reviewing an administrative law determination

may review the record to assess whether the grounds on which the ALJ’s

determination lie are supported by substantial evidence. See

Securities and Exchange Comm’n. v. Chenery Corp., et al., 332 U.S.

194, 196 (1947); Oldrati v. Apfel, 33 F. Supp.2d 397, 399 (E.D. Pa.

1997). 

In this case, the magistrate judge stated that the record

evidence “does not undermine the ALJ’s conclusion that ... Lawrence

retained the RFC [residual functional capacity] for a limited range of

sedentary work,” and specifically noted that, “[t]he statement by Dr.

Chitale on August 12, 2002 that Lawrence should undergo a vocational

evaluation to find a less strenuous job (other than housecleaning)

that she could perform ... is persuasive evidence that even her own

longstanding treating specialist believed that she was capable of some

kind of work.” Rep. and Rec. at 22. The ALJ’s report also

specifically noted this statement by plaintiff’s doctor: “He [the

doctor] told her that if surgery was not an option that she should

look for a “less strenuous job.” Tr. 21. Magistrate Judge

Strawbridge did not substitute his own findings for those of the ALJ,

nor did he pull evidence that the ALJ had not addressed from the

record. His review of the record was solely for the purpose of

determining whether the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by substantial

evidence. This was proper, and the Court approves the Report and

Recommendation.

3

be closed for statistical purposes.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

__________________________

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

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