Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Main entry under title: 

The US. Air Service in World War I. 

CONTENTS: v. 1. Final report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF. 

A tactical history of the Air Service, AEF.-v. 2. Some early 

concepts of military aviation. 

Includes index. 

1. European War, 1914-1 91 8-Aerial operations, American. 

2. United States. Army. A.E.F., 1917-1920. Air Service. 3. 

Aeronautics, Military-United States-History. I. Maurer, Maurer. 

0606. U54 940.4 49 73 75-42296 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

Stock Number 008-070-00362-7 
iii 

United States Air Force 

Historical Advisory 

Committee (As of September 1975) 

Dr. 1. 8. Holley, Jr 

Duke University 

Lt. Gen. James R. Allen 

Superintendent, USA F Columbia University 

Academy 

Dr. Robert F. Byrnes 

Indiana University Dartmouth College 

Lt. Gen. Albert P. Clark Dr. Forest C. Pogue 

USA F (ret.) Director, Dwight D. 

Eisenhower Institute for 

Historical Research 

Dr. Henry F. Graff 

Dr. Louis Morton 

Lt. Gen. Raymond B. Furlong 

Commander, Air University 

Mr. Jack Stempler 

General Counsel, USA F 

Office of Air Force 

History 

Maj. Gen. John W. Huston Stanley L. Falk 

Chief Chief Historian 

Carl Berger 

Chief, Histories Division 

Max Rosenberg Lawrence J. Paszek 

Deputy Chief Historian Senior Editor 

V 

FOK~OK~ 

There has been a tendency to belittle the work of the U.S. Air 

Service in World War I while singing the praises of heroes like 

Rickenbacker and Luke. Compared with the bombing of the 

U.S. Eighth Air Force in World War II or the B-52's in Southeast 

Asia, the 138 tons of bombs dropped by the U.S. Air Service in 

France in 1918 may seem almost too insignificant to mention. 

Any such comparison, however, should not lead to a conclusion that World War I was of little importance in the overall 

history of the U.S. Air Force. 

The U.S. Air Service should be viewed in relationship to its 

own age. World War I was fought when aviation was still young. 

The first ace of the U.S. Air Service won his victories in a 

French plane that had a top speed of about 125 miles per hour 

and a tendency to shed the fabric of its upper wing in a dive. 

The American-produced DH-4, used by the 1st Day Bombardment Group, usually carried about 220 pounds of bombs for a 

mission, which meant a lot of sorties to deliver 138 tons of 

bombs. 

Aviation technology was not always equal to the tasks to be 

performed. A major goal of the U.S. Air Service, one not 

attained during the war, was the development of a bomber 

force capable of hitting strategic objectives in Germany. Targeting for the strategic campaign involved the identification of 

"a few indispensible targets without which Germany cannot 

carry on the war"-an idea that would be used years later 

against Hitler and the Third Reich. Interdiction, close air support, and some other types of missions carried out by the US. 

Amy Air Forces in World War II, and by the U.S. Air Force at 

later times, had already been tried by the U.S. Air Service. 

Some documents illustrating various concepts and ideas for 

the employment of the U.S. Air Service in World War I have 

been selected for publication in this volume, one of a series 

being published by the Office of Air Force History. 

John W. Huston, Maj. Gen., USAF 

Chief, Office of Air Force History 

When the Great War began in Europe in August 1914, 

aviation in the U.S. Army was a function of the Signal Corps. Its 

mission was to support infantry and artillery by providing 

observation services. There were people in the Army and 

outside who could foresee no other military use for aircraft. 

Others believed that the airplane should be given a combat 

role. Some thought that aviation should be a separate combat 

arm. 

As news of aerial operations in the European war drifted 

across the Atlantic, there was more and more talk of buying 

fighting planes, battle planes, and bomb-dropping planes for 

the U.S. Army. Although some faltering steps were taken, little 

progress was made toward building a fighting air force-or 

even toward developing observation services for the ground 

forces-before the United States entered the war in April 1917. 

Having joined Great Britain, France, and Italy in war against 

Germany and Austria, the United States quickly drew plans for 

an air service to include fighting and bombing airplanes as well 

as observation planes and balloons. The allies, who had been 

fighting for two years or more and were much farther advanced 

in military aviation, provided valuable information to help the 

United States build up its air service. Allied contributions 

included not only technical data on new developments in 

aircraft and other aeronautical equipment but also information 

on how to use aviation in battle. 

One thing borrowed from the allies was the classification of 

military aviation into three, broad, functional areas labeled 

“observation,” “pursuit,” and “bombardment.” Another was 

the concept that aviation had two separate roles, one “tactical,” the other “strategical.” In addition, the Allies provided 

ideas, along with detailed information about tactics, techniques, and procedures, that formed the foundation for the 

employment of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces 

(AEF), in World War I. 

The wartime operations of the Air Service, AEF, included 

visual and photographic reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, 

infantry liaison, counterair operations, bombing and strafing in 

close support of ground forces, and interdiction of the enemy’s 

lines of communications. The war ended before US. units were 

ready for strategic air operations, but thinking on strategic air 

warfare had advanced far enough to raise, and tentatively 

answer, questions concerning area versus precision bombing 

and day versus night operations. Thus, US. military aviation in 

November 1918 was far different from what it had been when 

the war began four years earlier. 
viii 

There were wide differences of opinion in the U.S. Army as to 

how military aviation should be employed. There were those 

who believed that the sole function of aviation was to assist the 

ground forces. That point of view was held by Gen. John J. 

Pershing, Commander in Chief of the AEF, and by many other 

officers in command and staff positions in the U.S. Army. 

Others thought that aviation could best be used in a strategic 

role. While agreeing that some aviation had to be committed to 

supporting ground forces, they believed that aviation could 

make its greatest contribution toward winning the war by 

attacking strategic military and industrial targets behind enemy 

lines. This was the position taken by Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, the top-ranking air commander in the AEF. Many members 

of the Air Service, and some from other branches of the Army, 

held views somewhere between these extremes. The general 

inclination, even in the Air Service, however, seems to have 

been toward the view held by Pershing. 

The fundamental differences between Pershing’s and Mitchell’s thinking on aviation can be seen by comparing their ideas 

on air superiority. Both men believed it essential. Both gave it 

top priority. But they disagreed on what it was, and how to 

attain it. Pershing did not want enemy aircraft attacking his 

troops or otherwise interfering with his operations. The best 

way to prevent such attacks and interference, he thought, was 

to keep friendly airplanes over the lines in sufficient strength to 

command the air and thus prohibit the operation of enemy 

aircraft in the area. Mitchell, looking to the same goal, believed 

that the best way to attain it was to hit the enemy’s air strength 

behind the lines, removing the source of the threat by attacking 

the enemy’s airfields and shooting his planes out of the air 

before they could reach the front. 

The principal duty of aviation, in Pershing’s opinion, was to 

support ground forces by protecting them against hostile 

aircraft and by performing observation services for infantry and 

artillery. With command of the air over the battle front, his Air 

Service then might assist ground forces by attacking the 

enemy’s artillery and ground troops. Pershing believed that his 

Air Service attached too much importance to operations 

behind the lines to disrupt lines of communication. He approved plans for organizing units for strategic missions but 

balked at the idea of creating an independent air force for 

strategic operations. 

Mitchell agreed that aviation units should be attached to 

ground forces, but he insisted that they be under the control of 

an air service commander. This was necessary, he believed, to 
IX 

permit concentration of air strength when needed, as well as 

for proper coordination and direction of air operations. Mitchell placed much greater emphasis than Pershing did on close 

support and interdiction. He and others of this thinking believed that aviation could be used most effectively against 

strategic targets. For such operations, an air force working 

independently of ground forces was required. 

As indicated earlier, Mitchell did not have a chance to try out 

his ideas on strategic air warfare during World War I. The air 

units that fought under American command in World War I 

were attached to ground forces. Their missions were in more or 

less direct support of infantry and artillery. Thus the combat 

experience of the U.S. Air Service in World War I was exclusively in tactical air operations, a fact that was to have a 

profound influence on U.S. military aviation in the 1920’s and 

later.’ 

Some documents reflecting and illustrating various concepts 

of the functions of military aviation and ideas concerning the 

employment of aircraft as an instrument of warfare have been 

selected for publication in this volume. The period represented 

is from the creation of the Aviation Section and the beginning 

of World War I in the summer of 1914 until the end of the 

fighting in November 1918. The selection of documents for 

inclusion in this book has been restricted to official materials 

of American origin available on paper or microfilm in the Albert 

F. Simpson Historical Research Center of the U.S. Air Force or 

in the Fairchild Library of Air University; both facilities are 

located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Many documents 

identified for possible use have been omitted in an effort to 

avoid repetition so far as possible; others that appeared more 

appropriate to other volumes in this series have been reserved 

for later publication. Some items, such as Congressional hearings, Bolling’s report, and Gorrell’s plan for bombing, have 

already appeared in print in various places; many are being 

published here for the first time. 

Responsibility for the selection of documents for this book 

rests with the editor, who worked without the assistance of an 

Notes 

1 The toregoing summary is based on documents In this volume supplemented by various 

published works. including the following: John J. Pershing. My Experiences in the World War 

(New York. 1931); William Milchell, Memoirs of World War l (New York, 1960); Aifred J. Hurley. 

Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power (New York, 1964); Thomas H. Greer, USAF Historical 

Stdy 89. The Development 01 Air Doctrine In the Army Air Arm. 1917-1941 (USAF Hist Div. 

1955); I. 8. Holley. Jr.. Ideas and Weapons (New Haven, 1953); and Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, 

Concepts. Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the Unted States Air Force, 1907-1964 (AS. 

AU. 1971). 
X 

associate editor or an editorial committee. He would like to 

claim complete objectivity in making the selection and preparing the documents for publication, but he suspects that he may 

be no more successful than most other historians in keeping 

his work free of any subjective influence. With a policy of 

letting the documents speak for themselves, no attempt has 

been made to interpret or explain. Nor have efforts been made 

to discover the origins or to point out the factors that helped to 

shape the various concepts and ideas. Background information 

and notes have been kept to a minimum. 

The original text and, so far as possible, the original format 

have been followed in preparing the various documents for 

publication. As a result, there is some inconsistency, sometimes within a single document, in such things as spelling, 

punctuation, and format. For example, “reconnaissance” also 

appears as “reconnoissance,“ and “strafe” often appears as 

“straff.” The only editorial changes, except for omissions 

clearly indicated by ellipsis marks, are those made to correct 

confusing punctuation and obvious mistakes, such as slips in 

spelling and typing. 

The editor is grateful for the administrative support and assistance provided by Mr. Lloyd H. Cornett, Jr., Chief of the Albert F. 

Simpson Historical Research Center, Lt. Col. Charles C. Biasi, 

Executive, and Mr. Herschel Harvey, Chief of Administration. 

Special recognition goes to Mr. Deane J. Allen, Office of Air Force 

History, for his help in proofreading the original text, and to Mr. 

Lawrence J. Paszek, Senior Editor in the Office of Air Force 

History, for his work in photo editing, preparing artwork for this 

volume, and maintaining a close liaison with the printer to resolve 

the numerous difficulties that arise in the various phases of 

production. Mr. Jack Harrison, US. Government Printing Office, 

deserves credit for the arrangement of typography and design of 

this volume. The editor also wants to express his thanks to Mrs. 

Linda Copenhaver, Mrs. Mary F. Hanlin, Mrs. Jane Motley, and 

especially, Mrs. Lois Wagner for transcribing the documents and typing the manuscript. 

Maurer 
Cements xi 

Page 

Part I The Aviation Section, 1914-1917 . . . . . . . . . 1 

1. Aeronautics in the Army . . ..................... 3 

2. Four-Squadron Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 

3. Creation of the Aviation Section, Signal Corps, 18 

July 1914 ........................................ 21 

4. Field Service Regulations, 191 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 

5. Funds for Aeronautics (Fiscal Year 191 6), 

December 1914 ........................ . 27 

6. Scriven: The Service of Information, 1915 . . . . . . . . . . . 33 

7. Scriven: Annual Report, 1915 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 

8. War College Division: A Proper Military Policy, 1915 . . 41 

9. To Increase the Efficiency of the Military 

Establishment, 1916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

10. Preparedness for National Defense, 191 6 . . . . . . . 

11. National Defense Act of 1916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 

12. Funds for Fiscal Year 191 7, April 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 

13. Foulois: The 1st Aero Squadron in Mexico, 1916 . . . . . 75 

14. Scriven: Annual Report, 191 6 . . . . . . . . . . ... 89 

15. Funds for Fiscal Year 1918, January 1917.. . . . . . . . . . 91 

Part II Air Service Plans and Programs, 

April 191 7-February 191 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 

16. 12,000-Plane Program, 29 May 191 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 

17. Mitchell: Air Policy, 13 June 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 

18. Mitchell: Aeronautical Organization, 

13 June 1917 . . . . ...................... 111 

19. Dodd: Aviation Work, 18 June 1917 . . . . . . . . 113 

20. Churchill: Liaison with Artillery, 21 June 1917 . . . . . . . . 115 

21. Churchill: Air Superiority, 21 June 191 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7 

22. Parker: The Role of Aviation, 2 July 1917 

23. Board of Officers: Recommendations, 4 Ju 

24. Duties of the Chief of Air Service, 5 July 1917 . . . . . . . 125 

25. 59-Squadron Plan, 10 July 1917 . . . . . . . . . . 

26. Bolling: Report, 15 August 1917 . . . . . . . . 

27. 260-Squadron Plan, 18 September 191 7 

28. Command in the Zone of Advance, 10 October 1917 . 139 

29. Gorrell: Strategical Bombardment, 28 November 1917 141 

30. Foulois: Recommendations for Air Service, 1 

December 1917 ... . . .. . ... . , .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . , . 159 

31. Foulois: Report on Air Service Problems, 

23 December 1917 . . . .................. 161 

32. Command of the Air Se 

24 December 1917 
xii 

Page 

33 . 100-Squadron Schedule. 1 January 191 8 ........... 167 

34 . 120-Squadron Schedule. 6 February 191 8 .......... 171 

Part Ill Combat. February-November 1918 ...... 

37 . Command of the Air Service. AEF. 29 May 1918 ..... 

35 . Mitchell: General Principles. 30 April 1918 ..... 36 . Artillery Adjustment. May 191 8 ............... 

38 . No Independent Air Operations. 29 May 1918 ........ 

39 . Restatement of the 260-Squadron Plan. 

5 June 1918 ..................................... 40 . Infantry Liaison. 15 June 1918 ..................... 

41 . Infantry Liaison in I Corps. June 1918 .... 42 . The Role of Pursuit. June 191 8 .................... 

43 . 358 Squadrons. July 1918 ..................... 44 . Liaison-A Costly Business. 4 August 191 8 . . 45 . Command of the Air Service. First Army. 

6 August 191 8 ............................ 

47 . Plans for the Initial Phase of the Meuse-Argonne 

Offensive. September 191 8 ........ 48 . Battle Orders. Air Service. First Army. 

September-November 191 8 ........................ 49 . Objectives of Day Bombardment. November 1918 .... 

50 . Area vs Precision Bombing. November 1918 ......... 

51 . Observation Balloons. November 191 8 .............. 52 . A Combat Service. 11 November 1918 ...... 

46 . 202 Squadrons. 16 August 1918 ................... 

Part IV Postwar Review ...................... 

53 . Mitchell: Provisional Manual of Operations. 

23 December 1918 ............................... 54 . Notes on the Characteristics. Limitations. and 

Employment of the Air Service. 1919 ............... 55 . Sherman: Tentative Manual for the Employment of Air 

Service. 1919 .................................... 

Appendices ............................... 

A . Funds for Military Aviation. 1909-1 91 8 .............. 6 . Squadron Plans and Programs. 1917-1918 .......... 

173 

175 

177 

187 

191 

195 

199 

205 

213 

219 

223 

225 

227 

231 

247 

251 

253 

255 

263 

265 

267 

303 

313 

411 

411 

412 

Index ................................................ 413 
List OF Illustrzatiolzs xiii 

Page 

Early US. military aviators.. ............................. 2 

.......... 

......... 

......... 

who fired a rifle from the aircraft.. ...................... Capt. Charles D. Chandler who fired the first machine gun 

from an aircraft in flight piloted by Lt. Roy C. Kirtland ..... First serviceman to fly-Lt. Lahm (art by Richard Green) 

1 st Aero Squadron, Texas City, Texas, 191 3 .............. Lts. Thomas D. Milling and Wi 

Burgess-Dunne airplane used 

Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven 

Signal Corps Burgess-Wright 

A captive balloon inflated at Ft. Myer, Virginia, summer of 

Wright Model D Scout purchased by the Signal Corps in 

10 

10 

17 

18 

the U.S. duration and distance record.. ........ 

1908 .. ..... 40 

Formation of JN-3 aircraft .... ............... 56 

Pancho Villa ...... .................. 

.............. ........... 71 

Aircraft #43 landing in Mexi 

Mexico ......... 74 ...... Officers of the Is 

JN-2 Aeroplane #44 (c 

Lt. Herbert A. Dargue posing by his air 

Lts. Herbert A. Dargue and Edgar S. G 

Lt. Dargue, Capt. Foul0 

103 

French women assembling A n-made planes in France 104 

Lt. Col. George 0. Squier . . ...................... 94 

Gen. Pershing with his World War I staff .................. 

Brig. Gen. Edgar Russel .... ....................... 106 
xiv 

Page 

Maj. Gen. Sir Hugh Montague Trenchard .................. 109 

“Billy Mitchell” ... ............... 110 

Maj. Townsend F. ........................... 

Maj. Frank Parker ..... ........... 118 

Capt. Joseph E. Carberry ............................... 122 

(sketch by J. Andre Smith) ............................ 124 

Maj. Raynal C. Bolling ..... ................ 130 

Gen. Sir D. Henderson decorates Col. Edgar S. Gorrell ..... 

Maj. Marlborough Churchill ........................ 

Observation balloon ................................. 

Chaumont France, site of Pershing’s Headquarters, AEF 

Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly . . ................ 138 

140 

German Gotha bomber.. ................... 

Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord .... 

Glenn L Martin #50 airplane equipped with r 

.......................... 197 

204 

Generals Ferdinand F ........... 218 

Brig. Gen. “Billy” Mitc ........... 224 

Maj. Gen. Fox Conner .................................. 226 

Lt. Col. Bert M. Atkinson ................... Col. Robert McCleave . . ................. Col. Joseph C. Morrow; Maj. William K. Thaw and 

Lt. Col. Ralph Royce ..................... Lt. Col. Lewis H. Brereton .................. A loaded bomber awaiting takeoff ........................ 238 

Lt. Col. Frank P. Lahm .................................. 240 

Commandant Villome, French Air Force ................... 243 

Col. Milling, Gen. Mitchell, and Maj. Paul Armengaud 

Ground panels laid out to signal aviators in flight ........... Maj. Davenport Johnson .......................... .. 212 

Brig. Gen. Malin Craig ........... 222 

Maj. Gen. James W. McAndrew .................. 
xv 

Page 

Aerial view of Conflans .................................. 250 

Brequets in formation ................................... 252 

Col. Charles DeF. Chandler ............................. 254 

Telephone to a balloon.. ................................ 261 

Maj. Harold E. Hartney; Maj. James L. Dunsworth and 1st 

Lt. N. McDonald ...................................... 262 

Four different types and sizes of bombs used in raids ...... 276 

Signal Corps radio truck used to receive and transmit 

Panel marker atio anes .. Brig. Gen. Mitchell and his staff ................. Lt. Col. William C. Sherman and Lts. V. F. Ludden and C. G. 

Sellers .............................................. 312 

An open-air P.C. ....................................... 339 

Observer watching infantry movements below ............. 344 

“Take-off’’ in formation .................................. 357 

Another method of forming .............................. 358 

Method of forming fives or multiples; Right angle or crossover turn ................ ......................... 359 

Taylor stunt ............................... English vol de group ................... 

messages ... ................ 293 

Camouflage attack. .................... ............. 362 

Lufbery show .......................................... 364 

Attack on two-seater by formation of pursuit planes. ........ 365 

Method of assembling chain formations; Scouring patrol .... 366 

Pursuit chain of formation ............................... 367 

Strafing a machine-gun battery.. ......................... 369 

U.S. airplane attacks captive balloon ...... Daylight balloon attack ................... Day bombardment operation of one wing ............... 395-96 

Day bombardment operation of one group.. .. Chart showing functions of different branches 

An observer and pilot demonstrate steering th 

Germans fire a captured French AA gun against 

DH-4 (art by Masami DaiJogo). .......................... 410 

objective by reins ............................. 

Allied balloons.. .................... 

The US Airz Serzvice in 

Woda Warz I 

Volume II 

Early Concepts 

of Military Aviation 

PaRc I: 1 

The Auiation Section 

1914-1917 

When the Great War began in August 1914, military operations with lighter-than-air craft had a history going back well 

over a century. The airplane, however, was a new and as yet 

relatively untried instrument of warfare. While European nations had spent considerable sums in recent years in building 

up air forces of both lighter- and heavier-than-air craft, the 

United States had lagged far behind. 

In the United States, military aviation was under the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps, where the balloon section that had 

been established in 1892 had been expanded into an Aeronautical Division in 1907 to take in heavier- as well as lighter-thanair activities. In the first part of August 1914 the Army had fewer 

than 200 officers, enlisted men, and civilians in its aviation 

establishment. Of the 30 airplanes that had been obtained up to 

that time, one (the first one, purchased from the Wright 

Brothers in 1909) was in the Smithsonian Institution, and 21 

had been destroyed in accidents or condemned. 

Dissatisfaction with lack of progress and with Signal Corps 

jurisdiction over military aviation had brought on a congressional inquiry and “An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the 

Aviation Service.” Passed by Congress, and approved by the 

President on 18 July 1914, this act left aviation in the Signal 

Corps but created a new section to be responsible for aviation 

matters. Among other things, it also authorized as many as 60 

officers and 260 enlisted men for aviation duty. 

Meantime, the Chief Signal Officer, Brig. Gen. George P. 

Scriven, had asked for $1,000,000 for aviation for Fiscal Year 

1915, but Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison had reduced 

the amount to $300,000, and Congress had cut out another 

$50,000. Thus the new Aviation Section began business with an 

annual appropriation of only $250,000, but that was twice as 

much as had been provided for the previous year. 
2 Aviation Section 

Early U.S. military aviators: 

(left to right) Capt. Paul W. Beck. Lt. Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold. Capt. 

Charles D. Chandler, Lt. Thomas D. Milling. and Lt. Roy Kirtland 
1- AeRonautics 3 

in theA~rng 

1913 

crease the Efficiency in the 

Aviation Service” centered 

on the question of organization. Considerable attention 

was given, however, to the 

purpose and function of aviation in the U.S. military establishment. The matter of organization had been taken up 

early in 1913 by Congressman James Hay (D., Va.), who 

introduced a bill to take aviation out of the Signal Corps. 

The bill ran into so much opposition, however, from the 

War Department and from officers closely associated with 

aviation that it had to be 

abandoned. But Hay did not 

give up. In May 1913 he introduced another bill to create 

an Aviation Corps which 

would be directly under the 

Chief of Staff and would be 

equal to other branches of 

the line of the army. 

The House Committee on 

Military Affairs, of which Hay 

was chairman, held hearings 

on the new bill from 12 to 16 

August 1913. The following 

were among those who testified: General Scriven; Henry 

Breckinridge, Assistant Secretary of War; Lt. Col. Samuel 

Reber, a signal officer and 

balloon pilot who was slated 

to become Chief of the Aeronautical Division; Maj. Edgar 

Russel, Chief of the Aeronautical Division; Capt. William 

Mitchell, who then was on 

duty as a signal officer on the 

General Staff and who had 

Hearings on the “Act to In-- not yet learned to fly; 1st Lt. 

H. H. Arnold, Russel’s assistant; Capt. Paul W. Beck, a 

iilot and the only officer who 

appeared before the committee in support of a separate 

aviation corps; and Riley 

Scott, a former Army officer 

who had been experimenting 

with bomb dropping and 

who, like Beck, thought that 

the airplane had a great potential for bombardment. Besides the chairman, the committee members mentioned 

in the extracts below were 

Daniel E. Garrett (D., Tex.), J. 

C. McKenzie (R. Ill.), Frank T. 

O’Hair, (D., Ill.), Frank L. 

Greene (R., Vt.), and Maurice 

Connolly (D., Iowa). 

As a result of the hearings 

of August 1913, the committee struck out everything 

after the enacting clause and 

rewrote the bill, which later 

was enacted (Doc. 3), to provide for an Aviation Section 

in the Signal Corps. Following are extracts from these 

hearings in 1913.’ 

............................ 

Gen. Scriven [reading from 

a memorandum which he had 

among his papers]. .. Aeronautics and aviation in military affairs are merely an added means 

of communication, observation, 

and reconnaissance, and ought 

to be coordinated with and subordinated to the general service 

of information, and not be 

erected into an independent and 

uncoordinated service. 

............................ 

The Chairman. Will you 

state briefly what are the functions of an Aviation Corps in 

time of war? 

all theory. Little has been done 

offensively with aeroplanes in 

war, but they have done a great 

deal in reconnoissance work in 

maneuvers and the like, especially in France, a little in Italy, 

and they are trying to do something in Mexico. It seems that the 

thing divides itself into two different classes of work to be 

done. One is scouting and reconnoissance work by the fast 

flying machine, heavier than air. 

The Chairman. How does 

that pertain to the Signal Corps? 

Gen. Scriven. The results of 

reconnoissance work must be 

reported. The aeroplane is an 

adjunct to the Cavalry. It makes 

long reconnoissances and performs distance scouting. The 

cavalryman outlines his advance 

position, the aeroplane detects 

and observes him in the distance, and must send the information back instantly to the 

commander of the forces, and 

must do so by wireless. 

Gen. Scriven. Of course it is 

1 Hearings before the Cornmlnee on Military 

Affairs House of Representatives. Aeronautcs 

!n the Army, 6% Gong 1st sess (1913) 
4 Aviation Section 

The Chairman. How about 

the scouts sent out by the Cavaly, they have not to send back 

information in the same way? 

Gen. Scriven. They also 

have the wireless to some extent; but the aviator must have 

his wireless man with him, and 

his observer must be able to 

manage wireless to be of much 

use. The aeroplane has also a 

fighting function, we presume: 

that is, the bomb dropping. Of 

this nobody knows much of anything, but we have theories. As 

to the dirigible, its management 

is most essentially Signal Corps 

work, so far as observation and 

reconnoissance work can be 

done by balloon. The dirigible is 

capable of hovering over a city 

or a command or whatever you 

like, constantly sending in 

reports. 

Mr. Garrett. You say that 

both machines will cary wireless 

equipment? 

Gen. Scdven. Yes, sir. The 

aeroplane probably will carry 

other means of communication, 

such as the dropping of dispatches and things of that kind. 

One of the main services of the 

aeroplane is that of reconnoissance and the collection of 

information. 

............................ 

Mr. Garrett. In the recent 

wars, what has been the success 

of the flying machine? 

Gen. Scriven. Well, there 

has been a little reconnoissance 

work done, but the reports are 

not vey full, and the fact of the 

matter is, many of the flyers, of 

course, are not to be classed as 

experts, and certainly not as 

trained military observers. The 

Turk can not handle an aeroplane-I know that-and the 

other peoples recently at war 

probably can not do much with 

such a machine. Some volunteers, of course, from Europe 

appeared at the seat of the recent war, but the reports f have 

read are not vey full, not vey 

satisfactoy, but an occasional 

reconnoissance has been made 

that has proved of value. 

in mind is this: Could any army 

contend with its opponents if 

they should have an aviation 

service? 

lieve for a moment an army 

could so contend except at a 

disadvantage, and the condition 

in the Philippines is a good illustration of the fact. Consider the 

island of Corregidor. If an enemy should land, say, at Subig 

Bay and the defense was provided with aeroplanes, f doubt 

very much if the attack could get 

ashore; they must approach with 

their transports loaded with 

troops, with their horses and 

guns exposed in going ashore, 

and the beach open to anything 

that might come over it, attack 

from overhead-an ideal condition for the dirigible and aeroplane, which by dropping nitroMr. Garrett. The point I have 

Gen. Scriven. I do not begelatin might stop the landing or 

at least disorganize the enemy’s 

troops. Whatever may be 

thought regarding the danger of 

attack to a warship from overhead, there can be no doubt of 

the tremendous influence of 

overhead attack upon transports 

crowded with troops and upon 

small boats and shore landings. 

At best this is a time of confusion, or at all events extra hazardous, and when the enemy 

must be to some extent disorganized and not prepared or capable of resisting to the utmost 

the approach of aerial war machines, whether dirigibles or 

aeroplanes. 

On the other hand, if the defense had none and the enemy 

landed and marched to the hills 

that overlook Corregidor with a 

few aeroplanes and certainly 

with a dirigible, it is difficult to 

see how it would be possible to 

hold the position if conditions 

are at all what they may be 

expected to be in the attack on 

this position. 

The Chairman. Do you 

mean by that that the science of 

aviation has advanced to such 

an extent that any county that is 

going to war with some other 

county would be handicapped 

and at a great disadvantage unless that county had an aviation 

corps sufficiently experienced to 

contend with that of the other 

county? 
Aeronautics in 

the Army 

Gen. Scriven. 1 believe so, 

most distinctly. If you look at 

conditions at the Panama 

Canal-I have happened to talk 

with Mr. Scott, well known 

throughout the world as having 

conducted some interesting experiments in bomb dropping 

Mr. Scott later appeared before 

the committee1 who has informed me that he has dropped 

100 pounds of nitrogelatin, and 1 

believe the record shows that 

400 pounds have been dropped 

from an aeroplane. In talking of 

the Panama Canal, Mr. Scott 

remarked that he had questioned a flier who the other day 

passed over the Isthmus in regard to the canal as a target, and 

especially as to the spillway of 

Gatun Dam. It appears that the 

latter makes a vey conspicuous 

target; so, no doubt, do other 

vulnerable points. Now, the 

question immediately comes up 

as to what would be the result of 

dropping 300 or 400 pounds of 

nitrogelatin on the lock or spillway. There is probably little difficulty in doing it, and should a 

foreign fleet anchored beyond 

the range of the guns of our 

fortifications, some distance 

out-say, 15 or 20 miles-aeroplanes may well be sent out and 

great damage to the canal done. 

Of course, nobody would expect 

to see the aeroplanes again, but 

the probability is that some of 

them would be effective. Now, if 

we have nothing to resist the air 

craft except land guns, it seems 

more than probable that some 

damage would be done and the 

working of the canal interrupted, 

especially if we have no air craft 

to resist that sort of attack. 

Mr. McKenzie. How would 

you meet that attack? 

Gen. Scriven. By aeroplanes 

and dirigibles. 

The Chairman. Has the 

Ordnance Department succeeded in getting a gun that 

could be used on aeroplanes? 

Gen. Scriven. The Krupp 

gun can do it. The Krupps have 

a gun that can be used against 

machines. The Ordnance Department has been experimenting, but I do not know that they 

have yet devised a gun. ............................ 

Mr. Breckinridge. . . . the 

vast amount of experimental 

work that has been done and 

the state of continuous development in which this matter of the 

service of information has existed during the last 50 years, 

and now exists, are such that all 

of the energy and capacity of a 

separate body, such as the Signal Corps, will be required. 1 am 

free to believe that the art of war 

since the Civil War, if it has 

CongrrwJam- Hay. Chairman. 

&we Committee on Mllitw 

Affalm. 
6 Aviation Section 

changed at all, has only changed 

in the service of information, and 

that the only thing that would 

make the Battle of Gettysburg 

different today from what it was 

50 years ago would be that the 

work of each of the armies 

would be much better coordinated by the work of the Signal 

Corps, of which aviation would 

be merely a branch. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, may 1 ask what I asked 

Gen. %riven, and that is what 

function does the Signal Corps 

perform, or, rather, what functions will the aviation corps perform that pertains to the Signal 

Corps, which is purely a means 

of information? 

Mr. Breckinridge. This, for 

instance: the aeroplane goes out 

under orders, perhaps, of the 

commander of a screening brigade of cavalry which is protecting the advance of a larger body 

of mixed troops. Now, the aviator goes and gets his information; he is 20 miles away, and 

how does he get that information back? You do not transmit 

that information in the manner 

in which he came for it. He is 20 

miles away, and he will send an 

instantaneous wireless message. 

Now, he will send that instantaneous wireless message and that 

message will be received by 

what? By another wireless outfit 

under the command of the Signal Corps, and thus the information reaches the commander of 

i 
Aeronautics in 

the Army 

7 

the screening brigade of cavalry. 

As I say, that message will be 

sent back by wireless or wire or 

through some other agency of 

the Signal Corps. The transmission of that information from 

there to the commanding general of the army, who may be 

100 miles away, will be through 

nothing but agencies of the Signal Corps until it gets there. Of 

course, the Cavalry gets information, but the Cavalry is not 

under the Signal Corps. The differentiation to be made is the 

result of experience. It is not a 

matter of logic. You could say, 

as a matter of logic, that because 

the Cavalry gets information the 

Cavalry should be under the 

Signal Corps, or you could say, 

as a matter of logic, that because 

the Cavalry gets information and 

is not under the Signal Corps, 

therefore no branch of the service that gets information should 

be under the Signal Corps. It is 

not a matter of logic, but a matter of experience. 

The Chairman. What other 

service is it contemplated that 

aeroplanes or an Aviation Corps 

would render in time of war except to get information? 

Mr. Breckinridge. At the 

present time the only established 

use that is proved for aviation is 

the expediting of the service of 

information and the getting of 

information. 

The Chairman. But we are 

providing legislation not only for 

the present time but for the future. 

Mr. Breckinridge. I would 

go so far as to say that for the 

immediate future 99 per cent of 

the value of aviation will be in 

the service of information. Now, 

I do not say that in the development of dirigibles which can 

carry 5 tons of lyddite or nitrogelatin or any other high explosive, 

they will not be able to perfect a 

device which will drop a ton of 

explosives in a vulnerable place. 

I can not say that the time will 

not come when a flock of dirigibles can come to England, if it is 

unprotected, and may hover in 

the air for 40 hours, as a dirigible 

can do, and destroy whole cities; 

but I do mean to say that, looking at it through the vista of the 

future with the largest powers of 

imagination with which we can 

conceive the probable future 

growth of aviation, and yet also 

looking at it from the viewpoint 

of legislation that is likely to be 

required, and taking the average 

development that will be experienced in the next 15 or 20 years 

in the Army, as far as we can see 

there ought not to be any separation, because this great development in aviation will not come 

in that length of time, particularly 

in this county, because we will 

follow rather than lead in its development. 

The Chairman. We are far 

behindMr. Breckinridge (interposing). We were the pioneers; we 

developed it. Wright was the first 

man to do it, but in the feeling of 

security that America has always 

had, and in that she may be 

somewhat justified, we have 

lagged behind other nations 

which immediately perceived the 

necessity of this thing from the 

military standpoint. If the aeroplane is never to be developed 

another inch, as Gen. Scriven 

has said, the nation that is without aviation will simply be overwhelmed by the nation that is 

equally as well prepared in other 

respects and is better prepared 

in the matter of aviation, because the question of victory or 

defeat, where the troops are 

anywhere near equal, will 

depend upon the question of 

information or the lack of 

information. I think that is all 1 

care to say. 

............................ 

Mr. O’Hair. What is the true 

function of the Aviation Corps? 

Col. Reber. It is to receive 

and transmit information for the 

tactical commanders. For instance, the commander of a division desires to know what is 

going on in front of him. He has 

certain instrumentalities for gathering that information and certain instrumentalities for the 

transmission of that information. 

For example, his way of gathering it may be by Cavalry, 

screened Cavalry patrols, or Infantry patrols. There is a method 

for getting that information back. 

That information is transmitted 

back to the commander and he 

distributes it as he sees fit. 

............................ 
8 Aviation Section 

The Chairman. . . . Capt 

Beck, we will hear you now. I 

wish you would state what, if 

any, experience you have had as 

an aviator, and to what arm of 

the service you belong. 

Capt. Beck. Mr. Chairman 

and gentlemen of the committee, I am an Infantry officer and 

was detailed to aviation in January, 1911. My first experience 

with aviation was in January, 

1910, when I was sent by the 

War Department, as its representative, to a large international 

meet which took place at Los 

Angeles. During that Los Angeles meet l had occasion to make 

a number of flights as passenger 

with Glenn Curtiss in his machine, which, incidentally, was 

not a passenger-carrying machine, but it was modified in 

order to carry me up, and with 

Capt. B. D. Foulois, who was 

flying a French Farman machine. 

During the course of the aviation 

meet it occurred to me that the 

aeroplane might be used as an 

aggressive factor in war, and following that the idea of dropping 

various and varying weights 

from the aeroplane to find out, 

first, whether or not the equilibrium would be changed because 

of this dropping, and, second, 

whether or not we could reasonably expect to strike an object on 

the ground. The largest weight 

that I dropped at that time was 

Capt. Paul W. Beck, 

a pllot and the only offlcer to appear 

before Hay'. commtttee in support 

of a separate avhtlon corps. 

not in excess of 15 pounds. 

There was no change in the 

equilibrium of the machine. I 

found that the tables which I had 

roughly gotten up regarding the 

angle of dropping were totally 

inaccurate, which led me to perform a good deal of experimentation to bring out the proper 

tables. 

The following November I was 

detailed by the commanding 

general of the western division to 

assist in the organization of a 

large aero meet at San Francisco. The people behind that 

meet were the most influential 

people on the coast, and they 

wanted to make something exceedingly large on account of 

the then fight between San 

Francisco and New Orleans for 

the Pan American Exposition. I 

simply bring that out to show the 

scope of the meet. I was made 

secretary on account of the experience I had had at Los Angeles, which, while small, at the 

same time was greater than anyone else on the coast had at that 

time. From November until January we worked up the details 

and the meet was held in January. During that meet I continued the experiments started before at Los Angeles. Lieut. 

Crissy, of the Coast Artillery, 

worked with me on the aggressive use of the aeroplane, and 

devised a bomb-dropping device 

which was worked from the 

aeroplane, and he also got up a 

set of tables which enabled him 

to determine with considerable 

accuracy where they would 

strike the ground at varying altitudes. Those experiments were 

successful to a height of 1,500 

feet, showing conclusively that a 

weight up to 36 pounds could 

be dropped within 20 feet from 

an altitude of 1,500 feet. Understand, we were striving at that 

time to work out the basic principles. No one ever held for an 

instant that an aeroplane at 1,- 

500 feet would be of any military value. We had to creep before we could walk, and we 

wanted to work out these things 

in order to arrive at the greater 

things which lay in the higher 

altitudes. Since that time exLieut. Scott, of the United States 
Aeronautics in 

the Army 

Army, has devised a bombdropping device which has been 

successful up to altitudes of 5,- 

000 feet. I can not tell what his 

accuracy is offhand, but my 

impression now is that he 

dropped 14 projectiles from 

heights vaying from 3,500 to 

5,000 feet, and his largest miss 

was something like 30 feet from 

a given spot. 1 do not claim this 

to be absolutely accurate, but 

that is my impression. 

The Chairman. Captain, that 

leads you to believeCapt. Beck. That leads me 

to believe that there is an aggressive use for the aeroplane. 

There are four fundamental 

uses for the aeroplane in war. 

One is for reconnoissance purposes; two, for fire control of 

Field Artillery and Coast Artillery; three, the aggressive use, 

and four, the occasional transportation use. Those things are 

not experimental; they have all 

been demonstrated. They have 

been demonstrated abroad, and 

if they have not been demonstrated here it is because our 

people have failed to grasp the 

situation. We are behind; in five 

years we have done nothing. ... 

............................ 

whelming advantage of the 

aeroplane as an instrument of 

reconnoissance and report. He 

admits that its extensive use in 

offensive warfare by bomb dropping and machine-gun fire is as 

yet a matter of speculation. In 

these views he is supported by 

practically all of the conservative 

writers in the foreign services. To 

attempt to organize aviation on a 

basis of what it may'be able to 

do some time is vey unwise 

and, at any rate, premature. ............................ 

Mr. Green. When the aeroplane begins to be used for 

bomb throwing and machinegun work it becomes then an 

instrument offensive and defensive, and that takes it out of the 

range of information transmission for all practical and general 

purposes, does it not? 

Maj. Russel. As 1 have 

stated, there is a possibility of 

development in the offensive 

warfare utilization. It appears 

there has not been very much 

done as yet. No great accomplishment has been reported. It 

has some promise, but there 

have been no realizations of it. 

At present we can rely only on 

the aeroplane for obtaining and 

transmitting information. 

............................ 

Capt. Mitchell. ... This 

aeroplane business is pretty well 

understood in its relation to the 

military service; it is well understood by all of the great na- 

............................ 

Ma]. Russel. ... One of the best articles on the 

milita y value of the aeroplane 

has recently been written by 

Jacques Mortane, who as one of 

the greatest living authorities frequently advises the French military establishment. He brings out 

with a great clearness the overLt. Myron s. Crluy dqvlsed a bombdropping devlce and dropped the first 

bomb from a U.S. alrckaft on 15 January 1911 at the Tanforan race track 

near SM Franctaco. Seated wlth Cdsay Is Phillip 0. Pannalee, who 

piloted the Wrlsht aircraft for the expedment. 
10 Aviation Section 

Charles F. Will@, a 

Curtiss pilot. flbw the 

Curtiss PushedBiplane 

from which Maj. Jacob E. 

Fickel fired a rlfle from an 

aircraft. The event took 

place during an air meet 

held In August 1910, at 

Sheepshead Bay, N.Y. 

At right, 

Capt. Charles D. 

Chmndkr fired the fht 

machine gun +om an 

aircraft In flight on 7 June 

1912. Thomas D. Milling 

was the pllot of the 

Wrlght Type “B” aircraft, 

but Lt. Roy C. Klrtland 

substituted for hlm in 

the pilot’s seat. 

tion-that is, it is well understood what it is good for. Now, if 

this thing were not any good at 

all, if we did not derive any 

advantage from it, it would not 

be of any use to do what we are 

attempting to do; but we all 

know that there is something in 

it, and that from the military 

standpoint it is a necessary and 

important adjunct to the military 

organization. We know absolutely that aeroplanes are valuable for reconnoissance service. 

Now, reconnoissance work 

means the getting of information 

in regard to the enemy and 

bringing it back to the person for 

whose use the information is intended. Aeroplane reconnoissance means finding out about 

the enemy; that is, getting information about large units and not 

little details about small detachments. We have troops for that 

purpose, but the aeroplane reconnoissance will be used for the 

purpose of securing information 

concerning large strategic combination-the larger tactical 

movements-or the things useful 

for the commanding general to 

know. In other words, they will 

not be used to secure information respecting small details but 

of large tactical combinations. 

Now, the offensive value of this 

thing has not been proved. It is 

being experimented with-bomb 

dropping and machines carrying 

guns are being experimented 

with-but there is nothing to it 

so far except in an experimental 

way. 
Aeronautics in 

the Army 

11 

Some experimenters in Germany have dropped as much as 

300 pounds of explosive from 

an aeroplane, and all that sort of 

thing; but, gentlemen, you 

should bear in mind that if you 

drop 300 pounds of explosive 

on one man, while it may tear 

that one man all to pieces, the 

effect will be entirely local. On 

the other hand, it might be used 

against bridges and it might be 

used against dockyards and 

storehouses; but at the present 

time all that is in the experimental stage. On the other hand, the 

aeroplane to be safe from fire 

directed from the ground must 

be over 4,000 feet altitude. That 

has been proved in Tripoli and 

in the Bulgarian war. That is to 

say, until that altitude is attained 

it is not safe from hostile fire, 

from the ground. We have got 

to be over 4,000 feet to be safe 

from that hostile fire. Now, 

gentlemen, with these conditions 

we know what organization we 

ought to have with the units of 

the Army we now have. We 

know that almost to the extent 

that we know what a regiment 

of Cavalry or a regiment of Field 

Artillery or a regiment of Infantry 

should be. Reconnoissance with 

the troops may be divided into 

two kinds-one strategical reconnaissance-that is, reconnaissance at a distance, to find 

out what the enemy’s plans are 

away from the field of battle and 

the other is what we call tactical 

reconnaissance-that is, reconnaissance on the actual field of 

battle. We know that when an 

aeroplane is sent out alone on a 

mission it is apt not to get 

back-that is, the chances are 

that something is apt to happen 

to it-so it is the practice in this 

reconnoissance work to send out 

two aeroplanes. That would require two for tactical reconnoissance; and then if we have a 

strategical reconnoissance outfit, 

we will need two aeroplanes for 

that purpose. Now, for the purposes of tactical reconnoissance, 

suppose we are marching in this 

direction, for instance (indicating); we are reconnoitering the 

enemy’s front for that purposethat is, for tactical reconnoissance purposes-we need two 

aeroplanes for that service. At 

the same time we wish to get a 

line on the enemy’s flank movements, and for that purpose we 

need two aeroplanes. Obviously, 

therefore, they ought to run in 

twos all the time. Therefore, as I 

said, we need two machines at 

least for each of these kinds of 

reconnoissance. We need two at 

least to reconnoiter ahead of the 

forces and two to reconnoiter in 

on a flank or other places for 

tactical purposes, and we need 

at least two for strategical reconnoissance, with a given forcesay, a division of troops. 

There is a third use for them 

which is very important in 

France on account of her present deficiency, as they believe, in 

the matter of artillery materiel. 

The Germans have recently developed a field howitzer which 

can probably get next to the 

French batteries. Consequently it 

is very important that they develop their field-artillery fire, and 

they have definitely worked out 

a system which is better than 

anything they had before and 

that is accomplished by means 

of aeroplane. That is a very important function-that is, the fire 

control of field artillery by means 

of aeroplanes. That is another 

element of use, and we would 

need a unit for that purpose. 

The French in their organization 

have that. The French, in their 

organization, have provided 

aeroplanes for the artillery commander. That is, the commander 

who handles that artillery has a 

given force of aeroplanes and 

they are assigned to each group. 

They assign machines for the 

purpose of handling the fire of a 

particular lot of guns. Their 

groups correspond to battalions 

in this county. In starting the 

organization in this county it 

seems to me that we have pretty 

definite things to go on. That 

organization ought to consist of 

one unit for strategic reconnoissance, consisting of two machines, and two units for tactical 

reconnoissance; that is, one unit 

for the front and one for the 

sides, or four machines. Then, 

we ought to have a unit for the 

field artillery fire control. 

Now, in order that we may 

not overdo this thing, this organization ought to be thoroughly 
12 Aviation Section 

considered. A certain number of 

aeroplanes have been recommended to constitute this unit, 

and that number is eight aeroplanes-two for strategical reconnoissance, four for tactical 

reconnoissance, two in front of 

the force, two on a flank, and 

two for kld artillery fire control. 

Each of these aeroplanes must 

have two officets-one observer 

and one to do the flying-so that 

the miniium number in each 

machine would be two. Then, 

there should be one officer in 

command of each one of these 

forces and another to look after 

the property, making the number of officers necessary about 

20, and of enlisted men in round 

numbers, 80 would be required 

for one of these units. Now the 

unit of Army organization is the 

division, because that is the 

smallest complete army in itselt 

it comprises all of the branches 

of the service capable of acting 

together, and, in round numbers, consists of 20,000 men. 

With the exception of our Civil 

War and with the exception of 

the war in the Philippines, where 

we had 60,000 men, all of our 

expeditions have been not to 

exceed that size, in one place. 

So it seems to me, in so far as 

our organization in this county 

is concerned, that our unit to be 

used with troops should be 

based on the division, because 

that is a little army in itself. ... ............................ 

The Chairman. Do you think 

in course of time that the military 

by experience will be able to 

drop bombs with any accuracy? 

Capt. Mitchell. Yes, sir; 

probably with great accuracy, 

but the effect would be the same 

as a high-explosive shell. We do 

not use that against personnel; 

we only use it against materielhouses, buildings, etc., -because the effect is local. Some of 

the people in the Russo-Japanese War had a thousand fragments of high-explosive shell 

taken out of their bodies. Its 

effect is entirely local. Against 

personnel we use shrapnel. This 

may be regarded as a short shotgun that is thrown in the air and 

explodes at the proper time and 

sweeps the ground for about 

250 yards by 20 yards with a lot 

of heavy shot. 

The Chairman. How about 

the machine gun? 

Capt. Mitchell. it will probably never be any good for attacking personnel on the ground 

from aeroplanes; it may from 

dirigibles. To operate against 

other aeroplanes and dirigibles it 

will be used. On the other hand, 

it is thought in fighting aeroplanes they will ty to ram each 

other as much as they can, and 

both get smashed up. That is a 

problem. 

The Chairman. We would 

like to hear what you have to 

say about the possibility of the 

dirigible, how much they cost, 

and whether or not they are so 

important as to justify our Government in going into them. 

Capt. Mitchell. We should 

keep up with modem methods. 

The cost of dirigible ballooning is 

tremendous. We have not the 

same problems that they have to 

deal with in Europe, but we 

should have a few; that is, one 

or two, and keep them up to 

date, so we will be capable of 

developing them if called on to 

do it. In Germany their idea is 

that they are the battleships of 

the air and will be able to cary a 

great amount of explosives and 

guns and at the same time reconnoiter. On the other hand, 

they are very subject to attack 

from these little hornets of the 

air-the aeroplanes. 

like, if I may, to add a few 

remarks to some of the testimony given by preceding officers. In the first place, I would 

like to call attention to what has 

been done by aeroplanes and 

dirigibles in the Balkan war. Of 

course the information we receive now is very meager, and 

most of the information we have 

gotten is from consuls and considerable from military attaches, 

no official reports having come 

over as yet. 

However, we do know that 

there was a naval lieutenant in a 

hydro-aero plane-equipped 

with the bomb-dropping device 

invented by Mr. Scott, who was 

here yesterday--who located the 

Turkish cruiser that was creating 

so much havoc over in the Dar- 

............................ 

Lieut. Arnold. ... I would 
Aeronautics in 

the Army 

13 

danelles. He made a cross-country flight of 180 miles out and 

180 miles back and was fired on 

numerous times on that trip, but 

was not touched. He flew at an 

altitude of about 6,000 feet. In 

the Bulgarian Army, at the 

opening of the war, they had no 

aviation organization at all. They 

had four officers in Russia learning to fly and four machines 

under orders. Outside of that 

their aviation service did not 

amount to anything. So when 

the war broke out they had no 

experienced pilots whatsoever. 

But in spite of that fact they 

determined to organize an aviation corps and hired civilian 

aviators to enter the service, 

paying them a large bonus. Four 

or five of those aviators were 

crooks and did not develop at 

all; the others they used to train 

the officers. Up to about the 1st 

of December of last year they 

did not do anything at all, to 

speak of. At that time the aviation equipment was increased so 

that they had about 14 aeroplanes in use. 

Between December 10 and 

January 1 it was known that 

there were a number of reconnoissance flights made and vey 

valuable information turned in to 

the commanding generals of the 

different armies. There was a 

reconnoissance flight of 140 kilometers, at an altitude of between 1,100 and 1,200 meters, 

flying about opposing troops 

whose position they were able to 

reveal. They brought back very 

valuable information; just what 

the nature of that information 

was we do not know yet, but we 

know the flight was made and 

that they turned in a report to 

the commanding general. On 

the 11th another aviator flew 

over Preveza, with a passenger, 

and flew to a place 47 kilometers 

away, and brought back very 

valuable information as to the 

Turkish position. A short time 

later a flight was made over Janina to a place 75 kilometers 

away, at a height of 1,600 meters. This aviator threw down 

bombs, creating a veritable panic 

amongst the Turkish troops. 

Many hostile bullets tore the fabric, but the machine continued 

its flight unaffected. On the 28th 

of December a Greek army pilot 

officer made a flight over the fort 

of Bisani. He flew at an altitude 

of 2,300 meters, reporting observations concerning the garrison and the fortifications, which 

were considered of the highest 

importance by the Greek commanding officer. It is also known 

that at Adrianople aeroplanes 

and dirigibles were both used in 

going over the city. 

Of course, their flight for reconnoissance purposes 

amounted to practically nothing, 

but these aeroplanes were 

equipped with the Scott bomb 

dropper, and dropped bombs on 

the city and set fire to it, which 

caused considerable damage. ............................ 

The Chairman. ... Capt. Scott, who has been in 

the Army and is now a civilian 

operator, is present, and we will 

hear him. 

............................ 

The Chairman. You were at 

one time in the Army? 

Mr. Scott. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you do 

any duty as an aviator while in 

the Army? 

Mi. Scott. No, sir. I took up 

aviation afterwards. I have made 

a special study of the aeroplane 

as an offensive weapon. 

The Chairman. We would 

like to hear what your experience has been. 

Mr. Scott. About 1908, 

when Mr. Wright was making his 

first flights, I came to the conclusion that the aeroplane would 

eventually become very important as an offensive weapon. 

The fact that you can get over 

an object to be destroyed and 

that you can see it from an 

aeroplane better than in any 

other way caused me to come 

to the conclusion, with proper 

application of scientific principles, that bombs or explosives 

could be dropped accurately, 

and I took up that study 

specially. 
14 Aviation Section 

In 1911 a gentleman in 

France offered a prize for dropping dummy bombs on a target. 

The prize was 150,000 francshalf of that was available in 1912 

and the other half in 1913. I 

already had an apparatus designed which, through the courtesy of Gen. Allen, I was able to 

test at College Park. I took the 

apparatus over to France and 

was fortunate enough to win the 

whole series of prizes. The 

heights from which the projectiles were dropped were 200 

meters (about 656 feet) and 800 

meters (about half a mile). Fifteen projectiles were dropped on 

each flight, the time being 50 

minutes. The winning machine 

was able to place 12 out of the 

15 projectiles within a radius of 

10 meters-that is 33 feet, which 

would be a little over twice the 

size of this room-12 out of 15, 

each weighing 25 pounds. 

The second test was at 800 

meters-we really flew at 850, 

over half a mile, and 12 out of 

15 projectiles were placed within 

a radius of 40 meters, 120 feet 

square, which is a vey small 

portion of the side of this 

building. 

The various tests made-the 

meet lasted from March until 

September and included 

hundreds of flights-and the accuracy attained, convinced me 

that projectiles could be dropped 

with a great deal of accuracy on 

any target from, say, a height of 

a mile, from 1,000 to 1,500 meters, a mile, or a mile and a 

quarter. I have been studying 

considerably the application of 

such a device, which I believe to 

be sufficiently accurate at the 

present time, and I firmly believe 

that the aeroplane will become a 

vey important destructive 

weapon, much more so than we 

realize at the present time. It 

could be used, among other 

things, in a siege against a besieged place. There is always 

some key point like there was at 

Port Arthur and Adrianople, 

against which troops are fighting 

sometimes for days and week 

against the strongest pointwithout any appreciable effort. 

In such a case, if I were the 

commanding officer, I would 

send up as many aeroplanes as 

were available, 20 or 30, each 

one carrying 500 pounds of high 

explosive, and rain that high explosive on this importarit point 

that they were tying to attack 

and just as soon as that was 

completed, then rush in the 

trrmps and storm the fortifications or the strong poinit, and I 

believe it would be very effective. 

Mr. Connolly. In the event 

of using the aeroplane as a destructive means in modern warfare and you are up against another power presumably as well 

fortified with air craft as you are, 

then does not the warfare actually take place in the air, and 

would not their air craft protect 

their fortifications? 
Aeronautics in 

the Army 

15 

Mi. Scott. When you besiege 

a place the presumption is they 

are in more or less desperate 

straits, and in a case like Adrianople the outside force would 

have full opportunity to recoup 

their air force, and in this particular case I think you could presume that you would have the 

preponderance of aeroplanes, or 

that the enemy have none at all, 

but ordinarily the presumption 

would be that the two powers 

fighting would have equal forces, 

in Europe at least. 

Another important use, I 

should think, would be against 

headquarters. Commanding officers can not be made in a day or 

a year. From my experience I 

think that a mile above the earth 

you can pick out with an eye 

very readily anything as large as 

a tent or an automobile, or wagon-anything like that can be 

seen very clearly on a clear day. 

I imagine an important use of 

the aeroplane would be picking 

out headquarters, the enemy’s 

commanding general and important encampments like that, and 

by using shrapnel, a large shell 

weighing 500 pounds with high 

explosives, and being able to 

drop it within a square of 120 

feet, I think you could make it 

very uncomfortable for the commanding general. I think that 

would be an important use of 

the aeroplanes. Against fortifications-I firmly believe that 500 

pounds of nitrogelatin placed 

near a barbette disappearing gun 

carriage would put that completely out of service. If dropped 

on a mortar battery, 1 think it 

would temporarily at least put 

that out of order, and especially 

the range-finding system. The 

accuracy of these guns depends 

entirely on the range-finding system. These systems are screened 

as much as possible from the sea 

in the seacoast fortifications, but 

they can not be screened from 

the air, and 1 think it would be 

very readily put out of business, 

and when the range-finding system is put out of business the 

battety is put out of business, at 

least until it is repaired. 

We have very elaborate fortifications to protect the large cities, 

especially New York. I can imagine an enemy’s fleet of 20 or 30 

vessels coming toward New 

York-our Navy may be in 

some other part of the seasthey just come outside of the 

range of the Sandy Hook guns, 

cruise around and send aloft 20 

or 30 aeroplanes at a height of a 

mile, I do not see any way of 

bringing down an aeroplane except occasionally by accidentprobably by accident one may 

occasionally be brought downbut the fleet would cruise out 

there and the aeroplanes would 

go over New York with incendiary bombs especially constructed to produce conflagration, probably a few high explosives but mostly incendiary 

bombs, and drop them over 

New York and produce such a 

conflagration that no fire department could cope with-in other 

words, make New York like San 

Francisco. I do not think Washington is too far off for a thing 

like that-Baltimore, Norfolk, 

Charleston, and Wilmington, the 

coast cities, would be vulnerable. 

The same way on the Pacific 

coast. Those things are in the 

future, but military people have 

to look into the future, and the 

ones who look far into the future 

are the ones who usually win out 

in the long run. 

My particular hobby, the thing 

I have been studying about particularly, is the destruction of the 

Panama Canal. It has cost an 

immense amount of money. It is 

a lock canal, and there has been 

a great deal of discussion as to 

whether certain parts will hold 

up. The canal is about 50 miles 

across, 1 believe; that is, the center of the canal would be 25 

miles from either sea. 

Over in Europe, when dropping these bombs in the 800- 

meter contest, you were allowed 
16 Aviation Section 

to drop any number, one or all 

of them, at the same time. In the 

other contests you had to drop 

one at a time, flying around and 

going over the target successively, but in the 800-meter contest several of the aviators, two 

of them to be accurate, just put 

their eggs all in one basket. One 

man, a lieutenant in the French 

Army, who had a light Farman 

machine, with a 50-horsepower 

motor, could not carry a passenger, and he dropped the bombs 

himself. He did not have a particularly scientific way; he just 

put his eggs all in one basket 

and dropped them at one time, 

believing that if he got in the 

right place he would win out. He 

did this day after day, and he 

told me the effect of dropping 

the bombs was hardly perceptible; that is, the stability of the 

machine was not affected. Of 

course it jumped forward and 

backward and the speed increased after releasing the 

weight. I have not any doubt 

that an aeroplane will be built 

heavy enough to drop from 500 

to 1,000 pounds without any 

trouble whatever. 

With the machine I used over 

there I would not hesitate to 

drop 500 pounds. I dropped 50 

pounds a good many times, and 

I would have to touch the man 

on the knee to let him know it. 

You can build machines, 1 think, 

to drop 500 or 1,000 pounds of 

nitrogelatin, which is a very 

powerful explosive. 

eign nations is to destroy our 

In war the object of the forgreatest strategic point, which 

would be the Panama Canal, 

and they would put all their 

force against the canal. For some 

reason our fleet is not there, it 

has been defeated or it is protecting some other part of the 

coast-any way, they go there. 

No matter how strongly the 

canal is fortified, they do not 

come within range of the guns; 

they cruise out 10 or 30 miles. 

The distance to Gatun Dam or 

to the locks would be probably 

half an hour's fly. They send out 

their aeroplanes loaded with 

high explosives, say 20 or 30 of 

them, as many as they can send, 

hoping that some of them will 

get back; but in warfare we take 

chances, and if they destroyed 

the canal no doubt they would 

be willing to lose them all. They 

send them up and they are flying 

one. after another, placing 500 

pounds of nitrogelatin first on 

the spill-way and later up the 

Culebra Cut, causing slides. I 

think some of you gentlemen 

know the effect of an explosive 

on the earth, causing it to slide. I 

think the canal would be put out 

of business, probably in one 

hour or two hours, by an enemy 

with aeroplanes. That is, of 

course, my own personal opinion. We do not know the effect 

of an explosive dropped from an 

aeroplane, because it has never 

been done except in a small 

way. I firmly believe when the 

experiments are carried on in 

that direction that it will be found 

to be very destructive. 

MI. Connolly. Would it not 

be difficult to place bclmbs with 

precision at an altitude of 5,000 

feet on account of the various 

currents that intervene between 

the air craft and the target? 

MI. Scott. From my experience, I think the wind does not 

make a great deal of difference, 

especially after the first bomb, if 

it is planed off. In the first place, 

you usually fly into the teeth of 

the wind, and at a very high 

altitude the currents would probably be compensating. I do not 

believe that the wind would 

have a great deal of effect if they 

were up a half a mile. I am 

speaking from experience. 

Mr. McKenzie. You have 

spoken of danger to the Panama 

Canal from aeroplanes? 

MI. Scott. Yes, sir. 

MI. McKenzie. What is your 

idea of the way we shlould protect the canal, with air craft? 

MI. Scott. I am not able to 

answer that question at the present time. The only way to fight 

air craft is with air craft. 

MI. McKenzie. If iit is true 

that the Panama Canal is in danger of being destroyed by the 

operation of air craft, then, in 

your judgment, is not the fortification of the Panama Canal a 

needless expense? 

the defenders of the Panama 

Canal were going to contend 

Mr. Scott. If air cradt were all 
Aeronautics in 

the Army 

17 

with, yes; but the fortifications 

are naturally placed there against 

the navies at the present time, 

primarily. I think the authorities 

should consider the air craft as a 

menace to the canal and not 

wait until that menace really develops-take it up now. 

Mr. McKenzie. Pardon me, 

but according to your theoy, if I 

understand you correctly, you 

would have a fleet of aeroplanes 

stationed at either end of the 

Panama Canal, and they would 

be of greater service in destroying an enemy’s fleet than the 

fortifications? 

Mr. Scott. 1 believe so; yes, 

sir. The authorities say that 500 

pounds of nitrogelatin dropped 

on the deck of a battleship 

would have only a local effect. 

We do not know; it has never 

been tried. The proof of the 

pudding is in the eating and I 

think it should be done; that 

some old battleship or monitor 

should be made a target and 

that it should be done. A great 

many authorities say it would 

have a local effect. I do not 

believe it. 

one of the older battleships is 

about ready to go out of commission and that might be a very 

good experiment. 

Mr. Scott. I believe in taking 

time by the forelock, and at the 

present time I think the aeroplane is of sufficient importance 

to warrant vey serious consideration. 

Mr. McKenzie. I understand 

Mr. Connolly. Do you regard the air craft as a potential 

force in destroying batfleships? 

From your experiments, it would 

seem reasonable that you could 

hit a battleship. 

Mr. Scott. 1 think so. From 

the height of a mile, I should say 

50 per cent of hits. There is a 

great deal of controversy as to 

the effect that a high explosive 

would have on the deck of a 

battleship, whether it would be 

local or cause vey serious harm. 

That can only be proven by 

tying. 

The Chairman. We are vey 

much obliged to you, Mr. Scott. 

(Thereupon the Committee adjourned.) 

............................ 

Filrt oaviceman to fly-Lt. Lahm 

(art by Richard Green) 

2- FouR-Squatmon 

Plan 

19 

During the hearings of 

1913 (Doc. l), Scriven gave 

the committee a paper entitled "Suggested Organization for Aeronautical Work in 

the United States Army,"' 

which explained the basis for 

the first plan for the organization of units for tactical operations with aircraft. The 

first such unit, the 1st Aero 

Squadron, had been formed 

as a provisional organization 

at Texas City, Texas, on 5 

March 1913 as U.S. Army 

forces on the border were 

being strengthened as a result of revolutionary disturbances in Mexico.* 

. . . this office has convened 

boards of officers to discuss the 

necessities which confront us, 

and these boards, consisting of 

several experienced officers of 

the Signal Corps associated with 

practically all of the aviators on 

duty, have reported in effect as 

follows: Our military forces have 

been apportioned among six divisional commands. Since these 

are tactical units, and it has been 

agreed that a large aeronautical 

organization should be assigned 

as a part of each main tactical 

unit, the boards have reported 

that an organization called an 

Aeronautical Squadron should 

be assigned to each of these 

tactical units to serve therewith 

as a component part of such 

units for peace training or for 

service in war. 

On account of the present reduced strength of such divisions, 

it has been recommended from 

economical considerations that 

at present we favor the organization of only 4 of the aeronautical squadrons, subdividing 2 of 

those so that distribution may be 

made of these subdivisions 

among the tactical units requiring them. 

formed are to be placed at appropriate aeronautical centers, 

The four aero squadrons thus 

each commanded by a field officer and serving incidentally as a 

center of aeronautical instruction. 

The organization and equipment of each of the aeronautical 

squadrons proposed is as follows: 

It is customary to assign for 

the operation of an aeroplane 

two officers, who alternate in 

long cross-country flights as observer and aviator or pilot. It has 

been found by our experience, 

and abroad, that at least five 

enlisted men are required in the 

care, repair, and handling of an 

aeroplane. This personnel (two 

officers and five men) constitute 

the section necessary for the 

aeroplane. Two aeroplanes and 

their sections are proposed as 

the platoon; two platoons compose the company, and two 

companies, commanded by a 

major, constitute the aero 

squadron, the aero tactical unit 

proposed to be assigned to a 

division. 

............................ 

1 Aeronaurics m the Army, pp 120-122 

2 Maurer Maurer (ed ) Combat Squadrons of the As Force, World War II (Washington. 1969). pp 44 

3, CKeationo~ 

The Aviation Section, 

Signal COKPS 

18July 1914 

21 

............................ 

, . . there is hereby created, 

an aviation section, which shall 

be a part of the Signal Corps of 

the Army, and which shall be, 

and is hereby, charged with the 

duty of operating or supervising 

the operation of all military aircraft, including balloons and 

aeroplanes, all appliances pertaining to said craft, and signaling apparatus of any kind when 

installed on said craft. ... ........................... 
22 Aviation Section 

Shortly after the 

let Aem Squadron had been formed as a 

prodsional quadton. Lte. Thomae D. Milling and 

William C. Sherman broke the U.S. duration 

and dietance Ipcord. on 28 March 1913. flying non-etop, 

crnee-country. frnm Texae City to San Antonio. On the tetum 

flight, on 31 March, they drew the fht aerial map from 

an aircraft. Ihe picture wu taken upon 

landing at Towe City. 
23 

Regulations 

1914 

The position taken by 

Breckenridge and Scriven in 

the hearings of 1913 (Doc. 1) 

with regard to the function of 

aviation was reflected in the 

War Department’s field Service Regulations of 1914.’ 

These regulations made infantry the principal combat 

arm of the U.S. Army, with 

artillery and cavalry as the 

principal supporting arms. 

Aviation, which was not mentioned in the section concerning the use of combined 

arms in combat, was given a 

reconnaissance mission that 

included strategic and tactical reconnaissance and observation of artillery fire. The 

only refererice to a fighting 

role for aircraft was a single 

sentence relating to the use 

of aircraft in preventing aerial 

observation by the enemy. 

Though these regulations 

were altered in several instances between the time 

they were issued in 1914 ,?p 

the end of the war in 1s b, 

statements concerning the 

status and mission of aviation remained unchanged. 

Following are some extracts. 

............................ 

11. Reconnaissance-Reconnaissance is the military term 

used to designate the work of 

troops or individuals when gathering information in the field. 

Reconnaissance begins as soon 

as the theater of possible operations is entered and continues 

throughout the campaign. No 

matter what other sources of information of the enemy may be 

available, reconnaissance must 

be depended upon to obtain the 

information upon which all tactical movements of troops should 

be based. 

12, By Aero Squadron.-In 

forces of the strength of a division, or larger, the aero squadron will operate in advance of 

the independent cavalry in order 

to locate the enemy and to keep 

track of his movements. Contact 

with the enemy once gained will 

be maintained thereafter contin13. By the Cavalry.-Reconnaissance in the theater of 

operations is best made by the 

cavalry, which from the beginning of the campaign seeks to 

determine the enemy’s strength 

and dispositions. It protects its 

own army against surprise, 

screens its movements, and insures the safety and success of 

the troops of other arms. The 

defeat of the hostile cavalry, and 

its expulsion from the field are 

usually the best means to this 

uously. 

end. As the opposing armies 

draw near each other, the cavalry endeavors to secure control 

of the ground between and 

bends every effort to that close 

and continuous reconnaisance of 

the enemy’s forces that is vital to 

the success of the entire campaign. 

............................ 

21. During combat the aero 

squadron will operate around 

the flanks and over and to the 

rear of the enemy’s position, for 

the purpose of reporting his dispositions, the approach of reinforcements, or the beginning of 

his withdrawal from action. ............................ 

30. Employment of Air 

Craft.-Military air craft of all 

kinds will be employed under 

the direction of the commander 

of the forces to which they are 

assigned and the immediate 

control of the officer commanding the aero organization. 

Balloons are classed as free, 

captive, and dirigible. Free balloons may be used to convey 

information from besieged places, the return message being 

sent by radiotelegraphy, carrier 

pigeons or otherwise. Free balloons are of little use for any 

other service, and are not very 

dependable on account of their 

uncertainty of movement. Cap1 War Department Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1914. Corrected 

to July 31, 1918 (Changes Nos 1 to 11) 

(Washington 1918) No changes are indicated for the passages printed above 
24 Aviation Section 

tive balloons may be used for 

tactical reconnaissance, for observation of artillery fire, and for 

signaling. Communication from 

a captive balloon to the ground 

should be by telephone. 

Large dirigible balloons are of 

practical value for strategical reconnaissance and to travel great 

distances; they are also suitable 

for carying a number of observers, radio equipment, machine 

guns, and considerable weight of 

explosives. Aeroplanes are more 

dependable for field service with 

a mobile army than dirigible balloons, as the latter require substantial shelter from winds while 

on the ground. 

31. Reconnaissance by aeroplane includes strategical and 

tactical reconnaissance and the 

observation of artillery fire. 

Aeroplanes are also used to prevent hostile aerial reconnaissance. 

aeroplane is effective within a 

radius of 150 miles from the 

starting point, and is for the purpose of determining the position, 

strength, and direction of advance of the large elements of 

an enemy’s forces, and also the 

character of the roads, railroads, 

streams, and the general military 

topography of the theater of operations. 

Tactical reconnaissance by 

aeroplane is used both in attack 

and defense. It is extended in 

nature and does not involve 

minute examinations of very 

small localities or detachments. It 

is designed to discover turning 

Strategical reconnaissance by 

and enveloping movements, the 

position and strength of the enemy’s general reserve, artilley 

positions and movements of 

cavaly; also, from the movement of combat or fielcl trains 

behind an enemy’s position information may be gained as to 

whether certain parts oif the line 

are being weakened or strengthened, or whether a retreat is 

contemplated. 

artillery, aeroplanes are usually 

assigned to the artillery commander. They are especially 

useful against targets which are 

invisible from the position of the 

artillery officer conducting the 

fire. 

Aeroplanes are safe from hostile fire at altitudes of 4,000 feet 

or more. 

The results of reconnaissance 

are reported by radiotel’egraphy, 

signals, and the dropping of 

messages. 

For observation of fire of field 
Field Service 

Regulations 

25 

Transmission of 

Information 

as follows: 

buzzer, telephone). 

helio, night lamp). 

36. Information is transmitted 

1. By wire (telegraph, 

2. By visual signaling (flag, 

3. By radio telegraph. 

4. By messenger (foot, 

mounted, cycle, motor car, flying 

machine). 

............................ 

Use of the 

Combined Arms 

123. Infantry.-The infantry 

is the principal and most important arm, which is charged with 

the main work on the field of 

battle and decides the final issue 

of combat. The role of the infantry, whether offensive or defensive, is the role of the entire 

force, and the utilization of that 

arm gives the entire battle its 

character. The success of the infantry is essential to the success 

of the combined arms. 

is the close supporting arm of 

the infantry and its duties are 

inseparably connected with 

those of the infantry. Its targets 

are those units of the enemy 

which, from the infantry point of 

view, are most dangerous to its 

infantry or that hinder infantry 

success. The greater the difficulties of the infantry the more 

powerful must be the artillery 

support. 

124. Artillery.-The artillery 

125. Cavalry.-The cavalry, 

preceding contact of the opposing troops of the other arms, is 

engaged in reconnaissance of 

the enemy and of the terrain and 

in accomplishing such mission as 

may be assigned it. During combat it directs its activities to the 

support of the other arms and 

particularly toward insuring the 

success of the infantry as soon as 

that arm is fully committed to 

action. 

............................ 

5, FUDC%FOR Aeaonautics 

(FiscaJ YWR 1916) 

DecembeR 1914 

27 

When it came time to 

budget for Fiscal Year 1916, 

General Scriven asked for a 

little more than $1,000,000 

for aviation. Secretary Garrison again imposed a cut, this 

time to $400,000. On 8 December 1914, Chairman Hay 

and members of the House 

Military Affairs Committee (D. 

R. Anthony, (R-Kan.); William 

S. Howard, (D-Ga.); Julius 

Kahn, (R-Calif.); and Kenneth 

McKellar, (D-Tenn.) questioned the Chief Signal Officer about how the money for 

1915 was spent, about the 

$400,000 requested for 191 6, 

and, among other things, 

about the use of aviation in 

the war in Europe. In the end 

Congress cut the amount to 

$300,000 (see Appendix A). 

Following are extracts from 

the hearings.' 

.. .......................... 

The Chairman. How many 

airships, aeroplanes, or biplanes 

have you on hand? 

Gen. Scriven. We have on 

hand just now 11. Col. Reber is 

just placing an order for 8 more, 

and there are 2 training machines, so that we will have a 

total of 21 machines, and subtracting the cost of these orders 

that are now placed. . . we 

[will] have about $40,000 left for 

fiscal year 1915. 

The Chairman. What do you 

propose to do with that $40,- 

OOO? 

Gen. Scriven. We have six 

months to run and we have to 

buy gasoline and oil, and we will 

have a thousand and one little 

expenses. An air machine is very 

much like an automobile. When 

you buy an automobile, then 

your expenses begin. 

The Chairman. You expect 

to spend that for the upkeep and 

repair of the machines? 

Gen. Scriven. For upkeep 

and repairs. Of course, if we 

have any of that appropriation 

left, and 1 hope we will, we will 

buy some more machines. 

The Chairman. You have 

not a sufficient fund to buy more 

than the 21 machines you have 

already provided for? 

Gen. Scriven. I have been 

thinking it over, Mr. Chairman, 

and I am in hopes that we may 

be able to squeeze out two or 

three more machines, making a 

total, with the 21 on hand, of 23 

or 24 machines. If we can create 

four aero squadrons, like the 

one represented in that picture, 

of 8 machines each, that will 

give us 32 machines, and with 

that number we are quite well 

provided for an army of our 

size-32 machines in first line in 

commission. Then we should 

add 50 per cent of spare parts, 

or what really amounts to other 

machines, in the warehouses 

ready to put together, so that we 

will then have 50 machines, and 

then we shall be as well off in 

this respect as we need to be. 

The Chairman. You only 

want to accumulate 32 

Gen. Scriven. We only want 

to accumulate 32 machines in 

the first line and a reserve of 50 

per cent because we have under 

the bill 60 aviator officers and 

we are only allowed 12 enlisted 

men for instruction in flying. The 

limit is therefore 72. If we organize 4 squadrons of 8 machines 

each that is 32 machines-each 

squadron is supposed to have 

20 pilots and observers-4 

squadrons would require 80 

men, observers and pilots. That 

would constitute the necessary 

complement of men. Now we 

are allowed 60 officers. We will 

probably get these officers, because they are coming in ve y 

fast and they appear to appreciate the work. We should then 

require 20 enlisted men to make 

up the full complement of 800 

men. If these can not be obtained it will be necessary to cut 

off some of the 4 officers comprising the commander and staff 

of each squadron, or an observer need not be sent out with 

evey machine. At all events it 

will be possible to put 4 squadrons in the field fairly well 

manned and equipped. 

But to the 4 squadrons of 32 

machines should be added a reserve of 50 per cent of spare 

1 Hearings before the Cornminee on Milltarv Affairs. House of ReDreSentatlVeS Army 

machines? Appropriation Bill 1916 (1914) 
28 Aviation Section 

parts, because the machines require this for spare parts all the 

time. That would add 16 more 

machines to be purchased, as 

the spare parts should constitute 

an entire semblance not put together, so that in case of immediate necessity the spare parts 

could be assembled and replace 

broken machines in the field at 

once. 

The Chairman. Of the 

$400,000 you are asking for, 

how much do you expect to 

spend for this purpose? 

Gen. Scriven. I think I can 

give that exactly. We have 21 

machines now and $40,000 left. 

The running expenses from now 

until July will be, I should say, 

about $25,000, which will give 

us $15,000 free and two more 

machines, which will make 23 

machines. To make up the 32 

machines we will have 9 macines to buy and to make up the 

resetve for the 32 machines, 50 

per cent, 16, making it necessary 

to buy in all 25 new machines 

during the coming year to put 

the aviation squadrons into fairly 

good shape. ............................ 

Mr. Kahn. Gen. Scriven, you 

stated to the committee that you 

thought if you could build up a 

corps of 32 flying machines it 

would serve your present purpose in proportion to our Army? 

Gen. Scriven. I think so. 

Mr. Kahn. Can you give the 

committee any data as to the 

number of machines that each 

one of the belligerent nations 

had at the outbreak of hostilities 

in Europe? 

Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir; I can. 

I do not know how accurate it is, 

but it is the most recent thing on 

the subject I know of. It comes 

from a publication called the 

Clash of Nations published by 

Thomas Nelson & Sons, of New 

York, 1914. They give the number of aeroplanes for France, 

500; dirigibles, 11. Russia, aeroplanes, 500 dirigibles, 4. Great 

Britain, aeroplanes, 250; dirigibles, 8. Germany, aeroplanes, 

500 dirigibles, 20. Austria, aeroplanes, 100 dirigibles, 3. Italy, 

aeroplanes, 150; dirigibles, 2. 

Mr. Kahn. So that your request is an exceedingly modest 

one in comparison with what 

they had when war broke out in 

Europe? 

Gen. Scriven. I think it is a 

ve y modest one. I would like to 

go on and explain that a little 

further. The idea is to have four 

squadrons, three of them aeroplanes proper and one a squadron of hydro-aeroplanes. It must 

be understood that we irequire 

certainly eight machines (one 

hydro squadron) to be used in 

the Philippines, and especially 

for use in Panama, and also, as I 

think, in Hawaii. ............................ 
Funds for Aeronautics 

(Fiscal Year 191 6) 

29 

The Chairman. What is your 

information as to the effect of 

the aeroplane service in the armies of the countries now at 

war? 

Gen. Scriven. Mr. Chairman, 1 have pretty pronounced 

views on that. 

The Chairman. I mean, what 

is your information about that? 

Mr. McKellar. Are they 

doing any real service? 

Gen. Scriven. They are the 

most tremendous implement for 

reconnoissance and for the gathering of information that modern 

war has ever seen, 1 think. I 

think they have changed, as I 

said in my annual report, not 

strategy, but the principles of 

grand tactics. 

Mr. Anthony. It has not developed that they are of any 

practical value for offensive militay purposes? 

Gen. Scriven. No, sir; I believe not. 

A man to make a cruise of 

400 miles, across a course 200 

miles each way, has to cary, we 

will say, 400 pounds of fuel and 

oil. He can not take an observer 

with him because that would 

add too much weight, and he 

goes alone. The amount of destructive material he can carry in 

the way of bombs or guns under 

these conditions must be small, 

as their weight makes any considerable supply of ammunition 

prohibitive, but in addition a 

pilot alone without help can 

hardly do any effective firing 

either with bomb or gun; and if 

4,000 or 5,000 feet in the air, he 

can do little more than drop his 

shots broadcast upon the earth. 

We have recently tried bomb 

dropping at San Diego with 

three types of bombs, one 

weighing 25 pounds, one weighing 50 pounds, and one weighing 100 pounds. As a matter of 

fact, we did not use the 100- 

pound bomb. It has been estimated that our aeroplane carries 

about 25 to 50 gallons of gasolene for a flight of, say, 350 

miles; but this depends upon 

current winds. At all events, the 

machine carries enough gasolene to stay in the air about four 

hours, and carries also an observer and a pilot, besides oil. So 

loaded it is estimated that one of 

our aeroplanes has a free lifting 

capacity of about 120 pounds. 

With a lifting capacity of 120 

pounds and with each bomb 

weighing not less than 25 

pounds-and a 25-pounder is 

not good for much, so that the 

bomb should be as large as 50 

pounds to do any damage-f 

what value is the aeroplane as 

an offensive weapon? 

Of course, I do not now refer 

to attack of aeroplane against 

aeroplane or aeroplane against 

dirigible, nor do I wish to be 

understood as saying that in a 

few isolated cases bomb dropping may not do harm, but only 

that as a fighting machine the 

aeroplane has not justified its 

existence, except aeroplane 

against other air craft. 

As an implement for reconnaissance and as the far-seeing 

eye of a commander the aeroplane is superb. 

Mr. McKellar. You say they 

are used for getting information. 

How can a man in the air, several hundred or several thousand feet above the county, 

running a machine get any information about what is actually 

going on down below? 
30 Aviation Section 

Gen. Scriven. Not the man 

running the machine, but the 

observer. 

Mr. McKellar. How does he 

get any information about what 

is going on down below? 

Gen. Scriven. We can not 

say how he does it, but as a 

matter of fact we know he does 

it, because we know what they 

are doing in Europe. He also 

gives signals of what he sees. 

The Chairman. General, I 

apprehend that the greatest use 

of the aeroplane so far in the 

war in Europe has been that the 

observer in the aeroplane has 

been able to signal to his side 

the position of the enemy. 

Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kahn. And that supplements the work of the cavalry in 

that respect? 

Gen. Scriven. It supplements 

cavalry and it leads cavalry. It 

gives the cavalry the point of 

objective to get in touch with the 

enemy. 

The Chairman. And it also 

aids the artillery? 

Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir; visual 

signaling is done in several ways. 

There is a smoke bomb which is 

dropped above the point to be 

indicated, also fragments of tinsel paper, which fall down from 

the aeroplane and in the sunlight 

gives a streak of light. From such 

signals the observer at the guns, 

who is constantly following the 

plane gets his range with the 

glass. This, if well calculated, 

gives him his range and his direction. I believe, too, that other 

signals of the wigway type are 

used. Indeed, the matter is not 

difficult-a flag thrown to the 

wind from the aeroplane, a 

smoke bomb dropped, a sudden 

rise or dip of the machine perhaps might serve the purpose. 

Mr. Howard. The observer 

ought to be a very competent 

military officer. 

Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir; he 

must be a trained man. 

Mr. Howard. And a strategist? 

Gen. Scriven. Yes. ,4t all 

events, he should be able to 

interpret the movement!; of 

troops that he sees. We have 

tried, and I think successfully, 

the wireless with the aeroplanes, 

and by that means, through 

ground stations, should keep the 

commanding general constantly 

in touch with the movement of 

troops. If he (pointing) is sending 

a column over the hills yonder 

he can see through the aeroplane how far the column has 

gone and just what its position is. 

Hence he keeps in touch with 

the positions of his own moving 

troops and knows where they 

actually are, and not merely 

where they should be according 

to arranged plans. 

In regard to the enemy, his 

airmen outline the latter’s lines, 

see the movement of his troops, 

indicate his reinforcements. In 

fact, the whole game is open to 

a commander; the cards lie on 

the table. 
Funds for Aeronautics 

(Fiscal Year 191 6) 

31 

Mr. Kahn. Gen. Scriven, I 

have seen it stated in some of 

the papers that the aeroplane is 

largely responsible for the indecisiveness of the battles that 

have been raging in northern 

France lately. 

Gen. Scriven. I think that 

must be so. 

Mr. McKellar. Has not the 

use of aeroplanes in the European war now going on been a 

distinct disappointment to those 

who believed that air craft would 

play an important part in 

warfare? 

Gen. Scriven. Well, I think in 

one direction, that of destruction, such is the case; in another 

direction, that of information, 

their usefulness far exceeds the 

expectations and hopes of anybody. In reconnoissance work 

they have done more than anybody could have dreamed of. 

Gen. French's official reports 

show that. As far as aggressivenes and destruction are conof what we anticipated at the 

hearing a year and a half ago. 

Mr. McKellar. The only destruction they have accomplished is that of helpless women 

and children? 

Gen. Scriven. There has 

been no destruction of military 

importance, absolutely none, so 

far as 1 have observed. Their 

attack has inspired fear, but even 

that seems quickly to pass away. 

cerned, they have fallen far short 

............................ 

6, ScRiuen: The 33 

In a circular on “The Service of Information” in 191 5, 

General Scriven emphasized 

the importance of aviation as 

an instrument of reconnaissance and communication. 

At the same time, however, 

he recognized that the role of 

military aviation was expanding as aircraft were used for 

other kinds of operations in 

the war in Europe. Following 

is the section of the circular 

concerning the employment 

of aircraft. 1 

Air Craft 

The signal corps is intrusted 

with the air service of the 

army-undoubtedly the most 

important, as it is the most recent, auxiliary in the collection 

and transmission of military information. Air craft are now employed for strategical and tactical 

reconnaissance and the prevention of reconnaissance by the 

enemy’s air craft; for the direction and control of fire of the 

field artillery; for the destruction 

of the enemy’s personnel and 

materiel by explosive and incendiay missiles and other means; 

and for the rapid transportation 

of superior commanding officers. 

The value of air craft and especially of the aeroplane, in the 

field of reconnaissance has been 

proved beyond the shadow of a 

doubt. Whatever may be the 

opinions of military men as regards the offensive importance 

of air craft and the present 

standing of the dirigible there is 

no longer a question as to the 

value of the aeroplane in rapid 

and long-range reconnaissance 

work, and of its power to secure 

and to transmit by radio, visual 

signal or direct-flight information 

of the utmost importance to armies in the field. So true is this 

that it seems probable the aeroplane and, to some smaller degree, all air craft have altered not 

the principles of strategy, which 

are immutable, but the theoy 

and application of grand tactics. 

It now appears that the actual 

game of war is played openly 

with cards laid on the table, and 

opportunity no longer is given 

for inference as to concealed 

movements or for surprises, perhaps not even for the exercise of 

the high military quality of anticipation of the unseen movements 

of the adversary. It is now recognized that the possibility of brilliant and unexpected blows and 

surprises by enterprising commanders has been largely eliminated from modern operations 

of war by the information supplied by the aviators. It is proved 

that the modem air craft lays 

open to the field of mental view 

the whole visible area of the 

immediate theater of war and 

that the commander’s vision 

reaches far beyond the limits of 

the actual sight of his marching 

troops. The air craft sees and 

indicates the larger operations of 

war and points out to the slowly 

moving men on the ground not 

only the object to be attacked or 

defended, but to reconnaissance 

troops, especially the cavalry, 1 Scriven, The Service of Information, 

Circular No 8. Office of the Chief Signal 

Otficer (Washington. 1915). pp 21-23 
34 Aviation Section 

the objective to be sought, the 

localities to be searched, and the 

character of information to be 

obtained. 

By no means does the air craft 

supersede, nor can it ever 

supersede, the work of obtaining 

detailed information which can 

be acquired only by close observation, by contact, and by development of the enemy’s forces 

and positions. This remains the 

duty of the troops in the field; 

but the air craft does indicate to 

either commander the character, 

location, and general disposition 

of opposing forces, and of his 

own commands. Not only has it 

been proved that the aeroplane 

is invaluable in locating the position of the enemy, but it has 

especial value to a commander 

in finding his own troops, in 

keeping him informed when 

movements are taking place, 

and of the position of his flanks 

and center, his outposts, his 

cavalry, his artillery, of the positions attained by any detached 

body-in short, of keeping him 

constantly in touch with the locations and movements of all the 

units of his command under the 

changing conditions of war. 

This much is proved, but it 

does not follow that the air craft 

curtails the work of reconnaissance of other arms of the service, the infantry, the signal corps, 

and, more especially, the cavalry. On the contrary, it extends 

the usefulness and power of all, 

for if the general field of reconnaissance is outlined, it is obvious that the cavalry or infantry 

can more readily strike its objective and more quickly and accurately obtain information regarding any particular point than if 

obliged unseeingly to search the 

whole field of operations for locations and forces regarding 

which an intimate knowlledge is 

desired or contact expec:ted. In 

other words, by aid of air craft, 

and more especially of the aeroplane, a reconnaissance by 

troops moves less in the dark, 

knows better what to look for 

and search in detail, and loses 

less time and effort in acxomplishing the object sought. No 

move of concentration from 

flank or center, no envelopment 

of a wing nor reenforcement of a 

weak position should rernain unknown to the adversary in the 

case where he possesses a thoroughly efficient flying corps. It 

would seem, therefore, ihat not 

only has the power of all1 reconnaissance troops been increased 

by the air craft, but also that the 

need and importance of the cavalry in reconnaissance work 

have not been lessened, but, on 

the contrary, have been greatly 

increased by them. 

In addition to the influence 

exerted by air craft on grand 
%riven: The Service 

of Information 

35 

operations, events now appear 

to show that their value in more 

detailed operations is great and 

may increase in the future to 

enormous proportions. It is well 

established that the accuracy, 

value, and effect in service of 

field and siege artillery and, indeed, of the heavy guns afloat 

and ashore have been greatly 

increased by this agency. It may 

almost be said that guns are 

fought by means of the eyes of 

the aviator. So clearly has this 

been shown that there now appears a noticeable change in artillery practice. Instead of the 

old-fashioned system of range 

finding by trial fire or of observation from the battery or elevations near by, the exact range is 

now found with the help of 

aeroplanes, by signaling positions and noting the fall or burst 

of the shrapnel, and there can 

be no doubt that artillery-fire direction has been enormously increased in accuracy by the aeroplane, especially when the 

shrapnel burst can not be seen 

from below. Infantry fire has 

been largely improved in efficiency by the same means. 

acter the aeroplane has undoubted use in the finding of 

Besides influence of this charconcealed positions, in locating 

hidden howitzers or mortars, and 

in pursuit and rear-guard actions. It will be useful in the 

location of ships at sea or at 

anchor within defenses, possibly 

in the detection of submarines 

and submarine mines, and certainly in the enormous increased 

efficiency given to seacoast gun 

fire, and especially to the coast 

defense, the coast guard, and 

many other details of observation. 

But the useful, approved, and 

most important work of air craft 

is to be found chiefly in reconnaissance and the collection and 

transmission of information in 

the theater of militay operations. For this reason aviation 

must be reckoned as a vastly 

important branch of the signal 

corps of the army. 

The use of the aeroplane as a 

defense against aeroplane attack 

and for the rapid transmission of 

commanding officers or important personages to destinations 

sought is, of course, obvious. ......................... ... 

7, Scrziuen: 

Annual Repo~t 

FOR 1915 

37 

The section on aircraft in 

Scriven‘s The Service of Information (Doc. 6) was also 

used as an introduction to a 

chapter on aviation in the 

Chief Signal Officer’s annual 

report for Fiscal Year 1915, 

extracts from which are 

printed below.’ Reviewing 

events of the past year and 

noting the situation that existed in mid-1915, Scriven 

looked toward the future to 

an expansion of the aviation 

service to perhaps as many 

as 18 squadrons. At that time 

there was only one, the 1st 

Aero Squadron, which was 

made up of two companies, 

each with four airplanes for 

reconnaissance work. Developments in Europe, however, 

had indicated that squadron 

organization needed to be 

changed. 

1 Report of the Chiet Signal Oliicer 

United States Army to the Secretary of War 

1915 (Washington 1915) 

2 The act which created the Aviation 

Section (Doc 3) 

............................ 

... hereafter aeroplane 

squadrons should be composed 

of 3 companies, with a total of 

12 machines to the squadron. 

Two companies should have 8 

reconnoissance machines (4 to 

each company), and the third 

company should be made up of 

2 rapid-flying machines for chase 

or transport purposes and 2 machines of the bomb-carrying or 

offensive type. Such are the 

conclusions reached from experience abroad. 

............................ 

The organization and instruction of the personnel of the First 

Aero Squadron were completed 

during the year (at North Island) 

and the squadron sent to Fort 

Sill, Okla., for duty in connection 

with the problems of fire control 

and direction of the field artillery. 

The War Department has di- 

............................ 

rected the maintenance of an 

aviation school and a squadron 

for land flying in this country, the 

stationing of an aero company at 

each of the following places: 

Corregidor, P.I.; Fort Kamehameha, Hawaii; Canal Zone, and 

when this has been accomplished, an increase of the force 

at Corregidor to a squadron. 

Under this program the Signal 

Corps Aviation School will continue at North Island, in San 

Diego Bay, until a permanent 

site has been obtained. The First 

Squadron, now at Fort Sill, will 

proceed to San Antonio, Tex., in 

the early part of December, 

when it is expected that the 

buildings now being erected for 

its use on the old target range at 

Fort Sam Houston will have 

been completed. The personnel 

for the company designated for 

Corregidor is now at the Aviation School and its equipment is 

being purchased. It will leave for 

Manila at the close of the typhoon season of the present 

year. Steps are being taken to 

obtain and train the personnel 

for the companies intended for 

Hawaii and Canal Zone, and 

such of their equipment as is 

practicable to purchase from the 

appropriation for the current fiscal year will be procured. Sufficient funds have not been provided for in the current year’s 

appropriation to purchase complete equipment for these companies. It is expected to send a 

company to Hawaii by next April 

and one to the Canal Zone 

when funds are available for the 

equipment of the organization 

destined for that station. 

The estimate for the ensuing 

fiscal year has been prepared on 

the basis of the program prescribed by the War Department 

for utilizing the personnel authorized by the act approved 

July 18, 1914.* The total of this 

estimate is $1,358,000. 

emphasized the absolute necessity for an adequate aviation 

service, has illustrated in a most 

forceful way the dangers resulting from an inadequate supply 

of personnel and materiel, has 

The recent war in Europe has 
38 Aviation Section 

shown that aeroplanes are invaluable for reconnoissance purposes, and that their absence 

from a combatant force has resulted in most serious disasters. 

Aeroplanes have proved their 

value in the direction and control 

of artillery fire, in preventing the 

operation of the aeroplanes of 

an enemy, and have been used 

with great effect against both 

personnel and materiel. The difficulties surrounding the creation 

of an adequate aeronautical 

service after the outbreak of hostilities have been vividly illustrated during the past year, and 

the great inconveniences and 

dangers resulting from the lack 

of adequate aeronautical personnal and materiel have been 

so forcibly demonstrated that 

comment is unnecessary. 

The greater need at such a 

time, however, will be for trained 

men as pilots and observers. . . . 

The inadequacy of facilities for 

building aeroplanes and the 

manufacturing of their accessories has to a large extent been 

removed in this county. At the 

present time it is known that 

something more than 100 flying 

machines per month can be produced. While this supply might 

meet the needs of a small army, 

it would be totally inadequate in 

a great war. However, there can 

be no doubt that American manufacturers would arise to the occasion with a sufficiently large 

output. The training of men, 

therefore, is the crying need of 

the present time. 

The number of officers and 

men now authorized by law is 

inadequate to the needs of the 

Army as it is at present organized. With one aero squadron 

per division, the present organization of the Army calls for five 

aero squadrons. The commissioned personnel provided by 

law allows a sufficient number of 

officers for three aero squadrons, 

as at present organized, while 

the enlisted strength is insufficient; and if the number of officers and men allowed by law 

should be organized into three 

aero squadrons there would be 

no personnel left for the conduct 

of the Aviation School. 

The present war in Europe 

has developed three separate 

types of aeroplanes-the reconnoissance and fire control machines, the combat machine, 

and the pursuit machine. The 

aviation section possesses a satisfactory type of reconnoissance 

and fire-control machine and has 

taken up the question of the 

development of both the combat 

and pursuit types. For this purpose an item of $50,000 has 

been included for experimental 

machines in this year's estimates. 

The organization of the aviation units in the foreign armies 

suggests a squadron of 12 machines as the basis for our organization, 8 of these machines to 

be of the reconnoissance type 

and 2 each of the pursuit and 

combat types. Our aero squadron as at present organized has 

sufficient commissioned personnel for this increase in the number of machines, but the enlisted 

personnel is deficient by 24 men 

to provide crews for the additional machines and drivers for 

the additional autotrucks.. In case 

the Army remains at its present 

authorized strength, the personnel of the aviation section should 

be increased by 46 officlers and 

410 men to give sufficient personnel to supply five aero 

squadrons, one for each of the 

five tactical divisions at present 

organized in the Army, and to 

maintain the Aviation School. It 

is to be pointed out that there is 

need for at least one squadron 

for reconnoissance work in each 

of the three Coast Artillery districts in this county, and that a 

sufficient number of aeroplanes 

should be provided for fire direction and control for the l-ield 

Artillery on the basis of one 

aeroplane per battery, with one 

in reserve, or, in round numbers, 

six aero squadrons for this arm. 

This calls for the addition of nine 

I 
Scriven: Annual Report 

for 1915 

39 

squadrons to those above mentioned. 

If the plan for the reorganization of the Army by the War 

Department, which calls for 

seven tactical divisions and five 

Cavalry brigades, be approved 

by Congress, provision should 

be made for 1 aero squadron for 

Corregidor, 1 for Hawaii, 1 for 

Canal Zone, 1 for each of the 

three Coast Artillery districts in 

the United States, 1 for each of 

the tactical divisions, and 5 for 

the Field Artillery, giving in all 18 

squadrons, with a total strength 

of 368 officers and 2,360 enlied men. 

The total cost of the equipment necessay for these organizations will be $4,284,000. .___. 

Proposed otgantzatien of the aviation section for service dth an Army of 18O.M)O men. 

Total .....~~~~~~~~~ 1 1 19 174 173 90 150 282 612 74 816 336 2,360 

8. WaRCollege 

Diuisiorz: A P~operr 

M ilita ~y Policy 

1915 

41 

In March 1915 the Chief of 

Staff directed the War College Division of the General 

Staff to make a full study of 

“a proper military policy for 

the United States.” In the report submitted to the Chief of 

Staff on 11 September 1915, 

the War College Division recommended a mobile army of 

1,000,000 men prepared to 

take the field immediately on 

the outbreak of war. Of these, 

half should be fully trained, 

and the other half should 

have enough training to enable them to be brought to full 

com bat readiness wit hi n 

three months. The 500,000 

fully-trained troops were divided between regular army 

and reserve. For the regular 

army, the War College Division recommended 65 infantry regiments, 25 cavalry regiments, 21 field artillery regiments, 289 coast artillery 

companies, and, among 

other units, 8 aero squadrons. Five of the squadrons 

were for duty with five tactic al divisions recommended 

for service in the United 

States; the other three were 

to be stationed in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Canal 

Zone.’ 

The report of the War College Division was supplemented by a series of special 

studies which were published 

a little later. One of the studies was on military aviation, 

which is printed below.2 

Military Aviation 

1. Introduction. 

1. Relation of Aviation to 

The Military Service 

In this paper it is proposed to 

consider various aeronautical 

appliances in regard to their 

practical value in campaign, as 

shown by such data as are now 

available from the theater of war 

in Europe. 

In its relation to the military 

service, aviation to-day may be 

regarded as embracing all aerial 

appliances, such as heavierthan-air craft, dirigibles lighterthan-air craft, and nondirigibles 

or captive lighter-than-air balloons, together with the personnel necessary for their operation 

and management. 

2. Use of Aircraft on Our 

Coast and With Our Mobile Land Forces. 

In considering this subject account should be taken, first, of 

the use of aircraft of various 

types along and beyond the 

coasts and frontiers of the United 

States upon the outbreak of war; 

second, the use of aircraft in the 

Army by the mobile forces; third, 

the use of aircraft by our oversea garrisons. 

In addition to the battle fleet 

and units of the Navy designed 

to take the offensive on the high 

seas, the waters contiguous to 

the coast line of the United 

States are organized into naval 

defense districts. These cover 

certain sections of the coast line 

and contain patrol vessels, both 

surface and subsurface, and aircraft for reconnoissance purposes. These are essentially for 

the purpose of finding out and 

locating hostile vessels which are 

approaching the coast and of 

determining their strength, dispositions, and probable intentions. 

mations included in the naval 

defense districts, in time of war 

the United States Coast Guard 

(in peace under the Treasury 

Department) passes to the control of the Navy. 

The Coast Guard, in addition 

to its boats and revenue cutters 

which will be utilized as patrol 

vessels, embraces the Life-Saving Service. The latter has stations more or less regularly distributed along the coasts which 

are connected by telephone 

lines. They are also equipped 

with visual signaling appliances 

to communicate from shore to 

ships. The Navy maintains a 

chain of radio stations along our 

coasts and over-sea possessions. 

The naval defense districts become of great importance in 

case that the main battle fleets 

are defeated or in case they are 

operating at a great distance. 

Added to the strictly naval forNotes 

1 War College Division. Statement of a 

Proper Military &/icy for the United States 

(Washington. 1915), p 13 

2 War College Division, Mditary Aviation 

(Washington. 1916) 
42 Aviation Section 

Therefore, when an enemy expedition breaks through the naval defense and approaches the 

coast with a view to forcing a 

landing the resistance to such an 

expedition becomes primarily a 

function of the Army. 

The defensive formations of 

the Army consist of the harbor 

defenses and accessories and the 

mobile units. The harbor defenses consist of fixed and mobile 

gun defenses and mine defenses; also obstacles both on land 

and in the waters. The aircraft 

required in connection with the 

harbor defenses should consist 

of machines used for one or 

more of the following purposes: 

(a) For reconnaissance-that 

is, to determine the strength, dispositions, and probable intentions of the enemy. 

(b) For preventing hostile aerial reconnaissance. 

(c) For destroying hostile aircraft and for offensive work 

against enemy submarines and 

other vessels, including the interruption of enemy mining or 

countermining operations. 

fire of Coast Artillery, both 

against ships and against any 

invading force that may invest 

the seacoast fortifications. 

The number and character of 

the aircraft required depends on 

the locality, number of harbor 

defenses, their organization, 

strength, and positions. Each 

harbor-defense area, therefore, 

needs to be studied with this 

specific end in view, and should 

(d) For aiding in spotting the 

have radio apparatus not only 

for communicating with the 

Navy but also for communicating with its aircraft and with the 

units of our mobile forces. 

In addition to the aircraft required with the harbor defenses 

themselves, aircraft are required 

with modem movable coast-defense armament employed as an 

auxiliay element of the mobile 

forces in defending the intervals 

between our fortified harbors 

and with units of the mobile 

forces. 

The use of aircraft with the 

mobile units is a definite matter; 

each division requires one 

squadron of 12 aeroplanes. 

These are divided into three 

companies of four aemplanes 

each, two companies having reWright Model D Scout purchased by the Signal Corps in 1913. 

It was a single-seat pusher type aircraft propelled by a 6- 

cylinder, 60 hp. Wright Field engine. 
War College Division: 

A Proper Military Policy 191 5 

43 

connaissance and artillery observation machines and one company having two high-speed machines especially constructed for 

long-distance reconnaissance 

and for combating the enemy’s 

aerial craft; two battle machines 

for the purpose of bomb dropping and offensive work against 

enemy material of all sorts. This 

is in keeping with the best practice that has been developed in 

the European war. 

3. Use of Aircraft At OverSea Stations 

The use of aircraft with the 

Army in the over-sea possessions analogous to that mentioned above with the harbor 

defenses; and in addition, wherever mobile units of the Army 

happen to be, they must be provided with suitable aircraft. The 

defense of over-sea possessions 

constitutes a problem in itself, 

and these garrisons must be 

equipped not only with machines capable of reconnaissance over land but also with 

those capable of operations over 

water, with the power to alight in 

water-that is, hydroaeroplanes. 

The type of machine to be 

used necessarily depends on the 

locality; for instance, in Hawaii 

practically all of the military machines would need to be hydroaeroplanes; in the Philippines 

and Panama a great proportion 

of them. To the Coast Artillely 

troops in the United States 

proper and in the districts 

around the Great Lakes the 

same considerations apply. It is 

believed that the main principles 

enunciated above should be followed, and that an estimate of 

actual machines and material, 

both heavier and lighter than air, 

should be made for all places. 

11. General Types of 

Aircraft. 

4. Captive Balloons. 

For over a century captive 

balloons have been used by the 

armies of all the leading militaly 

nations. Their function has been 

one of observation; that is, to 

see what those on the ground 

were unable to see. They have 

therefore proved a useful means 

of observing and reporting the 

effects of artillery fire. Electrical 

means of communication greatly 

enhanced the utility of captive 

balloons, as it made communication instantaneous from car to 

ground instead of by the older 

way of raising and lowering written messages by ropes. In clear 

weather and on favorable terrain 

captive balloons are able to distinguish different branches of the 

service at a distance of 16,000 

yards or about 9 miles. With the 

best glasses at the present time 

the field of observation is said to 

extend to 20,000 yards. In general, captive balloons of the 

“Sausage” or “Drachen” type 

are used by all the armies of the 

great nations. Along the FrenchGerman front in northem France 

these balloons are used in great 

numbers all along the lines. 

Their function is to observe the 

fire of artillery and keep watch of 

all movements of hostile parties 

within their field of view. They 

are connected with telephone directly with the batteries whose 

fire they are observing and with 

the headquarters to which they 

are attached. In many cases the 

captive balloons work in conjunction with aeroplanes. The 

aeroplanes by flying over the 

terrain where the hostile targets 

are located find out the exact 

position of those which the captive balloons have been unable 

to locate by themselves. When 

by means of signals the locations 

of the targets have been indicated to the observer in the captive balloon, the aeroplanes proceed to other duty. Aside from 

the use of the captive balloons in 

conjunction with aeroplanes, 

War Cdlege Division: 

A Proper Military Policy 1915 

45 

their duties are practically the 

same as they have been for 

many years or were in our own 

Civil War. Free balloons such as 

were used from Paris, for instance, in 1870 are now a thing 

of the past, their place having 

been taken by the aeroplane or 

the dirigible airship. All military 

captive balloons are now so constructed that their undersurface 

acts like a kite, thereby making 

them steady in a strong wind. To 

keep the envelope distended 

properly in the face of the wind, 

a wind sail is provided so as to 

transmit pressure to the rear part 

of the envelope by means of the 

wind itself. Captive balloons are 

used not only with the field 

forces, but also are especially 

useful in fortress warfare. The 

organizations which handle these 

balloons consist ordinarily of 

some 4 officers, 72 men for each 

balloon section. 

5. Dirigibles. 

The term dirigible, as applied 

to aeronautical appliances, signifies a lighter-than-air craft, which 

is equipped with engines and 

propellers capable of moving it 

from place to place. Dirigibles 

may be roughly divided into 

three classes: Non-rigid, or those 

whose envelope can be entirely 

packed into a small space when 

deflated, and that have no rigid 

framework of any kind; semirigid, or those that have a stiffening for a part of their length in 

order to enable the envelopes to 

maintain their shape to better 

advantage than the nonrigid; the 

rigid, which have a framework 

for the whole envelope that 

maintains itself continuously. All 

have been tried for the last 15 

years. The nonrigid types have 

not given ve y good results, as 

they are too much dependent on 

the weather, due to distortion of 

the envelopes; the semirigid 

have given some satisfaction and 

have been largely employed. 

The advantage of the semirigid 

types is that they may be packed 

for shipment and reassembled 

much more easily than the rigid 

types; they can be deflated 

quickly and, consequently, are 

not so subject to complete destruction as the rigid types when 

anchored to the earth. On the 

other hand, they are not able to 

develop the speed that the rigid 

types, such as the “Zeppelin,” 

are capable of. 

Dirigibles and aeroplanes are 

frequently compared with each 

other as to their utility in general. 

As a matter of fact, they are two 

entirely different military accessories and are as different in 

many ways as is a captive balloon from an aeroplane. Dirigibles are able to stay in the air at 

any height for long periods of 

time. They are capable of running at reduced speed, can 

hover over localities for minute 

observation and to take photographs. They are able to cany 

several tons weight in addition to 

their passengers and crew. From 

the fact that they are able to 

remain stationary over a given 

place they are able to launch 

their projectiles with greater accuracy. Dirigibles in present war 

have been used both over land 

and sea. At sea they have carried out reconnaissance, have 

acted offensively against hostile 

submarines, have accompanied 

transports in order to observe 

the approach of hostile craft, 

have been used in mine laying, 

stopping and examining hostile 

merchanrvessels at sea, and for 

bombarding hostile localities. 

The airships which have made 

the longest trips and developed 

the greatest efficiency thus far 

the German “Zeppelin” 

rigid-frame type. These have repeatedly flown over England at a 

distance of at least 300 miles 

from their base, and have nearly 

always returned in safety. Some 

have been lost, however. Aeroplanes appear to be unable to 

cope with them at night. While 

dirigibles have not proved themselves to be a determining factor 

in combat, either on land or sea, 

they are being developed to the 

greatest extent possible, especially by the Germans, who have 

dirigibles of very great size. The 

principal features of this type are 

a rigid framework of aluminum, 

a number of drum-shaped gas 

War College Division: 

A Proper Military Policy 191 5 

47 

bags, and a thin outer cover. 

Although the details of construction are not definitely known up 

to date, their length is about 485 

feet, their volume about 900,- 

000 cubic feet, their total lift over 

20 tons, and their useful lift 

about 5 tons. They are driven by 

four motors of a total horsepower of about 800, which is 

applied to four propellers. Their 

speed is from 50 to 60 or more 

miles per hour and a full-speed 

endurance of over 100 hours, or 

more than 4 days. It is therefore 

evident that in good weather 

these airships have a radius of 

action of from 5,000 to 6,000 

miles. Moreover, they are being 

constantly improved, and are 

probably capable of crossing the 

Atlantic Ocean. Crews of from 

10 to 20 men are required for 

their operation; they are armed 

with bombs of various sorts, light 

guns, and are equipped with 

searchlights. They carry very efficient radio apparati, which 

have equipments for determining the directions from which 

radio impulses are being sent. In 

this way they are able to locate 

themselves at night or in foggy 

weather when the ground is invisible. They require very large 

and expensive hangars, gas 

plants, and equipments for their 

operation. When forced to make 

landings outside of their hangars, 

on account of their bulk, they 

are very difficult to handle in 

hard winds, and are liable to 

destruction thereby. 

The best of the nonrigid and 

semirigid airships have a capacity of more than 800,000 cubic 

feet, a maximum speed of 50 

miles per hour or less, and a full 

speed endurance of about 24 

hours. As mentioned above, 

their great asset is extreme portability and cheapness as compared with the rigid type. 

6. Aeroplanes. 

their appearance as military 

agencies in 1908, when the 

Wright brothers demonstrated 

thoroughly the possibilities in this 

respect. While many of the salient features of heavier-than-air 

machines had been worked out 

years before, it remained for the 

internal-combustion engine to 

really make mechanical flight 

possible. The military possibilities 

of aircraft of this description 

were appreciated immediately 

by the great nations. Large appropriations were made at once, 

notably by France and Germany 

for their development. At first 

England was slow to take up the 

matter, but in 1912 had gone at 

it thoroughly and was spending 

large amounts of money for their 

development. Italy, Russia, Japan, and the smaller nations of 

Europe and South America 

made liberal appropriations for 

obtaining the material and developing the personnel. Aeroplanes were used in a small way 

during the Italian campaign in 

Africa during the Balkan-Turkish 

War, and during the Balkan 

War. These nations had very little equipment and very few 

Heavier-than-air craft made 

trained flyers. Wherever the 

aeroplanes were given the opportunity under average conditions they rendered efficient 

service in reconnaissance. 

7. Types of Aeroplanes. 

We now find aeroplanes consisting of three principal classes: 

(a) Scout or speed machines; (b) 

reconnaissance aeroplanes; (c) 

battle machines. The first are 

used for distant reconnaissance 

and combating the enemy’s aircraft, the second for ordinary 

reconnaissance and the observation of fire of artillery, and the 

third for the destruction of enemy’s material, personnel, or 

equipment. 

8. Requirements of Various 

Great advances have been 

made since the war began in all 

these machines, all the details of 

which are not yet available. The 

following table, which appeared 

in the London Times of February 19, 1914, gives the approximate requirements of each type 

of machine at the beginning of 

the war. These general characteristics are still desired, but the 

radius of action and the speed 

have been considerably increased. 

Types of Machines. 
48 Aviation Section 

9. Aeroplane Engines. 

As to material, the most important consideration in aeroplane construction has been the 

engine. Without excellent engines the best aeroplanes otherwise are of no service; in fact, 

may be a source of danger. In 

the countries where aeroplane 

development has made the most 

progress large prizes have been 

given for the development of 

suitable engines. At the same 

time, research and experimentation have gone on along this line 

at Government plants. Engines 

require frequent replacement. In 

fact, it is reported that after 100 

hours in the air engines are 

"scrapped" and new ones installed. The plan found to give 

excellent results for the development of material is for the Government to have stations where 

experimentation along all lines is 

carried on. On the data furnished by these establishments 

specifications are made up for 

the construction of aircraft by 

private individuals and civil manufactories. If any parts, such as 

the engines mentioned above, 

need additional development, 

prizes are offered to stimulate 

construction and progress. 

111. Functions of Aircraft. 

10. Height At Which 

Aeroplanes Must Fly. 

It was soon found olut that to 

escape the fire of smalll arms, a 

height of about 4,000 feet above 

the ground had to be maintained. As soon as balloon guns 

were created this height had to 

be increased to 6,000 feet, at 

which height it is now necessary 

to fly in order to be reasonably 

safe from being hit by hostile 

projectiles sufficient to bring the 

machine down. At this height, 

6,000 feet, small details of the 

terrain and small detachments of 

troops or material are very difficult to distinguish. On the other 

hand, large columns of troops, 

trains, railways, bridge!;, artillery 

firing, and sometimes in position, 

defensive positions of large extent, and things of that nature 

can be readily distinguiished. 

Whenever it becomes necessary 

for the aircraft to fly at (3 lower 

altitude than 6,000 feet the 

chance of destruction by gunfire 

must be considered. 

11. Strategical Recamnaissance. 

Reconnaissance of this kind is 

strategical in its nature, the tactical reconnaissance of particular 

localities is still carried out by 

troops or captive balloons. In 

fact, it may be said that all strategical reconnaissance is now 

carried on by aircraft. The reconnaissance is carried out by an 

officer who requires considerable 

experience in order to be able to 
War College Division: 

A Proper Military Policy 1915 

49 

Performances required from nrioua milltary types. 

Light scout. Reconnaissance Reconnaissance Fighting aeroplane. Fighting aeroplane. 

aeroplane. aeroplane. (a) (b 1 

b) (b 1 

Tankage to give an en- 300 miles ......_... 

Tocany -~ ....... ~.~ Pilotonly ~~...~~... 

durance of. 

Range of speed .~~~~~ 50 to 85 miles per hour 

To climb 3,500 feet in 5 minutes .......... 

Miscellaneous qualities Capable of being 

started by the pilot 

single-handed. 

300 miles ..~~~~~~~200 miles ..._...... 

Rot and observer plus Pilot and observer plus 

80 pounds for wire- 80 pounds for wireless equipment. less equipment. 

45 to 75 miles per hour 35 to 60 miles per hour 

7 minutes ~~~~.~~~.. 10 minuts .-...... 

~~ ..._.............. To land over a 30-foot 

vertical obstacle and 

pull up within a distance of 100 yards 

from that obstacle, 

the wind not being 

more than 15 miles 

per hour. A very 

good view essential. 

200 miles 

Pilot and gunner plus 

300 pounds for gun 

and ammunition. 

45 to 65 miles per hour 

10 minutes ~~~~~~~. 

A clear field of fire in 

evey direction up to 

30” from the line of 

flight. 

300 miles. 

Pilot and gunner plus 

100 pounds. 

45 to 75 miles per hour. 

8 minutes. 

A clear field of fire in 

evey direction up to 

30” from the line of 

flight. 

distinguish objects on the earth 

and assign to them their true 

military value. The pilot is either 

an officer or noncommissioned 

officer. The observer is always a 

trained tactical officer, because 

in reconnaissance of this nature 

an untrained person can not interpret the militay significance of 

what he sees. 

12. Photography From 

Aeroplanes. 

Photography is utilized to the 

greatest extent possible in aerial 

reconnaissance. The devices are 

so arranged that they are capable of taking one or a series of 

views of a particular locality. The 

plates or films thus made are 

rapidly developed and are 

thrown on a screen by means of 

a stereopticon, when all details 

are magnified to any extent desired and details invisible to the 

naked eye are brought out 

plainly. These details are then 

entered on the maps of the officers concerned. As the height at 

which an aeroplane is flying can 

be taken from the barograph, 

and as the focal angle of the lens 

of the camera is known, a scale 

can easily be worked out and 

the views form good maps of the 

terrain photographed. 

13. Aeroplanes and Artillery. 

In addition to reconnaissance 

in general, aeroplanes have 

taken their place as a fixture for 

observing the fire of artillery. 

Due to the degree of concealment which artillery is now 

given, it is impossible to determine its location from the 

ground. The aeroplanes first pick 

up the targets, report their location to the field artillery, and 

then observe the fire of the batteries. By means of prearranged 

visual signals or radiotelegraphy 

the aeroplanes are able to indicate to the artillery where their 

fire is making itself felt. If artillery 

is insufficiently provided with 

aeroplanes, it is well established 

that an enemy so provided has 

an overwhelming advantage. 

14. Control of The Air. 

For this reason, among others, 

attempts to gain “control of the 

air” are made by belligerents at 

the inception of hostilities. This 

takes the form of offensive action by aeroplane against aeroplane. For this purpose machines known as “speed scouts” 

and “battle aeroplanes” have 

been developed. All the great 

European nations are now 
50 Aviation Section 

equipped with them. The only 

way in which enemy aeroplanes 

can be effectively dealt with is by 

aeroplanes, because they are 

difficult targets for gunfire from 

the ground. To gain control of 

the air a great preponderance in 

number and efficiency of aircraft 

is necessary. So far in the European war, unless one side had a 

greatly preponderating number 

and quality of aeroplanes, they 

have been unable to obtain and 

keep control of the air. An excellent instance of obtaining control 

of the air seems to be furnished 

by the Austro-Germans when 

they initiated the campaign 

against the Russians in May, 

1915. In this instance complete 

control of the air appears to 

have been obtained. The results 

to the Russians were disastrous 

because the Austro-Germans 

were able to fly at will wherever 

they wanted to, could pick up 

the location of the Russian masses, and make their movements 

accordingly, entirely unobserved 

by the Russians. In the fire of 

their artillery they had the advantage of being able to locate 

the Russian guns and observe 

their own fire while the Russians 

were powerless to do so. 

In an article on “Recent progress in military aeronautics,” 

published in the Journal of the 

Franklin Institute for October, 

1915, Lieut. Col. Samuel Reber, 

Signal Corps, United States 

Army, sums up the question of 

machines for control of the air as 

follows: 

Experience has developed three 

types of aeroplanes for military purposes. The first, the speed scout, for 

strategical reconnaissance, a one 

seater, with a speed up to 85 miles 

per hour and radius of action of 300 

miles and a fast climber, about 700 

feet per minute; the second for general reconnaissance purposes with 

the same radius of action, carrying 

both pilot and observer and 

equipped with radiotelegraphy, 

slower in speed, about 70 miles per 

hour, and climbing abut 500 feet 

per minute, and in some cases protected by armor; the third, or fighting 

craft, armored, and carries in addition to the pilot a rapid fire gun and 

ammunition and so arranged as to 

have a clear field of view and fire in 

either direction up to 30 degrees 

from the line of flight, the speed to 

run from 45 to 65 miles per hour, 

and the machine to climb about 350 

feet per minute. 

15. Surprise Movements. 

use of aeroplanes surprises are 

no longer possible. Generally 

speaking, this is so, providing 

both sides are equally well 

equipped with machines and 

weather conditions are favorable. If, however, complete 

“command of the air” is obtained by one side, the chances 

of surprising the enemy are 

greater than they have ever 

been before. 

It is often said that due to the 

16. Bomb Dropping. 

In addition to their functions 

of reconnaissance, the observation of the fire of artillery, and 

the combat of hostile machines, 

both heavier and lighter than air, 

much time, thought, and ingenuity have been given to the 

subject of dropping projectiles. 

Bombs of various sorts weighing 

from a couple of pounds to 50 

pounds have been tried. The 

most common ones weigh from 

15 to 35 pounds. At the height 

at which aeroplanes are required 

to fly it is extremely difficult to hit 

an object with any certainty. 

Various devices have been used 

and tried for this purpose. The 

factors of height, speecl, and 

wind, are almost impossible to 

compensate for entirely, up to 

the present time, so that consequently bomb dropping in general or the launching of projectiles of all kinds from aeroplanes 

has not attained great results in 

so far as the actual destruction of 

material or personnel is concerned. Advances along this line 

are constantly being made, however, but progress is slow. A 

special type of aeroplane has 

been developed for dropping 
War College Division: 

A Proper Military Policy 191 5 

51 

bombs and battle purposes. For 

bomb attacks on any locality 

these machines are sent in flotillas of from 30 to 60 machines, 

each of which is provided with 

from 5 to 10 bombs. They go to 

the locality and circle over it, 

dropping their projectiles. 

Against railways, roads, bridges, 

and hostile parks of various 

kinds, this method of attack has 

given considerable success. 

IV. Organization of 

Aeroplane Units 

17. Tactics of Aeroplanes. 

As to tactical use aeroplanes 

seem to be approaching methods similar to those used by a 

navy. That is, first the speed 

machines reconnoiter to the 

front; they are followed by the 

battle machines, which in their 

turn clear the way for the reconnaissance aeroplanes; those assigned to the artillery stay right 

with their guns. Fortresses, harbor-defense works, and naval 

formations require special organizations of aeroplanes, some or 

all of which may be operated 

from the water. The organization, kind, and number of the 

machines and personnel required for this particular service 

depend on the special locality 

and mission of whatever formation the aircraft are to be 

attached to. 

18. Development During 

European War. 

The use of aeroplanes is gradually being developed from experience in the European war. 

Organization has been found to 

be one of the most important 

considerations; in general the organization has been into squadrons. The squadron is a tactical 

and administrative unit. It has a 

personnel consisting of pilots, 

observers, bomb droppers, mechanicians, chauffeurs, and drivers, Flying personnel has to be 

developed in the military service. 

Unlike chauffeurs, for instance, 

there are few in the civil population who can be drawn on. The 

few who fly are demonstrators, 

exhibition flyers, or sportsmen. 

They are very few in number 

and scarcely a military asset. In 

France the squadrons usually 

have six machines and two 

spares. They have the same organization of depts of resupply 

that other units of the armies 

possess. The squadrons usually 

consist of complete units of one 

kind of machine; that is, speed, 

reconnaissance, or fighting. 

These squadrons 2re usually assigned to an army, or more if the 

machines and personnel are 

available. 

In general an aeroplane requires for its operation a personnel of 1 pilot, 1 observer, and 2 

enlisted men, mechanicians, 

chauffeurs, etc. 

In England 12 machines of 

different classes are assigned to 

a squadron. 

19. Assignment of Aeroplanes to Artillery. 

Many are of the opinion that 

machines with the personnel to 

operate them should be assigned 

permanently to artillery regiments so that they would be 

immediately available whenever 

action is required by the artillery. 

If they have to be obtained from 

a higher headquarters valuable 

time is often lost. It is believed 

that before long aeroplanes will 

be assigned permanently to regiments of artillery. 

V. Development of 

Aeronautic Personnel. 

20. General Line of Development in Europe. 

In the development of their 

aeronautical personnel all nations have worked more or less 

along similar lines. At first these 

detachments were attached to 

the engineers. All the pilots and 

observers were officers, while 

the mechanicians and others 

were enlisted men. As the science developed and more and 

more machines became necessary the importance of this 

branch constantly increased until 
52 Aviation Section 

eventually it formed a separate 

arm of the service. 

Instead of officers only being 

employed in the flying of the 

machines noncommissioned officers began to be used as the 

pilots. 

21. Officer-Observers and 

Noncommissioned Officer Pilots. 

The observers were either 

trained staff officers or officers of 

particular branches when the reconnaissance being made especially concerned a certain 

branch. For instance, in the observation of artillery fire an artilley officer, for the inspection of 

a demolished bridge over a great 

river an engineer officer, or for 

the observation of the tactical or 

strategical dispositions of an enemy's troops a staff officer. Noncommissioned officers are now 

vey generally used as pilots. All 

countries now at war have found 

that they have places for all the 

trained pilots they can possibly 

obtain. In general the units are 

commanded by officers and a 

certain number of the pilots are 

officers, but the bulk of the piloting is done by enlisted men 

while the officers are carried as 

observers. 

WAR DEPARTM SHINGTON, D. C 

On 27 May 1913 the War Department established the Military 

Aviator Certificate. Officers of the Army qualifying under rules 

approved by the S.cretary of War received the certificate. 

and a lnoignia (at rlght) to wear on their uniforms. 

22. Losses to Aero 

Personnel in War. 

The losses to the flying personnel in war, when equipped 

with proper machines, seems to 

be less than that of infantry, cavaly, and artillery in tho order 

named. 

23. Development of Aeronautic Personnel in the 

United States. 

In the United States the development has been along similar 

lines to those employed in Europe, with the difference that 

here a branch of the service existed that did not formerly exist 

in European armies. It was a 

development of the Civil War, 

i.e., the Signal Corps. This corps 

is charged with the transmission 

of information between the various units of an army; the captive balloons had formerly been 

assigned to it, and when the 

aeroplanes made their (appearance they naturally fitted in. In 

this way all the agencies for the 

transmission of information are 

kept under one head, which 

should give not only the maximum amount of efficiency in 

such transmission but ~ilso obviate the necessity of creating a 

new arm of the service. The 

development of aero units in the 

United States has been slow for 

various reasons: First, on account of the fact that very little 

money has been appropriated 

compared to the sums appropriated in Europe. Second, the selection of the flying personnel 

has been limited to lieutenants of 
War College Division: 

A Proper Military Policy 1915 

53 

the Regular Army, unmarried, 

and below 30 years of age. This 

reduces the number of eligibles 

to a very small compass and 

does not give the results that are 

necessary. In the development 

of a flying personnel it is thought 

that, in addition to a certain 

number of officers obtained from 

the Regular Army as now provided for by law, pilots should 

be obtained both from among 

the enlisted men and from suitable civilians who enlist for that 

purpose. When they have 

proved their ability to be efficient 

pilots they should be placed in a 

special grade to be designated 

by a suitable name, such as 

“aero pilot, Signal Corps,” for 

instance. This grade should be 

analogous to the grade of warrant officer in the Navy. When 

such men leave the service for 

any cause which does not interfere with the performance of the 

duties of pilot, arrangements 

should be made to obtain their 

services at once at the outbreak 

of war. The observers should be 

tactical officers who have received training. The present organization authorized for the 

aero squadrons in the United 

States provides that each one 

have 12 aeroplanes-8 of the 

reconnaissance type, 2 of the 

speed type, and 2 of the battle 

type. The personnel numbers 20 

officers, 18 of whom are pilots. It 

is intended that staff and Artillery 

officers be used as observers. 

The United States squadron appears to be a well-balanced unit 

for work in this country, judging 

by the experiences obtained in 

Europe. It should be perfected 

as soon as possible and every 

effort made to give our Army the 

aircraft of all types needed for its 

use. Lieut. Col Reber, in this 

connection, says: 

We who in the beginning started 

the movement are now at the tail of 

the procession. We have no dirigibles, but very few trained men, and 

fewer machines. The manufacturing 

industry is moribund from the lack of 

business, and there is no future for it. 

We have no aerodynamical laboratories in which to study the problems, and no engineering courses, 

except one, in which to develop our 

constructors. The Government has 

not stimulated any advance in the 

design of machines or motors by 

competition for substantial reward. 

We have no national league, as in 

France and Germany, to assist the 

Government by private subscription 

and by public demand for the development of air power. The interest of 

our people in aeronautics at large is 

dead, and has been perhaps so 

lulled by a sense of false security and 

the belief that war will not come to 

such a vast and powerful Nation as 

ours; that it will not heed an oftquoted maxim of the Father of our County, “In time of peace prepare 

for war.” In no particular is it more impossible to make up deficiencies 

after the outbreak of hostilities than 

in aeronautics. What is to be done? 

Evidently a strong appeal 

should be made to Congress for 

suitable legislation. 

24. Scope of Needed 

Legislation. 

What is needed is legislation 

that will give means of obtaining 

a sufficient personnel of pilots, 

enough money to buy suitable 

machines including excellent engines, and the training of a suitable number of officer-observers. 

Provision should be made for 

the creation of captive-balloon 

units, and dirigibles of various 

types should be developed. 

9. To lncrzecrse the 

Eggiciency OF The MiJiCaey 

Establishment 

1916 

55 

On 1 May 1915, during the 

time the War College Division 

was formulating a military 

policy (Doc. 8), the American 

merchantman Gulflight was 

torpedoed by a German submarine. A week later, on 7 

May, the Lusitania was sunk. 

Despite repeated protests 

from President Wilson, the 

sinkings continued; and as 

they continued, the need for 

U.S. military preparedness 

became more and more evident. 

On 18 January 1916, the 

Chief Signal Officer, General 

Scriven, again appeared before Hay’s Committee on Military Affairs, the subject 

being another bill “To Increase the Efficiency of the 

Military Establishment.” The 

following extracts from the 

hearings are concerned 

mainly with Scriven’s testimony in behalf of an expansion of the Aviation Section 

and his response to a question from Congressman Kahn 

about bombing operations in 

Europe .’ 

.............. 

The Chairman. You are asking for 73 additional aviation officers. I wish you would state the 

reason for that. 

Gen. Scriven. In order to 

explain it thoroughly, I think it 

might be well for me to state to 

the committee the scope, as I 

understand it, of the aviation 

service which is needed at the 

present time. I will do that 

briefly, sir, and give you the figures in regard to that. 

The organization of the aviation units in the foreign armies 

suggests a squadron of 12 machines as the basis for our organization, 8 of these machines to 

be of the reconnaissance type 

and two each of the pursuit and 

combat type. In case the Army 

remains at its present authorized 

strength the personnel of the 

aviation section should be increased to give the sufficient personnel to supply seven aero 

squadrons, one for each of the 

four tactical divisions organized 

for duty in the United States, 

three for over-seas garrisons, 

and a detachment for duty at the 

aviation school. 

It is to be pointed out that 

there is additional need for at 

least one squadron for reconnaissance work in each of the 

three Coast Artillery districts in 

this country, and that a sufficient 

number of aeroplanes should be 

provided for fire direction and 

control of the Field Artillery on 

the basis of one aeroplane per 

battery with one in reserve, or, 

in round numbers, six aero 

squadrons for this arm. This calls 

for the addition of nine squadrons to those above mentioned. 

While the above-mentioned 

force will give a personnel for a 

flying establishment in time of 

peace, a much greater number 

of officers and men will be required in time of actual hostilities. As a step toward getting the 

flying men necessary to meet 

war conditions, an aviation reserve corps should be created 

including citizen aviators, mechanics, and constructors of air 

craft. ... 

............................ 

I have said that the organization of the aviation units in foreign armies suggests a squadron 

of 12 machines as the basis of 

the present organization. We 

have heretofore had eight machines, which we have called 

squadrons. They have been 

scout machines. It seems desirable, in accordance with the present practice, to add a third company of four machines, two of 

which shall be what we call pursuit machines, capable of pursuing dirigibles or attacking aeroplanes, and two of them heavy 

1 Hearings before the Committee on Milttary Affairs, House of Representatives. To 

Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States, 64th Cong, 

1st sess. VOI 1 (1916) 
56 Aviation Section 

A formation of JN-3 aircraft, which were modified JN-2s used 

by the let Aero Squadron (late 1915 early 1916) at Fort SIU. 

Okla., and San Antonio. Tex. 
To Increase the 

Efficiency of The Military 

Establishment 191 6 

57 

carrying machines, which would 

be capable of carrying a considerable amount of ammunition in 

the shape of bombs, and which 

could be used for combat or 

destructive purposes. That 

makes the squadron as at present proposed 12 instead of 8. 

Now, it is also, I think, to be 

accepted that an aeroplane is an 

expendable article. It is like ammunition used with the gun. It is 

subject to destruction, and therefore we must have 12 machines 

for replacement, and also a reserve of 12, so that a squadron 

consists of 36 machines. ... 

............................ 

As I have said, if the reorganization plan of the Army by the 

War Department, which calls for 

seven tactical divisions and five 

cavalry brigades, should be approved by Congress, provisions 

should be made for one aero 

squadron for Corregidor, one for 

Hawaii, one for the Canal Zone, 

one for each of the three Coast 

Artillery districts in the United 

States, one for each of the tactical divisions and five for the 

Field Artillery, giving in all 18 

squadrons, with a total strength 

of 368 officers, counting 20 officers to a squadron and 6 officers 

for the school, with a total 

strength of 368 officers and 

2,360 enlisted men. ............................ 

Mr. Kahn. Well, I have in my 

office here in this building d picture that was issued by the British Government calling for volunteers, with a legend on it that 

this was the damage done by a 

German dirigible; and according 

to that picture the wreckage was 

something terrific. Now, does the 

bomb dropped by an aeroplane 

accomplish the destruction that 

those heavier missiles accomplish? As I understand it, the 

dirigible can carry much heavier 

missiles. 

Gen. Scriven. Oh, yes. Of 

course, the bomb dropped by 

the aeroplane is a very small 

matter; that is to say, it has very 

slight destructive power, because, so far as we know, they 

have not had the power to carry 

free weight enough to make it 

worth while. They can carry a 

bomb or two, but it is not much. 

............................ 

The Chairman. There seem 

Gen. Scriven. May I say just 

to be no further questions. 

one word before you go? In 

regard the first question you 

asked me, in connection with the 

Signal Corps at large, 1 have 

endeavored in this pamphlet 

here submitted to point out the 

need of a corps of information in 

modern armies, and I have endeavored to show how absolutely inadequate the strength of 

the Signal Corps is to meet those 

requirements. ... ............. 

10, PRepaR&ness 

FOR National Degense 

1916 

59 

Early in 1916 the Senate 

Committee on Military Affairs 

was holding hearings on bills 

for reorganizing the Army 

and for creating a reserve. 

The Chief Signal Officer, 

General Scriven, and the 

Chief of the Aviation Section, 

Colonel Reber, testified on 28 

January. They were questioned by Chairman George 

E. Chamberlain (D-Ore.), and 

Sen. Thomas Benton Catron 

( R-N.M.) .’ ............................ 

Gen. Scriven. In the first 

place, I would like to emphasize, 

as far as I can, the growing importance of the service of information. I have endeavored to do 

this in a little pamphlet before 

me, which I think has come to 

the committee room. But the 

service of information has become so obviously important 

and of such paramount value in 

military operations, especially in 

the light of events abroad, that I 

think it is well to emphasize it as 

strongly as possible. The general 

officer or the commanding general of any force or any expedition who has not a service of 

information, as compared with 

the man who has, is like a blind 

man fighting one who can see, 

one who has all the information 

on current happenings and 

changing events before him 

upon which to base his actions. 

The service of information is 

performed in these days, first, 

largely, in broad scope, by the 

aeroplane, which gives the general survev of the field. but must 

be supported by the other 

means of transmitting information now employed, such as, of 

course, the telegraph, telephone, 

what we call the buzzer, visual 

apparatus of various kinds, and 

largely, as is now pretty well 

recognized, by wireless telegraphy, or radio telegraphy, as it is 

now known. ... 

............................ 

The needs of the aviation section were gone into quite fully in 

the hearing before the House 

committee, and I understand 

that it will not be necessary for 

me to repeat what appears in the 

report of that hearing. I do, however, wish it to be fully understood that the aviation organization which is called for in the 

preceding table-that is, seven 

aero squadrons and a school detachment, has been reluctantly 

offered as absolute minimum in 

case the Army remains at its 

present strength. 

The Chairman. You went 

into that in the House committee? 

Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir. I 

asked there for 18 aero squadrons. 

Senator Catron. What constitutes a squadron? 

Gen. Scriven. A squadron as 

we had it consisted of two companies of four aeroplanes eachthat is, of eight aeroplanes, all of 

which were intended for scouting purposes. 

Senator Catron. How many 

Gen. Scriven. Under the old 

men to a company? 

plan it was 90 to the squadron, 

but now it has been proved by 

events abroad that to these two 

companies of scout machines for 

general outlook over the country 

must be added a third company 

of four aeroplanes, two of which 

shall be rapid-pursuit machines 

to counterattack any enemy’s air 

craft, and two heavy weight-carrying machines, armed with machine or other types of guns 

and capable of carrying a considerable weight of ammunition 

used for destructive purposes. 

So that a squadron properly organized now consists of 12 aeroplanes in the first line, 129 men 

and 20 officers. 

Senator Catron. You mean 

129 men in a squadron, or in 

each company? 

Gen. Scriven. In the whole 

squadron. There are 20 officers 

and 129 men to the squadron, 6 

officers to each company, which 

make 18, one squadron commander, who should be a major, 

and one adjutant and supply officer. But a squadron of 12 machines, in my opinion, is not 

enough. The organization is 

good as a fighting unit, but I 

think that for each machine you 

should count three-that is, one 

machine that is actually in use, 

1. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Preparedness for National Defense, 64th Cong, 1st 

sess. pt 12 (1916). 
60 Aviation Section 

one replacement, so that when 

the first is broken up or out of 

commission it can be at once 

replaced and a third aeroplane 

be kept as a reserve, not necessarily assembled, but ready to be 

used. As I see it, we should have 

one squadron in the Philippines, 

one in Hawaii, one in the Canal 

Zone, seven for use with the 

field armies-that is, one at the 

headquarters of each division 

and three squadrons for the use 

of the Coast Artillery-that is, 

one squadron for the North Atlantic, a squadron for the South 

Atlantic, and a squadron for the 

Pacific. To these 13 squadrons 

there should be added one aeroplane, with its replacement, for 

each battery of Field Artillery. 

The Chairman. How many 

would that mean? 

Gen. Scriven. That means 

18 squadrons. 

The Chairman. Of 129 men 

Gen. Scriven. Eighteen 

The Chairman. And 20 offiGen. Scriven. Yes. . . . 

The Chairman. How many 

squadrons have you now? 

Gen. Scriven. We have today, I think, 23 aeroplanes. Call 

it two squadrons. As a matter of 

fact, we have a squadron at San 

Antonio and we have the aviation school at San Diego, and 

then we have a company on its 

way to the Philippines. 

each? 

squadrons of 129 men. 

cers? 

............................ 

The Chairman. That is three. 

Gen. Scriven. I could hardly 

call it three. 

The Chairman. Not three 

squadrons? 

Gen. Scriven. No. Two 

squadrons by number; but better, one squadron and one company, and a school detachment. 

The Chairman. You have 

not three, then? 

Gen. Scriven. No, sir; not of 

the approved squadron organization. We have 46 officers and 

243 men. 

The Chairman. How many 

machines have you now? 

Gen. Scriven. Twenty-three, 

and two awaiting acceptance 

tests. 

The Chairman. How many 

do you need for 18 squadrons? 

Gen. Scriven. I think we 

need 36 machines to a squadron. But, as a matter of fact, 

perhaps we will say 24 machines 

to a squadron would be well 

enough, though each unit in 

service should have a support of 

two machines, rather than of 

one replacement. 

Officers of the U.S. Signal Corps Aviation School, North Island, 

San Diego, California, 1916. Thirteen of the 28 officers in the 

photo attained a general officer rank in later years. 
Preparedness for 

National Defense 

1916 

61 

The Chairman. You need 

432, and you have 23? 

Gen. Scriven. Yes; reckoning 24 to the squadron; or if you 

reckon 36 machines to the 

squadron, the total number of 

machines we should have is 18 

by 36, or 648. The machines 

should be considered as expendable, for they are easily 

placed out of commission. 

be a great number in reserve 

with the European armies? 

tremendous. 

machine cost? 

roughly, $10,000, with the instruments, and so on. 

The Chairman. I should 

think it would be almost as perishable as ammunition. 

Gen. Scriven. No doubt, 

and should be so reckoned. 

The Chairman. There must 

Gen. Scriven. It is no doubt 

The Chairman. What does a 

Gen. Scriven. I think, 

Abroad they are getting tremendously powerful machines, and 

will undoubtedly be able to carry 

guns and missiles in sufficient 

quantity to do a great deal of 

destruction. 

The Chairman. What do 

these Zeppelins carry? 

Gen. Scriven. They carry 

several tons. The new ones I do 

not know about, but the old 

ones had a capacity of something like 4 or 5 tons free weight. 

The Chairman. That is what 

the Germans are using for 

bombs? 

Gen. Scriven. Yes. 

Senator Catron. Can they 

drop their bombs with any accuracy? 

Gen. Scriven. No, sir; they 

can not. They have small chance 

to hit what they are aiming at. 

They simply drop the bombs 

when and where they can. 

Senator Catron. And they 

have to get up about how high 

to be at a safe distance? 

Gen. Scriven. Now, to be 

beyond the range of the powerful anti-aircraft guns, they must 

rise to at least 13,000 feet. This 

is probably beyond the ability of 

the dirigible. 

Senator Catron. If they drop 

them while they are moving and 

their machine is not entirely 

steady, they would have all 

kinds of trouble about where 

their shots would go? 

Gen. Scriven. They would. 

Senator Catron. What are 

you doing in regard to improving 

your machines, or whatever you 

call them? Have you adopted 

any machine that is a standard 

machine, or are you open to 

getting better ones? 
62 Aviation Section 

. Lieut. Col. Reber. We are 

keeping abreast of the practice 

as developed at home and 

abroad, and evey time any improvement is made we endeavor 

to put that in our machines. . . . 

............................ 

Senator Catron. What maLieut. Col Reber. AeroSenator Catron. What kind 

Lieut. Col. Reber. We are 

chines are you using? 

planes. 

of aeroplanes are you using? 

using a biplane tractor, twoseated scout machine. 

Senator Catron. Any particular make, designated by the 

name of any particular person? 

Lieut. Col. Reber. We have 

those machines made both by 

the Curtiss Co. and by the Martin Co. 

Senator Catron. I suppose 

you have in them the advantage 

of evey machine there is in the 

county? 

Lieut. Col Reber. We ty to 

get them. 

Senator Catron. What is the 

greatest speed you can get out 

of one of those? 

Lieut. Col. Reber. Do you 

mean the ones we have? 

Senator Catron. Yes. 

Lieut. Col Reber. I think 

Senator Catron. It seems to 

about 80 miles an hour. 

me that over in Europe they 

have gotten more speed than 

that out of them. 

Lieut. Col. Reber. But not 

out of the same type of machine 

we have. 

Senator Catron. Do we 

need another type of machine? 

Lieut. Col. Reber. We do, 

and the only reason we haven’t 

it is because we haven’t enough 

money to buy it. 

Senator Catron. That was 

what my first question was addressed to, whether you were 

keeping abreast of the times, 

getting machines as efficient as 

those now being used in Europe, 

that would be efficient for and 

beneficial to the Army in its operations. You now say you have 

not got as rapid a flying machine 

as they have? 

Lieut. Col. Reber. I might 

say this, that the average scout 

machine abroad, of the same 

type we have, has approximately 

the same speed as ours has. 

They have a faster type machine 

they have developed that we 

have not as yet been able to 
Preparedness for 

National Defense 

1916 

63 

buy, as it has not been developed in this county, although 

American manufacturers now 

are planning to build it, and they 

have offered to build some types 

which we expect to have tried 

out in the next two or three 

months. As a specific case, the 

Curtiss people are building and 

will have for exhibition and trial 

within about a month a fast machine, which will probably make 

110 miles an hour. 

Senator Catron. The paper 

stated some machines over there 

are making 110 miles an hour. 

Lieut. Col Reber. That is a 

fact. 

Senator Catron. Is that the 

greatest speed any of them has 

reached? 

Lieut. Col Reber. No, sir. I 

think the fastest speed on record 

is a little over 126 miles an hour; 

but that is not a militay machine. That was a racing machine. 

that? 

in France. In a Duperdussin 

mono-plane, Prevost made a 

speed of 126.59 miles per hour. 

Senator Catron. As I understand, Gen Scriven, you claim 

you ought to have some additional machines, and particularly 

these vey fast machines? 

Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir; I 

think it is pretty well developed 

Senator Catron. Where was 

Lieut. Col. Reber. That was 

that if the aeroplane is actually 

used in war, there must be 

means of counterattack by aeroplane. An aero attack must be 

met by a counterattack, and a 

Zeppelin attack should be met 

probably by the fast aeroplanes. 

Senator Catron. What is the 

speed of the Zeppelin? 

Gen. Scriven. I do not recall 

anything higher than about 65 

miles, whereas the aeroplanes 

have gotten up as high as about 

125 miles an hour. 

Senator Catron. What 

would be the particular benefit 

of the exceedingly fast machine 

in connection with the others? 

Gen. Scriven. Like a blackbird attacking a crow. He can fly 

all around his enemy, get above 

him, fire projectiles at him, and 

has the advantage of always 

being able to manuever for position. Like a fast ship, he can 

keep out of the way of the 

other’s guns, and make his own 

attack. 

Senator Catron. Have these 

machines proven a success as 

scout machines? 

Gen. Scriven. Our machines 

are vey successful as scout machines. 

Senator Catron. How do 

these machines inform the Army 

where a battey that may be 

firing against the troops is located? 

Gen. Scriven. They do it by 

visual signaling, by dropping or 

displaying objects of various 

shapes and colors, by directional 

flying, by smoke bombs, signals 

from a Vey pistol, and by wireless apparatus. 

Senator Catron. YOU stated 

a while ago that they could wire 

out, but they could not receive a 

message. 

Gen. Scriven. No; they can 

not hear. The aeroplane makes 

so much noise. 

The Chairman. How accurate is photography from those 

machines? 

Gen. Scriven. It has been 

vey excellent. 

The Chairman. At what elevation? 

Lieut. Col. Reber. They 

have taken photographs from 

12,000 and 13,000 feet. 

Gen. Scriven. It is vey good 

work. In making signals they 

have sometimes used little scintillations of silver paper. 

code? 

conventional code. 

thing else you want to discuss, 

General? 

Gen. Scriven. I have been 

thinking of the best means for 

obtaining a reserve of men who 

would be required in war for 

signal work, and also in regard 

to aviators regarding which I 

have made a suggestion, but 

that is in the House hearing. The 

question of a reserve of men and 

officers is going to be the most 

serious matter we have to face. 

The Chairman. It all looks 

serious to me, General. 

Gen. Scriven. I know. . . . 

The Chairman. They have a 

Gen. Scriven. They have a 

The Chairman. Is there any- 

............................ 

11. National Degense 

Act OF 1916- 

65 

The hearings in the House 

and Senate early in 1916 

(Docs. 9 and 10) were steps 

toward the enactment of the 

National Defense Act of 1916. 

With the War College Division's 

study on military policy (Doc. 

8) in hand, Secretary Garrison 

proposed a plan that included 

the creation of a Continental 

Army of 400,000 volunteers under federal control. The idea 

was approved by President 

Wilson and found support in 

the Senate. The House, however, favored a plan based on 

a large national guard. The 

President changed sides, Garrison resigned, and Newton D. 

Baker became Secretary of 

War. With some help from Pancho Villa, who raided Columbus, N.M., in March 1916, the 

preparedness measure finally 

cleared Congress and was approved by the President on 3 

June 1916.' It provided for an 

increase in the regular army 

over a five-year period, quadrupled the national guard, established officer and enlisted 

reserve corps, and provided for 

a volunteer army to be raised 

in time of war. The regular 

army, after expansion over a 

period of five years, was to 

include 64 regiments of infantry, 25 regiments of cavalry, 

and 21 regiments of field artillery, which is what the War 

College Division had recommended except that the law 

provided one less regiment of 

infantry. 

1 39 Stat 166 (1916) 

Each infantry regiment was 

to have 12 infantry companies 

(103 men each) organized into 

3 battalions, plus 1 machine 

gun company, 1 supply company, and 1 headquarters company. Organization of brigades, 

divisions, and corps was authorized when needed. 

The National Security Act of 

1916 did not specify the number of aero squadrons to be 

formed or give any indications 

as to their organization and 

functions, but it did state that 

squadrons could be formed as 

the need arose. Further, it tied 

the aviation establishment to 

the division organization of the 

ground forces. 

SEC. 3. Composition of 

......................... 

Brigades, Divisions, 

and So Forth. 

The mobile troops of the Regular Army of the United States 

shall be organized, as far as 

practicable, into brigades and divisions. The President is authorized, in time of actual or threatened hostilities, or when in his 

opinion the interests of the public service demand it, to organize 

the brigades and divisions into 

such army corps or armies as 

may be necessary. The typical 

Infantry brigade shall consist of a 

headquarters and three regiments of Infantry. The typical 

Cavalry brigade shall consist of a 

headquarters and three regiments of Cavalry. The typical 

Field Artillery brigade shall consist of a headquarters and three 

regiments of Field Artillery. The 

typical Infantry division shall 

consist of a headquarters, three 

Infantry brigades, one regiment 

of Cavalry, one Field Artillery 

brigade, one regiment of Engineers, one field signal battalion, 

one aero squadron, one ammunition train, one supply train, 

one engineer train, and one sanitary train. The typical Cavalry 

division shall consist of a headquarters, three Cavalry brigades, 

one regiment of Field Artillery 

(horse), one battalion of 

mounted Engineers, one field 

signal battalion (mounted), one 

aero squadron, one ammunition 

train, one supply train, one engineer train, and one sanitary 

train. The typical army corps 

shall consist of a headquarters, 

two or more Infantry divisions, 

one or more Cavalry brigades or 

a Cavalry division, one Field Artillery brigade, one telegraph 

battalion, and one field signal 

battalion, and such ammunition. 

supply, engineer, and sanitary 

trains as the President may 

deem necessary. ... ............................ 

SEC. 13. The Signal Corps. 

............................ 

... Authority is hereby given 

the President to organize, in his 

discretion, such part of the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Signal Corps into such 

number of companies, battalions, and aero squadrons as the 

necessities of the service may 

demand. 

............................ 
66 Aviation Section 

Pancho Villa. 

Mexican bandit and 

revolutionary. raided American 

territory in March 1916. His actions 

led to Penhing’s Punitive 

Expedition into Mexico, ddng 

which US. aviation gained the 

opportunity for field testing. 
12- FunasFo~ 

Fiscal yea^ 1917 

Ap~illQl6 

67 

In October 1915 General 

Scriven requested $3,768,743 

for aviation for Fiscal Year 

1917. Since the estimate had 

been based in part on the 

plan for a Continental Army, 

which by April 1916 appeared 

to be doomed, Secretary 

Baker reduced the amount to 

$1,222,100. When Baker, accompanied by Capt. Charles 

S. Wallace, appeared before 

the House Committee on Military Affairs on 8 April 1916 

for hearings on the 1917 

budget, the questioning related more to the Punitive 

Expedition than to events in 

Europe. After Pancho Villa’s 

raid on Columbus, N.M., the 

previous month, the 1st Aero 

Squadron had been sent to 

Columbus to join the Punitive 

Ex p ed it i on h ead ed by Brig. 

Gen. John J. Pershing. An 

emergency appropriation of 

$500,000 had been made, at 

Baker’s request, on 31 March 

to purchase airplanes and 

other aeronautical equipment. In the hearings in April 

the committee wanted to 

know about the 1st Aero 

Squadron’s activities and 

about the performance of the 

Curtiss JN-3 planes with 

which the squadron was operating. 

Following are some extracts from Secretary Baker’s 

testimony under questioning 

by Chairman Hay and members of his committee.’ Between the time Baker appeared before the committee 

and the time the appropriation was passed in August, 

growing concern over the 

state of preparedness resulted in a huge increase in 

funds for aviation. The 

amount appropriated for 

191 7 was $13,881,666. 

............................ 

The Chairman. Out of the 

$1,222,100 for the Aviation 

Section how many machines is it 

proposed to purchase? 

Secretary Baker. The intended expenditures include the 

cost of supplying one and twothirds squadrons at $233,400 

each, to fumish sufficient equipment for the present authorized 

strength, making an aggregate of 

$389,000; then that also includes one additional aero 

squadron at $233,400, making a 

total for new material for the 

Aviation Section of $622,400. 

12 machines, and this price is 

arrived at in this way. The 12 

machines with 50 per cent of 

spare parts it is estimated would 

cost $144,000. The actual fact 

about the price of an aeroplane 

is that it is pretty widely variant, 

of course. It depends a good 

deal upon the type of machine 

and a good deal upon the manufacture. 

The machines we have most 

recently bought for use in Mexico we are paying about $7,500. 

That is just for the machine. 

There is one manufacturer who 

claims to have the latest type of 

An aero squadron consists of 

machine, and they cost $12,500 

apiece. So that shows there is a 

somewhat wide variation in the 

price. 

The object of the aviation section is to continue to develop a 

reconnoissance machine until we 

have an adequate reconnoissance machine, and then to undertake to add to the equipment 

some of the so-called war machines, which means slightly armored machines, machines with 

larger carrying capacity. 

The intention is to have two 

squadrons of 12 machines with 

50 per cent of spare parts, and 

the machines are estimated at 

$12,000 each, including the 

spare parts. Then there is an 

estimate to be added, in addition, for certain trucks, motorcycles, supply trucks, tank trucks, 

carrier trucks, machine-shop 

trucks, making up the entire 

equipment of an aero squadron, 

with 12 aeroplanes, and all the 

attendant and accessory trucks 

and parts, the total cost of one 

squadron being $233,400. 

The Chairman. What are 

you going to do with the $800,- 

000 that remains? 

Secretary Baker. Of the 

amount that remains, Mr. Chairman, $288,500 is made up in 

this way: For replacing existing 

machines, $75,000 for maintenance, $50,000 for salaries of 

the civilian force, $27,500 for 
68 Aviation Section 

experimental machines, $50,- 

000 that is an experiment item 

for developing a better type. It 

has been recommended by the 

aviation section, and I think has 

the approval of such members of 

the General Staff as have considered it, that we ought to have 

in War Department a specific 

sum of $50,000 available for experimenting on aviation matters. 

The weak point in American 

aviation has been the motor, 

and it has been thought that the 

War Department could, after a 

competition in the development 

of an adequate aviation motor, 

perhaps, develop a type that 

would be satisfactory. 

The Chairman. Then it is 

proposed only to buy 12 machines during the coming fiscal 

year? 

Secretary Baker. No. The 

first figure I gave you was to 

supply one and two-thirds 

squadrons, which, with the 

squadrons on hand now-that 

is, one and one-third squadrons-would bring that up to 

three squadrons. That figure for 

supplying the one and two-thirds 

squadrons is $389,000. That 

would buy the one and twothirds additional squadrons, and 

an additional squadron besides 

that is estimated for at a cost of 

$233,400, so that the intention 

would be to buy 32 machines. 

The remainder of the $288,- 

500 to which I was referring a 

moment ago is to be used in the 

following way: For experimental 

machines, $50,000; for motor 

competition, $50,000; for instruments and incidentals, $10,000; 

for one rescue sea sled, $8,000, 

for four motor trucks, $16,000; 

and for maintenance of transportation, $2,000. That makes a 

total of $288,500. 

The Chairman. How many 

machines have you on hand? 

Secretary Baker. 1 have a 

complete history here, Mr. 

Chairman, of all that has happened in the department in the 

way of buying aeroplanes, 

where they are, and what has 

become of those that are no 

longer anywhere. 1 do not want 

to take your time to go into 

details in regard to that history, 

but it seems to me to be rather 

interesting. 

ious to have a full statement in 

reference to that matter. 

The Chairman. We are anx- 

............................ 

Secretary Baker. The first 

machine the Army ever had was 

an original Wright, which was 

acquired in 1908. It is now in the 

Smithsonian Institution. 

In 1911 we bought seven machines, three Curtiss, three 

Wrights, and one Burgess. The 

first Curtiss and the first Wright 

were condemned for further use 

in February, 1914, having lasted 

practically three years. The next 

Wright was destroyed by an accident in September, 1912, very 

shortly after its purchase. The 

Burgess machine was condemned in February, 1914, and 

the next Curtiss machine was 

also condemned in February, 

1914. The next Wright was destroyed by accident in August, 

1913, and the last of the Curtiss 

machines was condemned in 

June, 1914. 

That was almost the initial 

year of real experimentation with 

heavier-than-air machines, and 

all of the defects that at first 

appeared were, of courw, inherent in our machines, and they 

were finally condemned and destroyed. 

In 1912 we bought 12 machines. All of them have either 

sirice been condemned or destroyed by accident. Of the latter 

class 9 were destroyed by accident in 1913 and 1914, of the 

machines bought in 191 2. The 

others were condemned in 

June, 1914. 

In 1913 we bought eight machines, adhering to the types 

originally purchased, the Curtiss, 

the Wright, the Burgess, and the 

Burgess-Dunne, and of those 

eight machines one is now in 

commission; one BurgessDunne. That was the new type 

of that year. The others have 

either been condemned or are 

out of repair. One of them is 

marked “out of repair,” which 

means probably that it <:an be 

put into service with sorne spare 

parts added. 

In 1914 we bought 11 machines. One of them is out of 

repair, five of them have been 
Funds for Fiscal 

Year 1917 [April 19161 

69 

condemned, and five are now in 

commission. That year we had 

an experiment in a new type of 

machine, known as the Martin 

machine. I comment on that 

only to show that new makers 

are coming into the art and the 

department is keeping up with 

them by experimenting with 

their types. 

In 1915 we bought 20 machines-the Burgess, the Curtiss, 

and the Martin machines. The 

preponderating number bought 

that year was the Martin type. Of 

those, 2 have been condemned-2 Curtiss machines. 

The rest are substantially all in 

commission, making a total aggregate number purchased from 

the beginning of our experimenting in the art, of 59 machines and they are distributed 

as follows: One in the Smithsonian Institution, 32 have been destroyed or condemned, 3 are out 

of repair, and 23 are now in 

service as follows: 

flying boats and 9 training machines at San Diego, and 8 machines with the expedition in 

Mexico, making a total of 23 

machines. That does not account for the 8 machines bought 

this year which are now in process of delivey and experimental 

trial at Newport News. 

Four hydroplanes at Manila, 2 

............................ 

Mr. Anthony. What did we 

pay for the 20 machines we purchased last year? 

Capt Wallace. Those machines cost from $7,000 to 

$10,000 each. 

The Chairman. Heretofore it 

has been stated by the representatives of the Signal Corps that 

they were buying the best type 

of machine, and they told us 

they cost $10,000 apiece, and 

we appropriated in accordance 

with what they said they wanted. 

In other words, we practically 

gave them all they asked for for 

their aviation section. 

A great deal of criticism has 

appeared in the newspapers in 

regard to the kind of machines 

now in use not being machines 

that ought to be used, and we 

would like to know whether or 

not those machines that were 

bought in 1915 were the kind of 

machines that ought to have 

been bought for use in the 

Army? 

Secretary Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have given as much personal attention to that subject as 

was possible to give it in the 

limited time I have been in contact with the matter, and 1 want 

to say 1 am satisfied that the 

Army has bought as good machines as were made each time it 

has bought, but that in an infant 

art, undergoing very rapid development, the Army would hardly 

have a machine before some 

new development would be 

made that would antequate its 

machines. 

Perhaps the best illustration of 

that is what took place with Curtiss machine at the time we 

bought a number of machines 

known as the CURTISS J. N. 2. 

They turned out to be exceedingly dangerous machines. Nobody knew it beforehand; but 

there was some improper calculation of the wing area in those 

machines. Our men experimented with them and unhappily some of them lost their lives, 

not, probably because of the 

defect in the machine so much 

as because of the men’s. I do 

not like to say lack of skill, but 

lack of experience of the men 

dealing with experimental machines, which increased the possibility of accident. 

The net result of that was that 

our men very quickly put their 

finger on the defect, increased 

the wing area, and made what is 

known as the CURTISS J. N. 3, 

which, in the hands of competent aviators is regarded as good 

reconnaissance machine as there 

is. In other words, the makers 

have been experimenting, our 

Aviation Corps have been experimenting, and the combined 

experience of both has now 

been vey lately increased by the 

experiences in Europe, so that 

we are approaching a development of a more stable type and 

model of aeroplane. I think the 

Army has always bought as 

good machines as there were to 

be had. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretay, are the eight machines in 

operation in connection with the 

expedition in Mexico being operated successfully? 
70 

At the time 

of Secretary Baker’s testimony 

before the House Committee on Military 

Affairs, powered flight itself was scarcely 

more than a decade old. In 1900 Wright 

brothers were still experimenting with kite 

gliders (top). In 1902 they were soaring on 

the Wright Glider at Kitty Hawk, N.C.. 

(center), one year before their first succeesful 

powered flight. Five years later. the Army 

purchased from the Wrights the first military 

aircraft, Wright Type A. which Orville Wright 

flew in acceptance tests at Ft. Myer. Va.. on 

9 September 1908 (bottom). 
The Wrights taught others to fly. Orville taught students at 

Montgomery, Ma.. in 1910 (top). Army pilots, in turn, learned to 

fly from Wrights’ students. Lt. Benjamin D. Foulois received 

instruction from Phil Parmalee (at the controls) in operating a 

new Wright Type B aircraft at Ft. Sam Houston. Tex., in 

February 1911 (center). Lt. Frank M. Kennedy, at the controls of 

a Curtiss Trainer at College Park, Md.. 1911. learned to fly from 

Army pilots at the new Army aviation school (bottom). 
72 Aviation Section 

Secretary Baker. They are 

being operated successfully, Mr. 

Chairman. That needs a word of 

explanation. The first aeroplanes 

that were made had the propellers behind the aviator, and 

when any accident took place, in 

the way of the machine stalling 

in going along, so much of the 

power would be used to secure 

added elevation that the machine would lose its fotward motion and come to a standstill, 

except that it would be attempting to rise. The loss of the forward motion deprived it of the 

sustaining friction with the air, 

and the machine would stall and 

plunge head first down to the 

ground. 

weight of the motor and of the 

propeller and the gear behind 

the aviator crushed him. 

That led to the novel suggestion that the motor and propeller 

should be put in front. That is 

the so-called tractor type. All of 

the heavy machinery is in front 

of the aviator, and he is protected from the rushing air by a 

mica cage. That seems to have 

solved the problem to a great 

extent, and since that time there 

have been few fatal accidents, 

although there have been a 

number of falls. Apparently that 

machine is much more stable. 

The young men in charge of it 

now say they are perfectly willing to take it up and turn over 

two or three times as long as 

they are 500 feet above the 

ground. 

When that happened the great 

The Chairman. Is that the 

type which is now being used in 

Mexico? 

Secretary Baker. That is the 

exclusive type. Those machines 

require a good landing place. 

One of the highly desirable qualities to develop in aeroplanes is 

that which will enable a machine 

to slow down very gradually so 

that the aviator can pick his 

landing place and land in a relatively small level field. In Mexico 

their landing difficulties are very 

great. The county is mountainous, and the landing is very difficult. For that reason when the 

eight machines went down there 

they met with a series of minor 

accidents, and at one time only 

two of them were in actual operation. At the present time six out 

of the eight are in operation. 

Mr. McKellar. Mr.. Secretary, 

is any real good being accomplished by them? 

lying on them entirely for communication with the front. 

Secretary Baker. We are re- 

............................ 

Mr. McKellar. Would you 

mind, if you are not prepared to 

give the information about it 

now, looking up the question of 

the separation of the aerial force 

from the Signal Corps? 

Secretary Baker. I would be 

glad to do that. 

Mr. McKellar. And 'give us 

Secretary Baker. Yes. 

Mr. Greene. 1 remember at 

the hearings when they instituted 

the Aviation Section, it was suggested that the Aviation Section 

has to work also in connection 

with the combatants, because 

they give back directions for firing, and all that sort of thing. 

Secretary Baker. I think the 

most serious addition to your 

discussion is the fact that they 

are now devising a battle aeroplane which is in itself an offensive arm and that places a new 

phase on the whole thing. 

Mr. Greene. That was suggested at the time. 

the information about it? 

............................ 

............................ 

Secretary Baker. All the 

aeroplanes we now have and 

are proposing to buy are reconnoissance machines, and the 

machines in Mexico are doing 

what would be done by the 

wireless telegraph if the static 

conditions were not so bad. 

Mr. Shallenberger. What is 

the length of life of an aeroplane 

in war, the average length of 

life? 

Secretary Baker. Ten days, I 

am told; certainly a short time. 

Mr. Shallenberger. If the 

machines in Mexico are now 

doing good service, it shows 

what they can do under war 

conditions, does it not? 

hardly under war conditions. 

There are no antiaircraft guns 

in Mexico. 

Secretary Baker. They are 

............................. 


13, FouJo~: The 1st A~RO 

SquaCmon in Mexico 

1916 

75 

When Secretary Baker testified on 8 April 1916 (Doc. 

12), he spoke well of the Curtiss JN-3, which the 1st Aero 

Squadron was using on the 

Punitive Expedition. There 

had been some minor accidents, he said, but six of the 

squadron's eight planes were 

now in commission. The Secretary's information, however, was out of date. Two 

planes had been wrecked on 

20 March and another on 5 

April. And by the 19th of the 

month only two would be left, 

and they would not be in 

serviceable condition. 

The story of the difficulties 

the 1st Aero Squadron had in 

Mexico were recorded by the 

squadron commander, Capt. 

Benjamin D. Foulois, in a report completed at Columbus 

on 28 August 1916. The report is interesting and significant for what it has to say 

about the capabilities and 

1 The copy used is one beanng Foulois 

name stamped in the sgnature block at the 

end of the repOrl It is a carbon copy that 

was acquired by Lt Col Ernest L Jones and 

is now part of the Jones Collection in the 

Albert F Simpson Histoncal Research Center 168 65011-7A The same folder also 

contains another version, more in the form 

of a narrative account than a formal report 

This second version. which presumably was 

also written by Foulois, was printed. with 

five paragraphs (numbers 2-6) deleted, as 

Appendix B to Col Frank Tompkins, Chasing W/a (Harrisburg. 1934) 

employment of U.S. military 

aviation just a year before the 

United States entered the 

war. The major part of the 

report is printed below.' 

Report of Operations 

of the First Aero 

Squadron, Signal 

Corps, with Punitive 

Expedition, U.S.A. 

for Period March 15 

to August 15, 1916. 

In compliance with Par. 1, 

S.O. No. 61, Southern Department, March 12, 1916, the 1st 

Aero Squadron, left Fort Sam 

Houston, Texas, on March 13, 

1916 en route to Columbus, 

N.M., with the following personnel and equipment. 

Personnel-Captains B. D. 

Foulois, T. F. Dodd, Lieuts. C. 

G. Chapman, J. E. Carbery, H. 

A. Dargue, T. S. Bowen, R. H. 

Willis, W. G. Kilner, E. S. Gorrell, A. R. Christie, I. A. Rader, 

82 enlisted men, and 1 civilian 

mechanician. 2 Hospital Corps 

men, attached. 

Equipment-8 aeroplanes, 10 

trucks, 1 automobile. 

Upon arrival in El Paso, March 

14th, 1st Lieut. S. S. Warren, M. 

R. C., and one Hospital Corps 

enlisted man joined Squadron. 

Two additional trucks were also 

received from the Depot Quartermaster, El Paso, giving the 

Squadron, about 50% of its necessary motor transportation. 

The Squadron arrived at Columbus, N.M., March 15, 1916, 

and started immediately to assemble aeroplane equipment. . . . 

pilot, Capt. Foulois, observer, 

made the first reconnaissance 

flight into Mexico on March 16, 

1916. 

March 19, 1916 

Telegraphic orders were received from the Division Commander at Nuevas Casas 

Grandes, Mexico, for the Squadron to proceed at once to Casas 

Grandes, Mexico, for immediate 

service. 

Aeroplane #44, Capt. Dodd, 

............................ 

............................ 

All aeroplanes of the Squadron, eight in number, were 

started in flight, from Columbus, 

at 510 p.m. One aeroplane was 

compelled to return to Columbus due to motor trouble. 

Four aeroplanes landed at Las 

Ascencion, Mexico, on account 

of darkness. The other three became separated from the Squadron, in the darkness. One landed 

at Ojo Caliente, Mexico, one at 

Janos, Mexico, and another near 

Pearson, Mexico. This latter machine was wrecked upon 

landing. 

Foulois: The 1st Aero 

Squadron in Mexico 1916 

77 

March 20, 1916 

The four pilots who had 

landed at Las Ascencion proceeded south to Casas Grandes 

and reported for duty. The pilot, 

who had been compelled to return to Columbus, and the one 

who had landed at Janos arrived 

at Casas Grandes at approximately the Same hour, this date. 

The pilot who had landed at Ojo 

Caliente reported in to Casas 

Grandes, several days later, having incurred slight damage to his 

aeroplane, which had to be repaired. 

The aeroplane which had 

been landed near Pearson, was 

so badly damaged that the pilot 

abandoned it, and returned to 

Casas Grandes on foot. 

Commander at Casas Grandes, 

instructions were received, to 

make an aero reconnaissance 

south toward Cumbre Pass, in 

the heart of the Sierra Madre 

Mountains, for the purpose of 

locating troops moving southward toward Lake Babicora. 

Aeroplane #44, Capt. T. F. 

Dodd, pilot, and Capt. B. D. 

Foulois, observer, proceeded 

south at noon, March 20. Proceeded about twenty-five miles, 

from Casas Grandes, but were 

unable to rise over the foothills 

of the Sierra Madre Mountains, 

Upon reporting to the Division 

due to constantly encountering 

whirlwinds and terrific vertical 

currents of air, which, on account of the low power of the 

aeroplane, effectually prevented 

the aeroplane rising to an altitude sufficiently high to allow of 

crossing the mountains, which at 

this particular locality, rise to a 

height of over 10,000 feet above 

sea level. 

On this same date aeroplane 

#48, Lieut. T. S. Bowen, pilot, 

while making a landing was 

caught in a whirlwind, which 

completely wrecked the aeroplane. Lieut. Bowen, escaped 

with a broken nose, and minor 

injuries. 

March 21, 1916 

Orders received to locate 

troops under Colonel Irwin in 

the Galeana Valley. Aeroplane 

#44, Capt. T. F. Dodd, pilot, 

and Capt. B. D. Foulois, observer, located these troops at 

Galera Lopena, landed, and reported to Colonel Irwin. Retumed to Dublan, with report 

from Colonel Irwin. As a result 

of this reconnaissance and report 

from Colonel Irwin, six trucks of 

this Squadron, loaded with supplies, were sent to Colonel Irwin’s column. 

March 22, 1916 

cate with troops moving south 

on the Mexican North-Western 

Railroad, and Colonel G. A. 

Dodd’s command in the Galeana Valley. 

Orders received to communiAeroplane #42, Lieut. W. G. 

Kilner, pilot, Lieut. 1. A. Rader, 

observer, and aeroplane #45, 

Lieut. J. E. Carberry, pilot, flew 

to the Galeana Valley, located 

Colonel Dodd’s troops, landed 

and reported to Colonel Dodd. 

Returned to Dublan, with reports 

from Colonel Dodd, to Division 

Commander. Aeroplane #44, 

Capt. T. F. Dodd, pilot, Lieut. A. 

R. Christie, observer, and aeroplane #53, Lieut. C. G. Chapman, pilot, flew south into the 

Sierra Madre Mountains, in an 

endeavor to locate the troops, 

moving south on the Mexican 

North-Western Railroad. These 

aeroplanes were driven into the 

heart of the Sierra Madre Mountains, as far as the northern end 

of the Cumbre Pass tunnel, but 

due to terrific vertical air currents 

and whirlwinds, which at times 

drove the aeroplanes within 

twenty feet of the tree tops, the 

pilots were unable to cross the 

Sierra Madre Mountains, and 

were compelled to return to 

Dublan. 

As a result of this failure to 

accomplish the reconnaissance 

as directed the Squadron Commander submitted the following 

memorandum to the Division 

Commander: 
78 Aviation Section 

22 Mch. 16. 

Memo for the Commanding 

General Punitive Expedition, 

U.S. Army at Casas Grandes, 

Mexico. 

1. In view of the fact that the 

present aeroplane equipment of 

the First Aero Squadron is not 

capable of meeting the present 

military service conditions, it is 

urgently requested that the following number of aeroplanes, 

motors, and spare parts be purchased, if they can possibly be 

secured in the United States. It is 

further requested that this order 

be placed by telegraph and immediate delivery of all equipment, by express, be specified. 

2. Aeroplanes- 

(a) Two (2) Martin aeroplanes, Model S, with army 

standard landing gear, Hall-Scott 

125 h.p. 6 cyl. motors. 

(b) Two (2) Curtiss aeroplanes, Model R2, Curtiss 160 

h.p. steel cylinder motors. 

(c) Two Sturtevant aeroplanes, 140 h.p. Sturtevant motors. 

(d) Two (2) Thomas aeroplanes, 135 h.p. Thomas motors. 

(e) Two (2) Sloane aeroplanes, 125 h.p. Hall-Scott 6 cyl. 

motors. 

All of the aeroplanes above to 

be completely equipped, and 

ready for immediate use. 

one (1) spare motor for each 

two (2) machines purchased, 

and in addition the following 

aeroplane and motor spares: 

3. The manufacturer to furnish 

Two (2) spare propellers. 

One set lower wings, complete, 

One landing gear complete. 

One set tail control surfaces, 

complete, with fittings and wires. 

Three (3) spare radiators. 

Three (3) spare magnetos. 

with fittings and wires. 

B. D. Foulois 

Captain, Signal Corps, 

Comdg. First Aero Squadron. 

On this same date, a detachment was sent to salvage such 

parts of aeroplane #41, which 

was wrecked near Pearson on 

the evening of March 19, as 

were serviceable. This detachment returned same date, and 

reported that it had been fired 

upon, by Mexicans, in the vicinity of Pearson. 

March 23, 1916 

Received orders to communicate with Colonel G. A. Dodds 

troops in the Galeana Valley. 

Aeroplane #44, Lieut. A. R. 

Christie, pilot, aeroplane #45, 

Lieut. J. E. Carbeny, pilot, and 

aeroplane #53, Lieut. C. G. 

Chapman, pilot, flew to El Valle, 

landed and reported to Colonel 

Dodd. These aeroplanes and pilots, were unable to retum to 

Dublan, until March 25, due to 

high winds, dust storms, and 

snow storms. Detachment from 

Squadron proceeded to Pearson, Mexico, this date, and returned to Dublan, with such 

parts of aeroplane #41, as could 

be considerable serviceable. 

The Squadron Commander 

submitted the following plan to 

the Division Commander, which 

contemplated the establishment 

of aeroplane and fuel bases in 

advance of Division Headquarters. 

The JN-2 

(converted to dN-3) in 

which Dodd and Foulois made the 

first reconnaissance flight into 

Mexico, 16 March 1916. Pershing’s 

staff cars parked in rear. 
Foulois: The 1st Aero 

Squadron .in Mexico 1916 

79 

Headquarters, 1st Aero Squadron, Signal Corps, Colonia DubIan, Mexico, Mar 30/16. 

Memorandum for Chief of Staff, 

Punitive Expedition, US. Amy. 

1. Plans are herewith submitted for the most effective use of 

the 1st Aero Squadron, with its 

present equipment of six low 

powered aeroplanes. 

same. 

Plan 1 

Object: To maintain aero 

communication between Columbus, N.M.-Casas Grandes-El 

Valle and Namiquipa. 

(a) Two aeroplanes, with sufficient commissioned and enlisted 

personnel and supplies to take 

station at El Valle. One aeroplane to fly from El Valle to 

Namiquipa every morning, returning the following morning to 

El Valle. 

(b) Two aeroplanes to be assigned to maintain aero communication between Casas Grandes 

and Columbus, as follows: One 

aeroplane to leave Casas 

Grandes every morning, flying to 

Columbus without stop, and returning the following morning 

without stop. 

(c) Two aeroplanes to be assigned to maintain aero communication between Casas Grandes 

and Namiquipa, as follows: One 

aeroplane to leave Casas 

Grandes every morning, flying to 

Namiquipa without stop, returnAlso other data in reference to 

ing the following morning without stop. 

The foregoing plan contemplates the maximum use of all 

auiators and all aeroplanes, for 

maintaining aero communication 

between Columbus-Casas 

Grandes-El Valle and Namiquip only, and does not contemplate the use of aeroplanes 

for communication, south, east, 

or west of Namiquipa. 

Plan I1 

Object To maintain aero 

communication between Cams 

Grandes-El Valle-Namiquipa-and points south of Namiquipa (communication between Casas Grandes [and Columbus] to be maintained by radio-telegraph, motorcycles, and 

road transportation). 

(a) Transfer entire Squadron 

of six aeroplanes to Namiquipa, 

maintaining fuel bases only, at 

Casas Grandes, El Valle, and an 

advanced fuel base south of Namiquipa, to be determined later. 

(b) Upon transfer of Squadron 

to Namiquipa, the following assignment of aeroplanes to be 

made-( 1) Two aeroplanes to 

maintain daily communication 

between Namiquipa and Casas 

Grandes-(2) Two aeroplanes to 

maintain daily aero comrnunication between Namiquipa and El 

Valle-( 3) Two aeroplanes to 

maintain daily aero communication between Namiquipa and 

points south, within effective radius of aeroplanes. 

Plan 111 

(a) Upon establishment of effective radio-telegraph communication between Namiquipa 

and Casas Grandes, the following is recommended-( 1) Discontinue the use of aeroplanes 

between Namiquipa and Casa!: 

Grandes except in emergencies-(2) Continue the aero 

communication between Namiquipa and El Valle, if radio-telegraph, motor cycles, or other 

means fail-(3) Concentrate all 

available aeroplanes at Namiquipa for daily communication 

between Namiquipa and advanced troops-( 4) If communication between Namiquipa and 

El Valle is of secondary importance only and can be maintained by radio-telegraph, motorcycles, or other means of 

communication, the use of aeroplanes between these two points 

should also be discontinued, arid 

every available aeroplane concentrated at Namiquipa for the 

purpose of maintaining communication south of Narniquipa. 
80 Aviation Section 

Plan IV 

(a) In the event that contact is 

gained with the enemy, it is recommended that every available 

aeroplane be concentrated at the 

front for observation and reconnaissance of the enemy, as far as 

practicable. 

2. In connection with the foregoing plans, for effectiue use of the 

aeroplanes of this organization, 

the following is furnished. 

The six aeroplanes now in 

use, have been subjected, for 

nearly ten months, to severe 

weather conditions, in Oklahoma and Texas, exposed to 

rain, high winds, and severe cold 

weather conditions. 

As a result of these months of 

field service, all aeroplanes have 

been subjected to severe wear 

and tear. With the present extreme field service conditions every machine is liable, at any day, 

to be placed out of commission 

as unfit and too dangerous for 

further field service. 

3. Further information is furnished to the effect that these 

aeroplanes are not capable of 

meeting the present military 

needs, incident to this expedition. Their low power motors 

and limited climbing ability with 

the necessary military load 

makes it impossible to safely operate any one of these machines, 

in the vicinity of the mountains 

which cover the present theatre 

of operations. These same limitations as to power, climbing 

ability, and weight carrying ability limit these machines to safe 

operations for a few hours each 

day, chiefly on account of the 

altitude and extremely severe atmospheric conditions encountered every day in the present 

theatre of operations. 

4. The entire commissioned 

and enlisted personnel of this 

organization are exerting every 

effort to maintain all aeroplanes 

in the best possible condition for 

further field service, but even the 

united efforts of the entire technical ability in this command can 

not make these aeroplanes suitable for to meet the present military needs. 

5. An urgent appeal is therefore made, that this organization 

be supplied, at the earliest possible moment, with at least ten of 

the highest powered, highest 

climbing and best weight carrying aeroplanes that can be secured and purchased in the 

United States. 

With this new equipment, the 

present commissioned and enlisted personnel of this organization, will be able, under the 

present service conditions, to increase its effectiveness to this 

expedition at least five hundred 

percent. 

B. D. Foulois 

Captain, Signal Corps, 

Commanding 

1st Aero Squadron. 

Plan I11 of the foregoing was 

approved and ordered put into 

effect, April 1. 

Nine flights were made this 

date between Dublan, Galera . Lopena, and El Valle, carrying 

mail and despatches. 

March 27, 1916 

Seven flights were made this 

date between Columbus, N.M., 

Dublan, and El Valle, carrying 

mail and despatches. 

March 28, 1916 

Reconnaissance flights made 

as follows-Aeroplane #43, 

Lieut. H. A. Dargue, pilot, from 

Dublan to Bachineva, Bachineva 

to Namiquipa, Namiquipa to 

Santa Ana, and return to Namiquipa. Aeroplane #53, Lieut. 

Chapman, pilot, from El Valle, 

east and south, for a distance of 

110 miles returning to El Valle. 

March 29, 1916 

Six flights made this date by 

five aeroplanes, between Columbus, N.M., Dublan, El Valle, 

and Namiquipa, carrying mail 

and despatches. 

March 30, 1916 

Three flights made this date, 

with three aeroplanes, between 

Columbus, N.M., Dublan and El 

Valle, carrying mail and 

despatches. . . 
Foulois: The 1st Aero 

Squadron in Mexico 1916 

March 31, 1916 

Nine flights were made this 

date by four aeroplanes between 

Dublan, El Valle, Namiquipa, 

and San Geronimo, carrying 

mail and despatches. Severe 

rain, hail, and snow storms were 

encountered this date, causing 

several forced landings, away 

from the base at Dublan, until 

the storms had passed. 

April 1,1916 

Nineteen flights made this 

date, by six aeroplanes, between 

Columbus, N.M., Dublan, Espindeleno, El Valle, Cruces, Namiquipa, San Geronimo, and 

Santa Ana, carrying mail and 

despatches. 

Rain, hail, and snow storms 

were encountered on this date, 

causing several forced landings, 

until storms had passed. 

April 2, 1916 

Fourteen flights made this 

date by five aeroplanes, between 

Dublan, El Valle, Cruces, Namiquipa, San Geronimo, and 

Bachineva, carrying mail and 

despatches. 

April 3, 1916 

Six flights made this date, by 

four aeroplanes, between DubIan, El Valle, Namiquipa, and 

San Geronimo, carrying mail 

and despatches. 

April 4. 1916 

Four flights made this date by 

two aeroplanes, between El 

Valle, Namiquipa, and San Geronimo, carrying mail and despatches. 

April 5, 1916 

by four aeroplanes, between 

Dublan, El Valle, Namiquipa, 

and San Geronimo, carrying 

mail and despatches. 

Aero Squadron headquarters 

changed to San Geronimo. 

Orders received this date to 

locate Colonel W. C. Brown’s 

column, reported in the vicinity 

of San Antonio. Aeroplane #43, 

Lieut. H. A. Dargue, pilot, Capt. 

B. D. Foulois, observer, left San 

Geronimo on this reconnaissance. Flew to San Antonio and 

located a pack train of Colonel 

Brown’s column, returning toward San Geronimo. Landed 

aeroplane and received information that troops were proceeding 

toward Cusihuirachic. Flew to 

Cusihuirachic Canyon, and located troops entering Canyon, 

Landed and reported to Colonel 

Brown. Flew back to San Geronimo, with report from Colonel 

Brown to Division Commander. 

April 6, 1916 

Four flights made this date by 

three aeroplanes, between Namiquipa, San Geronimo, and 

Cusihuirachic, carrying despatches to troops. Aeroplane 

#44, badly damaged on landing 

at San Geronimo. All serviceable 

parts salvaged, remainder of 

aeroplane condemned and destroyed. 

Seven flights made this date 

April 7, 1916 

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A 

Dargue, pilot, and Capt. B. D. 

Foulois, observer, from San 

Geronimo to Chihuahua City 

with despatches for Mr. Marion 

H. Letcher, American Consul. 

Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E. Carberry, pilot, and Capt. T. F. 

Dodd, observer, from San Geronimo to Chihuahua City, carrying duplicate despatches to 

American Consul. Both aeroplanes arrived at Chihuahua City 

at same time, causing considerable excitement. By pre-arrangement aeroplane #43 was landed 

on south side of city, aeroplane 

#45 on the north side. Lieut. 

Dargue, in aeroplane #43, was 

directed to fly his machine to the 

north side of town in order to 

join #45. As he started off, four 

mounted rurales opened fire on 

the machine, at a distance of 

about one half mile. Capt. Foulois, having started into town, 

heard the firing, proceeded in 

the direction of the rurales and 

stopped their firing. Capt. Foulois was then arrested by the 

wrales and taken by them to the 

city jail, followed by a mob of 

several hundred men and boys. 

Enroute to the jail Capt. Foulois 

succeeded in getting word to an 

American bystander, requesting 

that he notify the American 

Consul of his arrival in the city 

and that the Consul take the 

necessary steps for the protec 
82 Aviation Section 

Lt. Herbert A. Dague, 

posing by hls alrcmft on 7 April 1916. 

The picture was taken just after Dargue and his plane were 

stoned at Chihuahua City. He kept the photographer posing him 

as long as possible to avoid further violence from the mob. 
Foulois: The 1st Aero 

Squadron in Mexico 1916 

8 3 

tion of all aviators and machines 

that had arrived in the city. 

Upon arrival at the city jail and 

after considerable delay, Capt. 

Foulois succeeded in getting in 

touch with Colonel Miranda, 

Chief of Staff to General Gutierrez, Military Governor of Chihuahua. Colonel Miranda then 

took Capt. Foulois to see General Gutierrez, who soon ordered Capt. Foulois’ release. 

Capt. Foulois, then requested 

that a guard be placed over the 

two aeroplanes, which request 

having been granted, Capt. Foulois, in company with Colonel 

Miranda, then proceeded to the 

north side of the city to locate 

the other three aviators and 

aeroplanes. Upon arrival at the 

landing place, only Lieut. Dargue, with aeroplane #43, was 

found. Lieut. Dargue reported 

that he had landed alongside of 

aeroplane #45; that Capt. Dodd 

had then proceeded into Chihuahua City to locate the American 

Consul and deliver his duplicate 

despatches; that after Capt. 

Dodd had left, a large crowd of 

natives, Carranzista soldiers, and 

officers, had collected and proceeded to crowd around the machine, making insulting remarks; 

that several natives burned holes 

with cigarettes in the wings of 

aeroplane #43; that others have 

slashed the cloth with knives, in 

several places, and extracted 

bolts and nuts on both machines. The two pilots left with 

the machines, Lieuts. Dargue 

and Carberry, felt that the mob 

would ultimately wreck the machines and decided to fly the 

machines to the smelters of the 

American Smelter and Refining 

Company, located about six 

miles from Chihuahua City. 

Lieut. Carberry got away safely 

without encountering any further 

difficulties. Lieut. Dargue, in 

aeroplane #43, Qot away in the 

midst of a shower of stones, 

thrown at him by the mob. He 

had only flown a short distance 

when the top section of the fuselage flew off and damaged the 

stabilizer, causing him to make 

immediate landing which he accomplished safely. He then 

stood off the crowd without further damage to the aeroplane or 

to himself until the arrival of the 

guard. Captains Foulois and 

Dodd spent the remainder of the 

day with the American Consul in 

arranging for supplies to be sent 

to the advance troops by railroad. Lieuts. Dargue and Carberry spent the remainder of the 

day repairing the damage done 

by the mob on the two aeroplanes. 

April 8.1916 

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. Dargue, pilot, Capt. B. D. Foulois, 

observer, and aeroplane #45, 

Lieut. Carberry, pilot, and Capt. 

T. F. Dodd, observer, from Chihuahua City to San Geronimo 

with despatches from American 

Consul to Division Commander. 

Orders received to move Aero 

Squadron base to San Antonio, 

Mexico. 

April 9. 1916 

Ten flights made this date, bly 

five aeroplanes, between Namiquipa, San Geronimo and San 

Antonio. 

April 10. 1916 

Orders received this date to 

locate troops in vicinity of San 

Borja, Mexico. 

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A. 

Dargue, pilot, Capt. B D. Foulois, observer, reconnoitered the 

area from San Antonio to Ojo 

Azules-Ojo Caliente-San 

Borja-Santa Maria-Tres Hermanos-Satevo-Carretas and 

return to San Antonio. No 

troops discovered within this 

area. 

Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E. 

Carberry, pilot, and Capt T. F. 

Dodd, observer, reconnoitered, 

the area from San Antonio-Ojo 

Azules-Ojo Caliente-Santa 

MariaSatevo-San LucasSanta Cruz-Manula-Santa 

Ysabel and return to San Antonio. No troops discovered within 

this area. 

Orders received this date to 

move Aero Squadron base to 

Satevo. 
84 Aviation Section 

April 11.1916 

Ten flights were made this 

date, by five aeroplanes, between Satevo-Santa RosaliaSan Lucas-San Antonio-Namiquipa-Dublan and Columbus, N.M. 

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A. 

Dargue, pilot, and Lieut. E. S. 

Gorrell, observer, flew from San 

Antonio, Mexico, to Columbus, 

N.M., making one stop at Dublan. Total distance 315 miles. 

Aeroplane #53, Lieut. C. G. 

Chapman, pilot, on reconnaissance trip to Santa Rosalia 

(south of Chihuahua City, on 

Mexican Central Railway. Upon 

landing at Santa Rosalia, Lieut. 

Chapman was taken by Carranza troops, to the Commanding Officer of the Carranza gamson. During his absence from the 

aeroplane, his field glasses, gaggles, and considerable ammunition were stolen from the aeroplane by Carranza soldiers. . . . 

April 12, 1916 

Six flights made this date, by 

three aeroplanes, between Satevo-San Geronimo-Namiquipa and south toward Parral. 

Aeroplane #53 Lieut. C. G. 

Chapman, pilot on reconnaissance flight south toward Parral, 

for the purpose of locating 

troops moving in direction of 

Parral. 

April 13,1916 Being in a hostile county, 100 

Aeroplane #42, Lieut. I. A. miles from the nearest base, and 

Rader, pilot on reconnaissance unable to make necessay reflight south toward Parral, for the pairs, the aeroplane was abanpurpose of locating troops in di- doned, and the pilot proceeded 

rection of Parral. No troops with Major Howze's column. 

located. Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E. 

Four other flights this date, by Carberry, pilot, Capt. B. D. Fouthree aeroplanes, between Sa- lois, observer, from Chihuahua 

tevo-Chihuahua City-and City to Satevo with despatches 

San Andreas. from Mr. Marion H. Letcher, 

Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E. American Consul, and desCarberry, pilot, Capt. B. D. Fou- patches from General Gutierrez, 

lois, observer, to Chihuahua City Military Governor of Chihuahua. 

with despatches for the Amen- Capt. B. D. Foulois and 14 

can Consul. Received first infor- enlisted men, 1st Aero Squadmation regarding flight at Parral. ron, from Satevo to Chihuahua 

April 14, 1916 City, in automobile and truck, 

~~~~~l~~~ #a, Lieut. H. A. with despatches for American 

Dargue, pilot, Lieut. E. S. G~~- Consul, and General Gutierrez, 

rell, observer, on reconnaissance Militay Governor. 

flight from Columbus, N.M, to Due to intense feeling in ChiBoca Grande-Pulpit Pass- huahua City over the clash beOaxaca Pass-Carretas- tween the American troops and 

Columbus, N.M. R~~~~~

of enlisted men was placed in 

Sance made for the purpose of concealment in the outskirts of 

locating a large Carranzista the city. Capt. Foulois, accomforce, reported to be moving panied by Cpl. Arthur Westereast toward our line of commu- mark (chauffeur) proceeded to 

nications. N~ hostile troops were the American Consulate, delivlocated within the area covered. ered the despatches for the 

B~~~~~~ of flight 315 miles, American Consul and Military 

Jano+Ascencion and return to troops at parral, the Detachment 

p,merican aeroplane record for Governor, and left the city without difficulty. Returned to Division Headquarters, at Satevo, flight with two men. 

Aeroplane #52, Lieut, 1. A. 

Rader, on reconnaissance flight 

south from Satevo, toward Parral, to locate troops in vicinity of 

Parral. Located Major Robert L. 

Howze's command in vicinity of 

Ojito, near Durango State line. 

Pilot was compelled to land on 

vey rough ground, and damaged aeroplane. 

Same date. 
Foulois: The 1st Aero 

Squadron in Mexico 1916 

85 

April 15, 1916 

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A. 

Dargue, pilot, Lieut. E. S. Gorrell, observer, on reconnaissance 

from Columbus, N.M., to Boca 

Grande-Pulpit Pass--Dublanfrom Dublan to Namiquipafrom Namiquipa to Satevo. Total 

distance 415 miles, with two 

stops. 

Three other flights made this 

date, between Satevo-Can Antonio-and Namiquipa, carrying 

mail and despatches. 

Aeroplane #42, dismantled, 

condemned and destroyed. 

Lower wings of this aeroplane 

placed on aeroplane #45, to replace wings damaged in flight to 

Chihuahua City. 

April 16, 1916 

Two flights made this date, between Satevo, San Antonio and 

Namiquipa, carrying mail and 

despatches. Division Headquarters moved to Namiquipa. 

April 17, 1916 

Two flights made this date 

from Satevo to San Antonio and 

Namiquipa. Squadron Headquarters moved to Namiquipa. 

April 18, 1916 

Namiquipa and San Antonio, 

caving mail and despatches. 

Two flights this date between 

Lts. Herbert A. Dargue and Edgar S. Gorrell pose next to 

“Aeroplane #43” between reconnaissance flights in 

Mexico. 1916. 
86 Aviation Section 

April 19, 1916 

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A. 

Dargue, pilot, Capt. R. E. Willis, 

observer, on reconnaissance 

flight from San Antonio to Chihuahua City, for the purpose of 

taking photographs and reconnoitering all roads and approaches to Chihuahua'City. 

Roads in vicinity of Chihuahua 

City were reconnoitered and 

several photographs were taken. 

While reconnoitering roads in 

the hills west of Chihuahua City, 

the aeroplane motor failed, 

causing a forced landing in the 

hills. The aeroplane was completely wrecked. Lieut. Dargue 

escaped uninjured, Capt. Willis 

was pinned under the wreckage, 

sustained a severe scalp wound 

and considerably bruised about 

the legs and ankles. As the aeroplane was completely wrecked, it 

was burned up, on the spot. The 

two aviators, with their personal 

equipment, started to walk to 

San Antonio, their nearest base, 

a distance of about 65 miles. 

After constant suffering and 

hardship, due to lack of food 

and water, they reached San 

Antonio, on April 21st. Stayed at 

San Antonio until April 23, when 

they proceeded by automobile 

to Namiquipa, and reported the 

results of their reconnaissance to 

the Division Commander. 

April 20, 1916 

Squadron to return to Columbus, N.M., to secure new aeroplanes. Of the eight aeroplanes 

taken into Mexico on March 19, 

1916, but two were still in commission on this date. These two 

aeroplanes (nos. 45 and 53) 

were in such condition as to be 

unsafe for further field service. 

They were therefore flown to 

Columbus, this date, and ultimately condemned and destroyed. 

The Squadron personnel and 

transportation arrived at Columbus, N.M., April 22, 1916. 

Upon arrival at Columbus, the 

Squadron received four new 

aeroplanes, which had been 

purchased from the Curtiss 

Aeroplane Company. 

From April 23 to April 29, the 

Squadron was employed in testing these four new aeroplanes. 

Practical tests in flight with these 

machines demonstrated their 

unsuitability for Mexican field 

service, and they were declared 

unsuitable for such service. 

On May 1, 1916, two Curtiss 

aeroplanes (R-2 type 160 horsepower) were received. By May 

25, twelve of this type had arrived. 

During the months of May, 

June, and July, constant troubles 

and difficulties were encountered 

with defective propellers, defective construction in aeroplanes 

and defective motor parts. 

Orders received for the 

............................ 

Total number of flights made 

from March 15, 1916 to August 

Total number of miles flown, 

from March 15, 1916 to August 

Total duration of flights, from 

March 15, 1916 to August 15, 

1916-345 hours, 43 minutes. 

The Squadron Commander 

invites attention to the fact that 

the 1st Aero Squadron, S.C., is 

the first organization of its kind 

that has ever been used in active 

field service in the history of the 

United States Army. This command took the field with aeroplanes of very low military efficiency, and with less than 50% 

of its authorized allowance of 

truck transportation. Due to lack 

of aeroplanes with greater carrying capacity, all flying officers 

were continuously called upon 

to take risks in every reconnaissance flight made while on duty 

in Mexico. All officers, thoroughly appreciated the fact that 

the failure of their aeroplane 

motors, while flying through 

mountainous canyons and over 

rugged mountains, would invariably result in death. They also 

appreciated the fact that in a 

forced landing even if safely 

made, there was every possible 

risk of being taken prisoner by 

an enemy, whose ideas of the 

Laws of War are on a par with 

an uncivilized race of savages. 

All officers, pilots, on duty 

with command, during its active 

service in Mexico, were constantly being exposed to per15, 1916-540. 

15, 1916:--19,553. 

............................ 
Foulois: The 1st Aero 

Squadron in Mexico 1916 

87 

sonal risk and physical suffering. 

Due to inadequate weight carrying capacity of all aeroplanes, it 

was impossible to even carry 

sufficient food, water or clothing, 

on many of the reconnaissance 

flights. Pilots, in flight, were frequently caught in snow, rain and 

hail storms which, due to inadequate clothing, invariably caused 

excessive suffering. 

In several instances, pilots 

were compelled to make forced 

landings in desert and hostile 

county, fifty to seventy miles 

from the nearest troops. In 

nearly every case, the aeroplanes were abandoned or destroyed and the pilots, after experiencing all possible suffering 

due to lack of food and water, 

would finally work their way on 

foot, through alkali deserts and 

mountains, to friendly troops, 

usually arriving thoroughly exhausted as a result of these 

hardships. 

shown by every officer in the 

command, in performing this 

new and perilous service, with 

inadequate equipment, and under very severe conditions, is 

deserving of the highest commendation. Foreign Governments have decorated their 

flying officers for far less perilous 

flying. The officers of this command considered their hardships 

and their service with the Punitive Expedition as part of the 

day’s work, and simply in line of 

duty. 

The experience gained by the 

commissioned and enlisted personnel of this command while 

on active duty with the Punitive 

Expedition has been of the 

greatest value, and it is believed 

that the knowledge gained by all 

concerned should result in more 

rapid and efficient development 

of the aviation service in the 

United States Army. 

The earnest and willing spirit, 

Lt. Dargue. 

Capt. Foulois. and Lt. 

Gomll plan a reconnaissance 

mission to locate Villa’. troops 

during the Punitive 

Expcdltion. 

14. ScRiuen: 89 

Annual Repo~t 

1916. 

With the first increments 

provided by the National Defense Act of 1916, the Aviation Section had personnel 

authorizations for 77 officers 

and 1,978 enlisted men effective 1 July 1916. In his annual 

report, dated 3 October 1916, 

General Scriven outlined 

plans for using these people 

to expand the tactical organization of the Aviation Section.’ 

............................ 

It is proposed to organize this 

force into ... 2 aero squadrons, 

2 aero companies; and a school 

detachment for duty at the Signal Corps Aviation School at 

San Diego, California. There 

were organized at the end of this 

fiscal year ... 1 aero squadron; 

1 aero company: ... These organizations will be expanded 

into the units proposed.2 

............................ 

Two of the aero squadrons 

will be organized and stationed 

in the Southern Department; 

one aero company will be assigned to the Philippine Islands 

and one to the Canal Zone. 

............................ 

An aero squadron is required 

for service with each division, or 

when divisions are operating as 

parts of a field army corps the 

squadrons may be detached 

from divisions and grouped under the immediate control of the 

field Army commander. The recommendation in my last report 

that aero squadrons of 12 machines be the basis of our organization has been approved, and 

existing Tables of Organization 

provide for three companies of 

four machines each for a squadron. A major will be in command 

of the squadron, with a first lieutenant as squadron adjutant ,and 

quartermaster; 2 master signid 

electricians; 2 sergeants, first 

class, 6 corporals; and 2 privates, first class, for duty with the 

headquarters and supply detiichments. Each aero company has 

an authorized strength of 1 captain; 5 first lieutenants; 1 master 

signal electrician; 2 sergeants, 

first class; 5 sergeants; 9 corporals; 2 cooks, 14 privates, first 

class; and 6 privates. 

1 Report of the Chiei Signal Officer. 

United States Army, to the Secretary oi War, 

1916 (Washington 1916) 

2 The company was the 1st Company. 2d 

Aem Squadron. which was organized at San 

Diego on 1 December 1915 and sailed for 

the Philippines early in January 1916 

Maurer. Combat Squadrons. pp 15-16 

15- Funas FOR 

Fiscal Y-R 1918 

JanuaRy 1917 

91 

When General Scriven appeared for budget hearings 

early in 1917, his days as 

Chief Signal Officer were 

numbered. There had been 

dissension within the Aviation Section between the 

flyers and the non-flyers. 

There had been charges that 

non-flying officers had been 

drawing flight pay. Scriven 

had openly accused aviation 

officers of insubordination 

and disloyalty. In hearings 

the previous April (Doc. 12), 

Baker had informed the committee that Scriven would be 

replaced and the Aviation 

Section reorganized. To take 

Cot. Samuel Reber’s place as 

Chief of the Aviation Section, 

Baker had brought Lt. Col. 

George 0. Squier back from 

London, where he had been 

military attache. Squier had 

taken charge of the section 

in May 1916, but that was just 

a temporary arrangement. He 

was slated to become Chief 

Signal Officer upon Scriven’s 

retirement in February 191 7. 

The committee was interested in what Squier, who accompanied Scriven to the 

hearing, had learned from 

conversations with British officials and from personal observation of aircraft in action 

on the battle front in Europe. 

I Hearings before the Committee on Milltary Affairs. House of Aepresentatwes. Army 

Appropriation Bill, 1978, 64th Cong. 2d sess 

(1917) 

Wilson, re-elected President on 7 November 1916 on 

a peace platform, was having 

no success in bringing the 

war to an end. Rather, the 

nation seemed to be moving 

inevitably toward a war for 

which it was ill prepared. The 

performance of the 1st Aero 

Squadron in Mexico, when 

contrasted with events in Europe, had helped to reveal 

how far the United States had 

fallen behind in the development of military aviation. 

For Fiscal Year 1918 the 

Signal Corps had requested 

$16,600,000, which was $2,- 

300,000 more than it had received for 1917. When asked 

about the cause of the increase, Scriven explained 

that the amount for the “Signal Corps proper” was only 

$1,000,000, which was $100 

less than the previous year. 

The remaining $1 5,600,000 

was for aviation. 

S. Hubert Dent, Jr. (D., Ala.), 

had become committee 

chairman following Hay’s 

resignation to accept a judicial appointment. Congressmen Greene, Kahn, McKellar, 

and McKenzie were still 

members of the committee, 

which also included William 

Gordon (D., Ohio) and John 

Tilson (R., Conn.). In addition 

to Scriven and Squier, Maj. 

William Mitchell and Maj. 

Charles S. Wallace were 

present at the hearing on 5 

January 1917.1 

............................ 

Mr. Kahn. Have you been 

using any aircraft in connection 

with fire control? 

Gen. Scriven. No, Mr. Kahn; 

I do not think I can say we have. 

There has been no general organized work in that direction, 

but there has been a little experimental work at Fort Sill with the 

Field Artille y, observations in 

the Philippines in connectiorl 

with the coast defenses, and at 

San Diego some experiments 

looking to the detection of submarine obstacles. 

Mr. Kahn. They are using 

aircraft for fire control ve y extensively on the European battlefields, as I understand it. 

essential, and we must come to 

it as soon as we can. 

Mr. Kahn. How does it happen we have not done any of 

that? 

Gen. Scriven. It is because 

we have not had the machines 

or the personnel. 

Mr. Kahn. When you have 

the machines, do you expect to 

operate them in connection ‘with 

the Coast Artille y, too? 

Gen. Scriven. I have just 

recently submitted a memorandum to the General Staff, asking 

them to decide, in connection 

with the military policy of the 

United States, the locations of 

various aviation centers, schools, 

aerodromes, etc., according to 

the needs of the service, and 

Gen. Scriven. It is absolutely 
92 Aviation Section 

also the locations of airplane 

centers, in connection with the 

Coast Artillery defenses. 

Of course you know we have 

just purchased a very large tract 

of land near Fort Monroe, costing $290,000, where there is to 

be established one of these centers and schools, and the Navy is 

coming in on that to some extent, temporarily. That will undoubtedly be an aviation center 

for the defenses of Chesapeake 

Bay. What the policy will be in 

regard to the locations for other 

squadrons of aeroplanes, so far 

as the Coast Artillery is concerned, I do not know. We plan 

the placing of squadrons in the 

Philippines, in Hawaii, and in the 

Canal Zone. They will be very 

largely used in connection with 

the Coast Artillery for defense. 

operate those aeroplanes? 

sir. The men we are training 

must operate them. 

Mr. Kahn. You do not intend, as far as you know, to turn 

over any of your aeroplanes to 

the Coast Artilley, to be operated by the Coast Artillery. 

tion of policy for the future. ... 

Mr. Kahn. How many machines have you purchased with 

the appropriation of last year, 

and how many have you obligated the department to purchase? 

in regard to that. 

Mr. Kahn. Do you expect to 

Gen.Scriven. We must; yes, 

Gen.Scriven. That is a ques- 

............................ 

GenScriven. I have the data 

Mr. Kahn. Will you put that 

in the hearings? 

Gen. Scriven. The total 

number of aeroplanes purchased 

or under order is 423. There 

have been 21 machines destroyed and condemned, and 

there are 27 out of commission. 

Of those in service 4 are in Manila, 30 at San Diego, 18 at 

Mineola, 7 at San Antonio, and 

14 at Columbus and on the border, making a total of 73 in 

service. There are 302 machines 

under order but not delivered. ............................ 

Mr. Kahn. Have you had any 

occasion to revise your opinion 

which you gave last year as to 

the life of an aeroplane? I think 

you said the life of a machine in 

time of peace is about 10 

months and in time of war about 

7 days. 

Gen. Scriven. No, sir. I think 

the use of an aeroplane is just 

like the use of so much ammunition. A machine goes up and 

comes down and may be 

smashed. If the machine goes 

along without an accident, I suppose anywhere from 6 to 10 

months is about as long as you 

can expect it to last. It depends 

on the conditions under which it 

is used or maintained, climate, 

weather, service, and the like. 

They are very fragile, and it is 

very difficult to estimate their life 

exactly. 

Mr. Kahn. Of course, the 

committee, 1 take it, is anxious to 

let the county know that, while 

we are willing to appropriate 

money for this purpose, the 

county ought also to know that 

the life of these machines is exceedingly short. 

Gen. Scriven. It is very 

short. Take, for instance, the 

conditions as they exist on the 

border. An aeroplane goes up, 

meets with some unfavorable 

conditions, and comes down 

perhaps 30 or 40 miles away 

from any place where it can get 

any assistance. That is the end of 

the machine. On the contrary, if 

the machine came down at a 

place where repairs could be 

made, the broken parts may be 

replaced without difficulty. 

Mr. Kahn. What do you 

mean when you say that is the 

end of the machine? Do you 

have to abandon it? 

Gen. Scriven. We may have 

to abandon it if you can not get 

any of the parts you need. That 

would be especially true in case 

the machine came down in an 

enemy's county. 

machines have met with such a 

fate recently? 

Gen. Scriven. There have 

been a good many of them 

which met such a fate down in 

Mexico. All of the first lot we 

sent down there suffered that 

fate. 

Mr. Kahn. There was some 

question about those machines 

being fitted for the work you 

expected them to do, was 

there not? 

Mr. Kahn. How many of our 
Funds for Fiscal 

Year 1918 

93 

Gen. Scriven. They were 

picked up and taken down there 

because they were all we had. 

They were taken down from 

Fort Sill and San Diego, where 

the conditions were different; but 

it was abwlutely necessary to 

send them out as the days were 

those of war. They were lowpower machines-90-horsepower Curtiss machines-and 

for that allotment the committee 

only gave us $300,000, which, 

as a matter of fact, extended 

over some 14 months. 

age price of one of these flying 

machines? 

Gen. Scriven. The machines 

which are proving very satisfactory now with the border troops 

at Columbus, communicating 

with Gen. Pershing, are 160- 

horsepower Curtiss machines. 

cost is $12,000, $20,000 with 

the spare parts. 

Mr. Kahn. What is the averMaj. Mitchell. The average 

............................ 

Mr. McKenzie. Since we 

have done our flying with the 

aeroplane, what is your judgment about the practicability of 

the use of balloons? 

Gen. Scriven. I think the 

captive balloon is very valuable. 

Of course, we know they have 

been using them on the Belgian 

coast and on the coast of France 

for observation purposes and 

very largely on the fighting 

fronts. Of course, they are limited in the altitude which they 

can reach. The free balloon is of 

no special value, as its use is 

exceedingly limited. As to the 

dirigible, I have never been 

much of a believer in it. The 

dirigible is six or seven hundred 

feet long, of enormous diameter, 

has powerful searchlights, guns, 

bomb-dropping devices, the 

ability to hover over a certain 

selected point, but it is vulnerable to attack from the aeroplane 

or from the ground and susceptible to weather conditions, and I 

can not see where the dirigible 

has ever done anything commensurate with its cost, or fulfilled the expectations of the 

people who believe in them. In 

fact, I do not believe in them at 

all. Of course, there may be 

ties when such a machine as 

the dirigible might be of some 

service, but those times are so 

infrequent, and the chances of 

success are so remote, I do not 

believe they are worth having at 

their present cost. 

Mr. McKenzie. Would you 

advise striking out the work 

“balloon” in the appropriation 

bill? 

Gen. Scriven. Oh, no. Balloons are very important. Captive and kite balloons are absolutely necessary. The captive 

balloon is much more valuable 

than most people recognize. 

When I was military attache of 

the United States in Italy I saw a 

captive balloon being carried 

along with the cavalry at a trot. It 

makes a very fine observation 

station. 

Mr. Kahn. Germany is the 

only county which uses the 

Zeppelin type of dirigible, is it 

not? 

lieve the English have tried the 

dirigible. Col. Squier is rather 

more in favor of the dirigible 

than I am. As far as I can see, 

the longer this war continues, 

the less the Zeppelin is proving 

its value; but, of course, that is 

an individual opinion. 

Gen. Scriven. Yes, sir. I be- 

............................ 

The Chairman. How are the 

aeroplanes armed? 

Gen. Scriven. That is another question that is very difficult of solution. They are catrying now merely the service rifle 

and pistol. Some men think that 

a short riot gun, a shot gun, 

should be used; others think that 

a gun of the Lewis type or some 

other such type may be well 

used. 

The Chairman. You have 

not equipped them with the machine gun at all? 

Gen. Scriven. Oh, yes; experimentally, we have tried 

some. We have used the Lewis 

gun, but they are not mounted. 

The Lewis gun weighs only 27 

pounds, and can be used from 

the shoulder. It is a very good 

gun. 

with Lewis guns? 

Mr. Kahn. Are they all armed 
94 

Gen. Scriven. There are 

some down there; 14, I think. 

Mr. Kahn. Have you ever 

used any other machine gun, 

except the Lewis gun? 

Gen. Scriven. The BenetMercier gun was used. We tried 

it out. I think there are some 

down there now. We have tried 

them all out thoroughly. 

............................ 

Mr. McKellar. The first item 

is on page 7 of the bill, “Signal 

Service of the Army,” a very 

comprehensive item. Will you 

explain to the committee, in 

general, exactly what you are 

doing in carrying out the provisions of that item? 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir. Last 

year you remember that we had 

$300,000 as the appropriation, 

and then you gave us an emergency fund of $500,000 in 

March or April, on account of 

the Mexican situation; and then 

it was suddenly increased from 

those small amounts until, on 

the 28th of August, the Army 

appropriation act was signed, 

and we got under that act $13,- 

281,666. In other words, gentlemen, beginning the year with the 

small amount of $300,000, we 

suddenly got a large amount of 

money with which to carry on 

the development of the Aviation 

Service. 

............................ 

Lt. Col. George 0. Squler, 

Officer In Charge of the Avhtlon 

Saction. Slgral Corpa (1916-1917). later (1917-1923) In the 

rank of first brigadier and then nulor general. 

he served u Chlef Sigml Officer. 
Funds for Fiscal 

Year 1918 

95 

- 

Col. Sauier. ... The - verv much behind Europe, Col. Squier. The unit of this 

equipment we are getting now is 

as good, 1 am sure, as this county can produce, and it is improving very rapidly. We are 

having very few accidents, and 

there are very few forced landings. Our troubles are now disappearing, because we have 

better equipment. 1 think I may 

say with considerable satisfaction 

that we have very few accidents 

of any sort at our schools now. 

The figures with regard to that 

are really astonishing. 

Mr. Kahn. if it is not too 

much trouble, will you put them 

in the record of this hearing? 

Col. Squier. I will be glad to 

do so. ... 

Flying Record, Army Air Service, 

Signal Corps Aviation School, 

San Diego, Cal., Jan. 1 to Dec. 

26, 1916. 

Total number of flights . ,7,087 

Total time in air (hours and 

Distance tranveled 

Fatalities ............. None. 

Col. Squier (continuing). 

We have been confronted by the 

fact that there has been no buying market for aeroplanes in this 

county, and, of course, without 

a buying market, you can not 

develop an engine or an equipment. Consequently, we were 

............................ 

minutes) .......... .3,356.56 

(miles) ............. ,251,775 

which, under the spur o> the service is <he squadron, which 

war, has gone forward in a mar- consists of three flights of four 

velous way along these lines. aeroplanes each, or a total of 12 

The flying movement abroad is aeroplanes in a unit. It will persimply prodigious; and any haps clear the atmosphere a bit 

questions you may wish to ask if we bear in mind two ideas 

me about that I will be vey glad which will help us to make a 

to answer, provided my answers proper estimate about this whole 

are not to go into the record or subject; and I will tell you the 

to become public. I have had way it appealed to me from the 

unusual opportunities to follow beginning and the method that I 

the flying movement abroad, be- used. 

cause I have been the military Before leaving England I 

attache to London for the past made inquiry on two points: 

four years, and 1 have been priv- Vey generally I made inquiry as 

ileged to see a good deal at the to how many aeroplanes shciuld 

front. Naturally, I must be vey be assigned to each mobile unit 

circumspect in anything that 1 or division of an army. I considmay say here in regard to the ered that if I knew that it would 

present war. be a great help. Second, I made 

The Chairman. Do you inquiry as to what was the cost 

mean that you do not want to of one aeroplane maintained in 

speak of that unless we go into the air per year. 

executive session? So I made it my business to 

c0l. Squier. Certainly, because whatever I have Seen has 

been under diplomatic privileges. 

inquire of the Government odficials and others and tried to get 

an answer to tho= two questions, because they are fundaThe Chairman. All right. ... mental questions. 

............................ I found that the allowance of 

Col.Squier. .... we hope aeroplanes per division of the 

to have seven squadrons for the mobile army is one squadron of 

Regular Army developed, or active aeroplanes in the air 

nearly SO, with materiel and per- whenever the commanding offimnnel by the end of the year, cer wants them. That does not 

Of tho= seven squadrons four mean that each division of a 

will be for the four departments; large army would have its Own 

three will be for over-sea sew- squadron, by any means; it 

ice-in the Canal Zone, Hawaii, means that the average would 

and the Philippines. be according to that formula. If, 

Mr. Kahn. For the sake of the 

record, will you state again how 

many machines are in a squadron in the aviation service? 
96 Aviation Section 

then, any mobile atmy has six 

divisions, we know just how 

many squadrons we ought to 

provide. 

The other important consideration is the price of keeping 

aeroplanes in the air for a year. I 

found in Europe, or in England, 

from separate sources, as near 

as they could guess it-of 

course, it is more or less guesswork, because you may have a 

series of accidents in a day that 

will wipe out whole squadronsthat the figure is about $50,000 

a year, or f10,000 a year, to 

keep an aeroplane in the air. So 

that 12 aeroplanes in a squadron 

would cost $600,000 a year for 

maintenance. 

Mr. McKellar. Have you 

given the original cost of the 

aeroplanes? 

Col. Squier. I am coming to 

that. So that the unit squadron, 

which will produce 12 flying 

aeroplanes in war, wears out an 

aeroplane, on the average, every 

three months; and 4 aeroplanes 

are therefore required to keep 1 

aeroplane in the air all of the 

time; so that you would have 48 

aeroplanes in a squadron used 

up in war per year. In peace it is 

less, of course, but not so much 

less as you would imagine, because an aeroplane is a fragile 

thing, and it wearS out very 

quickly. The life of an engine is 

only about 300 hours, roughly, 

and you would have to have 

several engines for each aeroplane, and the engine is an expensive part of the aeroplane, 

costing about $50 per honepower. 

So that I can say that the 

basis we are now working on is 

that the original cost of a squadron for a division, with all its 

equipment, which includes this 

book (indicating) full of accessories, the number of which would 

surprise you, is $800,000, 

roughly; and to maintain that 

after you got it is $600,000 per 

year, which is $50,000 per machine per year in the air. ............................ 

I have said, then, that with the 

appropriation you have given us, 

we propose to equip, as far as 

we can, seven squadrons for the 

Regular Army, and we will probably have pretty well under way 

six reserve squadrons which will 

be used temporarily, at least, in 

connection with coast defenses, 

in such manner as the War Department may decide. These 

machines have already been ordered for coast defense, bids 

have been called for, and if the 

committee desires to see them, 

the specifications are here (indicating). 

squadrons, in addition to the 7; 

for the Regular Army that would 

be 13 in all. And for the next 

fiscal year we propose to maintain those 13, and add 4 more at 

a cost of $800,000 each, maintaining those 13 at $600,000 

each. Those figures I gave you 

There will be 6 of these 

before. If you will bear those 

figures in mind, it will be easy to 

get a general idea of what we 

are doing. We feel very much 

encouraged as to the personnel 

also, and have inauguratedMr. Greene (interposing). 

$800,000 you say is the original 

cost? 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir; for the 

unit, the squadron. 

At present the President has 

authorized for the aviation section for the present year 1,800 

men; he has authority to do 

that. ... ............................ 

There has been authorized by 

the War Department for the next 

year no less than 3,200 men; the 

personnel for the squadrons for 

the Canal Zone and for Hawaii, 

and for the completion of the 

squadron at Manila-the officers 

to command them have already 

been selected, and the supply 

officers have already been designated, and the men themselves 

who are to go have been selected, very largely, with the 

view of keeping the two elements of personnel and equipment side by side. There are 

something like 200 of these men 

at the San Diego School; 50 of 

them will be sent to Panama and 

50 to Hawaii. 

............................ 

I have given you then, Mr. 

Chairman, our hopes for tliis 

year, namely, seven squadrons 

for the Regular Army, four of 
Funds for Fiscal 

Year 1918 

97 

which are to be in this county 

and three for the over-sea possessions; and six reserve squadrons for the Coast Defense; 

those six squadrons would be, 

speaking generally, two near the 

city of New York, say, one in 

Chesapeake Bay, one near Boston for instance, one near San 

Francisco, and one in the Seattle 

district. 

The machines are all bought, 

or under contract; the personnel 

is largely in hand for those; and 

two of the new squadrons for 

the Regular Army will be formed 

at San Antonio; all four of the 

Regular Army squadrons will be 

in the Southern Department at 

present, because there is the active border duty. Later some 

may be assigned to other departments. But the urgent base 

for us now is San Antonio, Tex.; 

and as one squadron is completed and ready, it goes out, 

and another one is formed. 

The Chairman. Let me ask 

you this question in that connection: The squadrons that you will 

use for the posts will be under 

the jurisdiction of the Signal 

Corps, will they? 

under one head. 

that they may be devoted to in 

directing fire will be under the 

Signal Corps? 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir; it is all 

The Chairman. And the use 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir. I may 

say, Mr. Chairman, that we regard the air service as being designed and provided for the 

whole of the Army; and in my 

judgment that is very wise at 

present, because you can look at 

the whole problem and spend 

the money with the greatest 

economy in that way. There 

may come a time afterwards 

when you may want to segregate the bookkeeping part of it. I 

have an open mind upon the 

subject-if there is to be any 

question of authority between 

committees of Congress. 

Mr. Kahn. Is that done 

largely in Europe in the belligerent countries? Is it one service? 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir; the air 

service in Europe is one central 

service. It is then assigned to any 

service that they may wish; for 

instance, to “spot” artillery fire. 

The way they use the aeroplane 

is that certain aeroplanes will be 

assigned to certain batteries; and 

they do it by numbers, and you 

can see them go to those batteries and perform that service for 

that day, and then return to their 

stations with their squadrons. 

Mr. Kahn. They are sent out 

by the Signal Corps? 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir; by the 

aviation service. 

Mr. Kahn. And they report to 

a certain battery commander? 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir. Of 

course, they are all under the 

general. 

Mi. Kahn. Yes; I understand. 

Col. .Squier. It is like you 

send a doctor to a general, and 

he is under the general’s command, but is in a separate service for technical training and 

equipment. 

............................ 

Mi. McKellar. Here is a subject as to which I think you could 

tell us a good many things we 

would like to know. As I understand it, when you went down 

on the border, all the machines 

that you had failed to come up 

to what was required of them, in 

other words, you could not fly 

over mountains? 

correct. 

to abandon those. Now, in the 

purchase of these 306 that are 

contracted for, have you secured 

by these contracts such machines as can fly over mountains, or can fly to almost any 

height? Will you just state how 

that is? 

Col. Squier. My answer is 

that the present squadron with 

the punitive expedition is fully 

equipped with suitable reconnoissance machines, which I $am 

satisfied are the best that this 

country can produce now; and 

with every auxiliary part that is 

needed for its service, including 

automatic Lewis machine guns, 

rifles, automatic cameras, inctandiary bombs, demolition bombs, 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir; that is 

Mr. McKellar. And you have 
98 Aviation Section 

wireless, etc. There is a base at 

Columbus, N. Mex., capable of 

repairing anything that happens, 

within reason, and it is self-supporting, so that we do not have 

to devote any attention practically to it at this end of the line. 

We have a propeller factory right 

there, and they make their own 

propellers there to suit the dry 

climate and the heat. 

............................ 

Mr. Kahn. These [aerial] 

battles are all fought with machine guns? 

Col. Squier. Absolutely. On 

that point 1 might add the angle 

of view of the machine gun as it 

appears to our Aviation Section. 

If you will eliminate the demolitions, for instance, where you 

drop bombs, or the incendiary 

bomb, and take the pure case of 

a fight between aeroplane and 

aeroplane, it would appear that 

what we want is not a large gun 

with a few number of rounds, 

but a small-caliber gun with a 

large number of rounds, for the 

following reason: You get the 

upper berth and come at the 

opponent by gravity, shooting 

through the propeller, and you 

only have a very short time in 

which to shoot. You then go by 

him at the rate of a hundred 

miles an hour, and you come 

back again, if you are faster than 

he is. So that if you had a large 

gun with only one shot and did 

not hit him at all, your shot 

would do no good; but if you 

had the same weight of lead in a 

hundred shot you would be 

more apt to hit him; and the 

aeroplane is so vulnerable at 

present, that he would be disabled as much by that small shot 

as by the large one. 

Mr. Kahn. And do they ordinarily aim through the propeller? 

CoLSquier. They ordinarily 

aim right through the propeller 

and the pilot sits right back of 

the propeller, they aim the 

whole machine; they do not aim 

the gun; they just pull a string to 

fire and aim the machine itself. 

The point is this, that you can 

only have a certain weight of 

lead on the aeroplane. 

Mr. Kahn. Yes; I understand. 

Col. Squier. And you can 

have that in one big shot, or a 

lot of little shots; and you can 

not cary an extra man, because 

he weighs so much; you must fix 

it so that this same man must do 

it; you can not take up an extra 

man just to shoot a machine 

gun, because the extra weight 

would be so much. And you 

would be going by the other 

machine at perhaps 120 miles 

an hour, and you want to hit 

him with one of those shots, and 

not to miss him. So you want a 

multiple machine gun, or something by which you will not be 

likely to miss him as you pass; 

you do not have much time to 

fire; then you go by and begin 

maneuvering again and repeat 

the operation. 

So that, as a general thing, we 

are against larger guns for aeroplanes; but I am speaking now 

about a machine that goes up 

and fires in the air at another 

aeroplane. 

Mr. Kahn. Are there many 

American aviators using those 

machines in the various armies 

in Europe? 

Col. Squier. There are in 

France a considerable number, 

as you know. 

Mr. Kahn. Yes. 

Col. Squier. They are 

known as the “American legion” 

or something of the kind. 

Mr. McKellar. Are you an 

aviator yourself? 

Col. Squier. No, sir. I have 

ridden as a passenger frequently, 

but I am not a driver. It is not the 

policy; in fact, I am too old to 

drive. The driver is, in war, a 

man under 30 years old, usually; 

it is a young man’s job; there is 

no question about that. 

the mobile army, the infantymen? 

Mr. Kahn. That is true also of 
Funds for Fiscal 

Year 1918 

99 

Col. Squier. Well, it is particularly true in this. In fact, I can 

tell you that, in a residence of 

several months with an army in 

war, I have never found a single 

actual flier that was over 24 

years of age at that time. Well, 

the only point I want to make is 

that it is distinctly a young man’s 

job. 

The Chairman. How close 

do these machines come to each 

other in a fight? 

Col. Squier. They have actually rammed each other. It is a 

most thrilling thing to watch 

them; in fact, there is no use 

reading novels any more; real 

life is more interesting; it is simply wonderful to see them. 

Mr. Greene. Col. Squier, I 

understand that the theory of 

this combat in the air is to gain 

control of that territory, for the 

other purposes for which the 

aeroplanes are subsequently to 

be used in it? 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Greene. The fighting itself has no particular military object? 

MI. Gordon. Well, it is to kill 

the other man. 

MI. Greene. Well, to kill him, 

but it is in order to get control of 

the air zone? 

Col. Squier. Yes, sir. 

MI. Tilson. Reconnaissance MI. Kahn. Control over the 

and fire control is what YOU are air is just as important as control 

looking for? over the sea? 

Col. Squier. And after this 

the only way they know now war the armies, in general, will 

about the maze of trenches disband or shrink, but the air 

along that line, which any hu- service is going to stay where it is 

man being could not 90 over, is and go on. They realize it is an 

by taking photographs of each asset that is going to remain, and 

zone from aeroplanes and not shrink or disband. All we 

matching them together each learn in this war about aerial 

day. Without that they could not navigation will be applied to the 

tell the new pieces of trench dug uses of civilization in the peace 

during the previous night. which follows. It is one point of 

permanent gain, at any rate, and 

that is why this county is safe in 

putting money into it. 

(Thereupon, at 1:30 o’c1oc:k 

p.m., the committee adjourned. . . .) 

Col. Squier, Yes, sir. In fact, 
100 Aviation Section 

When Germany resumed 

unrestricted submarine warfare at the beginning of February 1917, the United States 

broke off diplomatic relations. Then came the Zimmermann note, the arming of 

American merchantmen, the 

sinking of American ships, a 

call for a special session of 

Congress, and, finally, on 6 

April 1917, the declaration of 

war against Germany. 

Meanwhile, on 5 February 

1917, the Signal Corps was 

asked to estimate requirements for an army made up 

of the regulars, the national 

guard, and 500,000 volunteers. The estimate submitted 

on 16 February included 

$48,666,666 for aviation proportioned to the rest of the 

army. On 21 March Secretary 

Baker called for another estimate, this time with 1,000,000 

volunteers. Using the same 

formula, the Signal Corps 

came up with $54,250,000 for 

aviation. During this time estimates for aircraft production had mounted to 3,700 a 

year. In such exercises, the 

major concern apparently 

was production, with little attention being given to how 

the planes were to be used. 

The aircraft industry of the 

United States was not then 

geared up to any such production, even if the government had known what kinds 

of planes it needed for combat service. 

For several years officials 

of the War Department, the 

Signal Corps, and the Aviation Section had lamented 

the secrecy that prevented 

them from learning about the 

latest technical developments in aircraft production 

in Europe. There was plenty 

of inform ation available, 

however, to indicate that the 

major belligerent powers had 

made great progress in developing not only aircraft but 

also doctrine and tactics for 

the employment of their 
Funds for Fiscal 

Year 1918 

101 

growing airpower. Britain, 

France, and Germany had 

recognized the importance of 

air superiority and were using their aircraft for counterair operations, bombardment 

of strategic and, more often, 

interdiction targets, close 

support of ground forces by 

bombing and strafing, strategic and tactical reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, adjustment of artillery fire, and for informing 

infantry commanders of the 

location and movements of 

their troops. 

Although there was some 

awareness in the United 

States of these developments 

in the use of airpower, aviation in the U.S. Army was still 

regarded as being principally 

a service of reconnaissance, 

with plans for expansion of 

tactical strength being based 

on the addition of one squadron for each additional Army 

division. On 6 April 1917, 

however, the Aviation Section was ill prepared to carry 

out even the limited function 

it had been assigned for field 

service in time of war. 

When the United States reservists and retired officers 

went to war in April 1917, the on active duty as well as regaviation service of the U.S. ulars) and a little over 1,000 

Army consisted of the 1st enlisted men. No one seems 

Aero Squadron, which had to know for sure how m.any 

been formed in 1913 and had airplanes the Aviation Secserved with Pershing in Mex- tion had (about 200? less 

ico; the 1st Company, 2d than 300?), but all sources 

Aero Squadron, which had seem to agree that not one of 

been formed in December the planes was suitable for 

1915 and sent to the Philip- combat service, not even repines the following January; connaissance. 

the 7th Aero Squadron, Thus the United States 

formed in February 1917 for went to war without an air 

duty in the Canal Zone; and the force worthy of the name, 

6th Aero Squadron, organized and without any well forrnuin Hawaii in March 1917. Three lated ideas, much less plans, 

other squadrons, part of a for building and employing 

seven-squadron program, were such a force in battle.' 

in various stages of formation in 

the United States. 

For these units, and for administration, training, and 

other activities, the Aviation 

Section had about 130 officers (flyers and non-flyers, 

airplane and balloon pilots, 

1. The histoly of the U.S. Army's air service in the period prior to America's entry 

into the war is traced in considerable detail 

in USAF Historical Study 98, The U.7ited 

States Army Air Arm. April 1861 to Aprd 1917 

(USAF Hist Div, 1958). 

PaRt II: 

Plans arza Przogrzams 

Ap~il1917-Feb~ua~y 1918 

103 

In the days immediately following America’s entry into the 

war, much effort was devoted to plans for the development of 

an air force for wartime service. In Washington the concern 

was with production, construction, and training, with little 

attention being given to how airpower would be used in battle. 

As events developed, planning for the employment of U.S. 

airpower in Europe was left largely to General Pershing, his 

staff, and his Air Service, which was a separate service and not 

part of the Signal Corps of the AEF. 

Gen. Pershing with his World War I staff: First row (I. to r.): 

Brig. Gen. Harold B. Fiske, Maj. Gen. James W. McAndrew, 

Gen. John J. Pershing, Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, Brig. Gen. 

George V. H. Moscley; second row: Brig. Gen. Avery D. 

Andrew. Brig. Gen. LeRoy Elthy. Btig. Gen. Dennis E. 

Nolan, and Brig. Gen. Robert C. Davis. 

16 12,000 Plane 

PRogRarn 

29 May 1917 

105 

The development of an 

aviation program in Washington was given a new direction and greater impetus by a 

cable received on 24 May 

191 7 from Premier Alexandre 

Ribot of France. Ribot proposed that the United States 

form a flying corps of 4,500 

planes, with personnel and 

material, for service in 

France in 1918. The cable 

was based on a French study 

for a U.S. air force of 60 

groups for strategical operations. Half of the groups were 

to be pursuit and half bombardment, with each group 

being made up of 6 squadrons of 12 planes each [Docs. 

7 and 231. Since the cable did 

not specify pursuit and bombardment, officials in Washington assumed that the 

number covered all aviation 

and made plans accordingly.' 

The Joint Army-Navy Technical Aircraft Board quickly 

translated Ribot's proposal 

into the following plan.2 With 

provisions for replacement 

and reserve craft, the plan 

called for the production of 

12,000 airplanes during the 

first half of 1918 for service in 

France. To this were added 

more than 5,000 training 

planes. The plan was to concentrate on the production of 

training and reconnaissance 

planes in the United States 

and obtain fighting and 

bombing planes from the allies. Funding for production 

was included in $640,000,000 

appropriated by Congress in 

an act signed by the President on 24 July 1917 for a 

large expansion of the Aviation Section. 

Washington, D.C. 

May 29, 1917. 

From: Joint Army and Navy 

To: Secretary of War. 

Subject Report of Board 

Technical Aircraft Board 

Secretary of the Navy. 

1. The Board met at 1015 

A.M. at the call of its president. 

2. Present: All the members. 

3. The French Government, 

on May 24, 1917, requested the 

United States Government to 

cooperate with the French Aeronautics, and form a flying corps 

of 4,500 airplanes, personnel 

and material; such flying corps to 

be available for active service in 

France during the spring cainpaign of 1918. 

To meet the foregoing re 

quest, the needs of the United 

States Army for service airplanes 

and engines, to be used in E.urope, are as indicated [see table 

below]: 

In order that the United States 

Government may meet the request of the French Government, immediate steps should be 

taken to start the manufacture, 

in the United States, of the 

above airplanes and engines. 

B. D. Foulois V. E. Clark 

Major, Signal Captain, 

Corps, U.S.A. U.S.A. 

A. K. Atkins J. G. Hunsaker 

Lieutenant, Asst. Naval 

U.S.N. Constructor, 

U.S.N. 

J. H. Towers E. S. Gorrell 

Lieutenant, Captain, Signal 

U.S.N. Corps, 

U.S.A. 

Approved: 

Newton D. Josephus Daniels 

Baker 

Secretary of Secretary of 

War. the Navy. 

Service Airplanes and Engines (Latest Types) 

(To be produced between January 1, 1918, and June 30, 1918). 

1. The statements concerning the Rib1 

cable and 11s interpretation follow I. 8. Holley, Jr , Ideas and Weapons (New Haven, 

1958). pp 41-46, supplemented by Ministere 

de la Guerra. les Armees Francaises dam /a 

Grande Guerre. Tome V. Vol 2 (Paris, 1937). 

pp 48-51 

2 In Gorrell's History. A-1, pp 11-12. 

Types Airplanes Engines COSl 

Fighting line Reserve Fighting line Reserve 

Reconnaissance & 

artilley control ...... 3.000 1.000 6.000 2.000 

Fighting .. ...~ ........ 5.000 1,667 10,000 3,334 

Bombing ..__........ 1.OOO 333 2.000 666 

Total .-.......... 9.000 3.000 18.000 6.000 

Grand Total .......... 12.000 24.000 
106 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

Bdg. Gen. Edgar Rwrl (at the tlme a colonel) was 

Chlef SIcd Offker. AEF, and pmldent of a Board of 

Offiun appointed In dune 1918 to make rccommendatlons on adatbn 

mattem h France. (sketch by Joseph Cummlngs Chus) 
17- M itc hd J : 

Ah Poky 

13 June 1917 

107 

Two days after the Ribot 

cable, Pershing assumed 

command of the AEF in 

Washington. Sailing for Europe on 28 May, he stopped 

in England before going on 

to France. When he arrived in 

Paris on 13 June 1917, one of 

the people on hand to greet 

him when he got off the train 

at the Gare du Nord was Lt. 

Col. William Mitchell, Aviation Section, Signal Corps, 

U.S. Army. Mitchell, who had 

left Washington on 17 March, 

had been sent to Europe as a 

military observer with orders 

to investigate the status of 

French aeronautics. His first 

stop in Europe had been 

Spain, where he heard the 

news that the United States 

had declared war. He had set 

out immediately for Paris, 

and during the following 

weeks he had talked with 

French officials, visited 

French factories and aeronautical schoo I s, toured the 

French front, flown over enemy lines with a French pilot, 

visited Royal Flying Corps 

units in France, talked with 

their commander, Maj. Gen. 

Hugh Trenchard, and, among 

other things, had set up an 

office for the US. Air Service 

at 25 Avenue Montaigne in 

Paris. That office, he informed Pershing’s Chief of 

Staff, Lt. Col. James G. Harbord, in a memorandum 

dated 13 June, was “ready to 

go ahead with any project 

determined upon by the 

Commanding General.”l 

Mitchell also had prepared 

for the Chief of Staff two papers dealing with American 

air policy and organization. 

Harbord referred them to a 

Board of Officers appointed 

on 19 June to make recommendations on various aviation matters. The board was 

made up of Col. Edgar Russel, Chief Signal Officer, AEF, 

president of the board; 

Mitchell, the senior aviation 

member; Maj. Townsend F. 

Dodd, Aviation Officer, AEF; 

M aj . M arlboroug h Ch urchill, 

Field Artillery; Maj. Frank 

Parker, Cavalry; and Capt. 

Joseph E. Carberry, Aviation 

Section, Signal Corps. 

Churchill and Parker were 

members of a U.S. Military 

Mission, headed by Lt. Col. 

James A. Logan, that had 

been in France for some 

time. Carberry, who served as 

recorder for the board, had 

arrived in France only a short 

time earlier for flight trainung. 

Mitchell’s papers on policy 

and organization were received by the board at its 

third meeting, on 26 June 

1917.2 

1. Exhibit C (Duty Performed by Major 

Wm Mitchell, Aviation Section, Signal 

Corps, dated 13 Jun 17) to Mitchell, Memo 

for CIS. AEF, subj: Aeronautical Organization in France, 13 June 1917, in Gorrell’s 

History A-23. 

2 The proceedings of the board are in 

Gorrelvs History, A-23. 
108 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

Memorandum for the Chief of 

Staff, US. Expeditionary 

Forces. From: Major‘ Wm. 

Mitchell, Auiation Section, Signal 

corps 

1. Now that the United States 

Militay participation in France is 

assured, it seems to be an opportune moment to consider 

what poky should be adopted 

with respect to the aeronautical 

service. 

2. The opinion is advanced that, 

if a sound policy is adopted to 

begin with, results will follow 

quickly and surely. If, on the 

other hand, a halting policy is 

adopted, the air service will fall 

far short of what it is absolutely 

required to do in modern war. 

The decisive value of this service 

is difficult to appreciate at a distance from the field of militay 

operations. It should be an independent arm as artilley or infantY. 

3. Aeronautical functions divide 

themselves into strategical and 

tactical phases: 

a) The tactical function, basically, is to insure observation for 

the fire and control of our own 

artilley. To accomplish this, airplanes and balloons observe the 

fire while others fight off hostile 

aircraft which attempt to stop it. 

3 In Gorrell s History. A-23 

4 Mitchell had been promoted to Iieutenant colonel effective 15 May 1917 

5 This appendix has been omitted The 

document was published in Mitchell. Memoirs of World War I (New York. 1960). pp 

105-109 An entract appeared in Andrew 

Boyle. Jrenchard (London, 1962), pp 186- 

188 

This kind of air work has been 

done now for three years and is 

well understood. There is attached hereto a copy of the note 

of General Trenchard (commanding British aviation in 

France) on this subject, which 

was written in September 1916, 

and is as sound today as it was 

then (Appendix “A’).5 

b) The strategical phase 

(which has received a vey limited application, but which is 

being seriously considered by all 

belligerents and is not dealt with 

6 This exhibit, which has been omitted 

was dated 6 May 1917 It IS an extract from 

the document on which me Ribt cable was 

based (See Doc 23 for further reference ) 

in General Trenchards note) applies to the air attack of enemy 

material of all kinds behind his 

lines. To be successful, large 

combatant groups of airplanes 

must be organized, separate 

from those directly attached to 

army units. 

(strategical) that the United 

States may aid in the greatest 

way and which, it is believed if 

properly applied will have a 

greater influence on the ultimate 

decision of the war than any 

other one arm. 

4. There is attached hereto the 

French General Staffs request 

for what may be termed strategical aviation units (Exhibit B).6 

The first thing to be determined 

is whether it is to be adopted 

or modified. 

It is with this class of aviation 

............................ (Signed) Wm. Mitchell. 
Mitchell: 

Air Policy 

109 

MaJ. Gen. Sir Hugh Montague Trenchard. General Mca 

Commanding Royal Flying Corps in the Field when the United 

States entered World War 1. (from a drawing by Francla Dodd) 

18- Mitchell: 

AerzonauticaI Orzganization 

13 June 1917 

111 

Memorandum for the Chief of 

Staff, U.S. Expeditionay Force.’ 

From: Major Mitchell, Aviation 

Section, Signal Corps. 

1. United States aeronautical 

participation in France naturally 

divides itself into two classes: 

A. The air squadrons with 

the American units themselves, 

such as the divisions, army corps 

or armies, in accordance with 

the manner in which the army is 

organized and employed. The 

aeronautical units for this service 

will be attached directly to the 

troops in the same way, for instance, as the field and heavy 

artilley are. They always will 

comprise divisional air squadrons and balloon companies, 

and may consist of pursuit and 

bombardment squadrons in addition. Their entire object is to 

facilitate the work of the division, 

corps or army. They should be 

organized progressively. 

B. Based on the theory that 

no decision can be reached on 

the ground before a decision has 

been gained in the air, the 

French General Staff has requested, that in addition to the 

Aviation Units which form a part 

of the American troops coming 

to France, there be organized a 

number of large aeronautical 

groups for strategic operations 

against enemy aircraft and enemy material, at a distance from 

the actual line. These units 

would be bombardment and 

pursuit formations and would 

have an independent mission, 

vey much as independent cavalry used to have, as distinguished from divisional cavaly. 

They would be used to carry the 

war well into the enemy’s 

county. 

............................ 

(Signed): Wm. Mitchell 

L3 

1 In Gorrell s History A-23 

113 

Maj. Townsend F. Dodd, 

who had served with Pershing in Mexico, accompanied 

Pershing to Europe as Aviation Office1 of the AEF. Enroute to Paris he spent several days in London, talking 

with the US. Military Attache, 

Cot. William Lassiter, and 

with various British officials. 

His report on those conversations, submitted to the Chief 

of Staff, AEF on 20 June 

1917, included a note outlining what needed to be done.' 

The Chief of Staff sent 

Dodd's report to the Board of 

Officers, where it was received at the first meeting, on 

21 June 1917. 

Aviation Work 

Necessary for the 

Successful 

Prosecution of the 

War 

The following is a brief synopsis of the most important details 

of aviation work necessary for 

the successful prosecution of the 

war. 

I. The first thing to be determined is the results that the 

American Air Service, in connection with the Allied Air Service 

and the Allied Armies, is to accomplish. 

graph I are briefly as follows: 

acy of the air on the different 

fronts, the major consideration 

being given to the Western 

Front. 

b) The development and 

maintenance of an aerial offensive force that will be able to 

carry the war two hundred or 

more miles behind the German 

lines. This force, when first available might properly be considered for use strictly for the attack 

upon military features, such as 

The results called for by paraa) The unchallenged supremarsenals, factories, railways, etc:. 

but should also be sufficient to 

act as a reprisal agent of such 

destructiveness that the Germans would be forced to stop 

their raids upon Allied cities. 

c) This offensive arm would, 

of course, be of great value on 

and immediately behind the 

German lines in connection with 

land warfare. 

............................ 

Notes 

1 In Gorrell's History. A-23 

20- Churxhill: Liaison 

with A~tille~y 

2lJune1917 

115 

At the first meeting of the 

Board of Officers on 21 June 

1917, Churchill submitted 

two memoranda, one dealing 

with liaison with the artillery, 

and the other concerned with 

air superiority as it affected 

artillery. 1 

Aerial Observation in 

Liaison with 

Artillery. 

Informal notes for the Board 

of Officers convened by Par. 4, 

SO. 11, Hqrs. A.E.F.., June 19, 

1917. 

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 

The basic idea in connection 

with aerial observation in liaison 

with artillery concerns the fact 

that artillery is today partially 

blind and partially impotent 

without efficient aerial observation. 

Such being the case, it is evident that connection between 

the artillery and the air service 

cannot be too close and that 

there must be established a 

complete professional and moral 

liaison between the two arms. 

The aerial observer must be an 

artillery officer, trained in principles governing the conduct of 

fire, and perfectly familiar with 

the capabilities of his own arm; 

but he must live and work with 

his comrades in the Air Service. 

,.............. 

1. In Gonelvs History, A-23 
116 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

Ma). Marlborough Churchill. a Field Artillery 

officer, served on the Board of Officers 

appointed by Gen. Harbord to advise on 

aviation matters. 
117 

Notes to Justify the 

Statement that Military Success Depends 

Upon Superiority in 

the Air.l 

1. If the enemy is master of 

the air, the artillery cannot conquer the grodnd which the infantry is to occupy. 

2. Even though the ground be 

conquered, if the enemy regains 

mastery of the air at the time of 

the attack, the progress of the 

infantry advance cannot be 

known or controlled. In this case 

liaison is lost and success becomes a matter of chance. 

artillery must: 

a) Know, by means of aerial 

reconnaissance and photography: 

3. To conquer the ground, the 

x) the exact nature and location of the enemy’s batteries 

and works; 

cess attained at each period of 

the preparation; 

artillery preparation is finished. 

y) the exact amount of sucz) The moment at which the 

b) Be able to adjust its fire upon 

targets by means of accurate 

information furnished by welltrained aerial observers. 

4. To follow and direct an 

infantry attack, a general must 

maintain liaison by means of low 

flying airplanes. 

5. Without air superiority, the 

artillery is both blind and impotent so far as counter-battery 

and destruction fire are concerned. 

of artillery fire depend upon 

proper identification of targets 

and accurate adjustment. In 

modem war both these are impossible if the mastery of the air 

is not assured. 

7. If the enemy has the mastery of the air his artillery fire, 

known as “counter-battery” and 

“counter-preparation”, will 

make even the launching of an 

attack impossible. 

6. The accuracy and efficiency 

i 

1. In Gonell’s History. A-23. 

119 

The Role OF Auiation 

2 July 1917 

The minutes of the fourth 

meeting of the Board of Officers, held on 29 June 1917, 

state that “Major Parker was 

directed to submit a report on 

the tactical role of aviation.” 

Born in South Carolina in 1872, 

Parker was a graduate of the 

U.S. Military Academy in the 

Class of 1894. He was commissioned in the Infantry but 

soon transferred to the Cavalry. 

He had served as military attache in Latin America, cavalry 

instructor in Cuba, and member 

of the U.S. Cavalry Board, and 

had attended service schools 

in France on three occasions 

before being sent to France as 

a member of the U.S. Military 

Mission in 1916. In April 1917 

he became U.S. liaison officer 

at French General Headquarters. Later he would command 

a brigade and then a division 

in battle in France, and eventually he would retire as a major general. 

Parker’s wife, Katherine, was 

the daughter of Frank S. Lahm, 

the American aviation enthusiast who had resided in Paris 

for many years, and the sister 

of Frank P. Lahm, a U.S. cavalry officer who had won the 

James Gordon Bennett International Balloon Race in 1906, 

and had been the first U.S. 

Army officer to fly in a Wright 

airplane. At the beginning of 

July 1917, Frank P. Lahm was 

a major in charge of the Aviation Section’s balloon school at 

Omaha, Nebraska. 

The proceedings of the 

Board of Officers state that, “A 

report was read by Major Parker on the role and distribution 

of tactical units . . .,” at the fifth 

meeting, on 2 July 1917. Parker’s report,’ which became 

Exhibit N to the board’s proceedings, and which is printed 

below, is interesting not only 

for its ideas on the role of 

airpower but also because its 

authorship generally has been 

attributed to another officer. 

With a new title, “General Principles Underlying the Use of 

the Air Service in the Zone of 

Advance, A.E.F.,” and with 

only a few minor changes in 

the text, the report submitted 

by Parker was published in a 

Bulletin of the Information Section, Air Service, A.E. F., with a 

preface attributed to “Wm. 

Mitchell, Lt. Col., AS., S.C., 

A.C.A.”* (see Doc. 35). Thus 

Parker’s report became Mitchell’s “General Principles.”3 

The Role and Tactical 

and Strategical Em,- 

ployment of Aeronautics in an Army. 

ROLE. 

Military Aeronautics comprise 

all means of aerial activity which 

an Army employs to assist it in 

obtaining victory. 

Military Aeronautics are divided into: 

A. Aviation, or heavier than air 

formations. 

B. Aerostation, or lighter than air 

formations. 

A. AVIATION. 

Aviation is divided into two 

general classes: 

1. TACTICAL AVIATION, or that 

acting in the immediate vicinity 

or directly attached to organizations of troops of all arms. 

11. STRATEGICAL AVIATICIN, 

or that acting far from troops of 

other arms and having an independent mission. 

1 In Gorrell s History A-23 

2 A C A was the abbreviation for Air 

Commander Advance 

3 Primary and secondary sources seen by 

the editor do not indicate what contributions if any were made by Mitchell or otters in the preparation of the report assigned 

to and Submitted by, Parker 
120 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

I. Tactical Auiation. 

The object of tactical auiation 

is to assist troops in combat. All 

aviation elements themselves 

must be ready to fight to accomplish their mission. 

Tactical aviation consists of 

A. Observation aviation 

B. Pursuit aviation 

C. Tactical bombardment auiation. 

A. OBSERVATION AVIATION is carried on essentially by 

division squadron^.^ 

OBSERVATION AVIATION 

consists in: 

1. Reconnaissance by eye 

and by photograph of the enemy's positions and works of all 

sorts, and the results of all attacks against them. 

2. The adjustment of artilley fire. 

3. Keeping superior command in liaison with the infanty 

during attacks by means of wireless, optical signals and 

B. PURSUIT AVIATION is 

carried out by pursuit squadrons 

whose primary object is offensive combat. The mastery of the 

air is obtained by air battles. 

4. The Bulletin (Vol 111. No 132, 30 April 

1918) says: ". . . by observation squadrons." 

5 Bulletin: by means of electrical and 

physical means. 

6. Bulletin: The object of strategical aviaton is to destroy the means of supply of an enemy army. . . . 

7 Bulletin: The organizatons for this purcase . . are: . . 

PURSUIT AVIATION consists in: 

aeronautical materiel and personnel by combat in the air. 

tacking enemy personnel and 

material on the ground. 

These operate to prevent observation on the part of enemy 

aeronautical elements, to prevent hostile air incursions into 

friendly territory and to create a 

diversion against hostile elements. 

C. TACTICAL BOMBARDMENT AVIATION is carried out 

within about 25,000 yards of the 

line or roughly within the extreme zone of long-range artilley. 

1. Destruction of enemy 

2. Creating diversions by atIts object is: 

1. To assist in the destruction of enemy materiel of all 

sorts; 

nel both during the day and 

night, so as to undermine their 

morale. 

3. To attack hostile aerodromes so as to force hostile 

airplanes to arise and accept 

corn bat. 

2. To attack hostile person8 Bulletin accept combat to carry 

out long-distance reconnaissance and to 

attack personnel and material on the 

ground by gun-fire 

9 In the Bulletin was inserted an additional unnumbered paragraph Bombing IS 

carried on in the day-time primarily for reconnaissance It IS carried on at night for 

deStNCtiOn 

11. Stmtegical Aviation. 

The mission of strategical 

auiation is independent. 

Strategical aviation consists in 

attacking enemy elements, whatever their nature, at a distance 

usually more than 25,000 yards 

from friendly troops. 

The object is to attack the 

supply of an enemy army,6 

thereby preventing it from employing all its means of combat. 

This may be accomplished by: 

1. Destroying enemy aircrafts, air depots and defensive 

air organization. 

pots, factories, lines of communications and personnel. 

The organization for this purpose whose role is entirely offensive and whose radius of action 

extends beyond that of tactical 

aviation, should be:' 

1. Pursuit squadrons for 

fighting enemy aircraft. 

2. Day-bombardment 

squadrons for bombing enemy 

aerodromes to make hostile airplanes rise and accept combat, 

and to cany out long-distance 

reconnaissances.s 

3. Night-bombardment 

squadrons for destroying enemy 

elements and lines of communications? 

2. Destroying enemy de- 
Parker: The Role 

of Aviation 

121 

B. AEROSTATION. 

Of: 

AERONAUTIC UNITS consist 

1. Observation balloons. 

2. Dirigible balloons (these 

are not being considered at present in connection with U.S. Aeronautics in France). 

3. Observation balloons, 

from'O an elevated fixed station 

from which powerful glasses 

may be used and constant communication maintained by telephone with the earth. 

They are used for: 

ley. 

1. Adjustment of fire of artil2. Observation of combats. 

3. Observation of elements 

in and behind hostile lines. 

Airplanes and balloons have 

closely related missions and are 

therefore placed under one direction. 

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT. 

The method of operation and 

tactical handling of air forces 

with divisions," army corps, armies and groups of armies is 

prescribed from time to time in 

orders,12 for instance see Annex 

11, Regulations concerning a 

General Offensive, dated December 16, 1916 (French). ............................ 

Observation balloon. 

10 There may have been a typographical 

error in the original or in the copy included 

in Gorrelrs History In the Bulletin the word 

IS "form " 

11 In the Bulletin, "divisions" was omitted. 

12 In me Bulletin, the remainder of the 

sentence was omitted 
122 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

Capt. Joseph E. Carberry 

served M the recorder 

for the Board of 

Officenu. 
23. BOUR~ OF OFF~C~RS: 

Recom m enaations 

4July 1917 

123 

A draft of the proceedings 

of the Board of Officers was 

presented at the sixth meeting, on 3 July, for revision. 

The following day a revision 

was approved, and the board 

adjourned, sine die. 

Recommendations' 

The Board believes that it is 

now a cardinal principle in warfare that a decision in the air 

must be sought and obtained 

before a decision on the ground 

can be reached. Absolute and 

unchallenged superiority in the 

air can perhaps never be attained although possibly it may 

be attained for short periods of 

time; but experience of three 

years' war has amply shown that 

the side which can at critical 

times dominate the enemy in the 

air has taken the first, if not the 

vital, step toward victory. 

As a preliminary to the study 

of the specific recommendations 

which follow, the board recommends most strongly a careful 

study of Exhibit N,2 a memorandum outlining the role of aviation in modem war, with specific 

reference to the problem now 

awaiting solution in France. 

Proceeding to the specific recommendations required, the 

Board was ordered to report on 

the following, which it will discuss in order, concluding the entire proceedings with a series of 

proposed steps on which action 

is most strongly urged, to the 

end that the recommendations 

herein contained may receive 

prompt attention: 

The board was required to 

make recommendations on the 

following: 

(a) A complete aviation project for the US. Army in France. 

(b) The complete organization 

of the air service, including the 

manufacture and supply of 

equipment. 

(c) The establishment of depots, repair shops and parks. 

(d) The establishment of 

schools. 

(el The distribution of tactical 

units and their duties. 

An aviation project will embrace two phases of air development, strategical and tactical 

(See exhibit N). 

STRATEGICAL AVIATION. 

Based on the letter of the 

French Commander-in-Chief to 

the Minister of War, May 6, 

1917 (See Exhibit H)3 which 

states that the United States 

should aim to fumish 30 groups 

of 6 squadrons (pursuit), and 30 

groups of 6 squadrons (bombardment). 

cers and men required for this 

project is 20,000 Officers and 

110,000 Men. 

The estimated number of offiTACTICAL AVIATION. 

The tactical development will 

follow the development of the 

American land forces in Europe, 

and the personnel required to 

carry out this program can be 

calculated from the proposed tables of organization (Exhibit 

For each Army Corps there 

should be 141 officers and 1340 

men. 

Corps, this means 

On the basis of 10 Army 

1,410 Officers 

13,400 Men 

The total air personnel wiiu approximate 23,000 Officers and 

125,000 Men. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1 In Gorrell's History. A-23 

2 Exhibit N was Parker s report on the 

3 Omitted 

4 Omitted 

role of aviation (see Doc 22) 

24- Duties OF the 

Chiq OF A~R SeRuice 

5 July 1917 

125 

On 30 June Mitchell replaced 

Dodd as Aviation Officer. The 

duties of the position, which 

were to be changed to Chief of 

Air Service, were set forth in a 

general order assigning duties 

to the various staff officers of 

Headquarters AEF. The Headquarters had two major divisions, the General Staff, and 

the Administrative and Technical Staff, with the Chief of Air 

Service being in the latter. 

Headquarters, A.E.F. 

France, July 5, 1917. 

General Orders, 

No. 8. 

The tables hereto attached 

show the present distribution of 

staff duties of the Headquarters 

of the American Expeditionary 

Forces. . . . The distribution of staff duties 

in the headquarters of divisions, 

army corps and other commands subordinate to these 

headquarters will conform in 

principle to the distribution of 

duties shown in these tables. 

............................ 

By command of 

Major General Pershing: 

James G. Harbord, 

Lieut. Col. Geneml Staff, 

Chief of Staff 

Table IV. 

Technical and Administrative 

Seru ices 

(Air Sewicel 

Aviation and aero station 

Enlisted and commissioned personnel of ,iviation 

units. 

Material 

Organhation. 

Instruction 

Aerial reconnaissance obsewation and pt,otograAerial combat and bombing. 

Etc.. etc.' 

phy. 

1 The second fifth. and eighth items 

were dropped and a new one-Airplanes 

and balloons-was added at the beginning 

when the duties were revised in G 0 31 16 

February 1918 at the time Services of Supply was established with jurisdictlon over 

the administrative and technical Services Of 

the AEF 

25, 59-Squac)~on Plan 

loJuly 1917 

127 

On 10 July 1917 Pershing 

forwarded to Washington a 

plan for the tactical organization of the AEF.' Known as 

the General Organization 

Project (GOP), this plan had 

been developed jointly by the 

Operatioiis Section of his 

headquarters and a board of 

officers, headed by Col. 

Chauncey Baker, sent to 

France by the War Department to look into matters relating to the organization, armament, and equipment of 

troops. In the GOP, which 

was based on an army of 

about 1,000,000 men, aviation units were assigned to 

the army and to each of the 

army's corps but not to divisions.* The total number of 

aero squadrons in the GOP 

was 59, of which 39 were observation, 15 pursuit, and 5 

bombardment (see Appendix 

B). Following are extracts 

from the GOP.3 

1 The transmittal was dated 10 July. but 

the memorandum by which Pershing formally approved the project was dated 11 

July. 

2 In the AEF the infantry was organized 

into platoons of 58 men (commanded by a 

lieutenant), with 4 platoons to a company 

(captain). 4 companies to a battalion (malor). 3 battalions and a machinegun company to a regiment (colonel), and 2 regiments and a machinegun battalion to a 

brigade (brigadier general), the other arms 

being organized in a similar fashion. Two 

brigades of infantv and one of field attillery. 

Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, Office of 

the Chief of Staff, 

Operations Section 

REPORT ON 

ORGANIZATION 

(Modifications resulting from 

general conference included 

herein. )5 

1. BASIS OF STUDY 

In preparing the attached tables of organizations the Operations Section has considered the 

provisional organization prescribed for the first division ordered to France, definite projects 

presented by the French Army, 

Headquarters and British Army 

Headquarters in France, and has 

taken as the basis of the study a 

total force of about 1,000,000 

men in France. This force includes not only the combat elements, but also those necessary 

to main these combat forces. 

July 10, 1917. 

............................ 

plus engineer. signal. and other troops. constituted a division (major general). In the 

GOP the army was organized into five cops 

(major general), each with four divisions 

(major general). 

3. In Gonell's History. A-23, also A-7. 

4. The staff committee on organization 

Consisted of Lt. Cot Fox Conner. Maj Hugh 

A. Drum, and Ma). Alvin B Barber 

5 This was a conference of members of 

Headquarters AEF and members of the 

Baker Board 

F. C. 

H. A. D. 

A. B. B.4 

A force consisting of about 

one million men has been taken 

as a basis for the following 

reasons: 

(a) A thorough study of the 

subject of organization could not 

be made without considering a 

balanced force, complete in all 

the weapons and services essential to modern war. 

(b) An Army is the smallest 

unit fulfilling the conditions included in -a-. 

(c) The operations of the 

American forces in France must, 

for many reasons not discussed 

herein, include offensive action 

on a large scale. To carry this 
128 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

action out on a front sufficient to 

produce results commensurate 

with the endeavor, there must 

be available 20 combat divisions 

for the operations. 

(d) With 20 combat divisions 

as a basis, the Corps and Army 

troops and necessary Line of 

Communications troops were 

determined. 

It is evident that a force of 

about one million is the smallest 

unit which in modem war will be 

a complete, well balanced, and 

independent fighting organization. However, it must be 

equally clear that the adoption of 

this size force as a basis of study 

should not be construed as representing the maximum force 

which should be sent to, or 

which will be needed in France. 

It is taken as the force which 

may be expected to reach 

France in time for an offensive in 

1918 and as a unit and basis of 

organization. Plans for the future 

should be based, especially in 

reference to the manufacture 

etc. of artillery, auiation and 

other material, on three times 

this force, i.e. at least three million men. Such a program of 

construction should be completed within two years. ........................ .... 
59-Squadron Plan 129 

Table I11 

A Corps (4 Combat and2 

Replacement Divisions.) 

Approximate 

Strength 

Headquarters 350 

Combat husions 100.000 

Replacement Diusions 44.528 

Corps Troops 

...................... 

Aviation Troops. 

1 Comdr. & Staff 

2 Squadrons (Pursuit) 

3 Squadrons (Art. Sewice) 

1 Section, Photographic 

1 Secbon Meteorologic 

1 Aviation Park Co 

3 Balloon Cos. 

... 

15 

350 

500 

150 

150 

104 

468 

Table IV. 

Army Headquarters and Army Troops. 

Approximate Strength 

Headquarters Commander, Staff and Hq. Details to be subject to 

future study 

150 

.......................................................... 

Aviation 1 Commander and Staff 1.600 

5 Squadrons-pursuit 

5 Squadrons-Bombardment 

24 Balloon Cos 

24 Squadrons Artilley of Amy 

Service with heayr 

2 Sections. meteorological 30Cl 3 Sections. photographic 

16 Park companies 1.000 .......................................................... 

............................ 

~___ 

_rl -- 

26 Boiling Repo~f 

15 August 1917 

131 

Maj. Raynal C. Bolling, a 

New York corporation lawyer 

who had organized the first 

aero squadron in the National Guard, was sent to Europe by the War Department 

in June 1917 with a group of 

military and civilian engineers and technicians to 

gather information for the 

production of airplanes and 

other aeronautical equipment. His report, like that of 

the Board of Officers, advocated an air force of fighting 

and bombing planes over 

and beyond the aviation that 

would be assigned to the various elements of the ground 

forces. In bombardment, 

Bol I i ng between operations conducted 

during the day and those carried out at night, as is indicated in the following extract 

from his report.’ 

d i sting u i s h ed 

45, Avenue Montaigne, Paris, 

France. 

August 15, 1917. 

FROM: Major R. C. Bolling, 

S. 0. R. C. 

TO: Chief Signal Officer 

of the Army, Washington, D.C. 

SUBJECT Report of Aeronautical Commission. 

1. The Aeronautical Commission 

under my charge left New York 

on the steamship “Adriatic” 

June 17, 1917, landed at Liverpool June 26, 1917, proceeded 

to London, remained there 

about a week, proceeded to 

France and to Paris, remained 

there about two weeks, proceeded thence to Italy, remained 

there about ten days, returned to 

Paris and remained there about 

ten days. Thereafter the party 

was divided according to new 

instructions and duties. . . . 

C. American Production 

Program. 

There is general agreement 

here in the opinion we have 

formed concerning the governing principle for our American 

production program. That opinion is as follows: 

First:-The United States must 

provide itself with all airplanes 

and engines required for training 

............................ 

purposes in America. 

Second. The United States, 

must next provide the airplanes 

and engines necessary for use 

strictly in connection with the 

operation of American Force:; in 

the field. . . . Third. After these first two 

considerations comes the American program of putting into the 

field next year air forces in excess of the tactical requirements 

of its Army in France. It is greatly 

desired that the United States 

shall do this. Such air forces 

should consist of fighting airplanes and bombers. The fighting airplanes are divided into 

two classes: 

(a) Airplanes with fixed engines. 

(b) Airplanes with rotary engines. 

Both types appear to be essential. We all hold the opinion that 

the rotary engine is much less, 

reliable and has much less length 

of service than the stationary engine; but for certain purposes it 

appears to be indispensable. The 

bombing airplanes may be divided into day and night bombers. 

Day bombing presents muc h 

greater difficulties than night 

bombing because it cannot be 

conducted successfully by slow 

1 In Gorrells Hstory. 1-1. Pp 60-88 
132 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

machines with great bomb canying capacity, if the enemy have 

in the air any number of fast 

fighting machines or have great 

numbers of anti-aircraft guns effective at great altitudes. If it 

should be possible to drive from 

the air practically all the enemy 

fighting machines, day-bombing 

would become much more effective. Night bombing permits 

to [?I use large airplanes without 

great speeds but with great 

bomb-carying capacity. There is 

practically no effective means of 

preventing night-bombing. 

Therefore, its possibilities appear 

to depend almost entirely on the 

number of suitable airplanes 

which can be provided. From 

the militay standpoint these 

possibilities are vey great and 

extremely important. Could 

night bombing be conducted on 

a sufficiently great scale and kept 

up continuously for a sufficient 

time, there seems good reason 

to believe that it might determine 

the whole outcome of military 
Bdling Report 

15 August 1917 

133 

operations. Up to the present 

time, the trouble seems to have 

been that all bombing has been 

carried on intermittently and 

sporadically because of the lack 

of attention to the subject and 

provision for large enough numbers of the right kind of airplanes. In this connection, it may 

be well to compare the situation 

with artillery bombardment. 

While I speak with some diffidence on such a subject, all I 

have been able to leam indicates 

that intermittent and sporadic artillery bombardment produces 

but small results notwithstanding 

the great size and accuracy of 

modem bombardment artillery. 

When definite and important 

results are desired, artillery bombardment must be made systematic and continuous and tremendous quantities of high explosives must be used on the selected objectives. This seems to 

be exactly the situation which 

exists with respect to airplane 

bombardment. There seems every reason to believe that it can 

be made of vital importance if 

very great numbers of airplanes 

carrying great size and numbers 

of bombs can be provided and 

used continuously and systematically. 

To determine the proportion 

of airplanes of different types for 

United States production we 

have recommended the following rough method of calculation 

which seems to give results that 

check up pretty well with the 

views over here: First deduct 

from the total number of airplanes it is considered possible 

to produce the number required 

for use in direct connection with 

the military forces. That number 

can only be determined where it 

is known what will be the sue of 

the military forces at any given 

time and that number varies 

only in proportion to the size of 

the forces. By this deduction 

having obtained the number of 

airplanes within your capacity of 

production which can be used 

independently of United States 

military forces, we recommend 

that this number be apportioned 

as follows: About thirty seven 

and a half percent should be 

fighting airplanes divided equally 

between fixed and rotary engine 

fighters. About twenty five percent should be day bombers and 

about thirty seven and a half 

percent should be night bombers. Of course, it is impossible to 

establish any proportions which 

are likely to be entirely correct 

because it is impossible to tell 

what will be the air conditions at 

any given portion of the front at 

any given time. For example, the 

enemy may have a larger or 

smaller number of fast fighting 

machines requiring that we have 

a larger or smaller number of 

these mathines and permitting 

our use of a smaller number of 

day bombing machines. ............................ 

27,260-Squaa~or-2 

PJan 

1(3 SeptembeR 1917 

135 

Although the GOP (Doc. 

25) included troops for the 

Service of the Rear (later, 

Line crf Communications, still 

later, Services of Supply),’ it 

did not indicate what kinds of 

troops would be needed or 

how they were to be organized. These details were provided in September 1917 by 

the Service of the Rear Project (SORP). Headquarters 

AEF used the SORP to add 

201 aero squadrons for strategic aviation, which had 

been omitted from the GOP. 

This was done to bring AEF 

planning more into line with 

production plans made in the 

United States following the 

receipt of the Ribot cable 

(see Doc. 16). With the addition of 201 squadrons to the 

59 in the GOP, the total went 

up to 260: 120 pursuit, 80 

observation, and 60 bombardment. Extracts from the G.H.Q., and L. of C. troops. 

SORP, approved by Pershing The total estimated strength. of 

on 18 September 191 7, are this force, including service of 

printed below.* the rear and L. of C. troops, was 

given in Table 2, G.O.P., as 

L,R.E, about 1,100,000 men. It is now 

S,H, found that the following modifiA,B,B,~ cations in this estimate must be 

made: 

(a) The forward services (are to 

be increased by 55,590 men, of 

which 6,560 signal troops are to 

be added to the total strength of 

the 30 infantry divisions, 1,038 

ordnance Dersonnel are to be 

Headquarters American Expeditionav Forces* Office Of 

the Chief of Staff, 

Operations Section 

September 69 1917. 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

Subject: Services of the Rear 

and Lines of Communication. 

letter, dated July 10, 1917, 

transmitting to the War Department the A.E.F. General Organization Project (G.O.P.) states, in 

paragraph 3, “Recommendations as to Lines of Communication troops will be submitted 

later.” 

Chief of Staff 

1. The Commander in Chiefs 

............................ 

4. The basis of the projects 

submitted herewith is identical 

with that of the G.O.P., i.e., a 

force of 20 fighting and 10 replacement (base and training) 

divisions with Corps, Army, 

added to the army troops and 

47,992 aviation personnel are to 

be added to the Army troops. 

The increase in the divisional 

signal troops is necessary on account of the adopted signal 

corps personnel for infantry regiments. The increased ordnance 

personnel is due to the inatlequacy in the G.O.P. estimate. 

The addition to the aviation personnel consists of strategical 

units, all of which are not strictly 

necessary for the American 

1 TI ese des ynations apparently ate cot 

rect altl>obyli dn s often was added to 

Servce n SOR and to Line n LOC and 

dro~pec lrom Serv ce m SOS 

2 in Gottell 5 hstory A 23 also A 12 

3 Col Le Foy Elt8nye Lt Col Stuart heln 

Lelman and Lt Col Alv n E Barber 
136 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

~~ ~ 

forces herein considered . but are 

to be used on the fronts'occupied by our Allies as well as on 

our own . It is necessay. howTotals for Aeronautics . Front.-T acncal 

ever. to consider them in prepar- 5 corps ............................................................ 

ing a project for the senrice of 

the rear and in 

shipping program . With the 

A~Y .............................................................. 

Total Tactical-aU recommended by A.E.F. organization 

Project of July 11, 1917, except 

13 Park Cos . of strength 

of 1352 

Front-Sbateglcal . 41 Observation Squadrons ............................................ 

105 Pursuit Squadrons .............................................. 

55 Bombardment Squadrons .......................................... 

15 Balloon Companies .............................................. 

a 

73 Park Companies .................................................. 

Total Personnel ...................................................... 

Rear 

Hq . Air Service L . of C ........................ Research . Finance, Purchase, Inspection and Provision of Personnel ........ 

Training and Replacement ............................................ 

Repair and Salvage .................................................. 

Housing of Material and Personnel .................................... 

Reserve of Mechanics, etc ....................... 

Supply and Assembly ................................................ 

3 Port Depots x 104 3 Port Balloon Companies x 208 ...................................... 

................................................ 

Recapltulatlon 

Total Strength-Tactical .............................................. 

Total Strength-Strategical ............................................ 

Total Strength-% rvice of Rear ........................................ 

Grand Total ........................................................ 

Total Service Planes-exclusive of Training and Replacement Planes ........ 

Total Balloons-exclusive of Training and Replacement Balloons .......... 

Total Personnel 

8. 255 15.123 

23.378 

7.093 

18.165 

10.670 

3.120 

7.592 

46.640 

50 

295 24.066 

10.400 

2.600 

12.272 

5.200 

312 

624 

55.819 

23.378 

46.640 

55.819 

125.837 

4.680 57 in Eervre 

87 spare . 
260-Squadron 

Plan 

137 

above additions the total of divisional, corps, army and G.H.Q. 

troops, including base and training divisions, amounts to 908,- 

795 men. This figure includes 

the noncombatant organizations 

pertaining to divisions, corps and 

armies. 

.............. 

Kirby Walker 

Lt. Col. Cav., 

Acting Chief of Section 

28. Cornman6 in 

the Zone OF A6uance 

10 October2 1917 

139 

In August 1917 the activities of the Air Service, AEF 

were divided between the 

Zone of Interior, where Col. 

R. C. Bolling was placed in 

charge, and the Zone of Advance, where Col. William 

Mitchell was placed in command. About the same time, 

Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly 

was named Chief of Air Service, AEF. Mitchell’s authority 

was outlined in the following 

order. 

Headquarters, A.E.F. 

France, October 10, 1917. 

General Orders 

No. 46. 

............................ 

11. 1. Under the direction of the 

Chief of Air Service, all Air Service units and personnel serving 

in the Zone of Advance are 

placed under the command of 

the Air Commander, Zone of 

Advance, who is charged with 

their proper administration, instruction, discipline and employment. 

2. Command of the Air 

Service, Zone of the Advance, 

includes: 

Tactical Air Units, assigned to 

armies and corps. 

(a) Formation and equipment of units formed in the Zone 

of the Advance. 

(b) Technical supervision 

and inspection. 

(c) Supervision of tactical 

employment. 

(d) Supervision of instruction in the Zone of the Advance. 

Strategical Air Units not assigned 

to armies and corps but attached 

directly to these headquarters. 

(a) Formation and equipment of units formed in the Zone 

of the Advance. 

(b) Tactical employment. 

(c) Technical inspeciion. 

(d) Instruction in the 

Zone of the Advance. 

Air Depots and Parks in Zone of 

the Advance. 

(a) Technical supervision 

and inspection. 

Air Schools in Zone of the fidvance. 

tion. 

Liaison With the Air Services of 

Allied Armies. 

This liaison is to be maintained under the direction of the 

Chief of Air Service by means of 

liaison officers detailed at the request of the Commander iri 

Chief. 

(a) Supervision of injtruc- 

............................ 

By command of 

General Pershing: 

James G. Harbord. 

Brigadier General, 

Chief of Staff. 

I‘ 
On behalf of the British Government. Gen. Sir D. Henderson. 

K.C.B.. decorates Col. Edgar S. Gonell with the “Companion of 

the Diotinguished Service Order.” 
29- GorzrzeJJ: Strzategical 

Born barzarnent 

2s NouernbeR 1917 

141 

When Maj. Edgar S. Gorrelll became Chief of the 

Technical Section, Air Service, AEF, on 15 August 1917, 

he became responsible for 

initiating purchases for all 

kinds of equipment and supplies that the Air Service 

would need during the following year. Investigating 

and attempting to anticipate 

requirements of materiel for 

bombing operations, he 

made a study of the bombardment situation and from 

that formulated a bombardment plan for the Air Service, 

AEF. That plan, printed below,* was to be characterized 

many years later by Maj. Gen. 

Laurence S. Kuter of the U.S. 

Army Air Forces as the “earliest, clearest and least known 

statement of the American 

conception of the employment of air power.3 

Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. 

Foulois, who became Chief 

of Air Service, AEF on 27 November, not only approved 

the plan but made Gorrell, 

who had been promoted to 

lieutenant colonel, the head 

of Strategical Aviation, Zone 

of Advance, AEF. As events 

developed, however, Gorr el 1’s bombardment plan 

could not be carried out. 

Gorrell explained why in the 

1 For biographical data see the Introduction 

2 In Gorrell s History. B-6. pp 373-390 

3 Kuter. Air Power-The American Concept. [c 1943.1 photostat of typewritten copy 

In AFSHRC 167 6-50 

to the first volume in this serles 

“Early History of the Strategical Section” which he wrote 

in January 1919 as part of the 

“History of the Air Service, 

AEF.”4 Extracts from the history of the section are presented below as a sequel to 

the plan. 

A. Plan 

I. Introduction. 

(a) Three and a half years of 

War finds us in a position in 

which movement either by land 

or by sea is rendered vastly difficult and expensive. On the sea 

the Allies’ superiority keeps the 

Central Power’s above-water 

ships inactive, while on land, 

where Allied and enemy trench 

systems face each other from sea 

to boundary on the western 

front, movement can only be 

obtained over short distances by 

vast concentration of artillery, 

without which the infantry cannot advance. The speed with 

which the infanty can advance 

is determined by the speed of 

movement of the artillery, and 

even a minor operation demands a heavy toll of life and 

material. 

If the conduct of the War is to 

be seriously affected in the near 

future, a new policy of attacking 

the enemy must be adopted. 

4 The history of the Strategical Section IS in 

Gorrell’s History. 56. pp 371401. 

(b) Apparently both the Allies 

and the Germans have begun at 

the same time to conceive of the 

immense importance of aerial 

bombing, and we find in all 

countries, both Allied and German, the conception of the immensity of such a problem and 

the beginning of a preparation 

for a bombing campaign. Judging from our own knowledge of 

what the Allied countries are 

doing and from the report of 

Allied spies in the German tc!rritoy, the Allies are far behind the 

Germans at the present moment 

in preparation for next year’s 

bombing campaign. We constantly receive reports from our 

spies and agents in the German 

territory, indicating an increase 

in the size of many German factories-to be specific, indicating 

that about 25 German airplane 

factories have extended and increased facilities for output and 

increased number of employees-and our information even 

goes to show that portions of the 

Zeppelin Works have been prepared to build bombing airplanes. It is certain that Germany 

is concentrating on the manufacture of the Gotha airplane, tl3 be 
142 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

Germany’s Gotha bomber. 

supplemented by pursuit airplanes. The recent activities of 

the German forces in bombdropping, especially by night, 

have been an indication of her 

probable use of these bombdropping airplanes next year; 

and the bombs which she is now 

using have also been an indication of the type of bomb she will 

attempt to drop upon the Allied 

forces. 

(c) The German Lines are so 

situated that bomb-dropping is a 

very easy problem for the German forces, compared with 

bomb-dropping for the Allied 

forces; and judging by the character of the airplanes Germany is 

building for bomb-dropping, together with the realization both 

sides have apparently come tonamely that to affect the armies 

in the fields it is necessary to 

affect the manufacturing output 

of the countries-we can readily 

see that next spring and next 

summer the Allies will be visited 

by bomb-dropping airplanes, 

both by day and by night and 

will be confronted with the enemy’s superiority in the air and 

with a bomb-dropping campaign 

against them that will tend to 

wreck their commercial centers, 

to say nothing of the moral effect 

of such bomb-dropping against 

the inhabitants of the Allied 

countries. 

(d) This scheme which Germany is apparently talking of inflicting upon the Allies is the 

same as the Allies have recently 

been talking of inflicting upon 

Germany; but the difference between the two is simply that the 

German words are being rapidly 

turned to deeds, while the words 

of the Allies lack deeds to back 

them. Therefore, it becomes of 

paramount importance that we 

adopt at once a bombing project 

to be immediately put into force 

and carried out with all vigor at 

the quickest possible moment, in 

order that we may not only 

wreck Germany’s manufacturing 

centers but wreck them more 

completely than she will wreck 

ours next year. 

(e) German shells are being 

fired at Allied troops and positions over a large area of the 

Front; but the manufacture of 

these shells is dependent upon 

the output of a few specific, wellknown factories turning out the 

chemicals for them, so we can 
Gorrell: Strategical 

Bombardment 

143 

readily see that if the chemical 

factories can be blown up, the 

shell output will cease, to a 

greater or lesser degree dependent upon the damage done 

these chemical plants. The same 

is true of airplane output; the 

large Mercedes engine plants 

and the Bosch magneto factories 

are located in the same city, and 

if bombing airplanes raid this city 

of Stuttgart and can inflict damage on one or both of these 

plants, the output of German 

airplanes will cease in proportion 

to the damage done. 

(f) Many of these points could 

be gone into at length, but it is 

not necessay here for the advantages of bombing manufacturing centers is recognized without debate. 

11. Division of bomb-dropPing. 

(a) Aerial bomb-dropping is 

divided essentially into two 

classes, tactical and strategical. 

(b) Tactical bomb-dropping is 

becoming better known every 

day as the War goes on; and the 

results obtained by the HandleyPage squadrons in the vicinity of 

Dunkerque, as well as the bombardment against Dunkerque by 

the Germans, have more than 

indicated that wonderful results 

could be accomplished along 

tactical lines, should aerial 

bomb-dropping be really carried 

out in a manner which some of 

its ardent advocates have urged 

for a long time. The necessity for 

tactical bomb-dropping is evident and will come about as 

such a matter of course that it is 

not treated in this paper since 

the idea of this paper is solely 

that of strategical bombing 

against commercial centers and 

lines of communications, with a 

view to causing the cessation of 

supplies to the German Front. 

(c) By strategical bomb-dropping is meant, in the larger sense 

of the word, bomb-dropping 

against the commercial centers 

of Germany. An army may be 

compared to a drill. The point of 

the drill must be strong and must 

stand up and bear the brunt of 

the much hard work with which 

it comes into contact; but unless 

the shank of the drill is strong 

and continually reinforcing the 

point, the drill will break. So with 

the nation in a war of these 

days, the army is like the point 

of the drill and must bear the 

brunt of constant conflict with 

foreign obstacles; but unless the 

nation-which represents the 

shank of the drill-constantly 

stands behind and supplies the 

necessary aid to the point, the 

drill will break and the nation will 

fall. The object of strategical 

bombing is to drop aerial bombs 

upon the commercial centers 

and the lines of communications 

in such quantities as will wreck 

the points aimed at and cut off 

the necessary supplies without 

which the armies in the field 

cannot exist. 

(d) When we come to analyze 

the targets, we find that there are 

a few certain indispensable targets without which Germany 

cannot carry on the war. 

111. German targets to be! 

attacked. 

(a) The first question to consider in an air offensive against 

German industrial towns is the 

question of objectives, and these 

can be divided into four main1 

groups, following the general division made by English experts 

on this same subject. 

(b) The first, or Northerly 

group, comprises such towns as 

Dusseldorf, Crefeld, Elberfeld., 

Essen, and other German towns 

grouped in their vicinity. For 

short this may be called the 

Dusseldorf group. 

lection of objectives, the center 

of which may be taken as Cologne. This we will call the 

Cologne group. 

(d) The third and most important group comprises Mannheim 

and Ludwigshafen and also thie 

manufacturing industries in the 

vicinity of Frankfurt, such as the 

Meister-Luciuc Works at 

Hoechst, and the Casella Works 

on the far side of Frankfurt. This 

we will call the Mannheim 

group. 

(e) With the forces which the 

Allies will have available during 

the spring and summer of 1918, 

it is not wise to operate further 

south along the Rhine than tho 

Mannheim group, except to 

make feints and infrequent raids 

against Karlsruhe and Rastadt. 

(f) A fourth group of targets 

enter as a part of a logical 

scheme for destroying German 

(c) The second group is a col- 

Gorrell: Strategical 

Bombardment 

145 

ammunition works and these 

have special value for the reason 

that on days, such as often occur, when weather conditions 

prevent the airplanes from 

reaching targets in the Rhine 

Valley, bomb-dropping raids can 

nevertheless be made against 

targets in this fourth group; We 

will call this fourth group the 

Saar Valley group, which comprises the numerous steel works 

of this Valley. 

IV. Base of operation 

(a) Having chosen, as generally outlined above, the German 

objectives it becomes necessary 

to consider from what bases they 

are to be attacked. Two large 

bases have been used in the 

past; one from the Ostende region, the other from the region 

in the vicinity of Toul. These two 

may be compared as follows: 

(b) If the Ostende region is to 

be taken as a base or center of 

our operations, the following disadvantages will have to be considered. These disadvantages are 

inherent in the terrain and cannot be removed. Although it is 

true that the first two groupsnamely the Dusseldorf and the 

Cologne groups-may be attacked from the Ostende base 

nearly as easily as from the Toul 

base, yet the other groups will 

be entirely out of the question. 

Furthermore, the Germans will 

be entirely aware of these facts 

and therefore, for the purpose of 

defense, they will know the limitations of the chosen objectives 

of each and every one of the 

raids that we may attempt to 

make; whereas in operating from 

the Verdun-Toul base, the Germans will never know for what 

particular objective the raid is 

intended and hence must be 

proportionately extravagent of 

airplanes for defensive purposes. 

Furthermore, such concentration 

of airplanes as Germany effects 

for defensive purposes against 

our strategical bomb-dropping 

raids, means the subtraction of 

this number from her airplanes 

in tactical use over our Front. 

The following figures roughly 

show the distances involved and 

the advantages of choosing a 

base: 

tage against the Ostende base, 

and that is the disadvantage inherent in weather conditions. 

Past records show that there are 

only a certain number of days, 

very far apart, on which it is 

possible to raid at the distances 

which are involved in reaching 

(c) There is another disadvanthe first three groups of targets 

mentioned: British estimates 

show that these good days do 

not number more than four otr 

five per month and that only 

during the summer months. 

There will, however, be a large 

percentage of days when short 

raids can very easily be made. 

From the Ostende base there are 

practically no targets against 

which short raids can be made 

to injure Germany's manufacturing centers; while from the Verdun-Toul base, the Saar Valley 

with its enormous steel wok 

offers exactly the type of target 

which the Allies urgently desire 

to destroy; and therefore on 

days when raiding at long distances on Germany's Rhine Valley targets is impossible, short 

raids against the Saar Valley are 

feasible and sometimes several 

raids per day can easily be 

made. 

Extra mileage 

in excess of 

Goand shortest 

Distance Return mileage 

From Dusseldorf straight ....... ~~ _...... ~~~ ..... 186 372 .:32 

Ostende Dusseldorl by Maastrill ~~~~~ ...-.. ~.~ ..-... 206 412 :'72 

District Cologne straight ...... ~~~ .._...... ~.~.... 185 370 :'70 

Cologne by Maastritt ... ...._. ~~~ ....... ~.~ 192 384 : 134 

Mannheim ...~._~ ..... ~~ .__.. ..~.~~~ .... 280 560 :3GO 

From Dusseldorf straight ..~~ ....._. ~~~~ ......... 170 340 

Souilly Cologne ...... ~~ ....... ~~~ ._........... ~~~ 150 300 Mannheim .. ~~~~......~~~._.........~~~.. 150 300 : 40 

Frankfolt . . . . ._ ~. .. . .~ . .-. . . . . . .. . . ~ ~. 170 340 20 

From 

Toul Dusseldorf ~~ ....... ~~~~ ...._........... ~~. 190 380 :40 

Cologne ..~~..._..~~~~~...._.........~~~.. 170 340 : '10 

Mannheim ..... .... ~ ~ ...... -... ~.~~ ~ ...... 

Frankfolt ~~ ~~ ~. . .. . . . . ~~~.~. .. ... ~~~ .... 

130 

160 

260 

320 
146 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

(d) It has sometimes been advocated that raiding might be 

done across the northern border 

of Belgium, in order to permit 

pilots who fail because of engine 

failure to land in Holland. But 

such an agrument is a myth 

rather than a reality. If the Allies 

are constantly performing rsids 

from the Ostende base across 

Holland, we might find ourselves 

in a rather awkward diplomatic 

situation, and therefore any 

scheme to deliberately violate 

the neutrality of Holland is untenable. If neutrality laws be not 

violated, raiding from the Ostende base against German targets becomes extremely difficult 

because of the increased length 

of flight necessary. 

(el Apparently there is only 

one base from which operations 

should first be begun, and that is 

the base which we may call, for 

the purpose of reference, the 

Verdun-Toul base. It is suggested that we begin operations 

against the German targets with 

our airplanes operating from this 

Verdun-Toul base, and, as the 

number of airplanes in commission increases, that we spread 

out from this base as a center on 

either side, as conditions may 

indicate best, until, as a climax, 

airplanes may be used from all 

portions of the Allied lines to 

concentrate against the German 

targets which it is hoped to destroy:-the Rhine Valley targets 

being the targets for clear day 

operations and those at hand 

being attacked on days when it 

is impossible to reach the Rhine 

Valley. 

(f) In this base known as the 

Verdun-Toul base, there are 

really two bases: one roughly on 

a quadrilateral bounded by Pont 

St. Vincent, Toul, Void, and Vezelise. This for short we will call 

the Toul group; and its railheads will be Pont St. Vincent 

and Toul, with main depot and 

park at Toul. The second group 

will be in the district whose center is Souilly, and the rail-head, 

park and depot will have to be 

chosen in accordance with details to be taken up later on. 

(9) The first concentration of 

airplanes is suggested for the 

Toul base, and those to be used 

next for the Souilly base. As the 

number airplanes increases, they 

can be divided proportionately 

between these two bases until 

such time as we have a sufficient 

number to extend in either direction from these bases and to 

use airdromes along other portions of the line. In the location 

of airdromes it is to be kept in 

mind that any German concentration against our airdromes 

would deplete our aerial forces, 

and, therefore, our aerial squadrons must be scattered about the 

country in the most advantageous manner to prevent their 

depletion by bomb-dropping 

raids on the part of the Germans. Furthermore, the existence of numerous airdromes 

about the bases hereinbefore indicated will increase the difficulties of German intelligence and, 

therefore, will render less difficult 

the protection of our airdromes 

from German aerial raiding. 

V. Choice of systems or 

raiding. 

(a) There are two large systems of aerial bomb-dropping. 

One is what is known as daylight 

bombing; the other is night-time 

bombardment. There are many 

arguments both in fakor of and 

against each kind of bomb-dropping, but it goes without saying 

that our efforts should be directed against the German objectives both by day and by 

night, giving the Germans no 

rest from our aerial activities and 

no time to repair the damage 

inflicted. In this project it is proposed to commence this bombdropping with day-light bombardment solely because of the 

question of availability, since deliveries on our daylight bombardment airplanes will take 

place prior to deliveries on our 

large night bomb-dropping airplanes of Caproni and HandleyPage types. This will lend itself 

readily to our final project of 

both day and night bombardment, since our pilots will be 

receiving training in aerial navigation over Germany during the 

day, while we are waiting for the 

arrival of our night-time 

airplanes. 
Gorrell: Strategical 

Bombard m en t 

VI. Difficulties to be encountered which necessitate 

immediate preparation. 

(a) There will be considerable 

difficulty in instructing the pilots 

in the art of navigation when 

going very long distances, and 

course of instruction must be immediately established in the 

flying schools for obviating this 

difficulty. 

many in existence is not sufficient to permit green pilots to 

find their way across Germany 

and home again in safety, and 

therefore the preparation of a 

special map of Germany must 

be begun at once, following the 

indications which the Army Air 

Service is prepared to submit to 

the Topographical Section of the 

Intelligence Division of the 

Army. This special map was that 

contemplated in a letter to the 

Chief, Intelligence Division, A. E. 

F., dated November 12, 1917, 

subject “Aviation Maps for the 

American Army”, signed by 

Brigadier-General Kenly, requesting the preparation of such 

a map. 

(c) Weather conditions along 

the Rhine Valley permit of raiding only during special times of 

year-these being mainly in the 

late spring, the summer, and the 

early autumn-and therefore if 

bomb-dropping against German 

commercial centers is to be fea- 

(b) The ordinary map of Gersible during the year 1918, preparations must be begun at once 

in order that we may be ready in 

time to take advantage of the 

weather. 

(d) As indicated above, our 

advices show that Germany is 

already preparing a large bombdropping against the Allies. The 

existing program of Allied production of airplanes is on too 

small a scale to manufacture a 

sufficiently large number in time 

for 1918, and therefore a decision should be made immediately to undertake this bombdropping campaign in order that 

the necessary impetus may be 

given to the production of airplanes to permit their receipt in 

time for such a campaign. 

(e) Assuming that each effective machine in commission performs four raids per weekwhich, considering the short distance from our chosen bases to 

the Saar Valley targets, is not too 

optimistic-the total output of 

bombs heretofore contemplated 

for next year on a basis of past 

aviation, when bomb-dropping 

was not seriously considered, 

must be increased to meet the 

demands of next year. This increase can be easily effected if a 

decision is made, and made 

now, to consider such a bombdropping campaign. Hence the 

necessity of an immediate decision for strategical bomb-dropping next year, in order that 

bombs may be ready when 

weather conditions permit the 

commencement of such 

a campaign. 

(f) Considering the 50-pound 

bomb as a standard for calculation purposes, we find that two 

bombs will pack into a case 

about 2’6” x 1’3 x 2’9”; or, 

about 120 cases of bombs may 

be placed on a railroad truck. In 

the quantities contemplated, the 

bombs will have to be dumped 

into ammunition dumps in the 

open and provision should be 

made as soon as possible to 

provide underground bomb 

dumps in order that we may ,not 

have the regrettable experience 

of seeing our bomb dumps 

blown up as recently was the 

case at Dunkerque, where the 

Germans instead of attacking 

airdromes attacked the bomb 

dumps and rendered the bombing airplanes useless because of 

having destroyed their bombs. 

Furthermore, in this question of 

bombs, the technical sections of 

the Allies must design water-tight 

plugs, so that such bombs as are 

kept in the open or in underground dumps may be protected 

from weather conditions, thus 

necessitating keeping only the 

fuses and detonators in cover~d 

water-proof magazines. When 

handling such a large output of 

bombs as will be necessary for 

next year, we must consider that 

the following operations will ble 

necessary: detonators and fuses 

must be put into the bomb, the 

fins must be screwed on, the 

bombs must be transported to 

the airplanes, and must then he 
148 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

loaded upon the airplanes. 

Working with such large quantities it is clearly necessary to 

commence immediately to train 

special armament personnel in 

the loading and handling of 

bombs. This is not a difficult 

question, but needs to be undertaken at the earliest moment. 

Another point in the bomb question is the transportation of the 

bombs by rail from the seaboard 

to the point desired, and, when 

we consider that only about 240 

bombs can be transported on an 

ordinary, average, flat-car we 

see that the transportation of 

sufficient bombs for a strategical 

campaign in earnest against the 

German targets becomes a large 

problem and one which the railroad authorities must take immediate steps to meet. This 

problem is not insurmountable 

nor difficult if steps are taken 

now and without delay. 

(9) The next question of difficulty is that of sheltering the 

airplanes. During certain parts of 

the year, with luck, our airplanes 

should last roughly three months 

when kept in the open; but during the other portions of the 

year, as, for example, the rainy 

season, experience in Mexico 

shows that airplanes last only 

about two weeks; while French 

advices received about two 

weeks ago show that airplanes 

kept in the Toul region in the 

open, in the fall, or in other bad 

seasons, last only about 8 days. 

It becomes at once apparent, 

therefore, that every attempt 

must be made to shelter the 

airplanes; otherwise the replacement of airplanes due to lack of 

shelter becomes an enormous 

problem. For this purpose the 

United States is making provision to ship hangars to Europe 

with the various squadrons. Assuming the hangars arrived at 

the seaboard, the question of 

transporting them to the bases in 

the vicinity of Toul (or to wherever else the airplanes may be 

when they are at the Front) in 

sufficient numbers becomes 

rather difficult. Two thousand 

daylight bombarding airplanes of 

the DH 4 type would require 

about 500 Bessonneau hangars. 

Since about 10 railroad trucks 

are required to transport four 

Bessonneau hangars, we see at 

once that for even as small a 

number of airplanes as 2,000 we 

should require 1,250 railroad 

freight cars to transport these 

hangars. America is planning to 

adopt individual tent hangars, 

but the problem of transportation remains roughly the same as 

in the consideration of the Bessonneau hangars. 

(h) Since the bases are chosen 

in the vicinity of Toul and are in 

the country where it becomes 

rather cold in the winter time, it 

will be necessary to provide 

shelter for the personnel. This 

amount of shelter will depend 

upon the size of the force involved. Due to the population of 

the country we cannot safely 

count upon billeting more than 

approximately one-third of our 

aviation personnel, and therefore the remaining two-thirds 

must be provided for, say, perhaps in standard French barracks which, under conditions 

prescribed by regulations, will 

accomodate 90 men per barrack. The question of figuring 

the housing necessary becomes 

one of mathematics, as the force 

increases in size, but it is necessay to commence now, owing 

to the scarcity of material for 

building purposes, in order to 

obtain sufficient barracks or sufficient housing facilities by the 

time that the airplanes are ready 

for the bomb-dropping campaign next year. 

(i) Having chosen our first 

bases from which the airplanes 

will commence operation, it is 

necessary to choose landing 

fields, after the Italian system of 

one about evey ten miles, from 

the point of assembly (of American airplanes to our probable 

positions at the Front; to indicate 

on each landing field the portions where airplanes rnay land 

without smashing; and to erect 

wind-vanes to indicate the direction of the wind. These will be 

easy to keep up after they have 

once been established but the 

labor of locating these fields and 

marking them should be undertaken immediately, since it is one 

of the small points which is essential for success next year. 

(j) There are very few places 

in the vicinity of the entire Verdun-Toul bases where one can 
Gorrell: Strategical 

Bombardment 

1149 

land, and therefore details 

should be out at the present 

moment choosing these landing 

places and marking them so that 

they may be used either as airdromes or as landing places for 

machines in distress. 

(k) The weather in the Rhine 

Valley does not by any means 

follow the weather on the 

French side of the Vosges 

mountains, and experience has 

shown that it is not satisfacto y 

to rely upon existing weather 

reports as they are today predicted. Meteorological officers 

should, therefore, be sent out at 

once to study weather conditions 

in the Rhine Valley between 

now and next spring and summer, and reports should be received from our agents in Germany to assist in the calculations 

of probable weather conditions. 

(1) Our Intelligence Section of 

the Army Air Service will have 

considerable work to do in the 

preparation of the necessary 

data for such a strategical bombing campaign as herein contemplated, in order that fully up-todate information may be had on 

all targets and in order that 

proper maps may be prepared 

and proper instructions given to 

the various commanding officers 

and even to the individual pilots 

and observers. 

(m) Any system of raiding 

such as contemplated herein 

means carefully prepared and 

timed plans, and in order that 

they may be carried out without 

defects, telephonic communications must be established beWeen the various headquarters 

of groups and squadrons. This is 

a matter which must be done as 

soon as the airdromes are chosen, and work should be commenced thereon immediately. 

(n) The question of rail-heads 

and transports must be considered, since it will be necessa y to 

install at various points railroad 

sidings; and, in the case of large 

night bombarding airplanes, it 

may be found necessary to run 

special narrow-gauge railroad 

tracks into the airdromes themselves. The difficulty of transporting spares of large night 

bombarding airplanes like the 

Handley-Page must be overcome at once by choosing the 

routes which permit of transportation of the spares, since on 

account of the large chord of the 

wings of these airplanes it is not 

possible to transport them over 

eve y road in France, because 

they will not pass under all 

bridges. This means that special 

routes for transportation must be 

chosen. 

(0) The question of transportation between the various 

groups becomes difficult, since in 

some places the ground is 

marshy and chalky and since 

under certain conditions the 

Germans may command some 

of the roads by shelling if they 

desire; and it will, therefore, be 

necessa y to choose specific 

roads for the use of the transport 

interconnecting bomb-dropping 

routes, in order to supplement 

such transportation as takes 

place by railroad and the limited 

amount which can take place by 

air. 

(p) The question of the actual 

choice of position of each individual airdrome is one which 

must be considered immediately; 

and it should be remembered 

that these should not be chosen 

too close to the German lines, as 

has actually been the case today 

with certain of the airdromes in 

that vicinity. A proper location of 

our airdromes will facilitate their 

defense against enemy raids. 

(9) Since bomb-dropping over 

a distance of 150 to 200 miles 

necessitates a special knowledge 

on the part of pilots and observers far beyond any instruction 

now being given in any of the 

Allied schools, navigation becomes not the only problem, 

since a vey large problem is that 

of teaching the pilots to know 

the county over which they ,are 

to fly. This means months of 

training in these particular maps 

of Germany, and pilots trained 

simply in the art of map-reading 

as it is taught today can never 

hope to accomplish their missions and return to their own 

lines in safety. French relief 

maps along existing lines should 

be made up of German terrain, 

and their formation together with 

the natural features of the terrain 

should be indelibly impressed on 

the minds of pilots and observers 

during their scholastic training. 
150 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

Our own experience in the 

United States and in Mexico, 

and Allied experience in Europe, 

has shown that it is very easy for 

one or more machines or squadrons to start out to reach a certain point and to return to their 

base, each believing that he has 

reached the proper point, when 

probably all, or nearly all, have 

reached unconnected points and 

not the target for which they 

originally started to fly. Therefore, a knowledge of Germany 

must be taught to the pilots and 

observers in their instruction period, and provision must be 

made at the Front to keep up 

this instruction. 

(r) From both the morale 

point of view arfd also that of 

material damage, concentration 

of our aerial forces against single 

targets on the same day is of 

vital importance since it tends to 

hamper the defense and also to 

complete in a thorough manner 

the work which the bombardment is intended to perform. 

Therefore, it is suggested that 

often all available airdromes 

should concentrate upon a single 

objective in a single day. For 

example, suppose 100 squadrons are available and that it is 

desired to attack Mannheim and 

the Ludwigshafen Works. Assuming a time-table of three 

minutes between squadrons, this 

means a bombardment of about 

five continuous hours. If immediately afterwards, on the next 

possible day, Frankfurt were attacked in a similar way, judging 

from the press reports of what 

has already occurred in Germany, it is quite possible that 

Cologne would create such trouble that the German Government might be forced to suggest 

terms if that town were so attacked. Furthermore, after such 

a bombardment, the manufacturing works would be wrecked 

and the morale of the workmen 

would be shattered. It is also to 

be remembered that in chemical 

works of this nature a fire once 

started will spread and that with 

such a bombardment going on 

throughout such a length of time 

the organization of the fire brigade and fire protection, in the 

already undermanned German 

villages, would be broken down 

and therefore the results would 

be out of proportion to the immediate effects of the bombs. 

Germany has shown by her attempts to wreck havoc with the 

morale of the Allied nations, in 

such cases as the bombardment 

of London, that her own human 

nature lends itself to having 

havoc wrecked with it in a similar manner, and the press reports taken from German papers 

indicate that this conclusion is 

correct. 

(s) It cannot be pointed out 

that the scheme suggested 

herein is possible now; but it will portation and supply of both 

but those connected with transpersonnel and material become 

larger as the campaign increases 

in size, and it will therefore be 

necessary for railroad and materiel facilities to increase proportionately with the increase in size 

be possible in the future only by 

taking the matter in hand immediately and working at extreme 

pressure from now on till operations are able to commence next 

year. Therefore, it becomes immediately essential to ldecide in 

favor of such an operation for 

next year and to take the necessary steps to organize and to put 

into operation such a campaign 

as that proposed herein. Neither 

can it be said that an operation 

such as this is impossible. All of 

us well remember the huge cry 

of “Impossible!” that went up 

when it was proposed to concentrate enormous artillery attacks on the German lines such, 

for example, as the British have 

concentrated during the months 

of August and September 

against the German Front. Every 

one of us can now see that what 

looked impossible in the past has 

become a reality accomplished 

with ease in the present. So, 

with this bomb-dropping campaign, while the difficulties look 

large at present they will become 

feasible realities if we only start 

immediately to prepare. 

VII. Future Operatnons. 

as indicated herein, the difficulties connected with the commencement become negligible; 

(a) After starting the campaign 
Gorrell: Strategical 

Bombardment 

1 ti1 

of the campaign, until we work 

up to a climax where our airplanes are dropping bombs on 

targets in the same proportion as 

when the artillery shells a target. 

Statistics will show very easily 

that, given a fixed amount of 

explosives to destroy a target, 

aerial bomb-dropping will reach 

and destroy this target with less 

explosive, fewer shells, and less 

expenditure of money than is 

required for the artillery and infantry to destroy a target of similar importance to the final issue 

of the campaign. For practically 

three years the artillery has constantly shelled German positions 

and the infantry has sacrificed an 

enormous number of human 

lives, only to gain an insignificant 

number of miles along the Front. 

With a similar expenditure in 

aerial bomb-dropping of money, 

material, and human beings, the 

transportation in the rear of the 

German lines and the supplies of 

all sorts of material to the German troops could long ago have 

been cut off. 

VIII. Cooperation of the 

A1 lies. 

(a) The targets chosen in this 

program to be attacked, and the 

bases from which it is expected 

to deliver our attacks, are the 

same as those contemplated by 

the British in their proposal to 

wreck the manufacturing centers 

of Germany and by the French 

in such programs as they are 

proposing. The British are seriously considering such a bombdropping campaign, but have 

not started in earnest on the 

necessary preparation for such a 

campaign. The French production program for both airplanes 

and bombs, as well as for personnel, does not lend itself to an 

attack on the large scale proposed, during 1918, on the 

manufacturing centers of Germany. The money appropriated 

by the American Congress was 

appropriated with the idea in 

view of dropping the maximum 

tonnage of bombs on German 

manufacturing centers and 

means of transportation, and the 

American public as well as 

American industries and financial 

purse-string lend themselves to 

this idea and have so lent themselves since the beginning of the 

War. We find America today 

building an aerial program with 

the sole idea of such a campaign 

against Germany as that outlined 

herein, and therefore American 

backing of this program is certain. British participation in this 

campaign is also certain. French 

willingness to participate in such 

a campaign is certain, although 

her materiel, especially, and her 

personnel, to a minor degree, do 

not lend themselves to such a 

large scale operation as either 

the Americans or the British are 

prepared to undertake. Therefore, since all three nations will 

be desirous of participating in 

such a campaign as this and to 

participate against the same targets and from, roughly, the same 

bases, it is suggested that there 

be coordination of the .efforts of 

all the Allied land armies. Therefore, in view of the concentration 

mentioned herein, as well as 

other vital considerations, it is 

suggested as the proper part of 

America, especially in view of 

her aerial production, to take the 

initiative in bringing about such a 

coordination. 

IX. Necessity for 

immediate action. 

(a) Since a bomb-dropping 

campaign does not mean the 

mere supplying of airplanes and 

bombs, and since many other 

features, as hereinbefore indicated, enter into a project such 

as that contemplated herein, it is 

suggested that unless a decision 

is made to commence this campaign and to commence it immediately, we cannot hope to 

operate during 1918. Therefore, 

it is requested that approval of 

this project be given immediately 

and that the necessary authority 

to carry it out be granted in 

order that it may be started without loss of time and in order that 

it may be under way in the 

spring or summer of 1918. If it is 

not begun at that time, it must 

go over until 1919. It is not too 

late yet to commence this campaign; but the time when its 

commencement is possible with 

success is drawing to a close, 

hence the urgency of immediate 

approval of this scheme. 
152 Air Service 

Plans and F’rograms 

B. Sequel 

After adopting the program for 

operations it next became necessary to decide upon the staff for 

Officer in Charge of Strategical 

Aviation, Z. of A., A.E.F. It was 

decided that the staff should be 

comprised of the following officers: 

(a) Executive Officer. 

(b) Adjutant 

(c) Intelligence Officer. 

(d) Meteorological Officer. 

(e) Armament Officer. 

(f) Engineering Officer. 

(9) Supply Officer. 

(h) Photographic Officer. 

(i) Telephone Officer. 

(j) Wireless Officer. 

(k) Medical Officer. 

(1) Transportation Officer. 

(m) Officer In Charge of Pursuit 

(n) Interpreter. 

and Observation Forces, 

Steps were taken to obtain a few 

of these officers to start the work 

of this force. 

On December 22, 1917, a 

conference was held at French 

G. H.Q., at Compiegne, wherein 

the following representatives 

participated,- 

British:-Major General Sir 

Hugh Trenchard, General Officer Commanding the Royal 

Flying Corps, in the Field. 

French:-General D~vall,~ 

Commanding the French Air 

Service, in the Field. 

United States:-LieutenantColonel E. S. Gorrell, Officer in 

Charge of Strategical Aviation, Z 

of A., A. E. F. 

5. Maurice Duvall 

At this meeting General Trenchard told that he had been ordered by his Government to establish a force of bombardment 

aviation in the vicinity of Nancy 

for the purpose of bombarding 

the industrial centers of Germany, that whether or not the 

Allies intended to join with him 

in this work did not affect 

whether or not he continued 

such work, and that he intended 

to increase the size of his force 

and to push this work to its 

maximum extent in compliance 

with the orders of his Govemment on this subject. The French 

said that, in their opinion, it did 

not pay to heterogeneously 

bombard enemy industrial centers and that the Allies must remember bombardment of Allied 

towns by the enemy was a much 

easier task than bombardment of 

enemy towns by the Allies, and 

therefore not only from the point 

of view of the fact that the materiel was unavailable for this purpose but also from the point of 

view of the fact that the use of 

bombardment aviation as contemplated by the British did not 

agree with French tactical plans 

and that the French did not expect to join in this operation. 

The American representative 

stated that it was the intention of 

the United States to also undertake this work along the lines 

now being commenced by the 

British but that he could not 

pledge the United States or the 

A.E.F. to such a procedure for 

the reason that decision on that 

subject lay with G.H.Q., A.E. F. 

During the Christmas Holidays, 1917, the Chief of Air 

Service, accompanied by LieutColonel Gorrell visited I-leadquarters of the Royal Flying 

Corps in the Field, for the purpose of discussing this question 

with General Trenchard, the 

General Officer Commanding 

the R.F.C., in the Field. At this 

meeting General Trenchard proposed that, since he had already 

begun to operate from the 

Nancy District, and since the 

Americans had yet to make their 

first beginning in this work, that 

the Americans profit by such experience as he may have gained 

and such installation as he may 

have established and place their 

first few squadrons with his 

forces in order to train the Americans and to allow them to profit 

by what experience the British 

may have already obtained. If 

the Americans had one squadron it would be General Trenchard’s intention to place this 

squadron in an airdrome with 

several other British squadrons, 

the combination of squadrons 

being commanded by a British 

officer. When the Americans had 

several squadrons they would 

occupy an airdrome by themselves, being commanded by an 

American officer, to report to the 

British Commander in that District. When the Americans 

placed a larger force in the field 
Gorrell: Strategical 

Bombardment 

1 !j3 

than the British had there, General Trenchard proposed to turn 

over the command in that district, at such time as Americans 

should thus begin to secure predominance in the combinations, 

to the Americans and to allow 

the British to serve under an 

American Commander in that 

region. These propositions, because they offered both training 

and maintenance facilities to the 

American Air Service, both of 

which were lacking and both of 

which promised to be difficult to 

be obtained, were accepted by 

the Chief of Air Service. However, it may here be said, that 

shortly after this conference 

General Trenchard was recalled 

to England and General Salmond6 took his place in the field. 

Later, approximately the summer of 1918, the British Bombardment Forces in the vicinity 

of Nancy were separated from 

the Royal Air Force in the Field 

and placed under the command 

of General Trenchard, who 

would honor the orders of no 

one except the British Air Ministry. General Trenchard received 

no orders and would acknowledge no superior in the Field, 

not even Marshal Foch, who we 

supposed to command the Allied 

forces on the Western Front. 

This turn of affairs necessitated a 

change in the American attitude 

towards the problems then confronting them. The Americans 

had recognized and loyally supported Marshal Foch as the Allied Commander-in-Chief and 

therefore could not assist the 

British Independent Air Force in 

its efforts. It was therefore decided on June 18, 1918, by the 

Chief of Staff, A.E.F., that while 

cooperating in every possible 

way with air forces of our Allies, 

the Air Bombardment Force 

must remain an actual integral 

part of the American Expeditionary Forces. The Chief of Staff on 

this same date uttered the fundamental principles of the Bombardment Force when he said 

every one must be impressed 

with the importance of the principle of the concentration of the 

effort of each arm, and of all 

coordination and all effort to a 

common tactical end. He then 

said that all must be warned 

against any idea of independence and all must know from the 

beginning that every force must 

be closely coalescent with those 

of the remainder of the Air Service and with those of the Ground 

Army. He further stated that in 

making of arrangements with the 

British it must be thoroughly 

understood that, when the aerial 

forces reached a certain importance, the regions to be bombed 

would be designated by G.H.Q., 

A.E.F. and that the selection of 

the targets would depend solely 

upon their importance with respect to the operation which the 

A.E.F. contemplated for its 

Ground Army.’ 

Aviation, Z. of A., A.E.F. was 

being utilized for duties other 

rhan those belonging purely to 

The Office of the Strategical 

6. John Maitland Salmond. 

7 See Doc. 38. 

this office and it was proposed to 

also place him as Assistant to the 

Supply Officer of the Air Service. 

With this in mind, this officer 

wrote the following memorandum for the Chief of Air Service, 

which is quoted herein solely for 

the purpose of setting forth some 

of the problems which presented 

themselves as of January 1, 

1918. 

American Expeditionary Forces 

Memorandum for 

Chief of Air Service. 

tance possible at the present 

time that the officer detailed for 

charge of bombing should take 

up the reins if he is to bring an 

efficient, well-trained team to the 

front at the speed at which deliveries are to take place. Not onl,y 

that this officer take up his own 

duties forthwith, but he must 

collect his technical staff around 

him without delay, and fight thle 

thousand and one duties in the 

all-too-short time at his disposal. 

2. The fact that the United 

States is only now entering into 

the contest makes it almost impossible to obtain the number of 

specialist officers required, and 

the men chosen for these duties 

must be allocated to the best 

centers for their own instruction. 

Paris, January 2, 1918. 

1. It is of the maximum impor- 
154 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

The British and French after 

three and a half years of experience have decided on the personnel, spares and materiel required for their units, and the 

closest liaison is necessary for 

the officer commanding American bombing to reap the full 

advantage of their experience. It 

is probable that the original 

American bombing units will 

work under British command, 

and it is necessary to study the 

British organization with a view 

to blending in with it efficiently. 

The O.C.'s decision is required, 

after consultation with the British, as to the most important 

position from which to operate 

with a view to the preparation of 

various sites, and to determine 

the methods of supply of those 

sites. He must inspect the bombing units in order to become 

himself au fait with work in the 

field and to obtain a close understanding of the operations 

undertaken. He should inspect 

the English training schools for 

bombing, choose the commanding officers for the orignal units, 

and see that they are competent, 

efficient and well-trained and organize many other details. 

3. Accurate bombing on a 

large scale is a new science and 

requires the entire time and 

study of the man who is to 

shoulder the responsibility for 

success or failure during the 

coming year. 

4. The following points must 

be immediately considered and 

decided upon, and time will be 

required to do this in accordance 

with the estimate set forth hereinafter. 

Time 

Decision should be made 

with regard to having the 

same organization of units 

as the British have, and the 

necessary study is required 

to harmonize our 

organization and the British 

since not even the British 

have yet decided on a part 

of their organization. 

2 weeks 

Obtain staff and send 

them to learn their duties, days pick 'Iaff 

shce strategical aviation is months 

the most unknown part of instruction for 

them. aeronauhcs. 

2 days Obtain office rooms and 

clelks. 

at least 4 rn< Establsh well-informed 

intelligence 

Lay down detailed 

program to be iollowed in 

1918 and prepare this to 

exchange with British and weeks 

French in accordance with 

agreement Dec. 22. 

tonnage for railroads and 

give them estimate of 

requirements. Indicate 2 weeks. 

where railheads and 

railroad installations are 

necessary 

deliveries from every 

source. See if sufficient 

supples of every kind have 

been ordered for strategical week 

aviation. Place requisitions 

for what has not yet been 

ordered. 

Work out monthly 

Obtain accurate list of 

mths. 

Decide on commanders days pick 

of first units; dispatch them cornmanders7 lo 

for training. 3 months for 

training. 

Obhin necessary 

Specialists from England as 

a loan for two months 

during winter inaction 

Consult with and learn from 

them principles taught by 

their experience. 

Choose aerodromes for 

squadrons that will be ready 

by end of June. Choose 

parks and depots. Get these 

approved and preparation 

under way, even if only 

with a very few workmen 

Choose dummy 

aerodromes. 

at least 2 weeks. 

2 umeeks search. 2 weeks sulvey; 2 to 

3 u'eeks for 

approval. Time for 

work depends 

uwn number of 

men used. 

2 ueeks choice, 2 weeks connected 

with their 

preparation. 

2 weeks Choose concentration 

aerodromes. 

2 weeks. Choose hopping-off 

aerodromes. 

Give to Instruction 

Department our 1 day. plus 

requirements of pilots and 

observers shaving number following progress. 

and date. Follow progress. 

Department and Instruction 

Department list showing 3 days. 

different trades which will 

be required m organization. 

variable time 

Give to Personnel 

2 woeks work. 2% 

supc!nrision. 

Have prepared 

satisfactory map of 

Germany. since none exists moriths 

now 

Obtain schedule of 

bombing training school m 

England and follow 1 week 

progress made in that 

school. 

Visit English and 

American bombing schools. w"eks' 

Inspect bombing units in 

the field now and learn the 

work myself. 

Inspect aerodromes 

allocated for bombing work. wt'eks. 

Obtain schedule of 

navigation training in 

England get mariners into 

U.S. schools; work with 

Training Department 

tauards perfection of 

course. 

at least 1 month 

1 week. 
Gorrell: Strategical 

Bombardment 

1 !55 

Consultation re 

organization meterological 

serwe as it affects bombing 

at long range 

Obtain information on 

progress of wireless 

telegraph for navigation; days 

initiate improvements. 

days' 

3 days Check petrol 

arrangements. 

Personnel force keep 

track all our men working 

on Strategical Aviation on March. 

British Force. 

learning from them, keeping 

up with them, and 

coordinating our plans with 

them. 

Laying out equipment 

depots. parks, etc. 

Continuous after 

Contact with Allies 

1 month. 

1 month 

5. The above schedule shows 

that some 14 months would be 

necessary in order to be prepared to carry on this work if 

one person were to attempt to 

do it himself. With an efficient 

staff things can be divided into 

classes and separated, and the 

work can be started by June, but 

not before. The person who is to 

be responsibile for the success or 

failure must be on hand at all 

times to handle the staff and 

make the necessary decisions. 

6. This is the class of work 

which we have promised our 

Congress, our County and our 

Allies that we would do, and it is 

of utmost importance that we 

are prepared to carry out wholeheartedly, efficiently and without 

delay. 

Respectfully submitted, 

(signed) E.S. Gorrell 

Lt-Colonel, A. S.S. C. 

An effort was made to set 

upon an American organization 

for the Bombardment units of 

the Strategical Aviation of the 

A.E.F., similar to the organization adopted by the British because of the fact that the British 

had had experience in this capacity while the Americans had 

had no such experience, because the British were already 

engaged upon this work, and 

because it was essential that the 

organizations be similar in order 

to allow the commanding officer 

and any Allied officers engaged 

upon the work to realize the 

extent of the striking force under 

his command. 

Thus at this date, December, 

1917, American plans based 

their organization upon the 

"Group" to be the smallest selfcontained bombardment tactical 

unit. The Americans had no expectation of bombing by squadrons but to bombard by groups 

and perhaps by various combinations of groups whenever the 

target to be attacked should be 

worthy of it. 

Just after the middle of January, 1918, the Chief of Air Service was ordered by G.H.Q. to 

detail an Air Service officer for 

duty in the Operations Section 

(G3), on the General Staff. 

Lieut-Colonel Gorrell was relieved from duty as Officer in 

Charge of Strategical Aviation, Z 

of A., A.E.F. and by Par 7, S.O. 

21, H.A.E.F., dated January, 21, 

8 Ambrose Monell, who had resigned the 

presidency of the International Nlckel Company 

lo accept a wmmlsslon in the U S Army 

1918, was detailed to report to 

the Chief of Staff, A.E.F., on 

February 5, 1918, for this duty 

During the first part of February 1918, the office of the Chief 

of Air Service was moved from 

G.H.Q. to Tours and Colonel FL 

0. Van Horn, Air Service, who 

had been detailed by the Chief 

of Air Service as Operations 01- 

ficer in the Air Service (which 

designation of Air Service was 

later ordered, by the Chief of 

Staff, A.E.F., to be discontinued, 

for the reason that no such office 

existed within the Air Service) 

moved to Colombey-les-Belles 

with his office force. The Chief 

of Air Service appointed Colonel 

A. Monell," Air Service, in the 

Office of Colonel Van Horn and 

to command the Strategical 

Aviation, Z. of A., A.E.F. Colonel Monell was assisted by Major 

Fowler: Air Service, and Wing 

Commander Spencer Grey," 

R.N.A.S. The work previously 

started was carried on by Colonel Monell for a month or so. In 

the meantime Major Fowler weis 

relieved from duty with this work 

and sent to command the American Air Forces with the B.E.F. in 

the Field. Wing Commander 

Spencer Grey, R.N.A.S., be9. Harold Fowler, who had served with ':he 

Royal Flying Corps and had franslerred to I:he 

U.S. Air Service in 1917. 

10. While in charge of the Strategical 

Section. Gorrell had arranged for Grey to 

serve on his staff Grey, he said "was considered at that time as the worlds greatest 

authority on questions dealing with aerlal 

bombardment." (Early History of the Strategical Section. in Gorrell's History. 6-6 p 

372). 
156 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

coming discouraged over the 

failures of the American Production Program and realizing in detail what would be necessary before America could begin a Strategical Bombardment campaign 

of any size, left the American Air 

Service and returned to the Air 

Service of his own Government. 

Later on Wing Commander 

Grey was attached to the Air 

Service of the US. Naval 

Forces, operating in Europe for 

the purpose of bombarding enemy submarine bases. 

Colonel Monell after having 

selected an airdrome at Latrecey, several bombardment airdromes on the Toul Sector, and 

an airdrome near St. Blin, and 

having seen that construction 

work was begun on each of 

these, realized that the larger 

problems that faced the strategical aviation operations of the Air 

Service were industrial. He also 

realized that the pursuit operation of strategical aviation would 

not and could not become a 

reality for several years, due to 

the failure of the Allies to deliver 

pursuit planes to the American 

Air Service in accordance with 

their promises made in the Fall 

of 1917, and due to the fact that 

no pursuit machines, because of 

such promises, were being constructed in the United States. 

Therefore, there remained only 

one possible future for the Strategical Aviation-that was aerial 

bombardment. The D.H. airplane was being handled satisfactorily at Romorantin” insofar 

as its assembly was concerned. 

However the assembly of the 

Handley-Page airplane presented a more difficult situation 

and thereafter Colonel Monell 

concentrated his attention upon 

the question of the night bombardment program. 

The use of the words “Strategical Aviation” had led many 

persons, in and out of the Air 

Service, to believe that this operation of the Air Service was 

something independent from the 

rest of the Air Service and not 

dependent at all upon the rest of 

the Army. In order to eliminate 

such an idea and to cause a 

realization of the fact that the 

Strategical Air Service was employed as an integral part of the 

Air Service, A.E.F. and therefore 

of the entire A.E.F. and in order 

to force a realization of the fact 

that American Bombardment 

Aviation should and would be 

used as a combat arm upon 

missions synchronizing with and 

coordinated with the missions of 

the entire A.E.F., the name Strategical Aviation was changed in 

the Summer of 1918 to “G.H.Q. 

Air Service Reserve.” This 

change had the desired effect 

and brought home the realization of the fact that this bombardment aviation was a combat 

portion of the Army designed for 

use upon missions coordinated 

with the entire use of the A.E.F. 

in Europe. 

Plans were made in G3, 

G.H.Q., A.E.F. for the future use 

of the Bombardment Aviation 

when it should arrive at the size 

consistent with its being used as 

G.H.Q. Air Service Reserve. It 

was contemplated that any bombardment units in existence prior 

to the time when this reserve 

had reached a growth sufficient 

to justify its creation as a G.H.Q. 

Air Service Reserve would be 

used as a part of the Army Air 

Service of the various American 

Armies in the Field or in some 

specific cases units might probably be placed with the Eiritish 

Independent Air Force, later 

known as the Inter-Allied Air 

Force, for the purpose of receiving training in long distance 

bombardment. It being understood by the nations concerned 

that our bombardment forces 

must remain an actual integral 

part of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

11 Air Service Production Center No 2 
Gorrel I: Strategical 

Bombardment 

157 

Looking at this Section previously known as the Strategical 

Aviation, Z. of A., A.E.F. and 

gazing upon it with a hind-sight 

view of one year, in January, 

1918, the time when the plans 

hereinbefore quoted were originally made, there are two great 

faults which are easily seen. 

(a) Entirely too much optimism was felt for the American 

Production Program. 

(b) The Air Service failed to 

secure the approval of the General Staff of its plans for the 

employment of this aviation and 

consequently suffered from the 

fact that its plans for the use of 

the Strategical Air Service were 

not synchronized properly, especially from a mental point of 

view of its employment, with the 

ideas of the G.H.Q. 

sight view points. 

ble only upon the grounds of 

inexperience but the first point 

presents the same facts as affected the entire Air Service, 

namely, a program far too large 

to be realized in the length of 

These of course are hindThe second point is inexcusatime allowed for its production. 

There is no one to be blamed 

for this program for it had the 

approval and encouragement of 

the highest authorities in Europe 

and it was only cold matter of 

fact experience which proved to 

the world the fact that money 

and men could not make an air 

program over night and that the 

time to prepare for war was not 

after war had been declared but, 

as quoted from the first President of the United States: “In 

time of peace let us prepare 

for war.” 

Assembly of a Handley-Page bomber. 

30- FOU~O~S: 1 !59 

Soon after becoming Chief 

of Air Service, Foulois made 

a number of recommendations to Pershing's Chief of 

Staff. His memorandum was 

devoted mainly to organizational and logistical problems, but one item had to do 

with aerial operations. The 

following is an extract from 

an account written by Foulois 

in 1919.' 

............................ 

X-26. Under my orders from 

the War Department, I proceeded to General Headquarters 

A.E.F. and reported for duty to 

the Commander in Chief, on 

November 16, 1917. 

I was directed to make an 

inspection and report upon the 

Air Service activities as they existed at that time. While upon 

this inspection trip, I was assigned to duty as Chief of Air 

Service, A.E.F. (November 27, 

1917), relieving Brigadier General Kenly. 

inspection trip, and pursuant to 

my assignment as Chief of Air 

Service, effective November 27, 

1917, the following memoranda 

for the Chief of Staff, A.E.F. 

were submitted. 

X-27. Upon completion of my 

Memorandum for The Chief of 

tions 

mitted 

Staff 

Subject: 

for 

............................ 

The 

Air 

for 

following 

for 

Service. 

the 

consideration: 

Recommendations 

Air 

December 

Service 

recommendaare 

1, 1917 

sub- 

-- 

8. That a comprehensive plan 

of air operations (including 

bombing) be authorized at once, 

and that authority for the necessary construction and material 

be given, in order that fighting 

and bombing operations in cooperation with the French and 

British Flying Corps may be carried on at the earliest practicable 

date. (General plans now being 

prepared will be submitted as 

soon as ready.) 

B.D. Foulois, 

Brigadier General, S.C. 

1 In AFSHRC 168 68-5 
Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois. Chief of Air Service, AEF 

(November 1917-May 1918). 
31, FouJo~: Repo~t 1Eil 

23 Decernbea 1917 

In a memorandum to 

Pershing's Chief of Staff on 

23 December 1917, Foulois 

devoted considerable space 

to what he had recently 

learned about bombing. His 

recommendations included 

support for Gorrell's bombing plan (Doc. 29) and for 

cooperation with the British 

and French in strategical operations.' 

1 In Gorrell's History. A-I, pp 131-136 

Memorandum for the Chief of 

Staff. 

Subject. Report on Air Military and Civil sources. 

mation and data as obtained 

from official French and British 

problems, A.E.F., and ............................ 

11. Each and every high offi- recommendations re cial, military and civilian, with same. whom I have conferred has 

frankly stated that under the exdutV at G. H. Q. November isting conditions of ship tonnage, 

16th 1917, was assigned to the most swift and effective asdutV as Chief of Air Service per sistance which the United States 

(3.0. 66 H.A.E.F., November can give during the Summer and 

27, 1917. Fall of 1918, is through its air 

From November 16 to No- forces, 

vember 25, I visited and con- The war policy of Great Britferred with Major General Tren- ain for 1918 places (1) Tonnav; 

chard, Royal Flying Corps, (2) Air Service; (3) Army perCommanding the R.F.C., in sonnel, in the foregoing order of 

France; visited and conferred priori~. This infomation I rewith GWVX~~ Pet&% and cob ceived officially from one of the 

riel in charge of French most prominent members of the 

aviation on General Petain's British War Cabinet. 

Staff. 12. The foregoing opinion of 

English and French military ancl 

hm the date of assignment civil officials as regards the comas C.A.S., November 27, UP to parative effectiveness, during 

the present date, 1 have also had 1918, of troops on the ground 

a conference in Paris with Lord as compared with air troops and 

Northcliffe, representative of airplanes in the air is concurred 

Lord Rothermere, the President in or was concurred in, two 

of the British Air Board; numer- months ago, by the Congress of 

ous conferences with our own the United States, a great porAir Service Officers in Paris, and tion of U.S. Army and by the 

have just returned from a four American public. 

days conference in London with The English, French and 

the British Air Ministry and American military and civil offimembers of the British War cials heretofore mentioned fully 

Cabinet. believe that the air campaign of 

As a result of these confer- 1918 will be the most severe 

ences and investigations into our 

own needs as heretofore tentatively outlined by the Air Service, A.E.F., the following general 

summary of our air problems is 

submitted, also general air inforThe undersigned reported for 

............................ 
162 Air Service 

Plans and Programs 

and critical insofar as its effect on 

the morale of the English and 

French civil population is concerned. 

The effect, of air raids, on 

England during the past few 

months, has absolutely reversed 

the British war policy which existed four months ago, as rcgards reprisals on Germany. Today the cry is “Bomb the 

Huns.” 

During my visit last week in 

London I saw two small air raids 

and saw four civilians killed by a 

shell within one hundred yards 

from where I was standing. I also 

saw hundreds of poor people 

sleeping on the station platforms 

of the underground railway stations, because they were too 

frightened to go to their homes. 

So far, the air raids on London 

and the coast of England have 

been carried out by German 

squadrons in very small numbers, and on this particular raid 

only about 40 bombs were 

dropped. The morale effect, 

however, on the British people, 

of this small number of bombs 

was very great in proportion to 

the physical damage (10 killed, 

70 wounded4 small fires and 

several houses wrecked). 

Upon investigation, the morning after this raid, I learned that 

from the time the first warning is 

sent out until the “all clear” signal was given, practically all 

work ceases in factories and 

other industries. This particular 

raid which I witnessed, kept the 

anti-aircraft batteries surrounding 

London, busy for nearly four 

hours, putting up a barrage 

about the city. 

When one computes the manhours lost, in a city the size of 

London, it is readily understood 

why the British War policy is 

being directed to taking active 

offensive measures against the 

air menace of the Germans. 

There were approximately 20 

airplanes estimated to have been 

engaged in this raid, and I could 

not learn that there had ever 

been a larger number engaged 

in any single raid on England. 

The British Secret Service, 

however, have informed us that 

Germany is exerting every effort 

to produce a great number of 

bombing squadrons for offensive 

use during 1918. 

should most seriously and most 

promptly consider the probable 

morale effect on the French and 

English civil populations, in the 

event that the Germans attain air 

supremacy in night bombing 

in 1918. 

Such being the case, we 

From a strictly tactical viewpoint, if Germany secures air supremacy in night bombing in 

1918, the first military objective 

of the German Air Service will 

be the Allies Airdrome:, and their 

squadrons, in order to prevent 

counter-offensive on the part of 

the Allies. 

At the present time there is no 

effective method of combating 

night bombing raids, and the 

only answer to the prcjblem is to 

build more night bombing 

squadrons than the enemy and 

carry on a greater offensive 

bombing campaign against him. 

13. The Air Service, A.E.F. 

has collected a great amount of 

information, maps and data, on 

the most vital military industrial 

centers in Germany, where submarine essentials, munitions, 

chemicals, iron, steel, engines 

and airplanes are manufactured 

all of which are within bombing 

distance of the Verduri-Toul 

region. 

The British and French authorities have fully appreciated 

the importance of a strategic air 

offensive against German industrial centers and lines of communications, but they have never 

during the present war, been 

able to provide enough personnel and airplanes to take care of 

the tactical air units with troops, 

and also provide additional units 

for strategical offensive 

operations. 
Foulois: Report 

on Air Service Problems 

163 

Our enty into the war with 

large resources of personnel and 

aircraft materials, if promptly 

taken advantage of, will allow 

the Allies and ourselves to take 

the strategical offensive next 

Summer, against the German industrial centers, German airdromes and German lines of 

communications. 

14. The British Air Ministy 

and the British War Cabinet are 

now preparing a communication 

to be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F. recommending that the British, French 

and American Air Services take 

the necessay steps toward inaugurating a combined strategic 

offensive against German industrial centers without further delay. This communication should 

reach these headquarters within 

a few days. 

Recommendations in Air 

Service Policy A.E.F. 

15. In view of the foregoing 

statement of the needs of the Air 

Service, A.E.F. and the trend of 

our efforts toward a co-ordinated 

air policy with our Allies, it is 

recommended: 

say air personnel and material 

for tactical operations with 

troops. 

steps in co-operation with the 

British and French authorities for 

a combined strategical fighting 

and bombing campaign in 1918 

against German industrial centers, German airdromes, German aero squadrons and German lines of communications. 

First: Provide the necesSecond: Take immediate 

Third: Settle as quickly as 

possible, the question as to priority of Aviation personnel and 

material over other personnel w- and material. 

Fourth: Determine, as 

quickly as possible, the amount 

of tonnage per month which 

should be set aside for aviation 

peronnel and material. 

proval of the air program A.E.F. 

with the least possible delay, in 

order that the C.A.S. may take 

immediate steps to cany it into 

effect, without further loss of 

time. 

Sixth: Designate three 

members of the General Staff to 

work with the Air Service, in 

drawing up, in detail, a complete 

and co-ordinated air schedule to 

include all questions regarding 

instruction, training, organization, transportation and supply. 

Fifth: Obtain official apB. D. Foulois, 

Brig. Gen’I S.C. 

C.A.S. 
Ma!. Gen. Hunter Uggctt (taken as Brig. Gen.). commander of 

I Corps. was one of the few air-minded U.S. infantry generals of 

World War 1. 
32. Corrmmna OF 

The Ak SeRuice, AEF 

24 DecembeR 1917 

165 

As plans were made in December 1917 to organize an 

army corps in the AEF, orders concerning command of 

aviation units were revised. 

When I Corps was formed in 

January under the command 

of Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggetl in 

January 1918, Mitchell became Chief of Air Service, I 

Corps and Corps Air Service 

Commander. 

Headquarters, A.E.F. 

France, December 24, 1917. 

General Orders, 

No. 80 

Service will exercise general supervision over all elements of the 

Air Service and personnel assigned thereto, and will control 

directly all Air Service units and 

other personnel not assigned to 

tactical commands or to the 

L. of c. 

1. 1. The Chief of the Air 

............................ 3. The Air Service units in 

each army will be under the 

general supervision of the Army 

Air Commander, who will control directly all air units and other 

Air Service personnel on duty 

with that army and not assigned 

to Army Corps or other subordinate commands. The Air Service 

units of each Army Corps will be 

under the direct control of the 

Corps Air Commander. 

these headquarters, is revoked. 

4. Sec 11, G.O. 46, c. s., 

............................ 

By command of 

General Pershing: 

James G. Harbord, 

Brigadier General, 

Chief of Staff. 
166 

Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) James G. Harbord served as Gen. 

Pmhw’a Chlcf of Staff at Hudquartero. AEF. (Sketch by 

Joseph Cummings Chase). 
33- 1oo-squu6Ror2 

Sch&uJe 

IJanuaRy 1918 

167 

Following recommendations made by Foulois on 10 

December 1917 and again on 

23 December (Docs. 30 and 

31), a three-man committee 

was appointed to review Air 

Service policies, priorities, 

and schedules. Taking into 

consideration production, 

construction, and other problems, the committee concluded that 60 service squadrons ready for combat by the 

end of June 1918, and 100 by 

the end of the year, would be 

the most that could be attained. Following are the report of the committee’ and a 

memorandum indicating 

Pershing’s qualified approval.2 

January 1, 1918. 

Memorandum for the C. of S. 

Subject: Air Service Program. 

1. In accordance with memorandum dated December 21st 

and your subsequent verbal instructions, the following report is 

submitted: 

2. The committee consulted 

British Staff Officers. Their opinion appears to be that infantry 

divisions with corresponding 

aviation units were most necessary for the immediate futurethat no additional aviation 

should be brought over until an 

army (including its aviation) was 

on hand or the situation considered safe. It was, however, admitted that the total number of 

divisions might be reduced by 

one by August, 1918, in order to 

bring over its equivalent tonnage 

in extra aviation. The principal 

reasons advanced were probable 

German superiority on this front, 

that the British infantry was 

much worn from fighting and 

deficient in strength. 

3. The Committee also consulted the French Staff. In a general way their discussion may be 

summarized as follows: They believe an increase of aviation, especially pursuit and bombardment units, will be the most important reinforcement that the 

Allies will need, stating as a reason for this, that to obtain control of the air will go far toward 

rendering a German offensive 

ineffective . 

4. The ability of the U.S. to 

help the Allies this Spring and 

Summer will not be great either 

in trained divisions or in avialion 

ilnits. The number of the latter 

will be limited also by production 

of planes, instruction of pilots, 

and other factors. 

5. In order to permit the Air 

Service to be developed within 

its limiting factors such priority 

should be given to extra air units 

as will not unduly delay the formation of a balanced army (including its aviation). With the 

foregoing in mind it is believed 

that the weight of the extra aviation should be directed toward, 

lst, pursuit, and 2nd, bombardment squadrons. 

6. Based on the best estimate 

obtainable in which allowance 

has been made for delays in 

production, preparation of 

grounds, etc., the Committee 

believes the following to be 

about the probable maximum 

attainment. The program for December 31, 1918, is of course, 

less accurate and should be considered as subject to later revision, when circumstances warrant it. Program for 1919 to be 

considered as soon as developments this Spring permit it to be 

taken up: 

1 

2 AFSHRC 168 68-5 

In Gorrell’s History, A-I, pp 136-138 

1 00-Squadron 

Schedule 

169 

To be h 

To be in service 

selvice DecernJune 30. ber 31, 

Type of Unit 1918. 1918. 

Servre Squadrons 60 100 

School Squadrons 40 50 

Park Squadrons (incl. 

supply & repair) 70 100 

Construction Squadrons 20 20 -__ 

Total Squadrons 190 270 

Total men 28,500 40,500 

The above includes personnel 

now in England and France. 

Balance to amve progressively in 

England and France by April 1st 

The plans devised late in 1917 

called for a number of Park 

Squadrons to assemble and repair 

aircraft. Top left photo shows wing 

assembly in progress; bottom left 

shows the interior of an engine 

repair shop. Aviation mechanics for 

these tasks displayed a badge on the 

left breast of the uniform. above 

other decorations. It was a lage 

four-bladed propeller within a white 

embroidered circle (above). 

and October lst, respectively. 

The probable ratio of service 

squadrons to be: Pursuit 6, Observation 2, Bombardment 1. 

Material to be supplied from 

US. for above service squadrons to arrive progressively by 

June 30, 1918, and December 

31, 1918, respectively. 

7. The committee recommends adoption of the above 

program. 

8. A separate report will be 

submitted regarding the balloon 

program. 

Signed: W. B. 

Col., Auiation Sec., Sig. Corps 

H. A. Drum, 

Lt. Col., G. S. 

A. B. Barber, 

Lt. Col., G. S., A.E.F. 

January 5, 1918. 

Memorandum for: 

Chief of Air Service 

Subject: 

Air Service Program. 

1. The Commander-in-Chief 

approves the attached report 

dated January 1, 1918, subject 

Air Service Program, with the 

understanding that it represents 

the maximum the Air Service 

can attain. He desires no change 

for the present in the schedule 

for shipment of aviation troops 

but desires that you submit before February loth, a careful estimate of Air Service possibilities 

for the latter part of this year so 

that the schedule for the period 

following the 1st of April may be 

again considered. 

2. There is returned to you, 

herewith, your report on Air 

Service program, A.E.F.; it is liesired that you take up with the 

proper sections of the General 

Staff and supply departments 

and various detail questions presented in your report so that the 

Commander-in-Chief s decision 

may be canied out promptly. 

Ry direction: 

W. D. Connor, 

Acting Chief of Staff. 

3 Bum was Assistant Chief of kr Service 

for Policy, Drum and Barber. who had 

worked on the GOP. represented the Operations and Administrative Sections. respectively 

171 

In giving tentative approval 

to the work of the Burtt committee on 5 January 1918, 

Pershing asked for a review 

of the schedule for the last 

half of 1918. As a result of 

that review, Foulois raised 

the number of service squadrons to be ready by 31 December 1918.' 

February 6, 1918. 

Memorandum: 

For Chief of Staff 

(Administration Section) 

(Operations Section) 

Subject: Estimate Air Service 

possibilities latter part 1918. 

The following program of the 

Air Service is submitted as being 

the probable increase in the 

project already authorized for 

the latter part of 1918. 

2. The project for the latter 

part of 1918 calls for the following: 

%ce at the Front 100 

Schools 50 

Park (Repair 

SUP& etc 1 100 

Conshuction 20 

TOTAL . . . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. . . . . . . . 270 

- 

3. An agreement entered into 

with the British Air Ministry accounts for approximately 100 

squadrons to be trained in England. An additional agreement 

calls for the training of 30 bombing squadrons in England, of 

which about 12 were considered 

as included in the 100 squadrons mentioned in the approved 

project. 

4. The construction of airdromes and other necessary installations we estimate may use 

about 100 squadrons of either 

Service or Construction type, of 

which, 20 are included in the 

original project. These squadrons can be exchanged for part 

of the 100 squadrons in England, obtaining trained men for 

untrained. 

5. The project recommended 

for approval for the latter part of 

1918, would be as follows: 

Service at the Front 120 

Schools 60 

Park (Supply & Repair) 120 

Construction 100 

6. The increase of 130 squadrons is accounted for as follows: 

In service for the 

Schools 10 

Park (Repair etc.) 20 

Construction 80 (work) 

front 20 (bombing) 

7. Referring now to cable r12- 

quest for squadrons in November, which called for 30 

service and 20 park for 7 

months, plus those already here 

or enroute, a total of 393 was, 

contemplated. It should be borne 

in mind that the agreements with 

England contemplate a total of 

about 130 squadrons there for 

training, so that the actual increase herein, is to provide for 

those agreements, which fumish 

a pool, from which we can dralw, 

trained men supplying untrained 

men from here in exchange for 

them. 

8. The equipment required 

from the United States will not be 

increased over that for the original project for 270 squadrons, 

because the men in England will 

need no squadron or plane 

equipment. 

B. D. Foulcis 

Brigadier General, A. S., S. C. 

Chief of Air Service. 

TOTAL 130 

1. AFSHAC 168.68-5 

Combat 

FebRuaRy-NouembeR 1918 

173 

The United States had been at war for more than 10 months 

before any US. aviation unit began active operations in France. 

The first US. aero squadron to enter combat was the 103d, a 

pursuit unit. Manned by pilots who formerly had fought with 

the French in the Lafayette Escadrille, the 103d began operations with the French Fourth Army on 18 February 1918. Later 

that same month the 2d Balloon Company joined the 1st 

Division in the line in the sector north of Toul. The Toul Sector, 

where the Germans were relatively inactive on the ground and 

in the air, was the area to which U.S. aviation units were sent in 

the spring of 191 8 for their initial operations. 

35- Mitchell: 

G enerza J P~inc iples 

30 ApRil1918 

175 

In April 1918, after pursuit 

and observation squadrons 

had begun operations in the 

Tout Sector, the Information 

Section of the Air Service, 

AEF published Maj. Frank 

Parker’s 10-month-old report 

on aviation (Doc. 22), to 

which was added the following preface by Mitchell, Air 

Commander, Advance.’ 

General Principles 

Underlying the Use of the 

Air Service in the Zone of 

the Advance, A.E.F. 

These principles will be held in 

mind by all personnel in this 

Service in the execution of their 

duty. 

Wm. Mitchell. 

Lt.-Col., AS., S.C., A.C.A. 

PREFACE 

1. The issue of war depends 

primarily on the destruction of 

an enemy’s military forces in the 

field. To bring this about all elements of a nation’s military 

power are employed to bring 

about a decision on the field of 

battle in the shortest time possible. 

2. An army is composed of 

various arms and services whose 

complete interdependence and 

working together is necessary for 

efficiency. No one arm alone can 

bring about complete victory. 

3. The efficiency of an army is 

measured by its ability to carry 

destruction to the enemy’s 

forces. 

dependent on its military training, experience and direction. 

is one of its offensive arms. 

Alone it cannot bring about a 

decision. It therefore helps the 

other arms in their appointed 

mission. The measure of this 

help is its efficiency in its 

mission. 

4. The efficiency of any arm is 

5. The Air Service of an army 

1 Bulletin of the Information Secton, Air 

Service, A E F , Vol 111, NO 132. 30 npr 18 
Lts. Follet Bradley and Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold are seated in 

the alrcraft equipped with the “wireleu” outfit they rued for 

artlllery adjustment from airplanes in tees at Ft. Riley. 

Kansas, 2 November 1912 (above). Lts. Arnold and Joseph 0. 

Mauborgne make adjustments in the radio set during the tests 

(below). 
36. A~tiJJe~zg 

Abjustment 

May 1918 

17'7 

Artillery adjustments by observers in airplanes had become part of the work of the 

US. air service after the first 

such adjustment was made 

by Lieutenants H. H. Arnold 

and Follett Bradley at Ft. Riley, Kansas, late in 1912. 

When U.S. units went into 

combat in France in 1918, 

however, they followed procedures derived from French 

"Instructions on the Employment of Aerial Observation in 

Liaison with Artillery." Following are extracts from revised instructions based on 

the French edition of 29 December 1917 and published 

by GHQ AEF in May 1918.' 

Aerial Observation 

for Artillery. 

Chapter 1. When Used 

Airplane. 

1. Under favorable atmospheric conditions, the airplane 

affords rapid, accurate and, if 

necessa y, vertical observation, 

even on distant objectives*. It 

can determine the sense* and 

also the deviation of shots**. 

Notes 

1 In Gorrell s History. J-3. beginning p 

123 

2 Position of burst (deflection andlor 

range) with reference to the target 

3 Undamped waves, requiring more elaborate equipment. give a more stable signal 

and are received more easily and clearly 

than damped waves 

2. The airplane signals to the 

ground by means of radio (31, 

projector, dropped messages, or 

by signal light. The observer can 

thus report his presence, designate objectives, report the results 

of fire, and transmit information 

in regard to both friendly and 

hostile troops. This information 

is received by ground stations. 

3. The receiving stations can, 

by means of white cloth panels, 

radio***, or projectors, answer 

the observer's questions and 

give a certain number of simple 

indications concerning the 

conduct of fire. 

4. Radio.-Radio has greatly 

enhanced the importance of aerial observation for artillery. Because of the delicate construction of the radio apparatus and 

the large number of airplanes 

which of necessity must operate 

in a restricted zone, careful organization and strict discipline are 

essential in order to avoid confusion. 

Airplanes sending simultaneously may be distinguished by: 

a) Call signals for receiving 

stations. 

b) Differences in the wavelength used. 

c) Vaying the tone of the 

emission. 

d) The use, in certain cases, of 

watches with colored dials, by 

which neighboring airplanes 

send at alternate specified intervals and thus avoid confusion. 

This device interferes with the 

continuity of observation and 

should be used only when necessay. 

Certain airplanes (for command and for high power guns), 

use radio sets with sustained or 

undamped waves* .3 

strictly in their own zones. They 

should not approach closer than 

two kilometers to their receiving 

stations, except for ve y important messages. Messages sent 

from immediately above the receiving station interfere seriously 

with other messages. With 

proper organization in sending, 

five airplanes can operate on a 

kilometer of front. 

Technical details concerning 

the use of radio are prescribed in 

each army, army corps and division by the Signal Officer. 

5. Projectors.-When the 

number of airplanes is too great 

to permit all to use radio, the 

congestion may be relieved by 

the use of projectors carried by 

the airplanes. By day, the 

method is applicable only up to 

a limited distance from the receiving station. 

Projectors on neighboring airplanes can be distinguished by 

pointing the beam of light carefully, and by the use of call 

signals. 

Airplanes should remain 

*Under particularly favorable conditions, 

**The devialion of a shot is its distance from the 

airplane observation can be used at night. 

objective. 

***Some times by radio telephone. I. *Ordinarilw. aimlanes use darnwd waves 
178 Combat 

Following the 

Kansu tests. a major 

development in transmitting radiotelegraph messages took place at 

the Signal Corps Air Station, San 

Diego. in the summer-fall of 1916. 

when messages were wnt and 

received from ground to planes, 

planes to ground, and between 

planes, for the first time in aviation 

history. The Glenn L. Martin #50 

(above) was equipped for the 

experiments with sending and 

receiving sets (below). 
179 

The radio sets in 

the airplanes wen powered by a rmall fanddven generator mounted below the leading edge of 

the lower wing (above). An aezial of braided wlre trailed the 

aircraft. and a reel attached at the left of the 

front cockpit war wed 

to reel it into the 

plane (below). 
180 Combat 

6. Dropped messages.-This 

method is useful in transmitting 

information concerning objectives or firing. The message is 

placed in a container provided 

with a streamer. It should be ‘ 

dropped from a height not exceeding 300 meters, and as 

close to the receiving station as 

possible. 

7. Signal lights.-Generally, 

these are used only for communication with the infantry. During 

the artillery preparation, their 

use with the artillery may be 

authorized by proper authority. 

A conventional code must be 

prearranged, and only a few 

simple messages can be sent. 

8. Receiving stations.-Each 

regiment, group, or battalion, 

and sometimes each battery, has 

a radio receiving station. 

The artillery radio officer 

transmits the message received 

to the unit concerned. The station must have exclusive and 

continuous communication with 

each battery dependent on it. 

Within a regiment, communication must be arranged so as to 

provide alternate stations in case 

of damage to particular stations. 

If the airplane is equipped 

with receiving apparatus, the radio officer handles all messages 

from the ground station. 

9. Telephone communication 

is covered by Liaison for All 

Arms4 

10. Each receiving station has 

an identification panel enabling it 

to be recognized by an airplane. 

The personnel of a receiving 

station consists of the radio and 

panel operators supervised by 

the radio officer. All are specialists and must be carefully 

trained. Suitable replacements 

should be provided for. 

stations depend on the tactical 

unit to which they pertain. The 

following general classification 

may be made: 

a) The receiving station of a 

battalion or battery acts principally as an adjusting station. It 

receives the reports of the airplane observing fire. 

b) The receiving station of a 

sub-group acts as a command 

post. The airplane calls on it for 

fire on objectives found in the 

zone of the sub-group. It transmits the sub-group commander’s 

decision in regard to each objective. In certain cases of this kind, 

such as battalions and batteries 

having a special mission, and 

prearranged adjustments, the 

airplane calls directly on the adjusting station. 

group sometimes replaces an 

adjusting station which is out of 

action. 

c) The receiving station of a 

regiment or group acts as an 

information station. It follows the 

work of the airplanes with the 

battalions or batteries of the regiment, and also the observation 

airplane and that accompanying 

the infantry operating in the 

zone of the regiment. All useful 

11. The functions of receiving 

The receiving station of a subinformation is thus collected. 

vising receiving stations are established near the command 

post of the corps artillery. They 

receive from all corps airplanes, 

or at least those having general 

functions (general observation, 

infantry accompaniment, command). The corresponding commands are thus in a position to 

exploit promptly all information 

received. 

e) Each landing field has a 

receiving station for testing the 

radio equipment of airplanes 

leaving, for following the work of 

airplanes at the front, and for 

providing relief for airplanes 

about to land. 

12. Listening service.-In 

each division, army corps, and 

army, the artillery commander, 

in cooperation with the Air Service and the Signal Corps, decides what portion of the receiving personnel shall be used for 

listening duty. 

At times, particularly during an 

action or in open warfare, the 

artillery commander so organizes 

the listening service that one station at least in each regiment or 

group will be in a position to 

receive calls from all airplanes 

calling the regiment or group, 

without other previous arrangement. Communication between 

such stations and the units to 

which they pertain must be carefully planned. Whatever be the 

kind of communication used, the 

radio officer is responsible for its 

proper operation. 

d) In each army corps, super4. See Doc. 40 
Artillery Adjustment 181 

Balloon. 

pends on: 

13. Balloon observation dea) The altitude of the balloon. 

b) The range. 

c) The atmospheric conditions. 

d) The terrain. 

14. Altitude.-Altitude is an 

essential condition for good observation. A balloon can ascend 

to about 1200 meters with two 

observers, and to 1600 or 1800 

meten with one observer. 

15. Range.-The balloon 

should be pushed as far foward 

as possible while actually observing, but should be withdrawn at once when it ceases to 

observe and while descending. 

It has been found by experience that, on a well established 

front, the balloon can be maneuvered up to within about 9 

or 10 kilometers of the front line. 

Points of ascension can be 

within 6 or 7 kilometers of the 

front line. These distances are 

determined by the position of 

the friendly and hostile artillery. 

They can be reduced when, during preparation for an attack, the 

hostile artillery is clearly dominated. 

Fog, strong wind, rain, and low 

clouds ordinarily prevent successful balloon observation. 

16. Atmospheric conditions.- 

For the present balloons, the 

limiting wind velocity is about 18 

meters, or 20 meters during an 

attack. 

17. Terrain.-Even when the 

balloon is at its maximum altitude, there is generally a portion 

of the terrain hidden from view. 

The balloon commander prepares a visibility sketch for each 

point of ascension, and transmits 

it to the command and the artillery commander. 

18. Communication.-Telephone.-The telephone assures 

constant and reciprocal communication between the balloon 

and the command and the artillery. It is the normal means. It 

should be established so as to 

permit direct communication between the balloon and the battery whose fire is being observed. 

Radio.-Balloon companies 

are provided with radio equipment for use when telephone 

communication fails. 

Visual communication.-In 

addition the observer has various means of communication 

for use with the infantry which 

may, with prearranged signals, 

be used in connection with observation of artillery fire. 

Chapter 2. Functions. 

servation for artillery are: 

a) Information. 

b) General observation. 

c) Liaison with the other arms. 

d) Observation of fire. 

19. The functions of aerial oh20. Information.-This includes the study of the hostile 

positions to locate objectives, 

such as command posts, machine gun emplacements, battery positions, communication 

trenches, etc. 

The best means of obtaining 

information is by photography 

for the interpretation of aerial 

photographs affords information 

which would not be noted by an 

observer during a reconnaissance. 

21. All aerial observers, during 

flights or ascensions, cooperate 

in obtaining information. This information is collected in each air 

unit by the intelligence officer 

attached, who communicates it 

at once to the Intelligence Section and the artillery information 

officer. 

Similarly the intelligence officer attached to an observation 

unit is given such information 

from other sources as will assist 

him in his work. 

Objectives are designated by 

coordinates. An Objective Card 

is made out for each objective, 

particularly batteries, giving all 

available information. . . . 
182 Combat 

Aerial photographs are the basis for rough sketches in the air 

unit, provisional interpretation in 

the army corps, and subsequent 

incorporation in the battle maps. 

The destruction maps are also 

made up from them. 

During active periods, the 

rapid distribution of such 

sketches and interpretations is of 

prime importance, in order to 

locate new objectives promptly 

and permit destruction fire. 

22. General observation.- 

This includes watching for hostile 

batteries in action and determining the objectives on which they 

are firing, reporting hostile 

troops which can be fired upon, 

and sometimes observing the 

movements of our own troops. 

23. Constant observation is 

ve y difficult for airplane squadrons. They have no other means 

than sight, since all sounds are 

drowned by the motor. They 

should be used for such observation only for areas hidden to 

balloon or terrestrial observation. 

Such observation is particularly 

the function of the balloon, in 

areas which are visible to it. 

24. General observation requires: 

Of the aerial observer, a 

prompt call for fire, when 

deemed appropriate. 

Of the command, prompt exploitation of the information obtained. 

When practicable, the receiving station informs the aerial observer which battey is to fire. 

25. Liaison with other arms.- 

See Liaison for All Arms. 

26. Observation of fire.-This 

includes fire for adjustment, precision fire for effect, and verification during precision fire for effect, zone fire, and systematic 

fire. 

The observer can determine 

not only the sense but also the 

deviation, if each salvo or volley 

is fired at his signal. 

In fire for adjustment or verification and for precision fire for 

effect, the method fulfills this 

condition, and airplane observation is vey advantageous. It 

saves ammunition and increases 

the efficacy of the fire. 

For zone and systematic fire, 

in which the volleys are fired 

without notifying the observer, 

airplane observation is uncertain 

and only fairly effective. 

27. An airplane can observe 

for but three hours at a time. 

Observation may be interrupted 

at any time by atmospheric conditions or incidents of combat. 

The fire should therefore be delivered as rapidly as possible, 

without sacrificing accuracy of 

laying. 

28. The balloon can observe 

the sense and sometimes the deviation of shots with respect to 

numerous objectives. It should 

be used for the observation of all 

firing on these objectives, including precision fire, when terrestrial 

observation is impossible. 

For oblectives hidden from 

balloon observation, i he balloon 

can still be used for a rough 

adjustment to be completed by 

airplane observation, or for the 

observation of fire for effect begun with airplane observation. 

29. The assignment of the 

available aerial cbsewation is 

based on the orders of the command and of the artille y and on 

the reports rendered by the Air 

Service. 

30. Coordination of balloons 

and airplanes-Close coordination of balloons and airplanes 

and a careful assignment of duties to each are essential for successful aerial observation. For 

this reason both are placed under the Air Service commander 

of the army corps or army. 

The general assignment of duties is made by the aitille y commander as follows: 

a) To balloons, the general 

observation and observation of 

fire for objectives which they can 

see, except those for which terrestrial observation can also be 

used; 

b) To balloons, the rough adjustment on objectives wherever 

possible, to be subsequently 

completed by airplane 

observation 

tion of fire only in cases for 

which balloon or terrestrial observation is impossible. 

The Air Service commander 

makes the detailed assignment 

of duties to airplanes and balloons, in accordance with the 

general assignments of the artilc) To airplanes, the observa- 
Artillery Adjustment 

ley commander and conditions 

at the time. He makes the necessary arrangements for the successive use of the two methods 

on the same objective, when this 

is appropriate. 

31. Division of duties among 

airplanes.-When an airplane 

can be assigned to each regiment or group of artillery in a 

restricted zone where the artillery 

preparation is well advanced, the 

observer should be given a definite task. He is then charged 

with general observation and the 

observation of fire. 

In order to avoid errors, it is 

desirable that the observer who 

reports an objective should also 

observe the fire upon it. 

In some cases however it is 

better to assign one airplane to 

general observation and the verification of fire over a larger 

zone, and to others, the observation of fire for adjustment and 

precision fire for effect. 

32. The relative importance of 

the various aerial functions varies with the phases and character 

of an action. This is covered in 

orders by the command. 

In an offensiue against a fortified position, the duties of artilley airplanes and balloons are 

generally as follows: 

a) lnformation and general 

observation accurately to locate 

batteries and other objectives. 

b) Observation of fire for adjustment on datum points and 

the principal objectives. 

for effect for the destruction of 

batteries and other hostile positions. 

d) At the same time, reconnaissance and photography, to 

determine the effect produced. 

ginning as early as possible on 

the day of the attack. 

f) During the action, the observation of neutralizing or destruction fire on the hostile artilley, in the form of fire for effect 

based on previous adjustments 

and on shifting fire on new objectives. Even, at this time, adjustments on important objectives may be necessary. These 

are assigned to special airplanes. 

33. During movements, each 

large unit, generally the division, 

is assigned a route of march and 

a zone of action. Airplanes rec) Observation of precision fire 

e) The verification of fire, beconnoiter this zone and transmit 

information by projectors, signal 

lights, dropped messages, or radio, to information centers. 

These are established successively along the route so as to 

secure continuous reception. 

lnformation centers are in 

communication with the landing 

field of the airplanes by visual 

signals, telephone, radio, carrier 

pigeons, airplanes, or automobiles. An officer of the Air Service of the army corps or division 

reconnoiters if possible a suitalble 

landing field near the information center. The necessary seritinels are assigned to it and cornmunications organized, 

The division commander generally has his artillery commander with him, and moves 

successively from one informaltion center to another as the 

movement continues. 

The division artillery commander requests of the squadron commander, through the 

nearest information center, the 

airplanes which are needed by 

him. He states the assignment 

intended if possible. 

The airplanes designated folr 

such duty report at the information center of the division, either 

from the air or by landing, in 

order to ascertain the battalion 

with which they are to work and 

the objectives. The battalion puts 

out its identification panel near 

the receiving station. 
184 Combat 

34. The division artillery commander establishes a radio receiving station with panels at the 

information center nearest to 

him. Each battalion commander 

installs his radio receiving station 

as soon as he occupies a position, even if he has good terrestrial observation posts. For this 

purpose the radio transportation 

must be pushed foxward with the 

reconnaissance. 

35. The designation of objectives and assignment of duties to 

airplanes is very important. For 

this reason, an auxiliary landing 

field near the division inforrnation center is desirable, and is 

the more so when the communications between the latter and 

the regular landing field of the 

squadron are not reliable. The 

division artillery commander 

sends instructions as to the various assignments to the auxiliary 

landing field. This is facilitated if 

he keeps available several artillery aerial observers, who can be 

given instructions in advance 

and sent to the landing field to 

meet the airplane as it lands. 

36. But in no case should the 

lack of an auxiliary landing field 

or pod communications be allowed to interrupt the successful 

execution of aerial observation. 

37. Balloons.-Balloons move 

with the unit to which they are 

assigned. The functions remain 

unchanged. They are charged 

with general observation and the 

observation of fire. Communication is by radio, projector or 

folding cylinder. Telephone 

communication is established as 

soon as possible. 

A balloon observer is permanently attached to the artillery 

staff. 

When the advance is rapid, 

the balloon is deflated. 

As the attack develops, the 

organization tends to take the 

form of that for the attack of an 

organized position. 

Chapter 4. 

Methods of Fire, Field, 

Heavy, and High Power 

Artillery. 

Airplane 

fire has the following advantages. 

objectives. 

tions. 

or volley as a whole and the 

determination of the estimated 

position of the center. 

tages: 

between the observer and the 

battery commander. 

49. Airplane observation of 

a) The accurate location of 

b) Determination of deviac) The observation of a salvo 

It has the following disadvana) Unreliable communication 

b) Short period of observation 

possible. 

c) Airplane moving zit high 

speed, with difficulties due to 

clouds, wind, sun, obstruction of 

view by the wings of the airplane, limited radius of action of 

the radio, and incidents of aerial 

combat. These ronder the observation intermittent. 

The following points are thus 

important: 

a) A previous complete understanding between the observer 

and the battalion or battery 

commander with whom he is to 

work. 

b) Use of simple methods. 

carefully prearranged, in order to 

avoid dialogues. 

c) Short, well conducted firing; 

to save time. 

Night Airplane Observation. 

requires the following: 

out mist over the ground. 

............................ 

91. Night airplane observation 

a) specially clear nights* withb) Airplanes of certain models. 

c) Very well-defined objecd) A thorough familiarity with 

tives. 

the ground on the part of the 

observer. 

e) Strict fire discipline**. 

*Airplane observation has been successfully 

used on moonless nights 

**The flashes of the bursts are extremely 

fleeting. and the close attentum 3.equired of the 

observer IS very trying 
Artillery Adjustment 11 85 

92. Night observation should 

be as nearly vertical as possible, 

as it is easier to catch the flashes 

in this manner. 

Communication from the 

ground to the airplane is by radio when the airplane has a receiving apparatus, or by searchlight. 

If searchlights are used, two 

are needed, pointed in the direction of the objective and elevated to about 15". One fixes 

the line of fire, and the other is 

used for signalling. 

............................ 

94. The sense of shots can be 

determined at night, but not the 

deviations. 

Night observation is safer for 

the airplane, which must operate 

well inside the enemy lines. The 

methods can be used advantageously for harassing and interdiction fire on distant objectives*, 

effectively protected in the daytime by the antiaircraft defense, 

such as depots, railroad stations, 

camps, or points of obligatory 

passage. It is not suitable for 

destruction fire on batteries that 

are difficult to distinguish at 

night. 

5 A visible target on which fire is adjusted 

immediately after adpstment on a target 

that is or may become obscured 

'In this case. the observer is not confused by 

the flashes of the pieces themselves or by bursts in 

connection with other firing, 

Balloon. c) To lessen the strain on the 

observer, he should be warned 

as to the departure of shots in 

the following manner: 

95. Methods Of fire.-The 

special signals prescribed in the 

case of airplane observation are Battery: to fire!7. 

not necessary for balloon observation, because of the continu- Battery: the 

ous and reciprocal communicathe battery by telephone. BalObserver: 

d) Firing by balloon observation should be followed by firing between the Observer and 

on a witness point. . . .5 loon observation imposes no 

special restriction in regard to the 

conduct of fire. 

The following should be noted 

however: 

a) Only percussion fire can be 

accurately observed. Time fire 

should be used only to locate 

the approximate point of shots 

which are being lost. 

b) In firing by salvos, the inter- I 

val between shots should be 5 1 

seconds at least, so as to permit 

observation of the individual cr/ 

shots. I 

I 

, 

, 

37. Commana OF the 

Aia Se~uice, AEF 

29 May 1918 

187 

The duties of the chief 

aviation officers at GHQ and 

at army, corps, and division 

levels in the AEF were restated when Brig. Gen. Mason 

M. Patrick (soon promoted to 

major general) replaced Foulois as Chief of Air Service, 

AEF. Foulois then became 

Chief of Air Service, First 

Army. Mitchell remained with 

I Corps.’ 

General Orders 

No. 81 

General Headquarters A.E.F. 

France, May 29, 1918 

I. The duties of the Chief of Air 

Service, A.E.F., provided for in 

G. 0. No. 31, current series, 

these headquarters, are as follows: 

1. The Chief of Air Service is a 

member of the staff of the Commander in Chief, and acts as 

adviser on aeronautical matters. 

2. He is responsible for the 

organization, training, materiel 

and equipment, methods, and 

all other matters affecting the 

efficiency of the Air Service. He 

will make suitable recommendations to the Chief of Staff, based 

on inspection and study, investigation and experience. 

3. He is responsible for the 

preparation of all details concerning the instruction and training of air units, in accordance 

with the approved training policies, and he is charged with the 

supervision of all Army Aeronautical Schools. 

4. He will supervise the training of all air units until they join 

the tactical units to which they 

are assigned, or until they are 

sent to the AS., S.O.S., for final 

training, instruction and assignment. 

to the Chief of Staff drafts of 

such manuals and other literature as may be necessary in the 

training and employment of all 

air units. 

Nothing in the foregoing will 

be construed as in any way lirniting or prescribing the powers 

and responsibilities of the Geinera1 Staff, as defined by G.O. 

No. 31, current series, these 

headquarters. 

rent series, these headquarters, 

is amended in accordance with 

the provisions of the preceding 

paragraph. 

11. Brigadier General Mason h4. 

Patrick, N.A., is announced as 

Chief of Air Service, A.E.F. 

111. The duties of the Chief of Air 

Service of an army are as follows: 

1. In each army there will be a 

Chief of Air Service, who will 

command the army air units and 

who will act as adviser to the 

Army Commander and the 

Army General Staff on all aeronautical matters. 

2. Under authority of the 

Army Commander, the Chief of 

the Air Service of an army, is 

5. He will prepare and submit 

6. General Order No. 31, cur1 The Air Servlce and some other elements of First Army were organized before 

the army itself was formally organized, and 

Pershing took command, on 10 August 

1918 Foulois and Mitchell could not get 

along together Alter trying to have Mitchell 

sent home, Foulois stepped aside wlth a 

recommendation that Mitchell be placed in 

charge of the First Army Air Servlce 
188 Combat 

charged with the instruction and 

inspection of all air units of the 

army. He will keep the Army 

Commander informed at all 

times Concerning aeronautical 

matters, and will make such recommendations as he considers 

necessaty concerning aeronautical personnel, materiel and 

methods. 

eral plan of operations, and in 

co-operation with G3 of the 

army, he prepares the general 

plan for the employment of all 

air units in the army. He prepares detailed plans for the air 

units under his direct orders. 

4. He is charged, in accordance with operation orders issued, with the apportionment of 

aeronautical materiel and equipment placed at the disposal of 

the army. 

5. In addition, he is charged 

with the instruction and supervision of all Air Service units and 

personnel in the Advance Section, S.O.S., pending their assignment to tactical units. 

3. In accordance with the genIV. 1. Brigadier General B. D. 

Foulois, S.C., is announced as 

Chief of Air Service, 1st Army. 

2. The air units now attached 

to the 1st Corps are detached 

therefrom and placed under the 

command of the C.A.S., 1st 

Army. 

V. The duties of the Chief of Air 

Service of an army corps are as 

follows: 

1. In each army corps there 

will be a Chief of Air Service, 

who will command the corps 

aeronautical units. 

2. He is the adviser of the 

Corps Commander and the 

Corps General Staff in all that 

pertains to the Air Service. He 

will keep the Corps Commander 

informed in regard to aeronautical matters, and will make such 

recommendations as he considers necessary Concerning aeronautical personnel, materiel and 

methods. In accordance with the 

general plan of operations, and 

in co-operation with G-3 of the 

corps, he prepares the general 

plans of action for all the air 

units of the corps. He insures the 

co-ordination of the aeronautical 

plans of divisions and supervises 

the employment of all air units 

throughout the corps in accordance with the approved plans. 

He prepares the detailed plans 

for the air units under his direct 

orders. 
Command of the 

kr Service, AEF 

1 I39 

3. Under the authority of the 

Corps Commander, the Chief of 

Air Service is charged with the 

instruction and inspection of all 

air units assigned or attached to 

the corps; the collection, dissemination and utilization of aeronautical information within the 

corps, and the necessary liaison 

with the artillery and the Air 

Service of the Army and of the 

neighboring corps. 

4. He apportions the aeronautical supplies and materiel placed 

at the disposal of the corps, and 

prepares timely requisitions for 

aeronautical materiel. 

VI. Colonel W. A. Mitchell, S.C., 

is announced as Chief of Air 

Service 1st Corps. 

VII. When aeronautical units are 

attached to a separate division, 

the senior Air Service officer on 

duty therewith will bear the 

same relation to the Division 

Commander and will perform 

duties similar to those prescribed 

above for the Chief of the Air 

Service of an Army Corps. 

VIII. The 27th and 147th Aero 

Squadrons (pursuit) and the 

96th Aero Squadron (bombardment) are assigned to the 1st 

Army A.E.F. These organizations 

will be reported by their commanding officers to the Chief of 

Air Service, 1st Army, A.E.F. 

for duty. 

By Command of General 

Pershing: 

James W. McAndrew, 

Chief of Stcff. 

38. No In8epenbent 

Ah Opermtions 

29 May 1918 

191 

Writing about his plan for 

strategic bombardment (Doc. 

29B), Gorrell told of conversations with Trenchard late in 

1917 concerning a cooperative Anglo-American bombing program. With Pershing's 

approval, Foulois had concluded an agreement with 

British officials on 26 January 

1918 for organizing, equipping, and training 30 U.S. 

squadrons for night bombardment with Handley Page 

aircraft. Approving the plan 

and agreement in general, 

Pershing informed Trenchard 

on 6 February 1918 that he 

(Pershing) would instruct 

Foulois "to take the necessary steps towards insuring 

the closest possible co-operation with the British Air 

Service."' Gorrell went on to 

say, however, that on 18 July 

Pershing's Chief of Staff 

(Maj. Gen. James W. MCAndrew) placed certain restrictions on U.S. bombing 

operations, and on U.S. Air 

Service cooperation with the 

British in such a bombing 

program. Following is McAndrew's statement, as well 

as an extract from the document, a memorandum from 

Patrick, to which McAndrew 

was responding.2 

American Expeditionary Forces, 

Services of Supply, Office of 

Chief of Air Service 

2. Approval is requested for 

the Chief of Air Service to designate officers charged with the 

May 29, 1918, following duties: 

MEMORANDUM for Chief of 

Staff, GHQ, American E.F. 

SUBJECT: Approval of preliminaries for nightbombing operations. 

1. In order to carry out the 

agreement arrived at with the 

British Commander-in-Chief for 

the joint operation of our bombardment squadrons, and approved by the Commander-inChief, A.E.F., February 8, 1918, 

and in view of the fact that: 

(a) Night bombing units operate independently of other 

units in the Air Service (do not 

require the protection of Pursuit 

unit). 

(b) The planes used are radically different from those required by day bombing and day 

pursuit squadrons. 

(c) The final training of the 

personnel is along entirely different lines from that followed in 

the case of observation, pursuit, 

and day bombardment personnel, it is recommended that the 

development and operation of 

the Night Bombardment F'rogram should be camed forward 

by such officers as may be designated to specialize in this Section 

of the Air Service. 

(a) Study the development 

of our organization, personnel, 

and material in conjunction with 

the British officers charged with 

night bombardment, in order 

that our bombing units, when 

created, may properly cooperalte 

with similar British units. 

(b) Establish a center for the 

organization and instruction of 

pilots and bombers in night 

flying and bombing operations 

with required British instructor!:, 

and make special study of British 

training in night navigation. 

1 Ltr, Pershing to Trenchard. 6 Feb 18. in 

2 In Gorrell's History. 6-6. pp 39-42 

Gorrdl's History. B-6. p 33 
192 Combat 

~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 

(c) Arrange for the training 

of transfer pilots to fly planes 

from England to the American 

airdromes in France. 

emergency landing fields between the Channel and the 

American airdromes. 

(e) Arrange with the British 

for carrying out the present 

agreement of making a new and 

more comprehensive agreement, 

for doing the repair work on 

night bombing machines at 

Courban. 

(f) Arrange with Ordnance 

Department to have officers attached to British squadrons to 

make study of bombs, bomb 

gears, etc., used on British 

planes. 

(9) Arrange with Intelligence 

Department for officer or officers 

to make study of bombing targets with British Intelligence Officers attached to British Brigade 

Headquarters. 

(d) Arrange for the required 

............................ 4. It is necessary that the 

above points be given close 

study in order that our bombing 

operation may be properly correlated with the bombing operation of the British when the 

American bombing planes are 

received at the front. 

(Sgd) Mason M. Patrick 

Brigadier General, N.A. 

C.A.S. 

1st Ind. 

G.H.Q., A.E.F., June 18, 1918. 

To C.A.S., Hq S.O.S. 

1. Approved subject to such 

limitations as are imposed by the 

following paragraphs. 

2. While cooperating in every 

possible way with the Air Forces 

of our allies, all of our bombing 

forces must remain an actual integral part of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

3. It is of special importance 

that the higher officers among 

our bombing personnel be impressed with the importance of 

the principle of the concentration 

of the effort to each arm, and of 

the coordination of all efforts, to 

a common tactical end. It is 

therefore directed that these officers be warned against any idea 

of independence and that they 

be taught from the beginning 

that their efforts must be closely 

coordinated with those of the 

remainder of the Air Service and 

with those of the ground army. 

4. In making arrangements 

with the British it must be thoroughly understood that when 

our forces reach a certain importance the regions to be bombed 

will be designated by these 

headquarters and that the selection of targets will depend solely 

upon their importance with respect to the operations which we 

contemplate for our ground 

forces. 

5. In the establishment of 

training schools the idea of making them purely Amemcan must 

govern. 

6. In order to prevent interference with other projects it is necessay that all bombing projects 

involving matters of construction, supply or repair be taken 

up with the Asst. Chief of Staff, 

G.4 at these headquarters. 

7. G.2 at these headquarters 

has already established the liaison requested in subparagraph 

(gl, paragmph 2. 

By direction. 

(Sgd.) J. W. McAndrew, 

Chief of Stajf. 


39, Restatement OF 

the 260-Sq~ab~on Plan 

5June 1918 

105 

On 2 May 1918 the War De 

partment informed the AEF by 

cable that production problems 

were making it impossible to 

meet the schedule for preparing 

squadrons for service at the 

front.’ On 20 May Pershing replied that developments to date 

did not require any change in 

the GOP and SORP, which he 

had approved. Those projects, 

he said, “set forth our needs 

and desires to include June 

1919.” He then laid out a schedule that would put all 260 

squadrons at the front by that 

time.2 This new schedule reflected significant changes 

made in the 26Gsquadron plan 

in the SORP of 18 September 

1917 (Doc. 27). The 60 bombardment squadrons of the 

SORP had been designated for 

night operab-~s, and the 41 observation squadrons first 

classed as strategical aviation 

had become day bombardment 

units. Because of some confusion that had developed during 

the exchange of a series of cables concerning schedules, Patrick restated the schedule in 

the following paper? to which is 

added a memorandum indicating Pershing’s approval4 

American Expeditiona ry Forces 

From: Chief of Air Service. 

To: Commander-in-Chief, 

Subject: Air Service Building 

5 June 1918. 

American E.F. 

Program In United 

States 

1. Cable 1224-R, dated May 

3, 1918, requested our recommendations for the United States 

Air Plane production program, 

to include June 1919. Our recommendations were sent to the 

United States on May 21, 1918, 

in paragraph 1 of cable 11564. 

The United States requested further information on May 26, 

1918, in paragraph 1 of Cable 

1397-R, and we gave them this 

information on May 31, 1918, in 

our cable 121SS. The building 

program given to the United 

States was based on allowing 

Squadrons to be efficiently operating on the front according to 

the following tabulation, and the 

United States was informed that, 

to accomplish this, the squadrons should reach the front 1 

month prior to the time when 

they were expected to be 

operating efficiently. 

2. As stated in paragraphs 1 

and 1-a of our cable 11564, 

the building program given to 

the United States conforms exactly to the General Organization 

Project approved by the Commander-in-Chief on July 11, 

1917, as amended and completed by the Senrice of the 

Rear Project approved by the 

Commander-in-Chief on September 18, 1917, for an Army 

of 20 combat divisions. 

3. It is noted that the cable 

1224-R states that all we need 

tell America is the dates when 

we wish squadrons ready for 

service on the front and that 

America will then make the necessary calculations to ascertain 

what size building program is 

necessary to permit us to motiilize the squadrons on the dates 

when we desire. . . . 

............................ 

6. It is requested that this program be reviewed and that it be 

returned to this office with suc:h 

4. In Gorrell’s History. A-7, p 68. It is 

interesting to note that the indorsement 

signed by McAndrew was written by Gorrell. 

For the date of the indorsement. which was 

missing. see the previous note 

5. In the table which follows. Observation 

and Bombardment have been abbreviated, 

and format for Mono- and Biplace Pur!;uit 

has been changed to save space. 

2. Cable 1156-5. Pershing to AGWAR 

Washington, May 21st. in Gorrell’s History, 

A-7, pp 65-86. 

3. In Gorrell‘s History, A-7, pp 6548. The 

day of the month, missing at the top of the 

copy of the letter in Gorrell’s History is 

supplied by a paper prepared by Gorrell on 

29 July 1918, in Gorrelk History. A-7, p 94. 

1. Cable 1224-R. McCain (Maj. Gen Henry 

P. McCain. TAG) to Pershing AMEX Forces, 

May 3d. in Gorrell’s History, A-7, pp 89-90, 
196 Combat 

additions, comments, or modifications as may be desired, and 

that it then be known as the 

“AIR SERVICE PROGRAM.” It 

is desired to send this paper to 

the United States to clarify, if 

necessary, the cables already 

sent. 

............................ Mason M. Patrick 

Brigadier General, N.A. 

__ 

CorpsObs Sq 31 6 2 3 15 

Army Obs Sq 1 5 4 4 5 5 24 

Monoplace Pursuit Sq 3 23 8 8 8 840 

Biplace Purstut Sq 4 39 16 16 16 16 80 

Day Bomb Sq 9 8 8 8 8 41 - 

Night Bomb Sq 12 12 12 12 12 60 

ESG(G-3) 

1st lnd. 

G.H.Q., American E.F., 

France, June 5, 1918. 

To: Chief of Air Service, 

American E.F. 

Returned. 

1. The Commander-in-Chief 

approves this program as a basis 

for production in the United 

States. It constitutes a program 

upon which it is desired the Air 

Service develop, provided the 

tonnage is available. It must be 

understood that the military situation will, from time to time, 

cause minor variations in the 

dates when Corps Observation 

and Army Observatiori Squadrons are needed, but this fact 

need not vary the building program as already furnished the 

United States. 

(signed) J. W. McAndrew 

Chi,ef of Staff. 
Restatement of the 

260-Squadron Plan 

197 

With emphasis on developing the aviation program. aircraft 

factories, such as the Liberty Englne plant (above), worked 

feverishly to meet productlon goals. 

40- InplztRg 

Liaison 

15June1918 

Early in the war, failure of 

landline and other communications during battle caused the 

British and French to devise 

means for using aircraft to keep 

infantry commanders informed 

on the movements and locations of their various units. Although balloons were used, 

most operations of this type 

were carried out by airplanes. 

For such infantry liaison, or infanby contact work the Air Service, AEF, adopted procedures 

issued by the French in a pamphlet, “Instruction on Liaison for 

Troops of All Arms,” dated 12 

December 191 6. Following are 

extracts f’rom a revised edition, 

issued by the French on 28 De 

cember 1917 and published in 

translation by GHQ AEF on 15 

June 1918.1 

1 In Gorrell’s History. J-3. beglnnlng p 

2 00 

Liaison For All Arms 

I. General Considerations. 

1. The object of liaison is as 

follows: 

To keep the commander constantly posted on the situation of 

the units under his orders, and 

to furnish him with a basis for his 

decisions. 

To insure, between the various echelons of the command, 

between adjoining units and between the various arms of the 

service, the safe and rapid transmission of orders, questions, reports and information, and in a 

general way to insure all communications necessa y to obtain 

a close co-operation, particularly 

bebeen the infantry and artillery. 

Consequently, to be complete, the liaison must secure the 

following communications: 

(1) From the front to the 

rear. 

(2) From the rear to the 

front. 

(3) Laterally between units 

co-operating in the same action. 

It utilizes: 

(a) Means of obtaining information (liaison agents, ground 

observation, aerial observation, 

liaison with airplane, liaison with 

balloon). 

(b) Means of transmission: 

Telephone and telegraphy. 

Radio telegraphy and earth telegraphy (T.S.F. and T.P.S.) 

Visual and acoustic signaling. 

Various signaling (by arms, by 

panels, by fireworks). 

Courier. 

Carrier pigeons, etc. 

............................ 

Chapter 1V. 

Liaison by Airplanes and 

Balloons. 

1. Airplanes. 

A. Work Assigned to Airplanes. 

23. In combat, besides the 

various duties of reconnaissance 

which may be assigned to them 

by the commander, the work of 

aerial observers includes: 

Watching the enemy in the 

zone of the combat. 

Liaison of the commander 

with subordinate echelons. 

Accompanying the infantry. 

In an army corps, for instance, 

these duties may be distributed 

in the following way: 

( 1) One or several airplanes: of 

command follow the general development of the combat, watch 

the enemy within the assigned 

zone, give information as to the 

distribution of his forces, indications of counter-attacks, etc. 

(2) Courier airplanes are 

charged with the rapid transmission of orders from the commander and of valuable information about their own situation, that of nearby units and 

that of the enemy. 

(3) Airplanes for accompanying the infantry (cavalry uses the 

same methods as infantry for its 

liaison with airplanes and balloons), as a rule‘one per 

division. 
200 Combat 

They follow the assaulting 

troops and reserves, observe signals of the firing line and of the 

command posts and transmit 

them to the general commanding the division, and possibly to 

the artillery radio stations, to the 

command posts of brigade and 

regiment. 

They transmit to the infantry 

the orders of the division commander and, generally speaking, 

inform the commander of everything going on in the vicinity of 

the first line and behind it. 

nying the infantry is provided 

with distinctive signs (pennants, 

rows of lights, etc.), and besides 

makes itself known by a sound 

signal and a signal cartridge, 

both determined by the plan of 

liaison. 

Its characteristics and the signals which it uses to communicate with the infantry ought to 

be familiar to all men of the units 

for which it works. 

To prevent its appearance 

from giving the enemy a sure 

indication of an impending attack, and to make all concerned 

familiar with their own airplanes, 

it is indispensable that the airplanes accompanying the infantry fly frequently over the lines 

during the days of artillery preparation. Outside these periods 

they should fly from time to time 

in order to practice liaison with 

the infantry. 

24. The airplane for accompaThe airplane for accompanying the infantry rises above the 

advanced units to a height which 

must not exceed 1,200 meters. 

In certain cases it may be 

obliged to fly over the lines at 

very low height, but must not 

come below 600 meters except 

in case of necessity. 

It must be the constant care of 

the crew to assist the infantry, 

noting exactly its position and its 

needs and conveying rapidly 

such information to the commander and the artillery. 

B. Means of Communication. 

(1) Communication From The 

Airplane to The Earth. 

25. Airplanes communicate 

with the earth by means of 

(a) Weighted messages (1) for 

important indications, sketches 

and photographs intended for 

the command posts of army 

corps, divisions, brigades, and in 

exceptional cases of regiments. 

To drop a weighted message 

the airplane comes down to a 

low height (about 200 meters) 

above the command post concerned, calls the attention of the 

addressee by one or several 

sound signals (fixed by the plan 

of liaison), and drops its message 

so that it falls in open ground. 

(The plan of liaison should prescribe, as far as possibba, on 

what terrain weighted messages 

shall be dropped.) 

In the course of the infantry’s 

advance, supported by artillery 

fire of all calibers, it is difficult for 

an airplane to get through the 

very dense sheet of projectiles. 

At the moment it can drop messages on a command post located near the line of batteries 

only by remaining above that 

sheet, hence under bad conditions for carrying out it:; duty. 

(b) Radio telegraphy, for urgent information (position of 

friendly troops, requests for artillery fire, lengthening of range, 

etc.), to the authorities whose 

receiving station is likely to hear 

it, i.e., to commanders of army 

corps, divisions, brigades, infantry regiments, artillery goups 

and battalions. 

Such communications are 

made by using one of 1 he codes 

of Appendix VI.* Only such indications as are totally useless to 

the enemy may be transmitted in 

plain language. 

(c) Visual signaling arid signaling by fireworks (conventional 

signals of codes in Appendix VI) 

after having drawn attention by 

a sound signal (fixed by the plan 

of liaison) for communications 

intended for such elements as 

have no radio stations ,at their 

disposal and whose advance position does not permit the dropping of weighted messages. 

111 The message itself is placed in a metal box 

provided with a white or colored pennant which 

increases its visibility. 

2 This appendix and the othrmrs cited have 

been omitted 
I nf ant ry 

Liaison 

2101 

With the fireworks used nowadays the airplane cannot possibly indicate which element it 

wishes to communicate with. 

Such signals are consequently 

intended for all elements constituting the large unit for whose 

benefit the airplane is working. 

The use of projectors, on, the 

contra y, enables the airplane to 

choose its correspondent. It is 

therefore advisable to try constantly to improve the latter 

method. 

To be visible, visual and fireworks signals must not be used 

when the airplane is seen by the 

duties to be carried out, 

the better. 

be fired from a height greater 

than 300 meters, and as much 

as possible upwards, to avoid 

confusion with the signals made 

by the infantry. 

(2) Watch Posts 

26. In order that the airplane 

signals and the messages sent by 

them may not pass unnoticed, in 

case the noise of the battle 

drowns the sound signals, a permanent watch post service must 

be secured by the radio officers, 

or by the officers in charge of the 

liaison near the posts of command of army corps, division, 

brigade, regiment, artillery group 

and battalion, as soon as the 

post of command is established. 

This service is carried on by obSignal cartridges must always 

servers within the battalions and 

companies. (The distribution of 

the personnel should be such as 

to insure simultaneously “observation” and “watch.”) 

(3) Communication From The 

Earth to The Airplane. 

27. The airplane receives 

communications from the firing 

line and from the command 

posts. 

(a) Firing line: The line indicates its location: 

1. By means ofposition-rnarking panels, All men carting 

panels alternately open and shut 

their apparatus, taking care to 

set it facing the airplane with that 

side whose color stands out better on the surrounding ground. It 

is better to use many panels 

simultaneously during a fairly 

short time than a smaller number of panels during a longer 

time; thus, the line is automatically traced very quickly and 

clearly and troubles caused by 

forgotten panels are avoided. 

To reduce the enemy’s 

chances of spotting our line, the 

airplane observer must endeavor 

to reduce to a minimum the time 

required to take note of the new 

line. 

Panels are folded up again as 

soon as the airplane signals 

“understood,” and in any case 

after ten minutes. 

2. By means of Bengal flares 

of certain color (fixed by the 

plan of liaison). These signals 

constitute the surest way of indicating one’s position. It is important, however, to conceal them 

as much as possible from hostile 

view, by hiding them behind ii 

screen, at the bottom or on the 

front side of a shell crater, while 

taking care that they remain visible to friendly observers. 

To avoid confusion it is forbidden to display positionmarking 

panels or to light Bengal flares 

anywhere but on the line. (This 

interdiction applies as well to patrols sent in front of the lines as 

to supporting or reinforcing 

units). 

In order to distinguish clearly 

the signals made by our infanltry 

from those which might be set 

by the enemy to impede observation it is important to agree 

that panels or Bengal flares will 

be placed in groups of 2, 3, etc. 

3. For want of marking pariels 

and Bengal flares, the line uses 

all means available to indicate its 

location: signal cartridges of the 

25 mm pistol or V.B.,3 signal 

projectors sending series of alternated dots and dashes, waved 

handkerchiefs, pocket mirrors, 

etc. 

The marking out of the firing 

line is carried out 

Either at an hour set beforehand, or on a prearranged line: 

for instance, the final objective 

or one of the successive objectives: or by order of the command transmitted by the airplane by means of the signal 

cartridges, “Where are you?’ 

after having drawn the infantry’s 

attention by a sound signal; or 

upon the company or platoon 

3. Viven Besaera; a smoke grenade. 
202 Combat 

commander’s initiative, when 

their unit cannot advance any 

farther; or when, compelled to 

fall back, it has succeeded in 

securing a hold on the ground. 

Orders for marking out should 

not be too frequent. In principle 

the marking out will be done by 

panels. 

Should the observer not see 

the panels, or should he see 

them badly, he will request another marking out, which will 

then be executed by means of 

J3engal flares. 

In that case the company or 

platoon commanders will also 

signal their positions by means 

of color signal cartridges fired 

with the 25 mm pistol. 

The line sends its request to 

the airplane by means of the 

same fireworks and according to 

the same codes as for communications with the rear (see codes 

of Appendix VI). 

The airplane transmits these 

requests by radio to the general 

commanding the division. 

(b) Command posts. The different command posts indicate 

their locations by means of the 

identification panels described in 

Appendix Ill. 

Such panels are placed, eithei 

upon initiative from the command post to draw the airplane’s 

attention, or at a fixed hour, by 

order of the higher command 

transmitted to the command 

post by the airplane under the 

same conditions as to the firing 

line. Hence, as soon as the airplane sends out the signal, 

“Where are you?” all command 

posts noticing the signal should 

mark their respective positions. 

The panels are removed as soon 

as the airplane has answered, 

“Understood.” 

Command posts of generals 

commanding army corps and divisions can communicate by radio with such airplanes as have a 

receiving apparatus. 

All command posts can communicate with airplanes either by 

visual signaling or by means of 

their rectangular panels (described in Appendix III), using 

the conventional signals of Appendix VI. 

As a rule, visual signals are 

repeated and panel signals left in 

place until the airplane has answered, “Understood” (preferably by projector signals). 

11. Balloons 

A. Duties of Ballooas. 

28. The divisional balloon, 

whose work it is to insure liaison 

for the infantry, carries (3s a distinctive mark one or more pennants attached to the rear or to 

the cable of the balloon. If a 

night ascension is deemed necessary in order to receive signals 

from the infantry, the balloon 

indicates its presence by means 

of a luminous signal lit i4t regular 

intervals. 

Like the airplane for accompanying the infantry, its duties 

consist in: 

Following the progress of assaulting troops and reserves. 

Observing the signals from the 

line of the command posts, and 

transmitting them to the general 

commanding the division. 

Informing the commander of 

everything going on in i he vicinity of the firing line, and behind 

it. 

Sending out, if necessary, to 

the advanced elements conventional signals provided for in the 

plan of liaison. 

8. Means of Cornmimication 

29. (1) From the balfoon to 

the command. The babon is 

directly connected by telephone 

with the divisional command 

post (balloon circuits) arid with 

the army system. 

It is besides provided with a 

radio apparatus enabling it to 

transmit its observations in case 

telephone communications 

should not work. 
Infantry 

Liaison 

203 

(2) From the balloon to the 

jiring line and to the advance 

command posts. The balloon 

can communicate with the advance elements. 

(a) In daytime by means of a 

cylinder which folds and unfolds 

at will, thus making signals corresponding to dots and dashes. 

These transmissions are limited 

to the two signals, “Understood” 

or “Repeat,” preceded by the 

call of that particular post which 

the balloon addresses. 

(b) At night by means of luminous signals, enabling it to send 

more complete messages, which, 

however, are always likely to be 

read by the enemy. 

(3) From the firing line and 

the advance command posts to 

the balloon. In daytime, the firing line and the advance command posts indicate their positions to the balloon and communicate with it by means of the 

same methods as for communicating with the infantry airplane. 

However, the following should 

be noted: 

(a) The balloon does not send 

out to the firing line the order to 

mark out the line which it occupies. Consequently it only observes the prearranged making, 

or that ordered by the airplane. 

(b) The balloon does not see 

(c) It can see the identification 

the panels clearly. 

panels and the rectangular 

panels of the command posts 

only when they are inclined at a 

sufficient angle. 

(d) Being far away from the 

lines it can hardly ever receive in 

daytime the signals made by the 

advanced elements with the 24 

cm. projectors. 

At night the balloon indicates 

its presence and position by 

lighting a luminous signal at regular intervals. 

To this end, at an hour settled 

in the plan of liaison, the balloon 

sends out its call several times in 

succession and keeps its light up 

for five minutes. 

The signalers of the different 

command posts take note of the 

direction of the balloon, orient 

their projector toward it, call up 

and then send their particular 

station call to the balloon until 

the latter sends it back. The balloon then takes them from right 

to left successively and receives 

their message, which it immediately transmits to the post of 

command by telephone or radio. 

After these liaisons have been 

established the balloon observer 

watches the battlefield to catch 

any call which the different posts 

of command might send to him, 

and every 15 minutes he indicates his presence by two-minUte calls. 

As soon as he notices a call 

from a command post he starts 

communications with that post 

according to service regulations 

prescribed in Appendix V. Signals must be transmitted at low 

speed. 

41- Ingantrzg 

Liaison in I CORPS 

June 1918 

205 

The following instructions' 

for infantry liaison apparently 

were written shortly before I 

Corps began operations early 

in July 1918 and before the 

AEF version of the French 

instructions of 28 December 

1917 (see Doc. 40) had been 

received. Much attention is 

given to a variety of ways for 

aerial observers to communicate with infantry troops and 

headquarters. With radiotelegraphy for air-ground communications still in its infancy, and with radiotelephony even less developed, 

there really was no satisfactory means of communication, as these instructions indicate. 

Notes on Liaison 

Between Aircraft and 

Infantry During 

Attack 

Prepared under direction of Col. 

W. Mitchell, C.A.S. First Army 

corps. 

I. Functions of the Infantry 

Airplane. During periods of attack one infantry airplane is, in 

general, allotted to each Division. The functions of this plane 

are:- 

1. To follow the advance of 

the attacking troops and reserves. 

2. To observe signals from the 

1 In Gorrell's History, J-12 

front or most advanced line and 

the various P.C. and to transmit 

them to the Division Commander and, when required, to 

receiving stations of the P.Cs. of 

the artilley, Division, Brigade, or 

Regiment. 

3. To transmit to the infanty 

the orders of the Division Commander, and, in general, to keep 

the headquarters informed of 

eveything that is going on in the 

neighborhood of the advanced 

line and behind it. 

The Infantry Airplane, therefore, has a double mission to 

assure; first, to keep the staff 

informed of what is taking place, 

secondly, to act as liaison agent 

between the troops in the first 

line and Division Headquarters, 

or, when required, with the 

P.Cs. or artilley and infantry brigades or regiments. This forms a 

task of the highest importance 

and one which is extremely 

complex and vey delicate. It can 

be said without exaggeration 

that liaison with the infantry is 

the most difficult mission that 

can be entrusted to an aerial 

observer. For this reason, it is 

indispensible, both for the infantrymen and for the aviator, that 

exercises should be held frequently and as closely as possible approaching the realities of 

active warfare. The work of liaison with infantry is extremely 

difficult and arduous, both for 

the infantry and for the aviators, 

that the more practice exercises 

held to familiarize both with the 

duties to be camed out, 

the better. 

11. Mission of the Infantry 

Airplane-general principles. It is difficult to fix definite 

limits to the activity of Infantry 

Airplanes, Artillery Surveillance 

Airplanes, and Command Airplanes. It should not be forbidden to the observer in the Infantry Airplanes, to spot enemy beitteries in action and to signal 

them to the artillery, or to notify 

the Command of points particularly swept by the fire of the 

enemy; nor should it be forbidden to the artillery observer to 

observe and report matters of 

interest in our front lines or 

trenches, but the former is solely 

responsible for locating the advance of our attacking infantry, 

whereas the latter is solely responsible for observing, adjusting and directing the fire of our 

artilley. The observer of the Infanty Airplane has about all h'e 

can do to see what is occurring 

in the neighborhood and behind 

the foremost lines of the infanhy. 

Without entirely ignoring what is 

going on on the enemy's side, 

he should, in principle, only interest himself with our own infanty. If he fails to confine himself to this, he runs a considerable risk of failing to satisfactorily 

cany out his mission and obtam 

the best possible results. It is 

essential that the observer 

should thoroughly realize this-- 

that what takes place beyond 

our foremost lines is not his concern; this latter is the mission of 

the Command Airplane. 
206 Combat 

111. Mission of the Infantry 

Airplane--execution. The Infantry airplane flies above our 

lines, slightly behind our most 

advanced troops at an altitude 

generally low, but varying with 

atmospheric conditions, the nature of the ground, and what the 

observer is looking for. This altitude, however, should never be 

more than 1,200 meters and 

only exceptionally less than 600 

meters. Owing to the vulnerability of a low flying observation 

airplane, it should not descend 

below 600 meters except in 

cases of absolute necessity. It is, 

furthermore, advisable that the 

plane should not keep constantly 

to the same altitude, as by frequently changing its altitude, it is 

less likely to be hit by shots fired 

from the ground. During the 

course of operation, the surveillance of the battlefield should, in 

principle, begin before dawn and 

the infantry airplane should 

leave its field while it is stiil dark 

so as to arrive above the lines at 

the first moments of daylight. 

This is nearly always the most 

interesting time of day for observation. The results of reconnaissance by infantry airplanes during a light rain are often particularly valuable for the reason that 

at such a time the enemy takes 

few precautions to conceal himself, generally thinking that he is 

in complete security from aerial 

observation. 

At the beginning of offensive 

operations, the Infantry Airplane 

should not amve over the lines 

until a little after “H’ hour, so as 

not to call the attention of the 

enemy prematurely to the point 

and moment of attack. When no 

attack is planned it is sometimes 

of value for an airplane to fly 

over the lines at dawn dropping 

various luminous signals in order 

to deceive and worry the enemy. 

Fire from the ground by the 

infantry constitutes the principal 

source of danger for the low 

flying observation plane. The 

best method of contending with 

this and protecting himself as far 

as possible, is for the observer to 

fire with his machine gun as frequently as he can against the 

enemy trenches and positions. 

Furthermore, by machine gunning certain suspicious points, 

the observer often succeeds in 

making the enemy disclose himself by movements. 

IV. Means of communication between the airplane 

and the ground. 

signals by radio all his observations, in general addressing himself to the Division report center. 

He must pay special attention to 

the rapidity and clearness with 

which he sends his messages, 

and he should not hesitate to 

repeat his message several times 

until the receiving station gives 

the signal “understood.” It is ad1. By radio. The observer 

stations should also take any 

messages sent to the Division 

report center. Infantry airplane 

observer should not send by radio any information of which 

they are not certain. Observations of this nature should be 

noted on the written message to 

be dropped at the report center, 

mentioning, of course, the fact 

that the information is of doubtful accuracy. All radio messages 

should be preceded by the call 

letters indicating to whom the 

message is addressed. Coordinates, etc., must always be given 

in code. It is most strictly forbidden for any messages to be sent 

in clear. 

Note: Before leaving the 

neighborhood of his airdrome, 

the infantry airplane observer 

will test the working of his radio 

with the receiving station of the 

group (squadron) and will not 

start off over the line until the 

latter has notified him by a 

prearranged signal (a Special 

form of panel, for example) that 

his radio is working properly. For 

this reason, the Infanby Airplane 

must take off from his field early 

enough to make this test and, if 

necessary, to remedy any fault in 

his radio and still arrive over the 

lines at the hour fixed 

2. By visual signals and signal lights. The observer carries 

two sorts of luminous signals: 

1. The projectcr. 

2. Signal lights of various 

visabk that the artillery receiving kinds. 

Up to the present time the former method has been by no 

means perfected, and, although 
Infantry Liaison 

in I Cops 

207 

it has many advantages over the 

light signals, the infantry is not 

yet sufficiently expert in reading 

indications sent them from an 

airplane by projector to allow 

this method to be successfully 

employed. 

Liaison by signal lights presents several disadvantages. In 

the first place, such signals do 

not indicate the unit with whom 

the airplane desires to communicate (for example, they do not 

show that the observer wishes to 

call the attention of one certain 

battalion, rather than any other 

battalion that happens to be in 

the neighborhood). The considerable variety of signal lights 

which have to be employed necessitate the canying of a large 

number of cartridges, with the 

result sometimes of overloading 

the airplane. The pistol, unless 

fixed, is long and inconvenient. 

It may occur, by a false movement on the part of the observer, by a violent movement 

on the part of the plane or by 

bad functioning of the pistol, that 

the signal light is shot-inside, or 

on to the fuselage or wings of 

the machine. To guard against 

the last difficulty, it is desirable 

that the pistol should be fastened 

to the edge of the cockpit. An 

aluminum pistol is preferable, 

because of the weight, to one in 

bronze . 

Signal lights should not be 

fired from an Infantry Airplane at 

an altitude of less than 300 meters, in order to avoid confusion 

with similar signals fired from the 

ground. The pistol should be 

held vertically. 

Before leaving his field the observer should test the working of 

his signal pistol. A second pistol 

should always be carried in case 

for any reason the first one fails 

to work, and, furthermore, in 

order to permit of two different 

signals lights being fired rapidly 

one after the other. The latter is 

of value when, as often happens, the observer is required to 

send successively “I am the infanty airplane of “X’ Division”, 

and “Where are you?’ 

3. By sound signals. This is 

another method which has not 

yet been completely perfected, 

although tests with certain instruments have given good results. 

Infanty airplane reconnaissance 

over the positions held by the 

first lines of our attacking troops 

being usually made at a predetermined hour, and the Infanty 

airplane flying at a lower altitude 

than any other plane and bearing distinctive marks and letting 

off identifying light signals, there 

is little chance that it will fail to 

be recognized by the many infantymen who will be looking at 

it. It does not, therefore, appear 

necessary for a sound signal to 

be employed in this case. On the 

other hand, sound signals are 

practically indispensable in the 

case of airplanes wishing to inform the P.C. that they intend to 

drop a weighted message, because, particularly if the P.C. is8 

under shell fire, the vigilance of 

the look-outs cannot always be 

relied upon. If the plane is not 

equipped with a Klaxon horn, or 

some other type of sound producing instrument, a peculiarly 

timed burst of machine gun fire, 

several times repeated, if necessay, will usually have the same 

effect. 

4. By weighted message. 

Weighted messages are especially valuable for the purpose of 

confirming and completing the 

information already dispatched 

by radio or by various light signals. Weighted messages are 

dropped at the P.Cs. of Army 

Corps and Divisions, and but 

exceptionally to P.C. of infantry 

regiments. Weighted messages 

should never be dropped to atlvanced units, for orders or infcamation addressed to the P.C. of 

a battalion, for example, run a 

considerable risk of falling into 

the enemy hands. It is necessary 

for observers to practice dropping weighted messages from a 

height of at least 200 meters, 

until they are able to drop thein 

with the greatest precision. 
208 Combat 

Written messages, and maps 

showing the location of Bengal 

fires, P.Cs. &c., should be made 

in triplicate (one copy to be 

dropped at Division P.C. or Report Center, one copy at Army 

Corps Report Center, if required 

and one copy retained for the 

Squadron Commander). Before 

leaving the airdrome the three 

copies of the map, with new 

carbon sheets between, should 

be carefully affixed to an aluminum back and kept in place by 

gummed comers and by surgeons tape around the edges. 

The same is done with the message forms. The observer indicates in pencil on the map the 

location of our front line and 

P.Cs., as shown him by panels, 

Bengal fires &c. and any other 

observations of interest, noting 

the hour. When he has completed his mission he pulls off 

the tape and takes off one sheet 

of the map, rolls it up, and puts 

it in the Div. P.C. The second 

sheet is similarly taken off and 

placed in the message carrier for 

the Army Corps P.C., and the 

third is left attached to the board 

by means of a clip. The same is 

done with any messages that the 

observer may have written out. 

V. Means of communication between the ground and 

the airplane. The Infantry Airplane observer receives signals 

both from the most advanced 

line and from the Staff (generally 

the Staff of the Infantry Division). 

1. Communication with the 

most aduanced line. Units of the 

most advanced line (excluding 

both patrols sent further out and 

units in support or reserve further back) signal their location 

by- a) Individual panels (one for 

b) Bengal fires. 

c) Projectors. 

d) Signal lights. 

e) Various make-shift methods, such as mirrors, pocket 

torch lights, handkerchiefs, overcoat linings, etc. 

At the demand of the Infantry 

Airplane, or at an hour prearranged by the Staff, or at the 

initiative of a Company Commander or the Commander of 

any other unit, when this unit 

can no longer advance, or when 

after having been obliged to retire he has succeeded in holding 

his ground-the infantrymen lay 

out their individual panels. If the 

Infantry Airplane observer fails 

to see the panels, or has difficulty in distinguishing them, he 

repeats his signal of identification 

“I am the Infantry Airplane of 

“X’ Division”, and the question 

“Where are you”, and thereupon the signals of the infantry 

two men). 

must be made by Bengal fires. 

(a) Panels 

In case of individiual panels, 

because of their small dimensions, it is indispensable that they 

be placed together in groups of 

at least three or four, in order 

that the observer may see them 

clearly. Furthermore, it is necessay that they should he waved 

or moved about at the right moment in order to attract the observer‘s attention-the right moment being when the airplane 

has passed slightly beyond a 

point directly above the signalers. The observer will do his 

utmost to reduce to a strict minimum the time necessary for him 

to note the positions shown by 

the signals, in order not to keep 

the attention of the intwtry for 

too long a time and to avoid, as 

far as possible, that the enemy 

should be able to locale our line. 

On the other hand, infantrymen 

should wave and moue about 

their panels for a time sufficient 

for the Infantry Airplane observer to properly locate them. It 

is extremely difficult for anyone 

on the ground to determine the 

exact moment at which an airplane passes vertically over him, 

and it is certainly better for the 

panels to be shown a little too 

long than not long enough. 

However, if at the end of ten 

minutes the Infanty Airplane 

has not given the signal “understood’, the panels should be 

rolled up. 

vey important point that the 

panels when laid out must be 

It is necessary to insist on the 
Infantry Liaison 

in I Corps 

2109 

“living,” that is to say, continually moved about or agitated, 

and not merely unrolled and left 

lying. If this is not done it is likely 

to give rise to errors of the greatest importance, for immobile 

panels are very apt to give erroneous, or at least uncertain indications to the observer, being 

easily confused with other things 

and not informing the observer 

whether or not they are the locations of the most advanced line. 

Individual panels should be 

placed in such a way as not to 

be visible to the enemy, i.e., 

inclined on the parados of a 

trench, hidden in shell holes, or 

behind a slight rise of ground, 

etc. It is strictly forbidden to anyone not in the most advanced 

line to signal his presence by 

means of individual panels. This 

does not, of course, apply to 

battalion P.Cs. whose identification panels should be laid out as 

won as the Infantry Airplane 

sends his signal “Where are 

you?” The laying out of the battalion identification panels is 

often very useful to the airplane 

observer, especially when he has 

no clear idea of the approximate 

location of the most advanced 

line. Similarly, and for the same 

reasons, it is desirable that regimental P.Cs. should lay out their 

identification panels when the 

Infantry Airplane sends his signal 

“Where are you?’ (This is formally ordered in the French instructions of the 28th December, 

1917.. . .) 

Care must be taken to prevent 

the panels from becoming dirty. 

It is recommended that they 

should be carried in cloth cases 

or sacks to protect them from 

mud and dust. 

(b). Bengal fires. 

The panels have the serious 

inconvenience of being invisible, 

or nearly so, against light background, such as clay soil broken 

up by shell fire, or when they 

become soiled and are no longer 

a brilliant white-which is nearly 

always the case. 

Bengal fires, on the contrary, 

are always visible against no 

matter what background, and 

constitute certainly the most satisfactory method of signaling 

from the ground. It is, however, 

important that they should be 

concealed from the view of the 

enemy, while, at the same time, 

being clearly visible to the observer in the airplane. For this 

reason they should be placed 

behind a screen, or at the bottom or on the forward slope of a 

shell hole, etc. The same way as 

in the case of the panels, the 

Eiengal fires should be placed 

out in groups of three or four so 

as to be more visible to the 

airplane observer. 

(c) Projectors. 

Projectors can hardly be 

considered as a means of signaling the location of the advanced 

lines, but they can be very usefully employed to attract the attention of the airplane observer. 

They possess the advantage of 

being able to be employed without attracting the attention of the 

enemy and, furthermore, of 

being the more visible the worse 

is the visibility. Well handled 

they should render excellent 

service, but it is essential that the 

signalers with the infantry be 

very skillful in following the airplane. The present number of 

projectors authorized for a battalion (14) is considered to be 

scarcely sufficient and should be 

added to. Furthermore, in order 

to simplify the handling of a projector to as great an extent as 

possible, it is desirable that the 

signalers carry spare batteries 

and lamps. 

(d) Signal lights and 

smokes. 

Signal lights sent up from 

the ground give only a very 

vague indication of the point 

from which they were sent (not 

within 50 or 100 meters) and, 

therefore, are of little value to 

any one desiring to signal “I am 

here.” As for smoke signals, 

these are practically useless during battle as it is almost impossible to distinguish them among 

the shell-bursts. 

(el Make-shift methods. 

Handkerchiefs waved in the 

air, overcoats turned inside out, 

so that the lining is exposed, and 

waved, pocket electric torches, 

mirrors, etc., directed towards 

the airplane, etc., etc., are very 

ineffective and give very poor 
21 0 Combat 

results, but they should not be 

forgotten in any special circumstance when other regular methods of signaling are, for any reason, not available. 

(f) At present, with the apparatus available for receiving 

radio messages by an airplane, 

the results are so uncertain that it 

is hardly worth considering this 

method for signaling from the 

ground to the airplane in connection with liaison with infantry. 

For an observer to be encumbered with the radio receiving 

helmet and constantly obliged to 

look at his lamps and mess 

about with the handles, would 

seriously interfere with the efficient performance of his mission, 

which requires concentrated observation of what is going on 

below him. 

Staffs and Headquarters. 

their locations to the airplane 

observer by means of the different identification panels described in Annex 4 of the instructions of 28th December 

1917. These panels are laid out 

at the discretion of the P.C. in 

order to attract the attention of 

the airplane, or at a certain hour, 

arranged beforehand, or by order of the higher command, 

2. Communication with 

The various P.Cs. indicate 

transmitted to the P.C. by the 

airplane in the same manner as 

to the most advanced line. The 

panels should be taken in as 

soon as the airplane has given 

the signal “understood”. 

It is, of course, possible for the 

P.Cs. of the Corps Commander 

or Division Commanders to 

communicate by radio with any 

airplanes which have receiving 

apparatus on board, but it must 

be remembered that this procedure practically results in making 

the observer both blind and deaf 

to everything else during a comparatively long time when it 

might be more profitable for him 

to be employed in observing 

what is going on beneath him. 

All P.Cs. may communicate with 

the infantry airplanes, either by 

means of optical signals or with 

the rectangular panels of the 

P.Cs, as described in Annex 4, 

and employing the conventional 

signs used in Annex 8 of the 

instructions of December 28, 

1917. In general, optical signals 

should be repeated and panels 

left in position until the airplane 

has given the signal “understood’. To avoid enabling the 

enemy to locate the P.C. it is 

preferable, if possible that the 

observer should give the signal 

“understood” by projector. 

VI. Preparations for liaison 

with infantry. 

The missions of Infantry Airplanes and Command Airplanes 

can only be carried out effectively when the observers are 

thoroughly trained and have a 

complete knowledge of the plan 

of the operations, or, EIS the case 

may be, of the defence. In case 

of a necessary retirement of our 

troops, the observer should 

know our own succesjive positions quite as well as the enemy’s lines. It is, furthermore, 

indispensable that the observers 

should personally visit the Commanders of the various infantry 

units, down to, and including, 

Company Commanders at least, 

with whom they will have to 

work; that these visits should be 

held in the trenches; that the 

observers should look over the 

ground of operation from the 

first line observation posts, and 

that they should work out on the 

spot with the various Commanders the details of the missions 

which they will be called upon to 

fulfill. Delicate liaison of this nature can only be efficiently accomplished when each party 

thoroughly understands the 

other, and the only way that this 

can be arrived at is for each one 

to thoroughly know the other. 

No opportunity shoulcl be lost of 

improving the relatiom between 

the observers and the infantry 

officers, both when the latter are 

in the trenches and especiallybecause then they are less occupied with other duties-when 

they are on rest. The habit of 

close cooperation in working together must be encouraged to 

the greatest possible extent. 
Infantry Liaison 

in I Corps 

21 1 

VII. Practice Exercises. 

The more practice exercises of 

aerial liaison with infantry that 

can be carried out, the better. It 

is impossible to over do it. In the 

course of these exercises every 

one must endeavor to simulate, 

as far as possible, the conditions 

that will be met with during the 

actual attacks. The airplane 

should fly rapidly above the positions and, from time to time, fly 

off as if he were driven by hostile 

aerial attack, or forced away by 

clouds or other climatic conditions. The observer should strive 

to observe from the highest altitude possible. The infantrymen 

must handle their signaling apparatus exactly as they would do 

under the conditions of an attack 

and as if they were continually 

harassed by enemy fire, etc. 

The men handling the projectors 

must strive to follow exactly the 

course of the airplane until the 

latter has given the signal 

"understood", or has repeated 

his call signal. (With regard to 

the training of the projector signalers, in addition tc that carried 

out in exercises in cooperation 

with our aircraft. The signalers 

should, on all occasions, endeavor to follow with the projector any airplane that may pass 

over them, without, of course, 

lighting the lamp of the projector.) 

If possible, during the course 

of the practice exercises, several 

airplanes should fly over the 

troops at the same time, only 

one of which acts as the Infantry 

Airplane and gives signals. This 

serves the double purpose of 

training several observers at the 

same time and of accustoming 

the infantrymen to pick out their 

own plane from among a number of others. During the exercise the observer should precede 

all his radio calls by the call e 

(. . - . .I, or ex (. - . . -). Coordinates sent by radio should be 

given in code, but in an obsolete 

code and not the one actively in 

use. The code signals actually in 

use for list No. 2 of the signals 

between an airplane and the infantry instructions of 28th December, 1917, should not be 

used for practice exercises. 

In order that observers in the 

event of an advance should not 

find themselves handicapped by 

the lack of large scale maps 

(Plans Directeurs) it is advisabk 

that in exercises of liaison with 

the infantry they should practice 

both with the Plans Directeur 

and with the maps of 1/80,000. 

VIII. The maximum return 

from liaison with the infantry will 

only be obtained when every 

infantryman is thoroughly convinced of the value of the aid 

that can be given him by the 

observer in the airplane. It is 

indispensable to create in the 

infantry the spirit of the knowledge of the absolute necessity of 

infantry liaison and its undeniable utility. 

42. TheRoJe 

OF PURSUit 

June 191s 

213 

The following notes,’ 

which carry no indication as 

to date or author, evidently 

were written late in June 

1918, at the time the 2d Pursuit Group was being organized under the command of 

Maj. Davenport Johnson. The 

group, which began operations immediately in the Tout 

Sector, was part of the shortlived 1st Brigade Air Service, 

commanded by Col. William 

Mitchell. 

Notes on The Tactical 

Employment of 

Pursuit Aviation 

Prepared under the direction of 

Col. W. Mitchell. C.A.S. 1st 

The role of Pursuit Aviation is 

corps. 

two-fold: 

1. Offensiue 

To seek out and attack all 

enemy elements in the air, forcing the combat back over enemy 

territory, breaking up the enemy’s aerial formation activity, 

inflicting the greatest possible 

casualties on his air service, and 

preventing his observation aviation from functioning; 

To co-operate with our Day 

Bombardment Aviation in the 

attack of enemy elements on the 

ground, and especially enemy 

air elements that are forced by 

the bombardment of their airdromes to take to the air. 

2. Defensive 

To protect our observation 

aviation from interference by enemy aircraft, and to prevent incursions by enemy aircraft over 

our area. 

Offensive. 

Ascendency in the air on any 

given sector of the front is obtained by the attack, destruction 

or dispersing of the enemy air 

elements operating on that sector, and so completely dominating them that they are unable to 

cany out their missions. To accomplish this it is necessary for 

large forces of pursuit aviation to 

be concentrated under one command, so that the protection of 

our observation aviation may 

first of all be assured, and that 

strong, purely offensive patrolformidable in numbers, battle 

formation and tactical grouping-may be thrown out to clear 

the air of hostile elements, inflicting great losses on the enemy’s 

air service, breaking up his aerial 

defense against our aircraft and 

forcing his whole aviation to 

keep back of the zone in which it 

is of primary value. 

At all periods during the preparation and conduct of offensive 

operations by our troops, it is 

essential to prevent the functioning of the enemy’s observation 

aviation as it is to prevent enemy 

aircraft from interfering with the 

functioning of our own observaltion aviation. This is also very 

important when the enemy has 

assumed the offensive and is 

correspondingly difficult to accomplish as the enemy will have 

made a concentration of his air 

forces for the attack. The attack 

and destruction, or dispersing, of 

the enemy observation elements, as well as other enemy 

air elements back of his own 

lines, is the duty of the second 

Group of the Pursuit Wing and is 

most effectively carried out by 

offensive patrols of five to seven 

airplanes each, one of which 

may be a fast bi-place machine 

to cover the rear of the patrol. 

These offensive patrols penetrate 

far over the enemy’s territory at 

an altitude of 5000 to 6000 meters, seeking combat, sweeping 

the air of hostile aircraft; their 

primary duty being to attack at 

once any enemy aircraft that 

they may sight. The patrols of 

our Day Bombardment should 

work in close co-operation with 

them, striking the enemy’s aerial 

defensive organizations simulta . 

neously with strong attacks by 

the Pursuit patrols, taking advantage of the breaking up of 

the enemy’s formations and the 

dispersing of his offensive elements by the strong formations 

of the Day Bombardment aviation which are then attacked in 

detail by the pursuit machines (of 

the Offensive Pursuit Patrols. 

1 In GorrelKs History, C-4. pp 500-503 
214 Combat 

Offensive patrols acting in cooperation with Day Bombardment Patrols should penetrate as 

far over enemy territo y as the 

objective of the latter, in order to 

take advantage of opportunities 

for attacking the enemy air elements that may attempt to oppose them, and any enemy aircraft forced by the bombardment of their airdromes to take 

to the air. This does not mean 

that the pursuit planes should 

stay with them constantly, but 

should work in cooperation with 

them. 

Day Bombardment patrols are 

frequently followed back to their 

lines by enemy aircraft afraid to 

attack the formation but waiting 

a chance to pick off stragglers, 

and our Pursuit patrols should 

be in readiness to take advantage of the demoralization 

caused by the bombing, especially the bombing of camps, 

hutments, parks, transport, columns of troops on the march, 

etc., and find special opportunities for attack with M. G. fire on 

the enemy personnel scattered 

and driven into the open by the 

bombs. 

Such attacks at low altitude 

should be carried out by special 

patrols or special machines and 

not by the regular offensive patrots, which ordinarily should not 

attempt to descend to very low 

altitudes. 

The Second Pursuit Group is 

furthermore responsible for carying out attacks on enemy observation balloons. These also 

are done by mac hines specially 

detailed for the purpose and not 

by the regular patrols. It should 

be bome in mind, however, that 

isolated attacks for destruction of 

observation balloons are attended with considerable danger, as the German balloon 

winches can bring down their 

balloons ve y rapidly (and an attacking aeroplane is therefore 

forced to descend very low and 

come under heavy machine gun 

fire. The results obtained are 

rarely in proportion tcs the risk 

run, and such isolated attacks 

should, therefore, be undertaken 

only under especially favorable 

'I,' I I , /I .- 
The Role of 

Pursuit 

21 5 

weather conditions (clouds) or 

when it is considered essential 

for some particularly annoying 

enemy balloon to be destroyed 

or forced to move further back. 

This does not apply to demonstrations against enemy balloons 

by airplanes with the object not 

of destroying the balloon but 

merely forcing it to descend temporarily and interrupting the 

work it is carrying out. Such 

demonstrations are of advantage 

in that they interfere with the 

observation or adjustment of artillery fire that the balloon observer is engaged upon, while 

they are not especially dangerous as the airplane does not 

have to descend very low. Attacks for destruction carried out 

on a large scale against all balloons along a considerable 

length of the front give valuable 

results, especially when carried 

out at the beginning of, or during, any minor operation, but 

these must be organized with 

great caution and precision. 

The duties of the Surveillance 

Squadrons are to keep the enemy’s back area under constant 

observation, for general activity 

and important movements, but 

especially for the activities of his 

air service. These machines will 

be bi-place or tri-place, and will 

carry out their missions singly or, 

in special cases, in pairs. They 

will be equipped with cameras, 

and with radio-by means of 

which they can sig,ial the location of enemy aircraft, patrols, 

activity on airdromes, etc. 

The most efficient and economical organization of Pursuit 

Aviation, it is considered, is for it 

to be combined with Day Bombardment and Surveillance 

Groups in a Combat Brigade 

composed of 

The Brigade Commander and 

Staff 

2 Groups of six Pursuit Squadrons each, each with a Park 

and Meteorological Section; 

1 Group of six Day Bombardment Squadrons; and 

1 Group of two Surveillance 

Squadrons, with a Park, 

Photo Section, and Meteorological Section each. 

The functions of the three 

types require the closest co-operation and inter-dependence. It 

is therefore essential that they 

should be grouped under one 

tactical command. 

It is important that close liaison be constantly maintained 

between the Pursuit Groups and 

Observation Groups, and that all 

information of interest be interchanged between them. Observation Group Commanders 

should keep Pursuit Group 

Commanders constantly informed as to the number of observation planes they have in 

operation over the lines, the 

areas in which they are working, 

their altitude and the character 

of their missions-photographic 

or visual reconnaissance, artillery 

adjustment, liaison with infantry, 

etc. The Corps Air Service Commander should furthermore 

keep the Pursuit Group Commanders in possession of all information likely to be of value to 

them, both about the enemy 

and about any proposed operations within the Corps. 

Close liaison must be maintained between Pursuit Group 

Commanders and Commanders 

of Anti-aircraft Artillery. Anti-aircraft artillery serves as the sentinel of aviation, and the system 

employed by it to signal to our 

pursuit patrols the presence arid 

the course of hostile aircraft, 

must be worked out with the 

greatest care and precision with 

the Pursuit Group Commanders. 

Pursuit Group Commanders 

should furthermore carry out fiequent liaison with troops in line 

and at rest, with a view to developing the mutual understandirig 

of each other’s functions and 

capabilities and perfecting the 

co-operation between them arid 

the Air Service. In a war of 

movement all pursuit elements 

must be ready to move their 

airdromes, parks and all equipment at a moment’s notice. At 

such times the liaison systems 

are necessarily interrupted and 

the closest touch by motor vehicle, radio or signaling must be 

kept with the necessary division, 

Corps and Army posts of command, and with contiguous 

air units. 
216 Combat 

Defensive. 

The basis of an Air Service is 

its Observation Aviation, but the 

very existence of this Observation aviation depends upon a 

strong and well trained Pursuit 

Aviation, able to defend it from 

enemy attack, and powerful 

enough to assure at least a local 

superiority in the air in any sector selected for offensive operations. In order that our Observation aviation, carrying out photographic and visual reconnaissances, artillery adjustment, liaison with infantry, etc., may render its maximum service, it is 

essential that observation squadrons be enabled to accomplish 

their missions without interference from the enemy’s aviation. 

This is true at all times, but especially so during periods of offensive operations. 

To protect individual reconnaissance and artillery missions 

by individual pursuit patrols 

keeping continually close to the 

observation planes is a wasteful 

and inefficient method of protection, but it is sometimes necessary, especially in the case of 

long distance reconnaissance 

missions. The protection of the 

observation aviation is best assured by a system of defensive 

patrols of five airplanes each, 

forming a protective (lower tier) 

barrage. These patrols fly back 

and forth beyond and slightly 

above the line of the observation 

airplanes, between them and the 

enemy, approximately over the 

enemy trench line at an altitude 

of about 3500 meters. These 

defensive patrols attack any enemy aircraft that approach, but 

they should not attempt to penetrate far over enemy territory to 

seek enemy aircraft, as in so 

doing the successful accomplishment of their principal imission is 

jeopardized, the Observation airplanes behind being left unprotected while the defenswe patrol 

is away. 

The duty of maintaining the 

Protective (lower tier) Ekarrage is 

allotted to one Group of the 

Pursuit Wing. 

for the defense of our area 

against incursions by enemy 

long distance photographic reconnaissance planes. Aj such 

enemy planes usually cross our 

lines at a height of 5000 to 6000 

meters and maintain this altitude 

throughout the course of their 

mission, it is rarely successful for 

our pursuit to start from the 

ground after them after they 

have been sighted. A method of 

defense against these photographic planes is for high patrols 

of three to five airplanes each to 

patrol back of our line at an 

altitude of 5500 to 6000 meters 

throughout the hours oi’ daylight 

suitable for photography. The 

sectors covered by such patrols 

must be carefully selectcbd with 

reference to the likely points at 

which enemy long distance reconnaissance planes are apt to 

cross our lines and the courses 

which they are believed to follow. The patrols must be on 

their beats at their altitudes as 

soon as or just before the light 

becomes sufficient for 

photography. 

This Group is also responsible 


43. 358 Squa6Rons 

July 1918 

21 9 

Two days before approving 

the schedule submitted by 

Patrick on 5 June 1918, 

Pershing had informed the 

Army Chief of Staff and the 

Secretary of War that the military situation was “very 

grave.” A German offensive 

on the Aisne had driven back 

the French and seemed to be 

threatening Paris. The Supreme War Council was depressed. Everyone wanted 

more help from America. On 

19 June Pershing recommended a buildup of the AEF 

to 3,000,000 men (66 divisions) before May 1919. After 

a meeting with General Foch 

on 23 June, Pershing endorsed a plan that would put 

46 divisions in Europe by October 1918, 64 in January 

1919, 80 in April 1919, and 

100 in July 1919. On 23 July 

:he War Department informed Pershing that a program for 80 divisions in 

France by 30 June 1919 had 

been recommended to the 

President.’ 

1 See Cable P-1235-S, 3 June 1918. Cable P-1342-5. 19 June 1918. Cable P-1369- 

S. 25 June 1918, and SWC 316. Cablegram, 

23 July 1918. and related documents in 

Histoncal Division, Department of the Army. 

United States Army in the World War, 1917- 

7919, Vol 2 (Washington 1948). pp 449450. 

476479, 482-483. 544. and passim 

2. In Gorrell’s History, A-7, pp 94-101. 

The job of translating the 

latter plan into an Air Service 

program fell to Gorrell, Aviation Officer, G-3, General July 29, ‘1918. 

ESGG.3 

EXHIBIT “A”. 

Headquarters, AEF. Although 

Gorrell’s plan called for only 

9 add it i on al bom b ard m ent 

squadrons, he was able to 

add 14 to the day bomber 

force by reducing the night 

bomber program by 5 squadrons. He also provided for an 

additional 62 squadrons of 

observation and 27 of pursuit, making a total of 358 

squadrons for the Air Service 

AEF by June 1919. Following 

is a brief extract from the 

long and detailed study 

which Gorrell produced and 

which was forwarded to Patrick on 29 July 191 8.2 

1. “Problem” 

A. Promises:- 

(a) In July, 1918, the 

United States will have 30 Divisions in the American Expoditionary Forces in Europe. 

(b) By July 1, 1919, the 
220 Combat 

United States will have 80 Divisions in the American Expeditionay Forces in Europe. ... 

B. Required to ascertain:- 

mation of tne Air Service program necessa y for a balanced 

Army of the size indicated in 

paragraph 1-A. (Answer to this 

question is found in paragraph 

[and table] 5). 

............................ 

(a) Tt 5 size and rate of for- 

............................ 

............................ 

8. The above program in Table V, even with the help of our 

Allies, can not be met in full but 

should serve as a goal which the 

Air Service should strive to 

reach. 

Table V. 

Size and Rate of Formation Desired for the Air Service 

Date Corps Obser- Army Obser- Pursuit Sqd. Day Born- Night Bom- biioon 

vation Sqd. vation Sqd. bardment bardment Companies 

54 Sqd 

1918 

July 22 12 22 8 4 52 

Aug. 11 4 4 1 

Sept. 3 5 11 4 4 9 

Oct. 4 7 12 4 4 8 

Nov. 3 5 12 4 4 7 

Dec. 2 6 12 4 5 6 

1919 

Jan. 2 2 9 3 5 6 

Feb. 2 3 9 4 5 8 

Mar. 3 2 12 5 5 9 

Apr 3 3 12 5 5 10 

May 3 4 12 5 5 9 

June 2 3 12 5 5 8 

TOTAL 49 52 147 55 55 133 

GRAND 

TOTAL 358 133 


44, Liaison-A 

Costly Business 

4 August 1918 

223 

American pilots assigned 

to infantry liaison found the 

work both dangerous and 

frustrating. They complained 

that the infantry ignored their 

signals, did not put out markers, and otherwise failed to 

cooperate. The airman’s attitude is reflected in the following memorandum concerning this aspect of the 

employment of airpower.’ 

The memorandum apparently 

was prepared by Maj. Lewis 

H. Brereton, who had succeeded Mitchell as Chief of 

Air Service, I Corps, or by a 

member of his staff, for signature by Brig. Gen. Malin 

Craig, Chief of Staff to Maj. 

Gen. Hunter Liggett, Corps 

Commander. 

Headquarters, 1st Army Corps, 

American E. F., 

August 4, 1918 

Suggest Memorandum for 

Division Commanders: 

Liaison Instructions. 

1. The Chief of Air Service will 

be notified at the earliest possible moment of the arrival of new 

units in the Corps, and the date 

of their active operations. The 

Chief of Air Service will immediately have air service assigned to 

the unit concerned, and will notify such unit and the Corps 

1 In Gorrell‘s History, C-12, p 35 

2 See Doc 40 

3 SeeDcc 36 

4 A marking out 

Commander regarding dispositions made, and will cause liaison to be established and maintained immediately therewith. 

The attention of the unit arriving 

should be directed particularly to 

Confidential Pamphlet., No. 2, 

“Liaison for all Arms,” dated 

H.A.E.F., June, 1918, and 

Confidential Pamphlet No. 88, 

revised, “Aerial Observation for 

Artillery,” dated H.A.E.F., May 

1918.3 With reference to the 

contents of these pamphlets, 

which contain the basis for all 

liaison and co-ordination between air service and the Corps 

Troops, the following should be 

impressed strongly upon the 

newly-arrived units: 

and artillery surveillance should 

not be requested from aero 

squadrons when same can be as 

efficiently performed by terrestrial observation or balloons. 

tact plane (i.e., jalennement)‘ 

should not be demanded from 

an aero squadron if desired information regarding the position 

of the advance units can possibly 

be obtained through any other 

source. In this connection, it is 

desired to point out that observation balloons can effect efficient liaison between the infantry 

P.C. and the advance units under ordinary circumstances. 

11. When an infantry contact 

plane is called for, it must be 

realized thoroughly by the troops 

Concerned that the infantry 

plane cannot remain at a low 

(a) Artillery: Adjustment of fire 

(b) Infantry: An infantry conaltitude over the lines for more 

than a very few minutes without 

the certainty of being shot down. 

It is, therefore, of the utmost 

importance, that watchers be 

designated to observe all signals 

from the infantry plane, and that 

the personnel have on hand at 

all times the required material to 

indicate the positions of the 

troops to the airplane, and that 

the signals be made immediately 

upon demand of the plane. 

111. The cost to the Goveinment of training a pilot and observer, coupled with the cost of 

an observation plane, is approximately $80,000.00. Infantry 

contact work is the most hazardous of all air service operatitons. 

The present state of organization 

of the Air Service renders replacement of planes, pilots and 

observers increasingly difficult. It 

should be realized that the expense to the Government ensuing from the loss of an observation plane properly equipped 

and manned, can be decreased 

materially by a thorough understanding on the part of the imit 

concerned of the necessity of 

having the proper material ready 

for instant use in indicating the 

location of the lines, and the 

utilization of such material 

promptly, when called upon by 

the observer. 

Malin Craig 

Chief of Staff 

45- commana ogthe 

Ak Semite, Fkst A~my 

6 August 1918 

225 

When the First Army was Service, First Army) and com- and the channels used in 

formally organized in August mander of the First Army’s making such assignmlents 

1918 with Pershing as Com- aviation units (Army Air Serv- were outlined in the followmanding General, Mitchell ice Commander) (see Doc. ing memorandum. 

was staff advisor on aeronau- 37). The authority to assign 

tical matters (Chief of Air missions to Air Service units 

Headquarters, 1st Army, A. E. F. 

MEMO RAND UM 

Number 8 

August 61 h, 191 8. 

The following system and routine of assigning missions to the Air Service in the 1st Army is published 

for the information and guidance of all concerned 

MISSIONS BY WHOM OFFERED TO WHOM TRANSMITTED 

A Amy Obseruabon Group 

1. Reconnaissance 

a. visual 

Night 

Day 

b. Photographic 

2. Command Reconnaissance 

3. A~iley Adjustment 

Army G2 

Army G-3 

Army Adley Commander 

Group Commander through Branch Intelligence 

Officer 

Army Chief of Air Service 

Group Commander 

B Pursuit Group: 

1. Patrolling 

a. Offensive 

b. Defensive 

2. Protection 

Army G3 

Air Service Commander 

Army Chief of Air Service 

C Bombing Group 

1 Tactical Bombardment hYW Army Chief of Air Service 

D Balloon Group. 

1. General Surveillance 

2 Artillery adjustment hYG-3 Army Artillery Commander 

Army Chief of Air Service 

Group commander 

E Cops Observation Group 

1. Reconnaissance 

a. Visual Corps G2 Group Commander through Branch lritelligence 

Day Officer 

Night. 

b. Photographic 

2. Commander Reconnaissance corps G-3 Corps Chief of Air Service 

3. Artiley Adjustment Corps Artillely Commander Corps Chief of Air Selvice 

4. Liaison Division Commander 

a. Infantry 

b. Artilley Division Artillery Commander Group Commander __ 

F Balloon Group. 1. General Surveillance Corps G-3 Corps Chief of Air Service 

2 Artilley Adjustment Corps Artillery Commander Group Commander 

Lower unit commanders should come into direct communication in arranging for the missions outlined above. 

The coUection, collation and dissemination of information of the enemy obtained by the Air senilce is a duty of G2 and is fully covered by the InteUiince 

Regulations. 

By command of General Pe.shing 

46- 202 Squaarzons 

16 August 1918 

227 

Believing that Gorrell's 

schedule for 358 squadrons 

could not be met (Doc. 43), 

Patrick prepared a different 

schedule,' printed below, for 

202 squadrons by June 1919. 

The reduction from 358 was 

made by cutting pursuit and 

bombardment. Patrick's plan 

was approved, as indicated 

by the indorsement' appearing below, this being the last 

change in the squadron program before the Armistice. 

Notes 

1 In Gorrell's History. A-7, p 104. 

2 In Gorrell's History. p to3 The initials 

indicate that the indorsement was prepared 

or initiated by Col Fox Connet, Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G-3 Having reviewed the 

various programs. the anonymous author of 

a "History of the Various Air Service Programs for the Air Service. A.E.F" (in Gorrell's History, A-7). said, "The above programs serve to illustrate two points: (a) the 

General Headquarters 

American Expeditionary 

Forces Air Service. 

France, 16 August, 191 8. 

Memorandum For: CHIEF OF 

Subject: Air Service Program to 

30 June 1919. 

1. A careful study has been 

made of the papers entitled "Air 

Service Materiel" A.E.F. Estimate of July 29, 1918, and Exhibit "A" appended thereto. 

2. It was soon evident that it 

would be absolutely impossible 

to get together sufficient materiel 

or sufficient trained personnel to 

enable the Air Service to accomplish the program as laid down 

in Table 5 of Exhibit "A' which 

called for 358 Squadrons on the 

front by the end of June 1919, 

and for the same date, 133 Balloon Companies. 

3. Further consideration was 

given to a possible program and 

at the last meeting of the Interallied Aviation Committee all of 

the Allies were asked to submit 

to the Committee by Monday, 

the 19th, August 1918, programs showing what units they 

expected to place at the front by 

end of June 1919. 

4. Below is given a table in 

which are shown the number of 

Air Units we now have at the 

front and the number which it is 

STAFF G-3 

fact that G.H 0.. A.E.F., was at all times 

willing for the Air Service to expand to its 

maximum possible extent, and that G.H.Q. 

desired the largest and most efficient Air 

Service that could be placed on the American front: and (b) the fact that G.H.Q.. 

A.E.F.. having determined upon a policy for 

the Air Service did not vary in this pcilicy but 

continued to allow the Air Service to expand 

as rapidly as possible." 
228 Combat 

Obs. Obs. Day Night 

Pursuit Corps Army Bomb Bomb Totals 

Present 12 10 1 1 0 24 

August 4 3 3 2 12 

Sep!ernber 4 3 1 1 9 

October 4 2 1 1 8 

November 4 2 2 1 1 10 

December 4 3 4 0 1 12 

January 4 3 5 2 2 16 

February 4 4 5 1 4 18 

March 5 4 5 2 4 20 

April 

~ ~ ~ 

5 4 8 1 5 23 

May 5 5 8 2 5 25 

June 

TOTALS M) 49 52 14 27 202 

hoped may be placed at the 

front during each month between now and July 1, 1919. It 

is recommended that this be approved as the American E.F. Air 

Service Program for the next 11 

months, including August 1918. 

5. In addition to the above 

there are now two Pursuit 

Squadrons with the English 

which are to be released to us 

about the 1st. of Oct. if we so 

desire. 

6. Also in addition to the 

above it is planned to place at 

the front by 1st. July 1919 a 

total of 133 Balloon Companies. 

(Sgd) Mason M. Patrick 

Major General, N.A. 

C.A.S., A.E.F. 

1st. Ind. FC (G-3) 

Chief of Staff, GHQ, AEF 

France Aug. 17, 1918. 

To Chief of Air Service 

1. Returned. The foregoing 

program is approved. This program will replace all previous 

projects. It is desired that the 

Chief of Air Service prepare a 

cablegram informing the War 

Department of the new program. 

(sgd) J. W. McAndrew 

Major General 


231 

With the successful completion of operations at St. 

Mihiel in mid-September 

1918, the First Army, commanded by Pershing, issued 

battle instructions, in the 

form of a proposed field order, for an offensive in the 

area from the Meuse River to 

the Argonne Forest. The first 

objective was penetration of 

the Hindenburg Line for 

about 16 kilometers, and second being a further penetration for another 16 kilometers. 

On 16 September, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, 

First Army issued instructions, written by Lt. Col. 

Frank P. Lahm, for employment of the Air Service in the 

attack. The following day, 

Mitchell, Chief of Air Service, 

First Army, submitted the Air 

Service plan, which became 

an annex to the field order 

that the First Army issued on 

20 September. At midnight 

on 22 September, Pershing 

assumed command of allied 

forces that were to take part 

in the offensive. On 23 September, Mitchell issued a 

supplementary plan for the 

First Army Air Service, and 

on 25 September, Lt. Col. 

Bert M. Atkinson issued a 

plan for the 1st Pursuit Wing, 

which he commanded. Hhour for the attack was 0500 

on 26 September. 

The First Army moved 

three corps into the line on 

the front of the main assault; 

E Corps was on the left, V in 

the middle, and Ill on the 

right. To the left of I Corps 

was the French Fourth Army, 

which was to work in coordination with the First Army. To 

the right of Ill Corps was the 

French XVll Corps, French II 

Colonial Corps, and US. IV 

Corps. For the initial operations Mitchell had under his 

command 54 squadrons (28 

American, 23 French, and 3 

Italian), with a total of 963 

airplanes. In addition, his air 

service included 22 balloons 

(14 American and 8 French). 

The British Independent Air 

Force was to cooperate. 

Mitchell wanted the French 

1st Air Division, with some 

525 bombardment, pursuit, 

and observation aircraft, under his command, as it had 

been during the Battle of 

St. Mihiel, but the most he 

could get was a promise of 

assistance in an emergency. 

Following are: A. First 

Army instructions for the employment of the Air Service;' 

B. Extracts from the First 

Army field order2 and aviation annex;3 C. Supplementary plan of First Army Air 

Ser~ice;~ and D. Plan of 1st 

Pursuit Wing.5 

A. Instructions of 

First Army 

G-3 

Headquarters First Army, 

A. E. F. 

September 16, 1918. 

Memorandum, Fot Chief of Air 

Service. 

Subject: Employment of Aviation in Proposed Attack. 

The employment of aviation in 

the proposed attack will be divided into four phases: 

1. Preparation. 

11. During the Artillery Preparation. 

111. During the Attack. 

IV. Exploitation. 

1 .Preparation:Absolute secrecy must be maintained prior 

to the opening of the artillery 

preparation, consequently there 

will be no increase in aerial activity at this time. Sufficient patrols will be maintained to prevent the enemy's reconnaissance 

planes penetrating our lines; 

bombardment aviation will continue its normal activity (targets 

will be furnished from this office); reconnaissance aviation 

will secure the maximum information of the enemy without 

arousing his suspicions. 

1 Historical Division, Department of the 

Army, US. Army in the World War, 1917- 

1919, Vol 9 (Washington, 1948). pp 82-88. 

2. AFSHRC 248. 211-61K. 

3. In Gorrell's History, N-2. pp 350355. 

4. Ibid.. pp 356359. 

5. Ibid.. C-7. pp 391392. 
232 Combat 

2.Dudng The Artillery 

Preparation: Pursuit aviation 

will attack concentrations of enemy troops, convoys, enemy 

aviation and balloons. Day 

Bombardment aviation will attack enemy concentrations, convoys, stations, command posts 

and dumps, in a zone between 

approximately 10 and 30 kilometers back of the lines. Night 

bombardment aviation will attack railroad centers, enemy airdromes, troop concentrations 

and dumps. Reconnaissance 

aviation will carry out its usual 

missions, army squadrons paying particular attention to locating the arrival of reserves. 

3.Dudng The Attack: The 

same employment as during the 

artillery preparation. 

4.Exploitation: As dictated 

by the progress of the attack and 

situation at the time. 

5. Four command airplanes 

will be held at the disposal of G3 beginning at daylight on the 

day of the artillery preparation, 

these planes to be located as 

near as practicable to Army 

Headquarters. 

6. Missions will be ordered 

and results reported as directed 

in Memo. No. 8, these headquarters, dated August 8, 1918. 

7. Bombing objectives will be 

indicated by G3 and detailed 

information concerning these 

objectives by (3-2, 1st Army. 

R. McCleave 

Colonel, General Stajj, 

A. C. ofS., G3. 

FPL-P 

Headquarters, Air Service, 1st 

Army, American Expeditionary 

Forces 

Annex No. 4, 

(Field Orders No. 20). 

Subject: Plan of Employment 

of Air Service Units, 

1st American Army. 

I. Plan of Employment. This 

will consist of four stages as follows: 

tack. 

tion. 

France, September 17th, 1918. 

A. Preparation until day of atB. During the Artillexy preparaC. During the Attack. 

D. Exploitation. 

A. Preparation Until Day of Attack. 

1. Surprise, being a iactor in 

the success of operations, the 

utmost secrecy will be observed 

in movements and concentration 

of Air Service Units. 

2. Hostile reconnais., c.ance 

aviation will be prevented from 

entering our lines and the work 

of hostile balloons hindered. 

This will be insured by placing 

an absolute barrage over the 

front, from and including the 

Meuse on the east, to and including La Hazaree on the west. 

3. All information necessary in 

the preparation of attack, especially for the Artilley preparation, will be gathered. Particular 

care will be taken that the suspicions of the enemy are not 

aroused. These missions will be 

accomplished by: 

(a) Army Reconnaissance 
Plans for the Initial 

Phase of the Meuse-Argonne 

Offensive 

233 

1 Col. Robert McCleave. 

Aviation-Photographic and 

&wd miSsk3ns. 

(b) Army Corps and Army 

Artille y Aviation-Photographic 

ad vi%!a! nisshs, ordered by 

the Army Corps and Army ArtilIety Commanders. 

(3 Night Rero~~nihme 

Aviation-Visual reconnaissance 

carried out at night to obtain 

information of the movemenb 

and concentrations of enemy 

forces. 

4. Bombardment Aviation. 

both day and night, will continue 

to be mipioyeb fn a nomai 

manner. 

The above missions will be 

carried out so as to &~arige as 

little as possible the usual aspect 

of the sector. 

B. During The Artiltilley 

&p.nardbn. 

1. Pursuit. 

(a) The First Pursuit Wing (4 

gieiips) w;# isrrre an ahi& 

barrage of the front and protect 

our observation aviation at evey 

dtit& kx3m ttw Mecs.2 imkisive 

on the east and LA HAZAREE 

inclusive on the west; prevent 

enemy asasti hm. attacking 

through the WOEVRE and will 

attack concentrations of enemy 

trmps, cnqs, enemy ahk&k?n 

and balloons. 

Ib) Pursuit Aviation, French 

Aerial Divkiq wi!l he rn dksposed as to protect our right 

flank and front in case of 

811 idhck. 
234 Combat 

2. Day Bombardment Aviation. 

Will attack concentrations of 

enemy troops, convoys and 

aviation, railroad stations, command posts and dumps. 

3. Night Bombardment 

Aviation. 

Will attack railroad stations 

and trains, troop concentrfitions, 

ammunition dumps, and enemy 

airdromes. 

4. Reconnaissance Aviation. 

(a) Army Reconnaissancewill carry out long distance missions, both photographic and 

visual. 

d 

4 

(b) Army Corps and Army Artillexy-Will carry out the missions, both photographic and 

visual, prescribed by the Army 

Corps and Army Artillery Commanders, including: 

artillery fire. 

The observation and results of 

Liaison with Infantry. 

Information of the enemy of 

benefit to the Higher Command. 

(c) Night ReconnaissanceWill cany out visual reconnaissance as prescribed. 

C. During The Attack. 

The same general employment as prescribed in B. The 

offensive will be taken and 

maintained at all points and under all conditions. 

D. Exploitation. 

The offensive will be maintained, based on the progress of 

the attack and the situation at 

the time, with the particular object in view of destroying the 

enemy’s air service, attacking his 

troops on the ground and protecting our own air and ground 

troops. 

11. Four Command Airplanes 

will be held at the disposal of G3, commencing at daylight on 

the day of the beginning of the 

Artillery preparation. These 

planes will be located on the 

Souilly airdrome. 

111. Appendixes. 

Appendix No. 1, shows the 

distribution of the air forces. 

Appendix No. 2, c;hows the 

plan of reconnaissance aviation. 

Appendix No. 3, shows the 

plan of Bombardment Aviation.6 

The plans for the utilization of 

Aeronautical Units with the 

Army Artillery and with the 

Army Corps conform to the general scheme and are prepared in 

detail by those units. 

By Command of General 

Pershing 

H. A. Drum 

Chief of Stajj. 

Official: 

William Mitchell 

Colonel, A. S., U. S. A. 

Chief of Air Service, First Amy. 

4 

b 6. The annex has no appendix on pursuit. 


Combat 237 

Lt. Col. Lewis H. Brereton. 

7 This group and the other French and 

Italian units listed here, except for the 1st 

Air Divison. were attached to the US First 

Army and under Mitchell s command for 

 pera at ion^ The FTW& osgmrzdmai hierarchy was escadrille (flight)-groupe-esc&re :sqacM-3n), which was comparable to 

the U S squadron-roup-wing organizatan 

8 These units are not on the chart. but 

they are on the station list for the First Amy 

Air Service for 26 SeDtember 1918 

Appendix I 

[The appendix is an organizational 

chart labeled “Air Service of the 

American 1st Army.” Since it is not 

suitable for reproduction, it has been 

used as the basis for the following 

listing of units:] 

First Army Air Service (Col. William 

Mitchell) 

1st Pursuit Wing (Maj. Bert M. 

Atkinson) 

2d Pursuit Group (Maj. Daven4 squadrons (13, 22, 49, 

port Johnson) 

139) 

K. Thaw) 

3d Pursuit Group (Maj. William 

4 squadrons (28, 93. 103, 

213) 

1st Day Bombardment Group 

(Mai. James L. Dunswoih) 

166) 

4 squadrons (11, 20, 96, 

1st Pursuit Group (Maj. Harold E. 

Hartney) 

4 squadrons (27, 94. 95, 147) 

Army Observation Group (Maj. 

John N. Reynolds) 

3 squadrons (9, 24, 91) 

(Capt. Bloch) (Fr.)’ 

Army Artillery Observation Group 

6 squadrons 

4 balloon companies 

Night Bombardment Wing (Commandant Viome) 

2 groups (1 French; 1 Italian) 

5 squadrons (2 French; 

3 Italian) 

Corps Observation Wing (Maj. 

Lewis H. Brereton) 

1st Corps Air Service (Maj. Melvin A. Hall) 

9 Although the division appeared on the 

chart, it was not under Mitchell‘s command 

See the editor’s introductory note to this 

document 

1st Corps Observation Group 

4 squadrons: 3 US. (1, 

12, 50); 1 French 

3 companies (1, 2, 5) 

3d Corps Air Service (Col. Joseph C. Morrow) 

3d Corps Observation Group 

5 squadrons: 2 US. (88, 

90); 3 French 

Balloon Wing Co. D 

Balloon Wing Co. A 

4 companies (3, 4, 9, 42) 

Hany B. Anderson) 

4th Corps Observation Group 

3 squadrons: 2 US. (8, 

135); 1 French 

3 companies (10, 16, 69) 

5th Corps Air Service (Lt. Col. 

Arthur R. Christie) 

5th Corps Observation Group 

4 squadrons: 2 US. (99, 

104); 2 French 

4 Companies (6, 7, 8, 12) 

I1 Colonial Corps Observation 

Group (Fr.) 

4th Corps Air Service (Maj. 

Balloon Wing Co. C 

Balloon Wing Co. B 

3 squadrons 

2 balloon companies 

XVll Corps Observation Group 

(Fr.) 

2 squadrons 

2 balloon companies 

From Second Army Observation 

3 squadrons: Pursuit, night reGroup (Fr.)* 

connaissance, and day observation 

1st Air Division (Fr.)9 

Day bombardment brigade 

2 bombardment wings 

7 bombardment groups 

15 bombardment squad2 protection Squadrons 

rons 

Pursuit brigade 

2 wings 

6 groups 

24 squadrons 
238 Combat 

Appendix I1 

September 17th. 1918. 

Observation Plan-Under Battle 

Inshuctions No. ?..lo 

1. The Enemy can, in addition to 

reacting on the front attack, do the 

following: 

he can engage reserves which he 

always has in the area DamdlenMangiennes in order to attacit either 

on the Haute de Meuse or by debouching from the Forest of Spincourt. 

b. On the lek bank of the Meuse 

attempt an anack as a diversion or 

take away reserves from this part of 

the front and transport them to the 

right bank. 

of the rivn from other parts of the 

front. 

2. In consideration of tho above the 

follaving observations will be carried 

OUt: 

a, On the tight bank there must be 

constant observation of the area 

north of the Forest of Spincourt. 

tied out over Montmedy-bnguyon-Spincaurt-Audun-le-Roman 

would give notice of any amval and 

unloading of reserves which might 

be brought from other parts of the 

front. 

c. On the leh bank of the Meuse 

there must be constant observation 

of the area Dun-Romagne-sousMantfaucon-Charpenny-Vilosner 

in order to watch the possible movement of troops or concenbation. 

d. In addition reconnaissance must 

be pushed along the Mouzon-Dun 

and Mown-St. Juvin railroads in 

a. On the tight bank of the Meuse 

c. Bring up resews on both sides 

b. In addition, reconnaissance carorder to determine If any unloading and 8th French Anies. 

Appmved Willey Howell, 

Lt. Col, G.S. 

A.C. ofS.. GZ 

has taken place. 

e. Observation of the crossing 

over the Meuse are indispensable. 

3. To carry out the foregoing plan 

the following in5hllctions will govern: 

a, Observation Squadrons of the 

respective Corps will be responsible 

before operations for a depth of 

eight kilometers. Boundaries are indicated on map attached hereto." 

During overations Corn units will 

Wm' 

Cdonels Air 

Chiefof Air 

Appendix 111 

September Wth, 1918. 

PLAN OF BOMBARDMENT 

not &beyond a depth of five kilometers unless they are provided with 

pursuit planes for protection. 

b. Enemy front lines will be photo 

graphed by Cop Machines at evey 

opportunity. hntr of such photos 

will be sent to Amy Cropping 

Ground by airplane delivey. 

c. Amy Observation units will observe the area bounded on anached 

map by single green line. carrying 

out the missions indicated in paragraph X2 above. 

d. The necersay steps will be 

taken to secure the cooperation of 

the observation servke of the 4th 

A loaded bomber awaiting takerdf. 

AVIATION 

Four phases are to be considered. 

1. Prepamtion. Coveting the priod from this date until the time of 

adey preparation. 

2. Dun'ng the Alblleely Prepamtion. 

3. Duting the Attack. 

4. Egloitation. 

1. Prepomtion. 

Object: To hinder the arrival of enemy troops and supplies in the sector to be attacked. Destructon of 

enemy ahtion on its airdrome 

and parks. 

10. The prop~ed field order. This plan. 

rubmine5 as Appendix I1 lo Annex 4. becme Annex. 9 10 FiM Oder 20 

11 Nn m Gorelle HtBory, N-2 
Appendices 23 9 

As absolute secrecy must be ob- of troops and to destroy his aviation 

served, there will be no heavy con- Preparation. on the ground. 

Centration Of bombing, consequently Object To harass the enemy by Such of the following targets will 

with the limited means available, the attacking his troop concentrations, be selected as are found to be the 

various targets indicated herewith convoys, command posts most important as shown by reconwill be bombed in turn. and dumps; to hinder his movement naissance made at the time. 

Preparation 

2. During The Artillery 

TO BE REPORTS ON By ORDER 

OF RESULTS, ETC. TO BE 

ADDRESSED TO 

OBJECTIVES BOMBED 

BY 

Rallroad Centen: 

Longuyon 

Stenay 

Montmedy 

Carignan 

Mowon 

Vouders 

Lumes 

Airdromes & Park8 

Maimy 

Mouzon 

American 

Day Bombing 

Group of 

3 Squadrons 

2 French 

Night Bombing 

Groups at 

Epiez 81 

Chermisy 

C.G.. 1st Amy 

C.S.. 1st Army 

G2 

CAS G-3 

1st Army C. of A. 

bY 

C. A. 5. 1st Army 

C.G.. 1st Army 

C.A.S.. C.S.. 1st Army 

1st Army G-2, 

w. 

C. of A 

by C.A.S. 1st Army 

Durina Artillem PreDaration 

ObJecUvem 

To Be Bornbod By Order Report. On Result.. 

Of Etc.. To Be 

By Addressed To 

Troop Concentrations, and American C.G.. 1st Army 

convoys wherever found in a Day Bombing Group C.A.S. G2 

kilometers back of the lines. 

Dumps. Railheads. Camps 

& Command Pomt.. 

I Bneulles 

5 Meuse 

2 Romagne S 

Montfaucon 

3. Termes 

Grand Pie 

4 SaintJuwn 

5 Briqueney 

6. Hanicoult 

7 Dun-Doulcon 

8 Saulmey 

Railroad Centers 

zone approximately 10 to 30 of 3 Squadrons 1st Army w 

by C.A.S.. 1st Army 

Stenay 2 French 

Vouners Night Bombing C.A.S. 

Group 1st Army 

Airdromes and Park 

Mcuzon 

Malmy 
24Q Combat 

3. During The Attack 

Object: (a) To prevent the arrival 

of reserves. 

(b) To break up counter attacks. 

(c) To harass the enemy in the 

wh&awid of his troops & material. 

(d) To destroy his aviation on the 

those during the Artillery Preparation, selecting fhe ones found to be 

the most important as shown by 

visual and photographic reconnais- 

??axe mic!e a! tk time. Orders fcKmissions will be transmitted by G3, 

fhrough the C.A.S., and reports on 

results made as in the preceding 

phases. 

tJmii. TXgek w# be tire 5am-e as 

4. Exploitation. 

As dictated by the progress of the 

attack and the situation at the time. 

F. P. iahm, 

Colonel, Air Service 

Official: 

William Mitcheti. 

Colonel, A.S. U.S.A. 

Chief of Air Service, First Army. 

B. Field Order 

First Army, A.E.F. 

Ligny-en-Barrois, 

September 20, 1918-3 p.m. 

Field Orders 

No. 20 ............................ 

3. [Mission assignments, corps 

and services.] 

............................ 

(K) Air Service: 

(1) For plan of employ- 

(2) It will attack and defeat 

ment, see Annex No. 4. 

the hostile Air Service while 

screening our army front from 

hostile observation and attack. 

(3) The army dropping 

ground for messages from aeroplanes will be at the Souilly 

aerodrome. Four command 

planes will be held ready to execute any mission given at the 

army landing field at Souilly. 

(4) The Chief of Army Air 

Service will designate certain 

army balloon companies to accompany the advance. Corps 

commanders will designate and 

regulate roads for these 

movements. 

............................ 

By command of General 

Pershing 

H. A. Drum, 

Colonel, 

Chief of Staff. 

C. Supplementary 

Plan 

Headquarters, Air Service, First 

Army American Expeditionary 

Forces 

Supplementary Plan of 

Employment of Air Service 

Units, 1st Army 

1. This plan covers four 

phases: 

attack. 

tion. 

first combined army objective. 

far as second combined Army 

objective. 

2. (1) Preparation Until Day 

of Attack. 

(a) Acting vigorously over 

the enemy's lines between LA 

CHAUSSEE and the MOSELLE 

RIVER, on the right flank of this 

position and North and East of 

NANCY, so as to hold the enemy's attention in that direction 

and lead him to believe that we 

are to attack METZ. 

connaissance from crossing our 

lines and preventing observation 

from hostile balloons throughout 

the area mentioned above. In 

addition a Pursuit barrage to be 

placed between the MEUSE and 

the AlSNE to prevent enemy 

reconnaissance. 

France, September 23, 1918 

(1) Preparation until day of 

(2) During Artillery prepara- 

(3) During attack, as far as 

(4) Exploitation of Attack as 

(b) Stopping all hostile reLt. Col. (later Col.) Frank P. Lahm. 
Appendices 24 1 

(c) Gathering all information 

necessary for the preparation of 

the Attack throughout the area 

as far as, and including the final 

objectives. 

(d) All missions along the 

new front of operations will be 

carried out in such a way as not 

to alter the usual aspect of the 

Sector. 

3. Special Missions For Each 

Branch of Aviation Under (1). 

(a) Night Bombardment. 

Independent Royal Air 

Force, Night Bombardment 

Wing. 

Bombardment Wing. 

French Group of Armies of the 

Center. 

The objectives have been 

pointed out in the original plan 

of employment covering the period of attack and are chosen so 

as to shut off the zone of the 

last operations from the present 

zone of attack. 

bardmentdrench Air Division. 

2, over the front between LA 

CHAUSSEE and CHATEAUSALINS by means of 

1. Short distance offensive 

patrols across the lines, carried out 

by combined Bombardment and 

Pursuit forces. 

VILLOME, French Night 

French Squadrons of 

(b) Pursuit and Day BomMissions as per "a" paragraph 

2. Patrols covering our 

lines and attacking balloons. 

These missions should be carried 

out whenever any reliefs of troops 

are being made. 

bardment of 1 st US Army 

1st Pursuit Wing 

(Atkinson).-Barrage over front 

and attack of balloons between 

CHATILLON SOUS LES 

Offensive Pursuit and Day Bombardment patrols as directed in or 

to the East of this area. 

1st Pursuit Group 

(Hartney)-Barrage patrols over 

the front between CHATILLON 

RIVER at MELZICOURT so as to 

stop hostile reconnaissance and 

patrols. 

(d) Army Reconnaissance 

Aviation. 

1. lstArmy Obseruation 

Group. Photographic and visual 

reconnaissance of area included 

between a line from VERDUN to 

LONGWON inclusive, West to 

the RIVER AISNE, inclusive. 

2.2nd French Army Obserution Group. Photographic 

and visual reconnaissance of area 

between a line drawn from VERDUN to LONGWON inclusive, 

East to the RIVER MOSELLE 

inclusive. 

(c) Pursuit and Day BomCOTES-PONT SUR SEILLE. 

SOUS LES COTES-AISNE 

Night Reconnaissance. 

1st Army Observation Group 

VILLOME, Night Bambardmerit 

Group 

2nd French Army Observation 

Group. 

Visual reconnaissance to 

watch any movements of concentration or withdrawal of the 

enemy throughout the areas assigned to each aviation unit. 

NOTICE: These missions have 

been allotted by G2,lst Army, 

in the plan of reconnaissance. 

(e) Army Artillery and Anmy 

Corps Aviation. Visual and photographic reconnaissanceSpotting Artillery objectives arid 

adjustments. 

4. (2) and (3) During Artillery 

Preparation and During Attack 

of First Combined Objective. 

air service at all altitudes, attack 

of his ground troops, and protecting our own air and ground 

forces. 

and the quick progression of 1 he 

attack will give us an advantalp, 

our Aviation therefore will be 

able to act very boldly. This will 

enable our Pursuit Aviation to 

fight ground troops with machine guns and bombs. 

of Auiation. 

(During the night before D day, 

and during the night following, 

D day). 

(a) Destruction of the hostile 

(b) The benefit of surprise 

Special Missions of Each Ckiss 

(a) Night Bombardment. 
242 Combat 

Independent R.A.F. -Will 

attack the railway stations of 

METZ, SABLONS, THIONVILLE, AUDUN LE ROMAN, 

and the most important aviation 

grounds in that region. (Same 

general mission for Day Bombardment on D day). 

ment Wing-Will attack the railway stations of CONFLANS, 

LONGUYON, MONTMEDY, 

and all large gatherings of troops 

noticed. 

(b) Aerial Diuision. Its mission will be to cover the front, 

up to a depth of 10 kilometers 

in the enemy lines, destroy enemy aircraft and balloons. 

offensive power with bombs and 

machine guns against all enemy 

reserves, reinforcements and 

convoys, whether they are 

marching to the attack or retreating so as to throw them into 

confusion, cause a block in the 

road traffic and block cross roads 

throughout the enemy back 

area. 

will be on the plateau along the 

general axis Montfaucon-Nantillois-Romag ne-Ba y onvilleBuzancy. 

(c) Pursuit and Day Bombardment Auiation of First Army. 

1st Pursuit Wing (Atkinson)- 

Barrage at medium and high altitude up to 5 kilometers on our 

whole front. 

Enemy ground troops will be 

attacked by Pursuit Units with 

machine guns and bombs whenever ordered. 

Villome night BombardIt will develop its greatest 

The central line of action 

1st Day Bombardment 

Group, (Dunsworth)-Will attack enemy concentrations along 

the valley of the MEUSEROMAGNE-ST. JUVIN- and 

GRANDPRE. 

1st Pursuit Group (Hartney)-Will specialize against enemy low flying airplanes, protect 

our infantry liaison and observation planes and attack hostile 

balloons on the front Chatillon 

Sous Les Cotes-Melzicourt. 

(d) Army Reconnaissance 

Work. 

The 1st Army Observation Group (Reynolds)-Will 

cover the sector to the West of a line drawn from Verdun to 

Longuyon inclusive with both 

day and night reconnaissance. 

The 2nd French Army 

Obseruation Group (De Vergnette)-Will cover the sector east 

of a line drawn from Verdun to 

Longuyon, inclusive, with both 

day and night Army Reconnaissance. 

The missions specified in 

the plan of reconnaissance will 

be carried out. 

will be located at Souilly ready 

to take off at any moment to 

verify or obtain precise details 

concerning any important piece 

of information that may be required by the Army Commander. 

Four command airplanes 

(e) Army Artillery Auiation 

and Army Corps Auiation. Their 

employment will be governed 

by the plans of employment of 

the Army Artillery or of the Army 

corps. 

These airplanes will have to 

protect themselves to some extent from hostile machines which 

have broken through our Pursuit 

Aviation. 

Army Artillery and Army 

Corps airplanes should avail 

themselves of every favorable 

opportunity to attack enemy 

troops on the ground, when it 

does not interfere with their general mission. 

5. (4) Exploitation of Attack 

on Second Combined Army Objective (Second Operattion) 

1. General Aims. Theoretically the same as durinlg the preceding period. The missions will 

be specified according to the situation after the first attack. 

2. Special Missioris of Each 

Branch of Auiation. 

(a) Pursuit and Bombardment Auiation of The First Army. 

Same missions as during preceding period. 

(b) French Aerial Diuision. Same missions. Two principal axis along which its action 

will be ordered accordling to the 

situation. 

Buzancy-Stonne 

Bridges Over the 

Meuse. 

(c) Night Bombardment. 

Independent Force R.AF.- 
Appendices 243 

Commandant Villome. French Air 

Force. (Courtesy Attache de I’Air, 

French Embassy) 

Same list of ObjdlVeS. L’LLOME Night Bombardment 

Wing. -Diff erent objectives 

thrmghwt tk httkfiedd, rziL 

heads and bridges over the 

MEUSE as far as and including 

LL’MES. 

sance. Reconnaissance of lines 

fresh centers of resistance, supply and direction of movement 

of reinforcement or withdrawal. 

(Details of these missions should 

be specified by G2j. 

Army Artillery Aviation. Same 

missions. Greater impurkmm 

will be given to the Infantry 

Liaison work:-the airplanes 

tion to the Infantry (to the Divisions, regiments and even battalims ofi the first lire)-a greater 

share, too, should be given to 

the attack on land, (rear-guards, 

nests of resistance, reififorczments or reserves). 

Fot-mrd. 

Corps Aviation. 

the Army Corps and Army Artillery Aviation will be selected 

the larger units, which will be 

equipped for use at the eadiest 

facilitate the liaisons. If the attack 

progresses normaiiy, the advanced airdromes will become 

the permanent ground of the 

sector. 

(d) Army ReconnaisWhere the &T!E?m$J iS OXgEdZhg 

(el Army Corps and 

shodd bring m &Tea inha6. Provision For A Movement 

Army Attilley and Army 

Advxxed drdrms for 

Rex the pcrst of commnd of 

prxtkacshle mmf hl orrler to 

When the mimewrent forward is sufficiently important, 

new advanced ground will again 

be sdmtixi and prepared in a 

similar manner. 

wid; make arrangem~ts xc~rbingly. 

Pursuit and Bombardment 

A>i&im. 

These units will move 

nearer to the front as soon as 

Corps and Army Artillery. 

 ini it^ .~SJ utibize advanced airdromes, auxiliary airdromes or 

fhe airdromes of the Army Corps 

and Army Artillery. 

William Mitchell, 

Colonel, A.S., U. S. A. 

The Equipment Section 

terrains are freed by t!he kmy 

In Special cases, these 

CMrf of Ah SHiikx 
244 Combat 

D. Pursuitwing 

Plan 

Headquarters, First Pursuit Wing, 

Air Service, American E. F. 

September 25th, 1918. 

PLAN OF EMPLOYMENT OF 

PURSUIT, AND DAY BOMBARDMENT UNITS FIRST 

PURSUIT WING 

1. The operations will cover 4 

phases: 

1. Preparation until day of attack. 

11. During artillery preparation. 

111. During attack, as far as first 

combined army objective. 

IV. Exploitation of attack as far as second combined army 

objective. 

While the areas and objectives 

will be altered from time to time 

the plan of employment of pursuit aviation in the last three 

stages of the attack will follow 

the same general principles. 

2. (A) Preparation until day of 

attack: In order that secrecy may 

be obtained no airplanes from 

this wing will operate west of 

Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes until 

after H hour. 

(B) The normal activity of the 

sector between Chatillon and 

Port-sur-Seille will be maintained 

and the Groups will operate over 

the sector of the last operations. 

~ 

region of Metz, especial attention 

3. Pursuit Aviation after H hour: 

(A) Pursuit aviation at the disposal of the First Pursuit Wing 

comprises the 2nd and 3rd Pursuit Groups. The sector of the 

1st Pursuit Wing is from Portsur-Seille on the east to La Harazee on the west. The sector of 

attack is from the Meuse River 

on the east to La Harazee on the 

west. 

(B) In order to maintain a 

proper superiority over the enemy air service it will be necessary for our air service, not only 

to maintain protective patrols 

within the enemy's lines for the 

defense of our Army Corps Air 

Service and to attack enemy reconnaissance planes, but it will 

also be necessary from time to 

time to take the offensive with a 

display of dominating force 

sending out powerful expeditions so as to cover intermediate 

and high altitudes and to sweep 

the air clear of enemy aviation 

up to a depth, 10 or 12 kilometers inside his lines. 

(C) One Group will protect 

the front, daily, from dawn to 12 

h 30 and the other from 12 h 30 

'till dark. in the protection of the 

front, patrols of one Flight will 

operate over the sector, ChatilIon-sous-les-Cotes, Port-surSeille; Patrols of 2 Flights will be 

maintained throughout the period assigned over the sector 

Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes-La 

Harazee. 

In view of the fact that it is 

believed that most of the enemy 

aviation is concentrated in the 

will be paid to the sector between the Meuse and Chatillon. 

(D) Special Missions of Pursuit 

Aviation: 

By requiring one Group to do its 

barrage work in the morning its 

squadrons will be available for 

an offensive operation in the 

afternoon, and vice-versa. The 

Group assigned to patrol in the 

afternoon will be on the alert in 

the morning to carry out an offensive mission, in which the entire Group may be called upon 

to participate at medium and 

high altitudes, penetrating about 

12 kilometers beyond our advancing lines to clean the air of 

enemy aviation. A similar expedition may be sent out in the 

afternoon from the Group that 

has done the patrolling in the 

morning. The hours at which 

these offensive missions are carried out will be constantly various and an effort will be made 

to order offensive misions at 

hours when intelligence received 

from the Anti-Aircraft Artillery indicated maximum enemy activity. The strength and frequency 

of attacks on ground objectives 

will depend upon the strength of 

enemy aerial activity encountered. 

In special circumstances pursuit reconnaissances will be ordered. While it is not anticipated 

that such missions will be ordered, Group Commanders will 

see that their pilots are familiar 

with infantry ground panels. 
Append ices 24 5 

Close protection for Corps 

Observation photographic missions, when it is required, will be 

provided by the squadron assigned to barrage patrol. The 

Corps Observation Wing will be 

informed of the hours at which 

the different Groups will be responsible for the barrage patrol 

the night before. When Observation Squadrons cannot provide their own protection they 

will notify the Corps Observation 

Wing Commander who is authorized to adjust this protection 

directly with the Group that is 

responsible, at the hour in question, for the barrage patrol. The 

Group Operations Officer will inform the patrol leader of the 

squadron going out on barrage 

patrol that its mission has been 

altered from that of barrage patrol to one of close protection 

and the patrol leader in question 

will get into immediate telephonic liaison with the pilot who 

is responsible for the photographic mission. 

4. Day Bombardment Aviation 

In the First Pursuit Wing comprises the First Day Bombardment Group. In principle this 

Group will be used to attack 

from high altitudes, large objectives such as towns and railroad 

stations from which traffic is radiating. 

In the first stages of attack it 

will operate against enemy concentrations along the valley of 

the Meuse, Romagno, St. Juvin, 

Grandpre. 

Special Missions of Bombardment; In emergencies when intelligence is received that specially favorable targets are presenting themselves within 6 or 8 

kilometers of our front lines this 

Group will be ordered to attack 

such targets at low altitude in 

order to cause confusion and 

material damage to enemy elements arriving as reinforcements 

or retreating. 

By order of Lieutenant Colonel 

Atkinson 

Philip J. Roosevelt, 

Captain, Air Service, U. S. A. 

Operations Officer. 

247 

Battle orders issued daily 

by Col. William Mitchell, 

Chief of Air Service, First 

Army, and by his successor, 

Col. Thomas Dew. Milling, 

from the beginning of the 

Meuse-Argonne Campaign 

until the Armistice, generally 

consisted of five major parts. 

These (1) described the situation at the front; (2) indicated 

the actions to be undertaken 

by the First Army on the following day; (3) provided a 

general statement of the Air 

Service mission; (4) made det ai I ed operation al assign - 

ments to the various elements of the Air Service; and 

(5) supplied additional instructions, information, or 

comment. The general mission statements for the Air 

Service reveal a shifting of 

emphasis from time to time, 

even from day to day, as the 

battle progressed. Following 

are extracts from some of 

those battle orders.’ 

Headquarters Air Service, 

First Army American 

Expeditionary Forces 

France, September 25, 1918. 

Battle Orders No. 7. 

1. The enemy continues on 

the defensive at all points along 

the front. ... 

2. The 1st Army attacks between the MEUSE AND THE 

AISNE RIVERS at 5-30 H September 26th. ... 3. Our air service will take the 

offensive at all points at daylight 

September 26, 1918, with the 

object of destroying the enemy’s 

air service, attacking his troops 

on the ground and protecting 

our own air and ground troops. 

........................... 

France, September 29, 1918. 

1. The offensive of the Allied 

Battle Orders No. 11. 

Armies continues with success. ... 2. The 1st Army continues the 

attack, as do the French, British 

and Belgian Armies. ... 

3. Our air service will maintain 

the offensive at all points, and 

will assist the infantry and artillery in their advance in all ways. 

France, September 30, 191.8. 

1. The offensive of the Allied 

Battle Orders No. 12. 

Armies continues with success. ... 2. The 1st Army will remain in 

place on October lst, continuing 

its preparations for further advance. 

the offensive at all points and 

will thoroughly cover our position from hostile air attack or 

reconnaissance. 

3. Our air service will maintciin 

............................ 

France, October 3, 19B. 

Battle Orders No. 14. 

1. The offensive of the Allied 

Armies continues with success. ... Our air service continues to dominate the enemy’s 

aviation. 

2. The 1st Army attacks on 

the front west of the RIVER 

MEUSE on October 4th at 5.25 

H.... 

3. The air service will concentrate its efforts on the battlefield 

and will take the ojjensiue at (111 

points at daylight October 4th, 

1918, with the object of destroying the enemy’s air service, attacking his ground troops, and 

protecting our own air and 

ground troops. 

............................ 

1 In Garrells titstory. N-2. PP 1-96 Passim 
Combat 

France, October 4, 1918. 

Battle Order No. 15. 

1. Our Army has made substantial gains all along the line 

against a stubborn resistance. 

The Allied Armies continue to 

advance. The German Air Service confronting ours, after vainly 

attempting all day to gain control 

over our Air Service, was defeated everywhere. 

tack with vigor. 

ward great efforts to assist the 

troops on the ground by close 

operation with them. The same 

orders remain in effect for October 5th. 

4. The work of all branches of 

the Air Service, both French and 

American. has been extremely 

severe, not only on account of 

the presence of the enemy in 

great numbers, but on account 

of the weather and poor visibility. In spite of these difficulties, 

the Air Service have [sic] shown 

a dash and readiness to meet 

every call made upon them, in a 

way to excite admiration from all 

who have witnessed the work. 

2. Our Army continues to at3. The air service will put for- 

............................ 

France, October 7th, 1918. 

Battle Orders No. 17. 

1. The offensive of the Allied 

armies is being maintained. The 

front of the 1st Army had advanced in the ARGONNE FOREST. Our Air service continues 

to dominate the German aviation, notwithstanding the fact 

that it has been largely reinforced. ... 

heights east of the MEUSE 

RIVER, which are occupied by 

about three German divisions. ... 

3. The air service will take the 

offensive at all points over the 

front of the attack and will maintain a protective barrage west of 

the Meuse River to the Argonne 

Forest. The enemy’s air service 

will be destroyed, his ground will 

be attacked, and our own air 

and ground troops will be 

protected. 

2. The 1st Army will seize the 

............. 

France, October 10, 1918. 

Battle Orders No. 20. 

1. The Allied Armies are advancing everywhere. The enemy 

in front of the 1st Army has 

thrown his divisions into the line 

by regiments, in his attempts to 

stop our advance. ... 2. The first Army continues its 

attack on October 11th. ... 

3. The air service will support 

the attack and will prevent the 

enemy from organizing along the 

heights of the Bois de Barricoutt. 

The offensive will be taken at all 

points on the Front bedween the 

Meuse River and Grandpre 

inclusive. 

............................ 

France, October 11, 1918. 

1. The offensive of the Allied 

Battle Orders No. 21. 

Armies continues with success. ... 2. The 1st Army continues its 

attack on October 12th. ... 

Our air seruice will maintain 

the offensive at all points, will 

support the attack from the 

Meuse River to Beaumont, and 

will thoroughly protect our positions from hostile air attack and 

reconnaissance. 

............................ 

France, October 13, 1918. 

Battle Orders No. 2:3. 

1. The Allied Armies to our 

left are continuing their advance 

and the enemy is giving way 

before them. , . , 

attack on October 14th. ... 

2. The 1st Army continues its 

............................ 

3. The air service will concentrate its efforts on the battle field 

and will take the 0ffen:iive at all 

points at daylight October 14th. 

1918, with the object of destroying the enemy’s air service. harassing and attacking his ground 

troops, and protecting our own 

air and ground troops. 

............................ 
Battle Orders 

Air Service, First Army 

24 9 

France, October 18, 1918. 

Battle Orders No. 28. 

1. The enemy continues to fall 

back. ... The 1st Army has captured 20,000 prisoners since the 

commencement of Operations 

on September 26th. ... The 

German Air service opposing us, 

in vain, has attempted all day to 

gain control of the air by employing patrols of 25 to 50 machines, but has been defeated at 

every point. 

2. The 1st Army will continue 

to improve its position for further 

attack by local operations on 

October 19th. ... 

3. Our air service will maintain 

the offensive at all points, will 

protect our position from hostile 

air attack and reconnaissance, 

and will support our ground 

troops in their local operations. 

.......................... 

France, October 20, 1918. 

1. No change in enemy situa2. The 1st Army will continue 

Battle Orders No. 30. 

tion on our front. ... 

to improve its position by local 

operations, maintaining contact 

with the enemy and developing 

his line of resistance. 

3. The orders for tomorrow 

remain the same for all branches 

of the Air Service as prescribed 

in Battle Orders No. 28, Special 

effort will be made to give information concerning 'the location 

of hostile artillery units. 

France, November 3, 1918. 

Battle Order No. 44. 

1. The Allied Armies have 

forced the enemy into a precipitate retreat. ... The aviation of 

the enemy has been destroyed 

or driven back wherever found, 

his balloons have been burned, 

and our airplanes continually 

harry and demoralize his ground 

troops with bombs and machine 

guns.. .. 2. The First American Army 

will take up the pursuit of the 

enemy west of the MEUSE and 

will make preparations to extend 

it to the east bank of the 

MEUSE.. .. ............................ 

3. The air service will concentrate its efforts on the battle field, 

taking the offensive at all points 

at daylight November 4th, 1918. 

It will seize euery opportunity to 

assist our troops, our corps air 

services will be protected, the 

enemy air service destroyed, and 

his ground troops attacked. 

............................ 

France, November 5, 1918. 

Battle Orders No. 46. 

1. The enemy continues to 

retreat with his infantry in confusion. His artillery is gradually increasing its fire. The Air Service 

of the enemy wherever encountered has been destroyed or 

forced to withdraw by our own 

aviation. ... 

............................ 

3. The air service will take the 

offensive at all points on the 

morning of November 6th. The 

enemy air service will be destroyed and our own air and 

ground troops will be protected. 

Every opportunity will be seized 

to harass hostile ground troops 

with bombs and machine gull 

fire. 

.......................... 

France, November 11, 1918. 

Battle Orders No. 52. 

1. (a) Yesterday the enemy 

threw into the line opposite our 

Third Corps his last available division on the western front. 

(b) An armistice with Germany has been signed and 2111 

hostilities ceased at 11: 00 H November 11th. 

(c) The Allied Armies hold1 

themselves in readiness for further advance. 

............................ 

3. The Air Service will hold 

itself in readiness to resume operations at a moment's notice. 

No planes will cross the lines. 

6. Attention of all units is clirected to training memoranda 

attached , 

............................ 

........................... 

49- Objectives of 

Day Bornbaaarnent 

Nouernberz 1918 

251 

The interdiction and closesupport functions of day 

bombardment units of the 

AEF at the end of the war are 

seen in the following extract 

from the history that the 2d 

Day Bombardment Group 

submitted in December 

1918.' The group, which was 

not organized until the beginning of November 191 8, 

was part of the Second Army, 

of which Col. Frank P. Lahm 

was Army Air Service Commander. 

Air Service-Second 

Army, American Expeditionary Forces, 

Headquarters 2nd 

Day Bombardment 

Group. 

Outline of Operations 

Tactical:- 

I. Aims of Bombardment 

Group. 

1. Direct. 

(a) Cutting of communications lines; by bombing railroad 

centers, thus destroying yards, 

warehouses, supplies, munitions, 

trains, and demoralizing transportation personnel; by bombing 

main roads. 

(b) Destruction of enemy 

works; by bombing ammunition 

dumps, concentration camps, 

airdromes, supply depots, military factories, and military defenses. 

attacks; by bombing concentration of troops in reserve areas or 

in the zone of attack, or by 

bombing reinforcing troops on 

the march. 

retreat; by bombing retreating 

troops, by cutting communications, or by bombing newly established line of defense. 

(c) Smothering of enemy 

(d) Demoralizing an enemy 

2. Indirect. 

(a) Demoralize troops and 

(b) By engaging hostile purlower their fighting morale. 

suit, draw them away from the 

zone of attack. 

11. Choice of Objectiues. 

group operated with its army, 

2nd American Army, its sector 

covering the sector of the 2nd 

Army and extending about 40 

kilometers back of the front 

lines. 

2. Nature of objectives; railroad centers, airdromes, and 

munition dumps constituted the 

original objectives. These were 

to be bombed continually until 

specific and individual objectives 

were to be assigned in case of an 

attack. 

1. Area; as in most cases this 

3. Choice of objectives for 

each mission; unless specific 'orders were received from 

A.A.S.C. this group would select 

the target for each mission, depending upon the following elements: 

a. Importance of the target. 

b. Number of planes available for mission. 

c. Availability of protective 

pursuit planes. 

d. Presence and aggressiveness of enemy planes. 

e. Weather. 

For example, if Conflans, 

showed unusual activity, and the 

enemy planes were numerous 

and sufficient bombing and pursuit planes were available the 

time of bombing would depend 

upon the weather. 

............................ 

1 In Gorrelrs History, C-8. p 176 

50, A~ecrus 

P~ecision Bombing 

NouembeR 1918 

2 53 

Aerial bombardment became possible with the develgetting over a target with a 

bomb. Then came the problem of putting the bomb on 

the target. The history of the 

Bomb Unit, Aircraft Armament Section. Ordnance Department, AEF, the organization responsibie fur providing 

bomb sights for the Air Service, stated alternatives available then, as ktter, to perms 

attempting to solve the problem.' 

qmmt d akcraf! of 

............................ 

2. hbng from implanes 

may in general be divided into 

two types, precision bombing 

ad area bmbing. In the first 

case a definite target is picked 

out upon which the majority of 

the bombs are to drop. In the 

latter the frank admission is 

made that accuracy is hnited 

and a given area is covered in 

the hope that enough bombs will 

strike the target proper to accomplish the mission. 

2. The French and British 

have both tended toward the 

latter general scheme of bombing, and the system of "sowing" 

bombs or releasing them in series or tmii is the uiltgrimth of 

that tendency. The advantage of 

that system lies in the fact that 

the .&Its wc?d ii-r ihh work ... are mounted outboard, obviating any necessity of the observer 

g&iilg &*% iF& the fuselage 

to sight, and therefore leaving 

him always ready at his guns, 

4 offering hlm &&!a p*- 

tion. The disadvantage lies in the 

fact that admitting inaccuracy is 

Zp! to led to Careaes~ss k the 

use of sights; or their being practically ignored. 

3. hhg ingeneral is done 

in formation, the leading plane 

of the squadron aione using a 

sj&k and the other planes releasing their bombs when they 

are at what they judge to be the 

same point. The sighting observer is in that case protected 

by the &er &Tles m the formation. His business is to sight, and 

his attention is not attracted elsewh. Fcif ike re- the 

general policy of the United 

States has been toward precision 

hbkig; and :he Mkf that tlpe 

American Aviators would faithfully use their sights has been 

Cfirmed. 

............................ 

1. In Gonell's History, 1-2, p 77 

51, Obswuation 

Balloons 

NouernbeR 1918 

255 

The work of the balloon 

observers was detailed in the 

following instructions which 

were issued by Col. Charles 

DeF. Chandler, Chief of the 

Balloon Section, AEF,' and 

republished in a bulletin of 

the Air Service, AEF.2 

1 Balloon Notes, No 66, 27 Nov 18. 

2. Air Service Bulletin. Vol VII. No 317. 7 

Dec 1918. In the Bulletin the title was 

changed to "Observation " 

Instructions For 

Balloon Observers 

Assignment of Balloons 

1. When sufficient balloon 

companies are available they are 

normally assigned one to each 

Division, one to the artillery of 

each Army Corps, and others 

distributed to serve Army Artillery. The duties of the observer, 

therefore, vary somewhat, depending upon the assignment of 

his balloon. 

2. For all balloons the observer is expected to regulate 

Artillery fire and conduct general 

surveillance of the enemy terrain 

within view. In addition to this, 

the balloons assigned to Divisions have Infantry liaison which 

consists in the use of preconcerted visual signals between the 

balloon and infantry, reporting 

these by telephone to the proper 

P.C. 

3. In addition to the duties in 

the basket as indicated in the 

preceding paragraph, the observer takes his turn (usually by 

roster) for ground assignments 

such as officer in charge of 

chartroom and personal liaison 

with Division Headquarters or 

Artillery Brigade Headquarters. 

4. When there is little movement of troops, giving time for 

the construction of sufficient telephone lines, the personal liaison to Artillery and Infantry 

Headquarters is not required to 

the same extent as during warfare of movement when very 

few telephone lines are possible; 

then a balloon officer assigned to 

Division Artillery Headquarters is 

expected to inform the balloon 

by courier, if no other means is 

possible, of the information desired by Division Headquarters 

and upon securing the inforination he should give personal attention that it is, without dehy, 

made available to the officers 

who call for it. Likewise, the 

personal liaison with Artillery is 

expected to constantly inform 

the balloon of the location of 

batteries in their vicinity and arrange for temporary telephone 

of some kind from the nearest 

battery to the balloon position 

for location of fire. 

General Surveiliance 

5. General surveillance consists in reporting all matters of 

military interest within view of 

the observer in the basket. Even 

while adjusting fire for Artil1e:y 

the observer is expected to continue reporting events which 

come to his attention. 

6. The military information 

most desired consists of the following: 

Fugitive targets (troop and 

transport movements) 

Position of enemy batteries 

(usually located by flashes) 

Train movements, giving position of train and direction 

The beginning of barrage fire, 

reporting its extent and changes 
2 56 Combat 

Road transport and troop 

Hostile balloons and airplanes 

All airplanes brought down, 

both enemy and friendly 

Fires, lights, smoke and explosions 

Entrenchments or emplacements and any changes in these 

Bridges of all kinds across 

streams and canals, particularly the 

construction or destruction of temporary bridges. 

7. All of the general military 

information phoned from the 

basket is recorded in the chartroom log from which place it is 

telephoned to the various P. C‘s. 

according to the nature of the 

information. These miscellaneous reports are classified under a few general headings for 

the daily reports. 

8. The reports of train movements are particularly important 

for the reason that increased railway activity is an indication that 

the enemy is either augmenting 

or reducing the movement of 

troops. 

9. An enemy intending advance or retreat movements, 

usually constructs additional 

bridges over streams and canals. 

These are frequently visible from 

balloons and it is most important 

that any change in bridges, be 

promptly reported. 

10. The observer should always be careful not to include 

his own deductions in reports. 

He should simply give facts 

movements 

briefly and in case of doubt as to 

what he sees the report should 

carefully state that the information is not certain; if the information is of sufficient importance 

the Intelligence officers will secure confirmation from other 

sources such as ground observation posts and airplanes. 

11. All reports from the observer should answer the four 

questions of WHAT (definition 

of what was seen), WHEN (day 

and hour), WHERE (indicating 

the place), HOW (troops in 

march or at a halt, Artillery active or silent, etc.). 

12. General surveillance by 

Army balloons is ordered by 

Army G-3 and the information 

of this nature when secured is 

transmitted by the balloon to the 

Army Air Service Commander. 

13. Balloons forming a part of 

the Army Corps Group receive 

instructions concerning general 

surveillance from Corps G-3 

and transmit the information secured to the Corps Air Service 

Commander (Memo No. 8, Hqs. 

1st Army, A.E.F. Aug. 6, 1918). 

Infantry 

14. The observer can easily 

see Infantry in column and 

should be able to calculate its 

strength from the length of the 

column or time required while 

marching to pass a given 

point. . . . 

15. If the infantry marches not 

in column of four’s but by two’s 

the corresponding change in the 

figures should be allowed. It will 

be easy to determine the number of companies, battalions, etc. 

by the intervals between units, 

but note that toward the end of 

a long march these intervals diminish and may even disappear 

by reason of the lengthening inevitable in every column. The 

tail of every unit from the battalion up will generally be indicated 

by the presence of wagms, 

which form its combat train. If it 

is impossible to give wiih reasonable accuracy the strength of 

marching organizations it will be 

satisfactory to report “An Infantry column of such a length and 

having such a time of defilement 

is passing along the road between A to B toward e;.” 

in mass, not in motion, the estimate of the strength is much 

more difficult than for marching 

columns and it becomes a matter of experience with the observer. It should be rennembered, however, that a large unit 

does not move over a considerable distance in other foimation 

than in column and if it deploys, 

it is for the purpose of going into 

action and then the information 

of most interest would be the 

front along which the cleployment has been made, together 

with a number of the lines and 

the density of each line. 

16. When Infantry is in line or 
Observation 

Balloons 

257 

Artillery 

17. Batteries in position are 

located best by the flashes either 

early in the morning or twilight 

in the evening. Particular effort 

should be made to determine 

the number of guns in each battery position. 

18. It has been reported that 

dummy battery positions within 

view of the balloon are occasionally made more realistic by 

flashing a little powder in front of 

them. The nature of this flash 

and difference in the smoke 

should not deceive an experienced observer. 

............................ 

20. There is a serious difficulty 

in accurately estimating moving 

Artillery for the reason that frequently Infantry marches with it 

for defence in case of enemy 

attacks. At considerable distance 

the wagons of the Infantry transport may be confused with Artillery guns mounted. 

21. During preparation for an 

offensive, practically all Artillery 

and much of the Infantry movements are made at night and 

without lights which would otherwise be an indication to the 

balloon observer, but during 

open warfare involving advances 

and retreats, there will be plenty 

of Artillery moving in daytime. 

Cavalry 

22. During the present war 

comparatively little cavalry has 

appeared in formation within 

view of the balloons but the table for estimating the strength is 

given herewith. . . .3 

Transport 

tensively for movements of 

troops and supplies. These 

should easily be distinguished 

from horse-drawn vehicles or 

Artillery guns by the more rapid 

rate of movement along the 

roads. 

24. The railway transport of 

rations, forage and ammunition 

requires many trains of cars each 

day, often amounting to 25 

freight cars per day for each 

Division when considerable ammunition is being used. Continuous balloon observation will 

soon determine the amount of 

the normal railway activity for 

daily replacements so that any 

increase in the number of trains 

is a reliable indication that the 

enemy contemplates increased 

activity and troop movements. 

25. On French railways to 

move a complete Division requires approximately 35 trains 

and an Army Corps of two Divisions from 100 to 200 trains, 

considering each train as transporting one infantry battalion, 

one battery or a squadron of 

cavalry. 

23. Motor trucks are used ex26. For motor truck transportation, it is assumed that each 

truck carries from ten to fifteen 

men, there being approximately 

fifteen to eighteen trucks per 

company. 

Night Observation 

27. Information desired and 

obtainable by night ascensiosns 

embraces the following: 

To report the beginning oi enemy attacks. 

To determine the limits of the 

front which is attacked. 

To observe and report the signals of Infantry during barrage fire. 

To observe and report marker 

signals from front lines for enerny 

bombing planes. 

.......... 

Infantry Liaison 

29. During position warfatre 

which may be considered as including the so-called trench warfare, all infantry positions up to 

the most advanced outposts are 

usually connected by a telephone system so complete ,that 

visual signals to and from the 

balloons are ordinarily not necessary. Open warfare of molvement gives little time for providing telephone circuits to advanced infantry so that the clevelopment of visual communication via balloon observers becomes important. Division headquarters should know at all limes 

3 Table mined 
258 Combat 

where the advanced infantry line 

is located and its changes. 

30. Infantry liaison consists of 

Following the progress of asObserving the signals from the 

saulting troops and reserves. 

line of the command posts and 

transmitting them to the General 

commanding the division. 

Informing the command of 

everything going on in the vicinity of 

the firing line and beyond it. 

Signalling out, if prearranged, to 

the advanced elements conventional 

signals as provided in the plan of 

liaison. 

Means of Communication 

For Liaison 

31. From the balloon to the 

command-The balloon is directly connected by telephone 

with the divisional command 

post and with the army control 

system. 

It is, besides, provided with a 

radio apparatus enabling it to 

transmit its observations in case 

telephone communication 

should be broken. 

line and to the advance command posts. -The balloon can 

communicate with the advance 

elementsIn daytime by means of a cylinder which folds and unfolds at 

will, thus making signals corresponding to dots and dashes. 

These transmissions are limited 

to the two signals, “Understood” 

or “Repeat”, preceded by the 

call of that particular post which 

the balloon addresses. 

From the balloon to the firing 
Observation 

Balloons 

259 

36. The balloon observers 

should know in advance the following: 

Coordinates of targets. 

Batteries which will fire. 

Caliber and number of pieces to 

Nature of fire (salvo or one 

Type of projectiles with time of 

Interval between shots. 

concerning the targets the observer should then procure the 

firing maps and photographs 

covering the target area. 

38. Adjustments are reported 

on the line battery-target. Distances are reported in meters to 

the “right” “left” “over” and 

“short” stating first the deflection 

followed by the range, thus “25 

right” “50 over”. 

39. Figures are given by their 

digits, i.e. “two five right” “five 

zero over”. 

40. The telephone communication between balloon and battery should conform to the following example: 

Battery: “Battery ready to 

fire.” 

Observer: “Ready to observe.” 

Battery: “No. 1 on the way, 

etc.” 

“No. 2 on the way, etc.” 

Observer: “No. 1 two five 

right, etc.” 

41. Shots should be reported 

‘‘lost’’ if not seen but reported as 

“not in position to observe” 

when the movement of the basLot a Dassing cloud, or other 

fire. 

piece at a time). 

flight and type of fuse. 

37. After securing information 

obstacle prevents a proper view 

of the target. When a salvo is 

reported “lost” by an observer 

the Artillery fires the next salvo 

with data intermediate between 

that and the last salvo seen and 

the one lost but if the report is 

“not in a position to observe” 

the salvo is repeated with the 

same data. 

42. In order to observe successfully for several batteries simultaneously it is necessary to 

have very efficient fire and telephone discipline also knowing 

accurately the batteries which 

are to fire. 

Registration Points 

tion points for determining the 

error of the day thereby taking 

gunlaying corrections to account 

for changed atmospheric conditions. Balloon officers should frequently advise the batteries they 

serve of various clearly defined 

places in enemy lines which are 

easily visible from the balloon 

these being indicated on their 

artillery firing maps. If this is not 

done the battery commanders 

might select from their maps registration points not clearly visible 

from the balloon. 

43. All batteries need registraArmy Artillery 

44. If sufficient balloons (are 

available the fire of special high 

power artillery can be more accurately reported by using IWO 

balloons so placed that one observes for deflection and the 

other for range. 

Methods of Fire Affecting 

Balloon Observation 

45. The balloon observer having continuous telephone communication with the battery firing, no system of signals is necessary such as must be employed for observation by irirplane. It is therefore the fact, as 

a direct result, that the battery 

commander is not restricted in 

the conduct of his fire as he must 

necessarily be with observation 

by means of airplanes. 

46. In the adjustment of artillery fire the balloon observer 

should therefore remember that 

his function is to OBSERVE the 

fall of the projectiles from the 

battery or batteries with which 

he is working. He should not 

attempt to prescribe to the battery commander, the methods of 
260 Combat 

fire of the battery nor the manner in which this fire is to be 

conducted. However, in order 

that the most efficient co-operation may be secured between 

the balloon and the battery, the 

battery commander should inform the balloon observer as to 

what methods are to be employed in making the adjustment. This is for the reascn that, 

with observation by balloon, the 

method of fire adjustment will 

depend largely upon the ability 

of the observer to accurately determine the positions of the 

points of fall of the projectiles. 

47. In general there are two 

methods of making this adjustment. If the observer can determine exactly the positions of the 

points of fall and can transpose 

these positions to the firing map 

or photographic map, the battery commander can then easily 

determine the distance of each 

point of fall from the target. The 

balloon observer may himself 

make this determination, simply 

informing the battery commander that such and such shot 

fell so many meters right (or left) 

and so many meters over (or 

short). The battery commander 

will then make the necessary 

corrections for each shot until he 

considers the fire adjusted. 

48. In case communication 

between the observer and the 

battery is not entirely continuous 

it may be impractical to send the 

range and deflection errors after 

each shot. The balloon observer 

should then request the battery 

commander to fire a series of 

shots (6 or 8, for example). The 

observer observes the bursts of 

all shots of this series before 

making any report. After the last 

shot he calculates the center of 

impact of the series, with relation 

to an origin and system of coordinates known to the batte ry 

commander. He then informs 

the latter of the co-ordinates of 

this center of impact. The battery 

commander will then make the 

corrections necessa ry to bring 

the center of impact upon the 

target. 

49. Through various causes, 

however, it is often found that 

the observer is unable to do 

more than determine the approximate errors in deflection 

and only the general “sense” of 

the shots in range (i.e., whether 

the shot fell short of, or beyond 

the target). In this case the battery commander should adopt a 

different method of adjusting his 

fire. With the elements of fire 

properly calculated, the deflection dispersion of any number of 

shots, will be slight and the battery commander will as a rule 

correct the deflection as a whole, 

basing his correction upon the 

total number of shots employed 

to adjust his fire. In case the 

deflection is less than four 

“probable errors” it will usually 

not be necessary for the battery 

commander to make any deflection corrections. 

50. The range adjustrnent in 

this case is, however more complicated and requires a preliminary fire known as Trial Fire, the 

object of which is to place the 

zone of dispersion in an area 

which contains the target. In observing for Trial Fire, the balloon 

observer simply reports, after 

each shot, whether the shot fell 

short of, or over, the target. The 

battery commander makes the 

range corrections necessary, until he has bracketed the target by 

two shots, each of which is less 

than four “probable errors” 

from the target. He then assumes his trial elevation, the 

mean range of these two shots, 

thereby practically assuring himself that a number of shots fired 

with this trial elevation, will form 

a zone of dispersion which wiU 

contain the target. 

51. The next procedure is to 

place the center of imptact of all 

shots, upon the target itself. In 

order to do this the battery commander must resort to what is 
Observation 

Balloons 

261 

known as Improvement Fire. As 

a rule this requires that twelve 

shots be fired with the elevation 

determined from the Trial Fire. 

The balloon observer reports the 

sense of each shot, either (and 

this is preferable from the point 

of view of the observer) immediately after it has burst, or upon 

completion of the series. If more 

than six shots have fallen over, 

or if more than six have fallen 

short, the battery commander 

subtracts six from this number 

and multiplies the result by ‘/izth 

0: 4 probable errors. This operation will give a range correction 

which should be added to, or 

subtracted from, the trial range, 

according as the greater number 

of shots were short of, or over 

the target. The range as determined, is known as the Adjusted 

Range. If time or ammunition is 

lacking, the Adjusted Range can 

be determined with less than 

twelve shots, by the same process. The number of shots 

should, however, never be less 

than six. After the Improvement 

Fire has been completed and 

the Adjusted Range determined, 

the fire is considered as adjusted. 

52. When the fire of a battery 

has been adjusted, the battery 

commander may either dispense 

with the services of the balloon 

observer, or he may request the 

latter to observe the fire for effect, in order that the center of 

impact may be kept continuously on the target. This is called 

Control of Fire and the observer 

need only give the sense of the 

shots or he may only give the 

sense of a number of shots, as 

for example; “Last six shots, 

over” or: “All shots falling 

short”. 

53. In the case of fire upon 

fugitive targets, or other objectives where the element of time 

is most essential the battery 

commander does not attempt to 

adjust his fire for precision. He 

simply attempts to bracket the 

target by quickly enclosing it between two ranges, one of which 

gives a majority of shots, over, 

and the other a majority of 

shots, short. The deflection is 

adjusted by adjusting the sheaf 

of fire on a certain portion of the 

target, and then opening the 

sheaf until the fire is distributed 

over the entire objective. The 

balloon observer as a rule, sends 

only the sense of the shot generally waiting until a salvo is fired 

and then communicating to the 

battery commander the sense of 

that salvo. 

............................ 

Telephone to a balloon. 

52- ACombat 

senuice 

11 Nouernbea 1918 

263 

During the war many officers in the AEF tended to 

regard aviation as one of the 

technical services of the US. 

Army. Struggling against this 

attitude, members of the Air 

Service sought recognition 

for aviation as one of the 

combatant arms. The position taken by the Air Service 

is seen, for example, in the 

following memorandum dealing with the allocation of 

supplies among the various 

elements of the AEF.' For another example, see the introductory paragraph of Sherman's Tentative Manual (Doc. 

55). 

Headquarters Services of 

Supply, American Expeditionary Forces, Office Chief of Air 

Service 

November 11, 1918. 

Office Memorandum No. 82. 

1. The Air Service, although 

highly technical and specialized 

in character, is organized, 

equipped and trained for the 

sole purpose of taking its place 

on the fighting line with the 

other combatant services. 

2. Air Service units, from the 

moment they arrive in France, 

form a part of the Expeditionary 

Forces and each Air Service unit 

is at all times a part of some 

distinct organization of these 

forces. In the S.O.S. these organizations are as a rule territorial, 

at the front they are tactical. At 

all times they are composed of 

units of all or several of the 

combatants arms as well as the 

purely technical services. 

3. Whether in the S.O.S. or in 

the Armies at the front except for 

supplies which are peculiar to 

the Air Service, it receives its 

share of shelter and other equipment made available for the 

Army Organization to which it 

belongs and neither asks or 

wants more. 

4. If Air Service Agencies cliscover supplies that are needed 

they should at once give notice 

to the proper authorities that 

such supplies may be made 

available where they are needed 

and ask that the Air Service 

share accordng to its needs in 

the distribution of such supplies. 

This is true for all classes of 

equipment which is used frorn 

the base ports to the fighting 

line. The Air Service asks for no 

special favors. 

By direction: 

H. C. Whitehead, 

Colonel, AS, 

Chief of Staff. 

1. In Gorrell's History, A-9, p 201 



53, Mitchell: Pr2ouisionaJ 

ManaaJ ~~Operzations 

23 Dec-embeR 1918 

2 67 

While commanding the Air 

Service of the First Army, 

Mitchell pulled together in 

one document the routine 

procedures of his observation, day bombardment, and 

pursuit units.’ Later, after he 

became commander of the 

Air Service, Army Group, 

those procedures were revised and reissued as a series 

of operat ions bul I eti n s. * The 

series contained one addition 

of considerable significance-a bulletin on the “Organization and Employment 

of Attack Squadrons .” 

The bulletin on attack aviation evidently was written 

during the last days of the 

Meuse-Argonne Campaign, 

in which bombing and strafing of German troops and 

positions in the battle area 

became an important part of 

U.S. Air Service operations. 

Those attacks, made by bombardment, pursuit, and, to a 

lesser degree, observation 

units, led to plans for organizing units to specialize in attacks of that kind. The plan, 

as it appeared in the bulletin, 

was incorporated in a “Provisional Manual of Operations 

1 Routine Procedure of Air Service 

Units Cir No 1 CAS 1st Army 19 Aug 18 

republished in Air Service Bulletin Vol VII 

No 305 24 Dec 18 

2 In Gorrell s History C-2 pp 232-267 

3 AFSHRC 248 21141s 

4 Ma1 Gen Joseph T Dickrnan assumed commanc of Third Army upon its 

organization on 1:) November 1918 at which 

time Mitchell became Chief of Air Service 

Third Army 

of Air Service Units” which Official: 

Mitchell issued on 23 Decem- Wm. Mitchell, Brig. General. 

ber 191 8. A prefatory note U.S.A., Army Air Service Conistated that the United States mander, Third Amy. 

did not yet have any experience in organizing and em- Headquarters Air Service, Third 

playing attack units. In fact, Army American 

the first such unit was not Forces. 

organized in the U.S. Air Coblenz, Germany, 

Service until the 3d Attack December 23rd, 1918 

Group was formed in 1921. This manual treats of the acThe routine procedures for tivities of various types of units 

observation, day bombard- of the Air Service of the Amelimerit, and Pursuit which had can Expeditionary Forces, and 

been Published in bulletins of so far as subjects discussed arc! 

the Air Service, Army Group, concerned, may be taken as E\ 

were also incorporated with brief summary of experience of 

revision, in the ”Provisional the American Squadrons gained 

Manual,” which was issued during active operations, 

while Mitchell was with the For the most part, the note:j 

Army of OccuPation as Army deal with the routine procedure 

Air Service Commander, of groups and squadrons operat- Third Army.3 ing in the various fields of aerial 

Headquarters, Third Army 

American Expeditionary Forces. 

Coblenz, Germany, 

December 23rd, 1918. 

The following Provisional 

Manual of Operations for Air 

Service Units is approved and 

published for the information 

and guidance of all Concerned. 

activity. To these have been 

added articles published from 

time to time by these Headquarters as the need developed for a 

closer coordination of the work 

of the various units, both in their 

operations over the lines, and in 

the arrangement of a training 

program to satisfy their internal 

reauirements and also to imBy command of Major-General 

~~/i~ craig, 

prove their liaison with other 

Dickman:4 Anm: 

Chief of Staff. cussed:- 

The following subjects are clis- 

(a) The Routine of a Corps Obser- 

(b) The Routine of an Army Oti- 

(c) The Routine of a Day Bom- 

(d) The Routine of a Night Reccmvation Group, 

servation Group, 

bardment Group, 

naissance Squadron 
268 Postwair Review 

(e) The Routine of a Pursuit Unit. 

(f) Organization and Employment 

of Attack Squadrons. 

(9) Liaison of the Airplane with the 

Infantry. 

(h) Instructions for the Improvement of Liaison between the Observation Air Service and Line Troops. 

(i) Instruction of Observers and 

Pilots of Observation squadron^.^ 

The notes on routine procedure are based upon actual 

practice of units of the types 

mentioned. The article dealing 

with the “Organization and Employment of Attack Squadrons” 

is based upon the experience of 

others in this field, as this experience has never been tested by 

an American attack Squadron. 

Active operations were suspended before the organization 

of a unit of this type was carried 

to completion. 

The article on “Liaison of the 

Airplane with the Infantry” dealing as it does with a field in 

which the American airplanes 

operated with such conspicuous 

success, contains a record of the 

experience of our squadrons 

which is of the most importance. 

The pamphlet entitled “lnstructions for the Improvement 

of Liaison between the Observation Air Service and Line 

Troops” was issued as a guide to 

Observation Units in the outlining of a course of instruction for 

other Arms in working with the 

Air Service, which instruction 

was found to be most necessary 

the operations of the Group is 

delegated by the Group Cornrnander to a Group Operations 

Am!J Air Commander* Officer, whose selection should 

be based upon his ability as a 

Wm. 

Brig. Gen’l. U.S.A.y 

Third Amy9 

American Expeditionary Forces. executive and experierlce as an 

observer over the lines. This officer should keep in constant 

touch with the operations of all 

of the squadrons of the group, 

and should advise them as to 

the best methods of ca.rrying out 

............................ 

5. kerns h. and i. have been ornined 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

269 

the operations which the group 

is called upon to perform. He is 

responsible to the Group Commander for the performance of 

duties assigned to the various 

squadrons, for the preparation 

and forwarding of operations reports, and should keep the 

Group Commander constantly 

informed as to activities of the 

Group. 

4. The Group Operations Officer is responsible for the proper 

equipment and operation of the 

Group Operations Room, and 

will supervise the training of new 

observers assigned to the Group. 

In all matters connected with 

operations he should act as the 

adviser of Squadron Operations 

Officers. 

Assignment of duties to 

Squadrons. 

5. One squadron of the group 

will normally be assigned to carry 

out missions of surveillance and 

adjustment for the Corps Artillery, 

as well as photographic missions 

as ordered from G -2 of the 

Corps through the office of 

the Corps Chief of Air Service. 

The Corps Artillery squadron will 

make such adjustments of fire of 

the Corps Artillery as cannot be 

carried out by the Corps Artillery 

Balloons, and will have at all 

times an airplane of command 

at the disposal of the Corps 

Chief of Air Service. 

6. One squadron will ordinarily be assigned to each division 

in line. The divisional squadrons 

will carry out missions of reconnaissance, infantry liaison, and 

such artillery adjustments as cannot be done by the divisional 

balloon. In addition, they will 

carry out photographic missions 

ordered through the office of 

the Corps Chief of Air Service. 

7. Squadron Commanders in 

addition to their administrative 

functions will be responsible for 

the carrying out of duties assigned to their squadrons by the 

Group Commander. The actual 

control of operations within the 

Squadron will be delegated to 

an Operations Officer, selected 

for qualifications similar to those 

of the Group Operations Officer. 

The Day's Work. 

8. In preparing the program 

of work for the day in each 

squadron the Squadron Commander and Squadron Operations Officer should meet after 

flying is finished for the day to 

frame the schedule of operations 

for the succeeding day. They 

should be provided with the following data by the officers mentioned: 

Engineer Officer: Airplanes available and airplanes equipped for ptiotographic missions listed by number. 

Radio Officer: Airplanes equipped 

with proper radio installation. 

Ordnance Officer Airplanes 

equipped with proper armament. 

9. This data may be conveniently posted upon a chart in t11e 

Squadron Operations Office, or 

on the Squadron bulletin board 

in the Group Operations Room. 

In the assignment of missions to 

observers and pilots the flying 

record of each must be kept 

constantly in mind. For this purpose a chart should be kept 

posted to date, showing the 

number of flying hours of each, 

and the character of and date of 

missions performed. 

10. A typewritten schedule of 

work should be prepared showing the character of each mission, the airplane assigned, the 

name of the pilot and observer 

selected to carry it out, the time 

of departure, and in case of a 

photographic missiqn, the size' of 

the camera and the number of 

plates to be taken. 
270 Postwar Review 

11. One pilot, one observer, 

and one airplane should be designated to respond to alert calls, 

to be called upon in case additional work is required, or upon 

the failure of an airplane to perform its mission. 

12. A Pilot should be designated as Officer in charge of the 

Field, whose duty it is to see that 

the airplanes assigned to duty 

are properly inspected and 

equipped, and that the missions 

leave the field at the time scheduled. A copy of this schedule 

should go to the Engineer Officer, the Radio Officer, the Ordnance Officer, the Group Photographic officer, and the Group 

Operations Officer. One copy 

shall be posted on the Squadron 

Bulletin Board. 

13. The Engineer Officer is 

responsible for the proper condition of the airplane, and that it is 

ready for flight at the time specified. 

14. The Radio Officer will see 

that the airplanes are equipped 

with proper reels, and that the 

radio is in proper condition before the airplane leaves the field. 

15. The Ordnance Officer 

must see that the machine guns 

are mounted upon the airplane, 

and that the proper number of 

magazines and other ordnance 

equipment is placed in it, and 

that the fixed guns are in proper 

condition and equipped with 

belts of cartridges. 

16. It is the duty of the Photographic Officer to see that the 

airplanes sent out on photographic missions are equipped 

with the proper cameras and 

plates, and to arrange for the 

prompt return to the photographic laboratory of these articles, upon the return of the mission, so that the plates may be 

developed at once. The first 

prints are then identified by the 

Branch Intelligence Officer, assisted by the observer who performed the mission. During an 

attack, especially, speed in distribution of the photographs is of 

the utmost importance, and delivery of the first urgency prints 

should be made by airplane. 

field the observer should report 

at the Observer's Room and 

bring up to the minute all information which will be of assistance in the performance of his 

mission; he should then proceed 

to his airplane in time to reach it 

half an hour before the time of 

departure. He must then inspect 

his equipment. The pilot who is 

about to make a flight should 

also be at his airplane at least a 

half hodr before the time set for 

departure and must inspect his 

airplane and armament and 

warm up his engine. 

17. Just before leaving for the 

18. A daily form should be 

prepared and posted in the Operations Office of each squadron, upon which the observer, 

before leaving to carry out his 

mission, must enter his name 

and that of his pilot, the number 

of the airplane, charactcer of mission and time of departure. 

Upon his return he mu:d proceed without delay to the Operations Office, and enter upon the 

form the time of landin'g, with a 

short record of results obtained 

on the flight. He must then fill 

out a careful report of the mission, in the preparation of which 

the pilot can often render valuable assistance. 

19. Each pilot will be assigned 

an airplane. He is responsible for 

the calibration of his own ammunition, must load his own 

belt, and load and unload his 

gun himself. He is responsible 

for the aligning of the sights of 

his own gun. 

20. Each observer should be 

assigned two movable guns, 

mounted in pairs, as well as six 

magazines. He is responsible for 

the calibration of his ammunition, the loading of his inagazines, and the aligning of 

his sights. 

21. Squadron Commanders 

will detail to the headquarters of 

the unit to which their squadron 

is assigned, an observer to act as 

Liaison Officer. That all observers may benefit by this experience, it is suggested that this 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

271 

detail be made for a period of 

one week, except during periods 

of intense activity, when one Liaison Officer should act throughout the period to insure continuity of the Liaison. 

22. In all squadrons an Assistant Operations Officer will be 

appointed to act as assistant to 

the Squadron Operations Officer, and will familiarize himself 

with all his duties. He will take 

personal charge of the training of 

new observers assigned to the 

squadron, under the direction of 

the Group and Squadron Operations Officers. On account of 

the rapid expansion of the service, the constant training of officers who can go to newly 

formed squadrons fully acquainted with the duties and 

practical workings of an Operations Department is imperative. 

Group Operations Room 

tioning of the squadrons of a 

Corps Observation Group it is 

essential that the personnel be 

furnished with complete, accurate and up-to-date information 

in regard to the disposition, operations and plans of our own 

forces and those of the enemy. It 

is, therefore, of fundamental importance that each group have a 

conveniently located Operations 

23. To insure the proper funcRoom in which all this information is assembled and placed at 

the disposal of the observers and 

pilots. 

24. The Group Operations 

Officer is responsible for the 

proper upkeep of this room. He 

is assisted by the Branch Intelligence Officer detailed to the 

group by G2. Should a squadron be operating alone, responsibility for the maintenance of an 

Operations Room will devolve 

upon the Squadron Operations 

Officer. 

be available in the operations 

room may be classified under 

the following subjects: 

25. The information that must 

(a) Photography 

(b) Artillery 

(c) Infanty 

(d) Reconnaissance 

(e) Miscellaneous 

Photography 

26. One copy of each photograph will be kept on file in the 

Intelligence Office and two copies placed in the Operations 

Room at the disposal of the observers. 

27. The Intelligence Officer 

will keep a card index of photographs taken, showing the size of 

camera used, coordinates of the 

center, index number of the 

photograph, altitude and date on 

which taken, together with a record of the character of the photograph, whether good, fair or 

poor. These cards are filed according to the coordinates of the 

center of the photograph, each 

card representing a square kilometer and containing a record of 

all photographs whose center is 

within this square. Photographs 

will also be listed in a book 

Photo finishing room 
272 Postwiar Review 

under their index number showing the coordinates of the center, 

the date when taken, the name 

of the observer who carried out 

the mission. 

28. The photographs filed in 

the Operations Room are arranged in pigeon holes according to their coordinates, each 

pigeon hole representing one 

square kilometer on the map 

and containing the photographs 

whose center is in that square. 

The pigeon holes are numbered 

in the same way as the Plan 

Directeur; horizontally, according to the “X’ coordinates and 

vertically according to the “Y” 

coordinates. These files are kept 

up-to-date and complete by the 

Intelligence Officer, replacements being made when 

necessary. 

29. Areas covered by photographic missions will be graphically represented upon a map, 

each plate being outlined, the 

index number and date attached, and the area covered by 

the mission colored. Each map 

will show the missions performed during a week, and each 

month a second map will be 

prepared showing graphically in 

the same manner the areas photographed during the calendar 

month. 

30. A panoramic view of the 

sector is a valuable asset to the 

operations room and should be 

obtained if possible. Assemblages of photographic missions 

carried out by observers of the 

group tend to make the operations room attractive, and are 

very valuable for study of the 

sector. 

31. A stereoscopic instrument 

and magnifying glass must be 

available for the study and interpretation of photographs. 

Artillery. 

32. The most important map 

in the Operations Room is the 

general map of the sector (1 to 

10,000 or 1 to 20,000) showing 

the position of all of our artillery 

elements and the enemy organization in depth, particularly enemy batteries and battery emplacement locations. 

including the name of the unit 

and the number and caliber of 

guns should be shown by tags or 

markers which can be moved as 

necessary. Artillery P.C.’s and 

panel stations should be similarly 

marked, the markers of the latter 

including information as to radio 

call and type of panel used. 

34. This map should be 

checked daily and all information pertaining to the artillery 

should be kept up-to-date and 

should be accompanied by a 

chart showing the daily activity 

of each enemy battery. 

35. Fugitive target batteries 

should be shown upon a special 

map, similar markers being used 

to indicate their location and that 

of their panel stations with radio 

calls and type of panel. Upon 

this map the field of fire of each 

of these batteries shouldbe 

indicated. 

33. Friendly battery positions, 

36. A general map of artillery 

objectives (1/20000) issued by 

Army G-2 and showing important objectives, such as road intersections, ammunition dumps, 

material depots, bridges, railroads, camps, aviation fields, 

and other objectives should also 

be posted. 

37. A list should ah be 

posted showing the name and 

location of the various artillery 

units with which the command is 

to work, the coordinates of the 

P.C., the coordinates of the 

panel stations, the radio calls, 

the type of panels and the wave 

lengths. 

38. A relief map is of great 

vaue in an operations room for 

the study of the terrain. It is 

particularly valuable in case of 

adjustment of fire upon an objective upon the revem slope, 

as by a study of the contours, 

the observer will be able to plan 

his method of flying the mission 

in advance. 

39. A map should be provided 

showing the position of friendly 

balloons and the defiladed area 

from the three general ascension 

levels. 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

273 

Infantry. 

40. A map showing the parts 

of the line held by the different 

infantry commands, marking by 

tags the location of the various 

P.C.'s of units both in the line 

and in reserve, must be posted. 

On this map the successive objectives in case of an attack can 

be shown. It must show the outline of our trenches and detail of 

the enemy trenches, strong 

points, dug-outs, machine gun 

emplacements, etc. This map is 

of the utmost importance to the 

infantry observer in order that he 

may familiarize himself completely with the sector over 

which he must work. 

Miscellaneous. 

41. The Operations Room, 

being the information center, 

must contain all data obtained 

from various sources which bear 

upon the activities of the group. 

In it should always be found a 

large scale map showing the entire front line. 

42. All orders or letters of interest to the personnel, daily 

communiques, the weather forecast and visibility report will be 

posted upon a bulletin board in 

a conspicuous place. 

43. Summaries of information 

and bulletins from the Air Service and from the Army, Army 

Corps and Divisions shall at all 

times be available. 

44. Under the supervision of 

the Intelligence Officer a stock of 

maps of all scales shall be kept 

on hand for the use of pilots and 

observers. 

45. Maps showing the position 

of all friendly airdromes, and a 

map of enemy airdromes and 

balloon positions shall be 

posted. In addition, illustrations 

of enemy aircraft are of value. 

All possible information in regard 

to types and markings of enemy 

airplanes must be at the disposal 

of the observers and pilots. 

46. The room should be 

equipped with a blackboard and 

large tables, chairs and benches, 

and material such as ink, pencils, 

drawing pens, paste, glue, elastic 

bands, thumb tacks; paints and 

pins, should be provided. Buuers for practice in radio manipulation should be mounted. 

Forms for written reports of missions and a basket to file them in 

must be provided. 

47. The Operations Room will 

be well lighted and always be 

kept clean and in an orderly 

condition. Every effort should be 

made to make it as comfortable 

and attractive a place as possible. 

48. Owing to the fact that 

information of the most secret 

nature is constantly displayed, a 

rule barring all persons other 

than authorized personnel from 

the room must be rigidly enforced. Under no circumstances 

should other persons be admitted without special permission 

from the Group Commander. 

THE ROUTINE OF AN 

ARMY OBSERVATION 

GROUP 

49. The mission of Army Observation is the reconnaissance, 

in depth, both visually and by 

photograph, of the Army sector. 

The Army Observation Group is 

placed at the disposal of the 

General Staff of the Army and 

the missions carried out in conformity to its orders. Orders assigning missions are received tiy 

the Group Commander who 

transmits them to the Group Operations Officer, who is in immediate control of the operations 'of 

the group. 

The Group Operations 

Room. 

50. It is essential to the proper 

conduct of operations that both 

pilots and observers of a group 

have a thorough knowledge of 

their sector, and access to all 

available information in regard 

to enemy activity in it. For army 

work, it is especially necessary to 
274 Postwar Review 

be familiar with the main lines of 

communication, dumps, detraining and unloading stations, and 

airdromes. 

51. In order that this information may be conveniently assembled and placed at the disposal 

of the pilots and observers of the 

group, a Group Operations 

Room is maintained, equipped 

with large scale maps showing 

the location of principal enemy 

works, with photographs of all 

principal towns, dumps, railroad 

centers, airdromes, and anti-aircraft batteries. Bulletins and 

charts of special interest are 

posted from time to time. The 

Group Operations Officer is responsible for the proper upkeep 

of this room. 

52. Pilots and observers are 

required to spend as much time 

as possible in the Operations 

Room, studying the sector. Instruction in reference to the work 

is given by means of talks, pointing out the most important features of the sector, suggesting 

methods of preparations for missions, and impressing upon the 

personnel the importance of 

their work, especially during 

an attack. 

Method of assignment and 

execution of missions. 

ended, the Group Operations 

Officer will prepare a schedule 

dividing the work assigned for 

the following day between the 

various squadrons of the group. 

The division of work is based 

upon the number and character 

of the missions to be performed, 

and the airplanes and personnel 

available at the close of the day's 

flying, as shown by reports furnished by each of the 

squadrons. 

54. A copy of this schedule is 

issued to each squadron Operations Officer, with whom a conference is held in order that the 

work may be clearly understood. 

One flight in each group will 

always be held on alert to carry 

out any special mission that may 

be called for. 

55. The Squadron Operations 

Officers will assign the missions 

among the flights in their respective squadrons, flight leaders 

being given all necessary instructions covering the nature of the 

mission, the routes to be followed and the time of departure. 

In case of a photographic mission, objectives, size of camera, 

altitude, and number of plates to 

be exposed, are specified. The 

instruction as to the most advantageous method of carrying out 

a mission and the assignment of 

the individual pilot and observer 

to it is left to the discretion of the 

flight commanders. 

53. After flying for the day has 

56. In carrying out the various 

missions the flights follow accustomed routes over certain portions of the sector. As soon as a 

flight departs, the Squadron Operations Officer posts a tag or 

marker in the Group Operations 

Office showing the time of departure, number of airplanes, 

area to be covered, a.nd the nature of the mission, this tag being 

taken down immediately upon 

the return of the mission. The 

Group Operations Officer is thus 

kept constantly informed as to 

the amount and character of the 

work as it is being carried on. 

57. The alert flight remains in 

the vicinity of Group Headquarters to carry out special and 

Command missions. 

58. On landing upon the field 

at the conclusion of 21 mission, 

the observers go immediately to 

the Squadron Operations Room, 

and make a complete report of 

all information obtained, plates 

exposed, weather conditions at 

the lines, and the activity of enemy aircraft and anticraft. This 

information is handed without 

delay to the Branch Intelligence 

Officer, who places it at the disposal of the Group Commander 

and the Army Intelligence 

Officer. 

59. All the plates exposed are 

taken immediately to the photographic laboratory, developed 

and printed. Three proofs of 

each are sent to the Intelligence 

Officer. The latter disi:ributes the 

proofs among the observers 

concerned, who identify them by 

indicating on each different print 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

27'5 

the coordinates of its center, 

time of exposure, and the altitude at which taken. 

marked, and two are sent immediately to the Army Intelligence 

Office, the third being sent back 

to the laboratory in order that 

plate may be permanently 

marked. As soon as practicable, 

the required number ot prints 

are distributed according to a list 

on file in the Intelligence Office. 

Normal Employment of 

the Group. 

(a) During an inactive period, or before an attack. 

61. During an inactive period, 

or the period preceding an attack, the group should dispatch 

daily visual reconnaissance missions, covering all important 

lines of communication in the 

sector, to include both the roads 

and railroads. At such times, all 

movements of size are carried 

out at night and it is therefore 

necessary to make observations 

at break of day, or at dusk in 

order to obtain the information. 

Missions should be sent out 

some fifteen to thirty minutes 

before daybreak. They can then 

be over the objective as soon as 

there is sufficient light to observe. These observations at 

daylight and dusk are supplemented by visual reconnaissance 

carried out in conjunction with 

the photographic missions during the day. 

60. All three proofs are 

62. Photographs should be 

taken as frequently as possible of 

all enemy works, such as dumps, 

lines of defense in rear of the 

front lines, concentration points, 

aviation fields hospitals and railroad yards. As most of these will 

be found on or near main roads 

and railroads, it is advisable to 

make photographic assemblages 

of the lines of communication, 

and thus insure the discovery of 

new works, rather than to take 

isolated photographs of the 

works themselves. All photographic missions should be accompanied by at least one airplane whose duty it is to carry 

on visual reconnaissance which 

will often locate something of 

interest, to be photographed, 

either on the return trip or at 

some future time. During the periods mentioned, it is not necessary that Army Headquarters assign in detail the missions to be 

performed by the group, a general indication of what areas in 

the sector are considered of the 

greatest importance being sufficient. Under these circumstances, it is the duty of the Group 

Commander to so direct operations that the sector is systematically covered by both visual and 

photographic reconnaissances, 

special attention being paid to 

the areas referred to. 

(b) During an attack, or in 

an active sector. 

63. The general scheme of 

visual reconnaissance during an 

active period remains the same 

as that followed in an inactive 

sector, except that in such a period, enemy movements will 

take place in daylight, as well as 

night. For this reason, enemy 

lines of communication must b'e 

kept under constant observation. 

From time to time, the General 

Staff will require confirmation of 

information received from other 

sources, or will want the accuracy of certain deductions to be 

verified. It therefore becomes 

necessary to reserve a far larger 

portion of the command for the 

fulfillment of emergency calls. 

64. The photographic work 

carried out during an active period will be closely supervised 

and directed by the Army, which 

will indicate, as far in advance as 

possible, the objectives to be 

photographed, together with the 

order of their importance. 

65. A schedule is made out 

each day, listing the missions, 

both visual and photographic, to 

be carried out upon the following forenoon. This schedule is 

based upon the information received from the Army and a 

knowledge of the general situation. A sufficient reserve should 

at all times be held for special 

work. 
276 Postwar Review 

66. At least one flight (6 teams 

with their airplanes) should be 

kept on alert so that when a 

special request is received, the 

mission can be dispatched with 

the least possible delay. While 

the greatest care must be exercised to be ready for an alert 

call, equal care should be taken 

that too great a portion of the 

command does not remain idle 

for lack of requests from the 

Amy. If emergency calls do not 

come in, alert airplanes may be 

employed as deemed necessary 

by the Group Commander. 

THE ROUTINE OF A DAY 

BOMBARDMENT 

GROUP. 

67. The missions of Day Bombardment Aviation are the following: 

(a) To destroy and harass the 

rear areas of the battlefield and 

to attack military and industrial 

objectives within and beyond the 

range of artillery. 

(b) To cause a dispersion of 

enemy anti-aircraft defences 

(pursuit patrols, anti-aircraft batteries, etc.), throughout the zone 

of vulnerable bombardment objectives. 

(c) To destroy in combat the 

enemy's air forces. 

(d) To obtain information of 

military value by surveillance of 

'enemy activity carried on in the 

course of the bombing expedition. 

Preparation of a Bombing 

Expedition. 

68. Day bombardment objectives are designated by G-3 and 

transmitted by the Army Chief of 

Air Service to the Commander 

of the Day Bombardment 

Group. Unless specifically covered in orders from higher authority, the Group Commander 

will issue orders specifying: 

and the number of airplanes in 

each. 

(b) The types and weight of 

projectiles. 

(c) The route, altitude, and 

order of departure of each 

formation. 

(a) The number of formations 

69. The method of pursuit cooperation will be explained to 

the Commanders of the squadrons forming the Group. 

70. Unless the objective must 

be kept secret until the moment 

of departure, detailed orders 

should be issued in time to permit each pilot and observer to 

familiarize himself with all available information in regard to the 

main objective, the route, seconday objectives, and the region to be observed or photographed. A day bombardment 

expedition must be able to leave 

the field rapidly upon emergency 

order. In this case only the formation leader and deputy leader 

of each formation need know 

the exact route to be followed. 

Four different types and sizes of 

bombs used in raids: (I. to r.) 155- 

mm. 115-mm. 90-mm. and 75-mm. 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

277 

For the other pilots and observers a sketch of the objective and 

a general knowledge of the terrain, so that they may return to 

our lines in case of accident, will 

suffice. 

71. Each Squadron Commander will designate the airplanes, pilots, and observers to 

take part in an expedition, and is 

charged with the responsibility 

for their proper preparation for 

the mission. He will appoint formation leaders and deputy leaders and will assign to each airplane its position in the formation. 

Formations. 

Squadrons will invariably work 

in formation. These formations 

should be large, as many as 

eighteen airplanes being easily 

controlled by a leader when 

working at high altitudes. For 

low flying formations in bad 

weather, eight is the maximum 

that can be employed. All formations must have the following 

characteristics: 

72. Day Bombardment 

(a) Simplicity. 

(b) No dead angles. 

(c) Concentration of fire to the 

rear. 

(d) Concentration of fire below 

the center of the formation. 

(el Compactness. 

(f) Each airplane must be able 

to see the leader. 

73. All formations, whatever 

the number, should fly in a "V" 

formation with the rear of the V 

closed. Formations of more than 

ten should have one airplane in 

the center of the V at the average altitude of the V. Airplanes 

in formation should be numbered as follows: 

1 

32 

5 12 4 

7 6 

9 11 10 8 

Number 1 is the leader and flies 

at the lowest altitude, Numbers 2 

and 3, 4 and 5, and similarly 

placed pairs should fly at the 

same altitude, number 2 and 3 

about fifty meters higher than 

number 1, and about thirty meters to the right and left of number 1 respectively. Number 4 

takes the same position relative 

to number 2 as number 2 with 

reference to number 1; and 

number 5 takes the same position with relation to number 3. 

74.' Formations should be as 

compact as possible, especially 

when dropping projectiles; and 

during a combat, formations 

should close up. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the 

training of day bombardment 

pilots in formation flying. If the 

pilots maintain a regular echelonment in height, in case of 

emergency they can close up 

quickly upon the leader, by diving. The guide should never 

open his throttle wide, and observers should always warn their 

pilots whenever their own or any 

other airplane appears to be getting out of formation. It is fatal 

for an airplane to leave the formation, and the formation 

should not be broken up even to 

protect an airplane which has left 

it, 

75. Whenever the landing 

field is sufficiently large, the formation is made up on the 

ground, the pilots having first 

warmed up their engines. If this 

procedure cannot be followed 

for lack of room, for example, 

when several squadrons are 

leaving at about the same time, 

the airplanes will take off in the 

order of their number in the 

formation, each airplane begin - 

ning to taxi when the wheels of 

the preceding airplane leave the 

ground. Number 1 throttles 

down when he has attained sufficient altitude to do so with 

safety, and flies slowly until all 

the airplanes are in place. He 

may then take up his travelling 

speed-never full speed. The 

only practicable maneuver in 

formation flying is an "8" upon 

an extremely wide curve. covering at least five kilometers. 
278 Postwar Review 

Combat. 

merely an incident of day bombardment, but is one of its integral phases. The normal combat 

of a day bombardment unit is a 

fight between the formation and 

enemy pursuit airplanes that attack it. Observers must be on 

constant watch for enemy aircraft and upon sighting them, 

the observer fires an agreed signal of warning, which signal is 

repeated by all the other observers. All the observers should 

then test their machine guns. 

Number 1, upon learning that 

enemy aircraft are in sight, 

should slow down and the formation should tighten up as 

much as possible. The pilots 

must make every effort to keep 

in formation and keep the formation compact. Under no circumstances will they be permitted to attempt an individual 

maneuver. 

77. In the course of aerial 

combat it will sometimes be 

found that the mass of the enemy pursuit airplanes will attempt to create a demonstration 

by maneuvering and shooting at 

long range while two or three 

climb and then dive upon the 

formation, in an effort to separate one or more of the bombing 

airplanes from it. Observers must 

keep a careful lookout at all 

76. Aerial combat is not 

times for such attacks. The majority of attacks, however, will 

come from below. If the observer opens fire when the enemy is at least 300 meters distant, in most cases he will not 

come to close quarters. If allowed to approach nearer, the 

safety of a bombing airplane depends upon putting the enemy 

airplane out of action. 

lihood of an airplane becoming 

separated from the formation, 

bombing units should be thoroughly trained in single combat 

against pursuit patrols. In the 

course of such a combat a pilot 

will do little shooting, but will 

exert his efforts to keep his observer in a favorable position. 

He will avoid maneuvers such as 

regular spirals or straight dives, 

but should fly an irregular course 

and watch his observer so as to 

place the latter in a position from 

which he can shoot to the best 

advantage. If the enemy gets 

into a position where he can 

shoot without being shot at, the 

pilot must do everything possible 

to spoil his aim. A climbing turn 

made very steeply toward the 

side upon which the weapons 

are carried is the best maneuver, 

as it will allow the observer to 

use his guns. While the pilots 

ordinarily attempt to place the 

observer in shooting position, 

experience has shown that at 

times the pilot is obliged to turn 

on his pursuers. The pilot 

should, therefore, take every opportunity to perfect his maneuvering ability and gunnery. 

78. As there is always the likeBombing the Target. 

tive the formation will not be 

allowed to break up, but will 

tighten up as compactly as possible. Sighting errors thus produced are negligible considering 

the dispersion of the projectiles 

and the size of the usual day 

bombardment targets 

80. Greater accuracy is obtained by permitting the leading 

observer to sight for the whole 

formation. Accurate bombing is 

an art in which certain observers 

will excell, and these observers 

should be used as leaders and 

deputy leaders. Excitement adds 

to inaccuracy and if but one 

observer uses the sights he will 

know that all of the other airplanes are acting as his protection. When the leader has adjusted his sights and is approaching the target in line of sight he 

fires a signal “Prepare to drop 

bombs”. When the leader’s 

bombs start to leave the racks 

the other observers in the formation drop their bombs. Excellent 

results have been obhined by 

this method of bombing, which 

was adopted after extensive experience in active service. The 

greatest accuracy has been obtained when the formations 

reach their altitude before crossing the lines, the leader being 

thus given an opportunity to 

check his calculations before the 

objective is reached. 

79. In passing over the objec- 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

81. When several formations 

are directed against the same 

objective they should approach 

it at thirty second intervals, one 

behind the other. Upon leaving 

the objective they should all turn 

in the same direction. 

82. In the performance of a 

day bombing expedition, it is 

most essential that the bombardment formation reaches the objective exactly at the time designated, in order that successful 

coordination between the work 

of the bombardment units and 

the pursuit units may be assured, 

with the object of causing the 

greatest possible damage to the 

enemy and of maintaining our 

ascendency in the air. 

83. A Group Operations Officer will be appointed by the 

Group Commander of the Day 

Bombardment Group, and to 

him will be delegated the immediate supervision over the operations of the group. He will also 

act as the representative of G-2. 

It is his duty: 

(a) To compile and keep 

available for the Group Commander and the personnel of the 

Group, all information of value 

in the preparation of a bombing 

mission. 

(b) To keep an indexed file 

of photographs, and a stock of 

maps for use of pilots and observers. He will also post in the 

operations room a map (1 to 

80000 or 1 to 50000) of the 

sector in which the group is operating, as well as a 1 to 200,- 

000 scale map showing the line 

of the entire front with its 

changes as they occur. 

(c) To post upon a bulletin 

board all orders and communications of interest to pilots or 

observers of the group, and bulletins from the Army or its Corps 

or Divisions. 

(d) To post a map showing 

the location of friendly airdromes 

and hospitals. 

(e) To file the flight report of 

each crew and to interrogate 

personally the pilots and observers to get additional information 

if possible, and to transmit the 

information obtained to the 

Army Intelligence Section. 

the Photographic Section, the 

developing of all plates and the 

printing and distribution of photographs. 

84. The Group Operations 

Officer should receive the charts 

from the Army Chief of Air Service, showing bombing targets 

and intelligence in reference to 

them. He should keep duplicate 

(f) To supervise the work of 

copies of these, marking one of 

them daily with the bombardments effected. It is one of h's 

most important functions to keep 

up-to-date at all times available 

information in reference to the 

locations of enemy anti-aircraft 

batteries, enemy airdromes, iind 

the number and identity of the 

squadrons which occupy them. 

The photographs taken by the 

Bombing Group itself, will often 

assist in establishing the whelreabouts of new airdromes and the 

occupation of old ones. A Day 

Bombardment Group may furnish information of great value 

from visual and photographic reconnaissance conducted during 

the course of the bombing expeditions, especially in regard to 

location of enemy airdromes and 

works, and the number of erremy troops. 

85. The Group Operation!; 

Officer is responsible for the liaison of the group with the pursuit 

units in addition to the liaison 

with the Army Chief of Air Service, G-2, and G-3, and he 

should notify the pursuit group 

of the bombardment group's 

plan of operations and advise 

them as far in advance as possible of the hour, the altitude and 

return route of all expeditions. 
280 Postwar Review 

THE ROUTINE OF A 

SANCE SQUADRON. 

86. The mission of Night Reconnaissance is to provide information to the Higher Command 

in regard to the trend and extent 

of movements behind the enemy’s line made under cover of 

darkness. These are usually extensive if operations are impending. It is therefore imperative that 

the routes followed by the enemy in moving troops and material should be reconnoitered 

thoroughly and frequently at 

night, due to the fact that the 

most perfect day reconnaissance 

will often fail to disclose any 

abnormal activity. During active 

operations, the battle-field must 

be patrolled consistently by night 

reconnaissance airplanes. 

87. A night reconnaissance 

unit is ordinarily assigned for 

duty with an Army, the missicns 

of strategic reconnaissance and 

night surveillance-being assigned 

through the office of the Army 

Chief of Air Service. 

NIGHT RECONNAISOrganization. 

of a Night Reconnaissance 1 

Squadron is responsible for the 

activity and efficiency of the unit. 

It is his duty to insure the proper 

performance of the duties assigned to the subordinate officers 

of the Squadron. 

89. In addition to the pilots 

and observers, and the necessary enlisted personnel, the unit 

commander will be assisted by 

the following officers: 

Operations Officer. 

90. The duty of the Operations Officer attached to a night 

reconnaissance unit will be to 

advise the Commanding Officer 

of all tactical matters connected 

with the field of operations. 

Upon receipt by the unit of orders assigning the missions for 

any given night, under the authority of the Commanding Officer, he will prepare and post a 

schedule designating the pilots 

88. The Commanding Officer 

and observers and the hours 

during which each of the routes 

of enemy movements will be reconnoitered. The Opeiations Officer will procure all available information of the enemy’s rear 

areas, particularly in regard to 

railheads, routes, of transports, 

detraining points, billeting areas, 

camps, depots, anti-aircraft, divisions and airdromes. It is his 

duty to supervise the preparation 

of the personnel for the execution of the missions assigned to 

them, and he will assure himself 

that all information obtained by 

the unit in the course of a mission is passed on without delay 

to the Branch lntelligerice Officer. The Operations Officer will 

have charge of the landing lights, 

searchlights, etc., on the ground. 

He will see that these ilre lighted 

at the hours specified by the Unit 

Commander for airplanes to 

leave the airdrome or whenever 

an airplane overhead gives the 

correct signal for landing. He will 

also make a daily report of operations to the Chief of Air Service 

of the Army under which he is 

operating, which report will 

cover the routes, hours of flight, 

and all information obtained. He 

must make certain that every 

pilot and observer is familiar with 

the correct landing sigrial for the 

day before leaving the ground. 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

28 1 

Branch Intelligence Officer. 

cer will be detailed by G2 of 

the Army for duty with every 

night reconnaissance unit. This 

officer will see that all information obtained is transmitted to 

Headquarters without delay. He 

will make out routes covering 

points of concentration and the 

main arteries of movement in 

the enemy's rear areas, and he 

will transmit the orders for reconnaissance missions to the 

Unit Commander. 

Supply Officer. 

92. The Supply Officer will 

requisition and procure the supplies necessary for the unit. 

These will include Quartermaster 

and commissary supplies for 

which he will establish the necessay liaison with the Chief 

Quartermaster of the Army to 

which the unit is attached. In 

addition, he will establish the 

necessary channels for securing 

technical, Ordnance and Air 

Service supplies. The Supply Officer is also responsible for the 

squadron transportation, its 

proper upkeep and repair. 

91. A Branch Intelligence OffiEngineer Officer. 

93. The Engineer Officer will 

supervise the work of the several 

aero sections, and the work of 

the mechanics assigned thereto. 

He will keep on hand at all times 

a reserve of spare parts of electrical material, i.e., dynamo 

spares, searchlight spares, landing flares, etc., sufficient to meet 

the immediate needs of the unit 

and will advise the Supply Officer relative to such needs. 

Ad jutant. 

94. The Adjutant is charged 

with the administrative work of 

the unit. 

Study of Routes and 

Landmarks. 

95. Useful and reliable reports 

may be expected only from observers who are perfectly familiar 

with the terrain, both as a result 

of detailed study of all maps 

covering the sector, and from 

knowledge acquired from previous fliahts carried out. both bv 

should be made to reduce, as far 

as possible, the necessity for using a map by acquiring an exact 

knowledge of the salient features 

and landmarks. 

96. The position of the stars 

and moon, (according to the 

hour and the phase of the 

moon,) should be utilized for the 

purpose of orientation, especially 

for checking the indications c btained from the compass. 1.n lorder to determine with exactitude 

the angle of the course of the 

airplane, the indications given by 

the stars and compass must be 

combined with the effect of the 

drift resulting from the action of 

the wind at the altitude attained. 

The latest obtainable meteorological data is essential to the 

night flying pilot not only to enable him to judge the possibility of 

flying, but to permit him to correctly determine his course while 

he is in the air. 

97. Within our own lines, 

there exists an organization of 

signal lights of the front, marking " 

day and at night. Constant effort out the aerial routes which furnishes the pilot and observer 

with necessary indications and 

direction marks to enable them 

to take the direction of their objective and to find their field on 

return. Familiarity with the system of signal lights is of course 

essential. 

98. In spite of all precautions 

taken within both our own and 

enemy lines, permanent lights 

will be found which form excellent landmarks. Groups of 

searchlights placed around iniportant localities and objectives. 
282 Postwar Review 

and generally lit up on the passage of any airplane are visible 

from very far away, and can be 

used as direction points and 

guides. The star shells fired almost continuously from the 

trenches, and flashes of the cannon in an active sector will permit any lost plane to find the 

lines again. 

99. Whenever the enemy is 

carrying out night bombardment, their ground signal lights 

and direction rockets, the location of which is generally permanent, form indications of the 

highest value to our airplanes. 

Visibility In General. 

100. The closest possible 

study must be made of the effect 

of varying weather conditions 

upon visibility. Visibility at night 

is extremely variable. It depends 

upon two things: the clearness of 

the atmosphere, (absence of 

mist and fog) and the light afforded by the moon. The visibility of natural landmarks at night 

is found in general to take the 

following order: woods, important towns or other localities; 

roads, rivers and other water 

courses or bodies of water, 

(brooks, canals, lakes and 

ponds). 

101. On clear moonlit nights 

the visibility is very good. At an 

average altitude the visibility for 

practical purposes of direction 

may extend from 10 to 15 kilometers. Woods show up as 

clearly defined black (or dark) 

blots, easily recognizable by their 

shape and outline. Roads appear 

white or grey if bordered by 

trees or just after rain. Water 

courses may be recognized by 

the dark strips formed by the 

valleys, nearly always bordered 

by trees or meadows, and by the 

reflection of the moon in the 

water. Canals are still more easy 

to identify owing to their rectilinear form. 

102. On misty nights the reflections of the light on the mist 

interferes with observation. It is 

then necessary to place oneself 

between the moon and the point 

to be observed or the road to be 

followed. 

103. On dark nights it is quite 

possible to see quite well, but 

the visibility is generally confined 

to the vertical. For this reason, it 

is not possible to fly by known 

direction points and landmarks, 

but it is necessary to follow step 

by step the itinerary, paying 

ceaseless attention to locating 

one’s position accurate1.y on the 

map. When direction signal 

lights are given, they may, of 

course, be used to fly by. On 

dark nights when utilizing woods 

as landmarks and direction 

points to fly by, it is better, if the 

woods be of large dimensions or 

extent, to follow along .their 

edges than to try to fly sdraight 

across them. Large towns and 

localities show up in ths form of 

grey blots with sharply defined 

edges. White roads, not bordered by trees, in dry weather, 

show up clearly, but should be 

followed in all their detours lest 

they be lost. The same may be 

said for water courses, which 

are, however, more difficult to 

see and are frequently only visible by the dark line of the trees 

and meadows bordering them, 

or by the bank of mist lying in 

the valley. 

104. On bad nights when the 

hygrometric state of the air is 

pronounced, and particiilarly if it 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

:283 

is very dark and the sky is covered over, the visibility is extremely restricted. It is then very 

difficult to direct oneself other 

than by signal lights, or to find 

objectives except those which 

are lighted up. Nevertheless, it is 

always necessary to pay the 

strictest attention to watching the 

ground, and an experienced observer rarely fails to pick up sufficient indications to locate himself. Sorties on nights such as 

these should be carried out only 

in the event of real necessity and 

only over objectives close to the 

lines. 

Visibility of Special 

Objectives. 

105. (a) Stations: The rails are 

of dark color and do not show 

up well, but the platform, paths, 

etc., which practically always exist, make characteristic white 

patches which are easy to recognize. Sometimes red and green 

signal lights will be seen and 

often, especially when there is a 

great deal of activity at the station, various white lights and 

even arc lights are shown. 

(b) Factories: When lit up 

they can be seen as readily as by 

daylight. They are usually beneath a luminous halo which can 

be seen from a great distance. In 

general, all lights are put out as 

soon as an alert is sounded and 

frequently a few will be left in 

order to draw the bombardment 

to false objectives, such as slag 

heaps, etc. Iron castings look like 

huge reddish explosions. 

(c) Airdromes: From an 

average altitude the hangars are 

only visible on clear nights, but it 

is always possible to locate them 

from their relative position from 

the roads that feed them. Airdromes in use at night show only 

a very restrained amount of 

light-three or four red lights 

and occasionally a row of small 

searchlights lighted at the instant 

that an airplane is landing. Rockets and other signal lights are 

also used, and give useful indications as to the location and 

activity of the various fields. 

(d) Villages: These appear 

as a grey blot with roads, paths 

and sometimes railways converging into them. 

(e) Camps and Bivouacs: In 

open ground these are not difficult to find; the numerous paths 

around them make it still more 

easy to locate them. In woods 

they are rarely visible at night. 

Convoys carrying lights show up 

that portion of the road which 

(f) Convoys and Columns: 

they occupy. Motor car headlights give characteristic white 

spots on the roads. Columns 

without lights are difficult to spot 

except on clear nights at a low 

altitude. 

(g) Trains: On moonlight 

nights the smoke of a locomotive 

can be seen at a great distance, 

at low altitude the train itself ij 

visible. On dark nights only the 

tail lights can be seen and occasionally the firebox when it i:, 

opened (especially the refleciion 

of the fire on the smoke overhead). Only exceptionally are 

trains lighted up. 

Execution of a Mission. 

106. The altitude at which a 

reconnaissance is carried out depends on visibility; in order to 

recognize details by vertical observation, it is necessary to fly 

low. Good visibility is attained by 

flying away from the moon. 
284 Postwair Review 

107. By allotting clearly defined reconnaissance areas to individual airplanes flying at fixed 

times, it will be possible to obtain 

reports covering practically the 

whole night. 

108. If it is not possible to 

reconnoiter railway lines, roads 

and watercourses for movement 

by repeatedly flying along their 

whole length, one reconnaissance should be carried out between midnight and 300 A.M., 

as the beginning or end of any 

important movement will take 

place during that period. The 

direction of railway movement 

and activity at stations can be 

recognized by the glare from locomotives and the white smoke 

issuing from them. Size and nature of train movements and of 

entraining and detraining operations can only be observed by 

airplanes flying at low altitude. 

Increased activity at stations can 

be recognized by the unavoidable increase in lights on sidings 

and platforms. 

109. Troop movements and 

traffic on treeless roads and over 

open county cannot escape an 

observer’s attention. On roads 

bordered with trees, in villages, 

and in county affording facilities 

for cover, however, airplanes will 

have to fly low, when, as experience has shown, even the slightest movements can be detected. 

110. When ordering reconnaissances for concentrations of 

troops, camps, billets and airdromes, individual airplanes 

should not be allotted too large 

an area, and observers should 

be instructed in detail as to roads 

of approach of columns and assembly areas, from information 

gained by photographic and visual observations by day. 

111. Night reconnaissance airplanes will be sent out singly in 

order not to attract the enemy’s 

attention, which would cause 

him to extinguish lights and 

alarm his defences. It is recommended that Airplanes should 

cross the lines at great heights 

and then glide down. It may also 

be advisable to fly with the engine throttled down. Machine 

guns should only be used for self 

defense or when there is a 

chance of causing serious losses 

to the enemy. A machine which 

limits itself to reconnoitering may 

sometimes be taken by the enemy for one of his own aeroplanes. 

112. Parachutes flares are 

most useful for night reconnaissance. 

Enemy Defense Against 

Night Reconnaissance. 

113. As regards the enemy’s 

defensive measures against night 

reconnaissance airplanes, complaints received are chiefly concerned with the blinding effect of 

searchlights, which ma!, render 

all reconnaissance impossible; 

on the other hand anti-aircraft 

and machine gun fire have not 

been heavy. It will be found 

advisable to employ night pursuit for the purpose of neutralizing enemy searchlights and antiaircaft defense. Enemy night 

pursuit is a growing danger to 

night reconnaissance. 

THE ROUTINE OF A 

PURSUIT UNIT. 

Duties. 

double mission to perform: 

114. Pursuit aviation has a 

(a) Offensive. 

(b) Protective. 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

115. Offensive Patrols are dispatched to cross the enemy’s 

lines in sufficient strength to 

cruise over his rear area, search 

out enemy aircraft, and attack 

them with the object of causing 

maximum casualties and inflicting the greatest possible damage 

to his air service and with a 

further object of obtaining a definite moral superiority. Offensive 

patrols should cover low, intermediate, and high altitudes, and 

it must always be borne in mind 

that pursuit aviation furnishes its 

own protection and that the advantage of altitude will frequently outweigh the advantage 

of numbers in a combat so that 

low or intermediate patrols 

should invariably be accompanied by high protection. 

double mission to carry out: 

vation Aviation in a position 

where it will be, and will feel, 

that it is protected. 

116. Protective Patrols, have a 

(a) To place Corps Obser- 

(b) To protect our ground 

troops from the results of enemy 

artillery adjustment, reconnaissance, and photographic airplanes, as well as from attack by 

pursuit and attack airplanes. 

117. Protective patrols are not 

to be regarded as defensive in 

character. All pursuit aviation is 

offensive in character, but the 

limitation of the area in which 

protective patrols are ordered to 

fly and to fight and the end 

which it is desired to accomplish 

by the utilization of protective 

patrols distinguishes them from 

offensive patrols, whose mission 

is to attack and destroy enemy 

aircraft of every sort wherever 

found. 

118. The performance of the 

double role of protective patrols 

cannot be accomplished by the 

maintenance of a permanent 

barrage of the sector. Such a 

procedure is fatiguing for the pilots, expensive in material in 

comparison with the results obtained and renders it impossible 

for us to undertake offensive expeditions in force. Consequently 

a permanent barrage will only be 

resorted to at times of intense 

preparation for attack while it is 

imperative to prevent all reconnaissance of our rear areas on 

the part of the enemy air service. 

119. It is to be noted that 

barrage patrols can only afford 

effective protection to our army 

corps air service when active 

over a limited breadth of front 

which, as a rule, should not exceed 15 kilometers. The size and 

altitude of protective patrols will 

depend upon the general activity 

of the sector, and the strength 

and degree of aggressiveness of 

enemy aviation. On special occasions a triple tier barrage may 

be established for short periods 

of time. The depth that protective patrols will penetrate into 

the enemy rear areas will be 

prescribed in orders. Patrols 

must not exceed this depth except in extraordinary circumsiances; for them to do so leaves ,the 

Army Corps aviation unprotected. For a protective patrol to 

leave this area assigned to it, in 

order to attack enemy airplanes 

or for any other reason, constitutes a serious offense. 

120. In order to protect effectively our Army Corps airplanes, 

barrage patrols should operate 

from 5 to 9 kilometers over the 

enemy lines. 

121. For the rigidity of a fixed 

system of protective patrols there 

will be substituted a system 

which will comprise patrols especially directed against enemy 

army corps aviation and in addition a number of airplanes on 

alert, ready to take off in a few 

minutes, to cope with any 

marked increase of enemy aviation over a part of the sector of 

the enemy aviation in cases 

where ground activity makes an 

increase of aerial activity 

advisable. 
286 Postwar Review 

122. The size of the alert or 

mobile reserve will be prescribed 

in orders. The group commanders will be responsible for its 

proper utilization. It is not intended to use the planes on alert 

to counter attack every enemy 

airplane reported by our A. A. A. 

Observation Post or the Gonio 

Stations. The alert will be used 

by group commanders as a sort 

of “support System” to reinforce 

our aviation in case of increased 

enemy aviation or in case of 

activity on the part of infantry or 

artillery. 

123. In addition to the routine 

offensive protective patrols, pursuit aviation will perform 4 types 

of special missions: 

(a) Close protection of Corps airplanes. 

(b) Cooperation with Day Bombardment. 

(c) Attacks on balloons. 

(d) Attacks on ground troops. 

124. Close Protection of 

Corps Aviation will only be arranged in special cases where 

the Corps Aviation has to perform particularly difficult and 

delicate missions. The group 

commander of the Corps Observation Group will request such 

protectioh from the nearest pursuit group commander and the 

latter will be the judge as to 

whether or not his missions will 

permit him to furnish the protection requested. It has been 

found that by furnishing the 

daily schedule of operations to 

the Corps Air Service in advance 

the Corps Air Service is generally able to arrange its missions 

so that they coincide with the 

time of a routine pursuit patrol, 

and this patrol after it has concluded its protection of the 

Corps airplanes is able to continue its patrol of the lines. 

125. Cooperation With Day 

Bombardment is valuable, in 

that it enables pursuit patrols to 

obtain contact with enemy pursuit airplanes. Owing to the long 

range and slow speed of day 

bombardment airplanes, a covering protection should not be 

afforded. A day bombing expedition should rely upon its own 

strength to defend itself from attack of enemy airplanes. 

126. By sending out pursuit 

patrols to meet day bornbardment units over the objective 

and again at the line when returning from their raid it will 

often be possible to attack enemy pursuit airplanes which are 

following the bombers in the 

hopes of picking off a straggler. 

Under these circumstances our 

pursuit airplanes by knowing the 

altitudes and route whi’ch the 

day bombardment will follow, 

can obtain the advantage of altitude and surprise, as the enemy 

pursuit will have its attention directed to the bombers whom 

they are pursuing. 

dangerous and difficult and 

should only be undertaken in 

order to destroy the work of 

some balloon which is particularly embarrassing to our troops. 

Vey light patrols, of one or two 

airplanes, make the attack with a 

patrol overhead to protect the 

attacking airplanes from being 

surprised. Demonstrations 

against the entire line of enemy 

balloons along a considerable 

length of front often give valuable results by causing alU the 

enemy balloons to be hauled 

down; these results are especially to be sought during the 

preparation of an offen.; we or 

when the attack is in prlcgress. 

They must be organized with 

great care and precision in order 

that the attack may take place 

simultaneously along the entire 

front. In attacking a balloon, it 

must always be borne in mind 

that only the front part is vulnerable. At least the rear third has 

nothing in it but air. 

127. Attacks on Balloons are 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

287 

128. Attacks on Ground Objectives often give valuable results during a major operation. 

The objectives of attack should, 

as a rule, be the enemy reserves, 

either in mass formation or on 

the march. They should be undertaken in force as the result 

desired is the maximum moral 

effect. The employment of a 

large number of pursl;it airplanes 

in attacking ground objectives 

increases the safety of the operations by multiplying the targets at 

which the enemy must shoot. In 

a calm sector, machine gun attacks of objectives on the 

ground, trenches, machine gun 

emplacements, artillery positions, etc., produce very little effect either moral or material. 

They will not be attempted. 

Notes on Routine Procedure. 

129. The Group Commander 

will dispose tactically of his 

forces in order to cover the instructions or orders issued by the 

Army to which the Group is 

attached. 

130. All Tactical Work in Pursuit Units will be performed in 

formation, the size of these formations varying in accordance 

with the situation, the mission, 

and the enemy's dispositions. 

131. The Formation of five or 

six airplanes, i.e., the flight, will 

be the basis of all tactical operations, in order that the tactical 

efficiency of the several flights 

may reach maximum, it is advisable that the pilots live together 

on the ground as much as possible, and in addition, work together in the air at all times. 

Formations of five or six airplanes are extremely maneuverable and at the same time can 

be controlled to the best advantage by a single patrol leader. It 

is probable that of a flight of six 

airplanes and pilots, not more 

than five will be available for 

duty on any given day. Where 

the mission requires a greater 

number than five or six airplanes, two or more flights acting 

independently, but in liaison 

with one another, will be employed. 

ing methods may be employed 

for the formation of flights depending upon the direction of 

the wind and the size of the 

landing field: 

132. Either one of the follow- 

(a) Formation on leavinq 

the ground-The patrol leader 

takes off first, flying at less than 

full speed, and the others follow 

him in order. When the patrol 

leader has reached the approximate altitude which he has sot 

beforehand for formation, he 

will make a half circle and return 

over the flying field, each pilot 

then taking up his appointed 

place. Upon passing over the 

flying field, the patrol leader can 

determine the number of airplanes which have been unable 

to take off. 

(b) Formation over a selected spot-This method of 

forming patrols is especially useful when several patrols are t'3 

take off at the same time. In this 

case, the patrol leader is the last 

to take off and the deputy patrol 

leader the next to last. The altitude of assembly is fixed beforehand and depends upon the 

mission, ceiling, etc. It is never 

greater than 2,000 meters. Otherwise, the airplanes are likely to 

become dispersed before the patrol is formed. The assembly 

point is a few kilometers from 

the flying field, never more than 

ten, over some striking landmark. Upon arrival at this point, 

each pilot makes left-hand turns, 

while he is climbing, until he has 

reached the designated altitude 

which he must maintain precisely. The patrol leader climbs 
288 Postwar Review 

to an altitude of 200 meters below the patrol and describes 

right-hand circles. When he considers it proper, he turns toward 

the lines flying extremely slowly 

and balancing his wings to attract attention. The other pilots 

then assume their places. If no 

airplane is seen turning to the 

right below the patrol, the deputy patrol leader flies to the 

flying field to ascertain that the 

patrol leader has been unable to 

take off. A ground sheet signal 

gives the indication. If the patrol 

leader has been unable to take 

off, the deputy patrol leader assumes the leadership of the 

patrol. 

133. AU formations should 

comprise a double echelon in 

depth and in altitude, the airplanes at the rear being highest 

up so that they can take advantage of their altitude to close in 

on the patrol leader by diving, in 

case of necessity. The usual formation is that of an inverted 

“V’, the patrol leader at the 

head. Number two and number 

four on his left rear and number 

three and number five on his 

right rear; number two and 

number three should be about 

200 meters apart and about 50 

meters above and to the rear of 

number one. Number four and 

number five should be about 

400 meters apart and about 100 

meters above and to the rear of 

number one. When the patrol is 

composed of six airplanes, number six takes position above, behind, and to the left of number 

four, or above, behind and to 

the right of number five. 

134. In formations of several 

flights, the same principle is employed. The flight leader of the 

entire formation flies at the head 

of the leading flight. One flight 

behind, above and to the left of 

him and another flight behind, 

above and to his right. 

135. Single Flight Combat. - The patrol leader determines the 

advisibility of combat. He will be 

permitted a considerable latitude 

in making his own disposition 

when the combat is joined. As a 

rule, airplanes number four and 

number five of his formation will 

remain above to afford protection from enemy airplanes, 

which may in the vicinity. The 

patrol leader himself will always 

lead the attack. In the attack 

teamplay leads to victoy. It is, 

therefore, essential that all members of one flight shall talk over 

on the ground and practice in 

the air the evolutions, which the 

Flight Commander will use in 

attacking different types of enemy aircraft. 

136. In case of a combat 

when several patrols are flying 

together and a large force of 

enemy airplanes is sighted, the 

leader of the forward and lower 

flight will detemine what action 

to take. the leaders of the other 

flights guiding on him. In such 

cases, it is generally preferable to 

attempt to attack the rear man of 

the enemy formation. The inability to maneuver formations of 

more than five airplanes, makes 

it possible to throw the enemy 

into confusion and to attack his 

airplanes separately. The attack 

by the formation leader upon 

the leader of the enemy‘s formation should, as a rule, be 

avoided unless the formation 

leader is confident of possessing 

superior material. The attack by 

the leader of the formation upon 

the leader of an enemy formation invariably leads to a melee 

in which both formations become separated, which is difficult 

to break off inside the enemy’s 

lines, and which simply becomes 

an engagement of individuals. 

137. The Rally-After a combat every effort should be made 

to regain the formation as speedily as possible. This is easy to 

accomplish inside our lines if 

conspicuous landmarks are designated beforehand within four 

or five kilometers of the line. 

Within the enemy lines, the rally 

is far more difficult to execute. In 

this case, each pilot will fly toward the fixed rally point, within 

our lines, but will watch at all 

times to give assistance to any of 

our pilots who appear to be in 

trouble. When the rally point has 

been reached, patrol reforms in 

accordance with the principles 

laid down in paragraph 132 (b). 

138. In making disposition of 

his forces, the Group Commander will endeavor at all times 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

:289 

to keep in hand a mobile reserve 

of airplanes capable of taking off 

in a few moments to counterattack any increased enemy 

aviation over our front, or to 

reinforce our patrols on the front 

in case ground activity makes 

increased aerial activity advisable. 

139. In sectors where general 

conditions render it safe to install 

the pursuit airdrome very close 

to the front, i.e., 20 to 25 kilometers, it should be possible to 

arrange a very close liaison with 

the front, the anti-aircraft artillery, the goniometric stations, 

etc. In such cases a number of 

airplanes to be determined by 

circumstances, always at least 

one flight, will be held on alert, 

ready to take off and attack every enemy airplane crossing our 

lines and every enemy airplane 

making adjustments close to its 

own lines. Under these circumstances, flights will perfect themselves in taking off quickly and 

getting into formation immediately. In answering “alert” of this 

character, speed in leaving the 

airdrome and taking up formation is of paramount importance. 

140. Group Operations Offi- cer. Alerts of a character requiring instant response should 

come in to the office of the 

Group Operations Officer. He 

will decide whether or not the 

alert is to be answered, bearing 

in mind the number of airplanes 

instantly available, the number, 

type, and probable mission of 

the enemy airplanes reported, 

their altitude and direction of 

flight. He will transmit the alert 

to the flight or squadron which is 

standing by to respond to such 

calls, together with his estimate 

of the situation. The Flight Commander on duty will, as a rule, 

decide the number of airplanes 

which will actually be used to 

respond to an alert transmitted 

to him, but the group Operations 

Officer should be authorized to 

give orders on the subject in the 

name of the Group Commander 

regarding the number of airplanes to respond if, in his judgment, orders are necessary. 

141. After a patrol leader has 

left the ground, he is responsible 

for carrying out the patrol’s mission. He should be permitted 

complete independence of judgment in the leading of his patrol, 

and in exceptional cases, may 

depart from the designated route 

if the situation makes it advisable. The Group Operations Officer is responsible that complete 

information is given to the 

Squadron Operations Officer relative to every mission, and in 

exceptional cases he will explain 

the objective of the mission to 

the patrol leader personally. The 

patrol leader will only depart 

from the mission assigned to him 

in such cases as this appears to 

be essential. 
290 Postwar Review 

ORGANIZATION AND 

EMPLOYMENT OF 

ATTACK SQUADRONS. 

Composition of Attack 

Squadrons and Attack 

Groups. 

142. An Attack squadron will 

normally consist of 18 airplanes, 

(either mono-plane or bi-plane), 

divided into three flights. 

143. An attack group will consist of two or more attack squadrons, the normal composition 

being three squadrons. 

144. In addition to the combat 

squadrons, there will also be one 

park squadron assigned to each 

battle group. Whenever practicable, all squadrons of an attack 

group will be located on the 

same airdrome. 

Missions and Duties of 

Attack Squadrons. 

planes on the battle-field and 

their cooperation in fighting on 

the ground, by open gun fire, or 

by attacking with bombs and 

hand grenades, is particularly effective from the point of view of 

morale, both on our own and 

the enemy’s troops. 

145. The use of low-flying air146. The systematic and aggressive participation in the battle of flying formations against 

ground targets is of great importance. During offensives, attack 

squadrons operate over and in 

front of the infantry and neutralize the fire of the enemy’s infantry and barrage batteries. On the 

defensive, the appearance of the 

attack airplanes affords visible 

proof to heavily engaged troops 

that Headquarters is maintaining 

close touch with the front, and is 

employing all possible auxiliaries 

to support the fighting troops. 

The morale of the troops and 

their confidence in a successful 

defense is thereby materially 

strengthened. The object of the 

attack squadrons, in addition to 

the losses inflicted by them, is to 

shatter the enemy’s morale by 

continuous attacks in formation, 

and thus to exert a decisive influence on the result of the battle. Confusion to the enemy’s 

front line troops, dispersion of 

his infantry and machine gun fire 

from their normal targets, the 

demoralization of traffic, the dispersion and delay of reinforcements, as well as the actual 

losses inflicted upon his forces, 

are the means by which the mission of the attack squadrons is 

accomplished. 

147. Whenever the situation 

warrants, attack squadrons 

should operate in conjunction 

with bombing squadrons. The 

area of attack may thus be extended deeper into the enemy’s 

lines, the bombing squadrons 

operating beyond the attack 

squadrons, and normally as far 

back as the rear areas of the 

enemy’s corps, and, in some 

cases, to the rear areas, of 

his army. 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

,291 

Employment of Attack 

Squadrons. 

148. The successful employment of attack squadrons depends upon their concentrated, 

continuous, uninterrupted engagement at the decisive time 

and place. This condition limits 

their use to that particular portion of the battle front upon 

which the entire operations depends, and prohibits their distribution over relatively unimportant portions of the battle line. 

149. The proper execution of 

the missions of attack squadrons 

makes the fullest demands on 

the physical and mental capabilities of the personnel. While employed on attack missions, attack 

squadrons must devote themselves exclusively to their particular sphere of action. Tasks 

forming part of the normal duties 

of the observation, pursuit or 

bombardment squadrons must 

not be assigned to attack squadrons simultaneously with their 

attack missions. Attack squadrons, however, will report to the 

proper Headquarters immediately after landing, all observations made during their flights 

which may be of value. Their 

duties in connection with observation are the same as now 

specified for pursuit squadrons. 

150. Attack squadrons are to 

be employed in DECISIVE infantry actions. At other times 

(when the military situation is 

such that there is no probability 

of attack missions being required), attack squadrons may 

be employed as protection for 

corps and army observation 

units. 

151. Attack groups will normally be held under the direct 

command of the Chief of Air 

Service of an army or, (in extended operations) of the Chief 

of Air Service of the Army 

Group. Liaison must be maintained so that the entire forces of 

the attack units can immediately 

be thrown into action at the 

point designated. This requires 

that the personnel of the attack 

squadrons be constantly in touch 

with the progress of the battle 

and the exact locations of the 

leading elements of our own and 

the enemy’s troops. It also requires that they be thoroughly 

familiar with the location of the 

enemy’s artillery, machine gun 

nests, bivouacing centers, his 

lines of communications and 

routes or reinforcement immediately in rear of the battle front. 

152. The information outlined 

in the preceding paragraph will 

be obtained through close liaison 

with the Chief of Air Service (of 

the Army and Corps, Observation Groups, Balloons, Pursuit 

and Bombardment Groups, 

Ground Observation Posts and 

the General Staffs. 

153. During active operations, 

the attack units will be kept 

ready for immediate action, both 

during the day and night. Their 

efficient use requires that they 

strike at the given point at the 

decisive instant, and with their 

maximum force. Their airdromes 

should be located as far forward 

as communications and the terrain will permit. Advanced airdromes will be reconnoitered, 

and communications installed 

beforehand, and these advanced 

airdromes will be utilized as the 

military situation requires. 
292 Postwair Review 

(a) Offensive. 

154. In the offensive, attack 

squadrons will be employed in 

force to destroy the enemy’s forward infantry lines and harass 

his forward artille ry. They will be 

used to neutralize infantry and 

machine gun fire. They will prevent the organization of supports 

and their movement forward to 

the main line of resistance. They 

will prevent the sending forward 

of reinforcements. They will isolate and demoralize enemy concentrations. They will prevent 

designated routes of communications from being used. They 

will prevent the sending forward 

of ammunition, especially by 

horse-drawn caissons to the 

front lines. The above missions 

will be accomplished by the use 

of bombs, hand grenades, airplane cannon, and machine 

guns. 

155. Accurate knowledge of 

the ground is the first condition 

for the successful action of attack 

squadrons. The personnel must 

be thoroughly familiar with their 

own forward battle zone, and 

the composition and formation 

of the ground troops that are to 

make the attack, the position 

and location of the forward elements of the enemy’s ground 

troops, his centers of resistance 

and lines of reinforcement and 

withdrawal. 

156. Attack squadrons must 

not be engaged before the attack 

is made by the ground troops. 

The proper moment for the 

leading elements of attack 

squadrons to pass over our front 

line is the moment when the 

infantry units advance to the attack. Attack squadrons should 

therefore be continuously engaged until a decision on the 

ground has been reached. They 

should be ready and should 

strike again if counter attacks are 

being prepared. 

157. In case the advance is 

being successfully accomplished, 

the attack squadrons must utilize 

every possible means of turning 

the enemy’s withdrawal into a 

rout. 

that using gas to delay our advancing troops, are one of the 

normal targets for attack squadrons. The enemy’s barrage batteries are normal targets for our 

attack squadrons. Special flights 

should be detailed to attack 

these batteries. 

or flights may be detailed for 

harassing traffic in certain areas 

behind the enemy’s front lines. 

Their missions will usually be 

best accomplished by rendering 

designated traffic centers impassable. 

160. Attack airplanes should 

not be given missions against 

enemy aircraft. Their relation to 

enemy aircraft is normally a defensive one only. 

(bl Defensiue. 

161. The use of attack squadrons on the defensive against the 

enemy’s counter-attacks made 

during our offensive operations 

158. Light artillery, especially 

159. Special attack squadrons 

has been indicated above. When 

our troops are on the defensive 

and the enemy’s preparations 

indicate that his infantry attack is 

imminent, the attack squadrons 

must be held in constant readiness both by day and night. 

Continuous liaison must be 

maintained during this period regarding the enemy’s assembly 

points, troop movements and 

probable line of advance. 

162. The enemy’s leading elements become of secondary importance after the advance is actually started, and the force of 

attack squadrons should be concentrated upon his supports and 

reserves, his barrage batteries, 

and possibly upon certain of his 

interdiction and harassing batteries. Normally, the enemy’s second and third assault waves will 

be targets of prime importance 

for attack squadrons after the 

advance has begun. If the enemy’s leading elements attack by 

the infiltration method, our attack squadrons should concentrate upon the “follow-up” 

forces, and except under very 

unusual conditions, cannot be 

used against the enemy’s leading 

elements. 

163. If the enemy’s infantry 

advance is made in connection 

with tanks, the isolation of the 

tanks from their infantiy supports becomes one of the missions of attack squadrons. The 

Signal Corps 

radio truck used to 

receive and transmit messages. 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

2 93 

attack by airplanes upon tanks 

should be made with bombs and 

airplane cannon. 

Transmission of Orders. 

164. The commander of the 

attack squadron or attack group 

will receive detailed orders from 

the Headquarters to which his 

organization is attached. These 

will state the following: 

the enemy’s front lines. 

attack. 

phase. 

(a) Exact location of our own and 

(b) Objective and sector of the 

(c) Nature of the preparatoy 

(d) Method of attack. 

(e) “D’ Day. 

(f) “H’ Hour. 

(9) Targets especially assigned to 

the attack group or squadrons. 

165. Each attack squadron of 

the group will be given one 

target, one mission, or one area 

to cover. If the position of our 

front line is not exactly known, 

as, for instance, during rear 

guard actions, the enemy’s batteries, routes of advance, and 

road centers, will normally be 

given as targets. 

especially when our troops are 

acting defensively, every means 

for the rapid transmission of information and orders must be 

employed. If a division intends 

to counter-attack, this information, giving the hour and sector, 

must be transmitted to the attack 

squadron or group assigned. 

Telephones, telegraph, radio, or 

visual signals will be used. The 

166. During active operations, 

attack squadron or group. will, if 

necessary, maintain one or two 

airplanes over the Division P.C., 

for the receiving and transmission of information concerning 

the time of the proposed counterattack. Upon receipt of this information, the liaison plane will 

return to its airdrome and transmit its information by radio, 

dropped message, or by landing. 

167. Selected men of the 

leading elements of the infantry 

organization should be informed 

of the time that attack squadrons 

are to operate over their sector, 

and particular care should be 

taken that the panels or flares 

used to mark the front line are 

properly displayed. 
2 94 Postwar Review 

Training and Tactics. 

which attack airplanes operate, 

the greater the morale and material effect. For this reason, attack airplanes will operate as low 

as the terrain and their weapons 

permit. If machine-gunning 

troops in the open, descents as 

low as ten meters are advocated. 

Then flying at this height, the 

direction of attack should be 

parallel to, or away from our 

troops. Extremely low attack is 

especially valuable against columns of troops or convoys, 

along a straight road, in cuts, 

and against troops massed on 

open hill-tops. When using 

bombs, the airplane should be 

flown just high enough to be 

outside the danger zone of the 

explosion. For the engagement 

of batteries in action, a height of 

two hundred or three hundred 

meters is more favorable. If the 

batteries are exposed in the 

open where the terrain permits 

an attack from the flank or rear, 

at one hundred meters, or less, 

(depending upon armament of 

the airplane), may accomplish 

better results. 

168. The lower the altitude at 

169. Attack squadrons and 

groups must make use of every 

opportunity to carry out training 

behind the front for their work. 

The most important features of 

this training are simulated attacks 

in close formation, flight following flight, and the preparation of 

time scheaules of departure from 

the airdrome, formation of flight, 

attack, expenditure of ammunition, and return to the airdrome, 

replenishment of fuel and ammunition, and repetition of attack. Particular attention should 

be paid to the training of flight 

leaders, deputy flight leaders, 

and the control and maneuvering of the flight as a unit. Theoretical and practical instruction 

and training must be given to 

each individual until he has 

completely mastered his airplane 

and weapons. 

Relation to other Aircraft. 

170. Attack squadrons are for 

use against the enemy's ground 

forces. They are not, primarily, 

for use against enemy aircraft, 

except balloons. Their use 

against balloons should be considered as of minor importance, 

except in connection a'ith attacks 

against enemy artillery. 

171. During the preparatory 

phase of an operation, they may 

efficiently be used as protection 

for low-flying infantry md artillery airplanes. These missions 

should be utilized for familiarizing the personnel of the attack 

squadrons with the sector. 

attack squadrons, against their 

normal targets, they should be 

protected from enemy aircraft, 

either by pursuit airplanes, or by 

one or more flights of the attack 

group operating as protection at 

a higher altitude. If tho group 

does not contain a squadron 

equipped with machin'es of the 

pursuit type suitable for engaging enemy aircraft, thereby requiring that protection be furnished by one or more flights of 

attack airplanes, the schedule of 

operations should be worked out 

so that the protection flights be 

relieved by other protection 

flights before their fuel has been 

consumed, and they will then 

descend and expend their ammunition against ground targets 

before returning to their airdrome. 

thought should be given by all 

attack personnel to thc. 1 means 

172. During the operations of 

173. Particular attention and 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

295 

and methods of improving the 

efficiency of attack squadrons, 

particular attention being given 

to maneuvers and new 

weapons. 

LIAISON OF THE AIRPLANE WITH THE 

INFANTRY. 

174. The functions of the infantry airplane in its cooperation 

with the infantry is separated 

into two distinct categories, 

which will be specified hereafter 

under the titles of: THE INFANTRY COMMAND AIRPLANE. 

THE INFANTRY CONTACT 

AIRPLANE. 

I. The Infanty 

Command Airplane. 

Function. 

175. The Infantry Command 

Airplane acts as the liaison agent 

under the direction of the division commander, between the 

attacking infantry and the division P.C., and as an agent of 

liaison for the P.C.’s of the infantry itself, of the artillery and of 

neighboring troops, as circumstances require and in conformance with instructions from 

proper authority. 

176. It follows the operations 

of the front line troops for the 

purpose of obtaining the position 

of their lines when desired, and 

transmits same to the division 

P.C., and gathers such information as possible concerning the 

enemy and our own troops during the preliminary reconnaissance which is made prior to 

asking for the position of the 

front line from the infantry. 

177. It transmits to the infantry the orders of the division 

commander; transmits to the division commander the communications of the subordinate 

P.C.’s made by signals; and in 

general keeps the division commander informed of the progress 

of our own front lines and as to 

the situation in the immediate 

enemy lines. 

The Mission. 

178. It is not feasible to limit 

exactly the duties of the Infantry 

Command Airplane where such 

duties may temporarily coinci.de 

with those of the artillery surveillance or counter-attack airplane. 

It is desirable that the Infantry 

Command Airplane report all 

activity of interest that he may 

see during his preliminary recmonnaissance, so that his message 

may well include a report of 

enemy batteries in action; the 

activity of enemy and our own 

neighboring troops, and similar 

information of importance. He 

should always report the activity 

of enemy aircraft, enemy bal.- 

loons, and anti-aircraft. It must 

be borne in mind, however, ]:hat 

this airplane has for its specific 

mission the determination of the 

infantry front lines, and that all 

other considerations are secondary. To keep the command well 

informed as to the situation of 

our front line is the first and most 

important duty of the Infantry 

Command Airplane. The difficulties that he will have to overcome to be successful do not 

permit those in command to expect him to give other inforrriation regularly or to have him 

undertake other missions. However, if, as frequently happens 

in the war of movement. it is 

not immediately possible to obtain the position of the front 

line. the observer may render, 

other services in the interval 

which will elapse until the time 

when he can obtain its position. 

1 
296 Postwar Review 

179. He may temporarily assume the functions of a counterbattery or surveillance airplane. 

He may relay to the command 

and to the artillery the signals 

made by the infantry such as a 

request for a barrage, or for an 

increase of artillery range, or a 

request for ammunition. In the 

case of strong resistance by the 

enemy, checking our advance at 

any point, he may inform the 

command by radio or by a 

dropped message on the P.C., 

or may drop a message on a 

group of infantry, giving location 

and importance of the opposing 

forces. 

180. The command must realize that an absolutely fixed time 

for obtaining the position of the 

line is impracticable. This is true 

both at the beginning of an attack, when an Infantry Command Airplane will invariably be 

over the lines, and later during 

the war of movement when circumstances may easily arise rendering it impossible to obtain the 

line at a specific time. At the 

beginning of an attack the line 

should not be demanded until 

sufficient time has elapsed for 

the infantry to gain some predetermined objective. 

181. Infantry commanders 

and troops must assist the aviator so far as lies within their 

power. A watch must be maintained for his signals, and a 

prompt response made to his 

request for the position of the 

line. It must be borne in mind 

constantly that the success of the 

mission depends upon a thorough mutual understanding and 

cooperation between the infantry and the airplane. 

The Execution of the 

Mission. 

182. An observer, in order to 

render a comprehensive, valuable report must bring up to the 

last moment the information he 

obtained before leaving the airdrome. This will be done by 

flying over our artillery line before going to the front; locating 

the important P.C.’s and observing the activity of our own and 

the enemy’s artillery, the progress of the artillery engagement, 

and the aerial activity; then proceeding to the lines he will note 

the enemy activity on the 

ground; the grenade and bayonet fights, and any other information of importance and interest to the command. When he 

has thoroughly grasped the general situation he takes advantage 

of a favorable opportunity and 

discharges his signal asking that 

the Infantry indicate their 

position. 

183. The Signal used by the 

airplane in identifying himself, 

asking for the line to be indicated, sending “understood” 

and making other pre-arranged 

signals, are made by rockets of 

various descriptions, discharged 

from a Very pistol. The significance of the various rocket signals used is specified in the plan 

of liaison, and may be changed 

from time to time, if circumstances demand. 

184. The infantry will at all 

times have specially detailed 

lookouts whose duty it will be to 

observe the movements of the 

Infantry Command Airplane and 

report to the proper officer when 

the airplane signals its request 

for the line to be shown. The 

responsible officer will see that 

panels are promptly displayed. If 

the signal “Where are you” is 

again displayed by the airplane 

after the panels are shown, steps 

will be taken to immediately indicate the line by means of Bengal flares. These should be habitually used to mark the line in 

wooded county, and under 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

:297 

other circumstances where the 

airplane may have difficulty in 

locating the lines. If the Infantry 

Command Airplane does not 

send the signal “Understood” 

after ten minutes have elapsed, 

the panel should be taken in and 

no more flares will be lighted. 

185. After having determined 

the lines the Infanty Command 

Airplane will proceed toward the 

division P.C., sending by radio 

the information gathered, and 

confirming same by his written 

message which will be dropped 

at the P.C. Normally the mission 

of the Infantry Command Airplane is completed by this act. If 

it is desired to communicate with 

other P.C.’s, messages should 

be delivered after completing the 

mission for the division. 

11. The Jnjanty Contact 

Airplane. 

Function. 

186. The Infantry Contact Airplane takes an active part in the 

offensive operations, and acts as 

the liaison agent of the front line 

infanty and the accompanying 

artille y. 

The Mission. 

the ground with machine guns 

and light bombs, and by such 

maneuvering may easily indicate 

the position of enemy strong 

points and centers of resistance. 

By signals and methods pre-arranged with the infanty batteries 

and accompanying guns, it indicates targets which should be 

taken under fire, and also indicates objectives to the heavy 

machine guns and mortars. Its 

communication with the ground 

troops will be entirely by visual 

signals and dropped messages. 

In order that the results obtained 

by this airplane are commensurate with the risks undertaken, 

such close liaison must exist between it and the troops on the 

ground that prompt and unfailing advantage is taken of evey 

signal and message given by it. 

Success depends upon a liaison 

perfected to an extent hitherto 

unknown, in our service; a liaison must be founded on mutual 

knowledge, confidence, and admiration. The Infanty Contact 

Airplane by its signals and 

dropped messages gives to the 

smallest party of infanty information invaluable to them in 

187. It attacks the enemy on 

their advance. 

188. Such close liaison anti 

cooperation should exist between the infantry and the Infantry Contact Airplane that a message dropped near any group of 

infanty, however small, will be 

recovered by them and carried 

at once to a responsible officer 

and action taken without delay 

according to the contents of the 

message. In this way minor units 

will have information of their immediate front of greatest value to 

them. 

189. When the informatiori 

gathered warrants it, and upon 

the completion of its mission, the 

Infanty Contact Airplane conimunicates with the desired P.C., 

imparting such information as it 

has collected. For subordinate 

P.C.’s in particular this is important, as by this means information is received which will not 

be obtained by other means for 

a long period of time. 
2 98 Postwar Review 

Ill. Liaison. 

(a) Relations of the Air Service 

with Ground Troops. 

try mission, command or contact, depends entirely upon the 

maintenance of an intimate liaison between the air service and 

the infantry, from the division 

commanders down to the soldiers in the front lines. In order 

to foster the spirit of cooperation 

necessary to success, eve ry effort 

will be made to have officers of 

the air service units visit the infantry in the lines, for the purpose of becoming acquainted 

with their work, their difficulties, 

and the way they live. Infantry 

officers will also be encouraged 

to visit the airdromes, when circumstances warrant, to become 

familiar with the operations and 

work of an observation squadron. When possible, selected officers will be taken over the sector by airplane. Special efforts 

should be made to enable officers of the division and corps 

staffs to see the lines from 

the air. 

190. The success of the infan- 

(b)Aitplane to Ground Communications. 

191. Radio and visual signals 

fumish the most reliable and 

generally used means of communication between the airplane 

and the ground. In the American 

Army at the present time the 

dropped message is employed to 

a large extent. 

192. The observer sends by 

radip all his observations, confirming his information by a 

dropped message at the P.C. 

Rocket signals, discharged from 

a Very pistol, and other visual 

signals are used for communication with the front line troops 

and for other special purposes, 

as provided in the plan of liaison. 

193. The observer tests his 

radio set before leaving the vicinity of the airdrome, with the 

ground testing station there, so 

that no airplane ever proceeds 

to the front without its radio 

being adjusted to the stations 

with which it may have to communicate. 

194. The dropped message is 

invariably used to confirm the 

radio message at the P.C., for 

which primarily intended. This is 

important, as the radio messages 

are frequently lost by the receiving station. The dropped message is used by the Infantry 

Contact Airplane to communicate with the advancing troops, 

and, by special agreement, with 

the infantry batteries and accompanying guns. 

(c) Ground to Airplane Communications. 

195. For the infantry airplane, 

these signals are all visual. They 

comprise panels, Bengal flares, 

signal lights, and rockets, and 

any other improvised means for 

attracting attention of the plane. 

(d) Panels. 

196. Marking panels are used 

by the front line infantry to indicate their position to the airplane, either at the demand of 

the airplane, at a prearranged 

hour, or at the initiative of the 

infantry commander when for 

some reason he wishes to indicate his position to the Infantry 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

299 

Command Airplane. The Infantry Command Airplane, having 

seen the panels displayed without request, will immediately 

take the position of the line, give 

the signal understood, and proceed as in his regular mission. 

Identification panels are used to 

indicate the location of the 

P.C.’s and in case of stations 

equipped with radio receiving 

sets, the display of a panel 

means specifically “Here is P.C., so and so, with radio set erected, 

listening in, and ready to receive 

messages.” By this means the 

observer locates stations with 

which he may wish to communicate, and all stations so adjusted 

may intercept his message. 

(el Flares and Rockets. 

197. The Bengal flare is used to 

mark the infantry line in woods, 

during misty weather or fog, 

when it is difficult for the airplane to see the panels. If after 

the line has been marked by the 

panels, the airplane again demands the line, flares should be 

lit. In lighting flares, care must be 

taken to have airplane in a favorable position, going away 

from the line, as flares remain lit 

only about thirty seconds. 

198. After the airplane has 

signalled “Understood,” or after 

a period of ten minutes has 

elapsed, the panels should be 

concealed and no more flares 

lighted. 

199. Rockets and other signals 

are used for special purposes, as 

indicated in the plan of liaison. 

N. Training. 

tions of infantry must be thorough and must be continued 

constantly while in repose or behind the front lines, in order that 

the principles of close liaison and 

cooperation with the airplane 

may be kept constantly in view. 

201. Instruction must be given 

which will impress the importance of the work done by the 

airplane, and the absolute necessity of complying with its demands promptly. This instruction 

must be aimed at all infantrymen, from the regimental commander to the private. It must be 

borne in mind that after the observer has asked for the line, 

both he and the pilot are concentrating their attention on the 

ground; that it is very difficult at 

that time to maneuver so as to 

avoid machine gun fire from the 

ground or anti-aircraft fire, and 

that the airplane during this interval is at the mercy of enemy 

200. The preliminary instrucPanel markers 

for communication 

with airplanes. 
300 Postwar Review 

aircraft, completely without de- V. Exercises. 

Furthemore, the longer 

must remain Over 

202. Exercises will be held at the frequent intervals for the pur- the lines at a low altitude the 

heavier becomes the hostile ma- pose of 

tween the infantry and the 

the liaison bechine gun fire. The enemy is try Command and Contact Airplanes. These exercises will be 

the rear, and with troops in retrained in this Of 

fire, and heavy casualties invaridestruction of the infantry airplane not only means the loss 

ized officers, difficult to replace, 

delay results in the arrival of 

held at concentration points in 

pose behind the lines or newly 

ably to the The 

of arrived in corps A course 

in each corps at the airdrome of 

which will have for its purpose 

trained and of instruction will be established 

but it that a very serious the Corps Observation Group, 

infomation to the command at a the instruction of officers and time when VeY Probably Other non-commissioned officers in inmeans of communication do not fantry liaison, and to give those 

exist. The success or failure of an 

operation may easily depend on 

the certainty of receiving the information which it is the mission 

of the Infantry Command Airplane to transmit promptly. 
Mitchell: Provisional Manual 

of Operations 

301 

attending the course such a 

knowledge of the Air Service 

and its operation, possibilities, 

and limitations, as will establish a 

firm, mutual understanding and 

confidence. A large part of the 

instruction will take the form of 

practical exercises under conditions simulating actual service as 

closely as possible. Every effort 

will be made to make the course 

interesting to the students. 

203. In the armies on the 

front, arrangements will be made 

whereby officers of the air setvice, particularly of the observation units, may visit troops in the 

lie, for the purpose of gaining 

first hand knowledge of the operations of ground troops, which 

will aid them in aerial operations, 

and tend to strengthen the confidence and liaison with ground 

troops. 

204. All commanding officers 

of troops having control over 

observation air service will take 

such steps as are necessay to 

perfect the cooperation, confidence and liaison between the 

infantry and the air service. It 

should be borne in mind in this 

respect, that as the most suitable 

place to gain a knowledge of the 

infantry is in the front lines, so 

the most suitable place to gain a 

knowledge of the air service is 

on the airdrome and in the air. 

AA guns on French trucks operated by 2nd Balloon Co.. 

1st Army Corps., Montrieul, France, 8 duly 1918. 
Brig. Gen. Mitchell and his staff. Coblenz. Germany, November, 

1919: (1. to r.) Capt. 1. W. Miller, Capt. R. Valois. Lt. Col. L. H. 

Brereton. Gen. Mitchell, Ma). I. D. Joralemon, and 

Capt. 0. E. Manell. 
54. Notes OF the 

Cha ~acte~istics, Limitations, and 

Employment OF the A~R SeRuice 

1919 

303 

During the war, officers 

and soldiers of the infantry 

and artillery often expressed 

dissatisfaction with the way 

aviation was being used. 

Such comments were summarized and answered in a 

paper, “Notes on Employment of the Air Service from 

the General Staff View 

Point,” prepared in February 1919 under the direction 

of Colonel Gorrell, Assistant 

Chief of Staff, Air Service, 

AEF. After being circulated 

for comments, the paper was 

revised in France, given a 

new title, “Notes on the 

Characteristics, Limitations, 

1 In Gorrell s History D-1 

2 Vol I, No 72 12 Jun 20 

3 The revised Statement is more positive 

than the original The Air Service tries to 

keep the staff informed The Air Service 

helps adjust artillery The Air Service tries to 

destroy the enemy air service The Air SeNby using machine guns and bombs Only 

significant changes in content will be 

pointed out in these notes 

ice tries to help declde action on the ground 

and Employment of the Air 

Service,” and later published 

in Washington in an Air Service Information Circular.2 The 

latter version is printed below. 

The original paper contained sections, omitted from 

the published version, concerning principles of command, complaints of aviators 

against the infantry and artillery, the “temperament” of 

fliers, and the status of the 

Air Service as a combat arm. 

These paragraphs seem to be 

of sufficient interest to warrant their being printed as an 

addendum. 

Principles of Air Servicts 

Operations. 

1. What is the function of an 

Air Service? These are its chief 

purposes: 

ty, helps adjust Artillery, assis,ts 

in keeping the staff informed, 

destroys the enemy air service, 

by using machine guns and 

bombs, assists in deciding actions on the ground, and prevents the enemy air service fmm 

rendering similar assistance to 

the hostile forces3 

2. The Air Service has difficulty in keeping the staff informed because there are many 

things which it is hard or impossible for airmen to see because 

of atmospheric conditions, the 

speed at which airplanes travel, 

the blind angles on all airplanes, 

and the fact that from an airplane the ground appears in 

plan, without contours. The Air 

Service can not take the place of 

Cavaly, but the Air Service can 

bring back accurate, cool reports, not warped by the sights 

and sounds of the battlefield. 

The Air Service aids the Infan- 
304 Postwar Review 

These reports can be of value 

only if they are quickly decoded 

and transmitted. The airplane 

secures and carries reports 

quickly. A well-trained staff uses 

them quickly. 

3. Adjuting Artillery from the 

air in a war of movement is 

difficult unless all who take part 

in the adjustment, Artillery and 

airmen alike, are thoroughly 

trained. The first essential is a 

thorough understanding between the ground and air forces 

and a well-developed system of 

cooperation and of signaling or 

communicating information. 

First, the Air Service must know 

approximately where the Artillery posts of command are located. Second, the artillery panel 

crews must answer signals 

promptly and properly. Third, 

the radio must work. Fourth, the 

details of the shoot must be carried out smoothly, and this can 

be accomplished only when efficient ground communication exists. Fifth, though perhaps it 

should be put first, the airplane 

must find the target at which the 

Artillery is to shoot.4 

4. Airplanes in fighting in the 

air must try to keep clear of 

enemy airplanes an area about 

10,000 yards deep in front of 

the line of battle. If they are 

successful the Infantry see few 

air fights and therefore think our 

planes are not operating. Complete success is impossible. The 

idea of a submarine barrage by 

submarines against submarines 

is ridiculous, but no more ridiculous than the conception of a 

complete aerial barrage 2'/2 

miles high, 5 miles deep, and as 

broad as the front over which 

the battle is raging. A perfect 

aerial barrage is impossible because of the difficulty a plane 

has, first, to see another in the 

air, and second, to attack it. 

Therefore, enemy airplanes occasionally get past the most numerous and aggressive friendly 

pursuit concentrations. They 

must be acce ted by our ground 

as the enemy's shelling. 

5. Low-flying enemy airplanes 

must be fought by ground troops 

utilizing their machine guns and 

rifles. In firing from the ground 

on low-flying enemy aircraft remember that many a machine is 

hit, the pilot wounded, and the 

observer killed, when the airplane does not fall nor appear to 

be damaged. Do not become 

discouraged because the enemy 

plane which is being fired at 

does not fall. Many machines of 

our Army, disabled by enemy 

fire from the ground, have come 

home in crippled condition, with 

observers dead and pilots 

wounded. The enemy did not 

have the satisfaction of seeing 

them fall. 

6. If proper understanding, 

cooperation, and communication exist, airplanes can enter 

effectively into the battle on the 

gro~nd.~ The moral damage 

troops with t K e same philosophy 

they do with their bombs and 

machine guns is to the material 

damage as about 20 to 1, but 

success in battle comes from the 

destruction of the enemy's morale, and not from the enemy's 

annihilation. The best relations 

based upon intimate knowledge 

and personal acquaintance and 

friendship, must exist between 

the Air Service and the other 

arms. Otherwise there will be 

misunderstandings and recriminations.6 

7. The above points are illustrated and explained in the succeeding pages. 

Functions of the Air 

Service. 

8. Whatever the future development of aviation may be, up 

to the end of the war in 1918 its 

most important function had 

proved to be securing and transmitting information concerning 

the developments in and beyond 

the line of battle. The work of 

keeping the command informed 

was rendered difficult because 

what the Air Service could do 

and what it could not do were 

not sufficiently well known either 

to the staffs or to the troops, and 

4. The original contained the additional 

statement: "This is not always easy." 

5. The original began: "If good liaison 

exists. . . :' Similar changes were made in 

other places where "liaison" was used in 

the original. 

6. The original contained an additional 

paragraph: "Finally, the Air Service is a 

combatant arm and not a staff service. It 

must be utilized as such." 
Notes of the Characteristics, 

Limitations, and Employment 

of the Air Service 

305 

because the American Army did 

not have at its disposal a sufficiently large air force. The purpose of this pamphlet is to set 

forth simple statements of the 

capabilities and limitations of the 

Air Service. 

9. As has been pointed out, 

the Air Service, in order to assist 

the Infanty, besides keeping the 

command informed, adjusts Artilley; fights in the air against the 

enemy air service; attacks 

ground objectives, both tactical 

and strategical; and prevents the 

enemy air service from rendering 

similar assistance to the hostile 

forces.’ 

command informed is done 

by- (a) Visual reconnaissance; 

(b ) Photographic reconnaissance; 

(c) Thorough mutual understanding and the prompt communication of information. 

10. The work of keeping the 

Limitations of 

Reconnaissance. 

11. Visual reconnaissances by 

daylight and by well-trained observers often furnish information 

of great value. These missions 

sometimes fail for reasons which 

are readily apparent. An airplane 

can not stand still to scrutinize a 

stretch of county. A thousand 

men hidden in a wood or a 

village can not be compelled by 

an airplane to expose themselves. Therefore, if they wish to 

remain hidden they can do so. 

Hence negative information, 

while valuable, is not always accurate. Again, the Air Service 

can not replace the Cavaly. If, 

however, the presence of concealed hostile troops is suspected, this can often be verified 

or disproved by airplanes dispatched on special missions, 

while circling at a vey low altitude over the locality concemed.8 

12. An airplane passes over 

the county so rapidly that 

troops on the ground can sometimes deceive the aerial observer; for example, a column 

may alter temporarily its direction of march, etc. Hence even 

positive information must be 

carefully weighed in order to determine its value. 

13. No man, no matter what 

his flying experience, can stand 

on the ground and estimate the 

state of visibility in the air. A 

ground mist frequently reduces 

visibility from the air on days 

which may appear perfect for 

observation purposes to men on 

the ground? 

14. To the aerial observer certain things show more or less 

clearly, due to the fact that backgrounds and shadows affect vsibility. Fields show up from the 

air like checkerboard squares. 

Soldiers standing on the line 

where two fields meet are hard 

to see, while if they are a few 

feet within one field or the other 

they show up clearly. On the line 

between two fields, if they are 

seen at all, it is generally because 

they are revealed by their shadows. The best cover from airplane observation is natural 

shadow. 

15. Wheel tracks and paths 

are readily noted by an observer 

and show clearly on airplane 

photographs. Freshly turned 

earth is quite conspicuous and, 

no amount of camouflage can 

conceal it completely. 

7 The lasl clause was added in the revision 

8 The last sentence was added in the 

revision 

9 The original contained an additicnal 

sentence The only answef to the question 

of what is the visibility on any given dav IS 

Take the air and see 
306 Postwar Review 

Capabilities of 

Reconnaissance. 

16. As the limitations of aerial 

observation are seldom appreciated, so also its capabilities are 

seldom comprehended. 

17. Any staff officer who has 

seen war has heard tales of disaster such as are almost always 

brought back by the seriously 

wounded and by skulkers. All 

reports from ground observers in 

the front line have a tendency to 

be warped by the excitement, 

the sights, and the sounds of the 

battle field. It is difficult for a staff 

officer to avoid being influenced 

by these reports. A properly utilized and properly trained Air 

Service can discount many false 

reports and can clear up most of 

the obscure points on the line of 

battle. 

18. To locate troops on broken ground requires flying at altitudes of 700 feet and less, at 

which altitudes airplanes are extremely vulnerable to machinegun fire from the ground." It is 

difficult to locate the lines during 

an attack, as our own Infantry 

are then too busy to show their 

panels; hence, though the enemy does not greatly hinder our 

low-flying airplanes at such a 

time, the airplanes do not bring 

back the most valuable reports. 

The best time for Infantry contact patrols is usually for about 

one hour after the capture of an 

objective. During enemy counter 

attacks, a very heavy fire against 

our low-flying airplanes must 

be expected. 

19. The aerial observer, when 

not in action, is generally somewhat removed from the sights 

and sounds of the battlefield. 

He is not subject to the waves of 

emotion that can and do run 

through masses of men at the 

front. 

20. The aerial observer can 

not do his work intelligently unless he has had proper training. 

To secure reports of the greatest 

value, the observer should be a 

highly trained General Staff officer. This ideal, for obvious reasons, will rarely be attained. By 

the proper training of Air Service 

officers it can be approximated. 

The pilot should be a young 

man, the observer an older man, 

who has received several years 

on General Staff traininq in 

schools established for that 

purpose. 

The Airplane as an Instrument of Communication." 

western front was broken, and 

movement-which is the essence of war-began, the staffs 

of large units began to experience serious difficulties in transmitting orders and in securing 

information. These difficulties 

were almost insuperable so far 

as ground communication with 

advanced elements of ground 

troops was concerned; the common methods failed to function 

with more than a small part of 

their former efficiency. This was 

not true of the Air Service. The 

difficulties of communication, inherent in a war movement, are 

present to a much smaller extent 

21. Once the deadlock on the 

between the staffs and the Air 

Service than between ground 

observation posts and posts of 

command. In future wars we 

may expect the Air Service to do 

more and more of this important 

work. 

22. In a war of movement the 

Air Service will probably be the 

chief reliance of the G2's of 

combatant units. The training for 

G-2 work should therefore include experience in aerial 

observation. 

Communication. 

23. To keep in touch with the 

front line in open warfare, only 

one means is reliable-the actual 

physical canying of a message. 

Runners are slow, horses frequently impracticable, and motor cycles demand roads. Considering time and distance as important factors, the airplane is 

often the best carrier. Better 

means of communicating from 

the ground to the airplanes must 

therefore be devised. This is limited at present to a few prearranged signals which, though 

they may not contain all a commander desires to know, even 

now contain all he need know to 

form a sound estimate of the 

situation. Communication from 

airplanes to the ground, on the 

other hand, for all essential command purposes, is efficient 

where good training exists, l2 

10 Ine opening sentence of the original 

was dropped in the revision Infantry Iiaison flights are dangerous 

11 The original heading was The Airplane as an Instrument of Liaison See note 

5 above 

12 In the original this is followed by a 

section (one paragraph) on principles of 

command See addendum 
Notes of the Characteristics, 

Limitations, and Employment 

of the kr Service 

307 

Combat. 

24. Aerial fighting is difficult. 

Its difficulties are not appreciated 

by the majority of those who are 

not aviators. 

25. The greatest difficulty of 

the pursuit pilot is to find the 

enemy. The difficulty that a man 

in the air experiences in seeing 

another airplane is hard to understand. When an airplane is 

seen from the ground, it is generally the noise of the engine 

which attracts attention to it. In 

the air the noise of the pilot’s 

own engine drowns all other 

sounds. 

“Vision of the Air.” 

26. With no foreground or 

background a pilot may look directly at an airplane and not see 

it, because his eye is out of 

focus. This difficulty is hard to 

explain. To seafaring men it will 

appeal as natural. To landsmen, 

all that can be said is that it does 

exist, and aviators try all sorts of 

expedients in an effort to overcome it, such as looking at struts 

which are at different distances 

from their eyes and then sweeping the horizon. 

27. From above it is difficult to 

distinguish an airplane if the 

camouflage on the wings blends 

well with the background of the 

earth against which it is seen. 

28. An airplane seen from below can not be attacked unless 

the attacker is justified in accepting a serious disadvantage of position during the combat that is 

to follow. 

29. Two airplanes on the 

same approximate level present 

to one another very small projected areas as compared with 

the same two airplanes as seen 

from the ground, for from the 

ground they are seen in pian. 

30. For the foregoing reasons 

hostile airplanes often pass one 

another in the air without joining 

in combat.13 Also observation 

airplanes, like ground reconnaissance patrols ordinarily avoid 

combat unless they are attacked. 

Fighting in the Air. 

31. Fighting on the ground is 

in two dimensions; fighting in the 

air is in three. When combat is 

joined, an airplane moving at a 

speed in excess of 120 miles an 

hour is a gun platform from 

which to fight a target moving at 

a similar speed. The difficulties 

involved are sufficiently obvious 

to explain the fact that effective 

range never exceeds 400 yards 

and that 90 percent of the machines shot down are shot down 

at ranges from 100 yards to 10 

feet. 

32. To the average soldier at 

the front, and to his officers, too, 

the soie purpose of airplanes 

was apt to be regarded as the 

driving off of enemy machinesa function which was very poorly 

performed in the war, to judge 

by the accounts of those unfamiliar with the proper employment of an air service.14 

Tactical Employment. 

33. The proper employment 

of pursuit airplanes includes the 

destruction of enemy aircraft, the 

protection of our own observation airplanes, and the prevention of enemy aerial attacks on 

our ground troops. By our SLICcess in harassing and destroying 

hostile two-seaters the enemy is 

prevented from informing his 

c~mmand.’~ 

34. Experience has shown 

that maximum casualties can be 

inflicted on the enemy air service, and our own observation 

airplanes can be better protected, by adopting a vigorous 

offensive policy for our pursuit 

airplanes. This is the best defense. Maintaining our aerial 

front line far beyond the front 

line of our Infantry and clearing 

the enemy aircraft from the area 

in which our observation airplanes work, give better protection to our Infantry and to our 

13 In the original the following sen ence 

IS inserted Probably the Infantry of both 

sides curse their respective representmves 

as yellow while the truth is that the pilots 

have never seen one another at all or else at 

lea3 one of the planes was an obserbation 

plane charged with the duty of getting information 

14 In the original the sentence erided 

to judge by the accounts of tiose 

unfamiliar with the proper employment of 

an air service The original then contirlued 

The function was ill-performed because 

the Aii Service never attempted it foi the 

reasons indicated in paragraph 36 l:84 in 

revision I 

15 The last sentence was added iri the 

revision 
308 Postwar Review 

observation airplanes than attempting to give close protection. The Infantry do not see 

combats far within the enemy’s 

line, and consequently one hears 

frequent complaints and demands by the ground troops for 

the patrolling of our lines by our 

own pursuit airplanes. Such a 

disposition of forces would be 

analogous to placing all of our 

Infantry in the outpost zone and 

evenly distributing it from one 

end of the line to the other, 

while confining it to a strict defensive. Such tactics would of 

course inevitably result in 

defeat. l6 

Low-Flying Enemy 

Airplanes. 

35. As a matter of fact, the 

only successful way to deal with 

low-flying airplanes is for the Infantry to have confidence in their 

own weapons-rifles and machine guns-and to use them. It 

has been explained that it is difficult to see one airplane from 

another in the air. The lower an 

airplane is flying the harder it is 

to see. Once seen, a low-flying 

airplane is hard to attack from 

the air. With no room to dive or 

maneuver, the efforts of a pursuit airplane to attack even a 

two-seater which is harassins our 

Infantry, Artillery, or columns on 

the road may be compared to 

rts of a hawk to attack a 

mong trees. It is the duty 

Infantry to drive off the 

ing enemy airplanes. 

16 The last sentence was added in the 

revision 

17 The original continued In addition 

if while an airplane is over the lines or 

during the ten minutes after it departs 

shells fall near any part of the Division as is 

almost Certain to occur in all probability the 

shelling will be attributed lo the direct 

agency of the airplane The attribution of 

such shelling to airplane artillery adjustment 

is invariably based upon complete and to 

the aviator pathetic ignorance of the functions capabilities and limitations 01 the Air 

Service 

36. The great moral effect of 

low-flying airplanes results from 

an exaggerated notion of their 

capabilities. An airplane that remains over the enemy lines at an 

altitude of 500 feet for only five 

minutes may safely be assumed 

to cover 7 miles. It will probably 

be seen by all the troops of one 

division who are in the forward 

zone, and experience goes to 

show that, no matter with what 

equanimity the division withstands hostile shelling, a number 

of its troops will believe themselves to have been in danger 

from such an airplane. (One of 

the best American divisions in 

France on one occasion received 

3,500 enemy shells in its sector 

in one day without being disturbed, and yet personal questioning by General Staff officers 

disclosed that almost every man 

in the division believed himself 

to have been in danger from a 

single low-flying enemy airplane 

which was over its lines for 

about 10 minutes.) 

37. All ground troops must be 

educated to appreciate that- 

(a ) Airplanes never regulate 

Artillery on the front lines. 

(b) Airplanes seldom regulate 

Artillery from an altitude of less 

than 2,000 feet. 

(c) More or less continuous 

observation is essential to the 

regulation of Artillery fire. 

(d) Rifles and machine guns of 

ground troops are the best defense, and are a thoroughly efficient defense, against low-flying 

airplanes. 
Notes of the Characteristics, 

Limitations, and Employment 

of the Air Service 

309 

38. Infantrymen are loath to 

fire upon aircraft, because they 

fear to disclose their positions. 

Firing on aircraft by infantrymen 

does not tend to disclose the 

position of the Infantry, but 

rather by virtue of keeping the 

enemy at a higher altitude helps 

to conceal it. Many pilots and 

observers returning from flights 

have reported being fired upon 

by small arms, but if in any case 

a pilot or observer was able to 

locate the point from which the 

fire came with sufficient accuracy 

to demand Artillery fire against 

the hostile positions the case was 

a very rare one, probably 

unique . 

39. If Infantry do not fire 

against low-flying hostile airplanes, the enemy’s aviators will 

become bolder, descend to 

lower altitudes, and will remain 

much longer over the lines. 

ingly that the boldness of the 

German low-flying planes over 

the American Army on the western front was due to insufficient 

initiative by the Infantry, who 

frequently failed to engage hostile aircraft, or engaged them 

only in a half-hearted manner. 

41. A word of caution in this 

regard is imperative. The Infantxy must not engage our own 

airplanes. Before firing on any 

airplane its hostile intent should 

be established beyond a doubt. 

40. It can be stated unhesitatAll combatants on both sides in 

the late war received numerous 

reports of enemy pilots’ flying 

machines captured from the 

other side. So far as the allied 

armies are concerned no German airplanes were ever flown 

by the Allies near the lines. No 

allied pilot would have dared to 

fly any German plane near the 

lines, for the one reason, if for 

no other, that it would have 

been impossible to have notified 

all allied pilots when and where 

he would be in the air, and if all 

allied pilots, at least within a 

radius of 30 miles, had not been 

notified, any flier in a German 

airplane near the allied lines 

would, in all human probability, 

have been attacked. If the lowflying airplane has not exhibited 

any hostile intent, the Infantry 

should wait to see the hostile 

insignia before firing upon it. To 

fire when it is so far away that 

the insignia can not be distinguished, is not productive 

of results.*8 

Bombing and Machine 

Gunning. 

42. Besides its interest in the 

actual fighting in the air, the CI-3 

staff is interested in these elements of the air service which 

enter directly into the battle on 

the ground-bombers and airplanes which attack ground objectives. 

43. The developments of the 

late war in its later months inclicate that future wars will see a 

further strengthening of machine-gun nests as a means of 

defense. The airplane gave 

hopes, at the end of the war, of 

assisting materially in overcoming these obstacles. To be of 

assistance in the reduction of 

machine guns, air service units 

must know their location and 

communication must be sufficiently good so that the cooperative action between the arms at 

the disposal of the Infantry and 

Artillery can be assured. 

44. The attack of ground objectives in the zone as far back of 

the enemy’s front lines as his 

divisional posts of command 

often yields important results. 

For such attacks to be of maximum effect, good targets, such 

as columns on the road or 

troops in reserve, marching up 

to the line of battle or retreating, 

must be exactly and positively 

located before the “groundstraffers” are dispatched. Under 

other circumstances good results 

will in all probability not be 

achieved. 

18 The last two sentences were added In 

the revision 
31 0 Postwar Review 

45. Bombing and its results 

have heretofore been little 

understood. The great mobility 

and speed of airplanes make it 

possible to utilize day bombardment tactically to influence an 

action in progress. It is considered that as compared with the 

material destruction wroughtwhich is frequently considerable-the moral effect of either 

bombing or. machine gunning 

from airplanes is as 20 to 1, and 

victory in battle results from the 

destruction of the enemy’s 

morale. 

Mutual Understanding and 

Personal Visits. 

46. The basis of the proper 

operation of the combined arms 

is mutual understanding and a 

spirit of camaraderie. This is best 

secured by the exchange of personal visits. Infantrymen, artillerymen, and staffs must visit airdromes and watch the air service 

work. Aviators must be sent for 

tours of duty with Infanty and 

Artillery units.Ig 

ADDENDUM 

from Notes on 

Employment of The Air 

Service From The General 

Staff View Point 

Principles of Commandz0 

26. Nevertheless, in no case 

should Squadrons or Groups be 

under direct orders of G-2 and 

the role of Branch Intelligence 

Officer should be turned over to 

an Air Service Intelligence Officer. Air Seruice units must be 

under the direct orders of Air 

Seruice officers, held responsible 

that the orders of the Commanding General, expressed (for 

intelligence) through G -2, are 

properly executed. From a G2 

point of view the Air Service is to 

be regarded as any other combatant unit. The relationship between staffs of large units (Division, Corps and Armies) and the 

Air Service of the units should 

be analogous to that between, 

for example, G-2 of a Corps 

and the Divisions of the Corps. 

Each air service unit should have 

its own officer who is responsible 

for the collection and forwarding 

of all information of the enemy. 

He will cooperate with G-2 and 

maintain intimate liaison exactly 

as do the G-2s of divisions and 

............................ 

19 There were four additional paragraphs 

20 See note 12 

in the original See the addendum 
Notes of the Characteristics, 

Limitations, and Employment 

of the Air Service 

31 1 

corps. But he is under the orders 

of the Air Service Officer who 

commands the unit. ......................... 

51. All *’ the recriminations 

between the Air Service and the 

other line troops have not been 

made by the Infantry and Artillery. Aviators who have fought 

in the war have expressed themselves quite freely when they 

have been called upon by 

ground troops for protection 

against enemy aircraft at a time 

and a place where the only airplanes in the sky were American. 

Frequently American airplanes 

have been shot at and a few 

have been brought down by the 

machine guns and rifles of our 

own Infantry. 

own friends is one of the unavoidable incidents which occasionally occur to all arms. Recriminations were more bitter when 

the Air Seruice met with definite 

refusals to cooperate on the part 

of the line. When the Chief of 

Staff of one Division refused 

even to consider holding Infantry 

Liaison exercises with the Air 

Service, when day after day Artillery batteries changed their locations and the Air Seruice was 

not notified, when the Infantry 

took couer and hid instead of 

displaying their panels when an 

airplane signalled asking for 

them, when P.C. after P.C. was 

found which was without its distinctive panel, on these occasions it was difficult for the Air 

Service to maintain its high spirit 

and morale. 

52. But to be shot at by one’s 

Aviation Morale 

53. Much ridicule has been 

heaped upon the so-called 

“temperament” of fliers. Fliers 

are not per se any more temperamental than other healthy 

young men, and are equally 

anxious to live up to the best 

traditions of the profession of 

arms. Nevertheless the morale of 

an Air Service is a sensitive 

thing, certainly, at least as sensitive as that of the Infantry, and 

subject to much the same reactions. The giving of ill-advised 

orders to fliers such as sending 

out a squadron under atmosheric conditions that render e, ork impossible and increase 

the likelihood of casualties will 

destroy the confidence of the 

pilots and observers of that 

squadron in their superiors, with 

consequent loss of morale. 

These conditions can only be 

accurately appreciated by a flier. 

Therefore orders to Air Service 

units should always proceed 

from Air Service commanders, 

held responsible that the orders 

of commanding General expressed through their Staffs are 

carried out. 

21 See note 19 

The Air Service Not A Staff 

Service 

54. Finally it is particularly desired to impress upon all staff 

officers that the Air Service is not 

a staff service but is a combatant 

arm and it must be considered 

as such to obtain success. It is 

susceptible to the same tactical 

dispositions, in accordance with 

the same underlying tactical 

principles as are all other arms of 

the Service. 
Lt. Col. William C. Sherman (far right) was on hand to examine 

a new Vickers machine gun which fired through the propeller. 

Lts. V. F. Ludden (far left), C. G. Sellers (in cockpit), and 

Capt. G. C. Thomas collaborated in the briefing. 
313 55- Sheranan: Tentatiue 

ManuaJ go~The Employment 

OF Airz Serzuice 

1919 

Lt. Cot. William C. Sherman, who was Chief of Staff 

of the First Army Air Service 

in November 1918, and who 

produced a “Tactical History 

of the Air Service” at the end 

of the war,’ also prepared a 

“Tentative Manual for the 

Employment of Air Service.” 

Written in France in the early 

weeks of 1919, the manual reflected the experience gained 

during the war. A revised copy, 

entitled “Notes on Recent Operations,” was sent to GHQ, 

AEF for publication, but GHQ 

apparently never gave its approval. On 11 April 1919, following a cabled request from 

the United States, a copy was 

sent to Washington. There it 

was mimeographed on 18 June 

191 9 by the lnformation Group, 

Air Service, under the title 

“Notes on Recent Operations.” 

The following year it was published under the latter title as 

an Air Service lnformation Circular. The text printed below 

is from a copy of the original in 

Gorrell’s History.2 

1. Published in the first volume in this 

series. 

2. Gorrell’s History. D-1. pp 167-247. See 

ibid., C-15. for copy of version sent to GHQ. 

A note in D-1, p 1, states that the manual was 

prepared by Sherman and corrected by Gorrell. 

A copy of the mimeographed version that at 

one time was in the library of the Field Officers’ 

School at Langley Field, is in AFSHRC 

248.211-61K. The section on corps aviation 

was published in Air Service fnformafion Circular, Vol I, No 74. 12 Jun 20, and the entire 

manual in another Circular, Vol I, No 76, 30 

Jun 20. 

Part I. 

Chapter 1. 

General Principles 

some extent, a misnomer; the 

employment of Air Units is not 

an automatic thing, functioning 

as a service, but is an arm, subject to the same variety of a 

combination for differing tactical 

situations as are the other arms, 

and governed by the same tactical principles. It is proposed, 

therefore, to enumerate these 

principles, before going into a 

more detailed study of Air Service employment. 

2. It is a fundamental of human nature for man to fear man 

more than the chance action of 

steel and lead. Therefore, in the 

future, as in the past, the final 

decision in war must be made by 

man on the ground, willing to 

come hand to hand with the 

enemy. When the infantry loses, 

the Army loses. It is, therefore, 

1. The name Air Service is, to 

the role of the Air Service, as, 

well as that of the other arms,, to 

aid the chief combatant: the Infantry. That the lack of assist. 

ance from other arms would 

inevitably result in the defeat of 

our infantry does not affect the 

truth of the axiom. Two important corollaries therefore follow: 

the Air Service must know infantry and its assistants; and general 

officers and their staffs cannot 

hope to produce the most efficient knowledge, tactical cornbinations, unless they have a thorough knowledge, not alone c’f 

infantry, but of its assistant arms, 

which include the Air Service. 

3. In so far as the Army is 

concerned, the object of war is 

the defeat of the enemy’s armed 

forces in the field. This can be 

done only by seeking a decision 

in battle. It is essential to victory, 
314 Postwar Review 

therefore, to assume the offensive. In war, practically never 

does victory come as a result of 

the material destruction of any 

large portion of the enemy’s 

forces. Often much material destruction has resulted from victory: it has never been a prerequisite to victory. The final aim 

sought, therefore, is not the material destruction of the enemy, 

which can never in practice be 

even nearly complete, but the 

destruction of the enemy’s hope 

of victory, of his desire to continue fighting, in a word, of his 

morale. This fact must be particularly borne in mind, in considering the Air Service, whose 

moral effect on ground troops 

is out of all proportion to the 

material destruction wrought. In 

the line, the most certain outward sign of that superiority of 

morale which insures victory, is 

the possession of the battlefield. 

No other factor is so largely destructive of the enemy’s morale 

as this. It has been truthfully 

said, therefore, that to advance 

is to conquer, and one may conquer only by advancing. These 

facts, seemingly trite, must 

nevertheless be constantly kept 

in mind. Whole tactical doctrines 

have ignored certain of these 

truths, with consequent disaster. 

Nor were there lacking men, in 

the recent war, who believed 

that the war would end in complicated systems of trenches: A 

failure to appreciate the very nature itself of war. In the future, 

therefore, as in the past, the only 

true expression of war is the 

battle, and the battle implies and 

necessitates movement. The 

long deadlock on the Western 

front must be regarded as exceptional and peculiar, and lessons drawn from that carefully 

examined, lest a rule be deduced from what was indubitably an exception. 

4. It is the battle then that is 

sought for, and, in the battle the 

destruction of the enemy’s morale. It is not necessary, however, 

at one and the same time to 

attack all portions of the hostile 

army. The morale of an army 

may be compared to the human 

body: to destroy it, it is necessary to destroy only one of several of its component parts. The 

battle then resolves itself into an 

attempt, by a crushing blow, to 

destroy but a limited portion of 

an enemy’s army, while holding 

over the remainder the threat of 

impending destruction. This demands then a certain economy 

of forces: to the portions of the 

field where the blow is to be 

struck must be brought the superiority of force needed. For all 

other portions of the field, we 

may regard troops there employed as detachments-either 

to hold limited portions of the 

field or to ascertain the enemy’s 

strength. 

5. Before, however, the 

proper economy of forces can 

be determined, knowledge must 

exist of the enemy’s dispositions. 

In former wars, this required numerous detachments of troops. 

The employment of these constituted the preparatory stage of 

the battle, which frequently absorbed a large portion of the 

forces available. Great tact and 

coolness, a careful estimate of 

facts, still left often no lightening 

of the “fog of war.” It is in this 

phase of the battle that the relative importance of aircraft has 

steadily grown. Surprise exists 

now and always will, but air control can eliminate a very large 

proportion of the unknown elements, and admit of a solution 

based on facts. 

6. The decisive blow struck, to 

complete the victory requires 

that the fleeing enemy be given 

no opportunity to reorganize, 

and that his loss of morale be 

communicated to the portions of 

his army still unstruck. The pursuit, then, is at once organized. 

Too frequently, in past wars, the 

victor, scarcely less disorganized 

than the vanquished, has failed 

to gather in the fruits of victory. 

Very rarely has a thoroughly organized pursuit been possible. 

This will be dealt with in greater 

detail in a later chapter, so far as 

the employment of aircraft is 

concerned. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

315 

7. The general principles 

briefly outlined above apply to 

Air Service units, not alone active cooperation with ground 

troops, and their attack of the 

enemy’s ground troops, but 

equally in purely aerial warfare. 

Before, however, discussing in 

detail tactical use of aircraft, certain possibilities and limitations 

of aircraft must be considered. 

ment of airplanes during the 

great war has brought it about 

that practically one natural factor 

alone can prevent flying today: 

lack of visibility. A pilot travelling 

at rates of speed almost always 

in excess of one hundred miles 

per hour must have a fairly wide 

range of vision in order to know 

and to maintain his course. Nor 

can visibility be determined from 

ground observations, except in 

extreme cases. It is highly probable that with time, this handicap 

will be overcome to a large extent. It must, however, be accepted as a definite limitation 

today. A second limitation to be 

borne in mind is the duration of 

time an airplane may remain 

over the enemy lines. Due to the 

question of fuel supply, wear 

and tear on comparatively delicate engines, and the great 

physical and mental strain of 

flying, where every sense is 

keyed up to the highest, only a 

small average number of hours 

8. The extraordinary developper day per plane available can 

be kept up indefinitely. It is not 

uncommon among the uninitiated to believe that, because 

ten planes are available, ten may 

be kept over the lines all day, 

with short intervals for refilling 

fuel. Such is far from being actual service conditions. 

9. From the point of view of 

the command, the greatest value 

of the Air Service to date has 

been in gathering information of 

the enemy and of our own 

troops. In the nature of things, 

this source of information should 

be in future wars both more 

nearly complete and more reliable. The observer, aloof from the 

battle, is less subject to its disturbing influences. He is removed from the contagion of 

fear and panic, so easy of transmission where men are elbow to 

elbow. He hears none of the 

reports of the wounded, nearly 

always breathing calamity. He 

receives no impressions from 

skulkers, “the last man left in 

their company,” justifying their 

crime by reports of disaster. In 

short, he is physically so situated 

as to be able to see and report 

with an approach to that mathematical coolness and accuracy, 

that is so desirable, but so seldom secured by human beings 

in the thick of a fight, subject to 

all its disturbing reactions. 

from the airplane observer’s 

view: a situation that is rarely 

met with in even the best systems of terrestrial observation. 

During the long period of 

Physically, nothing is defiladed 

trench warfare, elaborate methods of liaison were established, 

which seldom succeeded when 

the war of movement-which is 

alone really war-began. Liailjon 

from airplane to ground, less 

modified, by movement because 

more simple and containing 

fewer links to be broken, should 

on the contrary, always be successful in open warfare, where 

due care is taken. Liaison from 

the ground to airplane, on the 

other hand, is still comparatively 

undeveloped, and constitutes 

one of the problems of the immediate future. 

Reports from untrained observers, whether on the ground 

or in the air, are generally valueless. Training is essential before 

one can describe even the location of the most conspicuous objects. To know what things are 

important, and what unimportant; to know exactly what to 

look for, and what negative in8- 

formation is of value; in shori 

from a view to secure such information as will permit an accurate 

estimate of the situation, requires 

an officer whose knowledge and 

intelligence fit him to be a general staff officer. In practice, this 

ideal will rarely be attained. 

Nevertheless it will be striven for, 

and thereby make more full md 

reliable the information received 

in future from the Air Service. 

10. An employment of the Air 

Service, as yet in its infancy, but 

capable of great results, is that of 

actually intervening on the battlefield, not alone by bombing 
316 Postwar Review 

[but also] by direct attack with 

machine guns. In estimating the 

value of such attacks, we must 

again bear in mind that an army 

is defeated not by destroying it, 

but by destroying its morale. It 

has been said before that man 

fears man more than the chance 

of lead or steel. The basis of the 

greater fear is the knowledge 

that man, having both intent and 

intelligence, can pursue his design to a fatal conclusion, and 

hence is more terrible than any 

inanimate object, directed from a 

distance. Much of this feeling 

enters into man’s fear of hostile 

airplanes. The latter’s commanding position, rendering concealment apparently useless, induces 

the instinctive belief in the heart 

of every man on the ground that 

he himself is being watched by 

hostile eyes and being made the 

target for bomb or bullet; and 

that this hostile man can pursue 

him intelligently and ultimately 

destroy him. To this is added a 

feeling of utter helplessness, not 

justified by facts, but none the 

less instinctive and not to be 

overcome wholly by reason or 

training. That the moral effect of 

attacks from the air is, as compared with attacks from the 

ground, out of all proportion 

both to the effort expended and 

the material damage done, is 

attested by many incidents. A 

division of first class troops, that 

received with equanimity four 

thousand shells per day in its 

sector, has been known to be 

greatly disturbed and harassed 

by the efforts of one persistently 

active day bomber. Inquiry 

showed that almost every man 

in the division believed himself 

to have bee0 in danger from this 

plane. 

11. It is the purpose of this 

manual to set forth the principles 

governing the use of air units, 

and to put on record the results 

of experience in this war. But, 

two facts must be held constantly in mind: The Air Service 

is a combatant arm, and full 

training in peace can alone prevent inefficiency in war. 

Chapter 11. Security 

as in all branches of the army 

embraces all those measures 

taken by a command to protect 

itself from observation, annoyance, or surprise by the enemy. 

Security of the plane in the air 

will be dealt with under the 

heading of combat, because in 

reality once the machines have 

actually left the airdrome, the 

general principles of combat go 

hand in hand and come under 

the province of fighting in the 

air. It will only be necessary, 

therefore, in discussing the security of Air Service Organizations 

to consider those measures 

taken by the Commanding Officer at his airdrome, that will protect him from observation, annoyance, or surprise. 

1. Security in Air Service units 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

317 

2. It is essential the greatest 

care be exercised in selecting an 

airdrome, not only from the 

standpoint of accessibility and 

other general principles and 

shelter, but also from the standpoint of security. An airdrome, 

therefore, should be selected 

bearing these principles in mind. 

Airdromes, if possible, should be 

away from landmarks which will 

be visible at night; they should 

be away from streams; if located 

at the edge of a forest they 

should not be near a prominent 

portion of the forest. While it is 

well in selecting an airdrome to 

take precautions against enemy 

action, it is advisable to look out 

for natural obstacles, such as undulating ground, and high obstacles which might endanger machines landing or taking off. Every precaution should be taken 

that will eliminate, insofar as 

possible, the chances of accidents. In flying, accidents are 

bound to occur even at the front 

where pilots are supposed to be 

capable of flying under any conditions. After the airdrome has 

been located, care should be 

used in the location of the hangars. They should never be 

placed closer than 100 yards 

apart; in practice it has been 

found well to scatter them 

evenly around the perimeter of 

the field. Where there is danger 

of night bombing it is well to 

cover them with camouflage material which makes them blend 

with the ground, not appearing 

as landmarks at night. Precaution against fire must always be 

taken in the case of hangars, and 

camouflage material should not 

be used where airdromes are not 

subject to night attack, as it is 

always inflammable and renders 

the possibility of complete destruction greater. At times it is 

better to place hangars on good 

ground than to religiously distribute them evenly over the airdrome and break a lot of propellers, tail skids and machines in 

rough ground. After a commanding officer has located his 

hangars he should next look to 

the security of his personnel. 

Under normal war conditions his 

enlisted men and officer personnel will be scattered over the 

whole airdrome, but great care 

must be taken to keep a unit in 

its own area, so as to maintain 

proper disciplinary control. By 

scattering the personnel in this 

way danger from bombardment 

is minimized and protection 

given to the hangars and machines located at the airdrome. 

Often airdromes are so located 

that additional precautions by 

way of trenches and abris must 

be taken. If the airdrome is very 

close to the line great care must 

be taken against attack in force 

by enemy low flying airplanes, 

machine guns should be 

mounted and personnel properly 

organized for the most efficient 

handling of same when occasion 

arises. Smoke screens, if possible, should be prepared so that a 

dense form of smoke can be 

scattered over the airdrome firom 

all directions should an attack of 

this nature be attempted and if 

under any special circumstances 

it is felt that the security of the 

airdrome is jeopardized. In this 

respect special guards should be 

maintained at all times to be 

ready to handle the situation. 

3. Complete mobility of all 

units insures the safety of miiterial when a general retreat becomes necessary. This mobility 

depends principally on suffic,ient 

initial transportation equipment, 

and its proper upkeep during the 

course of operation and on the 

maintenance of mobility in the 

unit at all times. Offices should 

be located in trailers ready to be 

pulled away on a moment’s notice. Spare parts should be kept 

in trailers and in spare trucks, 

and movement orders should be 

extant at all times and revised 

and republished at frequent 

intervals. 
318 Postwar Review 

Chapter 111. Shelters 

4. The maximum achievements of any Air Service organization can only be achieved 

when machines are properly 

housed against the weather and 

the personnel is comfortably 

cared for. Mobility and defense 

against bombardment attacks 

must be considered. 

5. Airdrome sites should be 

selected on flat well drained high 

ground, free as far as possible 

from mud and dust. Good roads 

must lead to them and a railroad 

should pass in the vicinity. High 

grass will injure many propellers 

and must be removed before 

flying begins. Sanitation and 

kindred subjects will be cared for 

as prescribed in Field Service 

Regulations. See also Paragraphs 2 and 3 in Chapter 2, 

Part I. 

Chapter IV. Orders 

6. The principles laid down in 

Field Service Regulations for the 

issuance of orders apply to the 

issuance of orders for the Air 

Service. 

Chapter V. Marches and 

Convoys 

7. (a) Wings, or larger units, 

will move by groups. 

(b) The removal of a Pursuit 

Group from one field to another 

has primarily three phases: 

move. 

1. Preparation for the 

2. The move. 

3. Arrival at the new airdrome and the preparation until 

day of attack. 

8. Preparation for the move. 

(a) As accuracy is of paramount importance in any move, 

the Group Commanders will be 

given his new location and all 

necessaq information conceming it, with instructions to make 

all arrangements to move-but 

to cany on his preparations fully 

with only the date, hour, and 

location omitted. 

(b) He will, therefore, before flying to the new location 

immediately call a meeting of 

Squadron Commanders, Park 

Commanders, Supply, Transportation, Radio, Engineering, 

and any other officers who in his 

opinion are necessary to contribute to the working out of the 

operation, which must be 

planned with all the forethought 

possible. In this meeting all 

questions of moment will be discussed which will include: 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

31 9 

I. Transportation. 

11. Supplies-ontinuance of 

incoming. 

111. Rations for at least ten days 

from the present railhead. 

IV. Material left on the field for 

transport to the rear, to be 

placed in charge of an offi- cer sent from the rear for 

that purpose. 

V. Billeting to be properly adjusted with the local authorities before leaving. 

VI. Pulling down of existing inter-camp lines of communication that have been installed by the group. 

VII. Camp thoroughly policed 

before leaving, etc., etc. 

(c) The Group commander 

will then make an aerial reconnaissance to the new airdrome 

with the object of returning with 

further particulars of importance 

to the move in general. 

I. He will establish the route 

by which pilots will fly, noting the important landmarks, airdromes, gas stations, headquarters to notify 

if forced to land one side or 

the other of given points 

“en route.” 

11. He will have inspected the 

new field and made notes 

on the landing facilities. 

111. The work of the construction squadron engaged in 

the preparation of the field 

and upon the construction 

of barracks, hangars, etc. 

IV. The line of communication 

to outside headquarters. 

V. The disposition of the hangars on the field and which 

squadrons will occupy 

them. 

VI. The new Group Headquarters and the most suitable 

location. 

VII. Men’s quarters and messes. 

IX. And in general an idea of 

the neighboring units and in 

which way they might be of 

assistance to his command 

in moving. 

(d) Upon returning to the 

old field he will see that all these 

details are passed on to the 

Squadron Commanders and to 

those affected. 

9. The Move. 

(a) Moving orders will be 

received from the wing or the 

Army Air Service Commander, 

depending upon the tactical use 

to be made of the unit and will 

be acknowledged by notifying 

the Headquarters as soon as the 

echelons have started or are all 

en route. 

(b) The move will be made 

in four echelons, by squadrons, 

each echelon of each squadron 

in charge of an officer. 

1. Advance echelon. 

11. Main echelon. 

111. Flying echelon. 

IV. Rear echelon. 

10. The advance echelon will 

be in charge of a competent 

officer and will be light, consisting only of the personnel nec:essay to start inter-camp communication by telephone to establish squadron operations, to locate source of supply, fuel, 

straw, water, etc., and to set up 

kitchens to take care of arrivals 

until incoming units are settled. 

In regard to the above, the park 

commander will immediately get 

in touch with the Air Depot of 

the Army of its advanced field to 

insure this supply, determining at 

the same time the quantity of 

planes on hand, spare parts, 

etc., that may be called upon for 
320 Postwar Review 

immediate use. Also get in touch 

with Parks of adjoining Armies 

which may be used as an auxiliary supply. 

11. The main echelon will 

leave if possible the next day 

and will consist of all non-flying 

personnel of the Group, less the 

necessary personnel from 

squadrons and Headquarters 

Detachment, required to provide 

meals, planes, make minor repairs on those planes which may 

be out of commission, attend to 

billeting, policing, etc., etc. All 

material that can be taken will 

accompany this echelon, which 

will leave camp at the designated 

hour and will follow the route 

according to itinerary. 

12. The following rules and 

regulations are to be observed 

on the march. 

(a) All stops for meals or 

other reasons, other than those 

caused by emergency, will be 

regulated on schedule order issued when moving order has 

been received, designating time 

of departure and route. 

(b) Speed of truck train will 

be between 10 and 12 miles per 

hour, regulated by Acting First 

Sergeant at head of train in side 

car. 

distances between transportation 

will be 30 feet, every place else 

200 feet. 

within a radius of one mile of 

any town or village. 

(el Acting First Sergeant 

may grant soldier permission to 

enter town but only for a good 

reason. 

(f) No soldier will descend 

from trucks for any reason whatsoever without permission from 

the N.C.O. in charge of truck. 

(9) Each junior N.C.O. will 

be in close relation with his senior N.C.O. and privates, and is 

directly responsible to his immediate superior for the discipline 

and work of his men. 

certain trucks are lagging, put 

them at the head of the train. 

(i) Trailers may be shifted at 

noon stops or at evening stops, 

provided that such changes will 

assist in maintaining schedule. 

(j) Chauffeurs will work in 

details to which trucks are assigned and will be held responsible that their trucks have extra 

supply of gas each. 

(k) N.C.O. in charge of 

each section will be responsible 

to the Acting First Sergeant for 

the loading and unloading and 

placing of equipment assigned to 

his section. He will also be responsible for the discipline of the 

(c) In towns and villages, 

(d) The train will never stop 

(h) When train is moving, if 

men fssigned to his section 

while en route and until the 

squadron is settled in its new 

quarters. 

13. The flying echelon will 

consist of all serviceable machines, with their pilots. This 

party will leave the field after the 

advance echelon has reached its 

new station to receive the 

planes. Flight formations will be 

used and each pilot leaving the 

Fund will be given the necessary information for making the 

trip. On arrival at the new station 

each pilot will report to the commander of the advance echelon. 

14. The rear echelon will consist of the necessary personnel 

required to provide meals, start 

planes, make minor repairs on 

these planes which may be out 

of commission, attend the billeting, policing material left on the 

field for transport to the rear, 

empty gas containers, etc., etc., 

but will terminate their work as 

quickly as possible, making sure 

that the camp is thoroughly policed and in the proper shape to 

be taken over by the rear units 

or a new organization, and leaving a proper guard for the camp, 

should the incoming units be de- 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

321 

layed or the local authorities be 

unable to furnish the proper protection. 

15. It is most important that 

these echelons be properly officered to handle any emergencies 

that might arise and that the 

move be conducted according to 

one prescribed route with a 

schedule of arriving and departing times for the main stopping 

points “en route.” 

16. Officers heading these 

echelons will be assisted by another officer and side car who 

will bring up the rear and notify 

the head of the convoy of any 

breakdowns. They will also be 

posted on all traffic rules for convoys, see that all rules of the 

road are observed and in entering congested areas will make 

sure that no other moving units 

have priority of movements. 

17. All drivers will be supplied 

with maps and an itinerary of the 

move in case of breakdowns. 

18. Each echelon will depart 

with ten (10) days’ ration. 

19. A medical officer will accompany each echelon. 

20. Arrival at the new field 

and preparation until the day of 

the attack. As soon as the Group 

has arrived and a hurried inspection has shown that things are 

progressing nicely, the Group 

Commander will 

son to the Wing or A.A.S.C. 

Headquarters, as the case may 

be. 

(b) Ascertain the locations 

of all units with which he will be 

expected to keep in liaison. 

(c) Dispatch the radio and 

searchlight officers to establish 

relations with the radio and 

searchlight P.C.’s and to get in 

touch with their respective liaison officers at A.A.S.C. Headquarters. 

(d) Dispatch other liaison 

officers, calling upon Squadron 

Commanders, if necessary, to 

establish relations with anti-aircraft batteries, balloon locations, 

headquarters of adjoining army 

units, corps observation groups, 

in short, developing all sources 

of information which will materially assist in the efficient functioning of the group as well as 

developing relations which will 

include the personal touch so 

essential in cooperation. 

(e) See that all lines from 

outside sources as well as the 

inter-communicating telephone 

systems are speedily installed, 

(a) Report the arrival in perincluding radio and searchlight 

installations. 

ations office of the group is establishing itself with all scale 

maps necessary, information 

about existing line locations of 

allied and enemy airdromes, 

anti-aircraft batteries, balloon locations, searchlight locations, 

etc., and the proper housing of 

the radio and power equipment. 

(9) Make arrangements fsor 

an aerial target, preferably a 

small lake at which the pilots 

may commence at once to test 

their guns. 

(h) Visit personally the staff 

officers of the A.A.S.C. or Wing 

of the Army to which attached; 

Corps observation groups, either 

pursuit group with whom patrols 

will be made; C.O.’s of units 

working with the army operation 

on the right or left, etc., etc. 

21. Separate squadrons will 

move as above, except that the 

aerial reconnaissance of the new 

station and other details of the) 

Group Commander’s duty will 

be performed by the Squadron 

Commander. 

22. A separate flight will generally move in only three echelons: the advanced echelon, the 

flying echelon, and the rear echelon. The main body of the flicght 

may travel with either the advance or rear parties, depending 

on circumstances. The Flight 

Commander will make the same 

arrangements as the Group or 

Squadron Commander in the 

moves discussed above. 

(f) Make sure that the opr- 
322 Postwar Review 

Part 11. Corps and Army 

Observation 

Corps Observation 

Introduction 

is to establish, on the basis of 

experience gained in the War 

with Germany, the general lines 

of tec:hnical procedure governing 

the operations of the air service 

assigned to Army Corps in the 

Field. 

1. The purpose of this Manual 

Chapter 1. General 

Principles 

2. The Air Service of any 

Army Corps in the Field is an 

auxiliary arm. Primarily it is organized for the purpose of observing the dispositions and activities of the enemy during active hostilities. It further assists 

the artillery as a means of fire 

control. It partakes of the general 

nature of combatant arms in that 

its mission forces it from time to 

time into combat with enemy 

aerial forces. The Corps Air 

Service may accept but will not 

ordinarily seek combat. 

Corps is under the tactical and 

administrative control of the 

General Commanding the Army 

Corps. The troops of the Air 

Service of a Corps are Corps 

Troops. Corps Air Service troops 

assigned for tactical duty to Divisions within the Corps retain 

their identity as Corps Troops. 

3. 'The Air Service of an Army 

4. The basis of organization 

for the Air Service of an Army 

Corps is the Observation Aero 

Service Squadron. The basis of 

the Squadron is the two-seater 

airplane manned by a pilot and 

an observer. The Air Service of 

the Corps may number one or 

several squadrons. 

rons are operating together in 

the same Corps they are organized into an Observation 

Group. The Observation Group 

is under the immediate command of a Group Commander. 

tive control of the Corps Air 

Service vested in the Corps 

Commander is delegated to 

Corps Air Service Commander 

(C.A.S.C.). The C.A.S.C. is an 

officer of the Air Service. He is a 

member of the Corps Staff. 

Upon the original organization of 

the Corps he is designated by 

General Headquarters upon the 

5. When two or more squad6. The tactical and administrarecommendation of the Chief of 

Air Service. Thereafter the Corps 

being a part of an Army, he is 

designated by the Commanding 

General of the Army upon the 

recommendation of the Army 

Air Service Commander. 

7. The Corps Air Service is 

dependent, for technical supply 

and replacement of personnel, 

upon the Air Service Organization of the Services of Supply 

operating through the medium 

of Air Depots, Air Parks, and 

Replacement Squadrons of the 

Air Service in the Zone of Advance. 

8. The details of organization, 

assignment and designation of 

personnel, amounts and kinds of 

transportation and technical 

equipment are fixed in the Tables of Organization for the Air 

Service of an Army Corps, Air 

Service of the United States 

Army. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

323 

Chapter 11. The Squadron 

9. Tactical and administrative 

control of the squadron is vested 

in the Squadron Commander. 

He is responsible for the tactical, 

technical, and administrative efficiency of his organization. He is 

assisted by a staff of officers in 

the discharge of his duties. His 

prime qualification is leadership. 

He is the rallying point of his 

command. The degree of success attained by the squadron 

will depend very largely upon 

the example set by the Squadron Commander. The Squadron 

Commander may be either a 

pilot or an observer. in either 

case he is conversant with the 

essential principles of the work 

of both. 

10. A Squadron Commander 

in his administrative duties is assisted hy a competent Adjutant. 

Routine administration is supervised by the Squadron Commander but is effected by the 

Adjutant. 

11. Routine details of squadron supply are administered by 

the Supply Officer. The Supply 

Officer will ordinarily be placed 

in charge of the transportation of 

the Squadron. 

12. In the exercise of his tactical functions the Squadron 

Commander is assisted by an 

Operations Officer. This officer is 

ordinarily the senior observer 

present. A junior observer may 

be detailed as Operations Officer 

if, in the opinion of the Squadron Commander, his executive 

ability, practical experience, and 

record for devotion to duty warrant his preferment. The Operations Officer is responsible, under the Squadron Commander, 

for the direction of the tactical 

operations of the squadron. He 

collects, compiles, and transmits 

all tactical information. He assigns tactical missions to the individual pilots and observers of the 

squadron. He directs the establishment and maintenance of liaison. He renders, nightly, to 

higher authority, a detailed account of the tactical operations 

of the squadron for the day. He 

acts as tactical advisor and instructor to the pilots and observers of the squadron. 

13. The Operations Officer is 

assisted in the discharge of his 

duties by an Assistant Operistions Officer. The Assistant Operations Officer is an observer. 

The Assistant Operations Officer 

replaces the Operations Officer 

during the latter's absence. 

14. The squadron is equipped 

with Radio Set capable of s'ending and receiving radio messages 

to and from all ground staticlns 

within a radius of fifty kilometers. 

The Squadron Radio Set is further equipped with an artillery 

spark set for receiving airplane 

messages on short wave-lengths. 

The squadron radio equipment 

further consists of airplane type 

sending sets mounted on each 

airplane. A detail of Radio mechanics is a part of the personnel 

of the squadron. The squad.ron 

Radio Section is in charge of the 

Radio Officer. The Radio Officer 

is responsible for the installation 

and upkeep of all radio equipment. He is further responsible 

for the radio liaison of the 

squadron. He is in personal 

touch with the Corps and P,rmy 

Radio Officers. He is conversant 

with Corps and Army Radio 

Plans and Regulations and .assures compliance with these. He 

assigns wave-lengths to outgoing 

airplanes. He is responsible for 

the coding and decoding of radio messages and of telegrams. 

He receives the test calls of airplanes leaving the airdrome unless relieved of this function by 

the Radio Officer of a higher 

unit. He investigates into the 

causes of airplane radio failures 
324 Postwar Review 

and establishes liaison with radio 

stations of artillery and other 

units with which radio failures 

have been reported. Wherever 

possible he logs the messages of 

all airplanes of his squadron operating on the lines, with a view 

to determining, in case of failure, 

whether the faulty functioning 

originated aboard the airplane or 

elsewhere. He maintains a complete log of all radio messages 

received at his station. He is 

assisted by one or more trained 

radio noncommissioned officers. 

15. The armament of the airplanes of the squadrons is installed, aligned, and maintained 

at the maximum of efficiency by 

the Armament Officer assisted 

by a staff of enlisted mechanics. 

The Armament Officer is responsible for the supply, calibration, 

and loading of machine-gun ammunition. He is further responsible for the supply of signal rockets, signal pistols, and message 

dropping tubes. During intensive 

operations he is charged with the 

duty of replenishing aboard each 

airplane, immediately the plane 

is announced available for flight, 

the stock of equipment above 

noted. Immediately upon taking 

station at an airdrome the Armament Officer establishes a machine-gun testing butt, an armament work-shop and storeroom, 

and erects adequate gun-racks. 

He assigns rear turret machineguns to observers by number. 

He assures the use of rear-turret 

machine-guns only by the observer to whom each gun, or set 

of guns, is assigned. 

16. The care and upkeep of 

airplanes and engines is the duty 

of the Engineer Officer. The Engineer Officer is in immediate 

charge of the airplane and motor 

mechanic personnel of the 

squadron. He is responsible for 

the instruction and efficiency of 

the mechanics. He is assisted by 

a Chief Mechanic and three 

Chiefs of Flight mechanics. 

17. For the purpose of distribution of control the squadron is 

divided into three Flights. The 

Flight is composed of six airplanes together with the indicated proportion of pilots, observers, and mechanics. The 

Flight is commanded by a Flight 

Commander. The Flight Commander is ordinarily a senior 

pilot. The Flight Commander is 

never an observer. The Flight 

Commander is responsible to 

the Squadron Commander for 

mechanical and tactical efficiency of his Flight. He acts as 

instructor and advisor to the pilots of the Flight. When an entire 

Flight is detailed for a single mission the Flight Commander is 

the leader of the formation. The 

Flight Commander is ordinarily 

Second-in-Command of the 

Squadron. 

18. The flight is never an administrative unit. In theory it is a 

tactical unit; in reality it is a 

technical group, furnishing a 

convenient sub-division for distribution of technical control. 

During intensive operations the 

operative unity of the Flight cannot be preserved. Fluctuation in 

the average availability of machines in the different flights, and 

varying qualifications of pilots, 

will render assignment to duty 

by flight roster inexpedient. 

Squadron Commanders will assign pilots to duty in the order of 

availability and according to the 

special qualifications of each, not 

Flight by Flight. During periods 

of comparative inactivity, however, a duty roster by Flight may 

be advantageously employed 

thus: 

One Flight, Duty. 

One Flight, Reserve. 

One Flight, Off duty. 

This arrangement is desirable in 

that it permits pilots one day in 

every three of complete rest and 

freedom from responsibility. lt 

has the further advantage of permitting a thorough inspection 

and overhaul of airplanes every 

third day. 

19. Where a single squadron 

is operating separately with a 

division in the field the tactical 

organization becomes similar to 

that of the observation group. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

325 

Chapter Ill. The Corps 

Observation Group 

20. The Corps Observation 

Group consists of a Headquarters, two or more observation 

squadrons, and a photo section. 

Medical ordnance, artillery, infantry, and Intelligence personnel are attached. 

vested in the Group Commander. The administrative 

functions of the Group Commander are similar to those of 

the Commanding Officer of any 

Army Post. 

22. The Group Commander 

assures the efficient execution of 

tactical orders received from 

higher authority. He is responsible for the organization and efficiency of the tactical staff assisting him in his functions. In reality 

he is the representative, at the 

airdrome, of the Corps Air Service Commander. Upon his ability 

to visualize the specific demands 

of the general situation as communicated to him from higher 

authority depends the success of 

the Group. 

23. The Group Commander is 

assisted in his administrative 

work by a Group Adjutant. The 

Adjutant is assisted in his duties 

by a Headquarters Detachment 

of enlisted clerks and orderlies. 

21. Command of the Group is 

The functions of the Adjutant are 

similar to those of the Adjutant 

of an Army Post. 

24. Supplies are received by 

the Group for the Air Park and 

also the Air Park attends to certain repair of not sufficient major 

importance to warrant their 

being done at the Air Depots. 

25. In the fulfillment of his 

tactical functions the Group 

Commander is assisted by an 

Operations Officer. The Operations Officer is an able and experienced observer. The Operations Officer is responsible, under the Group Commander, for 

the direction of the tactical operations of the Group. He collects, 

compiles, and transmits all tactical information proceeding from 

outside sources to the Group 

and all information proceeding 

from the Group to outside units 

and headquarters. He transmits 

orders for the execution of missions to the squadrons concerned. He actively directs and 

maintains at a high point of efficiency the liaison of the Group. 

He organizes the Group Operations Room. He prepares the 

schedule of missions for each 

day. He renders nightly to hi9,her 

authority a detailed account of 

the tactical operations of the 

Group for the day. He receives 

and supervises the reports of all 

observers. He acts as tactical advisor and instructor to the flyi~ng 

personnel of the Group. 

26. The Operations Officer is 

assisted in the discharge of his 

duties by an Assistant Opera. 

tions Officer. 

27. The Radio Section of the 

Group is exactly similar in organization to that of the squadron. 

The Group Radio Officer, in addition to the duties outlined for 

the Squadron Radio Officer, supervises the operations of the 

squadron Radio Sections. Where 

a separate Radio Section is not 

detailed to the Group the Group 

Commander may designate a 

squadron Radio Section in lieu 

thereof. The Group Radio Ssction maintains operators at the 

receivers throughout the day 

and night. It constitutes one of 

the surest means of liaison 

available 
326 Postwar Review 

28. A complete motorized 

photographic laboratory constitutes a part of the technical 

equipment of the Group. The 

laboratory, together with its staff 

of enlisted experts, is commanded by the Group Photographic Officer. Wherever possible the Photographic Officer is 

responsible for the installation of 

a photographic barrack, with 

complete apparatus for developing, dying, and printing in 

quantity production. Airplane 

cameras are a part of the equipment of the Group Photo Section. 'The installation of cameras 

aboard airplanes is a function of 

the Photo Section. 

29. The Branch Intelligence 

Officer is a member of the 

Group tactical staff. He is especially trained in the subject of 

intelligence of the enemy. He is 

assisted by a staff of clerks, 

draftsmen, and photo interpreters. He is responsible for the 

collection, compilation, and distribution of all intelligence of the 

enemy gathered by the observers of the Group. He provides 

the maps for the use of the 

Group. He prepares a special 

large scale mimeographed map 

for use of observers in marking 

the location of troops. These 

maps are extremely useful additions to dropped messages reporting the results of infantly 

contact patrols. He is responsible 

for the interpretation, assemblage, map and file record, and 

distribution of aerial photographs 

of enemy territory secured by 

observers of the Group. He 

maintains close liaison with G2 

of the Corps. 

30. The Operations Room is 

the tactical heart of the Observation Group. It is the center and 

source, for the organizations and 

individuals of the Group, of all 

tactical information. In it are 

conveniently displayed detailed, 

large scale situation maps of the 

organization of the Army, Corps, 

and Divisional areas. Other 

maps show enemy situation and 

organizations. Charts, diagrams, 

tabulations, orders, bulletins, reports, photographs having a 

technical or tactical bearing on 

operations are available for immediate access. Work tables, 

paste-pots, colored crayons for 

the use of observers and pilots 

are provided. Maps are on file 

for distribution to individuals. A 

collection of technical works for 

reference of flying personnel is 

kept at hand. The complete Operations Room is the realization 

of effective liaison. Before leaving on missions observers are 

instructed to post themselves on 

the latest developments and receive final instructions from the 

Operations Officer or his Assistant at the Operations Room. 

Upon returning from missions 

observers invariably prepare 

their reports here. The Operations Room is the Headquarters 

of their Operations Officer. 

Chapter IV. The Corps Air 

Service Commander 

31. Technical, tactical, and 

administrative control of all sections, units, and groupings of the 

Air Service of an Army Corps is 

vested in the Corps Air Service 

Commander. The C.A.S.C. is a 

field officer of the Air Service. 

He may be either a pilot or an 

observer. He should be thoroughly familiar with the general 

principles of the procedure governing the operations of the 

General Staff. He is a member 

of the Corps Staff. In addition to 

his administration and tactical 

duties, as an Air Service Commander he is the immediate advisor to the Commanding General and the Staff in all matters 

pertaining to the tactical employment and operations of the Air 

Service as a whole. He is at all 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

327 

times familiar with the tactical 

situation and may make such 

dispositions to meet it as the 

limitations and possibilities of the 

arm he directs indicate, provided 

that such dispositions in no way 

conflict with instructions emanating from superior commands. 

He further transmits and assures 

compliance with orders governing the employment of the Air 

Service emanating from the Staff 

and the C.O. He is responsible 

for the efficiency of Air Service 

liaison. He is responsible for the 

assurance of maximum operative efficiency of the units and 

staffs of his Command. He is 

assisted in the discharge of his 

duties by a staff of experienced 

Air Service Officers. The post of 

the C.A.S.C. is with the Corps 

Staff. The office of the C.A.S.C. 

is a section of Corps Headquarters. 

32. The C.A.S.C. is assisted in 

his administrative duties by an 

Adjutant. The Adjutant is assisted by a Headquarters Detachment of enlisted clerks and 

orderlies. 

33. Adequate transportation 

and transportation personnel 

must be allotted the C.A.S.C. 

for the cartying out of all liaison 

duties and establishment of 

courier services. SuDervision of 

transportation is ordinarily the 

duty of the Adjutant. 

34. The C.A.S.C. is assigned 

an airplane for his personal use. 

It is the function of one squadron of his command to assure 

the care and upkeep of his airplane. 

35. In discharge of his tactical 

duties the C.A.S.C. is assisted by 

an Operations Officer. The Operations Officer is an Air Service 

Observer of wide active experience and considerable executive 

ability. The Operations Officer 

P 
328 Postwar Review 

replaces the C.A.S.C. in his temporary absence. He is responsible, under the C.A.S.C., for the 

issuance and transmission of all 

tactical orders. He advises with 

the C.A.S.C. in all matters pertaining to the establishment of 

adequate liaison system by all 

sections, units, and groupings of 

the Corps Air Service. He collects, compiles, and transmits, in 

close liaison with the Corps and 

Divisional Staffs, all information, 

both outgoing and incoming. On 

the basis of the tactical situation 

as established by the day’s information and orders he prepares, 

under the immediate supervision 

of the C.A.S.C. the general Operations Order governing the operations of the Groups for the 

following day. 

the C.A.S.C. is assisted in the 

discharge of his duties by an 

Assistant Operations Officer. 

37. Such personal liaison for 

the Office of the Corps Air Service as cannot be undertaken by 

the C.A.S.C. or his Operations 

and Assistant Operations Officers 

is assured by one or more Liaison Officers. These Officers are 

ordinarily Air Service Observers 

of considerable active experience It is their duty to visit as 

often as may be necessary the 

Headquarters and Posts of 

Command of Divisions and Divi36. The Operations Officer of 

sional troops and there discuss 

and, if possible, solve all tactical 

problems and collect all tactical 

information having a bearing on 

the operations of the Air Service 

in their relation to the commands visited. Liaison Officers 

render verbal and written reports 

on their activities to the C.A.S.C. 

at the close of each day. 

38. It is important that all concerned recognize the Office of 

the Corps Air Service Commander as the sole controlling 

point for activities of the Corps 

Air Service. Ordinarily no orders 

emanating from Staff or Line 

Commanders requiring compliance by the units of the Corps 

Air Service will be transmitted 

direct to the Group or to the 

Squadron immediately concerned. Orders will be transmitted to the C.A.S.C. or his representative and thence will be issued to lower units. In this connection a comparison may be 

drawn for the tactical purposes 

between the regiment and the 

Air Service of the Corps. In the 

case of the regiment, orders requiring compliance by battalions 

or companies pass through the 

Regimental Commander. This 

practice is established by military 

precedent and dictated by practical considerations. In general 

the same precedents and considerations apply to the Air Service. 

Situations may and frequently 

do arise where it is impossible to 

transmit orders for the Air Service having their source in Divisions through the office of the 

C.A.S.C. Communications may 

be interrupted or extreme urgency may interfere and dictate 

the more direct and rapid 

method. In special situations of 

this nature it is permissible for 

Divisions to transmit orders direct to the Group. The C.A.S.C. 

in this case is informed by the 

Group Commander of the receipt of the order and the action 

taken to comply. In like manner 

all relations of the Group and 

Squadrons entered into with 

Line Organizations should be 

taken cognizance of by the 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

329 

C.A.S.C. Liaison Officers proceeding to Division Headquarters and Divisional units will report in one way or another to 

the C.A.S.C. that visits are contemplated or have just taken 

place. The result of visits will 

likewise be reported. It is of extreme importance that the 

C.A.S.C. be informed up to the 

minute of all tactical activities of 

his command. Obviously, unless 

he is conversant with the very 

latest data regarding the operations of his command he cannot 

intelligently direct future operations nor report accurately on 

the accomplishment of work. Incomplete exercise of control by 

the C.A.S.C. will result either in 

duplication and the issuance of 

superfluous orders, or in an under estimation of the needs of 

the situation and a consequent 

failure to make adequate 

disposition. 

Chapter V. Assignment and 

Functions of Squadrons 

39. In assigning Squadrons 

the C.A.S.C., upon whom this 

duty devolves, will consider the 

tactical needs of the Corps as a 

unit, and the needs of the Divisions of the Corps in the line. 

Excepting for purposes of training, the Division in reserve will 

not be considered. The C.A.S.C. 

will ordinarily assign one Squadron to perform the missions required by the Corps as a whole 

and one squadron each to the 

Divisions on the Line. 

40. The Corps Squadron has 

a zone of action bounded on the 

right and left by the Corps 

boundaries. The depth of the 

zone is ordinarily never more 

than ten kilometers from the enemy territory. The depth is determined in each particular case 

by the relative strength of enemy 

aerial defenses weighed against 

the urgency of demand for information. The Corps Squadron is 

charged with the duty of securing all photographs of enemy 

territory, whether photographs 

are requested by the Corps or 

Divisions. It is charged with such 

general surveillance of the 

course of battle across the entire 

Corps front as the situation may 

demand it. It controls and adjusts the fire of the Corps artillery 

and observes any preparations 

for enemy counter attack. 

41. The Division Squadron is 

charged with the duty of surveillance of the Divisional Sector to 

the depth of flight of the Corps 

Squadron. It is further responsible for establishing liaison between the Divisional Commander and the troops in the 

front line by means of low-flying 

Contact Patrols. It reports the 

position of the enemy’s advance 

elements and his dispositions tor 

defense and attack. It controls 

and adjusts the fire of the Divisional Artille y. Observations 

made by Divisional planes and 

reported to Divisional Headquarters are repeated to Corp5, 

Headquarters. 

42. All Squadrons report to 

headquarters of units to which 

they are assigned the locations 

of enemy batteries observed in 
330 Postwar Review 

action and the location and density of friendly and enemy shell 

observed. Special reconnaissance for the location of enemy 

batteries in action are ordinarily 

carried out by airplanes of the 

Corps Squadrons but may be 

requested by Divisions of the 

Squadron and assigned to them. 

Chapter VI. General 

Observation and Principles 

43. The observation airplane 

is not designed for combat. It 

is charged not only with securing 

information but with the duty of 

reporting on its observations. 

Observation planes will avoid 

combat whenever possible, 

thereby increasing their chance 

of returning safely to report on 

information gained. They will 

avoid all danger from enemy 

aerial defenses whenever such 

action will not materially interfere with the accomplishment of 

the mission. In like manner the 

Command will carefully weigh 

the urgency of need for information against the risk involved in 

obtaining it. Where the risk overbalances the need the Air Service will not be called into action. 

It must be borne in mind that the 

Air Service is a costly, highly 

trained arm. Replacements of 

personnel and equipment are 

difficult and effectives must be 

husbanded in times of relative 

inactivity in order that maximum 

service may be counted on 

~ 

when greater need arises, Airplanes must never be utilized 

when balloons will give the results desired. As a means of liaison between the troops and the 

Command the Air Service 

should be called upon only 

when all other means fail or are 

virtually certain to fail. Never use 

aerial observation when terrestrial observation is sufficiently efficient. Local actions will never 

be deemed sufficient reason for 

ordering the accomplishment of 

contact patrols. 

Chapter VII. Information 

44. With the Air Service, as 

with all other Arms, intelligent 

and successful action is based 

upon accurate and complete 

tactical and technical information 

of the military situation. The 

Corps Air Service itself is fundamentally organized with the object in view of gathering informa- 

?ion of the enemy for communication to the commands and 

Services concerned. The Air 

Service, on the other hand, is 

itself dependent upon outside 

sources for such information as 

will enable it to carry out its 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

functions in the most efficient 

manner. Collection and communication of information will constitute a prime preoccupation of 

Commanding Officers. 

45. Information may be considered under two general 

heads, (a) Information of the 

Friendly Situation, (b) Information of the Enemy Siiuation. Information of the Friendly Situation includes (a) Situation on the 

ground, (b) Situation in the air, 

(c) Plans for future operations 

(1) on the ground (2) in the air, 

(d) Liaison plans. Information of 

the enemy ordinarily available 

includes, (a) Situation on the 

ground, (b) Situation in the air, 

(c) Plans for future operations. 

the Friendly Situation: 

46. Sources of Information of 

1. On the GroundCorps and Division Staffs, 

Commanders of Combat 

Units. 

Field Orders: G-3, Army 

Corps, Division. 

Daily Operations Orders: G-3, 

Army, Corps, Division. 

Liaison Reports: G-3, Corps, 

Division. 

Station Lists: G-3, Army, 

Corps, Division. 

Situation Maps: 

Artillery Command, Army, 

Corps, Division. 

G3: Army, Corps, Division. 

Plans of Employment: Artillery, 

Observation Post Bulletins: G-3, 

2. In the AirArmy and Corps Air Service 

Commands. 

Neighboring Air Service Units. 

Station Lists Army Air Service. 

Bulletins: Army Air Service. 

Operations Reports: Army and 

Operations Orders, Army Air 

3. Plans for Future OperaField Orders: G-3, Army, 

Corps, Division. 

Operations Orders: G3, Army, 

Corps, Division. 

Plans of Employment: Artillery, 

Army, Corps, Division. 

Maps to Accompany Any 

Above: corresponding 

sources. 

Command and Units. 

Corps, Division. 

Corps, Division. 

Corps Air Service. 

Service. 

tionsAir Service Plans: Air Service 

4. Liaison Plans and Data-- 

Road Liaison: One-way Road 

Maps and Orders, G-I, 

Army Corps, Division. 

Field Orders: 

Telephone. 

Telegraph. 

Visual Signals. 

Rockets. 

Panels. 

Flares. 

Projectors. 

Plans of Liaison to Accompany 

Radio. 

Pigeons. 

M.D.S. 

Runner. 

Airplane Dropping 

Grounds. 

Fixed Regulations Governing 

All Forms Liaison: Confidential Pamphlet No. 2 (Revised) G.H.Q., A.E.F., June 

1918, ‘Liaison for All 

Arms.” 

Fixed Regulations Governing 

the employment of Aerial 

Observation in Liaison With 

Artillery: Confidential Pam.. 

phlet No. 80 (Revised) 

G.H.Q., A.E.F., May 1918, 

“Aerial Observation for Ad 

ley.” 

Means of Secret Liaison: 

Codes: G-2, Corps. 

Airplane Codes: Plan of Liiiison and Fixed Regulations 

as Above. 

Secret letter map coordinates: 

Service Code: Chief Signal Officer, Corps. 

Telephone Code Name Dire<:- 

tory: Chief Signal Officer. 

G-3, COWS. 
332 Postwar Review 

47. Sources of Information of 

the Enemy Situation: 

1. On the GroundField Orders: G-3. 

Operations Orders: G3. 

Liaison Reports: G-3. 

Observation Post Bulletins: 

Summaries of Intelligence: 

Interrogation of Prisoners: G-2. 

Enemy Order of Battle Maps: 

Aerial Photographs: G-2 and 

Air Service Reports: 

Amy Air Service. 

Corps on Right. 

Corps on Left. 

Own Corps. 

Balloon Observation Reports. 

2. In the AirEnemy Airdrome Maps: G-2, 

Bulletins: 

G-2. 

G-2. 

G-2. 

Air Service. 

Army (Thru A.A.S.C.) 

Amy Air Service. 

Corps on Right, Air Service of. 

Corps on Left, Air Service 

of. 

Operations Reports: 

Army Air Service. 

Air Service, Corps on 

Right & Left. 

Neighboring Air Service 

Units. 

Balloon Reports. 

Liaison Reports: G-3. 

O.P. Bulletins: G-2. 

Summaries of Intelligence: 

Interrogation of Prisoners: 

G-2. 

Interrogation of Captured 

Aviators: Air Service, 

G-2. 

Balloon Observation Reports. 

Friendly Anti-Aircraft Artillev. 

Observations of own Air 

Service Units. 

3. Plans for Future OperaSummaries of Intelligence. 

Interrogation of Prisoners. 

48. Stress is laid upon the 

personal contact element in collecting information of every sort. 

Frequent conferences by Air 

Service Officers with other officers of the Aerial Army and with 

Staff and Unit Commanders of 

Corps and Divisions will often 

elicit special information, not 

available from other regular 

sources, which may be advantageously acted upon. 

G-2. 

tions49. The Field Order embodies 

a resume of the friendly and 

enemy situation and establishes 

the strategical and tactical plan 

of action which will be followed 

by the troops of Army, Corps, 

and Divisions over a considerable period. It includes annexes 

giving information regarding the 

activities of special arms and 

services. The general Plan for 

the employment of the Corps 

Air Service during the period of 

activity presumed is based upon 

the tactical provisions of the 

Field Order. The Field Order is 

communicated to the entire 

flying personnel of the Corps 

Air Service in order that pilots 

and observers may have a thorough understanding of, and take 

an intelligent interest in operations in which they are to 

participate. 

50.The Daily Operations Order, G3, embodies a fesumk of 

the friendly and enemy situation 

at the close of the day and 

establishes the tactical plan of 

action for the following day. The 

activities of the Corps Air Service 

conform to the tactical demands 

for aerial cooperation with the 

troops as set forth day by day in 

the Corps Operations Order. 

The G3 Operations Order is 

not necessarily, however, the 

sole basis for the planning of 

daily Air Service operations. 

51. Liaison Reports, G3, and 

Observation Post Bulletins, G2, 

are hurried reports rushed from 

the forward areas by the most 

rapid means of liaison available. 

They ordinarily demand imme- 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

333 

diate action, if any, by the Air 

Service. They form the basis for 

the ordering of specific missions, 

not for the formulation of extended plans of action. They 

frequently warn the Air Service 

of radical changes in the terrestrial or aerial situation requiring 

a reversal or readjustment of set 

plans, an intensification of general activity, or the adopiion of 

additional precautionary measures. Their rapid transmission 

from the Office of the Corps Air 

Service Commander to the 

Group is at times of vital importance. 

52. Station Lists and Situation 

Maps are the basis of personal 

liaison. They show the location 

of the units with which liaison is 

required. 

53. The Plan of Employment 

of the Artillery is the basis of the 

plans for the accomplishment of 

Air Service artillery missions. 

54. Accurate information of 

the strength and method of employment of neighboring friendly 

Air Service objectives, when 

checked against the reported 

aerial strength and aggressiveness of the enemy, permits an 

intelligent estimate of the lengths 

to which Corps Observation may 

be safely carried. Knowledge of 

the offensive and defensive Pursuit patrol schedule in the sector 

will permit the accomplishment 

of routine Corps Observation 

missions at those hours of the 

day when aerial support and 

protection is present on the lines. 

DEsemination of information regarding the operations of neighboring Observation Groups will 

promote interest and encourage 

emulation in the ranks of the 

flying and executive personnel. 

55. Army Air Service Bulletins, Operations Reports, and 

Operations Orders contain information of enemy aerial strength, 

tactics, and equipment. Army 

Operations Orders ordinarily establish, by authority of the Army 

Air Service Commander, the 

broad tactical principles regulating the direction of Corps Air 

Service operations. 

56. Personal liaison and courier runs are routed in accordance 

with one-way road regulations 

of Army, Corps, and Divisions, 

established in orders emanating 

from the G1 Sections of various 

Staffs. Illustrative maps ordinarily 

accompany these orders. 

57. The system of liaison established by the Corps Air Service is governed by the Corps 

Plan of Liaison and fixed regulations above noted. Secret messages are encoded and decoded 

by means of the codes and keys 

above noted. Headquarters are 

called by code name in accordance with the Code Telephone 

Directory prescribed by the 

C.S.O. Map coordinates are 

transmitted by a system of secret 

lettering prescribed by higher 

authority. 
334 

58. Possession of information 

of the enemy is a prime requisite 

to the intelligent direction of aerial operations, permitting concentration of observation on 

those points where the reaction 

of our own forces will be most 

effective, or on points whence 

enemy a'ctivity is apprehended 

and where such activity may be 

forestalled by appropriate dispositions based upon information 

furnished by the Air Service. 

59. Information of our own or 

the enemy situation having its 

source in the Air Service is ordinarily communicated by the 

C.A.S.C. direct to the G2 Section of the Corps Staff. G2 is 

responsible for its transmission 

by the most rapid means of 

liaison available to those units 

concerned. 

60. All information collected 

by officers of the Corps Air Service which has a bearing on the 

operations of the Air Services of 

neighboring or higher units is 

transmitted by the most rapid 

means of liaison available from 

Air Service to Air Service, without reference to G2. 

61. All tactical and technical 

information, whatever its nature, 

is of direct or indirect interest to 

all flying, technical, and executive commissioned personnel of 

the Air Service. Its rapid transmission and thorough dissemination is of prime importance. 

Chapter VIII. Liaison 

62. Effective Liaison involves 

the establishment of mutual understanding, rapid communication, and effective cooperation 

between the Air Service of the 

Corps, Air Services ot other 

Corps, other branches of the Air 

Service, and other Branches and 

Arms of the Service to which the 

Corps Air Service stands in some 

tactical or technical relation. Information is gathered by means 

of Liaison. 

63. Liaison cannot be carried 

too far. Its scope is limited only 

by the means possessed. 

64. Liaison is carried out by 

the following means: 

conferences. 

son Officers stationed at important tactical centers of information. 

Mechanical mearts of longdistance communication: 

Frequent personisl visits and 

Permanent Air Slewice LiaiTelephone 

Telegraph 

Radio 

Visual Signals 

Motor Couriers 

Airplane Couriers 

Pigeons 

Mounted Couriers 

Runners 

65. Liaison by personal contact, besides elicting information, 

promoted mutual understanding 

and sympathy between the Air 

Service and other Branches of 

the Service. It is useful in acquainting other Servic'es with the 

possibilities and limitations of 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

335 

military aviation. It forms the basis for the laying of specific 

plans, prescribing of methods, 

and establishment of means and 

methods of rapid communication. Within the Corps, personal 

liaison will be frequently affected 

to include down to Infantry Brigades and Artillery Batteries. 

66. The permanent Liaison 

Officer is ordinarily posted with 

Division Headquarters and 

Corps Air Service Headquarters 

of the Corps on right and left. 

The permanent Liaison Officer 

at Division Headquarters is the 

representative of the Divisional 

Squadron and of the C.A.S.C. 

He collects and transmits, 

through the C.A.S.C., to the 

Group and Squadron, all tactical 

information available. He is in 

close touch with the Divisional 

Artillery Brigade Commander. 

He transmits, through the 

C.A.S.C., all requests for missions. He is the immediate advisor on Air Service matters of 

the Divisional Command and 

Staff. He is responsible to the 

C.A.S.C. for the establishment 

of a suitable airplane message 

Dropping Ground at Division 

Headquarters. He interprets, 

whenever necessary, dropped 

message and clears up 

obscurities. 

67. Establishment of adequate mechnical means of longdistance communication is a 

duty of the C.A.S.C. He must 

always be furnished with a direct-line telephone circuit from 

his office to the office of the 

Group Commander. The running of telephone lines is a function of the Corps Signal Officer. 

68. A special Air Service Motorcycle Courier connects the office of the C.A.S.C. with the 

Group. Orders, reports, bulletins, and routine administrative 

papers are transmitted by 

courier. 

69. Carrier Pigeons, Airplanes, 

and Mounted Couriers are used 

as a means of liaison when other 

means fail. Runners are employed over short distances 

where road communication by 

motor dispatch is impracticable. 

liaison includes the establishments at Corps, Division, Brigade, Regimental, and Battalion 

Headquarters of suitable Dropping Grounds for the receipt of 

airplane written messages. Signal 

Officers are responsible for the 

establishment and maintenance 

of Dropping Grounds. The location of Dropping Grounds is ordinarily selected by an Air Service Offficer and, wherever possible, the Radio Station is established nearby. A detail of enlisted men is on duty at the 

70. The Air Service system of 

Dropping Ground throughout 

the hours of daylight. The 

C.A.S.C. prepares a map showing locations of all Dropping 

Grounds in the Corps Area for 

the information of Pilots and observers of the Group. Distinctive 

panels, as prescribed in “Liaison 

for All Arms” (see chapter on 

Information) denote at the same 

time the locations of headquarters and the emplacements of 

Dropping Grounds. Dropping 

Ground panels are displayed by 

the detail on duty upon the call 

of the airplane. Calls are sent by 

signal rockets, short bursts of 

machine-gun fire, or radio. 

71. Liaison includes the taking 

of any measures which serve to 

enlist the interest of troops in the 

work of the Air Service. Divisional Squadrons may display 

special distinctive insignia on the 

wings and fuselage of airplanes 

permitting troops to recognize 

planes of their own Division. The 

morale of troops in action is appreciably raised by the knowledge that “their own plane” is 

flying over them and assisting 

operations. Where troops constantly observe planes known to 

be of their own command in 

action a feeling of interest and 

camaraderie with the Air Service 

is developed. Cooperation of the 

troops during infantry contact 

patrols is a direct result. The 

dropping of newspapers and cigarettes from airplane to the troops 

in advance areas is likewise a 

means of liaison, promoting, as it 
336 Postwar Review 

does, mutual confidence and 

sympathy. Visits by pilots and 

observers to advance positions 

and the front line during battle is 

a valuable means of promoting 

sympathy and understanding 

between the troops and the Air 

Service. In like manner visits 

from officers of combatant 

troops to the airdrome are encouraged. Line officers visiting 

the airdrome gain an intimate 

first-hand knowledge of the work 

and viewpoint of the Air Service 

and disseminate the information 

obtained upon return to their 

units. 

72. The Corps or Division 

Commanders may utilize airplanes for communicating to 

their troops in advance areas. 

Orders and citations calculated 

to raise the morale of the forces 

engaged in battle may be mimeographed and dropped in 

quantity along the lines. 

73. Airplanes communicate 

with the ground by radio and 

rocket signalling and by dropped 

message. Conventional rocket 

signals are fixed in Planes of 

Liaison of Armies, Corps, and 

Divisions. Secret Radio codes for 

use by airplanes are similarly 

prescribed. All airplane radio 

messages are in code. 

74. Ground troops communicate with airplanes by means of 

signal panels, rockets, bengal 

flares, and electric projectors. 

Regulations governing the use of 

ground signals are published in 

Liaison Plans and the Pamphlet, 

“Liaison for All Arms.” 

Chapter IX. Security 

75. The Chapter on Security 

of the Airdrome, Part I, applies 

in principle and detail to Corps 

Observation Stations. 

76. During active operations 

over the lines, Corps Observation Planes are largely dependent for security upon the protection afforded by the Pursuit Effectives operating on the sector. 

Pursuit protection is of two sorts, 

(a) Extended Barrage, and, (b) 

Close Protection. 

77. Pursuit barrage methods 

are prescribed by the Army Air 

Service Commander. Ordinarily 

formations of pursuit planes patrol the Army and Cow sectors 

at scheduled hours and for 

stated periods during each day. 

Certain formations are charged 

with the duty of clearing the air 

of enemy aircraft and protecting 

our own aircraft at low and medium altitudes. Other formations 

fly at higher altitudes and forbid 

the approaching of our lines by 

enemy aircraft. To assure the 

security of observation missions 

the Corps Air Service Commander prescribes the accomplishments of routine missions at 

those hours of the day when 

pursuit barrage is scheduled to 

operate. Close protection of 

Corps Observation Planes 

whose mission carries them deep 

into enemy territory is secured 

by personal arrangement between the Group Commanders 

of Corps and Pursuit Groups. 

78. Where close protection 

from Pursuit Units is not available Corps Observation Planes 

detailed for deep-flying photographic or visual reconnaissance 

missions assure their own security and are dispatched in formations of vaying numerical 

strength, the number of planes 

depending upon the reported 

strength and aggressiveness of 

enemy pursuit aviation in the 

sector. 

79. Security of Corps Observation Planes flying !within the 

friendly lines is further assured 

by the protection afforded from 

enemy pursuit by the Anti-aircraft Defenses of the Sector. 

80. Lacking other protection 

the Corps Observation Plane is 

dependent for security upon its 

own armament. 

81. Security decreases in direct proportion to the increase in 

altitude and distance from the 

friendly lines. Enemy pursuit 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

337 

aviation rarely ventures into the 

friendly lines at an altitude of less 

than three thousand feet. Corps 

Planes observing from their own 

lines at low altitudes are relatively secure both from enemy 

aircraft and enemy artilley. 

82. In conducting observation 

the intelligent Corps Observation 

team seek the maximum of security. Missions are carried out 

at the lowest altitudes and shortest flight ranges which permit of 

accurate observation. The enemy lines are ordinarily penetrated by the single plane only 

for short periods and after careful survey of the air. Repeated 

short sorties over enemy territoy, although they prolong the 

total duration of the flight, decrease the danger of attack and 

are therefore preferable to a single extended flight at a distance 

from the friendly lines. Observation of Artillery fire, excepting at 

extreme ranges during hazy 

weather, can be accomplished 

by the experienced observer 

without crossing the enemy 

lines. Observation of artilley fire 

at long range is more easily 

accomplished from high than 

from low altitudes. For purposes 

of security it is preferable to fly 

high within the friendly lines 

than to fly low in the enemy 

lines, for the reason that, though 

the danger of encounter is increased, the plane, if attacked 

over its own territory, can resort 

to rapid manoeuvres while losing 

altitude and thus drop into security under cover of friendly 

ground machine-guns and 

artille y. 

83. The use by observers of 

field-glasses is an added measure of security and is encouraged. The use of field-glasses 

permits accurate observation 

from a safe distance within the 

friendly lines and the rapid identification of distant airplanes. 

Long practice is required for the 

effective use of field-glasses. The 

ability to employ them is a rare 

and valuable asset among 

observers. 

by even cloud strata affords 

added security. Sun-glare is 

eliminated and the area to be 

surveyed in watching for hostile 

aircraft is limited. The silhouettes 

of aircraft within the range of 

vision stand out sharply against 

the clouds. Broken cloud groupings decrease security. Scattered 

banks of clouds afford ambush 

84. A sky completely overcast 

to hostile pursuit. Broken cloud 

banks are never approached by 

the single plane where it is possible to avoid them. 

Security from surprise attack is 

dependent upon the constant 

vigilance of pilot and observer 

and upon ability of airplane 

teams to distinguish enemy aircraft from friendly by the silhouette. Pamphlets showing the silhouettes of enemy and friendly 

types of planes are published by 

the Air Service Intelligence Section from time to time. These 

are made available to all flying 

personnel and are carefully studied and learned. 
338 Postwar Review 

86. Security from enemy antiaircraft artilley and machine-gun 

fire is afforded by effecting slight 

changes in course and altitude at 

short intervals. Where artillery 

fire is so dense as to assume the 

aspect of a barrage a long steep 

dive is resorted to, the dive 

being continued until the lowest 

bursts observed have passed 

overhead. The plane then climbs 

rapidly changing course at the 

same time. 

Chapter X. Orders and 

Reports 

87. The Corps Air Service 

Operations Order is based upon 

the tactical situation as set forth 

in information gathered by the 

C.A.S.C., through liaison channels. The Operations Order is 

issued by the C.A.S.C. at the 

close of each day and prescribes 

the general and specific lines of 

activity of the Observation 

Group for the following day. It 

contains: 

plan. 

presumed purposes. 

Squadron. 

sional Squadrons. 

a. Friendly tactical situation and 

b. Enemy tactical situation and 

c. General mission of the Corps 

d. General mission of the Divie. Specific missions. 

f. Special information affecting 

g. Any admonitions, advice, en- operations. 

couragement. 

88. The Operations Order is 

forwarded to the Group by 

M.D.S. If there is doubt that it 

will arrive at Group Headquarters in ample time it is communicated in advance by telephone. 

89. In preparing the Operations Order the C.A.S.C. will 

advise with the Corps Chief of 

Staff and the Assistant Chiefs of 

Staff, G2 and G3. 

90. Distribution of the Operations Order: 

Group Headquarters. 

Army Air Service Commander. 

C.A.S.C., Corps on right and 

left. 

corps c. of s. 

Corps G2 and G3. 

Commanding Genlerals, Divisions of own Corps. 

91. Operations Reports are 

prepared for the C.A.S.C. by the 

Group Operations Officer under 

the supervision of tho Group 

Commander. They contain a 

narrative of the salien,t features 

of each day’s aerial operations. 

They contain a statistical tabulatin of each day’s operations, by 

squadron, showing number and 

kinds of flights accomplished; 

number of flying hours; number 

of photographs secured; number 

of forced landings; number of 

planes crashed; numlber of combats; number of casualties; 

planes and personnel available 

for the following days operations. Totals for the entire Group 

follow squadron stati:jtics. For 

distribution see Par. !20. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

339 

92. A written report of each 

visual reconnaissance mission 

accomplished is furnished by 

each observer (a) in a dropped 

message to the P.C. of the Division for which the flight is made, 

and to the Corps P.C. in every 

case, and (b) in a carefully detailed narrative, prepared after 

landing, under the supervision of 

the Group Operations Officer. 

93. The dropped message report is complete but concise. 

Skeleton phrasing is permitted. 

All information secured, both 

positive and negative, dealing 

with the friendly and enemy situation, is included. The tendency of the inexperienced observer is to omit in the dropped 

message minor details of time 

and place. All details will be 

included, no matter how insignificant they may appear to the 

observer. Locations will be accurately described by coordinates or filled in on an attached 

map. The message, if dropped 

at the Corps P.C. by a Divisional 

Plane, will state in conclusion 

whether or not a similar message 

has been dropped at the Division, this in order to assure G2 

of the Corps that transmission 

of the information in the body 

of the message is or is not necessay. In preparing forms for 

the writing of dropped messages 

observers will duplicate, and 

thus save time, by the use of 

carbon paper firmly fixed between two or more message 

blanks, attached by means of 

rubber bands, thumb tacks, or 

tape, to a stiff backing. PhotoAn open-air P.C. 

graphic and artiiley missions are 

not reported by dropped message. Their results are reported 

by telephone liaison from the 

Group. 

94. The full narrative observer’s report prepared at the 

Group tells the entire stoy of the 

mission, including information of 

route followed; visibility; and duration of flight; enemy road and 

railway activity observed enemy 

aircraft observed; with description of types or silhouettes and 

distinctive markings; enemy balloons in ascension, giving location; enemy and friendly artiiley 

activity, locations of enemy batteries in action; density and location of friendly and enemy shell 

observed; locations and activities 

of friendly and enemy troops; 

general aspect of enemy sector, 

carefully calling attention to any 

lack of activity where activity 

might have been expected; fires 

and explosions in friendly and 

enemy territory. Where conclusions are drawn they are carefully labelled as such and are not 

stated as absolute fact. Observers are encouraged to draw conclusions. 

95. Inexperienced observers 

often omit the following essential 

data in reporting on missions: 

Negative Information of Enemy 

Exact time of observations. 

Exact locations by coordinates. 

Direction taken by Enemy 

Troops and Train movements. 

Approximate strength of columns observed on roads. 

Direction of flight of enemy aircraft. 

Sector. 
340 Postwar Review 

Careful supervision by Corps 

Air Service and Group Commanders and their Operations 

Officers is the sole means of 

training observers in the careful 

and complete preparation of 

reports. 

ments is made by the observer 

at the Group. The usual flight 

narrative describing general conditions under which the flight 

was accomplished is followed by 

a report of number of rounds 

fired and number of bursts observed and by an estimate of the 

result obtained. Failures are 

carefully reported, stating 

reasons. 

97. The photographic reconnaissance report includes the 

usual narrative with a statement 

of number of plates exposed and 

estimate of area covered. Failures and reasons thereof are 

reported. 

96. Report of artillery adjust98. Report of encounters and 

combats with enemy aircraft is 

made, by pilot and observer in 

conference, on a special Combat 

Report Form prescribed by the 

Army Air Service Commander. 

Report includes narrative of the 

incidents of combat; states the 

approximate number of rounds 

fired by the pilot and observer; 

states effect of fire on the enemy 

and effect of enemy fire. Time, 

locality, and altitude are carefully 

noted. Number And type of enemy planes encountered, a description of their characteristic 

markings, and comments on the 

tactics employed are embodied 

in the report. 

99. The Observer’s Report 

is the sum and substance of Air 

Service Information. Its contents 

are transmitted to all concerned 

by the most rapid means of liaison available. 

100. General principles governing the composition and issuance of Orders and Reports for 

the Army promulgated in Field 

Service Regulations apply to Orders and Reports of the Air 

Service. 

Chapter XI. Marches and 

Convoys 

101. The principles governing 

the conduct and regulation of 

Marches and Convoys for all Air 

Service units and Groupings are 

treated in Chapter V. Part I of 

this Manual. 

102. The Corps Air Service 

Commander and his Staff move 

with Corps Headquarters. 

Chapter XII. Participation 

in Combat Observation 

103. During the inactive periods in trench or stabilized warfare the Air Service of the Corps 

is charged with the following 

missions: 

a. To photograph to a 

depth of ten kilometers the enemy’s position. 

exact emplacements of enemy 

batteries. 

c. To adjust the fire of our 

own artillery on sensitive points 

and calibrate our guns. 

d. To maintain surveillance 

of the enemy and assure protection of increased activity indicating preparation for hostile attack. 

104. During a friendly offensive the Air Service of the Corps 

is charged with the fcillowing 

missions: 

103. 

of the enemy at low isltitudes, 

reporting on concentrations of 

troops for local stands and 

reactions. 

b. To locate by the flash the 

a, b, and c, as in paragraph 

d. To maintain surveillance 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

34 1 

e. To observe enemy road 

movements for indications of the 

bringing up of extensive reinforcements. 

f. To find and report to the 

Command and the artillery the 

location of the friendly front lines 

by means of low-flying infantry 

contact patrols. 

barrage. 

indications of a general enemy 

retreat. 

i. To seek fugitive targets, 

i.e. massed enemy troops, convoys on roads, and to adjust 

rapid zone fire on such targets. 

105. During a general retreat 

of the enemy and pursuit by 

friendly forces the Air Service of 

the Corps is charged with the 

following missions: 

a. To seek and report on 

the location of the enemy’s rear 

guard, notifying the heads of the 

friendly pursuing columns as 

well as the Command. 

b. To discover the enemy’s 

main axes of withdrawal. 

c. To report on the position 

of the friendly advance elements 

at frequent intervals. 

d. To report to the heads of 

friendly pursuing columns any 

concentration of enemy troops 

for local stands or reactions. 

g. To control the friendly 

h. To seek and report on all 

e. To discover the enemy’s 

main line of resistance. 

f. To photograph the enemy’s main line of resistance. 

106. During an enemy offensive met by stubborn friendly 

resistance the Air Service of the 

Corps is charged with the following missions: 

a, b, c, as in paragraph 

103. 

d. To maintain constant 

low-flying surveillance of the enemy and report in advance his 

preparation for each successive 

effort to break through the 

friendly lines. 

e. To observe enemy road 

movement for indications of the 

bringing up of extensive reinforcements. 

f. To locate enemy cantonments, camps, dumps, axial 

roads, and other suitable targets 

for the destructive and harrassing fire of the friendly artillery. 

Command and Artillery the location of the friendly front line 

during and after each enemy 

effort to break through. 

h. To control the friendly 

barrage. 

i. To adjust rapid zone fire 

on fugitive targets and concentrations of enemy troops preparing for assault on the friendly 

positions. 

retreat and pursuit by hostile 

forces the Air Service of the 

Corps is charged with the 

g. To find and report to the 

106. During a general friendly 

following missions: 

of the friendly rear guard and 

the general road aspect of the 

friendly retreat. 

b. To report to the friendly 

rear guard and to the Command 

the position of the advance 

guard and main body of the 

pursuing hostile forces. 

c. To effect liaison between 

the Command and the right and 

left flanks. 

Corps Air Service holds one, 

two, or three airplanes at the 

disposal of the Corps Commander for the accomplishment 

of special missions demanded 

by developments in the tactical 

situation. 

108. Photographic missions 

are requested as need arises by 

G-2, G-3, or the Artillery Command. During stable trench warfare tactical maps are based on 

data furnished by Corps and 

Army aerial photographs of the 

enemy’s territory. Photographs 

during war of movement are of 

little value in studying the enemy 

organization but serve to acquaint the Command with details of terrain. Oblique photographs of the enemy’s front-line 

defenses in either stable or open 

warfare are extremely useful. 

They are distributed down to 

include commanders of infantry 

platoons and serve to acquaint 

the Command and troops with 

the nature of the terrain and 

a. To report on the position 

107. Under all conditions the 
342 Postwar Review 

defenses immediately confronting them. During stable trench 

warfare photographic missions 

are a matter of daily routine to 

be accomplished by the Corps 

Air Service upon eve y day of 

favorable weather. During open 

warfare photographic missions 

are only occasional and are requested to clear up map obscurities or most other specific demands for information. The 

preparation of the photographic 

mission involves communication 

to pilot and observer, by 

C.A.S.C., of the limits of territoy 

to be covered. The work is carried out by formations. The 

usual altitude from which Corps 

photographs are secured is 3000 

meters. It is sometimes impracticable to send formations of 

planes on photographic missions. In this case the mission is 

carried out by a single plane 

flying at great altitude, 5000 to 

5500 meters. The security of the 

plane is increased by its inconspicuousness at extreme altitudes and the rapidity with 

which it can cover an extended 

area from great heights. In the 

case of certain types of planes 

(examples of which are the 

French Salmson and Breguet) 

which retain their qualities of 

speed, climb, and manoeuverability at extreme altitudes, security is further afforded by the 

ability of the plane, relying on 

its qualities of speed and climb, 

to out-distance attacking enemy 

pursuit. During periods of unsettled weather photographic missions are ready to take the air 

from early morning. Instant advantage is taken of any break in 

the clouds. Under these conditions Pursuit protection will not 

be counted upon owing to the 

loss of time involved in meeting 

the protection at the rendezvous. 

During midsummer, sunlight is 

sufficient for the securing of photographs between 8 and 16 

o’clock. Photographic missions 

during the spring and autumn 

months are ordinarily executed 

between 10 and 14 o’clock. In 

winter good photographs are secured only between 11:30 and 

1230 o’clock. 

109. Location of enemy batteries in action by the flash is a 

routine mission of Corps Observation Units during all situations 

excepting that of general friendly 

retreat. Battey flashes are best 

observed just after day-break 

and just before night-fall. They 

are rarely picked up, even by 

the vigilant observer, in broad 

daylight. Where it is lknown or 

suspected that a concentration 

of enemy batteries hia been effected within certain specific limits bounding a ve y restricted 

area a single reconnaissance 

plane charged with the sole mission of locating exactly the 

flashes of batteries in that area 

will ordinarily meet with success. 

Surveillance planes searching 

the sector for miscelhneous information are only moderately 

effective in locating batteries. 

The plane seeking to locate batteries in action should fly at the 

lowest altitude permitting observation and should remain as far 

behind the friendly lines as the 

work will permit. Once the 

plane’s presence is detected by 

the enemy, batteries will ordinarily cease fire. Information of enemy batteries in action is communicated to the Divisional and 

Corps Commands immediately 

by radio and later confirmed by 

dropped message. Enemy batteries in action may be effectively counter-battened by the 

assistance of the airplane reporting them. For this purpose the 

artillery assigns suitable counterbatteries. Liaison with these batteries is then effected. When 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

343 

arrangements are completed between the batteries and the Air 

Service the counter-batteries are 

prepared to receive radio calls 

from all planes of the Corps 

during the hours of daylight and 

to adjust fire on targets reported, 

without delay. It is a function of 

the C.A.S.C. to assure wherever 

possible the assignment of such 

counter-batteries and to provide 

for adequate liaison in order that 

the minimum of failures may 

result. Counter-batteries thus arranged for become, during active periods, fugitive-target batteries. Theoretically, all batteries 

are ready to receive airplane 

calls and adjust at all times. 

Practically, better results are obtained by assigning only a few 

batteries for this type of work 

and carefully perfecting liaison 

arrangements. All Corps and Divisional observers are supplied 

with the necessay information 

for calling counter-batteries and 

conducting adjustments, in accordance with the arrangements 

effected. 

110. Detailed instructions for 

adjustment of artilley fire by 

means of airplane observation 

are contained in Confidential 

Pamphlet No. 80 (Revised) 

G.H.Q., A.E.F., May 1918, 

“Aerial Observation for Artilley”: Successful adjustment of 

artilley is largely dependent 

upon carefully accomplished liaison. The best work is achieved 

after a visit by the observer to 

the battey with which he is to 

conduct fire. The adjustment 

should be arranged by conference between the observer and 

the battey commander, details 

of method, time, panel and radio 

signaling, being thoroughly discussed and a complete understanding and agreement reached. 

Before leaving on the mission 

the observer notifies the battey 

by telephone or radio that he is 

about to start. In preparing the 

mission the observer equips 

himself with a large-scale map 

bearing coordinates in secret letters and showing the location of 

the target. If an aerial photograph of the target is available 

this will be attached to the map, 

properly oriented and squared 

off to scale. The photograph 

renders exact location of bursts 

observed extremely easy. Batteries which do not respond to the 

radio call of the plane may be 

called by dropped message. in 

like manner batteries whose calls 

are not known to the observer 

may be notified that an adjustment is required and all necessay data for opening fire and 

establishing radio liaison may be 

included in the written message. 

The battey replies by panel signals whether or not the work 

requested can be undertaken 

and what method of fire will be 

used (see “Aerial Observation 

for Artille y”). Liaison between 

the airplane and artilley is at all 

times complex and difficult of 

perfection. The conditions governing its effective establishment 

change with the tactical situation 

and cannot be laid down by 

any rule which will cover all 

cases. Corps Air Service Commanders will be called upon to 

use great energy and ingenuity 

in assuring effective cooperation 

between the Air Service and the 
344 Postwar Review 

Artillery. This will be particularly 

true during active periods in war 

of movement. 

11 1. Surveillance of the enemy is a routine mission of 

Corps and Divisional Squadrons 

during all tactical situations. The 

Corps Squadron patrols the entire Corps Front reporting on 

the general activity of the entire 

sector to a depth varying from 

five to ten kilometers. The Divisional Squadron patrols within 

the boundaries of the Divisional 

Sector reporting in detail on all 

activity observed. Effective sector surveillance implies an accurate knowledge of the terrain by 

the observer. The observer 

should be familiar with the latest 

information on the tactical situation in order to concentrate his 

attention on those points which 

are of most interest to the Command. Sector reconnaissances 

are increased in frequency as 

combat activity or preparation 

for activity increases. During actual offensive or defensive operations they may overlap, establishing an unbroken watch on 

the movements of the enemy. 

Surveillance planes are fitted 

with radio equipment and are 

prepared to call the artillery into 

action whenever need arises. 

112. Control of the friendly 

barrage may be advantageously 

conducted by airplane. Where 

the barrage extends across the 

entire Corps front and is participated in by both Corps and 

Divisional Artillery, the Corps 

Artillery is observed by a plane 

from the Corps Squadron; the 

Divisional Artillery is observed 

by planes from the Divisional 

Squadrons. Observers controlling barrages are provided in 

advance with maps showing the 

barrage schedule, minute by 

minute. Control consists in reporting by radio to the Corps 

and Divisional Artillery Brigade 

Headquarters any failure of the 

barrage to play accurately and 

on schedule time, giving approx- 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

34 5 

imate location, density, and Caliber of bursts observed to be 

inaccurately placed or off schedule. Close adjustment of the barrage is not undertaken. 

113. The general principles 

and specific regulations governing the conduct of infantry contact patrols for the purpose of 

staking the friendly front line are 

established in “Liaison for All 

Arms.” The contact patrol is a 

mission of the Divisional Squadron. The contact patrol is most 

effectively carried out at an altitude ranging between 25 and 

100 meters. Troops frequently 

disregard the call of the plane to 

display panels. From these altitudes troops can be plainly distinguished and identified by the 

color of the uniform. Where 

troops do not show panels observers will not report the location of the “front line.” They 

Oboerver watching infantry 

movement. below. 

will report the location of the 

“most advanced friendly elements observed.” The Infantry 

panel is the only guarantee of 

the exact location of the front 

line. Where troops are seen but 

no panels are displayed upon 

the call of the plane, there is 

room to suppose the actual front 

line is still further advanced. 

Even though the observer can 

locate no friendly troops beyond 

a certain point he will not report 

the location of the “front line” 

until panels are shown. The infantry contact plane will never 

proceed directly from the airdrome to the point which the 

advance of the friendly troops is 

presumed, by schedule, to have 

reached. It will proceed to that 

point where the most advanced 

elements were last definitely reported. Having reached this 

point the plane will assure itself 

by observation of movement of 

troops on the ground that the 

advance has continued. It will 

then gradually extend its observations farther and farther to the 

front, working back and forth 

across the sector, until the observer can distinguish no friendly 

troops beyond. The line is called 

at this point. If no panels are 

shown the plane will carry observations somewhat deeper but 

with extreme caution. When satisfied that the limit of the friendly 

advance has been reached and 

noted the observer will immediately report to Division and 

Corps Headquarters by dropped 

message. The contact patrol observer will bear always in mind 

the possibility of enemy counterattacks and will constantly watch 

for enemy troop concentrations. 

Where counter-attacks appear 

imminent the observer will drop 

a message to that effect to the 

front line elements most nearly 

concerned. He will then call the 

fugitive target battey and adjust 

neutralizing zone fire over the 

terrain where concentration has 

been observed. Contact patrols 

frequently locate enemy machine-gun nests. Where hostile 

machine-guns are observed the 

front line troops are notified of 

the danger by dropped message. 

Contact patrol planes may assist 

the advance of friendly troops 

by opening fire on enemy machine-guns, silencing them until 

they can be captured. 

114. In directing the operations of the Air Service the 

C.A.S.C. maintains liaison with 

the Corps and Divisional Balloons. He is assisted in this function by the Corps Balloon Group 

Commander. The C.A.S.C. will 

assure himself at all times that 
346 Postwar Review 

airplane missions do not duplicate the work accomplished, or 

in course, by the Balloons. He 

will establish as a principle that 

work which Balloons can accomplish will not be undertaken 

by airplanes. This will usually 

apply to the accomplishment of 

artilley missions. Certain areas 

in enemy temtoy are obscured 

to Balloon Observers by inequalities in the'terrain. The areas 

not defiladed by the Balloons 

decrease in number and extent 

with the increase in altitude. 

Those areas closed to Balloon 

Observation at varying altitudes 

will be sketched in on a map for 

the use of the Corps Air Service 

and Group Commanders in determining what missions properly 

fall within the province of the 

Balloons during vaying conditions of visibility. A copy of the 

Balloon defilade map is posted 

for the information of flying personnel in the Group Operations 

Room. 

Chapter XIII. Shelter 

shelter of troops in the field, 

established in Army Field Service Regulations, apply to the 

troops of the Corps Air Service. 

115. The principles governing 

Army Observation 

Introduction 

116. The Army Observation 

units function as an organ o,f the 

high command. They are placed 

at the disposal of the General 

Staff of the Army and their activities conform to the orders issued 

by the General Staff. The Chief 

function of the Army Observation units is to keep under constant surveillance the dispositions 

and movements of enemy 

forces. This consists of the reconnaissance, both visual and 

photographic, in depth, of the 

entire Army sector. Their prime 

object being the gathering of information, it is necessary that 

they operate in spite of enemy 

aerial opposition. However, engaging the enemy's air forces in 

combat must be avoided as far 

as possible except when the nature of the mission demands and 

the chances of gain are commensurate with the risk involved. 

Chapter XIV. Information 

117. information of ihe enemy and our ground forces is 

essential to the proper tactical 

operation of any observation 

unit whether it be an independent squadron, a group, or a 

larger organization. 

118. The collection, preparation, and circulation to the 

smaller units of the command of 

this information is the duty of the 

Army Air Service Commander. 

Every Commander of a large 

unit, wing, or group will see that 

all essential information which 

he receives is circulated to the 

component elements of his command. It is the duty of all Commanders at all times to act on 

the principle that the collection 

of information without its circulation is useless. Information properly circulated to Observation 

Units has an important moral 

effect upon the flying personnel. 

It is to be remembered that except when actually in the air, 

aviators are removed from the 

sights and sounds of the battlefield and only by a thorough 

information system can the various possibilities of the military 

situation be brought home to 

them. Unless these possibilities 

are made clear it is impossible to 

obtain the maximum efforts from 

the personnel. 

119. The Operations Officers 

of the various units (separate 

squadron, group, or wing) are 

responsible for the supply of 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

347 

their respective units with: 

scale covering the entire sector. 

This map should be colored so 

that the prominent topographical 

features are easily referred to. 

(b) Maps of 1/50,000 

scale covering the entire sector 

for use by observers. It is of 

paramount importance that 

these maps be colored so as to 

make reference easier. 

x (c) Maps of 1/20,000 

scale covering the entire sector 

showing, by means of conventional symbols, all the important 

artillery objectives. These maps 

are printed at frequent periodic 

intervals by the second section 

of the General Staff (G-2). 

scale covering the entire sector 

for use by pilots and observers. 

(e) Maps showing the organization and occupation of the 

sector by ground troops. This 

map shows the location of the 

different friendly divisions in line. 

(f) Daily enemy Order of 

Battle map showing the location, 

both known and probable, of all 

enemy divisions both in line and 

reserve. 

x (9) A map showing the location of all known enemy airdromes. This map should indicate, by conventional symbol, 

whether the airdrome is occupied or unoccupied. 

(a) Maps of 1/20,000 

(d) Maps of 1/200,000 

x 

x 

x 

(h) A map showing the 

location of all enemy balloons. 

(i) A map showing the precise location of all the known 

enemy antiaircraft batteries and 

their calibre. 

emy areas that are defiladed 

from the different friendly balloons. This is valuable in that the 

Aeroplane observers can pay 

particular attention to those 

areas that are protected from 

observation by balloons. 

x (k) A map showing enemy’s system of railroads and 

the railheads. 

(j) A map showing the enx (I) A map showing the 

main roads over which traffic is 

heaviest. These are indispensable to observers so as to know 

beforehand where to look for 

traffic. 

(m) A map showing the 

location of all friendly airdromes 

in the sector of the Army Air 

Service Commander. The pilots 

and observers should be familiar 

with the location of all these 

airdromes so that in case of a 

forced landing if they should become lost the breaking of a 

plane might be avoided. 
348 Postwar Review 

x (n) Silhouettes, photographs, and tables of performance of all known types of 

enemy airplanes will be prepared or secured. These are essentials and must be studied 

carefully by the flying personnel. 

(0) Charts showing the 

lighting systems of enemy airdromes and signals for planes at 

night. 

(p) All photographs available of the enemy airdromes, 

dumps, towns, etc. It is well to 

arrange these in alphabetical order in books so that easy reference can be made to them and 

when new photographs are 

taken they can be compared. 

Also, it is necessary that these be 

at all times kept at the disposal 

of the pilots and observers for 

study, as it enables them to recognize them when flying over 

enemy temto y. Stereoscopic 

views of all these points should 

be prepared and placed at the 

disposal of the pilots and observers for study. 

Items marked x are prepared 

and distributed at frequent peri- odic intervals. 

120. Charts, diagrams, and 

maps should be supplemented 

by: 

(a) Army Summaries of Intelligence, prepared by the second section of the General Staff 

((3-2). It is of paramount importance that these be supplied to 

the squadrons and there be at 

the disposal of the pilots and Chapter XV. Liaisan 

observers as it is difficult to Pre- 121. Owing to the absolute 

vent these officers from suffering necessity for cooperation bea feeling of the other arms of the tween the various Air Service 

service unless these summaries units under the command of the 

are furnished to them. Army Air Service Commander, 

(b) Air Service s.u~~maries and also the various arms of the 

of Intelligence will be prepared Service, great importance must 

in the Headquarters of the Army be attached to the preparation of 

Air Service Commander to sup- means of communication for replement the Amy Summaries of ceiving and transmitting informaIntelligence. These should cover tion and orders. A rapid and 

all subjects relating to the enemy complete comprehension of the 

Air Service and especially deal entire situation has decided inwith the types of planes and of fluence upon the success of the 

using them as hmed from all operations. For mutual compredifferent sources, such as: re- hension of plans, possibilities, 

ports from agents, statements of and limitations nothing can be 

Prisoners and captured Orders substituted for personal contact. 

and documents of all sorts. 122. The exchange of per- 

(c) The Amy Air Service sonal visits between pibts and 

Operations Orders Prepred in observers and officers of other 

the Headquarters of the Army arms stationed nearer to the 

Air Service Commander, show- front will be encouraged as 

ing the activities Of all Air %Vke much as possible. All Air Service 

Units under his command. Commanders in the field will ex- 

(4 All available documents change personal visits with offiand Pamphlets concerning the cers of corresponding ri3nk and 

enemy's forces, Paying Particular will see that their subordinates 

attention to the information con- of all ranks come into close 

cerning the enemy's aerial personal contact with officers of 

forces. corresponding rank in the divisions in the line and in reserve. 

Operations Officer of all obser- in the anti-aircraft artillery. both 

vation units to attend to the de- machinegunners and heavier 

tails of the circulation of informa- gunners. in Field and Heavy 

tion within the command. It is Artillery, with balloon observers 

imperative that the observations and all other Air Service units. 

and experiences over the lines of both bombardment and pursuit 

eve y pilot and observer be as well as observation. 

made a~essible to eveY other 123. In order that a maximum 

Pilot and observer in the organi- return may be assured from the 

zation in the most inviting man- observation units, it is necessary 

ner, without delay. 

It is one of the duties of the 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

34 9 

that the best possible means of 

communication be established, 

as follows: 

(a) By direct telephonic installations to the Headquarters of 

the Army Air Service Commander. 

(b) By telephonic liaison 

with all the Air Service Units 

under the command of the Army 

Air Service Commander. 

(c) By liaison by radio with 

the station established at Headquarters, Army Air Service Comm a n d e r . 

from aeroplanes on the dropping 

ground established near the 

Headquarters Army Air Service 

Commander. 

(d) By dropping messages 

124. Liaison by aircraft is still 

to be developed as a means of 

reporting promptly the information obtained concerning the 

progress of the battle but with 

the development of wireless telephones for communication between planes and between 

planes and the ground the utilization of aircraft as a means of 

communication will be more and 

more emphasized. 

125. Evely observation group 

will be equipped with sufficient 

supply of telephones and wire 

to insure the establishment of its 

internal liaison, the Group Operations Officer and Headquarters being directly connected 

with the several squadron Headquarters and Operations Offices. 

The establishment of telephonic 

liaison from the Wing Headquarters to the Group Headquarters 

and from the Headquarters of 

the Army Air Service Commander to the Wings and separate groups of his command is 

the duty of the Army Air Service 

Commander. He will arrange 

with the Chief Signal Officer of 

the Army in the field for the 

installation of these telephone 

lines before ordering those units 

to their new stations. 

126. In order to insure close 

cooperation between pursuit and 

observation planes while in the 

air it is necessary for the Group 

Operations Officer of the Observation Group to inform the Operations Officer of the Pursuit 

Groups as to the time of departure of the missions, the number 

of planes in the formation, the 

altitude at which they are going 

to work, the probable time of 

crossing and recrossing the lines 

and the route to be covered in 

order that the pursuit patrols 

separating over the same area 

at the same time may be notified 

and pay particular attention to 

the safety of these formations. 

127. The Operations Officers 

of the various units are responsible for the interrogation of all 

pilots and observers immediately 

upon their return from missions 

and for securing a full, accurate 

and intelligible report of all observations of interest to the General Staff. This report should be 

transmitted by him by telephone, if possible, direct to the 

Headquarters of the Army Air 

Service Commander. 
3 50 Postwar Review 

Chapter XVI. Combat 

General Principles 

128. The object of tactics, as 

employed by Army Observation 

planes, is to avoid combat with 

enemy planes, to allow the obsewers to obtain the desired information and return to the airdrome with it. The Army 

Observation planes do not accept combat otherwise than as a 

defensive measure. Definite tactics to be employed by formations of biplace observation 

planes have not been adopted. 

It depends entirely upon the 

ability and initiative of the Flight 

Commander, the pilots comprising the flight and the conditions. 

Owing to the fact that the Army 

Observation unit operates far 

beyond the line of friendly pursuit patrols, it is necessary that 

they depend largely upon their 

own means of defense. However, even though formations of 

biplace observation planes are 

employed the co-operation between pursuit patrols and observation informations when the 

latter are operating within range 

of the pursuit patrols should be 

as close as possible. The numerical strength of a formation depends entirely upon the depth 

to which it must penetrate the 

enemy's territory and the known 

aggressiveness and numerical 

strength of the enemy's air 

forces. Missions must never be 

attempted by individual planes 

except when the weather conditions are such that formations 

flying is rendered impossible. 

Formations 

129. During the hours of daylight, the weather conditions permitting, the missions assigned to 

the Army Observations Squadrons will invariably be carried 

out by formations. These formations should not be too large. A 

formation of 4 planes, flying in 

diamond formation, has been 

found very effective as it is easily 

controlled by the leader and it is 

very flexible. All formations must 

have the following characteristics: 

(a) Simplicity. 

(b) Manoeuverability. 

(c) No dead angles. 

(d) Concentration of fire to the 

(e) Compactness. 

(f) Each pilot must be able to 

130. Airplanes in formation 

1 

3 2 

4 

rear. 

see the leader, 

are numbered as follows: 

3 The copy contains a typographical error, a parenthesis for what evidently was to 

be a second digit This perhaps was a zero 

but Circular 76, p 29. gives 25, which fits 

with the other distances in the formation 

Number 1 is the leader and 

flies at the lowest altitude, numbers 2 and 3 fly at the !same 

altitude, about 25 meters higher, 

25 meters to the rear, and 25 

meters to the right and left, of 

number 1, respectively, while 

number 4 closes the diamond, 

as it were, flying about 25 [?I 

meters3 above numbers 2 and 3 

and about 25 meters behind, 

keeping directly behind number 

1. 

131, In the event that the formation is attacked, the formation 

must be kept as compact as possible. The maximum security will 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment 

of Air Service 

351 

be maintained by keeping the 

closest possible formation-15 

to 20 meters between planes. In 

this manner the blind angles of 

one plane are covered by the 

other planes of the formation, 

thereby preventing the enemy 

planes from closing in to short 

ranges without exposure to concentrations of fire from the different planes. The usual tactics 

employed by the enemy pursuit 

planes against formations of biplace planes is to remain at long 

ranges and firing short bursts to 

confuse the pilots and observers 

so that they will break up the 

formation. It is fatal for any 

plane to become detached from 

its formation as it will then be 

subjected to the concentrated efforts of the enemy pursuit pilots 

and will be easy prey for them. 

132. In order that there be 

mutual understanding between 

the pilots and observers of the 

flight it is necessary that they 

know the following: 

munication between planes. 

plished. 

will fly. 

formations. 

133. The Flight Commander 

being responsible for the tactical 

employment of the formation 

while in the air must take all 

necessary precautions to prevent 

the formation from being surprised by enemy planes. He will 

pay particular attention to the 

sun and to the clouds that are 

above the level of the formation, 

behind which enemy planes may 

be lurking. 

(a) The various signals for com- 

(b) The mission to be accom- 

(c) The territory to be covered. 

(d) The altitude at which they 

(e) Their relative positions in the 

Single Planes 

134. Missions are carried out 

by single planes only when the 

atmospheric conditions such as 

low hanging clouds and mist 

prevent the employment of formations, and the early reconnaissance, when darkness forbids the employment of formations. When single planes are 

operating under or above the 

clouds it is an easy matter for the 

plane to enter the clouds, which 

afford excellent protection, in the 

event of being attacked by enemy planes. However, operating 

at such low altitudes, far beyond 

the enemy lines, under and in 

the clouds, requires the employment of pilots and observers of 

exceptional ability. They must 

know: 

(a) The terrain, thoroughly. 

(b) The direction and speed of 

(c) How to navigate, in the 

the wind at the different altitudes. 

clouds, by compass. 
352 Postwar Review 

Part 111. Pursuit 

Introduction 

1. Pursuit Aviation has for its 

object the destruction of the enemy air service and the protection of our own observation 

aviation. When opportunity offers it will take part in the battle 

on the ground, inflicting maximum casualties upon and weakening the morale of the enemy’s 

ground troops. Whatever later 

developments may appear, up 

to the present time the basis of 

the Air Service has proved to be 

that portion devoted to observation. But observation aviation’s 

vey existence depends upon a 

powerful, well trained and aggressive pursuit aviation. That 

our own observation airplanes 

and balloons may be [protected] 

and may feel and see that they 

are protected, while the enemy’s 

observation aviation is destroyed 

and driven back from the line of 

battle, pursuit aviation is 

employed. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

3 53 

(e) A map showing the location of all airdromes in the 

sector of the Army Air Service 

Commander, the Corps and Divisional sector boundaries of all 

units in line, the location of our 

antiaircraft units, balloons and 

other Air Service organization. 

(f) A diagram or chart of 

telephonic liaisions within the 

Army area. 

5. The charts, diagrams and 

maps should be supplemented 

by: 

(a) Army Summaries of Intelligence, prepared by G2. It 

is of the utmost importance that 

these be circulated down to include Groups and whenever 

possible should be circulated to 

include squadrons as it is difficult 

to prevent the pilots from suffering a feeling of detachment and 

isolation from the operations of 

the other combatant arms unless 

these summaries are furnished 

to them. 

(b) Air Service summaries 

of Intelligence will be prepared 

in the Headquarters of the Army 

Air Service Commander to supplement the Army Summaries of 

Intelligence. These should cover 

all subjects relating to the enemy 

air service and especially deal 

with the types and quantities of 

his airplanes and his methods of 

using them as learned from prisoners, captured orders and documents of all sorts. 

It is one of the duties of the 

Operations Officer of all pursuit 

units, under the Commanding 

Officer, to attend to the details of 

the circulation of information 

within the command. It is imperative that the observations and 

experience over the lines of eve ry patrol leader and every pilot 

be made accessible to every 

other pilot in the organization 

without delay. 

Chapter 11. Liaison 

6. Owing to the rapidity of 

movement of pursuit airplanes 

and the influence that they can 

exercise both in the battle for 

supremacy of the air and the 

fighting on the ground, great importance must attach to the 

preparation of means of communications for the transmission 

of information and orders. A 

rapid comprehension of the entire situation has a decided influence upon the success of the 

operations. 

7. For mutual comprehension 

of plans, difficulties and limitations nothing can be substituted 

for personal contact. The exchange of personal visits between Air Service pilots and all 

elements stationed closer to the 

front will be encouraged as 

much as possible. All Air Service 

Commanders in the field will exchange personal visits and will 

see that their subordinates of all 

ranks come into close personal 

contact with officers of corresponding ranks in the Headquarters and the Divisions in line 

and in reserve, in the antiaircraft 

artillery, both machine-gunners 

and heavier gunners, with balloon observers and with all air 

service units, both bombardment 

and observation as well as 

pursuit. 
3 54 Postwar Review 

8. In order that a maximum 

return may be secured from our 

pursuit aviation, and in order 

that the enemy may not throw 

an overmastering force of pursuit 

airplanes on the line at certain 

hours of the day, it is all important that close liaison be maintained with the front at all times. 

This liaison should be perfected 

so that every Group Commander can be informed without 

delay of the number, type, altitude and direction of flight of all 

enemy airplanes and formations 

approaching our front lines in 

the sector for which his group is 

responsible. This liaison may be 

established: 

(a) By direct telephonic installations to forward observing 

posts established at intervals on 

or near the front lines, in charge 

of Air Service officers. 

(b) By telephonic liaison 

with the anti-aircraft artillery observation posts. Messages relative to enemy aircraft activity 

from the anti-aircraft artillery to a 

4. Direction finding. 

pursuit group should have priority over the army telephone 

lines, because Air Service Units 

practically alone can be utilized 

to influence an action in progress. 

(c) By liaison by wire with 

the radio-goniometric4 stations. 

(d) By liaison by radio 

either with forward observing 

posts established by the Air 

Service or with radio equipped 

forward observing posts of the 

anti-aircraft artillery. 

be developed as a means of 

reporting promptly upon the 

progress of fighting in the air. 

With the prospective development of wireless telephones for 

communication between formations and between airplanes and 

the ground the utilization of aircraft as a means of communication will be more and more emphasized. 

10. In addition to immediate 

reports upon the number, type, 

altitude and direction of flight of 

enemy airplanes, daily reports 

should be made to the Group 

Commander upon the size, altitude and methods of operation 

of all elements of the enemy air 

service. These reports must be 

prepared by Air Service officers 

9. Liaison by aircraft is still to 

detailed by their Group Commanders to keep watch from the 

ground upon the enemy air 

service from advance observation posts. 

11. Every Pursuit Group will 

be equipped with a sufficient 

supply of telephones and wire to 

insure the establishment of its 

internal liaisons, the Group Operations office and the several 

squadron operations offices 

being directly connected. The 

establishment of telephonic liaison from the Wing Headquarters 

to the Groups and from the 

Headquarters of the Army Air 

Service Commander to the 

Wings and independent Groups 

of his command is the duty of 

the Army Air Service Commander. He will arrange with the 

Chief Signal Officer of the Army 

in the field for the installation of 

these telephone lines before ordering these several Iieadquarters to new stations. 

12. In order that our pursuit 

aviation may make safe the work 

of our observation aviation, 

close liaison must be maintained 

with all elements of the observation air service, and the pursuit 

group commander should have 

at all times as complete a knowledge as possible of the number, 

altitude and route of all observation airplanes working in the sector for which his goup is responsible. This liaison will also 

be helpful in keeping track of the 

movement of our advanced infantry and cavalry elements and 

in the selection of targets for 

ground straffing. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

355 

13. While the prime duty of 

pursuit aviation is fighting in the 

air, pursuit pilots will occasionally be called upon for special 

reconnaissances and will make 

valuable observations from time 

to time in the course of their 

patrols. This will not be allowed 

to interfere with their combatant 

operations. 

14. The squadron operations 

officers are responsible for the 

interrogation of all pilots upon 

their retum from flights and for 

securing a full accurate and intelligible report of all observations of interest to the higher 

command. This report should be 

submitted immediately by telephone, if possible, through 

channels to the Army Air Service 

Commander, who will transmit 

it to the Second Section, General Staff (G-2). 

Chapter 111. Combat 

I. General principle^:^ 

5. The guiding principle in 

Pursuit Tactics is to seek out 

and destroy enemy airplanes. 

Contact is made with the enemy 

by chains of formations, fotmations and by individual machines. Before passing on to 

study the tactics used by each, it 

is to be remembered that the 

primary object of the aerial force 

working with an Army is to keep 

the enemy under observation. It 

performs what was once the 

chief function of the Cavalry, 

and preventing the enemy observing our dispositions and maneuvers, seeks to keep him under surveillance at all times. The 

eyes of the Air Service are observation airplanes and balloons. 

But the arms and weapons are 

the pursuit airplanes and without 

the latter two-seaters would be 

blinded by the enemy air forces 

to such an extent that their missions would fail and they would 

have to resort to fighting tactics. 

Air Service have as their prime 

function to keep an area equal 

in depth to the distance over 

6. The pursuit elements of the 

the enemy lines which is allotted 

to the Corps and Divisional Observation squadrons clear of enemy machines. In other words 

the aerial front line must be 

maintained, at minimum, as 

much in advance of the line of 

battle on the ground as the 

range of the Corps Artillery. Pursuit machines, therefore, specialize on the fighting, and of necessity have to adopt certain tactics, 

varying with the type of machine 

used, with the activity of the 

sector and with the altitude at 

which they are working, but certain principles are universally 

applicable. 

in size by the number of machines that can be maneuvered 

by a single leader, at present 

five or six, is the tactical unit of 

pursuit aviatign. When more 

than one flight is to be used for 

any given purpose, emphasis is 

to be laid upon the value, from 

the point of view of esprit, of 

using the flights of a squadron 

echeloned together in a chain 

of formations. 

7. The flight formation, limited 

5. There was an error made In numberlng the 

seven paragraphs whch follow. The correct 

numbering resumes with oaraaranh 23 
3 56 Postwar Review 

11. Tactics of Single Machine. 

(a) The unit of the formation. 

8. A great deal of attention 

has to be given to the tactics of 

the single machine and it might 

be argued that this amounts to 

nothing more than tactics of the 

individual pilot. This is indeed a 

fact except that a great deal depends on the make of the machine in use, but there are many 

principles in individual aerial 

combat tactics that apply to all 

pursuit planes, which must 

closely be followed. 

9. The individual pilot in a 

formation must be a disciplined 

subordinate officer with confidence in his leaders. A single 

machine must be part of the 

team. The team must be the unit 

to engage the enemy. It must be 

remembered that the pursuit 

machine has no defense after a 

surprise other than its maneuverability and for this reason 

only pilots of the longest experience and the greatest ability 

should be permitted to engage in 

individual patrols and then only 

on rare occasions. Up to the 

point where the pursuit machine 

is attacked its defense consists of 

the eyes of the pilot plus its 

speed. It is quite possible for a 

single machine to get out of very 

awkward predicaments provided 

they are seen by the pilot in time 

and proper tactics are employed. 

When once attacked the pursuit 

pilot depends upon his ability to 

shoot and maneuver for success. 

The only safe protection from 

attack the single-seater has besides the eyes of the pilot is 

altitude, but the higher the pursuit machine gets the less likely 

its pilot is to see any enemy 

machines below him and the 

fewer machines will be encountered. The object of the attack of 

a formation is to break up the 

enemy group and resort to single 

combat without losing the chain 

of responsibility, so that throughout the combat the mental unity 

of the flight is not lost. When this 

stage is reached the individual 

pilot must close in and at close 

range deliver accurate and effective fire. Under no circumstances 

must he be drawn away from 

the rest of his flight, no matter 

what the results of his fire have 

been. He must carefully avoid 

being drifted over by the wind 

farther into enemy territory, or 

pulled away by any ruse whatsoever. If he is separated from his 

formation he must fight constantly, relying on being able to 

fly back home at low altitude if 

necessary, remembering that it is 

fatal to dive straight away. Even 

in case of engine failure the aggressive spirit must be maintained until the ground is 

reached. 

(b) When Single Machine 

Permissible. 

10. At times opportunity presents itself for individual pilots to 

perform a mission. On days 

when the weather is very bad, 

for instance, it sometimes becomes necessary for individual 

machines to cross the lines at 

extremely low altitude and penetrate to certain objectives for 

the purpose of gaining information of great value. At other 

times the enemy will seize the 

opportunity afforded by very 

bad weather and use especially 

designed armored machines for 

straffing the infanty at a vey 

low altitude. On misty days it is 

sometimes impossible to attack 

these enemy airplanes except 

[by] individual machines, flying 

as before, at an extremely low 

altitude and in this case all the 

elements of success called into 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

357 

"Take-off'' 

in formation. 

'2 i 

1; 

4j - E 

I; 

4 

service by formation leader must 

be employed. Surprise being the 

greatest asset, the pilot should, 

if possible, close in on the enemy machine by flying through 

the clouds a portion of the time, 

making allowance for speed of 

enemy machine and other possibilities so that the surprise will 

be complete and the personnel 

destroyed by a heavy cone of 

well directed fire at short range. 

Another occasion when it is permissible for a single machine to 

be sent on a mission is when a 

single enemy airplane penetrates 

far behind our lines and must 

be destroyed at any cost. At 

such a time it is well to attack 

- 2. 

P 

0 

m 

m 

1: 

'II; 

-~~ -- ~~~...~~. ..~~~. . .~ 

I: ~~. . . ~~~. . .~~. . L,"*. . . . 

0 Gas Station 

the enemy with individual machines rather than wait to dispatch a formation and run the 

risk of the enemy machine getting back home safely with the 

information gained. 

(Sketch by J. Andre Smltb) 
358 Postwar Review 

(c) Single-seater vs Singleseater. 

11. When a single-seater attacks a single-seater, his ideal 

objective is to get directly behind 

his opponent’s tail at very close 

range where tanks, engine and 

pilot are in line and where no 

care has to be taken as to deflecAnother method 

of forming. 

tion in aim. If the element of 

surprise has not been effected 

the only manner of getting this 

advantageous position is by 

making the enemy dive away. A 

good pilot, however, will never 

dive away and the fight resolves 

itself into a battle to gain the 

higher position. A pilot must 

never allow his machine to lose 

altitude or fall into a spin. This 

calls for perfect flying sq that just 

the right moment of rudder is 

used at the proper time and so 

that the fight can be moved at 

will toward supports or away 

from enemy reinforcements, as 

the case may be. Above all, a 

pilot’s attack must be vigorous 

and if he should be so unfortunate as to be outnumbered 

greatly, he must maneuver cooly 

but in a very erratic course until 

he can damage or destroy one 

of the enemy machines without 

himself being trapped. He must 

do his best to keep all enemy 

machines in sight and never permit an enemy pilot to align the 

axis of his machine in his direction. It is quite possible for one 

good single-seater to engage as 

many as three, four or even 

more enemy pursuit machines 

t 

I 

I 

1-leaders plane with strip of canvas 

on ground for identity 

/ e-- - - f -p-- \ 

\ 

\ 

1 

/ 

I Planes 2-3-4 8 5 idling at 150 meters in rear of hangars 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

, Id00 4 

I T I 

1050 A 1050 

359 

9 

00 

'0. 

- 

5 

Method of forming 

fives or multiples. 

f 

Right angle or 

cross-over turn. 

I 

I 

, 
360 Postwar Review 

,' \ t Zi \ I 

4L I '5i 

I 

for 20 minutes and get back 

safely to his lines. To a certain 

extent the type of airplanes will 

govern the particular maneuvers 

employed. 

(d) Single-seater vs twoseater. 

12. Attack by a single-seater 

on a two-seater machine is, of 

course, very much more difficult. 

It should be made in cooperation with another machine, but 

when this is not possible, the 

pilot should aim at closing in to 

short range, delivering his first 

burst before the observer is able 

to reply. When two or more 

machines attack a single-seater it 

is necessary by zigzag courses, 

relying on the extra speed, to 

close in despite the observers fire 

and at close range deliver hot 

bursts. When close in under the 

enemy's tail, make it a practice 

to turn opposite to the way he 

does. In this way it is practically 

impossible for the enemy observer to train his gun on you. 

gle-seater. 

23. There is another case 

when individual flying can be 

resorted to and this is in decoy 

tactics. Usually a machine goes 

out alone but in the sight of a 

larger formation. Sometimes it 

meets at a predetermined point 

at a given altitude and time. and 

there the formation conforms to 

the movements of the decoy. 

The best advice for a decoy 

machine under these circumstances is to follow an erratic 

(e) Decoy work b!y the Sin- 
course. It should never fly 

straight at all. The pilots should 

be scouring the sky systematically and thoroughly at all times 

and use his head to obtain the 

greatest results by decoying the 

enemy down on him or attrading the enemy's attention from 

the higher friendly formation 

above. It is essential in decoying 

tactics that the utmost co-operation and confidence exist between the leader of the patrol 

and the decoy so that there will 

be no chance of them getting 

out of touch. 

English uol de group. 

c 

- 

n 
362 Postwar Review 

Camouflage attack. 

111. The Single Formation 

(a) General. 

24. Good formation flying is 

the greatest essential in pursuit 

work. The greatest results cannot 

be obtained by units that do not 

do good formation flying. A unit 

with this asset is certain of success and will attain the greatest 

point of efficiency. The first essential is to get a good leader; 

the second, is to maintain the 

relative positions of the machines; the third, is liaison and 

cooperation between machines 

of the formation and last but not 

least is the chain of responsibility 

in the flight. 

- Dive slowly - - 4-b 

Run away apparently scared 

4 - *--+ 

# -I- Will climb and make sharp turn 

to attract enemy planes from rear. 

/ 

I 

I I 

\ 

25. The normal formation 

should comprise a double echelon in depth and in altitude, the 

planes at the rear being highest 

up so that they can take advantage of their altitude to close in 

on the patrol leader by diving, in 

case of necessity. The normal 

formation is that of an inverted 

"V", the patrol leader at the 

head, number two and number 

four on his left rear, number 

three and number five on his 

right rear. Number two and 

& / - 

Enemy planes & 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

363 

number three should be between 100 and 200 yards apart 

and about fifty yards above and 

behind number one. Number 

four and number five should be 

between two and four hundred 

yards apart. The shape of the 

inverted “V’, whether the angle 

is to be acute or obtuse, will 

depend upon the visibility from 

the particular type of airplane in 

use. When several flights are 

used as a chain the same principle is employed. The guide for 

the chain of formations flies at 

the head of the leading flight, 

one flight behind, above and to 

his left, the other behind, above 

and to his right. Where chains of 

more than three flights are employed each echelon of three 

flights will use a similar formation 

and while guiding on the leader 

will also maintain its own 

formation. 

(b) The leader and his responsibilities. 

26. A successful patrol leader 

must possess the complete confidence of his flight, and all that 

that entails. While the leader is 

under definite orders always, a 

great deal depends on his ability 

to engage the enemy at the most 

opportune moment, retaining his 

disposition of machines and 

launching his attack or maneuvering his formation as occasion 

demands. He will be well advised to allocate certain positions 

to pilots and then maintain them 

on successive patrols insofar as 

possible. Communication between machines must be simple 

but certain, and he can obtain 

this by signals with his wings or 

by firing Very Lights. The prospective development of the 

wireless telephone will be of 

great assistance in increasing the 

efficiency of patrol leading. Each 

machine in itself must be in a 

position to signal to the leader. 

In short there must be a chain of 

responsibility running from the 

leader through the deputy leader 

to each successive machine of 

the formation to the last man so 

that positions and liaison may be 

maintained under a competent 

leader, no matter what circumstances arise or what disaster befalls the unit. After much practice, that state of proficiency will 

be reached where a formation 

can be worn down to two machines but it still maintains its 

unity as a formation with its 

leader and the second machine 

working in cooperation ready for 

combined effort. 

(c) Fighting tactics. 

27. The actual fighting methods of the formation are much 

the same as for the chain of 

formations, with the exception 

that the leader, in attacking and 

meeting the attacking line of machines, usually breaks off his individual attack and climbs to 

support the rear machines or to 

hold himself in readiness to get 

his formation together again in a 

hurry. It is essential to demand 

this of the leader in spite of the 

temptation he will have to close 

in on his adversary. He will often 

be under the necessity of sacrificing a personal victory to the 

better judgment indicated. In an 

attack by a formation every effort should be made to obtain 

unity to the last. For this purpose 

it is well to attack the highest and 

rearmost enemy machines, if attacking from above, of if from 

below, the straggler should be 

selected for concentration. Each 

man of the formation should be 

able to surmise the attentions of 

the leader and in this way concentrated effort is more apt to be 

attained. In order that a perfect 

understanding may prevail 
364 Postwar Review 

Lufbery show. * -9-. , - I \ 

/ \ 

\ I 

k 

4 

I 

4 

\ 

t 

I 

t 

I 

k 

among the pilots of every flight 

they will live together on the 

ground and will be encouraged 

to talk over at all times the situation which have been or are 

likely to be encountered in the 

air. If it is impossible to close in 

on a formation owing to its superior speed or altitude, the next 

best alternative is to wait until 

the formation endeavors to 

make a turn and then launch the 

attack with great vigoux. The enemy can be broken up much 

more easily at this point than if 

he is flying straight away [and] 

has advantage of the height and 

speed. Great care in the attack 

must be exercised by all leaders 

to see that the formation itself 

does not straggle, because on 

going down on the attack altitude is lost so quickly by the 

front line the supports often get 

out of touch, with disastrous results, amounting, as it does, to a 

split in the attacking formation. It 

is found in practice that it is 

easier to keep a formation of 

pursuit machines intact in a 

combat than larger two-seater 

machines provided the pilots are 

sufficiently well trained. This is 

due undoubtedly to their superior maneuverability. 

(d) On the type of machine. 

28. Formation flying depends 

so much on the machines in use 

that it would be unwise to pass 

on without calling attention to 

the fact that the tactics must, of 

necessity, alter with the type of 

machine employed. The ideal 

machine for this work of course 

is one that is maneuverable, and 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

365 

that can be throttled down,6 and 

at the same time made to fly 

level at any speed by means of 

an adjustable tail or other contrivance.' With a machine of this 

nature, formation flying is very 

simple, as one can fly slowly 

until the actual combat or until 

necessity arises when by opening out the throttle the necessary 

speed is obtained to launch the 

attack. Some machines, however, have motors that cannot 

be throttled and tails that cannot 

be adjusted so formation flying 

becomes a greater problem. 

IV. Chains of Formations. 

(a) The simple chain. 

29. Aerial fighting has developed to that stage where it is 

necessary to send out formations 

and chains of formations for the 

accomplishment of missions. 

Mutual cooperation and support 

is essential. It has become necessay, therefore, to adopt a unit 

formation. The size of this unit 

varies and is determined by the 

simple fact that a flight leader 

cannot control more than a limited number of machines in the 

air at one time with the greatest 

efficiency. It has become necessary therefore, to send out 

chains of formations. Sometimes 

this chain consists merely of two 

6 The rotary motors used bn some planes had 

no throttles and were controlled mainly by turning the mom on and off by means of an ignition 

switch on the control stck Some degree of regulation. however, was provided by a mixture 

valve 

7 The reference may be to an adlustable 

hwizontal stabilizer such as had been incorpe 

rated in the Sopmth 1'12 Strutter and some other 

planes. or some similar means for trimming the 

aircraft in flight 

formations of three machines as 

a minimum, working in touch 

with one another; the front and 

lower formation guides and may 

be called the front line; the rear 

formation conforms its movements to the lower and supports 

the lower in its attack according 

to the requirements. They maintain their respective positions 

throughout the whole of an offensive patrol and are often 

given definite patrols when it is 

necessary to cover a large 

amount of territory with a limited 

supply of machines. In such 

cases a patrol will be ordered to 

cover certain points at certain 

altitudes and at given times and 

the two formations or echelons 

perform their mission, retaining 

their respective positions and relationship at all times. 

30. It is interesting to compare 

this simple combination to a patrol on the ground. On the 

ground one would find advance 

and flank guards, but in the air 

these are unnecessary and the 

work is accomplished by a top 

guard. The strength of this top 

guard has to be considerable as 

this is the most vulnerable point 

of the formation, and great care 

has to be taken that it does not 

get too far in the rear of the 

main or guiding unit. 

(b) Larger chains. 

31. This simple chain can be 

augmented as circumstances require by increasing the number 

of each echelon or by adding 

Attack on two-seater 

by formation of 

. . . . . . \ 

. 

from 

A 8 

rear, attack from while D remains 

the left above and right respectively. 

for protection. C attacks "% 
366 Postwar Review 

one or more formations to the 

chain. The positions of these 

added formations are maintained throughout the operation 

and they have clearly defined 

functions to perform for each 

particular occasion that arises. 

For example, if three formations 

are patrolling, it is well to have 

them proceed in a triangular 

chain, the right rear formation 

serves as a support to the main 

body while the left rear remains 

above in reserve to give protection during the combat and to 

deal with enemy machines that 

detach themselves and climb 

with the intention of counterattacking. 

(c) Chains at a distance 

from the airdromes. 

32. This simple combination 

of formations is not the only kind 

of chain flying that has been 

developed. Sometimes individual formations are dispatched 

and they maintain their individuality and their independence until a given point is reached at an 

appointed time, when they take 

up their positions with respect to 

the previously designated leading flight and proceed as in the 

simple chain. The advantages of 

these tactics for use against balloons or other localities of 

known enemy aerial activity, 

Method of assembling 7- 

chain formations. 77 

Fight leader of formaticln A takes 

off first and picks up B 8 C over 

specified points. 

\ 

\ 

Scouring patrol. 

.* "A"=PiVOt formation moves on definite prescribed patrol "8" 8 "C' Keep in touch at all times with "A" 

- - 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment W 

Air Service 

367 

such as the rendezvous of a day 

bombardment formation, is obvious. It is well to point out in 

this particular form of tactics by 

chains of formations that the 

greatest care must be exercised 

by each leader of a formation. 

He must not give battle to any 

enemy aircraft before he reaches 

his objective and must sacrifice 

everything to being at his objective at the given instant. The 

importance of this cannot be 

over emphasized, as failure on 

the part of even one formation 

leader might prove extremely 

disastrous. 

Pursuit chatn of 

formation. 

Deputy 

Leader B 

(d) Chain. 

33. These tactics can be employed at any altitude but for 

low work prove especially valuable. These tactics have in mind 

at least three formations, one 

acting as the pivot. Each formation leaves the airdrome at a 

given time and proceeds over a 

prescribed route to a rendezvous. No time is lost in getting to 

the rendezvous but each formation is independent until it connects with its pivot formation at 

that point. On arriving there the 

leader of the pivotal formation 

flies in an erratic course but on a 

definite bearing offensive. The 

other formations, flying erratically, keep in touch but practically out of sight of the pivot in 

the hope that the enemy may be 

encountered. Should one of 

these formations encounter erremy machines, a signal is given 

to summon the whole chain to 

its support. A chain of this kind is 

not liable to surprise as the 

whole sky is under observation 

practically all the time and it 

becomes impossible for enemy 

formations to approach without 

being seen by someone. On the 

other hand, enemy aerial activity 

is almost bound to be observed 

by someone and by signals the 

hostile machines can be encountered and destroyed. 

B 

A 

Plan C Elevation 

A-Leading Echelon 

8-Support 

C-Reserve 
368 Postwar Review 

(e) Barrage chain. 

34. These three formations of 

chain flying are used for offensive purposes. Pursuit aviation, 

however, is used a great deal for 

protection of reconnaissance and 

artillery observation machines. 

One of the simplest and most 

effective means of accomplishing 

this is by means of chains of 

formations. Each formation 

works individually, patrolling a 

given beat and connecting up at 

the beat with its adjacent patrol. 

Each patrol in itself is irregular in 

that it does not patrol the whole 

beat religiously but proceeds erratically. In this way the aerial 

front line is maintained in advance of the line of battle and 

friendly observation machines 

are permitted to carry out their 

important work of surveillance 

and observation unmolested. 

The utilization of permanent barrage chains is wearing on pilots 

and is opposed to the principle 

of economy of forces as it results 

in using up our available resources without permitting us to 

undertake those strong offensive 

expeditions in force which alone 

can cause maximum casualties 

to the enemy and give us a 

definite moral superiority. It 

therefore should only be undertaken at times of intense preparation for attack. 

(f) Fighting tactics of the 

different chains. 

35. The fighting tactics employed by the chains in actual 

combat have certain fundamental principles in common. In the 

attack the leaders, having done 

their utmost to surprise their adversary, sweep down deliberately on their opponent, relying 

on the support to lend necessary 

assistance. The latter at the same 

time acts as a reselve or top 

guard to deal with reinforcements which may arrive to assist 

the enemy. The primary object 

of the attack is to split up the 

enemy formation and enable the 

pilots of the patrol, maintaining 

superior altitude to destroy the 

enemy in single combat. SO 

much depends on the factor of 

surprise that its value cannot be 

overestimated. Probably the best 

feature of a surprise attack is 

that the offensive formation 

maintains its unity or at most, if 

it does lose it temporarily, regains more quickly to great advantage in the ensuing combat 

which is bound to follow. Provision is always made for a rendezvous in case a formation is 

broken up. In practice it has 

been found that the center of 

the fight and the shortest line to 

our own side of the lines is the 

best rendezvous area. This not 

only enables a formation to get 

back quickly but often insures 

machines supporting one another on their return journey. 

ued. 

36. Fighting tactics in the 

chain depend a great deal on 

the machine, on the direction of 

the wind, and on the locality, 

but certain principles prevail in 

all combats which mwt be adhered to at all costs. First, the 

leader controls the situation. 

Every machine must conform to 

his movement and support him. 

Second, attempts must be made 

to fight outwards at all times, 

the idea being to have your 

formation intact at the end of 

the fight, with the enemy scattered on the outskirts. Thirdly, 

under no circumstances must a 

pilot or formation attempt to 

dive away from a fight. It is 

better for a pilot when his machine is shot to keep fighting 

and circling and be forced down 

in enemy territory than to attempt to break away and dive 

for home. By staying with the 

fight he lends support to his 

comrades and may cause the 

enemy to retire and enable himself and comrades to reach 

safety after destroying enemy 

machines, whereas by diving for 

home he is practically #certain to 

be shot down himself. 

(h) Principles. 

(9) Fighting tactic!; contin37. Certain principles in the 

fighting tactics must be forgotten 

in the chain of formations. First, 

each formation must lend sup- 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

369 

port to the other. Second, if 

given a mission to perform, a 

rendezvous or patrol, it must be 

camed out at all costs, as the 

success of the chain of formation 

depends so much on the canying out of the mission by each 

individual formation. Third, each 

formation is subservient to the 

leading formation of the chain. 

The successful performance of 

the mission assigned to the chain 

is of a great deal more importance than any other that might 

be successfully accomplished by 

the single formation at the cost 

of the greater mission. 

Strafing a machine-gun battery. 

Chapter Iv. Attacks on 

Ground Targets 

38. Bombing and machine 

gunning of ground targets can 

only be camed out when air 

supremacy is attained. This supremacy does not have to be 

permanent but must be temporary at least. Unless this supremacy is held at the time low flying 

is to be done there will be a 

greater loss in machines than 

damage done to the enemy. 

Ground straffs may be carried 

out in force by placing over the 

lines at a certain period sufficient 

number of pursuit machines to 

establish the line of equal safety 

for machines as far over as the 

straffing is to be done. A single 

pilot of experience, however, 

may go over the enemy lines 

and ground straffs when the enemy hold air supremacy, but the 

amount of possible damage he 

may do does not equal the risk 

for loss taken. 

39. The discussion for low 

bombing and machine gunning 

can be combined because where 

it is possible to accomplish one it 

is, as a rule, possible to accomplish the other. Low bombing, 

however, is more effective on 

troops. Bombing can be done 

from a greater height than effective machine gunning. Bombing 

is more effective on places of 

shelter. However, machines 

doing low straffing should be capable of both and in most cases 

a good target for low bombing is 

a good target for machine gunning. 

40. Low straffing of ground 

targets is only used when large 

targets are available for attack. A 

target must be large enough to 

be an easy mark and important 

enough for its destruction to 
370 Postwar Review 

warrant risking the loss of a machine. Only in time of great activity on the ground by either of 

the combatant forces are ground 

targets sufficiently large to warrant their being attacked from 

the air. In the ordinary course of 

war when no offensive is being 

launched a good target such as a 

staff car, or a convoy or a battery may very occassionally 

present itself, and the pilot of a 

separate machine or a patrol 

leader of a formation may use 

his judgement as to whether the 

situation demands that he make 

an attack on that target. Although ground straffing is commonly spoken of as trench straffing, the term trench straffing is a 

misnomer. Targets in trenches 

are not large enough to straff 

from a height and are protected 

and for a machine to go down to 

within 25 or 30 feet from the 

ground where many machine 

guns can be directed against it, 

the chance of that pachine 

doing damage is too small to 

offset the chance of being 

brought down. When an offensive is under way large bodies of 

troops, cavalry and transport are 

being brought up to the line. 

These targets are large enough 

to spot from some distance in 

the air. Fire can be directed on 

the group and a great amount of 

material damage as well as 

moral damage to the enemy can 

be done. Targets whic:h admit of 

attacks from the air are any 

groups of men or horses or 

transport of the enemy large 

enough to be easy of mark, and 

materials or any sort which are 

of military value and which can 

be destroyed by aerial attack. 

41. The locality of effective 

ground straffing varies. As troops 

and transports approach the 

front line there is a point where 

large movement cannot be 

made. Back of that point is the 

beginning of the effective zone 

of ground straffing. The farther 

back of the line one goes the 

larger are the bodies encountered. But after a certain distance 

the frequency of encounter will 

diminish. The zone foi, the best 

targets for ground straltfing is that 

place where large enough targets 

to be easy of mark are found 

frequently. Besides the location 

of the target, the factor of comparative safety in distance of 

penetration enters the question. 

This factor is determined by the 

air superiority held, both permanent and temporary, upon 

weather conditions, the type of 

machine used, and the condition 

of enemy ground defenses. 

374 Postwar Review 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

371 

42. In conducting a ground 

straffe the command has to consider the disposition of its forces 

and the method of their dispatch 

and orders. The disposition of 

forces depends upon the force 

available and the state of the 

attack. The dispatch and orders 

depends upon whether the target is predetermined and designated when the straffing machines leave the ground; or 

whether the target is to be 

found, the area in which targets 

are likely to appear being 

designated. 

force is one of the number of 

machines for ground straffing 

and the number for protective 

patrols. Whenever straffing is to 

be done there should be sufficient protective force above to 

make the low flying machines 

safe from attack by enemy aircraft. If the protective force is 

insufficient a ground straffing 

machine will be easy prey for the 

enemy because a pilot doing 

ground straffing has his attention 

centered on the ground and not 

in the air. Also formations of 

machines on this mission become scattered in most cases. 

The greater the confidence of 

the pilot of the low machine in 

the pilots protecting him, the 

better the job of ground straffing 

will be. Cooperation between 

the protecting machines and the 

straffing machines is very important. The feeling of personal relationship brings about the best 

43. The problem of available 

cooperation, and patrols should 

be arranged to take advantage 

of that fact whenever possible. In 

case the number of machines for 

protection is small it will be necessary to concentrate the protecting force during certain hours 

and send out all ground straffing 

machines during those hours. If 

the number of machines available for protection is large a barrage of machines may be kept 

up to serve as a protection at all 

times. It is more difficult to secure cooperation between the 

low flying machines and the protecting machines where the protecting barrage of machines is 

used all during the day than 

where forces are concentrated 

during limited periods. The 

number of machines available to 

do ground straffing does not affect their disposition so much as 

the number of the protecting 

force. The use of a ground straffing force, whether large or small, 

may be concentrated or extended according to the protective force available and the 

ground conditions. 

44. The conditions on the 

ground which effect the dispatch 

of machines are whether the attack is just beginning or is in 

steady slow progress. When the 

attack is in its first stages machines should be sent over in 

great numbers and force should 

be concentrated on that period 

when greatest assistance can be 

rendered the ground troops. 

When the attack has slowed in 

progress ground straffing may be 

extended for several days and a 

constant stream of machines 

kept over the enemy to harass 

his reserves coming up. The 

number over the lines at any 

time need not however be so 

great as when the attack is advancing rapidly. The reason for 

putting a large number of strafting machines over when an attack is in its first stages is more a 

moral than a destructive reason. 

The sight of our machines stral'fing ground targets strengthens 

the morale of the friendly troops, 

and weakens the morale of the 

enemy at a psychological moment. If an attack is slow in 

progress and ground straffing 

has been carried out day after 

day, the enemy must cease day 

movement of large bodies and 

transport must move in small 

groups with some distance between groups. If it is found that 

insufficient ground targets are 

presented it is well to concentrate on a certain period, and 

extend straffing farther back into 

enemy territory where large targets can be found. Also, the 

central control should know 

what cities and towns the enemy 

is using for concentration points 
372 Postwar Review 

and may designate special straffs 

on those centers at an unexpected time. 

45. When machines are sent 

out for the purpose of attacking 

ground targets, the target may 

have been previously designated, and information concerning its nature and its place given. 

Such a target is usually one of 

fleeting opportunity. In such a 

case it is necessary for the machines which are to make the 

attack to arrive at the place of 

the target upon very short notice. For the purpose of performing missions of this sort certain 

squadrons should be moved to 

within the closest possible distance of the line previous to an 

attack. A certain number of pilots and machines must be kept 

on alert constantly, ready to 

leave the ground at a moment’s 

notice after information is received concerning a target. The 

machine used must be one 

which does not require warming, 

such as a rotary motored machine, in order that it may leave 

the ground immediately. Machines for this work can not go 

over the line farther than their 

protection takes them. If a protective barrage is up the mission 

can be dispatched without special escort. If there is not protective force on the lines a special 

escort must be provided. 

46. A definite target, however, 

may be given which is not one 

of fleeting opportunity, such as a 

town where concentration is taking place, an important railhead, 

etc. Machines which are to perform the mission need not be 

from an advanced airdrome. 

Targets of this nature are often 

given after a ground attack has 

been in progress for some time 

and when few moving targets 

worth while present themselves. 

However, the central control 

should know what centers are 

used for concentration points at 

all times and should direct attacks on them. These centers are 

usually too far over the line for a 

low attack from the air to be 

carried out unless sufficient force 

is sent out as an escort to provide temporary air supremacy 

over the target. An enemy aerodrome presents a target of almost the same nature. Any target may be straffed from a low 

altitude provided air superiority 

can be insured at the particular 

time and place. 

47. Machines are also dispatched without particular targets being designated The pilots 

may only be instructed as to the 

locality in which targets are likely 

to be found. This is particularly 

true during the beginning of an 

attack by ground troops on the 

enemy. In such a case the central control should know the 

hour of attack, the lines of halting, the final objective, and the 

zone of exploitation. The pilots 

to do ground straffing should be 

informed of these various lines, 

and orders should be issued, 

that up to a certain tirne targets 

will be attacked in a given zone; 

that after another definite time 

targets will be attacked in a definite zone farther in enemy territoy. Unless this method is followed pilots will not always be 

certain of whether tarsgets are 

enemy or their own. E3ut even if 

the progress is not so rapid the 

central control must know the 

zone in which targets are likely 

to be found and instruct pilots to 

look for them in that area. The 

more complete the information 

the better will be results, for pilots should not have to spend 

much time looking for targets. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

373 

48. Whether machines are 

sent out singly, in pairs, or in a 

formation will depend entirely 

upon the situation. A small formation of three or five machines 

will bring best results in straffing 

most targets because there will 

be a leader of some experience 

to find the target and to keep a 

lookout for enemy aircraft. Also 

the formation will scatter the enemy fire from the ground. The 

formation cannot be large because of the danger of collision 

in getting at the target. Machines 

of a small number can take turns 

at attacking a target but the 

number cannot be large because 

attack must be quick and machines must not have to wait for 

each other any length of time, If 

the target is surprised fire from 

the ground will not be severe, 

but if time is given for the preparation the chance of the loss of 

machines will be greater. The 

number of machines sent to attack the same target is, therefore, limited. 

49. The pilots who are to do 

the ground straffing must possess very definite information as 

to where enemy troops are located and where friendly troops 

are located. Uncertainty, even to 

a limited extent, will ruin the 

efficiency of the work. In case 

the push is rapid and the line 

uncertain the central control 

must inform the pilots of limits 

of the zones in which straffing is 

to be done. That limit should 

not be several miles within the 

enemy side of the line, for while 

attempting to make it safe for 

friendly troops, the situation is 

made more unsafe than necessary for the pilots. Pilots should 

always be informed as to the 

latest line reports, and, if the 

line is a moving one, the pilot 

should know the line the infantry 

is supposed to hold at the precise moment attack is to be 

made from the air. Pilots after 

having this information should 

know their maps so well that 

reference to them is almost unnecessary. It is impracticable for 

pilots to determine whether 

troops are enemy or their own 

by uniforms, etc., before the 

attack from the air is made. To 

do this will do away with suddenness of attack, besides, in 

most cases, placing the pilot in 

unnecessary danger. There will, 

of course be exceptional cases 

where the pilot cannot tell by 

position whether troops are enemy, in which case they should 

make certain by uniforms and 

observation of various indicating 

facts before making an attack. 

50. The method of actually 

straffing the target cannot be 

prescribed. The closer a machine 

is to the ground, down to 100 

feet, the more accurate will be 

the bombing and shooting; also 

the more accurate the fire from 

the enemy. Effective bombing 

and shooting can be done from 

2000 feet. The height from 

which work will be done will 

depend upon the development 

in types of machines, and armament, and in the effectiveness of 

the fire from the enemy. 

51. Formations in an attack 

usually become very dispersed. 

If the nature of the target permits 

attack in formation, airplanes of 

the formation should attack one 

after the other. In case the formation becomes completely 

scattered, pilots of inexperience 

should not remain over enemy 

territory a great length of time, 

for they are very subject to attack. The leader should, whenever possible, prescribe when 

withdrawal to the line is to be 
374 Postwar Review 

made by signal to other machines. Otherwise, the machines 

should not linger over enemy 

territory but a few moments. In 

case of complete dispersion each 

machine is to make its way back 

in the shortest line. If dispersion 

is only partial it is best to pick up 

the formation while withdrawing. 

52. Weather conditions effect 

ground straffing fundamentally. 

Clouds may prohibit protective 

patrols. In this case ground 

straffing machines cannot work 

in formations far over enemy 

territory, the distance depending, 

however, upon height and nature of clouds, and visibility of 

atmospheres. A single machine 

may do effective ground straffing 

when clouds are under 2000 

feet, going to or returning from 

his target in the clouds. This is 

best accomplished when visibility 

is vey poor, when there can be 

practically no enemy machines 

about. The most effective 

ground straffing done by single 

machines can be accomplished 

in weather of this sort with very 

little danger of loss of the machine. The pilots must, however, 

be of experience. 

53. The most difficult situations, however, arise when 

clouds exist at altitudes about 

2000 feet, not rendering a protective patrol useless, but changing vey greatly the cooperation 

between the protective patrol 

and the ground straffers, and 

rendering the [possibility of 

protection] against attack from 

enemy aircraft much more difficult than where there are no 

clouds. If it is possible for machines to work above the low 

clouds, it is necessary to have 

part of the protective patrol 

above the clouds and part directly in touch with the ground 

straffers beneath the clouds. [If3 

it is impossible for machines to 

work above clouds the protective patrol cannot penetrate far 

into enemy territory, the distance 

depending upon the height of 

the clouds. The ground straffing 

machines, being lower, can work 

a little farther into enemy territoy than the protective patrol 

is working. 

54. Machines used in ground 

straffing can be combatted from 

the ground and from the air. The 

greatest source of destruction, 

however, comes from the 

ground because of the greater 

possibilities of fire from that 

source, both with respect to accuracy, and as to amount and 

kind. Also the sources of fire on 

the ground are difficult to observe, and cannot easily be combatted by the low flying machine. It is necessay to perfect 

devices for fire from the ground 

and to provide machines, which 

are to do low flying, with a 

means of protection from enemy 

ground fire. When ground straffing is being done it must also be 

combatted from the air by low 

flying machines with overhead 

protection. 

Airplane 

attacks captive balloon (left). 

Minutes latex the balloon becomes 

engulfed in flames (right). 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

375 

55. The type of machine 

which is best adapted to ground 

straffing is necessarily an armoured machine. As weight is 

increased maneuverability, 

speed and climb will be decreased. The best machine will 

be the one with adequate armouring and with least decrease 

in maneuverability, speed and 

climb, and with greatest reliability of engine. The reliability of 

the engine is more important in 

a ground straffing machine than 

in other types, because that machine usually works in a place 

where a forced landing means 

the loss of a machine and pilot 

The least vulnerable engine to 

bullets is an air cooled engine. 

Rotary motors can be shot 

through and still run. It is at 

present considered that the best 

type of machine for ground 

straffing is a single seater, rotary 

motored, armoured machine 

with two fields of fire-one in 

front and one below. 

Chapter V. Balloon Attacks 

56. Balloon attacks may be 

divided into two general headings, one the individual unpremeditated attack made merely 

because the pilot finds himself in 

position for such an attack after 

an engagement or some special 

mission, and secondly the scientific attacks made with cooperation in various forms. 

57. The first type is usually 

made with the utmost danger to 

the pilot as he is open to attack 

by enemy aircraft from above 

and has no efficient method of 

stopping attack from the ground 

defenses. These attacks should 

be discouraged save in very exceptional circumstances when 

they should consist only of a 

single dive, a long burst of machine gun fire continuing to an 

extremely short range, and then 

an immediate but cautious return to the lines. Organized balloon attacks often yield important results. They will almost always be undertaken just before 

or during an assault. In all balloon attacks it is most essential 

that the gas bag be perforated. in 

order that the gas may mix with 

the atmosphere and the incendiary ammunition ignite the resulting combustible mixture. It has 

been found satisfactory to use 

ordinary ammunition for the 

perforation of the bag while a 

short burst of the incendiary 

fired at extremely short range, 

25 to 50 yards, will in the majority of cases ignite the gas. 

58. There are several methods 

of attacking a balloon. It should 

be kept clear in the mind of all 

pilots making such attacks that 

only approximately the 

front 213rds of the bag has gas in 

it, the back ?h being filled largely 

with air. Because of this, a vertical dive is not recommended. 

On the other hand the pilot’s 

machine should be gotten into 

such position that he will be firing parallel to the fore and aft 

axis of the balloon. This guarantees that the bullets will puncture 

the bag where the gas is located. 
376 Postwar Review 

59. In a premeditated attack 

one of the elemental principles is 

to silence ground defenses in the 

shape of machine guns, “flaming 

onions” batteries (incendiary 

anti-aircraft) and anti-aircraft 

guns of greater caliber. This may 

either be done by our batteries 

or by aircraft accompanying the 

pilot who is to destroy the balloon. Both of these methods 

have proven very satisfactory in 

practice.. In the first case the battery commander makes arrangements for his barrage to be directed at the winch and for a 

considerable radius surrounding 

the balloon. This barrage is usually laid down two or three minutes before the attack by our 

aircraft. 

60. In the second case the 

machine which is to destroy the 

balloon is accompanied by four 

or five other pursuit machines, 

fitted with bomb racks carrying 

light bombs. These bombs are 

dropped on the emplacements 

of the anti-aircraft defenses and 

as close as possible to the winch. 

Immediately after this and at the 

same time that the single machine attacks the balloon, machine gun fire is also directed at 

these ground defenses and it has 

been found that the enemy in a 

considerable number of cases 

leaves his balloon up and takes 

cover. 

61. Attacks on balldons 

should have as much of the element of surprise in their favor as 

conditions permit in order to 

prevent the enemy from drawing 

his balloons to the ground before the attack is made. In case 

there are clouds in the sky such 

cover as they afford should be 

utilized. On clear days great skill 

in maneuvering is necessay to 

make the balloon companies believe that the patrol has some 

other mission than destruction of 

the balloon. Very often a long, 

gentle glide to the enemy side of 

the balloon and considerably 

above it, followed by a steep, 

rapid dive and attack, will be 

successful. At other times it becomes necessary to follow the 

balloon as it is drawn to within a 

vey short distance of the 

ground. 

62. When more thain one balloon is to be destroyed it is much 

more satisfactory, whenever 

possible, to assign separate patrols for the destructiori of each 

target. In this way the element of 

surprise is maintained .to a considerable degree. It is perfectly 

apparent that in the caw of attacking by one patrol of a number of balloons, that thc J successful destruction of one will warn 

those to be attacked later of their 

danger, and will give them an 

opportunity to draw dawn the 

balloon and prepare for an intensive defense. 

63. The element of surprise 

may be vey valuably increased 

by making balloon attacks just at 

dawn or very late in the evening. 

Attack at this time also removes 

to a vey large extent thle danger 

of interference by hostile aircraft. 

The effect of an evening attack 

on a balloon line has really very 

little tactical or strategical value 

as each balloon destroyed will 

be replaced in time for ascension 

the following morning, but there 

is undoubtedly a consiclerable 

effect on morale, particiilarly insofar as observers are 

concerned. 

I 

Attack at 0 hour. Formation A, B 8 C rendezvous over balloon at 0 hour+ 1 mi. to protect attacking plane 

Daylight balloon 

attack. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

flor The Employment of 

Air Service 

377 

64. It is exceedingly important 

that observers making successful 

descents in parachutes should be 

aitacked as they are extremely 

dangerous to our troops on the 

ground because of their training.s Here again the question of 

rriorale arises and if observers 

are attacked as they are descending in their parachutes it is 

believed a considerable increase 

u'ill be noted in the number of 

unnecessary descents made. 

65. It has been found much 

more satisfactory to utilize the 11 

millimeter balloon gun than the 

ordinary caliber machine gun. 

Something on the order of the 

one-pounder, firing a very delicately fused contact shell, would 

be even more successful for the 

destruction of enemy balloons. 

The use of bombs containing 

sulphur or other incendiary material did not prove satisfactory. 

66. Whenever possible balloon attacks should be made 

uith an escort of considerable 

sirength, in order to allow the 

a ?acking machines to perform 

their mission without interruption 

bg enemy aircraft. This protectirsn should be flying in the close 

vicinity of the balloon at the time 

of the attack, but at a higher 

altitude, and should be very 

careful not to communicate to 

the enemy by its actions prior to 

the attack information that the 

a3ack is to be made. 

67. A considerable proportion 

of the balloon attacks made by 

the Allies during the recent war 

failed in the destruction of the 

balloon because the pilot did not 

have a true appreciation of his 

distance from the balloon. This 

realization of distance may be 

gained by practice with balloons 

behind our lines during the 

course of which pilots will become familiar with the appearance of the bag in the sight and 

will then be able to deliver their 

burst of incendiary ammunition 

at a range short enough to be 

efficient . 

pursuit squadrons on any front 

to keep the enemy balloons in 

their sector down as much of the 

time as possible. Balloon observation is extremely valuable for 

the regulation of artillery fire and 

for reconnaissance of back 

areas. It is even suggested that in 

the future night pursuit will be 

equipped with searchlights or 

other means for locating and destroying enemy balloons during 

darkness. 

68. It should be the attempt of 

Chapter VI. Night Pursuii: 

69. With the development of 

the Air Service, the problem of 

night flying and more particularly 

night pursuit has to be faced and 

solved. 

70. At first sight, it might appear the limitations of night pursuit are so great that a squadron 

of this kind would not justify its 

existence, but on more careful 

study one finds that the potentialities are great and the possibilities almost unlimited. 

71. The main function of night 

pursuit at present is, of course, 

the defensive patrols for the purpose of destroying night bombers. The British have already 

demonstrated that this is quite 

practical. 

72. As the Air Service develops, the night pursuit will be 

used in conjunction with patrolling for the purpose of surveillance and reconnaissance. All 

big movements of troops now 

take place by night and in time 

pursuit pilots will be required under certain circumstances to gci 

out to predetermined objectives 

for the purpose of dropping a 

flare at a given important cross 

road to ascertain movements of 

troops or for the purpose of coinfirming a suspected withdrawal 

or concentration. At first, night 

reconnaissance by pursuit machines will probably be done in 

the late evening or in the early 

morning, but as time goes on 

and the number of squadrons of 

this kind increase, this kind of 

8. The shooting of parachutists abandoning 

disabled ercran was then. and is yet, a difficult 

and controversial area of international law. 
378 Postwar Review 

work will be done in all favorable weather at night. Concentrations will be located and bombs 

will be carried, enabling the pursuit machines to descend and 

harrass same from very low altitudes with extremely great accuracy. Balloon straffing at dawn 

and in the dusk of evening will 

be almost entirely the functions 

of the night pursuit machine and 

this practice may in time blind 

the enemy insofar as balloons 

are concerned. Straffing enemy 

troops by machine gun fire, owing to the case with which a 

surprise and get away can be 

effected at night, will be a vey 

safe and effective work of the 

night pursuit, and its possibilities 

are limited only by the weather 

conditions. 

problems in connection with 

night pursuit that have to be 

faced and attempts made to 

solve before a squadron can 

hope to meet with any success. 

The pilots must be specially 

trained in navigation by night 

although this can be learned in a 

vey short time by one of ordinary intelligence and can be 

helped greatly by increasing the 

number of lighthouses, mortar 

signals, and cooperation between the units of the Air Service, day and night forces combined. Forced landings at night 

73. There are many difficult 

discourage pilots more than any 

other feature of this work, but 

with proper landing flares and 

emergency airdrome lighting sets 

on all fields, and cooperation of 

searchlights in the defended 

area, the dangers from this 

source can be reduced practically to the same as day flying. 

74. Pilots find that one of the 

greatest problems of night pursuit is locating the enemy. They 

claim it is impossible to see him 

even with the aid of searchlights. 

It is difficult but it is not impossible. On moonlight nights the enemy is visible at 500 to 600 

yards even when he is not in the 

beam of the light, and on bright 

starlight nights he appears as a 

dark shadow at a distance of 

200 yards. If he happens to be 

picked up by a searchlight, his 

planes show up for a vey great 

distance, and experience proves 

that sometimes machines can be 

held in the beam ten minutes. 

Sometimes he can be seen, not 

in the beam itself, but in the 

twilight formed in the air by the 

searchlights and fights have 

taken place without the beam 

picking him up or without the 

knowledge of the operators of 

the light. 

75. As for the actual combat it 

is safe to say that the enemy can 

be engaged and brought down 

with slight danger of his retaliation, provided he is seen first by 

the pursuit pilot. 

76. One of the great problems 

of night flying is equipiment. 

These necessities include firstclass searchlights, airplanes, airdrome lighting plants, llighthouses, motors and signals. 

77. For night flying to be a 

success in the operations of an 

army it is absolutely essential 

that it have the proper cooperation and liaison with the neighboring arms. The searchlights 

are operated by the Engineers 

Corps. A liaison officer must be 

placed on the staff of the Chief 

of night flying who can1 advise 

and insure the proper location of 

searchlights and the cooperation 

of their personnel with the pilots. 

The vey closest liaison must be 

maintained with the anti-aircraft 

artillery. The Chief of Air Service 

must have a liaison officer from 
Sherman: Tentative. Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

379 

this branch on his staff, and the 

guns must be located and operi3ted on his advice and with his 

cooperation. In addition, official 

observation posts are to be established in all units on the lines, 

each in touch with a Post of 

Command where there will be 

located a wireless transmitting 

station, in order that the Chief of 

all wireless stations in the rear 

will be kept familiar with indications and locations of enemy 

aerial activity and likewise advised of its cessation, so that he 

can most efficiently make his 

tactical decisions. 

78. Defended areas-that is 

territory over which it is forbidden to fly at night-should be 

reduced to a minimum if not 

dispensed with entirely. Arrangements can be made whereby all 

machines crossing the lines 

could be challenged by the forward observation posts and the 

identity of the machine fixed at 

this point. 

79. It is vey essential to obtain the proper kind of machine 

for night work. In the first place 

the engine must be reliable, simple, and if possible, one that 

starts up easily and instantly. 

Any reliable rotary or radial motor seems best adapted for night 

pursuit. The machine itself must 

be light, maneuverable and possess great flexibility of speed, 

owing to the tactical necessity 

after overtaking a twin-engine 

machine for a pilot to reduce the 

speed to the same or less than 

that of the bomber. It is essential 

that it climb and dive rapidly and 

at the Same time should land 

very slowly so that it can be 

safely landed in a very small 

area, a feature that will always 

be essential in night forced landing. It is well to strengthen the 

center section struts and take 

similar precautions so that in 

case of a turn over the pilot can 

be sure of getting out and it is 

advisable to have a machine 

sensitive laterally rather than fore 

and aft. If a machine is too sensitive fore and aft, one is apt to 

dive into the ground or stall on 

coming into the airdrome when 

one's attention is often diverted 

to landing light instruments or 

ground lights. With regard to 

fuel, it is advisable to have as 

much gasoline as possible. Although a patrol should not be 

for more than 1% hours, pilots 

frequently get lost returning and 

have to fly around a long time 

before they get their bearings. 

feature. Machines should be 

equipped with two guns, one 

balloon and one ordinary. Sights 

should be illuminated and ordinay ammunition used with this 

exception, that vey few tracers 

80. Armament is an important 

should be used (1 in 15). Bomb 

racks are essential and it is well 

to have a rack that can be bodily 

taken off with bombs and replaced on short notice as normally its employment will nolt be 

the duty of night machines. 

81. The instrument board is 

an important feature. All instruments must be lighted and in 

addition luminous in themselves, 

and two movable [flash-lights, 

must be provided, the whole 

electrical equipment being runI9 

from two separate storage baiteries which, in themselves, 

should be very accessible, yet 

substantially fixed. A good air 

speed indicator and a good altimeter are even more essential in 

night flying than in day, and the 

compass, too, must be of the 

very best. A machine will carry 

wing tip flares. A navigation light 

on the outer struts, and a signalling light on the bottom of the 

fuselage with at least one emergency parachute landing flare. 

9. The words in brackets, inserted to fill an 

obvious omission, are from Circular 76, p. 44. 
380 Postwar Review 

Normally the dangerous wing tip 

flares will not be used but in the 

case of forced landings these will 

be lighted, sufficiently high 

above the ground to insure their 

being bumed out by the time the 

ground is reached. These must 

be examined very frequently 

and under no circumstances 

should they be used later than 

the date stamped thereon. There 

is no such word as economy in 

connection with the use of flares. 

They must not be opened until 

they are actually going to be 

placed on the machine. Firstclass parachute flares should be 

the only parachute flares carried. 

The signal-light beneath the fuselage must be operated by a 

tapper key and a permanent 

switch be opened interchangeably, at will and instantly. 

82. Two kinds of airdrome 

equipment must be recognized 

and provided. First, that in 

vogue on the fields of the other 

night squadrons operating which 

must be most reliable and if necessary elaborate; secondly, the 

emergency landing set, which 

should be at hand on these fields 

but in addition should be placed 

on every airdrome in the army 

area so that a pilot lost in a fog 

may with safety call and land at 

any field. The arrangements of 

the main fields must be worked 

out as circumstances require, but 

it is essential that a good generating unit be at hand and that 

the bounds of the field be clearly 

defined. For an emergency lighting outfit, three small concentrated beam throwing lights, with 

power furnished by a fifteen volt 

storage battery placed on a trolley are recommended. These are 

quite inexpensive and will on 

every field justify their existence 

many times over. 

must [be] lit up with Mortars and 

Lighthouses, and a 36” Speny 

light at the main airdrome for 

purpose of defense as well as for 

the purpose of directing machines home is essential. 

84. Certain rules must be inaugurated for landing at an airdrome at night. These must be 

formulated not forgetting the 

possibility of the enemy bombing and must consist of a signal 

for recognition and on the main 

field the use of a dummy airdrome as an adjunct. All pilots 

will be called upon to make circuits to the left and glide in 

83. The army area as a whole 

parallel to the main lince of lights. 

Each pilot must flash the proper 

code letter before landing. If a 

crash blocks the field, :proper signals or a beam of light must be 

flashed to him. In this connection it will be essential to instruct 

and hold responsible one man at 

least on every field in the best 

methods of placing the lights, so 

that a pilot will never be required 

to come in over obstacles and so 

that he will be able to make a 

landing even if he is unfamiliar 

with the airdrome. 

85. Probably the greatest difficulty to be encountered is ths 

selection of pilots for this work. It 

is absolutely imperative that 

night pilots master the science of 

flying. It is quite possible to be a 

pilot in the day time and yet 

know vey little about flying, but 

he who hopes to succeed at 

night must be capable of flying 

any kind of a machine intuitively 

and in addition must hlave mastered the peculiarities of the particular machine that ha is to use. 

It is essential that he be keen 

about his work and the responsibility for this rests primarily with 

the squadron commander directly through the flight commander. He must be imbued 

with the spirit of determination 

first of all to develop this branch 

of aviation. He should lbe steady, 

sober, keen and industrious and 

so fond of flying that he sees 

every opportunity to get up in 

the air, day and night. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

381 

86. In flying a pursuit machine 

at night a pilot who has mastered his machine thoroughly 

should have no difficulty in mastering the art, whether pursuit or 

bomber, but it is useless for him 

to attempt the work until this is 

the case. In all armies there have 

been regretable accidents in this 

connection which have tended 

to bring night flying into disfavor 

with the pilots. It is a fact that 

any good day pilot will make a 

good night pilot provided his vision is normal. In addition to 

being a good pilot, the night 

flyer must have a thorough 

knowledge of the country, particularly of the landmarks. He 

must be skilled in the location of 

possible fields, airdromes, forests, rivers, bad ground, etc., 

and when he has first enlisted 

into the service of a night squadron, he should utilize evey opportunity that presents itself in 

mastering the situation, never 

feeling satisfied until he knows 

the country thoroughly. He must 

be instructed in cloud flying but 

should be warned never to attempt it unless compelled to do 

so. If overtaken by a mist or 

clouds he must never let the 

ground get out of sight. If necessaty he should make a forced 

landing rather than attempt to 

get home at night by flying 

through the mist, unless of 

course he is flying high and is 

sure of the weather. 

87. After a pilot becomes 

competent he will practice forced 

landing on his own airdromes on 

moonlight nights, and practice 

combat fighting with two-seaters 

at night cooperating with the 

searchlights. Rehearsals of 

forced landings by means of parachute flares are practicable, the 

pilot using the engine if he discovers that the field sought is 

liable to cause him to tum over. 

88. The location of instruments and the method of using 

them in the dark must become a 

matter of second nature to the 

night pilot, so that this will in no 

way distract his attention from 

more important things. Patrols 

will often be monotonous because they will cover short beats 

over important points. Enemy 

night bombers are certain to follow permanent land marks, such 

as rivers or forests. This means 

that a pilot on patrol must stay 

over this spot patiently and await 

his opportunity. He will do well 

to have patience and not to be 

distracted by neighboring lights 

from his particular mission. Prlots 

must never attempt to fly under 

200 meters at night as the risk 

. involved is too great, and on his 

first flights he must arise over his 

airdrome at a height of at least 

1000 meters and take his time 

coming in. The morale of pilots 

in all branches of the Air Service 

must be carefully preserved, but 

this is even more marked in the 

case of night pilots. Day flying 

should be performed and should 

only be permitted between certain definite flying hours of dalylight. Otherwise pilots will never 

feel that they are off duty and in 

a few weeks will become tired 

and disgusted with their work, 

and lose a11 their keenness. 

89. The main duties in the 

operations of night pursuit is the 

defensive barrage. Patrols will 

be carefully planned with the 

object of intercepting hostile 

bombers at the point where thley 

are picked up by the searchlights. Patrols will, therefore, be 

carried out slightly in the rear of 

lines and more particularly over 

permanent land marks. They will 

not last more than one and one 
382 Postwar Review 

fourth hours and va y in altitude 

from 2000 to 4000 meters, according to the situation. It is 

inadvisable to send patrols up 

until enemy activity has been 

reported by the advanced posts 

and it is quite possible to determine with great accuracy when 

the enemy is operating by observing his mortars, lighthouses, 

airdromes, and so on. Balloons 

may be utilized for this purpose 

as they can render valuable 

assistance. 

90. When a pilot is on patrol 

he will have his attention called 

to enemy aircraft by the firing of 

the Archie guns, by observation 

of the explosion of bombs on 

the ground and by the direction 

and concentration of searchlights 

beams. He will “cut” his motor 

frequently and glide as long as 

possible with a dead motor so 

that the light operators and gunners can listen for the enemy 

ships. In times it will be possible 

to institute a system of rockets 

and flares which will enable a 

pilot on patrol to follow the 

course of an enemy bomber and 

it is within the range of possibility 

that before long wireless telephones will come to assistance 

of a pilot on patrol and solve 

many of his difficulties. 

91. When a pilot sights an 

enemy machine, his simple tactics will be to get under his tail, 

closing in to a very close range 

and opening up fire after throttling down, making use of the 

element of surprise to the utmost, for, if the enemy begins 

to slide-slip and maneuver, he 

will probably get away. Should 

a pilot be so unfortunate as to 

be seen by the enemy machine 

before he has effected a complete surprise, he must endeavor 

to keep his eye on the enemy 

by observing his instrument 

board, his exhaust or the explosive tracers from his machine 

guns. After a short time the 

enemy will steady down and 

probably attempt to dive for 

home, when it will be safe for 

the pursuit machine to close on 

him again. It is easier on a clear 

night to see machines above 

silhouetted against the sky but 

should he dive and get below 

the attacker, it is quite possible 

to pick up his outline once more 

against the lights on the ground 

probably in time special illuminating lights will be provided for 

this purpose. 

92. In addition to defensive 

patrols, night pursuit will be utilized in time for reconnaissance 

and surveillance and Especial machines will be dispatched to intersections and cross roads, railway stations, rivers, etc., for the 

purpose of locating and confirming enemy movements. In some 

cases parachute flares will be 

used and in time it will be possible to take photographs at night. 

The same machines will be able 

to carry light bombs and shutting 

off their motors, glide down to a 

ve y low altitude and !with great 

precision and accuracy drop 

them, insuring good results. 

93. Other duties, however, 

besides these will be sequired of 

night pursuit squadrons. They 

will be required to attack balloons suspended in th’e air or 

lying on their beds late in the 

dusk of evening after all the 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

enemy airplanes have landed, 

enabling the pilot to come back 

unmolested and in safety to his 

own lines, landing after dark. In 

the early dawn the same work 

can be accomplished and it is 

not without the range of possibility that the efficiency of balloons will in this way be 

reduced. 

late evening and in the early 

dawn is one of the chief functions of night pursuit and airdromes may be so far back that 

the whole situation will be 

changed. Hangars probably will 

have to be underground and 

mechanics will have to live in 

dug-outs. On fine nights single 

machines will harrass enemy airdromes many times over and 

on [some] nights large offensive 

operations will be able to put 

machines out of action. Before 

and during an offensive enemy 

94. Airdrome straffing in the 

concentrations will be straffed 

and machine-gunned at night 

from a low altitude. The Commanding Officer of a Night Pursuit unit must be ready to develop the possibilities of his 

command to the utmost. 

of night pursuit will depend on 

the location of the airdrome. 

The ideal place is in the center 

of the line of searchlights. This 

enables pilots to stand on their 

airdromes ready to take off and 

reduce the duration of their patrols. With an airdrome in this 

location, pilots are able to go up 

and take short flights, making 

many sorties per night if necessay. Many devices, such as 

dummy airdromes, must be used 

to enable the location of this 

advanced field to be kept secret 

and to prevent its being bombed. 

Machines will not be brought up 

until the night of an anticipated 

95. A great deal of the success 

raid, the actual location of the 

squadron being well in the rear. 

As a matter of general princiipal, 

it is ve y much better, however, 

to have squadron work from the 

field where its headquarters, 

hangars, machine shop, etc., are 

located, as advanced fields are 

never entirely satisfacto y, and if 

at all practicable this should be 

the case. The location of this 

field near the searchlights, in 

addition to the usual advantages, 

keeps a possible landing ground 

within gliding distance of the 

pilot at all times and greatly 

increases his confidence and 

efficiency. 

96. While it is important to 

have the airdrome located ccmtrally, the proper location of the 

searchlights is more essential and 

two methods prevail. First, the 

concentration of searchlights 

around important bombing objectives from the enemy standpoint of view and, second, the 

location of a continuous line of 

lights along the whole front. 

There are many points in favor 

of both, the ideal, of course, 

being the adoption of both. Certainly, it is best to have as many 

lights as possible and in this the 

question of economy does not 

figure. Searchlights will be placed 

in units of three lights in triangular formation, the sides of the 

triangle being roughly [300 

yards].10 All the lights will be 

10. The bracketed phrase, supplying a 

number that was omitted, and correcting a word 

mat was misspelled, IS from Circular 76, 61 46. 
384 Postwar Review 

under the control of one P.C. 

and where possible this will be 

located on the airdrome and in 

direct touch with the operations 

officer of the squadron. Another 

very important feature about the 

location of the lights and one 

which will go a long way to the 

success of the operations is that 

of possible “forced-landing’’ 

field. Every search light, where 

possible, will be placed on a 

possible emergency landing field 

and instructions given to the operators that upon a distress signal from the plane all lights so 

located will concentrate on their 

respective emergency field. In 

locating these searchlights and 

instructing the operators, care 

will be taken that operators understand that a plane lands best 

up hill and into the wind, not 

forgetting to point out that it is 

next to impossible at night to 

land over high obstacles. 

97. Anti-aircraft guns should 

be located so as to fire in zones 

and the best rule is to have 

them fire only towards enemy 

territory and over the enemy 

lines. In this way they serve as a 

signal for a pilot who may be in 

the air and at the same time 

there is less likelihood of a 

friendly pilot being hit. Enemy 

bombers prefer to penetrate an 

anti-aircraft barrage than searchlights where there are pursuit 

machines about. With this in 

view tactical distribution of the 

guns will be made to suit occasions and special circumstances. 

Part IV. Day 

Bom bardment 

Introduction 

Object of Day Bombardment 

1. The primary object of 

bombing operations is the destruction of the material, personnel and morale of the enemy. 

The secondary object ii c reconnaissance of enemy movements 

in the air and on the ground. 

The effect of destroying the enemy’s materiel and personnel is 

not commensurate with the effect gained by day bombardment in weakening the morale of 

troops and civilians in the 

bombed areas. The ratio of the 

effect and lowering the enemy’s 

morale over that of destruction is 

estimated as about twenty 

to one. 

Chapter I. Information 

2. Information of the enemy 

and our own ground forces is 

essential to the proper tactical 

operations of a day bornbardment unit. The collection and 

preparation of this information 

for distribution to the smaller 

units of his command is the duty 

of the Air Service commander. 

Information properly circulated 

to bombardment units has an 

important effect upon the morale 

of the personnel. This is the only 

method by which units far from 

the battlefield can have brought 

to them the actual situations at 

the front. Unless the possibilities 

of day bombardment are made 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

385 

clear it is impossible to get the 

maximum efficiency from the 

pilots and observers. 

be supplied by the Army Air 

Service Commander with 

cation of all enemy airdromes. 

This map will indicate whether 

or not the airdromes are occupied, and will show the quantity 

and kind of air forces present. 

(b) A map showing the location and kind of all enemy 

antiaircraft artillery, which will be 

kept as near up to date as 

possible. 

(c) A map showing the existing and probably locations of 

all enemy divisions, both in the 

lie and reserve. The map will 

be prepared from information 

furnished by the second section 

of the General Staff ((3-2). 

(d) A map showing the location of all airdromes in the 

sector of the Army Air Service 

Commander, the corps and divisional sector boundaries of all 

units in line, the location of our 

antiaircraft artillery units, balloons and other air service units. 

(el Silhouettes and photographs of all known types of 

enemy airplanes. These should 

be posted in the operations 

rooms, and in the mess hall and 

quarters of the flying personnel. 

(f) A diagram of telephonic 

liaison in the army area. 

3. Every unit headquarters will 

(a) A map showing the lo- 

(9) A map showing the location of heavy and railroad artillery units and their targets. 

5. The charts, diagrams, and 

maps will be supplemented with 

(a) Army summaries of intelligence prepared by G-2. 

These will be circulated to be 

accessible to every pilot and 

observer. 

(b) Air Service summaries 

of intelligence prepared in the 

headquarters of the A.S.C. 

These will cover all subjects relating to the enemy air service, 

especially the quantities and 

types of his airplanes, and his 

methods of employing them in 

aerial warfare. It is the duty of 

every operations officer to make 

known to his flying personnel all 

the experiences that other pilots 

and observers have had over 

the lines. 

Chapter 11. Liaison 

5. Success of day bombardment depends in a large measure, upon a system of well established liaison. The liaison 

must be such that it guarantees a 

rapid transmission of information 

and orders. A comprehension of 

the entire situation at the moment has a decided effect upon 

the success of bombardment operations. In order that bombing 

raids may be made most effective, and with a minimum of 

losses, a close Liaison with tho 

front must be maintained. Ac'curate knowledge of the enemy's 

aerial activity at the time is the 

most important factor in decidling 

upon the tactics to be employed 

in executing the raids, the route 

to be followed, and the altitude 

from which the objective will be 

bombed. The Liaison should be 

so perfected that each group 

commander can be informed 

without delay of the location, 

number, altitude, direction of 

flight and types of enemy airplanes approaching our front 

lines. This liaison will be established 

communications with anti-aircraft artillery observation posts. 

(b) By wire with the radiogoniometric stations. 

(c) By wire with the line of 

observation balloons. 

(a) By direct telephonic 
306 Postwar Review 

6. The telephone communications from group to wing, and to 

the Army Air Service should be 

direct. The internal liaison from 

group headquarters to the several squadrons should be perfect. The group operations officer should be able to communicate without delay with all 

squadrons operations officers 

and with the flying field and alert 

tents. 

7. Too much emphasis cannot 

be placed upon the importance 

of the exchange of visits between the commanding officers 

of the air service units. This applies especially to the day bombardment and pursuit aviation. 

Without these exchanges of visits 

it is impossible to arrive at that 

close cooperation so necessary 

between these two branches. 

Personal visits between officers 

of all branches of aviation and 

the officers of infantry, artil!ery, 

anti-aircraft artillery, and balloon 

sections are the best means of 

establishing a feeling of understanding and sympathy between 

the various arms of the service. 

This understanding is necessary 

to perfect an efficient system of 

liaison upon the battle field. 

Chapter 111. Security 

ures taken by a command to 

protect itself from annoyance, 

observation, surprise and attack 

by the enemy. The protection of 

day bombardment naturally falls 

under combat, and will be 

treated under that head. Under 

security will be discussed only 

those measures taken by the 

commanding officer for the protection of his airdrome. 

9. The selection of an airdrome depends upon several 

circumstances, such as accessability, distance from the front, 

size, security and shelter. In day 

bombardment it is essential to 

select a large field. Airplanes 

loaded with bombs require a 

long runway to take off. As they 

climb slowly they must have 

considerable distance in which to 

attain sufficient altitude to clear 

the natural obstacles which generally surround a field. The necessity, especially during an offensive, to take off on short notice, and to take up formation 

quickly, requires the squadrons 

to leave the ground together. 

Therefore, a large airdrome is 

absolutely essential for the efficiency of the group. 

10. Day bombardment airdromes as a general rule are 

situated at 35 kilometers from 

the front lines that the airplanes 

may attain their bombing altitude without making unnecessary detours before crossing the 

lines. Working within the limits 

8. Security embraces all measabove laid down the selection of 

an airdrome, as regards security, 

should be made with a consideration of the following principles: 

It should be away frlom all 

landmarks which are visible at 

night, such as streams, intersecting highways, and large cities. 

An airdrome situated alongside a 

forest affords great security, as 

the hangars and buildings can be 

concealed among the trees. Care 

should be taken to place the 

hangars on a well defended 

edge of the forest. The day 

bombardment fields at Amanty 

and Maulan were good examples of forest security. On many 

occasions enemy night bombers 

could be heard circling the forest, but the airdromes were 

never hit by even stray bombs. 

These airdromes were also good 

examples of camouflaging material. The colors of the hangars, 

and buildings, blended so well 

with the colors of the forests that 

it was difficult to locate either 

airdrome even in daylight, especially if the clouds were low and 

the known landmarks in the vicinity hidden. The hangars 

should be spaced at least 100 

meters apart so that thle maximum effect of one bomb would 

be one hangar. All hangars and 

buildings should be camouflaged 

to blend with the surrounding 

color. As most night rabders carry 

incendiary bombs great care 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

387 

must be taken in choosing camouflage material and in the disposition of inflamables. The gasoline stores must be placed a 

safe distance from the hangars 

or other likely targets. 

bardment airdromes from the 

front usually is a sufficient safeguard against daylight raids. But 

it is always well to organize a 

system of defense against low 

flying enemy airplanes. This defense usually consists of machine 

gun emplacements around the 

airdrome so placed that the enemy airplanes will have to pass 

through a barrage before reaching a bombing position over the 

hangars. At times the exigencies 

of the service make it necessary 

for day bombardment airdromes 

to be placed close to the front, 

as for example, when operating 

in a constricted area. When airdromes are close to the front, 

earthworks and bombproof shelters must be erected around 

quarters as protection for the 

personnel against air raids and 

shell fire. 

12. The distance of day bom13. Each group should be 

mobile, and should have ample 

transportation facilities to move 

all its material in case of a general advance or retreat. Lack of 

transportation has occasioned 

great losses in material. Units 

operating near the lines should 

have their supplies or spare parts 

packed in boxes with hinged 

doors, to be loaded on trucks at 

the first alarm. The offices 

should be in trailers so that all 

the records can be carried away. 

Orders covering emergencies 

should be prepared in advance 

and understood by those responsible for carrying them 

into effect. 

Chapter VI." Group 

Organization 

16. Group Commander. 

Group Operations offic:er. 

Group Adjutant. 

Group Armament Officer. 

Group Supply Officer. 

Group Instrument officer. 

Group Radio officer. 

Group Photographic Officer. 

Group Officer in charge 

of flying field. 

Group Police officer. 

Group Surgeon. 

Group Transportation 

officer. 

17. The efficiency of a group 

depends primarily upon the organization of its commissioned 

personnel. The principal duties 

of the group officers are here 

designated in order of importance. 

11. The index in Gorrell's History. D-1. p 165. 

lists Chapter IV, Orders, and Chapter V, 

Marches and Convoys, which are omitted from 

the text. D-1, p 236. Those two chapters are 

included in Circular 76 by reference to the portinent chapters of Part I. 
388 Postwar Review 

Group Commander 

18. The group commander 

has all the administrative duties 

of a post commander. He is also 

responsible for the operations of 

his group, the orders for which 

he receives from the G3 Army 

through the Army Air Service 

Commander. In compliance with 

these operation orders he issues 

orders to his squadron commanders for the execution of the 

designated missions. Unless specifically covered in orders from 

higher authority the group commander’s orders cover the following essentials: 

(a) The number of formations and the number of airplanes in each. 

(b) The types and weights 

of projectiles to be used. 

(c) The time of departure, 

the order of departure of each 

formation, the route, altitude, 

and time of arrival at objective. 

The duties of the group commander should be so coordinated that the minimum amount 

of time will be spent in the office. 

It is essential for him to keep in 

personal touch with all his 

squadron commanders, and to 

create a feeling of sympathy with 

all his flying personnel. Flight 

commanders and leading observers should feel at liberty to 

make suggestions to him regarding changes in the execution of 

raids, which is possible only if he 

adopts an attitude of sympathy 

toward the elements pf his command. He must make frequent 

visits to group commanders of 

the other branches of aviation, 

especially those of pursuit 

groups, as such conferences are 

the surest means of acquiring 

cooperation in aviation as a 

whole, and of putting into effect 

in his group the best methods 

used by all the others. It is his 

duty to instruct his squadron 

commanders fully regarding the 

parts their respective squadrons 

will take in the raids. He must be 

a flying officer, and should participate in such raids as his duties 

will permit. It is absolutely essential for him to participate in 

enough over-the-lines duty to 

become familiar with the actual 

execution of raids. With the development of the wireless telephone he will be able to direct 

the execution of a bombing raid 

from a point of vantage impossible to a formation leader. 

Operations Officer 

cany out the will of the group 

commander much the Same as 

an adjutant does that of a post 

commander. He should be chosen for his executive ability, preferably a leading observer who 

has had considerable experience 

over the lines. He will have immediate supervision of group 

operations. It is his duty: 

(a) To compile and keep 

available for the group cornmander and flying personnel all 

information of value in the preparation of bombing raids. 

(b) To keep an indexed file 

of photographs, and a supply of 

maps for the pilots and observers. He will post in the operations room a map of tho sector 

(1 to 80,000, or 1 to 50,000 

scales) in which the group is 

operating, also a map (1 to 

200,000) showing the lines of 

the entire front with the changes 

as they occur. For the instruction 

of the flying personnel he will 

post maps upon which are indicated the location of all antiaircraft batteries, airdromes, artilley positions, hospitals and balloons, both our own and those 

of the enemy. 

(c) To post on a bulletin 

board all orders and communications, and all bulletins of the 

Army, Army corps and divisions, 

which may be of interest to pilots 

and observers of the group. 

19. The operations officer will 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

389 

(d) To transmit all information obtained from squadron operations officers to the Army Air 

Service Commander, and to file 

the raid reports of each squadron with the records of the 

group. 

(e) To supervise the work 

of the group photographic officer, to see that all possible photographs of the raids are taken 

and proper distribution of the 

prints made. 

group pilot and observer detailed to instruct new pilots and 

observers in the theory and 

practice of bombing. 

(g) To instruct selected officers in the duties of the operations office, to supply operations 

officers to new squadrons. 

(h) To post silhouettes of 

all types of our own and enemy 

airplanes in places where they 

can be studied by all pilots and 

observers. 

(i) To keep in touch with 

the meteorological station, and 

to post at least twice daily the 

reports of weather and air conditions. 

The group operations officer 

should keep intelligence charts 

showing all the bombing objectives, and mark daily on duplicate copies the bombardments 

effected. He should keep up to 

date all information of the number and types of enemy aircraft 

in the sector, their air tactics, 

and the best methods to combat 

them. He is responsible for the 

correct interpretations of the 

photographs taken by the group, 

(f) To supervise the work of 

and for utilizing the information 

thus obtained. He is further responsible for the establishing 

and maintenance of internal liaison, liaison with G2 Army, 

A.A.S.C., and all the pursuit 

wings and other groups. 

Armament Officer. 

armament officer are: 

(a) To exercise general supervision over the entire armament of the group. 

(b) To advise the group 

commander on the best types of 

bombs available for a particular 

purpose. 

(c) To maintain a close liaison with the ordnance department that the squadrons may 

obtain, at the earliest date, any 

improvements in bombs, ammunition, guns or armor. 

20. The duties of the group 

(d) To maintain a personal 

liaison with the armament officers of all aviation units, and to 

take advantage of the improvements evolved by them. 

(e) To advise the supply 

officer of the needs of the group 

in armament, and see that requisitions are made out to supply them. 

The duties of the armament 

officer are very important in the 

group. He is responsible for the 

storing and care of explosives, 

and for the protection of the 

airplanes against incendiary budlets in combat. He should be an 

officer of great initiative as mojt 

of the improvements in armament will be developed from 

suggestions made by him to the 

ordnance department. Nearly all 

real and effective improvements 

result from experience gained at 

the front. 

Supply Officer 

21. The main duty of the 

group supply officer is to keep 

on hand an adequate but not 

an over supply of spare parts. 

Enough spare parts is necessaiy 

to permit the group to operate 

at maximum efficiency; an over 

supply decreases the mobility of 

the unit when ordered to move. 

It requires a constant study of 

the spare parts used by the 

group to estimate the amount 

necessary. To prevent an over 

accumulation of spare parts th4a 

group supply officer must supervise the work of the squadron 

officers and issue spare parts to 
390 Postwair Review 

the squadron only when actually 

needed for particular repairs. By 

personal visits to the parks one 

can leam what supplies are on 

hand, and what expected, and 

thus avoid submitting many useless requisitions. 

Instrument Officer. 

22. The duties of the instrument officer are: 

(a) To keep in adjustment 

all delicate instruments used in 

bombing. 

(b) To keep up to date 

information on the manufacture 

and improvement of such instruments. 

(c) To recommend improvements in the instruments 

and requisition new and improved types. 

Radio Officer. 

Radio officer are: 

lation and testing of all radio 

equipment. 

(b) To install and test all 

wireless telephones. 

(c) To operate the radio 

station. 

(d) To carry out orders from 

the group operations officer in 

establishing liaison with all other 

radio stations at the front. 

Photographic Officer 

photographic officer are: 

tographic section. 

and installation in the airplanes 

of all the cameras. 

properly developed and prints 

made. 

(d) To see that all prints are 

properly marked. 

(e) To make the correct 

interpretations of the photographs. 

are efficient in the manipulation 

of the camera. 

(9) To collect all the cameras after a raid, and to assume 

responsibility for the plates exposed by the observers. 

Officer in Charge of Flying Field. 

25. The officer in charge of 

the flying field is responsible for 

23. The duties of the Group 

(a) To supervise the instal24. The duties of the group 

(a) To command the pho- 

(b) To supervise the care 

(c) To see that all plates are 

(f) To see that the observers 

discipline on the field. His duties 

include the following: 

(a) That pilots comply 

strictly with the rules for taking 

off and landing, and for piloting 

while in the air. 

(b) That the sleeves are 

properly placed and working all 

the time. 

(c) That the landling T is 

always out in the day time to 

indicate exactly the direction of 

the wind. 

(d) That flares and landing 

flights are ready and properly 

placed to aid airplanes landing 

after night has fallen. 

(e) That all wrecked airplanes are removed from the 

airdrome without delay. 

(f) To superintend the 

maintenance of the terrain of 

the airdrome that the field be in 

the best possible condition for 

airplanes to take off and land. 

(9) To see that airplanes 

parked outside the hangars are 

properly aligned. 

The officer in charge of the 

flying field has a very important 

bearing on the proper functioning of the group. His (discipline 

must be very strict. M.any infractions of the field rules are made 

by pilots returning from a raid in 

which the airplanes have suffered from anti-aircraft or enemy 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

391 

airplane attacks. The officer in 

charge of the flying field must 

report every breach of discipline 

to the group commander. There 

is a tendency for the group commander to overlook breaches of 

discipline when there has been 

a severe combat, but the field 

officer must enforce the flying 

rules to safeguard against accidents. The officer in charge of 

the flying field also assumes 

command of the ground targets 

for aerial gunners. He should 

see that the targets are properly 

placed, and danger flags sent up 

during practice. 

Police OfFcers. 

26. The police officer can be 

given the odd jobs which do not 

seem important, but which must 

be done for the proper maintenance of the group, when operating against the enemy. It is his 

duty: 

(a) To see that the camp is 

kept clean. 

(b) To see that all oil, gasoline drums and other material 

which cannot be sheltered are 

properly placed and neatly 

arranged. 

(c) To see that necessary 

walks are laid out and maintained. 

(d) To take proper precautions to protect the camp against 

fire, and to see that fire fighting 

facilities are maintained. 

(e) To see that the enlisted 

personnel use the latrines ordered by the surgeon, and when 

a group occupies an airdrome 

temporarily it is difficult to make 

the enlisted personnel observe 

the above regulation. 

(f) To see that an airdrome 

when evacuated is left in proper 

condition. 

Surgeon. 

health and sanitation of the 

group. Close supervision of the 

group surgeon by the group 

commander is necessary. He 

should have a comfortable 

building as a hospital in which 

to treat flying personnel suffering 

from only temporary ailments. 

There is a tendency on the part 

of most group surgeons to evacuate pilots and observers for a 

27. The surgeon cares for the 

month or more for slight indispositions which could be curled 

in three days at the group hospital. 

The group surgeon will see 

that a medical officer is on duty 

during flying hours, and an ambulance with a driver on the 

field. 

Group Transportation Officer. 

group transportation officer is 

the care of all transportation. 

on the group supply officer for 

28. The principal duty of the 

(a) He will make requisition 
392 

- -- 

Postwar Review 

all transportation and spare parts 

needed. 

employment of the transportation in all marches and convoys. 

(c) He will see that his 

chauffeurs are properly instructed in all traffic regulations. 

(d) He will see that his enlisted personnel is properly instructed in the care and upkeep 

of all motor vehicles. 

(e) He will see that no 

transportation is driven from the 

park that is not in proper condition. 

(f) He will be directly under 

the supervision of the group 

commander, and will assign no 

transportation without his 

consent. 

Group Adjutant. 

29. The group adjutant will 

carry out the administrative duties of the group, and will bear 

the same relation to the group 

commander that the adjutant of 

a post does to the post commander. 

(b) He will supervise the 

Chapter VII. The Squadron 

30. Squadron commander. 

Adjutant. 

Operations officer. 

Ordnance officer. 

Engineer officer. 

Supply officer. 

31. The squadron commander 

is responsible for the operations 

of his squadron. He should be a 

natural leader of men. His 

squadron will have no more initiative than he personally shows, 

nor will the morale of his command be higher than his own. 

He must be a flying officer and 

must so perfect his organization 

as to have time to lead frequent 

raids. His adjutant must be capable of looking after the preparation of raids. Squadron commanders should be chosen from 

the best flight leaders gifted with 

executive ability. His more specific duties are: 

sary for the execution of 

missions. 

tion to his flight leaders on points 

not covered by the Operations 

officer. 

(c) To give personal instruction to his flying personnel on 

the tactics employed in the execution of missions. 

(d) To acquire sufficient intimacy with his flying officers to 

enable him to judiciously select 

pilots and observers for special 

missions. 

(a) To issue orders neces- 

(b) To give special instrucAdjutant. 

administrative duties of the 

squadron. 

Operations Officer. 

tions officer include: 

available for the squadron commander and flying personnel all 

information of value in the preparation of bombing raids. 

(b) To keep an indexed file 

of photographs, and a :;upply of 

maps for the pilots and observers. He will post in the operations room a map of the sector 

(1 to 8O,OOO, or 1 to 50,000) in 

which the squadron is operating, 

also a map (1 to 200,000) showing the lines of the entire front 

with the changes as they occur. 

For the instruction of the flying 

personnel he will post maps 

upon which are indicated the 

location of all anti-aircraft batteries, airdromes, artillery positions, 

hospitals and balloons, both our 

own and those of the ernemy. 

(c) To post on a bulletin 

board all orders and coimmunications, and all bulletins of the 

Army, army corps or divisions, 

which may be of interest to pilots 

and observers of the squadron. 

32. To the adjutant fall the 

33. The duties of the opera- 

(a) To compile anti keep 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

3 93 

(d) To post silhouettes of all 

types of our own and enemy 

airplanes in places where they 

can be studied by pilots and 

observers. 

cers in the duties of the squadron operations officer. 

(f) To make proper preparations for all the raids. 

(9) To compile all information submitted by pilots and observers returning from a raid and 

make written report of same to 

group operations officer. 

(h) To see that the orders of 

the squadron commander are 

transmitted to the flying personnel. 

tions room similar to that of the 

group operations officer. 

Ordnance Officer. 

34. The ordnance officer is 

under the supervision of the 

group armament officer, and is 

responsible for the armament of 

the squadron. His duties are: 

(a) To test and calibrate all 

ammunition. 

(b) To supervise the care of 

all machine guns. 

(e) To instruct selected offi- 

(i) To maintain an opera- 

(c) To synchronize all machine guns mounted to shoot 

through the propeller, and to 

adjust all sights. 

bombs on all airplanes scheduled for raids. 

(e) To see that all bomb 

sights and bomb racks function 

properly. 

(f) To test all pyrotechnics. 

(9) To care for all the explosives in the squadron. 

(h) To see that all machine 

guns mounted for a raid function 

properly. 

Engineer Officer. 

35. The engineer officer has 

supervision of all the airplanes, 

spare parts and the E. & R. 

shops. His duties are: 

(a) To supervise the overhauling of all motors and the 

aligning of all airplanes, and to 

make all necessary repairs. 

Supply Officer 

ron supply officer are: 

(a) To take charge of 

squadron stores and supplies. 

(b) To make necessary requisitions to the group supply officer for supplies needed in the 

operations of the squadron. 

(d) To supervise placing the 

36. The duties of the squadChapter VIII. Reliminary 

Training at the Front 

37. No matter how thorough 

the course of training given ait 

the instruction centers, no bombardment unit is prepared to 

begin actual operations against 

the enemy when it arrives at the 

front. The knowledge that the 

enemy is but twenty minutes 

away brings home to the pilots 

and observers the realities of 

war. Hying behind the lines, and 

a short review of the things they 

have learned at training schools, 

soon impress them with these 

realities, and lead to rapid and 

real preparation for work over 

the lines. 

38. The pilots and observers 

will be given a review of their 

theoretical course of instruction 

to ascertain their fitness for further service. If their previous 

training is found to be sufficient 

they will be taught from maps, 

the exact location of the lines, 

and all the topographical features of the sector. Special attention will be directed to prominent landmarks. They will acquaint themselves with the position of all our troops, anti-aircraft batteries, as well as those 

of the enemy. They must learn 

the location of all bombing objectives and be able to identify 

them from photographs. Thep 

must be able to identify at a 

glance silhouettes of all our own 

and enemy airplanes. They will 

be given instruction in the enemy methods of attack and our 
394 Postwar Review 

tactics for defense. Formation 

flights will be made evey day, 

approaching nearer to the lines. 

Pilots and observers who are 

paired off in teams will always 

fly together when possible. They 

should live together in the same 

quarters, and know each other 

intimately. On the practice flights 

the pilots will be given an objective, and the time will be fixed 

for leaving the ground and 

bombing the target. The formation will pass over the flying field 

at a given altitude for inspection 

by the commanding officer. 

39. When the flight returns to 

the airdrome the signal to break 

formation will be given by the 

leading observer. The pilots will 

obey the rules of the flying field, 

landing with the T, and in rotation. This practice will be continued until the pilots and observers know the sector perfectly and 

can adhere to the time schedule 

while flying tight formation with 

a full load of bombs. The observers will make observations, 

practice signals with Vey pistols, 

take photographs, and submit 

raid reports to the operations 

officer immediately after landing. 

During this period the pilots and 

observers will be given instruction in aerial gunnery with 

shooting practice at ground targets. The Observers must become expert machine gunners to 

be successful in combat with 

hostile aircraft. This training will 

give the squadron commander 

an opportunity to select his flight 

leaders, and the observers who 

are to specialize in photography, 

reconnaissance and protection. 

40. Leading observers will be 

chosen from those making the 

best records at the bombing 

schools. After operations have 

begun other observers will be 

given an opportunity to qualify 

in leading. Some observers 

make excellent records in training centers, but fail in duty over 

the lines, and vice versa. After 

this training the squadron will be 

ready to begin real operations. 

Large targets which are close to 

the lines and easy to hit should 

be chosen as objectives for the 

first raids. 

Chapter IX. Preparation 

for a Raid 

tives will be designated by G3 

of the Army, and transmitted 

through the Army Air Service 

Commander to the commander 

of the group. Upon receipt of 

those orders he will delcide upon 

the following: 

tions and the number of airplanes in each. 

(b) The types and weights 

of projectiles to be carried. 

(c) The route, altitude, and 

time of departure and oarrival 

over objective of each formation. 

(d) The method of pursuit 

cooperation. 

The pilots and observers must 

be allowed ample time to acquaint themselves with all available information regarding the 

objective, both primary and seconday, the route, and the region to be observed arid photographed. The squadron commanders will designate the pilots 

and observers who are to participate in the raid, and are responsible for their preparation for the 

execution of the mission. They 

will designate their flight leaders, 

and deputy flight leaders, and 

will assign positions in the formation to the rest of the teams 

scheduled for the raid. The 

squadron operations officers will 

then prepare the operalion order, a copy of which will be sent 

to the group operations officer. 

41. Day bombardment objec- 

(a) The number of forma- 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

3'95 

The Formations 

42. Day bombardment squadrons will invariably work in formation. The formation should be 

large, as many as eighteen airplanes being easily controlled by 

a leader when working at high 

altitude. For low flying formations in bad weather, eight is the 

maximum that can be employed. All formations must have 

the following characteristics: 

(a) Simplicity. 

(b) No dead angles. 

(c) Concentration of fire to the rear. (d) Concentration of fire below 

the center of the formation. 

(e) Compactness. 

(f) Each airplane must be able 

to see the leader. 

All formations, whatever the 

number, should fly in a "V' 

formation with the rear of the V 

closed. Formations of more than 

ten should have one airplane in 

the center of the V at the average altitude of the V. Airplanes 

in formation should be numbered as follows: 

1 

32 

5 12 4 

7 6 

9 11 10 8 

Number 1 is the leader and flies 

at the lowest altitude, Numbers 

2, and 3, 4 and 5, and similarly 

placed pairs should fly at the 

same altitude, numbers 2 and 3 

about fifty meters higher than 

number 1, and about thirty meters to the right and left of nutnber 1, respectively. Number 4 

takes the same position relative 

to number 2 and number 2 with 

reference to number 1; and 

number 6 takes the same position with relation to number 3. 

Formations should be as compact as possible, especially when 

dropping projectiles; during a 

combat. formations should close 

Day bombardment 

operation of one wing. na 

* 

Day Bombard- Purh Triplace men1 Biplace monoplace 
3 96 

up. Too much emphasis cannot 

be laid upon the training of day 

bombardment pilots in formation 

flying. If the pilots maintain a 

regular echelonrnent in height, in 

case of emergency they can 

close up quickly upon the leader 

by diving. The leader should 

never open his throttle wide, and 

Observers should always warn 

their pilots whenever their own 

or any other airplane appears to 

be getting out of formation. It is 

fatal for an airplane to leave the 

formation, and the formation 

should not be broken up to protect an airplane which has 

dropped out. 

The Take Off 

43. The pilots and observers 

should be in readiness on the 

field at least thirty minutes before the formation is scheduled 

to leave the ground, reporting to 

the respective operations officers. This will give the operations 

officers time to place any unavailable pilots or observers. The 

pilots will utilize this time to 

make a thorough inspection of 

their airplanes and test their motors, and the observers to arrange their maps, Very pistols, 

ammunition drums and to inspect their machine guns. If the 

flying field is sufficiently large the 

formation will be assembled on 

the ground. The flight leader and 

pilots 2 and 3 leave the ground 

simultaneously; 4 and 5 will start 

as soon as the wheels of 2 and 3 

are in the air, and so on until the 

whole formation is in flight. The 

leader will throttle down as soon 

as he has attained sufficient altitude to do so with safety. When 

all the airplanes are in position 

the flight leader may make up 

traveling speed in climbing, but 

never full speed. The only practicable formation maneuver is a 

figure 8 on a wide circuit of 

about five kilometers. 

Day bombardmant 

operation of one wrlng. 

z + PUrSUlt f DayBombard- Mono- Tri-place mend Blplme place 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

397 

Flight to the Objectiue 

44. The formation will attain 

an altitude of about 1000 meters 

in the vicinity of the airdrome, 

and then upon the signal of one 

white star from the leading airplane, follow the prescribed 

course to the lines. The bombing 

altitude, generally 4,000 meters 

or higher, must be attained before the formation is within five 

kilometers of the lines, in order 

that the leading observer may 

make the calculations necessary 

for the adjustments of his sight 

without being molested by antiaircraft fire or enemy airplanes. 

The target may be approached 

either up or down wind. The 

formation should be tight upon 

crossing the lines. Any airplane 

which cannot hold its position in 

the formation must return to the 

airdrome. 

Bombing the Objectioe 

45. When nearing the objective the leading observer will 

steer his pilots by means of reins 

attached to the pilot’s arms. This 

is necessary because the pilot 

has a limited visibility of objects 

directly under his airplane. The 

leading observer should recheck 

his calculations, and then fire the 

“Prepare to Bomb” signal of six 

green stars. When the image of 

the target appears at the black 

line in the bomb sight he will pull1 

the bomb dropping lever. All 

other observers, or pilots as the 

case may be, will release their 

Day bombardment 

operation of one group. t 

tt t’t tt tt 5Spads .f. SSpads 

t 

tf ** tt 

T tr 

tt * 5 Spads 

t t 10 Breguet 

* * Photographic Plane f * tt 

* 5 Spads 

* Tri-place 3 Spads 3- Tri-place * tt 

3 Spads 

a 

t 

tt 

3 Spads 

t 

5 Spads 

tt tt tf 

t * 

* 

* 

* Tri-place 10 Breguet 

-I= * Tri-place 

Photographic Plane i- 

-I= 

tfr ** tT 

5 Spads * Tri-Qlacs 

* 

Tri-place 10 Breguet ** f -I=* 

t T Photographic Plane * rr 

3 Spads 3 Tri-place 

I f * 

tTT 

tt 

5 Spads 

t 

tf 

3 Spads 

t 

5 Spads 

tt ‘t 

r 

?t 3 Stlads 

‘f Pursuit at 1300-1400 meters 

Pursuit Day Bombard- Bomber at 12W meters monoplace ment Biplace Tri-place Triplace at 1200 meters 
398 Postwar Review 

bombs the moment those of the 

leading airplane are seen to 

leave the racks. Great accuracy 

has been obtained by using this 

method of bombing. Precision 

bombing over the lines is an art 

in which only a few observers 

excel. Such observers should be 

chosen for leading or deputy positions. Bomb sighting requires 

cool judgment and intensive observation of the target. Excitement causes inaccuracies. If but 

one observer does the sighting 

he knows that all the others are 

acting as protection, and his excitement is thus lessened. 

46. When several formations 

are sent to bomb the same objective they should bomb at 

thirty second intervals. Upon 

leaving the objective they should 

all turn in the same direction. In 

the performance of a day bombardment mission it is essential 

that the formations reach the objectives exactly on time in order 

that successful cooperation with 

the pursuit units designated may 

be assured. With successful pursuit cooperation great damage 

can be inflicted upon the enemy 

with the minimum losses to both 

day bombardment and pursuit. 

Chart Showing 

Functions of Different 

Branches of Air Service. 

Meters 

5,500 0pn:iy- p."I"yi! 1-0 p!P-tb of -5 -m!ks-yn.e~iy!o-n- ~ 

- 

- - 

- - Day Bombardment of rear areas - ............................ ...............- ~ - - 

- - Army Reconnaissance of rear areas 5000 _-_ - ........................................... ..- - 

- - - - Corps Observation to depth 01 5 miles - ............................. __- - - 

Balloon 

too0 

Enemy 

Balloon 

I Low flying pursuit 

Low flying Battleplanes(1nfantry Starting) - 

No Mans Land 

An observer and pilot demonstrate steering 

the pilot to the objective by reins. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

3'99 

During the Argonne-Meuse offensive the cooperation between 

day bombardment and pursuit 

was responsible for seventy-five 

per cent of the enemy airplanes 

brought down by the 1st Pursuit 

Wing. 

The Return Route 

47. To spend the minimum 

amount of time over hostile territory is the aim of every formation leader. The route from the 

objective back to the lines must 

be chosen with consideration of 

the direction of the wind, the 

position of the sun, the location 

of cloud banks, the most accurate enemy anti-aircraft batteries, 

and the probable direction of 

attack by enemy aircraft. If the 

presence of hostile aircraft does 

not make it inadvisable the formation leader should always 

take the advantage of the wind 

to regain the lines. It is sometimes advisable to fly toward the 

sun, and thus put the enemy 

under the disadvantage of facing 

the strong light. The leader 

should avoid passing under 

clouds which offer concealment 

to hostile airplanes. Clouds under the formation or at the same 

level, may be utilized for protection. Frequent changes of direction should be made, but they 

should be made slowly. Rapid 

changes of direction may cause 

a rear airplane to lag, which USUally results in its destruction. 

Speed does not enter very much 

into the safe return of the formation. The formation should be 

formed to afford no vulnerable 

point of attack, as its safety depends upon its fire superiority. 

Breaking Formation and 

Landing 

48. Having recrossed the 

lines, beyond which enemy pursuit airplanes seldom venture, 

the formation leader begins a 

long glide toward the airdrome. 

When nearing the landing field 

the leading observer fires a 

green rocket as a signal to break 

formation. The airplanes circle 

the airdrome and land accordiing 

to number in formation, Number 

1 first, followed by Number 2, 

and so on. All airplanes land into 

the wind, as indicated by the 'T. 

The landing rules must be strictly 

observed. The observers and pilots report immediately to their 

respective operations officers on 

the field, and submit written raid 

reports, which include results (of 

the bombardment, observations 

of enemy movements on the 

ground and in the air, the nurnber of enemy airplanes brought 

down, and our own losses. 

Low Bombing Raids 

49. At the beginning of an 

advance, or during an offensive, 

by either friendly or hostile 

troops, there are occasions when 

day bombardment must resort to 

low bombing. Such conditions 

arise when the weather conditions are such that altitude cannot be attained to cany out the 

imperative bombardments. 

Other occasions are when certain bridges must be destroyed, 

but the topographical features 

around the objective make it impossible for artilley fire to accomplish that destruction. Day 
400 Postwar Review 

bombardment must be used at 

low altitudes against such 

objectives. 

50. The time element often 

prevents the accomplishment of 

such missions. The day bombardment airdromes are at considerable distance from the front 

lines, and time is required for 

transmitting the information, and 

for warming up the high powered engines. Often the conditions have changed before the 

bombers amve at the objective. 

A heavily loaded bombing airplane is slow in climbing and 

maneuvers, and therefore unsuited for this kind of work. The 

best type of airplane for low 

bombing is one that can climb 

and maneuver quickly. The rotay engine, which is air cooled, 

and can be started vey readily, 

and which continues to run after 

being hit by enemy bullets, 

would, therefore be better than 

the fiied motor for low bombing. The accuracy and volume of 

ground fire causes so many 

losses that low bombing is extremely costly, even if our forces 

have supremacy of the air. 

51. When orders are received 

for a low bombing mission the 

group commander decides the 

number of airplanes to be sent in 

formation, never more than six. 

Great care should be taken in 

selecting the leader. He should 

be daring and know the terrain 

perfectly, and the exact location 

of our own troops. The pilots 

should be chosen for their skill 

and daring, as there is always 

danger of collisions when,the 

bombers operate at vey low altitudes. When descending to 

bomb the pilots should “strafe” 

the objective, to demoralize the 

enemy and prevent accurate fire 

from the ground. The observers 

use their machine guns before 

and after they have released 

the bombs. 

Chapter X. Combiat 

52. General Principles. The 

three general tactical principles 

in order of their importance are: 

(a) The effective bombing of the 

objective. 

(b) The reduction of our losses 

to a minimum. 

(c) The inflicting of the greatest 

kmes to enemy aviation. Tactics of 

day bombardment in combat are, 

therefore, defensive, 

53. Due to the size of a bombing formation, and the slow maneuvers necessary, quick changes 

of direction and steep dives are 

impracticable. The bombers must 

depend upon the nature of their 

formation, which should be such 

as to give them fire suiperiority. 

The formation should have symmetry, simplicity and compactness, with no dead angles, and 

should permit a concentration of 

fire to the rear and below the 

center. Each pilot must be able 

to see the leader. A formation 

so formed, with well trained pilots and observers, can defend 

itself against superior riumbers 

of the enemy. 

54. The formation is limited to 

the number of airplanes which 

can be maneuvered b!y a formation leader. The importance of 

the objective determinces the 

number of airplanes to be employed in a particular raid. When 

the number required is greater 

than can be used in one formation the mission passes from 

squadron size to that clf the 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

401 

group. The plan of group bombing is analogous to the chain 

formation employed by pursuit 

aviation. The several flight leaders are subordinate to the leader 

of the leading formation, and 

must make their tactics correspond to his. It is a governing 

principle that the chain of responsibility must never be broken, from airplane to airplane in 

the squadron, and from formation to formation in the group. 

This leads to the question of 

formation leaders, upon whom 

the success or failure of operations very largely depends. 

Formation Leader 

55. A formation leader to be 

successful must have the absolute confidence of his pilots and 

observers. Under definite orders 

at all times, much depends upon 

his quick decisions and accurate 

estimates of tactical situations. 

The tactical situation often 

changes his plans. The appearance of cloud banks, a change in 

the direction of the wind, a sudden burst of sunlight, or new 

methods of attack by the enemy, 

make it imperative for him to 

think and act quickly to carry out 

his mission in the face of altered 

conditions. He must know just 

what reliance can be placed on 

each pilot. He must so arrange 

his pilots, and the chain of responsibility in the formation, that 

no matter how great the losses 

incurred the formation will preserve its units. He must be a 

model of discipline, and enforce 

the same from his pilots. Though 

tempting aircraft targets often 

appear he must remember that 

the safety of the formation depends upon its unity, and neither 

he nor any other pilot should 

break formation to attack individually. He must sacrifice 

chances for personal glory in 

combat to the object of his mission, which is to reach and 

bomb the objective and return 

without loss. 

Enemy Methods of Attack 

56. The deciding element in 

aerial combat is usually surprise. 

The enemy will employ all 

means at his disposal to conceal 

his approach. His most usual 

methods are to climb into the 

sun, and approach from that direction with the advantage of 

light and altitude. When the enemy gets between a formation 

and the sun he often escapes 

detection until he actually opens 

fire. He will also take advantage 

of cloud banks to screen his approach. Sometimes when operating as a chain one flight of 

enemy pursuit airplanes will follow the bombers to attract their 

attention, while other flights approach unnoticed. His aim is to 

break up the formation, or at 

least isolate several of the bombers, and then by concentration 

to destroy them. Sometimes a 

single enemy pursuit airplane 

will fly below and in front of the 

formation in an attempt to entice 

a bombing pilot to dive at him. 

Other enemy airplanes, at 

greater altitudes, will immediately dive on the bomber thus 

separated from the formation. 

57. Having decided to attack, 

several of the enemy usually approach from the rear, and open 

fire at about 200 meters. While 

the observers are engaged with 

those at the rear other attacking 

airplanes will dive under the formation and attack from the dead 

angle under the tail. This attack 

is usually directed at the airplanes at the rear of the formation. Other airplanes will dive 
402 

rapidly at either side of the formation and rake the whole arm 

of the V with deflection fire. 

One, or perhaps two, will try to 

shoot down the leader, and thus 

break up the formation. Occasionally when the enemy has 

vastly superior numbers, he will 

make a determined rush at the 

formation. This attack, when 

made by experienced flights, is 

very hard to combat, especially if 

the bombers are inexperienced. 

An enemy formation sometimes 

flies parallel to the bombing formation at slightly greater altitude. In an attack of this kind the 

individual pilots make sudden 

dives at the flank of the bombers, deliver their bursts, and then 

sideslip to safety before regaining their positions alongside and 

above the formation. 

Methods of Defense 

58. The observer first to sight 

enemy airplanes fires a rocket of 

six red stars. The formation 

tightens up, and the observers 

fire at the nearest enemy airplanes. Fire is concentrated 

upon the leading airplanes until 

they turn back, or are brought 

down. When this is accomplished fire is brought to bear on 

the enemy airplanes which venture closest to the formation. 

During a combat the pilots watch 

the progress of the fighting by 

means of mirrors, and endeavor 

to maneuver their airplanes into 

the best firing positions for the 

observers, and at the same time 

keep their places in formation. 

The formation leader maneuvers 

to take advantage of the wind, 

clouds and sunlight. He should 

never increase the formation 

speed beyond that possible to 

the slowest airplane in the formation. In a group operation he 

will lead his formation so the 

guns of the other formations can 

be brought to bear on the enemy. The leaders of the other 

formations will maneuver to 

conform to the necessities of 

group protection. If an observer 

has his guns completely 

jammed, or if he is too badly 

wounded to operate his guns, 

the pilot will fly directly below 

the leader for protection. If a 

motor is put out of commission 

the pilot will attempt to regain 

the lines. The leader can sometimes maneuver a formation to 

protect a pilot who has been 

forced to drop out, but no pilot 

will leave the formation for that 

purpose. The leader rnust always 

bear in mind the prearranged 

cooperation with the pursuit, 

and try to lead the enemy toward the rendezvous. The pursuit airplanes can inflict great 

losses by attacking when the enemy is engaged with the 

bombers. 

Tactics of a Single Two-Seater 

59. When a bombing airplane 

becomes separated from the formation the pilot and observer 

generally have to fight their way 

back to the lines. A large bombing formation attracts enemy 

pursuit airplanes from over a 

wide area. Pilots with motor 

trouble, or forced to drop behind 

because of broken control wires, 

are attacked by enemy airplanes 

from the main combat as well as 

those which were too late to 

attack the formation proper. 

When thus attacked the pilot 

must fly an irregular course. He 

must give his observer every 

chance to fire bursts at favorable 

targets, and try to reach the lines 

as quickly as possible. If the attacking airplanes are riumerous, 

and the pilot, consideling the 

disability of his airplane, sees no 

chance to cut his way through, it 

is well to make a tight spiral in 

descending. Often a pilot can 

risk the accuracy of ground fire if 

such a maneuver would throw 

off the attacking airplanes. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

403 

Part V. Balloons 

Chapter I. Organization 

1. The Mobile Army. There 

should be a balloon company 

for each division, one for each 

corps, and three companies as 

reserve balloons for each army. 

These companies should be 

completely motorized in order to 

assure efficient functioning with 

the elements of the army with 

which they are working. 

details of organization, the 

amounts and kinds of transportation, and the factors on which 

the allowance of transportation is 

based are fixed in the Tables of 

Organization, Air Service, US. 

Army. 

Within a corps, a balloon 

company should be assigned to 

each division and one to the 

corps. These assignments should 

be permanent or at least continue while the divisions are with 

the corps, so that perfect liaison 

can be established. 

2. Tables of Organization. The 

Chapter 11. Information 

1. That which is collected in 

time of peace. This consists of a 

study of maps, of types of balloons and airplanes of our own 

and other nations, and of such 

other information as is available. 

2. That which is gathered in 

time of hostilities. This consists of 

all information gathered during 

hostilities by balloon companies 

at the front. In general this information is only that which is seen 

from the basket, relative to troop 

movements, destructions, enemy 

batteries, infantry actions, information on our own artillery fire, 

flares, explosions, fires, etc. This 

information is transmitted to the 

Information and Operation Sections of the General Staff of the 

unit with which the balloon is 

working. The means of communication is usually the telephone, 

but in the event of the failure of 

this means, recourse is had to 

radio-telegraphy, radio-telephony, visual signalling, or runner. 

3. The only other reconnaissance which balloon personnel is 

called upon to make is that by 

balloon observers in airplanes to 

make themselves more familiar 
404 

with the immediate field of operations. 

4. Reports. In addition to routine administrative reports, the 

following reports are submitted. 

(a) By balloon companies to 

Group Headquarters. 

(1) Daily balloon company report. 

(2) Observers’ ascension 

report. 

(3) Report on enemy balloons. 

(4) Daily hydrogen report. 

(b) By Balloon Group to 

Balloon Wing, and to General 

Staff of unit with which employed. 

Report. 

(c) By Balloon Wing to 

Army Air Service Operation Section. 

Report. 

(1) Daily Balloon Group 

(1) Daily Balloon Wing 

Chapter 111. Security 

Security embraces all those 

measures taken by a balloon 

company to protect itself from 

observation, annoyance, or surprise by the enemy. 

(a) From observation. This 

consists of all the ordinary precautions taken by troops in the 

field to prevent observation by 

the enemy. It further consists of 

all possible efforts to conceal the 

position of the balloon bed. This 

is effected by choosing defiladed 

positions which are also concealed by overhead Screens such 

as trees, vines, etc. It is further 

effected by the use of vari-colored camouflage balloon fabric. 

When the balloon is out of its 

bed, great care should always be 

taken to leave nothing in the 

vicinity of the bed which would 

disclose its position. All machine 

gun and automatic cannon positions should be screened from 

observation. When the balloon is 

in the air, screening should be 

provided for the winch, tender 

and personnel from aerial observation. These points cannot be 

too highly emphasized as they 

are vitally essential to uninterrupted functioning. 

(b) From annoyance. This 

consists of an equipment of machine guns and automatic cannon on anti-aircraft mounts 

manned by experienced personnel. As the chief sourl:e of annoyance by the enemy is their 

airplanes, specialists are trained 

in balloon companies whose 

only duties are to study continuously types of airplanes and to 

watch the sky for thern. These 

lookouts and the anti-aircraft armament personnel miist be 

highly trained. Furthermore, balloon company commiinders 

must always arrange to have at 

least one anti-aircraft (artillery 

battery within protective radius. 

sists of the usual precautions 

against surprise as well as the 

proper training and functioning 

of lookouts. 

(c) From surprise. This con- 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment of 

Air Service 

405 

Chapter IV. Marches 

A successful march, whether 

in peace or war, is one that 

places the company at its destination at the proper moment 

and in the best possible condition. 

In war, marches are of frequent occurrence, and success 

depends in a great measure 

upon the skill with which they 

are conducted. 

Balloon companies, being 

completely motorized, move always as a motor train. 

There are two types of 

marches undertaken by balloon 

companies: those with the balloon inflated, and those with the 

balloon packed. 

12 The maneuvering spider consisted Of 

several ropes-usually 4 in number, at least 1 

inch in diameter to permit firm hand grasp, and 

usually about 25 feet lo&-spliced into a common eye which was fastened to Me maneuvering block (pulley) through which passed the 

cable to the balloon The winch to which the 

cable was attached was sltuated some distance 

Iran the block, the latter being weighted with 

sand bags so as to keep it down near. but not 

touching, the ground The purposa of the spider 

was to provide a means of applying manpower 

to the block By pulling on the ropes. men could 

haul down the balloon when the winch was out 

of order, or they could maneuver the block so as 

to bring the balloon around an obstacle 

Marches with the balloon 

packed follow the rules and regulations prescribed for motor 

trains. 

The rate and length of 

marches with the balloon inflated depend on the tactical situation entirely. The rate is dependent only on the rate of 

travel of the winch transporting 

the balloon. 

The most common forms of 

obstacles encountered during a 

march with balloon inflated are 

wires crossing the road, camouflaging crossing the road, trees 

bordering the road, and tall 

buildings on narrow streets in 

villages. Wires may be either insulated or high tension, and radio antennae are sometimes 

found stretching across roads. 

These latter are usually on vey 

high poles or from the tops of 

tall trees. It is usually considered 

advisable in crossing wires to 

pull the wires down and when 

the winch has crossed them, to 

fasten them up immediately. 

This is far better than cutting the 

wires and splicing them together 

afterwards. Sometimes, however, wires must be cut and if 

they are, they should be immediately repaired. Often, it will be 

necessa y to maneuver the balloon over wires rather than to 

cut them or let them down, but 

the first two methods are better if 

the number of wires is not too 

great. In maneuvering the balloon over wires, use can be 

made of the tender in conjunction with the winch, or by throwing the maneuvering ropes over 

the obstacles one by one and 

slowly working the balloon over 

in that manner. 

With reference to maneuvering around trees, the height of 

the trees must be considered, 

their proximity to the road, extent to which branches reach 

over road, and the velocity and 

direction of the wind. The maneuvering spider1* can usually 

be used to vey good advantage 

in passing trees, and they may 

often be maneuvered around by 

what is known as “jockeying.” 

This consists of taking the opportunity, when the balloon 

swings back and forth in the 

wind, of catching it at the right 

angle and driving quickly past 

the tree. Most trees, however, 

can be passed by running the 

winch on the windward side of 

the road and by the use of the 

maneuvering spider. Occasionally the balloon can be put up 

100 meters higher than it is usually transported and then hauled 

down rapidly. This straightens 

out the cable and to some extent 

overcomes the action of the 
406 Postwar Review 

wind on the balloon by the rapid 

descent. If at the same time the 

winch moves, the obstacle can 

be passed. 

In passing through villages 

practically the same means can 

be used as in traveling along 

roads bordered with trees. 

The usual maneuvering height 

of a balloon is about 100 meters. 

This, of course, varies with the 

wind. 

Roads should be reconnoitered before the march so that 

the best roads can be picked. 

In maneuvering with the balloon inflated, the train should be 

made up as follows: 

(a) Light truck ahead carrying telephone material and personnel. 

(b) Winch, with winch crew, 

maneuvering officer, and the 

balloon. 

(c) The tender, transporting 

men of the maneuvering squad, 

and machine guns. 

(d) The remainder of the 

trucks, in whatever order is 

deemed best by the company 

commander. 

It is always more desirable to 

move by day than by night, but 

often, due to exigencies of the 

service, it becomes necessary to 

make night marches. If this becomes necessary a reconnaissance of the road by daylight is 

imperative. If it is possible to 

choose the time of marching, the 

early morning or the early evening are usually best as there is 

often a lull in the wind at 

those times. 

Chapter V. Combat 

1. Combat Principles. 

(a) Duties of Company 

Commander. In addition to his 

regular administrative duties, the 

company commander must be 

responsible for the proper use of 

the balloon, its defence, its 

marches, choosing of new sites, 

reconnaissance of roads, liaison 

with units which he is working, 

communications, and supplies. 

He is assisted in the ex‘ecution of 

these duties by the various officers within the company, but he 

himself is responsible for their 

proper accomplishment. 

Officer. The Maneuvering Officer 

has, under the supervision of the 

company commander, complete 

charge of the balloon and its 

accessories, the protection squad 

and the winch. He is responsible 

for the proper safeguarding of 

the balloon against attack, for 

the proper posting of his means 

.of defense, for the safety of the 

observers, and for the housing 

and precautions against observations for his balloon. 

(c) Protection against attack. 

Machine guns and automatic 

cannon should be so placed 

near the point of ascension as to 

give the best barrage against an 

attacking plane. Lookouts 

should be posted at most advantageous points from which they 

(b) Duties of Maneuvering 

can scan the sky. Thsey should 

be close enough to the ascension point, however, to permit of 

a clear transmission of warning 

by word of mouth. 

(d) Liaison. Group Commanders and Company Commanders should strive at all 

times to be in perfect liaison with 

the heavier-than-air units in their 

sector, the commanding officers 

of units with which the companies are working and the various 

section of the General Staff of 

Corps and Divisions. This is of 

utmost importance. 

(e) Combat Ord,ers should 

be issued by Group Commanders to their balloons. ’Those orders should conform to the combat orders of the corps and divisions. They should asign duties, 

and prescribe routes of movement either forward or rearward. 

(f) Army Balloon Wing 

Commanders are responsible for 

the reconnaissance of all roads 

in their sector. Maps should be 

published showing all roads 

passable for balloons. We should 

confer with Signal Officers of 

units in the Army and arrange so 

that no overhead wire crosses 

roads marked on the map “Balloon Roads.” He should see to 

the placing of signs, such as 

“Balloon Road-No Overhead 

Wires,” on all roads in the army 

sector which balloons may 

have to pass. 
Sherman: Tentative Manual 

for The Employment 

of Air Service 

407 

Offensive Combat 

1. During offensive combat, 

companies assigned to divisions 

move with the troops of the division. The liaison officer at the 

divisional P.C. transmits information and orders to the company commander relative to 

movements. In order to assure a 

place in the line of march in 

advance, the balloon company 

should be attached to a neighboring artillery unit, and move 

with it. The details of routes and 

positions are, of course, decided 

upon before the advance takes 

place. 

2. Eking in a position, with 

liability to move forward, in addition to the regular net of telephone lines, a forward line 

should be run and a forward 

telephone central established. 

The line should be run as far 

forward as possible, and the advance central placed so that it 

will be convenient to the next 

contemplated stop. This facilitates uninterrupted telephone 

communication with units with 

which the balloon is working. 

Defensiue Combat 

1. In a defensive sector, all 

roads to the rear should be reconnoitered and routes established by each company commander. On days when the balloon cannot ascend, the personnel of the company should be 

utilized to construct balloon beds 

and positions at intervals along 

the line of retirement as far to 

the rear as time permits. 

2. As in a advance, telephone 

lines should be run to the rear, a 

rear central established, and as 

many telephone preparations as 

possible made for successive 

rearward positions. 

Night Combat 

deal of work at night. They are 

able to see flares, signals, etc., 

but locations cannot ordinarily 

be accurately determined. By 

means of an electric signalling 

device, messages can be sent 

from balloons to front line positions and to the rear. Balloons 

can also be used as a receiving 

point for messages. 

1. Balloons cannot do a great 

Chapter VI. Artillery Adjustments 

1. To insure efficient cooperation with Artillery for the regulation of fire, balloon officers 

should meet with the artillery 

officers each evening for the 

purpose of securing detailed information concerning the batteries which will fire the following 

day and the targets which they 

will engage. It is a general rule 

that the evening conference 

should arrange to divide the observation so that balloons will 

observe fire for all targets which 

can be seen from balloons. All 

other targets will have the fire 

regulated by the airplanes of an 

observation squadron. When 

personal liaison of this kind is 

impossible the information from 

the artillery should be obtained 

by telephone. 

2. The balloon observers 

should know in advance the following: 

Coordinates of targets. 

Batteries which will fire. 

Caliber and number of pieces to 

Nature of fire (salvo or one piece 

Type of projectiles with time of 

Interval between shots. 

fire. 

at a time). 

flight and type of fuse. 
408 Postwar Review 

3. After securing information 

concerning the targets the observer should then procure the 

firing maps and photographs 

covering the target area. 

4. Adjustments are reported 

on the line battery target. Distances are reported in meters to 

the “right,” “left,” “over,” and 

“short,” stating first the deflection followed by the range, thus, 

“25 right,” “50 over.” 

5. Figures are given by their 

digits, i.e., “two five right,” “five 

zero over.” 

6. The telephone communication between balloon and battery should conform to the following example: 

Battery: “Battery ready to fire.” 

Observer: “Ready to observe.” 

Battery: “No. 1 on the way, 

etc.” 

“No. 2 on the way, 

etc.” 

Observer: 

etc.” 

7. Shots should be reported 

“lost” if not seen, but reported 

as “not in position to observe” 

when the movement of the basket, a passing cloud, or other 

“No. 1 two five right, 

obstacle prevents a proper view 

of the target. When a salvo is 

reported “lost” by an observer 

the artillery fires the next salvo 

with data intermediate between 

that and the last salvo seen and 

the one lost, but if the report is 

“not in a position to observe,” 

the salvo is repeated with the 

same data. 

8. In order to observe successfully for several batteries simultaneously, it is necessary to have 

very efficient fire and telephone 

discipline; also knowing accurately the batteries which are 

to fire. 


Appenaices 41 1 

1 Oct 1908 

4 Nov 1909 

3 Mar 1911 

24 Aug 1912 

2 Mar 1913 

27 Apr 1914 

4 Mar 1915 

31 Mar 1916 

29 Aug 1916 

14 Feb 1917 

12 May 1917 

12 Jun 1917 

15 Jun 1917 

24 Jul 1917 

6 Oct 1917 

8 Jul 1918 

9 Jul 1918 

4 Nov 1918 

Allotted by Board of Ordnance 

Allotted by Board of Ordnance 

Appropriated by Congress, FY 

Appropriation for FY 191 3 

Appropriation for FY 1914 

Appropriation for FY 191 5 

Appropriation for FY 1916 

Emergency Appropriation 

Appropriation for FY 191 7 

Aviation Seacoast Defenses 

Appropriation for FY 191 8 

Seacoast Defense, Panama 

Emergency Appropriation 

Emergency Appropriation 

Urgent Deficiency Act 

Aviation Stations, Seacoast DeEmergency Appropriation 

Appropriation 

and Fortifications 

and Fortifications 

1912 

Canal 

fenses 

25.0002 

5,0002 

125,0003 

100,00 

125,000 

250,OOO4 

300,000 

500,000 

13,881,6665 

4,800,000 

10,800,000 

750,000 

43,450,000 

640,000,000 

8,300,0006 

8,000,000 

884,304,758 

60,000,000 

A. Funds For Military Aviation' 190~1918 

- 

1. Adapted from chart prepared by Historical Section. Information Group, Air Service, 23 

May 1919. in History of the Bureau of Aircrafl Production (reproduced by Hist. Oft, AMC. 

1951). Vol I. p 104. 

2. For purchase 01 the Wright plane. 

3. $25.000 available immediately. 

4. $50.000 available immedialely. 

5. Includes $600.000 for purchasing land for aviation sites. 

6. Allocation from $40.000.000 lor Signal Service. 
41 2 Postwar Review 

B. Squadron Plans and Programs 1917-1918 

Document Date of Plan Observation Pursuit Bombardment Total Date lor 

or Proaram Sauad- Comoletion 01 

-- rons Plan or 

sm Project ;g t .F ; 5; : nz I1OJul 17 15 24 39 15" 5 59 Dec 18 

18Sep17 15 24 80" 120 Dec 18 

1 Jan 18 Dec 18 

6 Feb 18 (100 squadrons of 1 Jan 18 plus 20 120 Dec 18 

5Jun 18 15 24 3b 120 41 60 101 260 Jun 19 

60' 260 

(Ratio of 2 Obs to 6 Pur to 1 Bomb) 100 

bomb) 

29Jul 18 49 52 101 147 55 55 110 358 Jun 19 

16Aug 18 49 52 101 60 14 27 41 202 Jun 19 _____ ____~ 

Ten for corps and 5 for army aviation 

" In addition to corps and army, 41 for strategical aviation ' In addition to corps (10) and army (5), 105 for strategical aviation 

I' In addition lo army aviation (5). 55 for strategical aviation % Divided between 40 monoplace and 80 biplace 
haex* 413 

Adjutants, duties of: 281, 323, 325, 327, 392 

Administration, responsibility for: 268, 281, 323, 325, 327 

Adrianople: 13-1 5 

Accidents. See Aircraft, losses 

Aerial photography. See Photography, aerial: Reconnaissance and 

Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps: 1 

Air defenses. See Antiaircraft defenses and Weapons 

Air operations 

observation 

Bombing operations. See Bombing operations 

Communications in. See by type 

Escort and patrol missions. See Escort and patrol missions 

fighter operations. See Pursuit operations 

first by United States: 86, 173 

formations. See Formations and maneuvers, combat 

limitations: 303-304 

maneuvers, combat. See Formations and maneuvers, combat 

in Meuse-Argonne offensive: 23145 

mission assignments. See Mission assignments 

orders, typical: 247-49 

patrols. See Escort and patrol missions 

pursuit operations. See Pursuit operations 

responsibility for: 187-89 

support missions. See Escort and patrol missions 

tactics. See Tactics 

three-dimensional factor in: 307 

Corps 

appropriations for: 1, 3739, 55, 57, 67-73, 91, 101-1 05 

autonomy proposed: 3, 72, 97, 103, 108, 153, 192 

Aviation Section created: 21 

chief, duties of: 125 

as combat arm: 192, 263, 31 1, 313, 316, 322 

command and control: 187-89 

flight pay, dissension over: 91 

morale status. 31 1 

relation to other arms: 41 

reserve components: 55, 63, 101 

Air Service (see also air units by type); Aviation Section, Signal 

* Photo captions indicated by italic 
414 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. II 

staff appointments and shifts: 155-56 

of armies: 187-88 

of corps: 188-89, 326-27 

Air Service Information Circular: 303, 31 3 

Air Service Production Center: 197 

Air speeds: 62-63 

Air superiority, importance and attainment: 49-50, 99, 101, 11 3, 

117, 120, 123, 213, 216, 244, 247-49, 307408, 314, 369 

Air units. See by type 

Aircraft (see also Balloons; Dirigibles) 

air speeds: 62-63 

allotments to squadrons: 19, 55-57, 59-61, 95 

altitudes, operational: 24, 29, 48, 63, 80, 87, 200, 206 

armament and equipment: 39, 59, 67, 75, 93, 95, 97-98, 123, 

balloons, cooperation with: 43 

bombing missions. See Bombing operations 

capabilities and limitations: 303-306, 31 5 

characteristics and requirements: 47-48, 50 

in coast defense support: 35, 39, 42-43, 55, 57, 60, 91-92, 96- 

combat capability: 101 

command use of: 199-200, 205-1 1, 232, 234, 240, 242, 269, 

295, 327, 336, 341 

commercial uses foreseen: 99 

costs of purchase and maintenance: 61, 67, 69, 93, 96, 223 

courier service by: 334-36 

in defense against air attack. See Pursuit operations 

development, production and procurement: 1, 7, 38, 62-63, 67- 

equipment for. See Armament and equipment 

in fire control and direction. See Fire control and direction 

first purchase: 68, 70 

foreign development: 47, 63, 101, 141-43, 151, 162 

fueling and refueling: 78 

ground units, assignment to: 18, 51, 55, 57, 60, 65, 89, 95-97, 

hangars, location and security: 148, 317, 319, 386-87 

identification, friend or foe: 273, 309, 31 1, 335, 337, 348, 352, 

378-80 

97 

69, 78, 86, 92, 95, 100, 105, 131-33, 147, 156-57, 195-96 

111, 123, 127-29, 136, 156, 165, 167, 182-83, 189, 196, 

205-11, 223, 269, 295-98 

385, 389, 393 
4.1 5 

Index 

instruments, flight control by: 68, 379, 381 

liaison role. See Liaison operations and systems 

longevity estimates: 72, 92, 148 

losses and condemnations: 1, 68-69, 75-77, 81, 84-87, 92, 95 

maintenance, repair and replacement: 27, 57, 60-62, 67-69, 78, 

nonstop flight records: 84 

number in service and required: 1, 27-28, 42, 60, 6849, 92, 

performance statistics: 95 

radio communications among: 349, 354, 363, 382 

in reconnaissance and observation. See Reconnaissance and 

reserve inventories: 61 

safety features development: 72 

salvage operations: 78, 81, 85 

as surprise deterrent: 33, 50 

transportation role: 33-35 

transporting: 149 

types. See Aircraft types 

vulnerability: 98, 306 

bombers, development and procurement: 50-51, 55-57, 67, 

Breguet: 252, 342 

Burgess: 68-69 

Burgess-Dunne: 26, 68 

Burgess-Wright36 

Caproni: 146 

classification: 4243, 47, 50 

combat types development: 38 

Curtiss: 10, 56, 62-63, 67-69, 71, 73, 75, 78, 86, 93 

De Havilland: 148, 156,410 

Duperdussin: 63 

experimental: 68-69, 72 

Farman: 8, 16 

fire-control types development: 38 

Gotha: 141 

Handley-Paige: 143, 144, 146, 149, 156, 157, 191 

JN. See Curtiss above 

Martin: 54, 62, 69, 78, 178 

pursuit types, production and procurement: 105, 133, 135, 156, 

reconnaissance types development: 38, 67, 72, 105, 135 

Salmson: 342 

80, 92, 96-98, 123, 148, 169, 192, 223, 327 

101, 135 

observation 

Aircraft types 

103, 133, 135, 167 

167 
416 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. II 

Sloane: 78 

Sturtevant: 78 

Thomas: 78 

trainers: 69, 105 

Wright: 10, 39, 68, 70-71 

construction and repair: 156, 171 

enemy strikes against: 146, 162, 387 

identifying: 283 

landing rules: 380 

officer in charge, duties of: 390-91 

railroads, access to: 31 8 

road systems, access to: 318 

safety equipment at: 380, 384 

site selection and security: 92, 14849, 156, 184, 192, 243, 291, 

strikes against enemy: 120, 163, 232, 234, 23840, 251, 383 

Airfields 

317-18, 383, 386-87 

Aisne-Marne offensive: 219 

Aisne River: 24041, 247 

Alerted flights: 276, 285-86, 289, 292, 372 

Allen, James: 14 

Altitudes, operational 

aircraft, general: 24, 29, 48, 63, 80, 87, 200, 206 

balloons: 93, 181, 406 

in bombing operations: 397 

in fire control and direction: 308, 337 

in liaison operations: 223, 345 

in pursuit operations: 213-14, 216, 285, 287, 294, 336-37, 370, 

in reconnaissance and observation: 21 1, 283-84, 306, 337, 342 

373, 381-82 

Amanty: 386 

American Expeditionary Forces 

expansion program: 219-20 

organization: 127-29 

personnel, numbers and required: 127-29, 135-37 

squadrons as elements of: 192, 263 

staff structure: 125 

American Smelter & Refining Co.: 83 
41 7 

Index 

Ammunition 

against balloons: 375, 377, 379 

dumps. See Supply depots 

incendiaries: 375 

supply. See Supply operations and systems 

tracers: 379 

Ammunition train: 65 

Anderson, Harry B.: 237 

Andrews, Avery A.: 103 

Anthony, Daniel R., Jr.: 27, 29, 69 

Antiaircraft defenses and weapons (see also Ground forces) 

British: 162 

enemy: 206, 284, 330, 338, 374, 376 

in ground units: 304, 308-309, 317-18, 336, 384 

liaison with: 215 

prewar concepts: 5, 72 

Appropriations, Air Service: 1-3, 17, 27-31, 37-39, 53, 55-57, 59- 

Argonne Forest: 248 

Armament and equipment 

63, 65, 67-73, 91-101, 105 

aircraft: 39, 59, 67, 75, 93, 95, 97-98, 123, 378-80 

development, production and procurement: 141, 171 

dirigibles: 47, 93 

responsibility for: 187-88, 270 

transportation of: 31 9 

Armament officers, duties of: 324, 389 

Armengaud, Paul: 246 

Armies 

First: 188-89, 225, 23145, 24749 

Second: 251 

air service chiefs, duties of: 187-88 

air service command and control: 225, 322, 325-28 

air service organization: 65, 96, 128-29, 165, 234-37, 322, 325 

Armistice signed: 249 

Army Group, Center: 241 

Army War College: 41-53, 55, 65 
418 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Arnold, Henry H.: 2, 3, 12-13, 776, 177 

Artillery fire control and direction. See Fire control and direction 

Artillery units. See Field Artillery; Ground forces 

Atkins, A. K.: 105 

Atkinson, Bert M. 230, 231, 237, 241-42, 245 

Audun-le-Roman: 238, 242 

Austria-Hungary, aircraft in inventory: 28 

Automobiles. See Motor vehicles; Transportation 

Autonomy, proposed and actual: 3, 72, 97, 103, 108, 153, 192 

Aviation school: 37-39, 55, 57, 59-60, 71, 89, 96 

Aviation Section, Signal Corps: 21. See also under Air Service 

Bachineva, Mexico: 80 

Baker, Chauncey B.: 127 

Baker, Newton D.: 65, 67-72, 75, 91, 100, 105, 219 

Balkan Wars: 11-12, 47 

Balloon companies 

2d: 173 

combat practices: 406-407 

command and control: 406-407 

convoys and marches: 405-407 

ground forces, assignment to: 255, 403, 407 

liaison by: 406 

mission assignments: 43-45, 225, 240 

number in service and required: 227-28 

orders, issuance and transmission: 406 

organization: 45, 403 

Balloon school: 1 19 

Balloons 

altitudes for: 93, 181, 406 

ammunition against: 375, 377, 379 

attacks on: 214-15, 232-33, 241-42, 249, 286, 294,374, 375- 

construction features: 45 

77, 382-83 

Caquot: 44 
419 

Index 

cooperation with: 43 

in fire control and direction: 24, 108, 121, 181-85, 255, 258-59, 

Italian development: 93 

in liaison: 202-203, 223, 255, 345-46 

in Meuse - Argonne offensive: 231 

in night operations: 407 

operational area: 181 

in reconnaissance and observation: 23-24, 43-45, 93, 121, 

security of: 404 

types in use: 43 

Baltimore, Md.: 15 

Barber, Alvin B.: 127, 135, 169 

Bayonville: 242 

Beaumont: 248 

Beck, Paul W.: 2, 3, 8 

Belgium: 93 

Bengal flare: 201-202, 208-209, 258, 296, 298-99, 336 

Bennett, James Gordon: 119 

Billeting. See Housing 

Bisani: 13 

Bloch, Captain: 237 

Boca Grande, Mexico: 84-85 

Bois de Barricourt: 248 

Bolling, Raynal C.: 730, 131-33 

Bomb sights: 253 

Bombardiers, training program: 191 

Bomber - observation - pursuit ratio: 169 

Bombing operations: 47, 50-51, 55-57, 101, 108, 11 1-1 3, 120, 

346, 377, 407-408 

181 -85, 202-203, 255-61, 330, 377, 403-404 

131-32, 195, 376, 384 

accuracy in: 61, 154, 253, 278 

aircraft efficiency in: 400 

altitudes for: 397 
420 US. Air' Service 

in World War I 

Vol. II 

area versus precision bombing: 253 

as Army function: 156 

bases for: 145-46, 151 

British cooperation in: 151-53, 159, 161-63, 191-92, 241-42, 

British doctrine: 253 

command and control: 151 

critique of: 157 

defense against enemy fighters: 278 

definition and object: 143 

by dirigibles: 45, 57, 61 

effectiveness: 57, 161-62 

enemy plans and practices: 141-42, 147 

enemy tactics against: 401-402 

first drop: 9 

first target: 250 

formations and maneuvers: 51, 253, 277-79, 395-403 

French cooperation in: 151-53, 159, 161-63, 191-92, 231-45, 

French doctrine: 253 

by Germany: 11, 61 

ground forces, attacks on: 234, 249, 251, 369-75 

international law considerations: 145 

landings after: 399 

leaders, responsibilities during: 401 

low-altitude raids: 399-400 

in Meuse - Argonne offensive: 397 

mission assignments: 225, 231-34, 236-45, 247-49, 251, 276 

Mitchell views on: 12 

morale, effect on: 142, 150, 162, 251, 304, 310, 314, 316, 335 

night operations: 120, 131-32, 142, 146, 156, 162, 191, 195, 

number of aircraft engaged: 162 

operational areas: 251 

operational routines: 276-77 

orders, issuance and transmission: 31 1, 318, 327-28, 338-40, 

organization for: 155 

policies, priorities and plans in: 141-57, 159, 161-63 

prewar concepts, tests and experience: 4-5, 7-9, 12-1 7, 33-35 

pursuit operations, cooperation with: 213-14, 279, 286, 290, 

return routes: 399 

security measures in: 401-402 

staff organization for: 152, 155 

248 

247 

232-34, 241 -42 

388, 392, 394 

379, 382, 398, 402 
421 

Index 

tactics: 277-79, 400-403 

takeoff system: 396 

target selection and assignment: 1 17, 143-45, 149, 151, 153, 

techniques in: 397-99 

three-dimensional factor in: 307 

time and distance factors in: 146, 149-50, 31 5 

training programs: 393-94 

visibility and weather factors in: 307, 315, 389, 397, 401 

components, assembling: 147-48 

development and procurement: 147, 192 

French development and production: 151 

incendiaries: 15 

load and weight capacities: 8, 11, 15-16, 29, 50, 57, 61, 132, 

142, 147, 162 

nitrogelatin types: 4-5, 15-1 7 

smoke-bomb signals: 30, 63 

varied types: 276 

Bosch magneto: 143 

Boston, Mass.: 97 

Bowen, Thomas S.: 75, 76, 77 

Bradley, Follett: 7 76, 177 

Breckinridge, Henry: 3, 5-7, 23 

Brereton, Lewis H.: 223, 237, 302 

Bridges 

i92,23i-32,238-45,25i,253,279,309-i 0,394 

Bombs 

identifying: 256 

strikes against: 243 

Brieulles-sur-Meuse: 239 

Brigade, 1st: 213 

Briqueney: 239 

British antiaircraft defenses and weapons: 162 

British government agencies. See under United Kingdom 

Brown, William C.: 81 

Bulgarian army: 13 

Burtt, Wilson B.: 169, 171 
422 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Buzancy: 242 

Cameras: 326 

Camouflage measures: 305, 307, 317, 386-87 

Camps, identifying: 283 

Canal Zone: 28, 37, 39, 41, 43, 57, 60, 89, 92, 95-96, 101. See 

also Panama Canal 

Canals, identifying: 282 

Carberry, Joseph E.: 75, 76, 77-78, 81-84, 107, 722 

Carignan: 239 

Carranza forces: 83-84 

Carretas, Mexico: 83-84 

Cases Grandes, Mexico: 75-79 

Casella Works: 143 

Casualties 

civilian: 162 

in squadrons: 52 

Catron, Thomas B.: 59-63 

Cavalry (see also Ground forces) 

air units as adjunct to: 4, 6-7 

organization: 65 

regiments, number expanded: 65 

reconnaissance and observation by: 23, 25, 34 

roles and missions: 23, 25 

Chain of formations: 365-69 

Chamberlain, George E.: 58, 59-63 

Chandler, Charles D.: 2, 70,254, 255-61 

Chapman, Carleton G.: 75, 76, 77-78, 80, 84 

Charleston, S.C.: 15 

Charpentry: 238 

Chase, Joseph Cummings: 106, 166, 229 

Chateau-Salins: 241 
423 

Index 

Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes: 241 -42, 244 

Chauffeurs, duties of: 320 

Chaumont-en-Bassigny: 124 

Chesapeake Bay: 92, 97 

Chief Signal Officer. See Scriven, George P. 

Chief of Staff, A.E.F. See Harbord, James G. 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See March, Peyton C.; Scott, Hugh L. 

Chihuahua City, Mexico: 81-86 

Christie, Arthur R.: 75-78, 237 

Churchill, Marlborough: 107, 115, 716, 117 

Civilian casualties: 162 

Civilian employees: 67 

Clark, V. E.: 105 

Clash of Nations, quoted: 28 

Clear transmissions: 200, 206 

Close-support missions. See Bombing operations; Pursuit 

Coast defenses 

operations; Tactical air support 

air assaults on: 15 

aircraft in support of: 35, 39, 42-43, 55, 57, 60, 91-92, 96-97 

Codes: 63, 200, 202, 21 1, 323,333, 336 

College Park, Md.: 14, 71 

Cologne bombing target group: 143-45, 150 

Colombey-les-Belles: 155 

Columbus, N.M.: 65, 67, 75-80, 84-86, 92-93, 98 

Command aircraft: 199-200, 205-1 1, 232, 234, 240, 242, 269, 

Command and control 

295, 327, 336 

Air Service, A.E.F.: 187-89 

army and corps air service: 225, 322, 325-28 

balloon companies: 406-407 
424 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. II 

British proposals and practice: 152-54 

in fire control and direction: 183 

flights: 324 

groups: 268, 325, 388 

by pilots: 270 

in pursuit operations: 213, 215, 287, 291 

in Royal Flying Corps: 151 

squadrons: 19, 23-24, 52, 89, 97, 121, 139, 152-54, 165, 192, 

225,232,239, 268, 310-1 1, 323, 392-93 

Command posts 

of .enemy, strikes against: 232, 234, 239 

liaison with: 202-203, 205, 209-10, 255-56, 258, 273, 293, 

295-97,304, 378-79 

Commercial aircraft, prediction of: 99 

Communications systems and installations: 334. See also by rype ; 

Signalling systems 

air to ground: 24-25, 30, 33-35, 43, 63, 72, 79-83, 120-21, 

177, 183-85, 199-203, 205-1 1, 215, 255, 258, 290, 296, 298, 

304, 336 

among air units: 349, 354, 363, 385-86 

altitudes for: 207 

discipline in: 177, 259 

dismantling and reinstalling: 31 9 

of enemy, strikes against: 251 

ground to air: 201-202, 208-10, 223, 258, 293, 296, 298-301, 

among ground units: 306 

listening service: 180 

makeshift methods: 208-209 

by motor vehicles: 79, 84, 193, 334 

night signals: 202-203 

receiving stations: 180, 182, 184 

responsibility for: 270, 335 

shore to ship: 42 

with staffs and headquarters: 210 

testing: 206-207 

time and distance factors in: 306 

transmission methods. See by type 

watch posts for: 201 

306, 336 

Compass: 379 

Compiegne: 152 

Conflans: 242, 250, 251 
Index 

425 

Congress, appropriations by: 1-3, 17, 27-31, 53, 55-57, 59-63, 

Conner, Fox: 103, 127,226 

Connolly, Maurice: 3, 14, 16-17 

Connor, William D.: 169 

Construction projects: 192, 319 

Construction squadrons: 169, 171 

Contact patrols. See Ground forces, contacts with; Liaison 

Continental army plan: 65, 67 

Connvoys and marches 

balloon companies: 405-407 

discipline in: 320-21 

reconnaissance and observation in: 319 

squadrons: 31 8-21, 340 

65, 67-72, 91-101 

operations; Reconnaissance and observation 

Corps 

I: 165, 188-89, 205-1 1, 231, 237 

Ill: 231, 237, 249 

IV and V: 231, 237 

air service chiefs, duties of: 188-89, 326-27 

air service command and control: 225, 322, 325-28 

air service organization: 65, 128-29, 165, 322, 325-29 

Corregidor Island: 4, 36, 37, 39, 57 

Courban: 192 

Courier service. See Messenger service 

Craig, Malin: 222, 223, 267 

Crefeld: 143 

Crissy, Myron S.: 8, 9 

Culebra Cut: 16 

Cumbre Pass, Mexico: 77 

Curtiss, Glenn: 8 

Cusihuirachic, Mexico: 81 

Cusihuirachic Canyon: 81 
426 U.S. Air Service' 

in World War I 

Vol. II 

Dai Jogo, Masami : 41 0 

Damvillers: 238 

Daniels, Josephus: 105 

Dardannelles Strait: 12-1 3 

Dargue, Herbert A.: 36, 75, 80-81,82, 83-84, 85, 86, 87 

Davis, Robert C.: 703 

De Vergnette: 242 

Deception. See Ruses 

Decorations and awards: 336 

Decoys: 360-61, 401 

Dent, S. Hubert: 91-101 

Dirigibles 

air speeds and operational areas: 47, 63 

armament and equipment: 47, 93 

assets and weaknesses: 47,93 

Baldwin Airship No. 1 : 46 

bomb capacities: 61 

bombing operations by: 45, 57, 61 

British development: 93 

classes defined: 45 

construction features: 45-47, 93 

crews required: 47 

defense against: 63 

engines in: 47 

German development: 93 

lift capabilities: 47, 61 

mission assignments: 4-5, 7, 12, 45-47 

Mitchell views on: 12 

reconnaissance and observation by: 24, 45 

Zeppelins: 45, 61, 63 

in communications: 177, 259 

in convoys and marches: 320-21 

Discipline 

Distance records: 22 
,427 

Index 

Divisions 

1st: 173 

number expanded: 39, 219 

number in service and required: 167, 195 

organization: 65, 127-28, 135 

Dodd, Francis: 109 

Dodd, George A.: 77-78, 81-83 

Dodd, Townsend F.: 75-77, 83, 107, 722 

Doulcon: 239 

Drum, Hugh A.: 127, 169, 234, 240 

Dublan, Mexico: 77-81, 84-85 

Dun: 238-39 

Dunkerque: 143, 147 

Dunsworth, James L.: 237, 242,262 

Duration records: 22 

Dusseldorf bombing target group: 143-45 

Duvall, Maurice: 152, 11 6 

Economy of force, principle of: 314 

El Paso, Tex.: 75 

El Valle, Mexico: 78-81 

Elberfeld: 143 

Eltinge, LeRoy: 703, 135 

Engineer officers, duties of: 269-70, 281, 324, 393 

Engineer units: 65 

Engines 

Baldwin: 46 

characteristics and requirements: 48 

costs of purchase and maintenance: 96 

Curtiss: 78 

development and procurement: 68, 105, 131-33 

in dirigibles: 47 

fixed verssus rotary: 131, 133, 375, 400 
420 U.S. Air Service 

in Wo'rld War 1 

VOl. II 

Hall-Scott: 78 

Liberty: 104, 797 

maintenance, repair and replacement: 96 

Mercedes: 143 

Salmson: 26 

Sturtevant: 78 

Thomas: 78 

Wright Field: 39 

England. See Royal Flying Corps; United Kingdom 

Equipment. See Armament and equipment 

Escort and patrol missions: 21 3-1 6, 231, 241, 244-45, 285-86, 

Escort and patrol missions, enemy: 249 

Essen: 143 

Exchange tours: 348 

Exercises. See Training programs 

307-308, 374, 377, 381-82. See also Pursuit operations 

Ferry pilots, training: 192 

Fickel, Jacob E.: 70 

Field artillery (see also Ground forces) 

bombardment by: 133, 150-51, 232-33 

bombardment by enemy: 249, 308 

fire control and direction. See Fire control and direction 

regiments, number expanded: 65 

roles and missions: 23, 25 

organization: 65 

Field glasses, use of: 337 

Field Service Regulations: 23-25 

Fighter operations. See Pursuit operations; Tactics 

Fire (conflagration), safeguards against: 31 7 

Fire control and direction 

advantages and limitations: 182, 184 

aircraft role in: 9, 24, 30, 33-35, 37-39, 42-43, 47, 49, 52, 55, 

91,99, 101, 108, 115, 117, 120, 776, 177-85, 205-206, 223, 

234, 241-42, 247-49, 296, 304308, 322, 329-30, 333, 340- 

41, 344 
429 

Index 

altitudes for: 308, 337 

assignments to: 182-84 

by balloons: 24, 108, 121, 181-85, 255, 258-59, 346, 377, 407- 

command and control in: 183 

by enemy: 215 

essentials and limitations: 304 

functions and purposes: 181-84 

liaison, interarm: 182, 343 

maps, use in: 272, 343-44, 346 

methods in: 259-61, 343-44, 408 

mission assignments and execution: 269 

Mitchell views on: 11-12 

operational areas: 337 

registration techniques: 259 

reports of: 340 

security during: 216 

visibility and weather factors in: 307, 315, 346 

408 

First aerial map: 22 

First aircraft purchase: 68, 70 

First bomb drop: 9 

First bomb target: 250 

First machine-gun firing: 70 

First military pilot: 17 

First squadron in combat: 86, 173 

Fiske, Harold B.: 703 

Fixed versus rotary engines: 131, 133, 375, 400 

Flare signals: 63, 199-202, 258, 282, 293, 296, 298-99, 336, 363, 

Flash spotting: 184-85, 257, 282, 340, 342 

Flashlight signals: 208-209 

Flight pay, dissension over: 91 

Flights 

380, 382 

command and organization: 324 

as tactical units: 324, 355 

Foch, Ferdinand: 153,218, 219 
430 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Formations and maneuvers 

in bombing operations: 51, 253, 277-79, 395-403 

in pursuit operations: 287-89, 336, 338-69, 373 

in reconnaissance and observation: 350-51 

tactics in. See tactics, combat 

Fort Kamehameha: 37 

Fort Monroe: 92 

Fort Myer: 40,46, 70 

Fort Riley: 176-77 

Fort Sam Houston: 37, 71, 75 

Fort Sill: 37, 56, 91, 93 

Foulois, Benjamin D.: 8, 77, 76, 87, 760 

on 120-squadron plan: 171 

on aircraft production and procurement: 105 

arrested in Mexico: 81-83 

on bombing doctrine: 161-63 

as chief of Air Service, A.E.F.: 141, 159, 161, 187 

as chief of First Army air service: 187-88 

on organization and logistics: 159 

Punitive Expedition report: 75-87 

Fowler, Harold: 155 

France: 93 

Second Army: 234, 241-42 

Fourth Army: 173, 231, 238 

Eighth Army: 238 

II Colonial Corps: 231, 237 

XVll Corps: 231, 237 

1st Air Division: 231, 233-34 

aircraft development and production: 47, 63, 101, 151 

aircraft in inventory: 28 

bomb development and production: 151 

bombing doctrine: 253 

bombing operations, cooperation in: 151-53, 159, 161-63, 191- 

bombing prize offered: 14 

pilots in service of: 98 

squadron organization: 51 

Frankfurt-am-Main: 143, 150 

French, 'Sir John: 31 

92, 231-45, 247 
431 

Index 

Fuel capacities and storage: 29, 78, 379, 387 

Galeana Valley, Mexico: 77-78 

Galera Lopena, Mexico: 77, 80 

Garrett, Daniel E.: 3-4 

Garrison, Lindley M.: 1, 27, 65 

Gatun Dam: 5, 16 

General Headquarters Air Service Reserve: 156 

General Organization Project, A.E.F.: 127-29, 195 

General Staff, G.H.Q.: 41-53, 68, 91, 157, 163, 169, 187 

Germany 

air superiority, use by: 50 

aircraft development and production: 47, 101, 141-43, 162 

aircraft in inventory: 28 

bombing operations by: 11, 61 

dirigibles development: 93 

submarine warfare by: 55, 100 

war declared against: 100 

Gettysburg, battle of: 6 

Gliders: 70 

Gordon, William: 91 

Gorrell, Edgar S.: 75, 84, 85, 87, 105, 740, 141-57, 191, 219, 227, 

Grandpre: 239, 242, 245, 248 

Great Britain. See Royal Flying Corps; United Kingdom 

Great Lakes region: 43 

Greek army: 13 

Green, Richard: 17 

Greene, Frank L.: 3, 9, 72, 91, 96, 99 

Grenade assaults, identifying: 258 

Grey, Spencer: 155-56 

Ground crews. See Maintenance, supply and support forces 

303-1 1 
432 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

Vol. II 

Ground forces (see also by arm) 

aircraft assignments to: 18, 51, 55, 57, 60, 65, 89, 96-97, 11 1, 

antiaircraft defenses and weapons: 304, 308-309, 31 7-1 8, 336, 

attacks on: 369-76, 378, 400 

balloon companies, assignment to: 255, 403, 407 

bombing operations against: 234, 249, 251, 369-75 

contacts with: 210, 255, 298, 301, 310, 332, 33436, 343, 348, 

estimates of: 256-57 

identifying: 283-84 

infantry as chief combat element: 313 

liaison with: 11 7, 120, 184, 199-203, 205-1 1, 21 5, 223, 234, 

mobility of: 141, 306 

reconnaissance and observation by: 34 

relations with: 41, 296, 298, 304, 310, 321 

123, 127-29, 136, 156, 165, 167, 182-83, 189, 196, 205-11, 

223, 269, 295-98 

384 

353-54, 385 

243, 255, 257-58, 269, 293, 295-99, 301, 31 1, 341-42, 345, 

353, 378, 385-86, 407 

strikes against enemy: 120, 232-33, 241-43, 247-49, 287, 292, 

294 

Groups 

1st Bombardment: 237, 242, 245 

1st Pursuit: 237, 241-42 

2d Bombardment: 251 

2d Pursuit: 213-14, 237, 244 

3d Attack: 267 

3d Pursuit: 237, 244 

command and control: 268, 325, 388 

observation units: 322, 325-26 

operational procedures: 268-79 

organization: 155, 387-92 

staffs and staff officers: 325-26, 387-92 

Gulfhght, SS: 55 

Gunnery training: 394 

Gutierrez, General: 83-84 

Hall, Melvin A.: 237 

Handkerchief signals: 208-209 
433 

Index 

Hangars 

Bessonneau: 148 

location and security: 148, 31 7, 31 9, 386-87 

Harbord, James G.: 707, 113, 116, 139, 165, 766 

Harricourt: 239 

Hartney, Harold E.: 237, 241-42,262 

Haute de Meuse: 238 

Hawaii: 28, 37, 41, 43, 57, 60, 92, 95-96, 101 

Hay, James: 3-1 7, 27-31, 55-57, 67-72, 91 

Heintzelman, Stuart: 135 

Heliograph signals: 25 

Henderson, Sir D.: 740 

Hindenburg Line: 231 

Hoechst: 143 

Holland: 145 

Horn signals: 120 

Housing, provision for: 148, 31 8-1 9 

Howard, William S.: 27, 30 

Howell, Willey: 238 

Howze, Robert L.: 84 

Hunsaker, J. G.: 105 

Hydroplanes. See Seaplanes 

Identification, friend or foe: 273, 309, 31 1, 335, 337, 348, 352, 

Incendiary ammunition and bombs: 15, 375 

Industrial centers 

identifying: 283 

strikes against: 120, 142-45, 147, 151-53, 162-63, 251, 276 

Infantry (see also Ground forces) 

as chief combat element: 31 3 

385,389,393 
434 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

organization: 65 

roles and missions: 23, 25 

regiments, number expanded: 65 

operations; Reconnaissance and observation 

Infantry contact patrols. See Ground forces, contacts with; Liaison 

Information. See Intelligence operations and reports 

Insignia 

aircraft identification: 273, 309, 31 1, 335 

mechanics: 132,169 

military aviator: 52 

Inspections, responsibility for: 189, 270, 319 

Instrument officers, duties of: 390 

Instruments, flight control by: 68, 379, 381 

Intelligence officers, duties of: 181, 270-71, 273-75, 281, 31 0, 326 

Intelligence operations and reports (see also Reconnaissance and 

observation) 

British: 162 

collection and dissemination: 1 17, 149, 181-82, 234, 241, 347- 

purpose: 314, 346 

responsibility for: 189, 256, 268, 279, 323, 325-26, 346, 352-53, 

384, 389, 392 

transmission: 334 

48, 352-53, 384-85 

Inter-Allied Air Force: 156 

Inter-Allied Aviation Committee: 227 

International law considerations: 145 

Interrogations, of pilots and observers: 349, 355 

Irwin, George L.: 77 

Italy 

aircraft development: 47 

aircraft in inventory: 28 

balloon development: 93 

Janina: 13 

Janos, Mexico: 75-77, 84 
435 

Index 

Japan, aircraft development: 47 

Johnson, Davenport: 272, 237 

Joint Army-Navy Technical Aircraft Board: 105 

Joralemon, I.D.: 302 

Journal of the Franklin institute : 50, 53 

Kahn, Julius: 27-28, 30-31, 55-56, 91-99 

Karlsruhe: 143 

Kenly, William L.: 7 38, 139, 147, 159 

Kennedy, Frank M.: 77 

Kilner, Walter G.: 75-77 

Kirtland, Roy C.: 2, 70 

Kitty Hawk, N.C.: 70 

Klaxon horn signals: 207 

Krupp guns: 5 

Kuter, Laurence S.: 141 

La Chaussee: 240-41 

La Harazee: 232-33, 244 

Lafayette Escadrille: 98, 173 

Lahm, Frank P.: 77, 119, 231, 240, 251 

Lake Babicora, Mexico: 77 

Landing fields. See Airfields 

Landings 

after bombing runs: 399 

emergency: 378-81, 304 

rules for: 380 

Las Ascencion, Mexico: 75-77, 04 

Lassiter, William: 113 
436 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Leaders, responsibilities of: 36364, 373-74, 400-401 

Letcher, Marion H.: 81-84 

Liaison officers, duties of: 199, 271, 321, 328, 335, 378 

Liaison operations 

with air units: 348-49, 378-79 

aircraft role in: 199-203, 31 5 

with Allies: 139, 151-54, 156, 161, 167, 171 

altitudes for: 223, 345 

with antiaircraft defenses: 215 

balloons role in: 202-203, 223, 255, 345-46, 406 

with command posts: 202-203,205, 209-10, 255-56, 258, 273, 

enemy attacks against: 242 

failures in: 223 

with ground forces: 1 17, 120, 184, 199-203, 205-1 1, 21 5, 223, 

ground forces contacts with: 298, 310, 332, 334-36, 343, 348, 

importance: 21 1 

information, disseminating: 33336 

methods and measures: 215, 33336 

Mitchell views on: 205-1 1 

in night operations: 378-79 

in pursuit operations: 215, 291-92, 354 

reports, uses of: 332-33 

responsibility for: 189, 323, 325, 327-29, 335 

among squadrons: 321 

training programs: 21 1, 299-301, 301 

transportation for: 327 

Liggett, Hunter: 764, 165 

Lighting systems: 380, 383-84 

Lights, signals by: 25, 177, 180, 183, 206-209, 258, 281, 298 

Line of Communications, A.E.F.: 135 

Lines of comm u nication 

293, 295-97, 304,378-79 

234, 243, 255, 257-58, 269, 293, 295-301, 311,341-42, 345, 

353, 378, 385-86, 407 

353-54, 385 

reconnaissance and observation of: 275 

strikes against: 120, 143, 162-63, 251, 292 

Listening service: 180 

Logan, James A. : 107 
437 

Index 

Logging procedures: 256, 324 

Logistical support. See Supply operations and systems 

London, air raids on: 150, 162 

London Tlmes: 47 

Longuyon: 238-39, 241-42 

Los Angeles, Calif.: 8 

Low-altitude raids: 399-400 

Ludden, V. F.: 312 

Ludwigshafen: 143, 150 

Lufbery show: 364 

Lumes: 239, 243 

Lusltanm, SS: 55 

Machine guns 

aircraft role in overcoming: 309 

Benet-Mercier: 94 

firing as signal: 207 

first fired from aircraft: 10 

Lewis: 93-94, 97 

Mitchell views on: 12 

proposals for use: 9, 12 

synchronized firing system: 98 

testing: 321, 324 

Vickers: 372 

Magneto, Bosch: 143 

Maintenance, repair and replacement 

aircraft: 27, 57, 60-62, 67-69, 78, 80, 92, 96-98, 123, 148, 169, 

192, 223, 327 

engines: 96 

motor vehicles: 68 

responsibility for: 324 

Maintenance, supply and support forces: 19 

Malmy: 239 

Maneuvering officers, duties of: 406 
438 U.S. Air Service 

in Wo'rld War I 

VOl. II 

Maneuvers, combat. See Formations and maneuvers, combat; 

Mangiennes: 238 

Manila, PA.: 37, 69, 92, 96 

Mannheim bombing target group: 143, 150 

Manula, Mexico: 83 

Maps 

Tactics 

compilation and distribution: 147, 149, 208, 259, 272-74, 279, 

321,326, 341,347,352,385, 388, 392 

in fire control and direction: 272, 343-44, 346 

first aerial: 22 

reading and use, training in: 149-50, 21 1 

in reconnaissance and observation: 272-73 

Marches. See Convoys and marches; Mobility; Transportation 

Marrell, 0. E.: 302 

Materiel. See Armament and equipment 

Mauborgne, Joseph 0.: 176 

Maulan: 386 

McAndrew, James W.: 703, 189, 192, 196, 228,229 

McCleave, Robert: 232,233 

McDonald, N.: 262 

McKellar,'-Kenneth D.: 27, 29-31, 72, 91, 94-97 

McKenzie, John C.: 3, 5, 16-17, 91-93 

Mechanics: 169, 324 

Medical services: 321, 391 

Meister - Luciuc Works: 143 

Melzicourt: 241-42 

Mess operations: 31 9-21 

Messages, by air drop: 4, 24, 17580, 183-84, 200, 206-207, 240, 

Messenger service: 25, 199, 255, 306, 334-35 

Metz: 240, 242, 244 

296-98,335-36, 339, 343, 345,349 
439 

Index 

Meuse - Argonne offensive: 231-45, 247-49,267,397 

Meuse River: 231-33, 238, 240, 242-45, 247-49 

Mexican Central Railroad: 84 

Mexican North-Western Railroad: 77 

Mexican Punitive Expedition: 19, 66-67, 69, 72-73, 75-87, 91, 93- 

Mikkelson, Linda: 174 

Military Affairs Committees. See Congress 

Military aviator, certificate and insignia: 52 

Military policy, U.S. formulation: 41-53, 55-57, 59-63, 65, 91 

Miller, I. W.: 302 

Milling, Thomas D.: 2, 70, 22, 76,246, 247-49 

Mineola, N.Y.: 92 

Mining operations: 45 

Mining operations, enemy: 42 

Miranda, Colonel: 83 

Mirror signals: 208 

Mission assignments 

air operations: 225 

arms and services: 23-25 

balloon companies: 43-45, 225, 240 

bombing operations: 225, 231-34, 238-45, 247-49, 251, 276 

Coast Guard: 41-42 

dirigibles: 4-5, 7, 12, 45-47 

fire control and direction: 269 

pursuit operations: 225, 232-38, 240-45, 247-49, 251, 284-87, 

reconnaissance and observation: 182-83,225, 232-34, 238, 

94, 101, 148 

292-93, 352, 355 

255-56, 258, 269,273-75, 280, 284, 295-98, 332-33, 340-46 

Mitchell, William: 3, 91, 93, 174, 224, 246,302 

as A.E.F. air service chief: 125 

on air-ground liaison: 205-1 1 

bombing operations, views on: 12 

as developments observer: 107 

on dirigibles: 12 
440 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

on fire control and direction: 11-12 

as First Army air service chief: 225, 231, 237, 243, 247-49, 267 

as 1st Brigade air service chief: 213 

as I Corps air service chief: 165, 187, 223 

machine gun, views on: 12 

operations manual, provisional: 267-301 

organization, views on: 12, 107-108 

on reconnaissance and observation: 9, 12 

on roles and missions: 175 

as Third Army air service chief: 267 

as Zone of Advance air service chief: 139 

Mobile units. See Ground forces 

Mobility 

ground forces: 141, 306 

squadrons: 215, 243, 317-21, 387. See also Convoys and 

marches; Transportation 

Monell, Ambrose: 155-56 

Montfaucon: 242 

Montgomery, Ala.: 77 

Montmedy: 238-39, 242 

Morale 

in Air Service: 31 1 

British: 167 

effect of bombing operations on: 142, 150, 162, 251, 304, 310, 

31 4, 31 6, 335 

effect of pursuit operations on: 290, 294, 304, 308, 310, 314, 

316, 335, 371, 376-77 

of enemy, destroying: 314, 316 

night pilots, preserving: 381 

of observers and pilots: 31 1 

Morrow, Joseph C.: 236, 237 

Mortane, Jacques: 9 

Moseley, George V. H.: 103 

Moselle River: 240-41 

Motor vehicles 

communications by: 79, 84, 183, 334 

development and procurement: 68 

estimates of needs: 257 
441 

Index 

maintenance, repair and replacement: 68 

speed and interval regulation: 320 

Motorcycle messengers: 79, 335 

Mouzon: 238-39 

Namiquipa, Mexico: 79-86 

Nancy: 152-53, 240 

Nantillois: 242 

National Defense Act of 191 6: 65, 89 

National Guard: 65 

National Security Act of 1916: 65 

Naval forces 

air assaults by and against: 15-1 7 

air reconnaissance in detecting: 35, 45 

roles and missions: 41 

Navigation systems: 146-47, 149, 281, 378 

Netherlands: 145 

New Orleans, La.: 8 

New York City: 15, 97 

Newport News, Va.: 69 

Night operations 

balloons in: 407 

bombing operations: 120, 131-32, 142, 146, 156, 162, 191, 195, 

liaison in: 378-79 

pursuit operations: 37744 

reconnaissance and observation: 18445,233-34, 241-42, 257, 

232-34, 241 -42 

28044,382 

Night signals: 202-203 

Nitrogelatin bombs: 4-5, 15-17 

Nolan, Dennis E.: 703 

Noncommissioned officers, duties of: 320 
442 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Nonstop flight records: 84 

Norfolk, Va.: 15 

North Island, Calif. See San Diego, Calif. 

Northcliff e, Lord: 161 

Northerly bombing target group: 143 

Nuevas Casas Grandes, Mexico: 75 

Oaxaca Pass, Mexico: 84 

Observation, aerial. See Fire control and direction; Liaison 

Observation groups: 322, 325-26 

Observation-pursuit-bomber ratio: 1 69 

Observers (see also Fire control and direction; Pilots; 

operations; Reconnaissance and observation 

Reconnaissance and observation) 

assignments and duties: 4, 19, 30, 49, 52-53, 181-83, 199, 

battle atmosphere, detachment from: 31 5 

exchange tours: 348 

ground forces, contacts with: 210, 255, 301 

interrogating: 349 

morale: 31 1 

qualifications, training and efficiency: 30, 38, 51-52, 115, 149- 

reports by: 270,274,281432,295436,298,315, 325,329,338- 

205-1 1, 223,255,259 

50,210,223,269, 271, 273, 306,315,340,351, 389,393- 

94, 407 

40, 349,399 

Offensive, principle of: 314 

Officers. See by assignment 

OHair, Frank T.: 3, 7 

Ojito, Mexico: 84 

Ojo Caliente, Mexico: 75-77, 83 

Omaha, Neb.: 119 

Open transmission. See Clear transmissions 

Operational areas 

balloons: 181 

bombing operations: 251 
4.43 

Index 

dirigibles: 47, 63 

fire control and direction: 337 

pursuit operations: 285, 304, 371, 374-75, 379 

reconnaissance and observation: 308,337, 342,344 

squadrons: 329 

Operations officers, duties of: 71, 268-71, 274, 279-81, 289, 321, 

Operations rooms: 271 -74, 326 

Orders, issuance and transmission 

323,325, 327-28,346-49, 353, 355,388-89, 392-93 

balloon companies: 406 

bombing operations: 31 1, 318, 327-28, 338-40, 388, 392, 394 

pursuit operations: 293, 31 1, 318, 325, 327-28, 33840, 388, 

reconnaissance and observation: 325, 327-28, 33840, 388, 

types and scope: 24749,332 

392 

392 

Ordnance Department: 5, 253. See also Armament and equipment 

Ordnance officers, duties of: 269-70, 393 

Ordnance units and troops: 135, 148 

Orqanization 

air units: 3, 19-20, 27-28, 51, 55-57, 59, 65, 89, 105, 111, 120, 

123. 191 

American Expeditionary Forces: 127-29 

armies: 65, 96, 129 

Army, US.: 42, 57, 59, 65 

army and corps air service: 65, 128-29, 165, 322, 325 

balloon companies: 45, 403 

bomber units: 155 

cavalry: 65 

divisions: 65, 127-28, 135 

field artillery: 65 

flights: 324 

foreign squadrons: 39 

groups: 155, 387-92 

infantry: 65 

Mitchell views on: 12, 107-108 

pursuit operations: 215, 290 

responsibility for: 187 

signal units: 65 

squadrons: 19, 37-39,42, 51, 53, 55, 59, 67, 79,324,392-93 
444 U.S. Air Service 

in Woirld War I 

VOl. II 

Ostend: 145 

Overcoat lining, signals by: 208-209 

Pacific coast region: 15 

Pan American Exposition: 8 

Panama Canal: 5, 15-17. See also Canal Zone 

Panel signals: 177, 180, 183, 199,201-203,204,208-10,244, 

Parachute descents, attacks on: 377 

Parachute flares: 284 

Paris, German drive on: 219 

Park squadrons: 169, 171 

Parker, Frank: 107, 178, 119-21, 175 

Parker, Katherine: 1 19 

258,293,290,298-99,304,311,336,343,345 

Parks, aircraft: 123, 139, 238-39. See also Airfields 

Parmalee, Phillip 0.: 9, 71 

Parral, Mexico: 84 

Patrol operations, aerial. See Escort and patrol missions 

Patrol operations, ground: 201 

Patrick, Mason M.: 786 

and 202-squadron plan: 227-28 

as A.E.F. air service chief: 187 

on aircraft production and procurement: 195-96. 219 

on combined bomber offensive: 191-92 

Pearson, Mexico: 75-78 

Pershing, John J.: 74, 78,218 

and 260-squadron plan: 195 

as A.E.F. commander: 107,127, 135 

on A.E.F. expansion: 219 

on Air Service autonomy: 103 

on Air Service program: 169,171, 195 

on bombing operations: 191 

as First Army commander: 225,231 

in Punitive Expedition: 6667, 93 
44 5 

Index 

Personnel 

assignment and replacement: 163, 322 

number in service and required: 1, 39, 55, 57, 59-60, 89, 96, 

101, 123, 135, 169 

safety measures for: 31 7 

strength in A.E.F.: 127-29, 135-37 

strength in Army: 27, 38-39, 41, 51, 53, 57, 65 

Petain, Henri Philippe: 161 

Philippine Islands: 4, 28, 41, 43, 60, 89, 91-92, 95, 101. See also 

Corregidor Island; Manila 

Photographic officers, duties of: 270, 326, 389-90 

Photography, aerial: 49, 63, 86, 99, 101, 117, 120, 181-63, 215, 

234, 238, 240-41, 245, 268-72, 274-75, 279, 326,329,340-43, 

346,382,388,392 

Photography, aerial, by enemy: 216 

Pigeon messages: 183, 199,33445 

Pilots 

assignments and replacements: 19, 52-53, 223, 324 

battle atmosphere, detachment from: 315, 352 

command and control by: 270 

from enlisted grades: 27, 52-53 

exchange tours: 348 

first military pilot: 17 

in French service: 98, 173 

interrogating: 349, 355 

morale: 31 1, 381 

number, expansion of: 55 

numbers required: 27 

qualifications, training and efficiency: 37-38, 51-52, 71, 86-67, 

98-99, 146-47, 149-50, 191,223,273, 277,294,306,351, 

reports by: 399 

356,373,36041, 389,393-94,400 

Police officers, duties of: 391 

Policing procedures: 31 9-21 

Pont St. Vincent: 146 

Port Arthur: 14 

Port-sur-Seille: 241, 244 

Posts of command. See Command posts 
446 US. Air Service 

in Wolrld War I 

VOl. I1 

President of United States. See Wilson, Woodrow 

Press reports: 150 

Preveza: 13 

Priorities, British: 161 -62 

Prisoners of war, enemy: 249 

Projector signals: 177, 183-84, 201, 203, 206-1 1, 258, 336 

Pulpit Pass, Mexico: 84-85 

Punitive Expedition. See Mexican Punitive Expedition 

Pursuit-observation-bomber ratio: 169 

Pursuit operations: 35, 38, 42, 47, 49, 55, 59, 63, 101, 108, 111, 

120. 156 

aircraft efficiency in: 364-65, 372, 375, 379 

alerted flights: 285-86, 289, 292, 372 

altitudes for: 213-14, 216, 285, 287, 294, 336-37, 370, 373, 

balloons, attacks on. See under Balloons 

bombing operations, coordination with: 21 3-14, 279, 286, 290, 

379, 382, 398, 402 

by British: 377 

combat kill range: 307 

combat maneuvers. See formations and maneuvers, combat, 

command and control: 213,215, 287,291 

decoys in: 360-61, 401 

enemy ground forces, strikes against: 120, 232-33, 241 -43, 

escort and patrol missions. See Escort and patrol missions 

formations and maneuvers, combat: 287-89, 336, 355-69 

ground forces support. See Tactical air support 

ground targets, attacks on: 369-76, 378, 400 

importance: 314-16 

leaders, responsibilities of: 363-64, 373-74, 400 

liaison in: 215, 291-92, 354 

limitations: 304, 307, 309 

mission assignments: 225, 232-38, 240-45, 247-49, 251, 284- 

morale, effect on: 290, 294, 304, 308, 310, 314, 316, 335, 371, 

night operations: 377-84 

number of aircraft for: 371 -73, 400 

381 -82 

below 

247-49, 287, 292, 294 

87,292-93,352,355 

376-77 
447 

Index 

observation functions: 291 

offensive character: 285 

operational areas: 285, 304, 371, 374-75, 379 

operational routines: 284-89 

orders, issuance and transmission: 293, 31 1, 318, 325, 327-28, 

338-40, 388,392 

organization: 215, 290 

in reconnaissance and observation security: 336 

roles and missions: 213-16, 294, 307 

romantic appeal: 99 

security in: 294, 371, 377 

single aircraft in: 356-57, 360-61 

special missions: 355 

strafing. See Ground targets, above 

tactics: 28839,291 -94, 307-309, 355-84 

tanks, strikes against: 292-93 

target assignment and identification: 233, 292-93, 309-1 0, 372- 

teamwork in: 356, 363, 371 

three-dimensional factor: 307 

time of day for: 376-78 

time and distance factors: 315 

training programs: 294 

visibility and weather factors: 307, 315, 356-57, 374, 378, 381- 

73 

82, 389 

Quarters. See Housing 

Rader, Ira A.: 75, 76, 77, 84 

Radio communications and installations: 334 

air to ground: 3-4, 6-7, 24-25, 30, 33-35, 47, 49, 59, 63, 72, 

with air staffs: 349 

among aircraft: 349, 354, 363, 382 

dismantling and reinstalling: 321 

ground to air: 210, 323, 325 

Navy, by and with: 42 

testing: 206, 298, 324 

79, 120, 176, 177, 181, 183-85, 200, 202-203, 206, 215, 258, 

292, 293, 296-98, 304, 323, 325, 336, 343-44 

Radio officers, duties of: 201, 269-70, 323-25, 390 

Railways 

in air equipment transportation: 148-49 

identifying: 283-84 

reconnaissance and observation of: 256-57, 275 

strikes against: 232, 234, 238-39, 242-43, 245, 251 
448 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Rastadt: 143 

Rations. See Mess operations 

Reber, Samuel: 3, 7, 27, 50, 53, 59, 62-63, 91 

Reconnaissance and observation (see also Fire control and 

direction; Liaison operations; Photography, aerial 

by aircraft: 23-24, 30-31, 33-35, 38, 47-49, 55, 63, 99, 101, 

alert flights: 276 

altitudes for: 21 1, 283-84, 306, 337, 342 

by balloons: 23-24, 43-45, 93, 121, 181 -85, 202-203, 255-61, 

of bridges: 256 

capabilities and limitations: 182, 184, 303-306 

by cavalry: 23, 25, 34 

combat, avoiding: 330, 346, 350 

in convoys and marches: 319 

cover and concealment from: 305 (see also Camouflage) 

cooperation with Allies: 238 

coordination among aircraft: 182 

crew, number in: 270 

defined: 23 

by dirigibles: 24, 45 

enemy attacks against: 242 

by enemy, preventing: 213, 231-32, 240, 244, 247-49 

of enemy elements: 341 -44 

facts reported: 256, 340-41 

false reports: 306 

formations: 350-51 

of friendly elements: 341, 345 

grenade assaults, identifying: 258 

by ground forces: 34 

ground forces, estimates of: 256-57 

ground forces, support of: 35 

importance stressed: 57, 59, 21 6, 31 5, 330-31, 334 

information, scope and sources of: 331 -32 

of lines of communication: 275 

logging procedures: 256, 324 

maps, value in: 272-73 

Mitchell views on: 9-12 

mission assignments and execution: 182-83, 225, 232-34, 238, 

Motor vehicles, estimates of: 257 

of naval forces: 35, 45 

117, 120, 177-85, 199, 205-11, 215, 231-45, 322, 329 

330, 377, 403-404 

255-56,258,269,273-75,280,284,295-98,332-33,340-46 
Index 

449 

.- 

navigation systems: 281 

night missions: 184-85, 233-34, 24142, 257, 280-84, 382 

number of aircraft for: 350 

operational areas: 308, 337, 342, 344 

operational routines: 269-71, 274-77, 283-84 

orders, issuance and transmission: 325, 327-28, 33840, 388, 

prewar concepts: 3-4, 6-7, 9-10, 12-13 

in Punitive Expedition: 75, 87 

purpose: 42 

pursuit operations functions in: 291 

of railways: 256-57, 275 

reports. See Observers, reports by 

of road systems: 275, 341, 406-407 

security measures in: 216, 285-86, 291, 336-38, 342, 351-52, 

by signal troops: 34 

tactics in: 338, 350-51 

time of day for: 206, 275, 342 

visibility and weather factors: 282-83, 305, 31 5, 337, 342, 351 

392 

404 

Record, flight: 22 

Registration techniques: 259 

Regular Army. See United States Army 

Reorganization. See Organization 

Repair. See Maintenance, repair and replacement; Spare parts 

Reports 

in fire control and direction: 340 

in liaison: 332-33 

by observers: 270, 274, 281-82, 295-96, 298, 315, 325, 329, 

by pilots: 399 

338-40, 349, 399 

Rescue operations and equipment: 68 

Reserve components: 55, 63, 65, 101 

Reynolds, John N.: 237, 242 

Rhine River and Valley: 14347, 149 

Ribot, Alexandre: 105-1 07, 135 

Railroads 

airfields, access to: 318 

reconnaissance and observation: 256-57, 275 
4 50 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Road systems 

airfields, access to: 31 8 

identifying: 282, 284 

reconnaissance and observation: 275, 341, 406407 

strikes against: 292 

Rocket signals: 296, 298-99, 336, 382 

Roles and missions (see also Mission assignments) 

in air operations: 303-305 

cavalry: 23, 25 

field artillery: 23, 25 

infantry: 23, 25 

Mitchell views on: 175 

naval forces: 41 

in pursuit operations: 213-16, 294, 307 

of squadrons: 3-17, 21, 23, 29-31, 33-35, 38, 43, 48-53, 61, 

65, 67, 107-108, 11 1, 11 9-21, 157, 161, 199-203, 205-1 1, 

231 -45 

Romagne-sous-Montfaucon: 238-39, 242, 245 

Romorantin: 156, 197 

Roosevelt, Philip J.: 245 

Rothermere, Lord: 161 

Royal Flying Corps (Air Force) 

aircraft development and production: 101 

bombing doctrine: 253 

bombing operations, cooperation in: 151 -53, 159, 161 -63, 191 - 92, 241-42, 248 

command and control, proposals and practice: 152-54 

dirigible development: 93 

Independent Air Force: 231, 241 -43 

intelligence operations: 162 

morale: 167 

pursuit operations: 377 

squadron organization: 51 

squadrons serving with: 228 

training programs: 171, 191 -92 

Royce, Ralph: 236 

Runners. See Messenger service 

Ruses, application of: 206, 240, 360-61, 401 

Russel, Edgar: 3, 9, 706, 107 
451 

Index 

Russia 

aircraft development: 47 

aircraft in inventory: 28 

Russo-Japanese War: 12 

Ryan, John J.: 74 

Saar Valley bombing target group: 145, 147 

Sablons: 242 

Safety measures 

at airfields: 380, 384 

for personnel: 317 

St. Blin: 156 

St. Juvin: 238-39, 242, 245 

St. Mihiel offensive: 231 

Salmond, John Maitland: 153 

Salvage operations: 78, 81, 85 

San Andreas, Mexico: 84 

San Antonio, Mexico: 81-86 

San Antonio, Texas: 22, 37, 56, 60, 92 

San Borja, Mexico: 83 

San Diego, Calif.: 29, 37, 54, 60, 69, 89, 91 -93, 178 

San Diego Bay: 37 

San Francisco, Calif.: 8-9, 97 

San Geronimo, Mexico: 81-84 

San Lucas, Mexico: 83-84 

Sandy Hook, N.J.: 15 

Sanitary train: 65 

Sanitation measures: 31 8 

Santa Ana, Mexico: 80 

Santa Cruz, Mexico: 83 

Santa Maria, Mexico: 83 
452 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Santa Rosalia, Mexico: 84 

Santa Ysabel, Mexico: 83 

Satevo, Mexico: 83-85 

Saulmey: 239 

School squadrons: 169, 171 

Schools 

aviation school: 37-39, 55, 57, 59, 60, 71, 89, 96 

balloon school: 119 

establishment and operation: 123 

navigation courses: 147, 191 

supervision: 187 

in Zone of Advance: 139 

Scott, Hugh L.: 41 

Scott, Riley: 3, 5, 8-9, 12-17 

Scriven, George P.: 3-17, 19, 23-25, 27-31, 32, 33-35, 37-39, 

Sea, command of: 141 

Seaplanes, number required and procured: 28, 43, 69 

Searchlights 

55-57, 59-63, 67, 89, 91-94 

against aircraft: 377-78, 381 

signals by: 185, 282, 321 

Seattle, Wash.: 97 

Secretary of War. See Baker, Newton D.: Garrison, Lindley M. 

Security measures and operations: 146, 200-201, 207, 209-1 0, 

231-32, 239, 244, 273, 316, 318, 386-87 

at airfields: 92, 148-49, 156, 184, 192, 243, 291, 317-18, 383, 

for balloons: 404 

in bombing operations: 401 -402 

in fire control and direction: 216 

in reconnaissance and ObSeNatiOn: 21 6, 285-86, 291,336-38, 

386-87 

342,351 -52,404 

Sellers, C. G.: 372 

Semaphore (wigwag) signals: 30, 59, 199 

Senate. See Congress 
453 

Index 

Service of the Rear Project: 135, 195 

Service squadrons: 169, 171. See also by type 

Services of Supply: 135, 263 

Shallenberger, Ashton C.: 72 

Sheepshead Bay: 10 

Sherman, William C.: 22, 372, 313-408 

Shore-to-ship communications: 42 

Sierra Madre range: 77 

Sights 

bombing: 253 

machine gun: 379 

Aeronautical Division: 1 

aviation, control of: 1, 3, 33, 52 

Aviation Section. See Air Service 

Signal Corps 

Signal units: 34, 65, 135 

Signalling systems: 24-25, 30, 33-35, 49, 59, 63, 120, 177, 180- 

81, 183-85, 199-203, 205-1 1, 25758, 281, 296-98,306, 334, 

363,380. See also by type 

Smith, J. Andre: 124, 357 

Smithsonian Institution: 68-69 

Smoke 

signals by: 30, 63, 201, 209 

tactical use: 317 

Smoke-bomb signals: 30, 63, 201, 209 

Souilly: 146, 234, 240, 242 

South American aircraft development: 47 

Soviet Union. See Russia 

Spare parts (see also Maintenance, repair and replacement) 

procurement: 27-28, 67, 78 

storage: 317 

Specialists. See Technicians 

Spies, reports from: 141, 149 
4 54 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. It 

Spincourt: 238 

Spincourt Forest: 238 

Squadrons (see also Aircraft; also by type) 

1st: 19, 37, 56, 67, 75-87, 101 

2d, 6th and 7th: 101 

27th and 96th: 189 

103d: 173 

147th: 189 

4-squadron plan: 19-20, 27-28, 195-96 

100-squadron plan: 167-69 

120-squadron plan: 171 

202-squadron plan: 227-28 

260-squadron plan: 135-37 

368-squadron plan: 219-20, 227 

as A.E.F. elements: 192, 263 

aircraft allotments to: 19, 55-57, 59-61, 95 

assignments and transfers of: 37, 41, 57, 60, 89, 92, 329 

with British: 228 

casualties in: 52 

as combat elements: 192, 263, 31 1 

combat readiness: 41 

command and control: 19,23-24, 52, 89, 97, 121, 139, 152-54, 

convoys and marches: 31 8-21, 340 

costs of maintaining: 96 

dedication of personnel: 248 

development: 52-53 

enemy’s destroyed: 249 

equipment. See Armament and equipment 

expansion programs: 39, 65, 103-105, 127, 131-33, 135-37, 

first in combat: 86, 173 

flights as tactical units: 324, 355 

French organization: 51 

ground forces, support of. See Tactical air support 

headquarters, establishing: 319 

housing for personnel: 148 

liaison among: 321 

in Meuse-Argonne offensive: 231 

mobility of: 215, 243, 317-21, 387 

number in service and required: 60, 95, 101, 123-27, 135-37, 

operational areas: 329 

organization: 19, 37-38, 42, 51, 53, 55, 59, 67, 89, 324, 392-93 

165, 192,225,232, 239, 268, 310-1 1, 323,392-93 

167-69, 171, 219-20,227-28 

167-71, 195436, 219, 228 
Index 

park squadrons: 169, 171 

personnel, assignment and replacement: 163, 322 

personnel, number and required: 1, 39, 55, 57, 59-60, 89, 96, 

101, 123, 135, 169 

personnel, safety of: 317 

personnel strength: 27, 38-39, 51, 53 

policies, priorities and plans: 103, 167-69, 192 

pursuit-observation-bomber ratio: 1 69 

roles and missions: 3-17, 21, 23, 29-31, 33-35, 38, 43, 48-53, 

school squadrons: 169, 171 

staffs and staff officers: 323, 392-93 

tactics. See Tactics 

61,65, 67, 107-108, 111, 119-21, 157, 161, 199-203, 205- 

11, 231-45 

Squier, George 0.: 91, 93-99 

Staffs and staff officers 

Air Service appointments and shifts: 15-56 

American Expeditionary Forces: 125 

air service chiefs: 187-89 

army and corps air service: 325-27 

for bombing operations: 152, 155 

communications with: 21 0 

coordination with air operations: 163 

groups: 325-26, 387-92 

relations with: 310-1 1 

squadrons: 323, 392-93 

Stenay: 239 

Stonne: 242 

Strafing. See Ground forces, attacks on 

Strategic air support. See Bombing operations 

Strategic Aviation, Zone of Advance: 156-57 

Stuttgart: 143 

Subig Bay: 4 

Submarine warfare, German: 55, 100 

Submarines, detection of: 91 

Supply depots 

establishment and operation: 123, 139 

strikes against: 120, 232, 239, 251 
456 US. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

Supply forces. See Maintenance, supply and support forces 

Supply officers, duties of: 281, 323, 389-90, 393 

Supply operations and systems: 163, 169, 263 

responsibility for: 187-88, 192, 319, 322-25, 346-47 

strikes against: 120, 143, 151, 232-34, 239, 242-43, 292 

Supply train: 65 

Support missions. See Escort and patrol missions 

Supreme War Council: 219 

Surgeons, duties of: 391 

Surprise 

aircraft as deterrent: 33, 50 

application of: 232, 241, 314, 357, 376, 382 

security from: 337, 351, 371, 404. See also Security measures 

and operations 

Surveillance. See Reconnaissance and observation 

Synchronized firing systems: 98 

Tactical air support: 4243, 72, 101, 117, 119-21, 139, 163, 199- 

Tactical units. See by type 

Tactics 

203,205-1 1, 231-45, 24749,251, 285,292, 313 

in bombing operations: 277-79, 400403 

general: 51 

in pursuit operations: 99, 288-89, 291-94, 307-309, 355-84 

in reconnaissance and observation: 338,350-51 

Takeoff systems: 396 

Tanforan race track: 9 

Tanks, strikes against: 292-93 

Target selection and assignment 

in bombing operations: 117, 14345, 149, 151, 153, 192, 231- 

in pursuit operations: 233, 292-93, 309-10, 372-73 

32, 238-45,251, 253, 279, 309-10,394 

Taylor stunt: 360 

Teamwork in pursuit operations: 356, 363, 371 

Technicians, training and efficiency: 153 
457 

Index 

Telegraph battalion: 65 

Telegraph communications and installations: 25, 59, 199, 293, 334 

Telephone communications and installations: 24-25, 43, 59, 149, 

180-81, 183-85, 199,202,255,257-59,293,319, 321,334-35, 

349,354, 38546,407 

Termes: 239 

Terrain, effect on operations: 181 

Texas City, Texas: 19,22 

Thaw, William K.: 236, 237 

Thionville: 242 

Thomas, G. C.: 372 

Three-dimensional factor in flight: 307 

Tilson, John Q.: 91 

Time and distance factors 

in bombing operations: 146, 149-50, 315 

in communications operations: 306 

in pursuit operations: 31 5 

Tinsel-paper signals: 30, 63 

Toul bombing targets group: 146 

Toul sector: 145-46, 148, 156, 173, 175, 213 

Tours: 155 

Towers, John ti.: 105 

Towns, identifying: 282-83 

Tracer ammunition: 379 

Trailers. See Motor vehicles 

Trainer aircraft: 69, 105 

Training aids and literature: 187-88, 192 

Training programs: 37. See also Schools 

Army in general: 41 

bombardiers: 191 

for bombing operations: 393-94 

by British: 171, 191-92 
4 58 U.S. Air Service 

in World War I 

VOl. II 

ferry pilots: 192 

in liaison operations: 21 1, 299-301, 31 1 

in map reading and use: 149-50, 21 1 

mechanics: 324 

in navigation: 147, 191 

observers: 30, 38, 51-52, 115, 149-50, 210, 223, 269, 271,273, 

pilots: 37-38, 51-52, 77, 86-87, 98-99, 14647, 149-50, 191, 

306,315,340,351, 389, 393-94,407 

223, 273, 277, 294, 306, 351,356, 373, 380-81,388, 393-94, 

400 

responsibility for: 187-88 

technicians: 153 

air units equipment and personnel: 148, 150-51 

by aircraft: 33-35 

of aircraft: 149 

of armament and equipment: 319 

for liaison operations: 327 

Transportation (see also Convoys and marches; Mobility) 

Transportation officers, duties of: 391 -92 

Trenchard, Hugh M.: 107-108, 709, 152-53, 161, 191 

Tres Hermanos, Mexico: 83 

Tripoli, war in: 11, 47 

Troop units. See Ground forces 

Trucks. See Motor vehicles; Transportation 

Turkish army: 13 

United Kingdom (see also Royal Flying Corps) 

Air Board: 161 

Air Ministry: 161, 163 

air raids on: 162 

aircraft in service: 28 

war aims, policies and priorities: 161 -62 

War Cabinet: 161, 163 

combat mission: 31 3-14 

organization: 42, 57, 59, 65 

personnel strength expansion: 41, 57, 65 

training program: 41 

United States Army (see also American Expeditionary Forces) 

United States Coast Guard: 4142 
459 

Index 

United States Navy: 41 -42, 92. See also Naval forces 

Valois, R.: 302 

Van Horn, Robert 0.: 155 

Verdun: 241 -42 

Verdun-Tout base: 145-46, 148 

Very pistol signals: 63, 798, 296, 298 

Vezelise: 146 

Villa, Pancho: 65, 66, 67 

Villome, Commandant: 237, 241 -43 

Vilosnes: 238 

Visibility factor 

in bombing operations: 307, 315, 389, 399, 401 

in fire control and direction: 307, 315, 346 

in pursuit operations: 307, 315, 356-57, 374, 378, 381-82, 389 

in reconnaissance and observation: 282-83, 305, 315, 337, 342, 

351 

Visual signals. See by type 

Viven Bessiere: 201 

Void: 146 

Volunteer forces: 65 

Vosges sector: 149 

Vouziers: 239 

Walker, Kirby: 137 

Wallace, Charles S.: 67, 69, 91 

War aims, British: 161 -62 

War Department: 3, 145, 228 

Warren, S. S.: 75 

Washington, George, quoted: 53, 157 

Watercourses, identifying: 282 

Weapon systems, aircraft. See Armament and equipment 
460 U.S. Ail: Service 

in Wclrld War I 

VOl. II 

Weather factor in operations: 50, 77-78, 80, 92, 14547, 149, 

Westermark, Arthur: 84 

Whitehead, Henry C.: 263 

Wigwag (semaphore) signals: 30 

Willard, Charles F.: 70 

Willis, R. H.: 75, 86 

Wilmington, Del.: 15 

Wilson, Woodrow: 55,64,65,91 

Winds 

181-182,206,215,248,251,277,38143 

direction, indicating: 148 

effect on operations: 181 

Wing, 1st Pursuit: 231, 233, 237, 241 45 

Wireless. See Radio communications and installations 

Woevre sector: 233 

Wooded areas, identifying: 282 

Wright brothers: 1, 7, 13, 47, 70, 77 

Zeppelins: 45, 61, 63 

Zimmermann note: 100 

Zone of Advance, A.E.S.: 139 

Zone of Interior, A.E.F.: 139 

Q U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1978 038-795