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S. HRG.107–994

CLEAN AIR ACT: RISKS FROM GREENHOUSE

GAS EMISSIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH

INCREASING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS

MARCH 13, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works

(
(II)

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont, Chairman

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

HARRY REID, Nevada

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

BARBARA BOXER, California

RON WYDEN, Oregon

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

KEN CONNOLLY, Majority Staff Director

DAVE CONOVER, Minority Staff Director
(III)

CONTENTS

Page

MARCH 13, 2002

OPENING STATEMENTS

Campbell, Hon. Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado ....... 44

Chafee, Hon. Lincoln, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island .................. 29

Corzine, Hon. Jon S., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ..................... 32

Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph, U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut ............... 43

Smith, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from the State of New Hampshire .................... 6

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ....................... 4

WITNESSES

Baliunas, Sallie, astrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Cambridge, MA ...................................................................................... 19

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 154

Report, Climate Research, Vol. 18:259–275, 2001, Modeling climatic effects of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions: unknown uncertainties .............................................................................................................. 162–178

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Campbell ...................................................................................... 183

Senator Jeffords ......................................................................................... 179

Senator Smith ............................................................................................ 179

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 181

Cogen, Jack D., president, Natsource, New York, NY .......................................... 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 195

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Smith ............................................................................................ 196

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 197

Legates, David R., director, Center for Climatic Research, University of Delaware, Newark, DE ................................................................................................ 15

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 101

Report, A Layman’s Guide to the General Circulation Models Used in

the National Assessment .......................................................................... 106–125

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Campbell ...................................................................................... 132

Senator Jeffords ......................................................................................... 126

Senator Smith ............................................................................................ 126

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 129

Summary, Addendum #1, Theoretical and Applied Climatology, 41,

11–21 (1990), by Springer-Verlag, Mean Seasonal and Spatial Variability in Global Surface Air Temperature ...................................... 134–145

Markham, Adam, executive director, Clean Air-Cool Planet, Portsmouth, NH . 17

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 146

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Campbell ...................................................................................... 154

Senator Jeffords ......................................................................................... 151

Senator Smith ............................................................................................ 152

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 153

Pielke, Roger A., Jr., associate professor, Center for Science and Technology

Policy Research, University of Colorado/Cooperative Institute for Research

in Environmental Sciences, Boulder, CO ........................................................... 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 87
Page

IV

Pielke, Roger A., Jr., associate professor, Center for Science and Technology

Policy Research, University of Colorado/Cooperative Institute for Research

in Environmental Sciences, Boulder, CO—Continued

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Campbell ...................................................................................... 100

Senator Jeffords ......................................................................................... 94

Senator Smith ............................................................................................ 98

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 99

Rowland, Sherwood F., Donald Bren research professor of chemistry and

earth science, University of California Irvine, Irvine, CA ................................ 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45

Report, Climate Change Science, An Analysis of Some Key Questions,

National Academy Press ............................................................................... 47–82

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Jeffords ......................................................................................... 83

Senator Smith ............................................................................................ 84

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 86

Whittaker, Martin, managing director, Innovest, Richmond Hill, Ontario,

Canada .................................................................................................................. 20

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 183

Responses to additional questions from:

Senator Jeffords ......................................................................................... 188

Senator Smith ............................................................................................ 191

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 193

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

Charts:

Alaska’s Temperature History ......................................................................... 207

A Sun-Climate Link ......................................................................................... 161

Forecast Amount of Averted Global Warming ............................................... 157

Global Temperature ......................................................................................... 159

Global Tropospheric Temperature ................................................................... 160

Surface Temperature ........................................................................................ 158

Letter, East-West Center, Honolulu, HI ................................................................ 208

Report, ‘‘Swiss Re’’................................................................................................ 199–206
(1)

CLEAN AIR ACT: RISKS FROM GREENHOUSE

GAS EMISSIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room 406,

Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James M. Jeffords (chairman of the

committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jeffords, Voinovich, Smith, Chafee, and

Corzine.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Senator JEFFORDS. Good morning. The hearing will come to

order.

Today we will hear testimony on the economic and environmental risk of increasing greenhouse gas emissions. It is important

to note that the hearing is not a debate about whether manmade

emissions are causing warming. For the time being, that question

has been settled by the National Academy of Sciences. An Academy

report from June 2001 said,‘‘Greenhouse gases are accumulating in

Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface

air temperatures and sub-surface ocean temperatures to rise, and

human-induced warming and associated sea level rises are expected to continue through the 21st century.’’ We are fortunate to have today a witness here who has worked

on that report.

What the committee will review is the magnitude of the possible

injuries or losses that may be caused by this warming. I urge the

witnesses to stay on that topic and help us assess the risk related

to increasing greenhouse gas emissions.

One year ago today, the President formally notified the world

and the Senate of his decision to unilaterally abandon the Kyoto

Protocol. At the same time, he also abandoned his campaign promise to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, or the fourth ‘‘P’’ from powerplants. That was a serious blow to a sensible, market-based approach to reducing carbon emissions. As a result, the country has

no actual policy in place to achieve a real emissions reduction target, so emissions will continue unabated. This is happening despite

our international commitment in the Rio Agreement to reduce U.S.

emissions to 1990 levels. Voluntary measures are no substitute and

have failed to do more than slightly slow the rate of growth.
2

This situation concerns me and it should concern all of my colleagues. Unconstrained emissions will increase atmospheric concentrations. These will lead to greater global warming and provoke

even greater climate changes.

Some of my concern is parochial. In Vermont, we rely on predictability of the seasons for our economic well-being and our quality

of life. In the spring, maple syrup production is important. In the

fall and summer, it is tourism. In the winter, it is skiing,

snowboarding, and other outdoor recreation. It is safe to say that

most Vermonters aren’t interested in moving Hudson Bay to maintain their way of life.

Elsewhere in the country, my colleagues should be concerned

about the potential impacts of climate change on public health, infrastructure, agriculture, and wildlife.

Sea-level rise should be of particular concern to my friends who

represent coastal States, especially with growing areas. As Senator

Stevens has noted, Alaska villages have already started to experience some of these effects. However, these gradual impacts may

pale in comparison to what might happen with a sudden or abrupt

change.

In December 2001, the National Academy said, ‘‘Greenhouse

warming and other human alterations of the Earth’s system may

increase the possibility of large, abrupt, and unwelcome regional or

global climactic changes.’’ This should be a sobering statement that

encourages action; instead, the debate often seems to be focused on

the trees rather than the forest. But that information is not essential for Congress to act.

The potential calamity that awaits us through inaction is too serious for Congress to ignore. We acted on lead in gasoline and on

ozone-depleting substances, even though we did not have perfect

information. We made the right choice.

The science on climate change is sound enough to proceed with

reductions now. Many carbon-intensive businesses have already

begun to take action. They see a duty to their shareholders and to

the public to start reducing these carbon risks.

Major insurance companies are increasingly concerned about the

uncertainty of a changing climate in their financial exposure. Several markets are developing for the trading of greenhouse gas reduction credits, even in the United States.

It seems that there must be some level of economic or environmental risk associated with these emissions; otherwise, how could

the credits have value, and why would anyone trade them? But

they are being traded at $1 to $9 per ton.

Congress is often slow to act on complex problems like climate,

especially without vigorous leadership from the White House. In

this situation, the private sector may have to lead us in the right

direction.

Unfortunately, in the meantime it seems to be business as usual

on emissions. They will continue to grow, and we may reach atmospheric concentrations that haven’t existed for hundreds of thousands of years. We need to know and be prepared for what that

means for our committee, our plans, and our Nation.
3

I look forward to the panel’s testimony. It will help us discover

and better understand the risks that are posed by continuing to increase greenhouse gas emissions.

[The prepared statement of Senator Jeffords follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF VERMONT

Today we’ll hear testimony on the economic and environmental risks of increasing

greenhouse gas emissions. It’s important to note that this hearing is not a debate

about whether manmade emissions are causing warming. For the time being, that

question has been settled by the National Academy of Sciences.

An Academy report from June 2001 said, ‘‘Greenhouse gases are accumulating in

Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise’’ . . . and . . . ‘‘Human-induced

warming and associated sea level rises are expected to continue through the 21st

century.’’ We’re fortunate to have a witness here today who worked on that report.

What the committee will review is the magnitude of the possible injuries or losses

that may be caused by this warming. I urge the witnesses to stay on that topic and

help us assess the risks related to increasing greenhouse gas emissions.

One year ago today, the President formally notified the world and the Senate of

his decision to unilaterally abandon the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, he also

abandoned his campaign promise to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, or the fourth

‘‘P,’’ from power plants. That was a serious blow to a sensible, market-based approach to reducing carbon emissions.

As a result, the country has no actual policy in place to achieve a real emissions

reductions target. So, emissions will continue unabated.

This is happening despite our international commitment in the Rio Agreement to

reduce U.S. emissions to 1990 levels. Voluntary measures are no substitute and

have failed to do more than slightly slow the rate of growth.

This situation concerns me and it should concern all of my colleagues. Unconstrained emissions will increase atmospheric concentrations. These will lead to

greater global warming and provoke even greater climate changes.

Some of my concern is parochial. In Vermont, we rely on the predictability of the

seasons for our economic well-being and our quality of life.

In the spring, maple syrup production is important. In the fall and summer, it’s

tourism. In the winter, it’s skiing, snowboarding and other outdoor recreation. It’s

safe to say that most Vermonters aren’t interested in moving to Hudson Bay to

maintain their way of life.

Elsewhere in the country, my colleagues should be concerned about the potential

impacts of climate change on public health, infrastructure, agriculture and wildlife.

Sea-level rise should be of particular concern to my friends who represent coastal

states, especially with growing areas.

As Senator Stevens has noted, Alaskan villages have already started to experience

some of these effects.

However, these gradual impacts may pale in comparison to what might happen

with a sudden or abrupt change. In December 2001, the National Academy said,

‘‘greenhouse warming and other human alterations of the Earth system may increase the possibility of large, abrupt and unwelcome regional or global climatic

events.’’

That should be a sobering statement that encourages action. Instead, the debate

often seems to be focused on the trees rather than the forest.

There are even some people who think we should stop our efforts to assess the

possible impact of global warming on our economy or our environment. They want

to wait for perfect information. That seems unwise and irresponsible.

We must redouble our efforts to understand how global warming may affect us.

We should continue working diligently to reduce the uncertainties of predictions.

I am hopeful that the President will soon send up the detailed global change

budget, as required by the Global Change Research Act of 1990. That budget must

keep the national assessment moving without delay or censorship.

But, that information is not essential for Congress to begin acting. The potential

calamity that awaits us through inaction is too serious for Congress to ignore.

We acted on lead in gasoline and on ozone-depleting substances even though we

did not have perfect information. We made the right choice. The science on climate

change is sound enough to proceed with reductions now.

Many carbon intensive businesses have already begun to take action. They see a

duty to their shareholders and to the public to start reducing their carbon risks.
4

Major insurance companies are increasingly concerned about the uncertainty of

changing climate and their financial exposure. Several markets are developing for

the trading of greenhouse gas reduction credits, even in the United States. It seems

that there must be some level of economic or environmental risk associated with

these emissions. Otherwise, how could the credits have value and why would anyone

trade them? But, they are being traded at $1-$9 per ton.

Congress is often slow to act on complex problems like climate, especially without

vigorous leadership from the White House. In this situation, the private sector may

have to lead us in the right direction.

Unfortunately, in the meantime, it seems to be business as usual on emissions.

They will continue to grow and we may reach atmospheric concentrations that

haven’t existed for hundreds of thousands of years.

We need to know and be prepared for what that means for our communities, our

plans, and our nation.

I look forward to the panel’s testimony. It will help us discover and better understand the risks that are posed by continuing to increase greenhouse gas emissions.

Senator JEFFORDS. Our first witness is Dr. Rowland.

Senator Voinovich, I note your arrival. If you have an opening

statement, now is the time.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome the panel.

I want to thank you for holding this hearing today on the economic and environmental risks associated with increasing greenhouse gas emissions. I think it is always important to try and understand the risks associated with the various policy decisions that

we grapple with here in the Senate; however, Mr. Chairman, I

want to make sure we don’t rush past the underlying assumptions

on the science of greenhouse gases and climate change and jump

immediately to the worst case scenario effects. In courtroom terms,

we are in danger here, I think, of passing a sentence before we

have fully deliberated on the evidence.

Over the last year, I have chaired one hearing on climate change.

I have now attended, including today, three others. There is no

question in my mind that there is a real difference of opinion between the scientific experts on climate change.

It is amazing to me how certain groups have bought into the idea

that everything is settled and they close their mind to conflicting

evidence. I get letters from constituents and friends about climate

change, and it appears that they just look at one set of information

and have made a conclusion about it. Then what I do is, I send

them the testimony that I’ve had at hearings and said, ‘‘Here, read

all of it, and then you tell me what you think after reading both

sides of this.’’ There is a difference of opinion.

Greenhouse gas emissions and the climate change debate are

real issues which deserve our attention and the attention of the

best and brightest scientists in our country and the world. There

are a number of issues which need to be addressed before we plan

what to do about the worst case scenario, such as: what do the

models tell us about past changes and climate patterns, and how

well-suited are they to predict future changes? What do we know

about the predicted range of climate temperatures due to manmade

emissions over the next 50 to 100 years? If something needs to be

done today, what are the available technology options and what
5

would the cost be to society to implement those options? Finally,

if we were to implement changes, what would the impact be?

I am told that if we were to implement the Kyoto Treaty completely, we would only avert the expected temperature change of

.06 °C—that’s .06 °C, which is substantially less than 1 °F. That’s a

.01 °C. To me that hardly seems significant, and maybe some of our

witnesses will comment on that.

I’d also like to say a brief word about the President’s climate

change initiative. I know today’s hearing was planned for the anniversary of the President’s announcement on Kyoto—very good, Mr.

Chairman. Instead of dwelling on Kyoto, which was a failed treaty

and would never have passed the Senate and still would never pass

the Senate, we should look at the President’s initiative. To me, it

seems to be a very reasonable approach and it is the only credible

alternative proposed to date. By the way, it is one that’s gaining

support by many of our allies who would like to go forward and get

something done on this issue and not have it be a long debate of

the international community with nothing getting done. It provides

the necessary funding for both the science and the technological research. It encourages companies to register their CO2 emissions. It

sets a national goal to reduce our carbon intensity, which is the

best way to protect our economy and begin to address the issue.

Finally, in terms of the multi-emission strategy, as I’ve said repeatedly, I would support addressing CO2, Mr. Chairman, in a voluntary way which encourages new technologies and practices such

as carbon sequestration or anything else that’s out there that we

can look at, but I will not support a mandatory CO2 reduction cap.

I think it is important that we do not let the CO2 issue stand

in the way of meaningful reductions of SO2, NOx, and mercury.

There are many people out there that want something done about

those three emissions, many of them who live in your part of the

country. We can sit here and have a chowder society and debate.

I’d like to get on with dealing with those three so that we can improve the environment and at the same time, create an environment where we have reasonable energy costs for the people of this

country.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on the economic and environmental risks associated with increasing greenhouse gas emissions. I think it

is always important to try and understand the risks associated with the various policy decisions we grapple with here in the Senate.

However, I want to make sure we don’t rush past the underlying assumptions on

the science of greenhouse gases and climate change and jump immediately to the

worst-case scenario effects. In courtroom terms we are in danger here today of passing a sentence before we have fully deliberated the evidence.

Over the last year I have chaired one Hearing on Climate Change and have now

attended three others. There is no question in my mind that there is a real difference of opinion between the scientific experts on climate change. It is amazing

to me how certain groups have bought into the idea that everything is settled and

they close their mind to conflicting evidence.

Greenhouse gas emissions and the climate change debate are real issues which

deserve our attention and the attention of the best and brightest scientists in our

country and the world. There are a number of issues which need to be addressed

before we plan what to do about the worst-case scenarios such as:
6

• What do the models tell us about the past changes in climate patterns and how

well suited are they to predict future changes? • What do we know about the predicted range of climate temperatures due to

man-made emissions over the next 50 to 100 years? • If something needs to be done today, what are the available technology options

and what would the cost be to society to implement them? • Finally, if we were to implement changes, what would the impact be. I am told

if we were to implement the Kyoto Treaty completely, we would only avert the expected temperature change by .06 degrees Celsius over the next 50 years. That

hardly seems significant.

I would also like to say a brief word about the President’s Climate Change Initiative. I know today’s hearing was planned for the anniversary of the President’s an- nouncement on Kyoto. Instead of dwelling on Kyoto, which was a failed Treaty and

would never have passed the Senate, we should look at his Initiative. To me it

seems to be a very reasonable approach and it is the only credible alternative proposed to date. • It provides the necessary funding for both the science and the technology research. • It encourages companies to register their CO2 emissions. • It sets a national goal to reduce our carbon intensity, which is the best way to

protect our economy and begin to address the issue.

Finally, in terms of the Multi-Emissions Strategy I have said repeatedly that I

would support addressing CO2 in a voluntary way which encourages new technologies and practices such as carbon sequestration. I will not support a mandatory

CO2 reduction cap. I think it is important that we do not let the CO2 issue stand

in the way of meaningful reduction of SO2, NOx, and mercury.

Senator JEFFORDS. Senator Smith.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB SMITH, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just pick up on the Senator from Ohio comments. I want

to compliment him for working together with this Senator. We

have a number of issues which easily could put our States against

each other, but it has been a cooperative effort. I agree with your

comments regarding the technology that’s out there that is bringing dramatic reductions in NOx, SO2, and mercury. We have a

partnership between a company in New Hampshire, Power Span,

working with a company, working with a utility in Ohio. We’re getting good results on that, and I think that’s the kind of thing that

brings us together to reach compromise and solutions, and I am

very grateful for your cooperation on these issues.

We are this morning talking about economic and environmental

risks associated with climate change, and certainly want to welcome all the witnesses, but specifically, Adam Markham from

Portsmouth, NH. It is good to see you here. Mr. Markham will be

discussing a recent report coordinated by the University of New

Hampshire that describes much of the potential environmental and

economic impact of climate change in New England—impact on industries, which is where we make money, skiing and—we don’t

have any sugar maple subsidies. We have peanut subsidies and tobacco subsidies, but no sugar maple subsidies. I’m not advocating

any, either.

This study underscores concerns that I’ve shared with members

of this committee about small, family-owned businesses that are at

risk as a result of what we may or may not do.

These are just a few of the risks that New Hampshire would face

with a potential change in climate. There are many more aspects

to the question of risks posed by climate change than we could
7

even get into today. But when we talk about risk, I think it is

worth looking to those whose entire business is based on putting

a price on risk, translating environmental risk into economic terms,

and obviously that is the insurance industry. Insurance companies

are motivated to seek the clearest risk information available on the

subject of anything, and certainly climate change, as well. This motivation is not clouded by politics or agendas, but focused squarely

on the bottom line.

I have had my share of disagreements with insurance companies

on some of these issues, but accuracy in this kind of work is not

a luxury. It’s a necessity. If they don’t estimate risks accurately,

then somebody is going to go bankrupt—they will.

I would like to reference a document that’s found on the website

of one of the largest reinsurance companies in the world. It’s called

‘‘Swiss Re.’’ I would ask unanimous consent that this document be

made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JEFFORDS. Without objection.

Senator SMITH. The document has a very interesting title, ‘‘Climate Research Does Not Remove the Uncertainty: Coping with the

Risks of Climate Change.’’ The title I think sums up our hearing

today. The primary point of the paper is that climate change is

happening and it poses financial risks. We’re still unclear on how

much of the change is natural and how much of it is human induced.

I have been to Woods Hole, MA. We’ve talked about these issues

with a number of scientists. That’s what I hear over and over

again—is the change natural? How much of it is natural? How

much of it is human induced? But there is change taking place. If

you go back to the insurance industry and their customers, causes

are of secondary importance in the face of weather-related losses.

So as we examine the risk question—and that’s why I bring the

insurance analogy up here—as we consider the entirety of the climate change debate, we should focus more attention on economic

risk posed by any climate change, natural or human induced.

The study points out that our vulnerability to extreme weather

conditions is increasing. This is because in a global economy, local

weather can have international consequences. As an example,

Swiss Re points to the flooding of the Far East Computer Chip Factory, causing supply bottlenecks through the entire technology sector. The paper points out that climate change is not needed for that

example to occur.

But evidence does show, though, that human interference in the

climate system exacerbates the problem caused by natural climate

change, so the difference between natural variation in the climate

and natural variation coupled with human influences may be

small. We don’t know yet. The scientists will continue to try to answer that question.

There are differences between forces that can cause either negligible damage or catastrophic loss. These are the intelligent

thoughts of experienced businessmen and woman and people not

driven by any political agenda. Their jobs are to accurately assess

the economic risks posed by climate conditions, and they provide an

excellent perspective for us to consider.
8

Let me just share one quote from the paper. ‘‘The climate problem cannot be ignored, nor will it be solved merely by calls for optimum climate protection. We need to find ways of implementing the

necessary climate protection measures in a manner which is both

socially and economically acceptable.’’ That’s reasonable counsel.

Although I might doubt the authors ever intended it for this committee, I would urge that we listen to their advice.

Given the potential risk, we have to begin to explore reasonable

ways of mitigating the potential economic damage, regardless of

the cause of climate change.

I’ve strongly advocated a system based on incentives for innovative measures to reduce greenhouse gas. That’s what Senator

Voinovich was just talking about. We are working with the chairman on this. We have some differences. Hopefully they will be differences that we can bridge, but we do have differences. But I believe that capitalizing on innovation in the free market will meet

whatever challenges are presented. We need to think out of the

box.

Maybe technology will move a lot quicker in this area than the

regulation that we propose. Maybe we won’t need to worry about

Kyoto because the technology that we are producing will export to

the Third World countries and as they develop, they won’t be making the same mistakes that we made. Just maybe that might work.

It doesn’t seem to me to make a lot of sense to try to get people

involved in a treaty who won’t abide by the treaty or can’t abide

by the treaty and don’t have the means to abide by a treaty.

I don’t think it is necessary to regulate through command and

control carbon, for example, at powerplants to cut atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases. Let’s get the technology working out there

so people can make money and reduce carbon while we’re doing it.

We don’t have to create economic damage as a means to avoid economic and environmental risk. There are other ways. We shouldn’t

be in the business of choosing winners and losers.

Regardless of whatever the policy answer is, one thing is for certain: absent a bipartisan approach to the resolution of this issue,

we will achieve nothing, nothing at all. I’ve learned that as the

chairman of this committee the hard way, frankly. We had two

major issues when I was chairman of the committee. One was the

Everglades and one was brownfields, and they have been

lollygagging around here in the Senate for years. I had some strong

views on both and couldn’t get them passed, and we were able to

work together, come up with a bipartisan solution, and found myself voting against amendments that I supported in order to stick

with that solution as we move forward, and both of those pieces of

legislation are now law. It is tough to deal with this. It is frustrating when you have people who differ with you on issues but you

know in your heart you’re going to have to compromise before you

can get it done.

So, regardless of whatever the policy is, we will need to be bipartisan. We can’t allow politics to trump reason and success. You

know, good politics isn’t always necessarily the right thing for the

environment. I think we ought to let the chips fall where they may.

But we do have a long tradition of bipartisanship in this committee, Mr. Chairman, as you well know, and I think it will con-
9

tinue. There’s a tremendous diversity of opinion in this room on

how to address these issues, but I’m confident that that diversity

is both valuable and a challenge, and I look forward to meeting

that challenge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Good morning. Today we are here to talk about the economic and environmental

risks associated with climate change.

I want to welcome all of our witnesses, and a special welcome to Adam Markham

who has come down from New Hampshire. Mr. Markham will be discussing a recent

report coordinated by the University of New Hampshire that describes much of the

potential environmental and economic impact of climate change in New England—

impact on industries such as skiing and sugar maple.

This study underscores concerns I have shared with members of this committee.

Small, family-owned businesses are at risk. These are just a few of risks that New

Hampshire would face—associated with the potential change in climate.

There are many more aspects to the question of risks posed by climate change

than we could list today. When we talk about risk, I think it is worth looking to

those whose entire business is based on putting a price on risk—translating environmental risk into economic terms—the insurance industry. Insurance companies

are motivated to seek the clearest risk information available on subject of climate

change.

This motivation is not clouded by politics or agendas, but focused squarely on the

bottom line where accuracy is not a luxury. It is a necessity. If they do not estimate

risks accurately, they will soon go bankrupt.

I would like reference a document that can be found on the web site of one of

largest reinsurance companies in the world—Swiss Re. I would ask unanimous consent that this document be part of the record. The document bears the title ‘‘Climate

Research Does Not Remove the Uncertainty: Coping With The Risks of Climate

Change.’’ The title pretty well sums up our hearing topic today.

The primary point of this paper is that climate change is happening and it poses

financial risks. We still are unclear on how much of that change is natural and how

much is human-induced. But for the insurance industry and their customers,

CAUSES are of secondary importance in the face of weather-related losses.

As we examine the risk question, and as we consider the entirety of the climate

change debate, we should focus more attention on economic risk posed by any climate change—natural or human induced. The study points out that our ‘‘vulnerability to extreme weather conditions is increasing.’’ This is because in a global

economy, local weather can have international consequences.

An example Swiss Re points to is the flooding of a Far East computer chip factory,

causing supply bottlenecks for the entire technology sector.

The paper points out that climate change is not needed for that example to occur.

But, evidence shows that human interference in the climate system exacerbates the

problem already caused by natural climate change. The difference between natural

variation in the climate, and natural variation coupled with human influences may

be small. We don’t know yet—the scientists will continue to try to answer that question.

There are small differences between forces that can cause either negligible damage or catastrophic loss. These are the intelligent thoughts of experienced businessmen and women—people not driven by any political agenda. Their jobs are to ACCURATELY assess the economic risks posed by climate conditions—and they provide an excellent perspective for us to consider. I would like to share one last quote

from the paper,

‘‘The climate problem cannot be ignored, nor will it be solved merely by calls

for optimum climate protection. We need to find ways of implementing the necessary climate protection measures in a manner which is both socially and economically acceptable.’’

I believe that is reasonable counsel and even though I doubt the authors ever intended it for this committee, I would urge that we heed their advice.
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Given the potential risks, we must begin to explore reasonable ways of mitigating

the potential economic damages—regardless of the causes of the climate change. I

have strongly advocated a system based on incentives for innovative measures to

reduce greenhouse gases.

I believe that capitalizing on innovation and the free market will meet whatever

challenges are presented—we should think ‘‘out of the box.’’

I don’t believe that it is necessary to regulate—through command-and-control—

carbon at power plants to cut atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases. We don’t have

to create economic damage as means to avoid economic and environmental risks.

There are other ways.

And we shouldn’t be in the business of choosing winners and losers.

Regardless of whatever the policy answer is—one thing is for certain: absent a

bipartisan approach, we will achieve nothing. We cannot allow politics to trump reason and success.

Fortunately, this committee has a long tradition of bipartisanship. I can assure

you this—if a partisan approach is followed on this committee with this, or any

other issue, the only thing that will be achieved is failure—what a terrible legacy

that would be. There is tremendous diversity of opinion in this room on how to address these issues. That diversity is both valuable and a challenge.

But, this isn’t the first time this committee has been faced with such a challenge.

When people put political agendas aside and are willing to work toward a constructive solution, we ultimately find common ground. I have done my best to work on

all environmental legislation applying the principles of cooperation, partnership,

and bipartisanship.

It is my hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will continue to work together and find a

good solution.

Thank you.

Senator JEFFORDS. Our first witness is Dr. F. Sherwood Rowland,

the Donald Bren Research professor of chemistry and earth system

science, the University of California.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF F. SHERWOOD ROWLAND, DONALD BREN RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY AND EARTH SCIENCE,

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, IRVINE, CA

Mr. ROWLAND. I’m pleased to be here to testify to your committee, Senator Jeffords.

To Senator Voinovich, I will just say that I grew up in Ohio and

my undergraduate education was at Ohio Wesleyan University.

I am here really as a member of a committee that was appointed

by the National Academy of Sciences and made a report to the

White House last June. I am an atmospheric scientist, and I will

tell you something about that report.

A natural greenhouse effect has existed in Earth’s atmosphere

for thousands of years, warming the Earth’s surface by a global average of 57 °F. During the 20th century, the atmospheric concentrations of a number of greenhouse gases have increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind.

Our current concern is not whether there is a greenhouse effect,

because there is one, but rather how large will be the enhanced

greenhouse effect from the additional accumulation in the atmosphere of these greenhouse gases.

Daily, the Earth intercepts energy from the sun, much of it in

the visible wavelengths corresponding to the spectrum of colors

from red to violet and the rest in ultraviolet and nearby infrared

wavelengths. An equal amount of energy must escape from the

Earth daily to maintain a balance, but this energy emission is controlled by the much cooler average surface temperature of the
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Earth and occurs in wavelengths in what is called the ‘‘far infrared.’’

If all of this terrestrially emitted infrared radiation were able to

escape directly to space, then the required average temperature of

the Earth would be 0 °F. However, the greenhouse gases—carbon

dioxide, CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, and others—selectively intercept some of this far infrared radiation, preventing its escape. A

warmer Earth emits more infrared radiation and Earth with an average surface temperature of 57 °F was able to make up the shortfall from greenhouse gas absorption. However, at first slowly during the 19th century and then more rapidly during the 20th century, the atmospheric concentrations of these greenhouse gases increased, often because of the activities of mankind.

Other greenhouse gases have also been added, such as the

chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, and tropospheric ozone. With more of

these gases present in the atmosphere, more infrared will be intercepted and a further temperature increase will be required to

maintain the energy balance.

Carbon dioxide is released by the combustion of fossil fuels—coal,

oil, and natural gas—and its atmospheric concentration has increased from about 280 ppm as the 19th century began to 315 ppm

in 1958 and 370 ppm now.

Water is actually the most significant greenhouse gas in absorbing infrared radiation, but the amount of gaseous water is controlled by the temperature of the world’s oceans and lakes.

Methane has a natural source from swamps, but is also released

during agricultural activities—for example, from rice paddies while

flooded and from cows and other ruminant animals and by other

processes—and has increased from about 0.7 ppm in the early

1800’s to 1.5 ppm around 1978 and 1.77 ppm currently.

Nitrous oxide concentrations grew from 0.27 to 0.31 ppm during

the 20th century, formed by microbial action in soils and waters on

nitrogen-containing compounds, including nitrogen-containing fertilizers.

The chlorofluorocarbons or CFCs were not a natural part of the

atmosphere but were first synthesized in 1928 and were then applied to a variety of uses—propellant gases for aerosol sprays, refrigerants in home refrigerators and automobile air conditioners,

industrial solvents, manufacture of plastic foams, etc.

The CFC concentrations started from zero concentration in the

1920’s and rose rapidly during the latter part of the 20th century

until the early 1990’s. They are no longer increasing because of the

Montreal Protocol, an international ban on their further manufacture.

Tropospheric ozone is a globally important compound formed by

photochemical reactions as a part of urban smog in hundreds of cities. Other potential influences on temperature changes for which

the global average data are still very sparse include the concentrations of particulate matter, such as sulfate and black carbon

aerosols.

Measurements of surface temperatures only became sufficiently

broad in geographical coverage about 1860 to permit global averaging, with improved coverage as the years passed. The globally

averaged surface temperature increased about 1.1 ≥F during the
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20th century, with about half of this change occurring during the

last 25 years. The year 1998 was the warmest year globally in the

entire 140-year record, and the 1990’s were the warmest decade.

Fluctuations in solar activity have been directly observed since

the invention of the telescope 400 years ago, but accurate, direct

measurements of total solar energy output have only been possible

with the advent of satellite measurements in the late 1970’s. These

satellite data exhibit a small but definite cyclic variation over the

last two decades, paralleling the 11-year solar sun spot cycle, but

with little long-term difference in solar energy output contemporary with the rising global temperatures of the past two decades.

Predictions of future temperature responses require atmospheric

model calculations which effectively simulate the past and then are

extrapolated into the future with appropriate estimates of the future changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. These

models calculate the direct temperature increases that additional

greenhouse gases will cause and the further feedbacks induced by

these temperature changes. One of the most prominent of these

feedbacks is the change in albedo, or surface reflectivity, in the

polar north. When melting ice is replaced by open water, or melting

snow replaced by bare ground, less solar radiation is reflected back

to space and more remains at the surface, causing a further temperature increase.

The models also assume that more water will remain in the atmosphere in response to the temperature increases, providing another positive feedback.

There is an additional possible feedback from the changes in

clouds—amount, composition, altitude. In present models, the cloud

feedback is assumed to be small, but data for better evaluation are

very difficult to obtain.

Extrapolations for 50 or 100 years in the future necessarily include hypotheses about future societal developments, including

population growth, economic activity, etc. The Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC, developed a large set of scenarios about the possible course of these events over the next century, with resulting model calculations of globally averaged temperature increases for the year 2100 relative to 1990, ranging from

2.5 °F to 10.4 °F, or 1.4 °C to 5.8 °C. These results were only a small

part of the three IPCC reports issued during the year 2001 about

climate change. Volume I of the IPCC reports treated the scientific

bases; Volume II covered impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability;

and Volume III, mitigation.

The National Academy of Sciences, in response to a May 2001,

request from the White House and following discussions between

the Administration and the Academy over some questions raised by

the former, convened an 11-member scientific panel, which issued

in June a 24-page report, ‘‘Climate Change Science: An Analysis of

Some Key Questions,’’ from a select committee of atmospheric scientists. I quote the first few sentences of this report and have appended the entire represent to this testimony. Many of these words

were repeated by Senator Jeffords.

‘‘Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a

result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and

sub-surface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact,
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rising. The changes observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human activities, but we cannot rule out that

some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of natural

variability.’’ The increasing global temperatures will have many consequences, often adverse in the long run. Because many of the

causes of this temperature increase have their origin in the activities of mankind, actions can and should now be taken which will

slow this rate of increase. I should say the last words are mine and

not the Academy report. I think that we need to start taking actions that will ameliorate the problems of the greenhouse gases.

Thank you.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you very much, Dr. Rowland.

I think we will go through all of the witnesses first before questions.

Our second witness is Roger A. Pielke, Jr., associate professor,

Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Colorado/Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences in Boulder.

Go ahead.

STATEMENT OF ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO/COOPERATIVE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES,

BOULDER, CO

Mr. PIELKE. Thank you. I’d like to thank Chairman Jeffords and

the committee for the opportunity to offer testimony this morning.

My name is Roger Pielke, Jr., and I am from the University of

Colorado. On page 7 of my testimony, you’ll find more details on

my background.

In the time I have available, I would like to highlight the takehome points from my testimony. These are developed in greater detail in the written testimony and also in the peer-reviewed scientific papers on which they are based.

Before I proceed, I want to say that everything I’ll present today

is consistent with the NRC report that Dr. Rowland referred to and

the IPCC, so it is starting with those scientific background documents as a starting point. There is no need—I agree with some of

the statements made earlier—no need to question the level of

science in those reports; however, as you will hear from me momentarily, it does lead to a range of different interpretations for

policy.

The take-home points:

First, weather and climate have increasing impacts on economies

and people around the world. Data is scattered, hard to come by,

but the picture we are able to put together, largely based on economic data, is that the impacts are growing. I think the Swiss Re

report you referred to and the insurance industry would back that

up.

The primary cause for that growth in impacts is the increasing

vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in climate, per se. This is not to

say that climate does not change or has not changed or will not
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continue to change. This is only to say that when we look at the

sensitivity of impacts to the various factors that lead to impacts,

it takes both a climate event and an exposed society or exposed environment to lead to impacts.

This is shown dramatically on page 3, figure 3, of my testimony,

where I show a picture of Miami Beach from 1926 and a picture

of Miami Beach from near the present, near 2000. Not only does

climate change, but society changes.

Taking the assumptions of the IPCC figure 6 on page 4, we compare the relative sensitivities of economic losses to tropical cyclones

to society factors versus climate factors and find societal factors

under the assumptions of the IPCC range from the 22-to-1 to a 60-

to-1 increased, larger sensitivity than the climate impacts.

Again, not to discount the possibility of climate change, but to

say to understand climate change we have to put it into the context

of societal change.

To address increasing vulnerability and the growing impacts that

result would require a broader conception of climate policy than

now dominates the debate. We could do a whole lot to energy policy

and not do very much to address the growing risk of climate

change, climate variability to economies, people, and the environment around the world.

Therefore, we must begin to consider adaptation to climate to be

as important as matters of energy policy when we talk about response options. Present discussion all but completely neglects adaptation to climate. Increased attention to adaptation would not

mean that we should ignore energy policies or reduce the intensity

which we want to improve energy policies, but instead it would be

a recognition of the fact that changes in energy policy are insufficient to address the primary reasons underlying the trends and the

societal impacts of weather and climate.

Again, another point to emphasize is my testimony is focused on

the societal and economic impacts today. It is not focused on the

environmental or ecological impacts of climate.

The Nation’s investments in research, which I should say are

considerable in the area of climate change, in my opinion could

more efficiently focused on producing usable information for decisionmakers seeking to reduce vulnerabilities to climate.

Specifically, the present research agenda is focused, in my view,

improperly on prediction of the distant climate future. We can

spend a lot of money on research and argue for a long time what

the climate future will be 50 to 100 years from now. The real test

of what the climate future will be is when we actually experience

the climate of that time.

Instead, I would suggest we are neglecting what are traditionally

called ‘‘no regrets adaptation and mitigation opportunities.’’ Instead

of arguing about global warming, yes or no, the degree of risk in

the far-distant future, we might be better served by addressing

things like the present drought that is developing in the Northeast,

for which, again, energy policy will not do much to mitigate.

In closing, I would like to leave you with the thought that climate change is much too important a topic to equate solely with

energy policy. The last figure in my testimony, figure 7 on page 6,

illustrates schematically how we might think about energy policy
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and climate policy, which do, indeed, have important overlaps but

are not the same topic.

Thank you very much.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Doctor.

Our next witness is David Legates, a Ph.D. and C.C.M., director

of the Center for Climatic Research, the University of Delaware,

Newark, DE.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DAVID R. LEGATES, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR

CLIMATIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, NEWARK,

DE

Mr. LEGATES. I would like to thank Senator Jeffords and the

committee for inviting my commentary on this important topic. My

basic background in research has been in precipitation, so you’ll

probably guess that I’m going to focus primarily on precipitation,

and precipitation variability. With rain outside, it is probably a

good topic to bring up today.

In my written testimony, I discuss some of the problems associated with determining climate change from both climate models

and observations. In my limited presentation here, I’m going to examine an issue, which I feel focuses on an important environmental risk that we face—human-induced changes in climatic extremes—droughts, floods, and storminess.

Do climate models well represent the Earth’s climate? Well, on

three separate occasions, I have reviewed the ability of state-of-theart climate models to simulate regional scale precipitation. The

models poorly reproduce the observed precipitation, and that character of the models had not substantially changed over time. But,

more importantly, climate models simply do not exhibit the observed variability. Both air temperature and precipitation exhibit

little year-to-year fluctuation, which is quite unlike what we presently experience. This is crucial, because climatic extremes and not

their mean values have the largest economic and environmental

impacts.

Simply put, climate models cannot address issues associated with

changes in the frequency of extreme events because they fail to

simulate storm scale systems or to exhibit the observed variability.

Moreover, many extreme weather events are so uncommon that we

simply cannot determine their statistical frequency from the observed record, let alone determine how that frequency has changed

over time. Determining anthropogenic changes in extreme weather

events, either from modeling or observational standpoints, therefore, is nearly impossible.

Furthermore, it is unclear how much should be attributed to anthropogenic increases in atmospheric trace gases and how much

will be simply a result of natural variability or measurement biases.

So I ask: is there a cause for concern that anthropogenic warming will lead to more occurrences of floods, droughts, and storminess? I point to the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change, the IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, which states that,

‘‘Global warming is likely to lead to greater extremes of drying and

heavy rainfall and increase the risk of droughts and floods.’’
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The mainstream media has frequently echoed this enhanced hydrologic cycle scenario; however, if one carefully reads the IPCC

Technical Summary, you will find an admission that, ‘‘There is no

compelling evidence to indicate that the characteristics of tropical

and extra-tropical storms have changed. Recent analysis of changes

in severe local weather do not provide compelling evidence to suggest long-term changes. In general, trends in severe weather events

are notoriously difficult to detect because of their relatively rare occurrence and large spatial variability.’’ The IPCC further goes on to state that areas experiencing severe

drought to severe wetness increased only to a small degree over the

entire 20th century. Tom Karl and Richard Knight have concluded

that as the climate has warmed, precipitation variability actually

has decreased across much of the Northern hemisphere’s mid-latitudes. Bruce Hayden, writing for the Water Sector of U.S. National

Assessment, argues that little can or should be said about change

in storminess in carbon-dioxide-enriched years.

Sinclair and Watterson recently noted that increased levels of atmospheric trace gases generally leads to a marked decrease in the

occurrence of intense mid-latitude storms.

Clearly, claims that a warmer world will lead to more occurrences of droughts, floods, and storms are exaggerated.

So what should we do? I feel first we must continue to develop

and preserve efforts at climate monitoring and climate change detection. Efforts to establish new global climate observing systems

are useful, but we must preserve the stations that we presently

have. There simply is no surrogate for a long-term climate record

taken with the same instrumentation and located in essentially the

same environmental conditions.

However, given that oceans cover nearly three-quarters of the

Earth’s surface, we must further develop satellite methods for monitoring the Earth’s climate. We also need to better utilize a national network of WSR–88D, Nexrad weather radars to monitor

precipitation and its variability.

But foremost we must focus on developing methods and policy

that can directly save lives and can mitigate the economic devastation that often is associated with specific weather-related events.

Climate change discussions usually focus on increases in mean

air temperatures or percentage changes in mean precipitation, but

it is not changes in the mean fields on which we need to place our

efforts. Loss of life and adverse economic and environmental impact

occurs not when conditions are normal, but rather they occur as a

result of extreme climatic events—floods, droughts, storms at all

spatial scales. One thing I can guarantee is that, regardless of

what impact anthropogenic increases in atmospheric trace gases

will have, extreme weather events will continue to be a part of our

life and they will continue to cause the most weather-related

deaths and have the largest weather-related economic impacts.

Thus, we must focus on providing real-time monitoring of environmental conditions, which will yield to important benefits. First,

it will provide immediate data to allow decisionmakers to make informed choices to protect citizens faced with these extreme weather

events, and, if installed and maintained properly, it will assist with

our long-term climate monitoring goals.
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For example, the State of Delaware has undertaken a project to

develop the most-comprehensive, highest-resolution, State-wide

weather monitoring system available anywhere using our high-resolution weather data system technology.

So I conclude, therefore, that, regardless of what the future

holds, employing real-time systems with a firm commitment to supporting and maintaining long-term climate monitoring goals is our

best opportunity to reduce the risk of weather-related events on

human activities.

I again thank the committee for inviting my commentary.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you.

Our next witness is Mr. Adam Markham, executive director of

the Clean Air-Cool Planet, Portsmouth, NH.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF ADAM MARKHAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, PORTSMOUTH, NH

Mr. MARKHAM. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of

the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today. My name is

Adam Markham. I am the executive director of Clean Air-Cool

Planet.

There is compelling evidence and sound science to suggest that

there are significant and severe risks to continued greenhouse gas

emissions to the atmosphere. Future warming scenarios described

in the New England Regional Assessment that Senator Smith just

referenced give a 6 °F to 10 °F range for warming over the next century for New England. Such a change would result in Boston getting the climate of Richmond, VA, in the best case, and that of Atlanta, GA, in the worst case.

Risks identified in the regional assessment include a major

threat to the maple syrup industry that Senator Jeffords mentioned. According to the most credible forest models, the sugar

maple is one of the most sensitive trees to warming temperatures.

Business-as-usual emission scenarios are almost certain to eventually drive the sugar maple northwards out of New England, entirely. For Vermont, alone, maple syrup is a more than $100 million industry, with over 2,000 mainly family-owned sugar producers.

A change in climate may also have severe repercussions for New

England’s winter tourism economy. A recent study of the past 19

years of weather data for the two most ski-dependent economies in

New England, Vermont and New Hampshire, showed an average

of 700,000 fewer ski visits in the years with the worst snow conditions. In New Hampshire, the industry generated $566 million in

visitor spending in the year 2000, and it creates more than 10 percent of the State’s winter jobs.

The indications are not good. There has been a 15 percent decrease in snowfall in northern New England since 1953.

Climate models also suggest that in the longer term global

warming will transform the conifer forests of northern New England into the type of forests now found further south. The conditions that currently support northern hardwood forests, their habitats, and their wildlife will shift up to 300 miles north during the

next 100 years, potentially causing the loss of these forests or their
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transformation into other types of forests over much of the landscape. More than 300,000 people in New England and New York

are employed in the forest sector and would likely be affected by

these sorts of changes.

Public health, too, is at risk. For example, 60,000 hikers a year

visit Mt. Washington and the major peaks of the White Mountains.

On hot summer days, air pollution poses a threat to hikers, especially at elevations above 3,000 feet. According to the regional assessment, there is a striking correlation between hot days—that’s

warmer than 90 °F—and high levels of ozone pollution.

Lyme disease is also a risk for people outdoors, and is on the increase in New York and parts of New England. Research on ticks

suggests that warmer winters could increase the instance of Lyme

disease and push its range further into northern New England.

Heat waves kill more people in the United States than hurricanes, flooding, or tornadoes. Heat-related deaths in the summer

time could double under likely U.S. global warming scenarios. The

poor, elderly populations are at particular risk, and northern cities

may also be more at risk because people are less adapted to high

temperatures.

The cost of climate impact in the coastal zones may be particularly large. Sea levels are currently rising at about a foot per century. This rate is increasing. The State of New Hampshire recently

calculated that this will significantly increase the area of sea coast

vulnerable to flooding and could turn 100-year storms into 10-year

storms, or the damage from 10-year storms.

On the positive side, the Northeast States have long been leaders

in reducing air pollution. New York’s green building law, New

Hampshire’s greenhouse gas registry, and Massachusetts’ full pollutant regulation were all firsts. Connecticut is at the forefront of

efforts to support the development of commercial fuel cell technologies, and Efficiency Vermont is the Nation’s first public energy

efficiency utility. A first in the Nation bipartisan full pollutant bill

recently passed strongly in the New Hampshire House.

In August 2001, the New England Governors and eastern Canadian premiers signed a climate change action plan with the ambitious, long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gases by 75 to 85 percent from current levels. Thirty-five cities and counties in the region have passed resolutions pledging to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions and implement local climate action plans, and many

businesses in the Northeast are convincingly demonstrating that

common-sense investments in energy saving can pay off handsomely.

All over New England and the Northeast individuals, institutions, and corporations are inventing, exploring, and implementing

innovative solutions to climate change, but this is not enough.

Without effective national legislation, regional efforts such as those

in the northeast will founder and may ultimately fail.

Energy efficiency and alternative fuels may be the real roots to

energy security. If we are serious about reducing our reliance on

foreign oil and about competing in world markets, we must produce

more-efficient automobiles. If we want energy security and more

jobs, we should aim to be producing 20 percent of our electricity
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from renewable resources by 2020. Federal controls on CO2 I believe are essential and urgently needed.

If greenhouse gases are not curbed, climate change will likely

transform the character of many of the things in New England that

those of us who live there hold dear. The loss of sugar maples,

changes in the northern forests, warmer winters, more frequent

heat waves, and the distribution of coastal wetlands may eventually deliver a body blow to much of the region’s character and economy.

Thank you for inviting me here today.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Markham.

Our next witness is Sallie Baliunas, astrophysicist from HarvardSmithsonian Center for Astrophysics.

Thank you for coming, and please proceed.

STATEMENT OF SALLIE BALIUNAS, ASTROPHYSICIST, HARVARD-SMITHSONIAN CENTER FOR ASTROPHYSICS, CAMBRIDGE, MA

Ms. BALIUNAS. Thank you, Senator, and committee members for

inviting me here. I’ve worked for 25 years studying the changes in

the sun and the impact on life and climate of Earth.

The human effect on global warming remains a very serious scientific matter. A simulation that looks at the effect of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is included in my testimony. This

is the Hadley Center’s simulation for temperature change in the

next 50 years, calling for a 1 °C rise in temperature. Implementing

a Kyoto-type cut would avert the temperature rise by the year 2050

by only .06 °C. That shows that if the human concentrations of

greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are a major problem, then

much more steeper cuts than outline din the Kyoto Protocol are

warranted, yet the Kyoto Protocol, itself, runs costs in most analysis of $100 to $400 billion a year, not insignificant.

That means that science remains critical to helping address this

issue, and one key scientific question is: What has been the response of climate thus far to the small amount of energy that has

been added by humans from greenhouse gases in the air?

Now, there has been substantial new Federal investment made

very wisely, especially in space-based instrumentation, to address

this key issue. The two capital tests that I talk about in my testimony are comparing the record of the surface temperature, which

has warmed over the past 20 years, and the record of the lowest

layer of air from about 5,000 to 28,000 feet.

The surface temperature has warmed in the 20th century, but

there are three phases to the surface temperature record. There

was a warming early in the 20th century, before most of the greenhouse gases were put into the air, peaking around 1940, followed

by a cooling until the late 1970’s, and then a recent warming.

Now, the recent surface warming may, indeed, have a human

component, but the recent surface warming is about .1 °Ψ περ

δεψαδε, ανδ τηατ ςοθλδ σετ αν θππερ λιμιτ το ςηατ τηε ηθμαν εφφεψτ

ςοθλδ βε. Αψψθμθλατεδ οωερ α ψεντθρυ, τηατ σθγγεστσ 1 °Ψ ςαρμινγ.

Now, the computer simulations estimate more warming than

that, but, in fact, that warming, seen from the surface, may not be

primarily human at all. The computer simulations insist, or science
20

insists, that not only the surface layer but the layer of air just

above it must warm. Both must warm, and, in fact, the layer of air

in the lower troposphere must warm faster and greater and much

more steeply than the surface layer.

Those records have been brought before this committee before by

John Christy. The NASA microwave sounder unit experiments

aboard satellites now go back 21 years and cover essentially most

of the Earth. Professor Christy’s latest charts are shown in my testimony. The striking thing about the lower layer of air is that there

are significant variations in temperature. On short time scales, for

example, the very large El Nin ̃ o warming pulse of 1997–98, but

there is no long-term warming trend that is very significant, as

forecast by the computer models. It is much smaller. The most

warming that can be seen in the data of the lowest troposphere are

.04 °C per decade.

Those satellite results, as you know from Professor Christy’s previous testimonies, are validated by independent records made by

radio sounds aboard balloons. Those records go back to 1957, which

is a period that includes the recent rapid rise in the air’s greenhouse gas concentration.

The balloon radio sound records and the satellite records both

agree that there is no significant warming that can be attributed

to human activities in the last 20 years or the last 40 years.

There is a very strong warming pulse called the ‘‘Great Pacific

Climate Shift’’ apparent in the radio sound record in 1976–77, but

so far no one can attribute that to human causes because it is

something that the Pacific Ocean has been observed to do every 20

or 30 years prior to the great increase in greenhouse gases in the

atmosphere.

Now, this is all good news. It means that the human global

warming effect, if it is small—the best and most reliable data says

that its amplitude is small and slow to develop, so that is creating

a window of time and opportunity to continue to improve the observations of the computer simulations and to make better measurements of climate characteristics that are needed to address this

issue. These remain essential to the problem of what to do.

Proposals like the Kyoto agreement to sharply cut greenhouse

gas emissions are not enough, atmospherically speaking, yet temperature speaking the impacts have not shown up at the degree to

which the models say that they should.

These cost estimates are severe, and these costs would fall disproportionately on America’s poor and the world’s elderly and poor,

besides America’s. So the window of opportunity is to continue the

observations in order to better define the human magnitude of

global warming, but our best and most reliable evidence says that

it is quite small and slow to grow to date.

Senator JEFFORDS. Our next witness is Dr. Martin Whittaker,

managing director of Innovest, Richmond Hill, Ontario, Canada.

Please proceed and welcome here.

STATEMENT OF MARTIN WHITTAKER, MANAGING DIRECTOR,

INNOVEST, RICHMOND HILL, ONTARIO, CANADA

Mr. WHITTAKER. Thank you and good morning. We are very

pleased and honored to be here, especially pleased because we
21

think we have a story to tell that creates a positive link between

corporate environmental performance and financial performance.

We are a pure research investment house. Our business is to provide impartial research to Wall Street on corporate, environmental,

and social performance as it affects financial performance and

shareholder value.

Climate change is an issue which cuts across all our research

and one that seems to be of rising importance to the companies and

to investors, alike. It is also an issue where the financial industry

can play a positive leadership role, and I draw the committee’s attention to the World Economic Forum held in Davos in February

2000, ‘‘The greatest challenge facing the world at the beginning of

the 21st century is climate change. Not only is climate change the

world’s most pressing problem, it is also the issue where business

could most effectively adopt a leadership role.’’ We see climate change as a source of business risk and opportunity—risk to both exposure to weather extremes, for example, in

the insurance business, where each year now brings about 5.5

times as many weather-related natural disasters as 40 years ago,

resulting in 13.6 times the insurance losses—that’s according to

Munich Re—but also risks to government policies to constrain

greenhouse gas emissions, for example, in heavy greenhouse-gasemitting industries, but also the opportunities through energy efficiency where companies can gain tangible financial benefits from

energy efficiency measures, which also lower emissions, and also,

of course, in the growing clean energy markets. California, alone, has almost, I think, about $1 billion in export

sales now in clean technologies, and that market will grow if we

shift gradually toward a cleaner technology base.

This yin-yang risk opportunity image provides fiduciaries and

companies with an opportunity not only to hedge emissions, hedge

their exposures, but also to potentially increase their risks through

a compounded effect. I’ll explain that in a second.

I want to pick out five key combinations of trends from the submission that I made, which really explain why I think business attention is being more squarely focused on this climate change

issue.

Growing sophistication in the understanding of the scientific impacts, as we’ve heard today, and a need really to see beyond Kyoto

insofar as the wider sustainability context affects future greenhouse gas emissions. We think Kyoto is a critical first step toward

that in focusing attention, but also the idea that economic win/win

situations do exist and are there. We don’t have time to go into

them today, but we can certainly draw the committee’s attention

to examples of that.

Second, new thinking on the breadth of sectoral impacts. Risks

are not just faced by greenhouse-gas-intensive heavy industries,

but, as you’ve heard today, also tourism, agriculture, real estate,

building materials, and, of course, finance, which is the sector we

serve, but also, as regards the company impacts, we are seeing increasing differentials between companies, and so company strategy

here can translate into future final performance, we think.

A third trend is really an evolution of the term ‘‘fiduciary responsibility’’ and the need to incorporate environmental and social
22

issues into investment decisionmaking because they affect financial

performance. This has been driven by the evolution of socially responsible investing, but it is now entering the mainstream, and the

formation of the carbon disclosure project, which is a coalition of

institutional investors now over $2 trillion in assets under management, are now engaged with, I think, 500 of the world’s largest

companies as shareholders to say, ‘‘This is a business risk issue.

What are you doing?’’ I think also this year we are going to see both the city of New

York and the State of Connecticut will be filing shareholder resolutions on climate change in an effort to encourage greater transparency on that issue.

The fourth trend set is regulatory momentum both here and

abroad. U.S. companies working in the United Kingdom, for example, in Europe, will be abiding by the regulations in those regions.

That, I think, is a key reason why corporate attention is being focused on this issue, even though domestic support of Kyoto has

waned, to say the least.

Last, the growing importance of disclosure, in general, to investors on hidden liabilities. Climate change liabilities may well fall

under this rubric. The market is jittery over perceived corporate

environmental performance and transgressions, and climate change

liabilities may well be included there.

So I’d just like to wrap up with two recommendations, I suppose.

We are a great believer in the power of the markets and creating

a virtual circle whereby corporate environmental performance can

be encouraged by financial institutions seeking that from their

investee companies.

The effect of light regulatory action in the United Kingdom on

requiring institutional investors to disclose their possession on social and environmental issues has had a tremendous effect in focusing business attention on these issues, and similar requirement on

climate change in the spirit of the carbon disclosure project that I

mentioned may well encourage investee company leadership on this

issue and encourage the creation of carbon risk screening tools

within the financial community.

I think we need to also finally educate the marketplace, the investment community certainly, but also companies and small- or

medium-sized enterprises to encourage them to become more climate literate. The financial services industry can play a key role

in that, and I think that if there is a message here it is: If we can

get the political and investment communities working together to

finance solutions, we would be on the right track, instead of getting

bogged down in the nuances of the Kyoto Protocol.

Thank you.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Whittaker.

Our next and last witness is Jack D. Cogen, president of

Natsource, New York, NY.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF JACK D. COGEN, PRESIDENT, NATSOURCE,

NEW YORK, NY

Mr. COGEN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify.
23

My name is Jack Cogen. I am president of Natsource, LLC, an

energy and environmental commodity broker headquartered in

New York City with offices in Washington, DC., Europe, Japan,

Canada, and Australia.

My testimony will address the financial risk associated with climate change policy.

At the outset, I want to acknowledge that there are legitimate

differences of opinion as to what should be the nature, degree, and

timing of policy responses to the risk associated with climate

change, itself. However, the role of Natsource is to work with clients who decide it is in their best interest to evaluate the extent

of their financial exposure under possible greenhouse gas policies.

Our clients make the threshold decision that they are at risk financially.

After that, the next step for them is to analyze the extent of their

financial risk and develop strategies that make sense for mitigating

that risk. Natsource contributes its policy and market expertise to

helping clients assess and manage risk.

The client base of Natsource includes multi-national corporations, as well as foreign and domestic firms. Natsource assists them

in quantifying their financial exposure under different policies that

might be adopted to limit greenhouse gas emissions.

Our experience indicates that companies consider a variety of

factors when they weigh the degree of risk they face and what to

do about it. The primary factors are, No. 1, the probability they

will be subject to emission limitation policies; and, No. 2, the potential direct and indirect costs of those policies to the company.

Natsource provides analysis, strategic advice, and market intelligence once a company decides to undertake a comprehensive risk

assessment. Generally, we help clients assess their financial exposure by identifying policies that might be adopted, assigning probabilities to those policies—in other words, we’re handicapping the

committee—quantifying the net emissions shortfall or surplus the

company faces under each policy, and estimating potential compliance cost based on the company’s emissions profile, internal reduction opportunities, and our knowledge of various commodities available in the greenhouse gas emission markets.

Multi-national companies face an especially complicated risk, because they operate across multiple jurisdictions with different policies. In addition, many of these companies must evaluate the effect

of climate change policies on the market demand for their products

in different countries.

If potential compliance costs are substantial and the probability

of emission limitations is significant enough, the next step for

many companies is to develop a cost-effective risk management

strategy. This involves assembling an optimal mix of measures for

reducing of offsetting emissions. These include internal and external emission reduction projects, internal emission trading programs, and the use of external trading markets.

Companies choose to undertake emission reduction measures in

spite of or because of policy uncertainty for a variety of reasons, including to reduce future compliance cost, gain experience in the

greenhouse gas markets, maintain or enhance their environmental

image, and place a value on internal reduction opportunities.
24

Greenhouse gas markets are evolving and will continue to evolve

over the next several years. In the future, these markets will function more smoothly and with lower transaction costs as greenhouse

gas policies become clearer and markets become more liquid.

Even now, more-sophisticated financial instruments such as call

options are being used as a hedge against risk. Natsource recently

complete the first comprehensive analysis of the greenhouse gas

trading market for the World Bank. The analysis identified approximately 60 greenhouse gas transactions involving some 55 million tons of emissions. These numbers actually under-estimate the

total number of transactions, because they do not include internal

only transactions and small volume transactions.

Current market prices for greenhouse gas commodities range from less than $1 to over $9 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent,

depending on the type of commodity and vintage. I will add that

the United Kingdom just over the past 2 days completed their auction for emission allowances in the direct sector there. The price

has not yet been released, but the after market is already saying

that you can buy a U.K. emissions allowance for 7 pounds per metric ton. You will find, by the way, that that will turn out to be

much lower than the price that the U.K. government paid for them.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, a small but growing number of

companies are beginning to more carefully analyze their financial

risk under possible greenhouse gas policies. For a variety of reasons, some companies have decided to take steps now to reduce

emissions, even though final policy decisions in most cases are still

pending. As a consequence, these companies are able to take advantage of cost-effective opportunities provided by the market to reduce their financial exposure.

As the acid rate allowance system has demonstrated, emissions

trading provides flexibility that can significantly lower the cost of

emission reductions.

That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to

answer any questions you or other members of the committee may

have.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you.

Thank all of the witnesses for very excellent and stimulating testimony.

Now it comes our time to have a chance to have a little dialog,

and perhaps pursue our own specific desires, but, more hopefully

and more importantly, further allow our understanding of what is

going on.

Dr. Rowland, the Academy’s 2001 report, which you helped write,

was stunningly clear. It confirmed the seriousness of human-induced climate change, and it contains a real sense of urgency about

the problem.

What should be done to reduce the risks that the report outlines

and to clear up related scientific uncertainties?

Mr. ROWLAND. The Academy report, of course, did not go beyond

basically the IPCC Volume I, the scientific bases. It did not go into

adaptation and mitigation. Those have been the subjects of extensive discussion under IPCC with Volumes II and III, each of which

are roughly 1,000 pages long, so that there is a very extensive literature on what the possibilities are.
25

I think that the recognition is always there, that carbon dioxide

is spread throughout the world in energy use by everybody, more

intensively in the United States than other places, but definitely

there in India and China and every country, because, by and large,

the development of civilization has paralleled the more-intensive

use of energy, and that has been true in every country.

The problem that we face in the future is how to reduce the strict

dependency that more energy is required to have a better standard

of living, and that means we have to look at all aspects of the civilization.

I don’t think there is any silver bullet that one can give that

says, ‘‘If we did this, then everything would be taken care of.’’ It

means energy conservation, it means looking for alternative energy

sources, it means more research on how to put carbon dioxide some

place other than the atmosphere—that is, sequestration.

It has always been very inexpensive to release carbon dioxide to

the atmosphere, and putting it anywhere else—trapping it at a

power plant and putting it some place other than the atmosphere

is clearly more expensive than just releasing it. So that’s not a

problem that is going to be easily solved, nor will it be a problem

that can be solved without cost, but it is something that needs to

be very, very intensively investigated.

I think that we have been in a situation in which we have, for

the last 10 or 20 years, ignored the fact that carbon dioxide is accumulating, that there is a long-term problem, and it is going to require a solution that takes decades to bring about a society in

which the energy dependence is not escalating as it is presently.

I don’t have any good solutions other than all of those things

which have been discussed before in a ‘‘no regrets’’ strategy. If you

have energy conservation, then that is an improvement. If you have

an alternative source that doesn’t require releasing CO2, that is an

improvement.

I think in many countries, probably, there will be reliance on nuclear energy, which has a different problem, but it doesn’t release

carbon dioxide.

Senator JEFFORDS. The Academy’s report says that, ‘‘National

policy decisions made now will influence the extent of any damage

suffered by vulnerable human populations and ecosystems later in

the century.’’ The Administration’s new policy decision appears to

be business as usual. How will this policy affect the future?

Mr. ROWLAND. I think that what one has observed over the last

50 years, if you put carbon dioxide emissions and GNP and say carbon dioxide emissions per GNP, that that is a number which has

been going down. That is, as you multiply GNP, you do not necessarily take up the carbon dioxide emissions at the same rate, and

over a period of time, there have been efficiencies that have occurred. But that, alone, is not going to solve the problem, because

GNP is going to go up steadily in the future.

I’ll give you just one example that illustrates the problem of just

doing dollars per GNP, and that is if you compare an SUV versus

a high-mileage automobile. One uses much more gas, but they have

to pay for that gas, and so the carbon dioxide emission per GNP

unit is the same as far as the gasoline use of those two. What we

really need to do is to have policies that get things done without
26

as much expenditure of carbon dioxide for whatever that activity

is. That means looking very much at the energy conservation side.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you. Is it generally safe to say that increasing greenhouse gas emissions is likely to increase the probability and the magnitude of negative impact on humans and ecosystems?

Mr. ROWLAND. As far as humans are concerned, the infrastructure that they live in has been built for the present climate, and

if that climate starts to change, then that infrastructure is not necessarily the right one for the new climate.

The faster that that change occurs, the more the infrastructure

gets out of whack, no longer the right one for that location, so that

slowing climate change is almost as important as controlling greenhouse gas emissions totally.

There is no way that the world is going to stop emitting carbon

dioxide without coming very close to doubling the amount that is

in the atmosphere, and that means that some time over the next

century or two we’re going to have a very different climate. We

don’t know how much difference that is going to be, but we need

to slow down the rate at which we approach that and, as the other

Academy report says, ‘‘We have to worry about whether climate

change may occur on a very short time scale.’’ The kind of question that is running around the climate community is whether climate is a dial where the warming just gradually

changes, or whether it is a switch and you quickly go to a new climate. That’s not something that we have any way of predicting,

but it doesn’t—just because we are changing slowly at a particular

time does not mean that we will not yet come to some new position

where the climate is just different than what it was.

Senator JEFFORDS. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rowland—— Senator JEFFORDS. I’m going to pick a witness, and you can pick

your witness or go after the same one I did.

Senator VOINOVICH. I’m going to go after all of them.

Dr. Rowland, I’m interested in your opinions. In your written testimony you said that increased greenhouse gas concentrations are

often because of the activities of mankind, and in your oral comments just now you said they were mostly caused by the activities

of man. As I listened to the testimony, there is marked differences

of opinion about the causality and the temperature of manmade activity and natural activity.

Mr. Markham, you talked about 6 ° increase in temp, Dr.

Baliunas—who is from Ohio, very nice to see you again. I saw you

at our energy meeting about 6 months ago—you talk about .06 °C

increase in temperature. By the way, Dr. Markham, I’m going to

get a hold of my sugar maple people to see if they feel the same

way as you do about things, because I refer to our sugar maple industry as ‘‘Ohio gold.’’ But, you know, there is a difference of opinion here.

For example, I’ll get to one specific question. Dr. Legates, in his

testimony, Mr. Markham discusses the potential effects of rising

temperatures in the Northeast. The question is: Can the climate

models predict with any accuracy whether manmade emissions will
27

cause these effects? I mean, Mr. Markham, you had the most dire

predictions that we had of anybody here at the table. It’s, like, ‘‘It’s

the end in terms of your part of the world unless something is

done.’’ The issue is: What’s the basis of it? How do you get those results?

Dr. Legates, I’d like to have you comment on what he had to say.

I’d like to know could you believe, Dr. Legates, that the climate

models predict with any accuracy whether manmade emissions will

cause the effects that we just heard from Mr. Markham.

Mr. LEGATES. I think there’s a serious problem with climate models in that, like I say, they are designed to produce only the mean

field, not its variability. What we’re interested in with climate models is to try to see how the mean changes. The problem is that on

very small spatial scales we get quite a bit different characteristics

than we normally see in the environment.

For example, one of the things I’ve found that is characteristic

of models from when I started looking at them in 1990 to just a

couple years ago when I did another analysis is that in the southern Great Plains of the United States, almost every model has Colorado being much wetter than northeast Louisiana. I needn’t tell

you that that’s not the way the real world works.

The issue with that then is, if we start to look at regional scale

fluctuations, we can look at fluctuations on the mean field. But if

that mean field is specified wrong, we know it is biased in this case

in completely the wrong direction from the way precipitation variability exists, the question then becomes: if the model changes in a

field, is that change a result of what would really happen, or is

that change a result simply because our initial specification of the

model is wrong; and hence the results are going to be entirely different from what might really happen?

So, to come back to sort of what he’s saying, I have concerns

when we simply average out the mean conditions and only look at

changes in the mean, because when we look closer at climate models they don’t reproduce the smaller scale spatial variability that

really is important to climate. Climate is not just a global phenomenon. Global climate is a net result of regional scale fluctuations.

There are areas where we normally expect a lot of moisture,

areas where we expect little moisture, and we have to maintain

that fidelity in the climate system. By just averaging out and focusing on large-scale features, which is what climate models do, a lot

of these subtle things get missed.

Senator VOINOVICH. Does anybody else want to comment on models?

Mr. Markham?

Mr. MARKHAM. Yes. I think the figures that I were giving you

came from the New England regional assessment, and those were

scenarios that were developed to give a broad range of potential

changes in the New England region. I think it is certainly true

that, as you take global models and look at what they will mean

for a particular region or a particular place, then the accuracy of

those potential predictions is less; nevertheless, what it shows is

that there is very significant risk. This is also backed up by actual
28

observed changes, so the New England regional assessment looks

at an average of about 0.7 °F increase in temperature over the last

century in New England.

Again, as you go more local you can see that there have been

much greater increases in temperature over the century in southern New England, and precipitation various across the region, so

the more local we go the more difficult it is to make predictions.

Nevertheless, the general trend is toward observation of warming

and likely increased warming.

Senator VOINOVICH. The real issue is that, in terms of public policy, that you have general trends and people grab a hold of the

worst numbers, and then they say with these numbers you have to

do this because if you don’t do it the world is going to come to an

end, you know, or we’re in bad shape. Somewhere through this we

need to try to get a balance of how we work things out.

Mr. Cogen, you talked about some of the businesses, I guess, over

in England that are doing some things. Are they doing these things

because of command and control, or are they doing it because they

feel it is in their best interest to look at reducing carbon dioxide

and have found it to be a good investment overall in terms of efficiency and just good citizenship?

Mr. COGEN. In the United Kingdom it is a mixture of both. The

United Kingdom has put a carbon levy, which is a tax on carbon

intensity, and then they have designed a trading program underneath it to give companies flexibility and the ability to reduce their

tax by 80 percent, so it is a combination of the two.

Having said all that, many of the multi-nationals who are operating in the United Kingdom look at this as much from the sales

side of their products and what the public expects of them, not just

under the United Kingdom. Yesterday, in fact, the chairman of

British Petroleum announced—I’m reading from ‘‘Air Daily,’’ which

is an industry publication—that they cut their greenhouse gas

emissions by more than 9 million tons 8 years ahead of schedule.

To quote the chairman, ‘‘I believe that the American people expect

a company like BP to offer answers and not excuses.’’

That’s clearly the positioning of a multi-national that this is an

issue that they think their customer base cares about. It’s not just

something that the Government is doing from a command and control. So it is a market-driven force that is making BP do this internationally, as well as government incentives and requirements in

the United Kingdom.

Senator VOINOVICH. I’m familiar with BP. I know Sir John

Brown. They had great presence in Cleveland for a number of

years. I think their colors even advanced their issue of trying to be

good corporate citizens in climate.

The only comment I’m going to make is that the issue becomes,

from a public policy point of view, in terms of command and control

and that you must do this, and so forth, and my experience in Ohio

when I was Governor is that we got involved in this 35/50 reduction in the 17 worst toxins and basically went to the companies and

said, you know, ‘‘We think you ought to do this, and we’re not going

to demand that you do it, but we’re going to suggest that you ought

to look at this.’’ It amazed me the number of companies that signed
29

up and the impact that had in terms of reducing the 17 worse toxins in the State.

You’ve got a situation where you want to do something about a

problem. There’s a disagreement about what man is doing in regard to that, but there is no question that man has something to

do with it. Then the issue is: what is the public policy response to

that that will get at it, and at the same time not put you in a position where you are non-competitive or, in the alternative, have a

dramatic impact on the economy and the well-being of the citizens

that live in your respective communities.

Mr. Chairman, that’s a real problem here, because, in terms of

regionalism, we have a different economy in my part of the country

than they have in the Northeast. It is a manufacturing based economy. Reasonable cost energy has been the basis of that economy.

In the Northeast they have a different kind of economy. Our economy is impacting on their economy.

That’s our challenge is how do we reconcile all of these things to

the extent that we move ahead and get something done, rather

than end up in a debating society or in multiple lawsuits that clog

up the courts and don’t do anything for improving the environment

or dealing with the energy needs that we have in the country. You

folks are the experts.

My time is up, but maybe the next time around you can maybe

comment on that.

Mr. Chairman.

Senator JEFFORDS. Senator Chafee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE, U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the witnesses for their testimony.

I guess, to followup on Senator Voinovich, some countries, as Dr.

Whittaker testified, are already implementing policy changes to

comply with Kyoto, and Dr. Whittaker said that the European

Union has already committed itself to a legally binding timetable

for Kyoto implementation, and that Japan, the United Kingdom,

and Canada have signaled their attempt to ratify the Kyoto Protocol during the coming weeks, so the other countries are doing it.

I guess my question is, Dr. Rowland said, ‘‘Unfortunately, that

means a lot of them are turning to nuclear.’’ Dr. Whittaker, is that

what you’re finding in the international community? Is that the sad

reality? Is that the option?

Mr. WHITTAKER. That’s not what we’re finding. No. The benefits

are really coming from greater efficiency, I would say, through the

kind of mix of command and control and economic incentives that

Jack talked about.

Senator CHAFEE. Do you want to repeat that again?

Mr. WHITTAKER. Yes. The mix of economic incentive and command and control is really what is helping businesses in those

countries move toward solutions. I’ll give an example of NTT,

which is a Japanese telecoms company. I think it is Japan’s largest

electricity consumer. Over the next 10 years, it proposes to save

about 100 billion yen through the adoption of clean energy technologies. Those types of actions are not coming from any legislation
30

or from the Japanese government yet, although the Japanese government hasn’t announced its intention to ratify. It may be a preemptive strike, sort of in anticipation of regulation, but still there

are tangible benefits for NTT shareholders. I think that’s the message that we’re seeing time and time again in different parts of the

world.

Senator CHAFEE. In your home country of Canada, how are they

planning to comply with Kyoto? Is it more reliance on nuclear or

the Hydro Quebec Power taking a slice out of the emissions of carbon dioxide? How is Canada going to comply? It’s such a similar

economy to our own.

Mr. WHITTAKER. If I knew the answer to that question, I would

be very popular in Canada. They haven’t decided yet. There is a

tremendous amount of concern in Alberta, which is, of course, oil

rich, and particularly the oil sands, which are extremely greenhouse gas intensive, to produce.

The role of emissions trading is going to be crucial in helping

Canada achieve its targets, so it will be looking internationally to

achieve credits, to buy credits to help offset its emissions in order

to meet its targets.

It is also going to be encouraging its renewables and clean energy sector, and there are various efforts underway to expedite that

already.

Again, it is a combination of approaches, but certainly the answer is not clear yet.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much.

Senator Jeffords and Senator Lieberman have introduced a bill

which would reduce the carbon dioxide emissions to the 1990 levels, probably the most aggressive bill in the Senate, I would say.

I don’t know if I can run down the panel and get a 30-second opinion on that bill before my time runs up.

Dr. Rowland.

Senator JEFFORDS. Well, you can take extra time for that.

Mr. ROWLAND. Reducing to the 1990 level of emissions would require substantial cutback, and the question of how much economic

dislocation it would do would surely depend upon the rate at which

that was done, but we are well above the—we have increased since

1997, continued to increase our CO2 emissions, and so the 1990

goal has been receding from where we have been as a country.

It means that we really haven’t taken hold of trying to cut back

on a voluntary basis. As Senator Voinovich says, clearly Ohio is different from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and it’s different from

California, and the solutions in each of those places for becoming

more energy efficient may not be the same, and they require somebody who is there and who knows their particular conditions that

can do that, but we have not adopted, as a country, that energy

conservation is a major goal in order to minimize carbon dioxide

emissions.

Mr. PIELKE. Let me say what may be, I guess, an unpopular

truth here. I’m not familiar with this bill, but if we assume in a

thought experiment full and comprehensive implementation of the

Kyoto Protocol around the world, it is safe to say it’s not going to

do much at all to address the environmental and economic risks associated with climate change.
31

I should point out that the framework convention on climate

change that the United States signed onto in the last decade makes

a distinction in the term ‘‘climate change.’’ It defines climate

change as only those impacts that are the result of greenhouse gas

impacts. Any other climate impact is not covered by the framework

convention. So whether it is maple syrup growers or people worried

about hurricanes or human life in developing countries, it doesn’t

make much sense from a policy perspective to try to separate out

human climate impacts from non-human climate impacts. I would

say it is a broader issue.

Mr. LEGATES. I’m also not familiar with the legislation, but I do

recall in 1997 that American Viewpoint conducted a survey of State

and regional climatologists, and one of the questions they did ask

was: if we rolled back to 1990 levels, would it have a significant

impact. I believe I remember somewhere between one-half and twothirds of the respondents indicated that it would have little or no

impact.

I don’t think it would have much of an impact, either. My concern is that a lot of the variability, particularly a lot of the loss of

life that we see is going to be as a result of the extreme events,

and these extreme events are going to continue to occur. So we

need to take into account, to some extent, how we alert the people,

how we deal with growth along coasts, for example, and things like

that. These issues would be impacted by climate change, but also

in this case I think, while cutting back would be beneficial for some

other reasons, I don’t think it presently is necessary from a pure ‘‘global warming’’ standpoint.

Mr. MARKHAM. If you accept the science that greenhouse gas

emissions are increasing the risk of climate change, then it seems

to make sense to reduce CO2 emissions, and this bill would do that.

I think that the target of 1990 is a good first-step target. It is

an aggressive target, but it still won’t take us back to the levels

that are probably required.

Although it takes a long time to bring down the CO2 level, CO2

can stay up in the atmosphere for more than 100 years. We need

to be acting now to protect future generations. I think that’s why

maple syrup is a good example, because people planted those trees

for their children and grandchildren, usually. They can’t harvest

them for 40 or 50 years or so. So we need to be looking down the

road and thinking about future generations, and we need to, I believe, be acting now to start reducing CO2 emissions, and this bill

would take us a long way in that direction.

Ms. BALIUNAS. Assuming the climate projections are accurate,

then reducing to 1990 levels for the United States would mean

about a 20 percent cutback in carbon-based energy use or carbon

dioxide emissions. Replacing that—I agree with Dr. Rowland—is

going to be extremely difficult to do, and yet climactically, temperature-wise, assuming the models are accurate, this averts, off the

top of my head, less than .05 °C of the warming by the year 2050.

So it is, on the one hand, extremely costly, and on the other hand

ineffective. That’s why it is important to realize that a policy like

this is only a scant first step. There has to be much more done

much more dramatically if one accepts the models. That’s why the

science is still very critical in this debate.
32

Mr. WHITTAKER. I guess the question is where would the emissions come from? If you look at the key source categories, the stationary—essentially, the power production sector, coal combustion

sector, is the No. 1 by a country mile.

We’ve done some financial modeling around this issue and looked

at what would happen if the top U.S. utilities all had to reduce

their emissions to their own 1990 levels to 1998 levels and played

around with different scenarios there. A softened Kyoto, which essentially is leveling at 1998 levels, corresponds to, according to our

analysis, roughly 11 percent of the current total market capitalization of some of the most coal intensive utilities, so the financial cost

of doing that, if that’s what you wanted to do, would need to be

taken into account.

Mr. COGEN. In discussions with our customers about Senator Jeffords’ bill, the impact of it has been slightly different. It’s not the

details of the bill or whether it will pass or not pass, it’s raising

the conversation to a level that has to be taken seriously, and combined with a movement overseas to ratify Kyoto with the United

Kingdom or Danish programs, with many regional or State programs here, it is forcing corporations—especially that have longterm assets planning cycles, whether it is 40 years for maple trees

or 30 years on a power plant—to take this into consideration that

we may be in a carbon strait in the future and what the effects of

that would be. So I think it is galvanizing the conversation and

forcing companies who have fiduciary responsibilities to make decisions to decide for themselves not so much on the science, but on

the policy and what investigation decisions they will make under

different policy regimes.

Senator Jeffords’ bill is forcing them to take it seriously now,

which is a good thing.

Senator JEFFORDS. Senator Corzine.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON S. CORZINE, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Senator CORZINE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your holding the

hearing. I had a formal statement I’ll put in the record.

I feel like I am an interloper coming in at the end, and so I will

pass, but I do want to emphasize how strongly I feel that we need

to fully understand in the terms of science these risks that are associated with climate change.

I would just mention that there are studies that show the 127-

mile shoreline in New Jersey is potentially at risk to complete erosion, something in a foot rise over the next 50 years. For a $40 billion industry, for enormous amounts of property, this is an issue

that concerns the citizens of New Jersey, concerns me, and I think

it should anyone.

I apologize for being late. We had three hearings at one time.

But there is nothing more important, long-run, for my community

and the people I represent than this issue.

[The prepared statement of Senator Corzine follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JON S. CORZINE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing today on the economic and environmental risks of increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
33

I want to make just a few points before we begin to hear testimony from the

panel.

The Science Warrants Action. First, I think that the science warrants a hard look

at risks and potential impacts. Last year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) recently released its Third Assessment Report. The report as I read

it indicated that the science is increasingly clear and alarming.

The report indicated that human activities, primarily fossil fuel combustion, have

raised the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide to the highest levels in the

last 420,000 years.

The report further indicated that the planet is warming, and that the balance of

the scientific evidence suggests that most of the recent warming can be attributed

to increased atmospheric greenhouse gas levels. Mr. Chairman, these IPCC findings

were validated later in the year by the National Academy of Sciences.

Mr. Chairman, we also know that without concerted action by the United States

and other countries, greenhouse gases emissions and concentrations will continue to

increase. Climate models currently predict warming under all scenarios that have

been considered. Even the smallest warming predicted by current models—2.5 degrees Fahrenheit over the next century—would represent the greatest rate of increase in global mean surface temperature in the last 10,000 years.

So while scientific uncertainty remains, I think the trend is clear. As a result, we

need to focus on risks.

New Jersey and Other Coastal States Will be Impacted by Climate Change. For

my State of New Jersey, Mr. Chairman, the threat of continued sea-level rise is one

of the risks that I am most concerned about. With the exception of the 50-mile

northern border with New York, New Jersey is surrounded by water. The state’s Atlantic coastline stretches 27 miles. Fourteen of 21 counties have estuarine or marine

shorelines. Rising sea level is already having impacts, by exacerbating coastal erosion, and causing inundation, flooding, and saline intrusions into ground water. The

N.J. coastal area also supports one of New Jersey’s largest industries—tourism.

Sea level is rising more rapidly along the U.S. coast than worldwide. Studies by

EPA and others have estimated that along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, a one-foot

rise in the sea level is likely by 2050 and could occur as soon as 2025. In the next

century, a two-foot rise is most likely but a four-foot rise is possible. So I’m con- cerned about this risk to my home state.

We Need to Take Steps to Reduce Risks. Given the state of the science and the

risks we face, I think we need to take steps to reduce risks. The president’s plan,

which represents only an incremental step over business as usual, is simply not

enough in my judgment.

At the state level, New Jersey is already taking aggressive steps to reduce emissions. The state has a plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 3.5 percent below

1990 levels by 2005. Specifically, the plan would achieve a 6.2 million ton reduction

through energy conservation initiatives in residential, commercial and industrial

buildings, another 6.3 million ton reduction through innovative technologies in residential, commercial and industrial buildings, a 2.2 million ton reduction through energy conservation and innovative technologies in the transportation sector, a 4.5

million ton reduction through waste management improvements, and a half million

ton reduction through natural resource conservation.

So I think what New Jersey is doing—under a plan that Governor Whitman got

underway—shows that we can and should do much better than what the president

proposed.

Support the Climate Titles in the Energy Bill. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to

urge my colleagues to support the climate change titles in the energy bill. In particular, I want to urge my colleagues to support the registry provisions in Title XI

of the bill. These provisions will require the largest emitters to report greenhouse

gas emissions—as utilities are already required to do. These provisions also enable

companies that undertake emissions reductions to register them, so that they will

receive credit for their actions if reductions are required at any point in the future.

Taken together, Mr. Chairman, I believe that these greenhouse gas registry provisions will provide a powerful incentive for companies to take actions to reduce emissions. I know you agree, as you are a cosponsor of S. 1870, a bill containing similar

provisions that I introduced in December. The energy bill registry provisions represent a compromise between S. 1870 and related legislation in the Energy and

Commerce committees, and I urge my colleagues to support them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JEFFORDS. Dr. Rowland.

Mr. ROWLAND. So far all of the discussion has been on controlling

carbon dioxide, and there are other greenhouse gases. The one that
34

I would draw particular attention to is tropospheric ozone—that is,

one of the components of smog is ozone formed by the interactions

of nitrogen oxides and unburned hydrocarbons and light, and that

mostly takes place in cities, although we have run into it experimentally in burning forests especially in the Southern hemisphere.

The failure to burn gasoline completely in an automobile results

in the formation of ozone, which is a greenhouse gas. Then the hydrocarbons eventually become carbon dioxide, anyway, but on the

way it produces another greenhouse gas that adds to the total

interception of infrared radiation.

This is happening in hundreds of cities all over the world. It

would be to our advantage and to the globe’s advantage if the pollution problems of these cities, with respect to ozone, could be reduced, and that’s something that is a problem in China; it’s a problem in India; it is a problem in the United States and everywhere.

We know how to do it. In places like Los Angeles, the smog has

been reduced by adopting certain policies. And, to the extent that

we can get those policies in place in cities all over the world, then

that reduces the amount of tropospheric ozone and is the equivalent of cutting back on some carbon dioxide because it is a greenhouse contributor.

So it doesn’t get rid of the fact that the automobile eventually

puts the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, but on the way it also

produces another problem, and if we could just go to clean-burning

in an automobile, helping in reducing tropospheric ozone, and that

helps because it is a greenhouse gas. So it is a policy that would

be useful on our part to encourage and assist, if we can, in the cities that have these problems.

Senator JEFFORDS. You mentioned India. I have been to the

places—India, China, and other places in that area—which have

extensive coal burning, as you well know, and the problems there

are much greater than we have here. Internationally, what should

we be doing to try to assist in those countries having the capacity

to reduce their pollution?

Mr. ROWLAND. In the cases of both India and China, they have

very high ash coal, and much of their pollution in the cities comes

about by having particles in the atmosphere coming about by burning coal that has material in it that’s not going to burn. City pollution problems can be sort of divided in two categories. One has to

do with producing particles, and that has a lot of bad things happening, particularly when you breathe them in. In addition, there

are the photochemical problems that come from the chemical interactions that take place.

What I was talking about earlier would be trying to reduce the

photochemical problems by adopting the kinds of procedures that

have been put into place by the Southern California Air Quality

District.

The question of getting the particles out of the air in Beijing and

Delhi is a matter of people in China and India deciding on some

way of using cleaner fuel to begin with. How they treat their coal

in order to get rid of the particles before they burn it would be a

very complicated problem. That’s one that I don’t know exactly how

they would do it.

Senator JEFFORDS. Senator Voinovich?
35

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. I would like to ask the witnesses: how

many of you are familiar with President Bush’s climate change initiative?

[Show of hands.]

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator Chafee asked you your opinion

about Senator Jeffords’ bill, and I have: Rowland, question mark;

Pielke, question mark; no, Legates; yes, Milburn [sic]; no, Whittaker. I mean, no one really came out and said yes/no. You kind

of all waffled to a degree except Mr. Markham.

Senator JEFFORDS. That shouldn’t surprise you.

Senator VOINOVICH. Right.

Senator JEFFORDS. We do the same thing though.

Senator VOINOVICH. The way I summarize it, it provides the necessary funding for both the science and technology research, encourages companies to register their CO2 emissions, sets a national

goal to reduce our carbon intensity, which is the best way to protect our economy and begin to address the issue.

Anyhow, the No. 1 issue is: What do you think of that policy? No.

2, what other things should we be doing? We get into this whole

issue of the technology and where we are in the models and the

rest of that and where should we be investing our money in that

regard. I’ll make a comment before you answer the questions, but,

Dr. Rowland, you’re talking about coal in China and the ash problem. Whether we like it or not, regardless of what happens to

Kyoto, a lot of these newly emerging economies are going to burn

coal. Coal produces about 55 percent of our energy here in the

United States, and my State is about 85 percent.

It seems to me that one of the greatest things that we could do

as a matter of public policy, Mr. Chairman, would be to really put

some money into clean coal technology and also provide some incentives so that we could go ahead and really do a job with that

technology that could be exported around the world that would

help deal with the problem that these countries are dealing with

now.

If that’s not what we’re going to do, and faced with what the real

world is, then we have to go to some other alternative source of energy. We talked about nuclear is what many others have said.

Then what’s left is gas, hydro, and then some of the renewables

that we have, but most of us recognize that renewables produce

about 1/10th of 1 percent of the energy in this country, so that’s

the real world we’re dealing with.

I guess the issue is: how do you deal with the real world? In the

remainder of my time, what do you think of the Bush policy? We’ll

start off with that.

Dr. Rowland.

Mr. ROWLAND. I’ll make a response to your question about clean

coal technology. Yes, there’s no question that India and China are

going to depend for the next decades very heavily on coal, and they

both, unfortunately, have very poor coal, so if they could have technology available—that is, clean coal technology—then it would help

them quite substantially with their own local environmental problems. Still, you end up with carbon dioxide from burning the coal.

But we might be able, as part of the cleanup of their cities, to persuade them also to take care of the other aspects of air pollution
36

that they have in the urban areas. But I’m sure that clean coal

technology in India and China would be very beneficial to them

and to the atmosphere, generally.

Mr. PIELKE. Let me say, from the standpoint of climate risk, the

choice between, let’s say, the Kyoto Protocol and the Bush plan,

there is a distinction without a difference there. There are really

no differences in risk because neither addresses the underlying

causes of risk, which are the increasing vulnerability of society and

the environment to climate events.

Clearly, there are economic, political, and symbolic—— Senator VOINOVICH. Can I?

Mr. PIELKE. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. That’s really interesting. You’re saying—and

I want to make sure I understand. You’re saying that, in your opinion, we’re seeing, if you look at history, a much greater vulnerability to changes in natural climate types of things? In other

words, is that—am I understanding that right?

Mr. PIELKE. Yes. What I’m saying is that, even in the context— forgetting about the natural versus human cause of climate

change—climate has changed. I mean, it is clear in different locations over different time periods. But if you take a look, for example, at hurricanes, for which we have very good data, the same

storm which would have caused $100 million inflation-adjusted in

1926 Miami, today would cause about $90 billion. That has nothing

to do with the changing frequency or nature of storms, only that

Miami Beach and associated property develop is much different

than it was the beginning of the last century.

So when we’re looking at risk and we’re worried about impacts

of climate, you can’t just say, ‘‘We have more precipitation. Will the

temperature be warmer,’’ and so on. We also have to look at how

the economy changes, how society changes, and so on.

When you put those two things together, by far the largest signal—and, again, this is talking about humans and not the environment—by far the largest signal are the changes we make every

day, how we develop, how much more wealth we accumulate,

where we live, and so on. Those are the determining factors in risk.

The insurance company insures against property damage. It

doesn’t ensure against number of storms.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. So, again, I want to understand this.

It’s like Senator Corzine was talking about the coastline. In my

State, the water level is way down, and I suspect it will go way

up, and I haven’t figured out what it is. Some people say that if

somebody turns a spigot on it turns it up, but we know that isn’t

the case. But the question we have, like, for instance, when I was

Governor, we did coastal plain. We advised people not to build in

certain places. We required, when people buy a home now, that

they’ve got to be given information about the erosion and some

other things. Those are the kinds of things you’re talking about

that we’d better start thinking about in terms of our overall policies?

Mr. PIELKE. Yes. There’s a disconnect here. I think Senator

Corzine is properly concerned about erosion on the coast. But let’s

not kid ourselves. Let’s not think that the choices we have before

us on energy policy are going to make any difference whatsoever
37

on what happens on the coast. Many other decisions that you folks

will face will affect that, such as development, replenishment of

beaches, and so on—the decisions that are made every day that go,

I guess, underneath the radar screen of energy policy. But I think

there is a policy disconnect here. If we are talking about energy

policy and justifying changes in terms of beach erosion or water tables and so on, it is not in concert with how we understand how

climate and people interact.

From that standpoint, I would say Bush versus Kyoto, you’re

talking to the wrong experts here. It may make sense from the

standpoint of keeping our allies happy with respect to international

relations or showing environmental symbolism, but it is not at all

going to address these issues of risk.

I think it is time that the debate moved on to acknowledge that.

Senator JEFFORDS. Dr. Rowland.

Mr. ROWLAND. I’d comment about climate models and weather.

The climate models are not designed to reproduce weather, and

most of what Roger Pielke is talking about and also what Mr.

Legates talked about are weather-related questions of how much

precipitation there is very locally. When you live locally, then that’s

very important to you. It is what happens right there.

If you build on the barrier beach in Florida, then eventually

you’re going to get hit by a hurricane, and that’s why he’s saying

that the beach damages weren’t there in 1926. The beaches were

there in 1926 and the hurricanes went over them, but people

weren’t there. If you build on them, then at some time it is going

to hit you. That’s the weather-related aspect.

The climate-related aspects have to do with 50 or 100 years, and

there the question of the storms—the climate models don’t reproduce storms. Storms happen, are created and produced on a much

smaller spatial scale than the climate models can do.

If I give you an example for myself, I live on the coast in southern California. My office is about 4 miles inland. The weather is

different there because there is a low hill, low hills in between, and

50 miles away there is a 12,000-foot mountain with snow on top

of it.

If you have a climate model that has a box that is 100 miles by

100 miles, then the beach and the desert and the mountain are all

in the same box. You can’t predict any kind of weather out of that.

For that you need a very much smaller-scale model, and if you

build a smaller-scale model that only does the weather, then it does

pretty well. They do pretty well on precipitation. But you can’t expect a climate model to do that because the scales are so different.

Climate modeling is really looking 50 to 100 years in the future

and under conditions when the hydrological cycle would be three,

four or five times as severely changed as now, and that’s when they

start worrying about the storms, but they can’t predict them because that is much too fine a scale for their model.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Markham, go ahead. I was going to ask

you.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yes. I just wanted to respond to Senator

Voinovich’s question about the President’s climate policy.

I think the simple answer to that is that that is a business as

usual policy which will allow carbon emissions to increase over the
38

next decade at roughly the same rate at which they’ve increased

over the last decade, so, by tying the issue to carbon intensity rather than to overall CO2 emissions, that policy is not a policy for reduction, it is a policy for continued increase. For that reason, I

don’t think that it will help us if our objective is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

I would also like to just say that I think it doesn’t help to try

and totally separate energy policy from response to climate change.

We are almost certainly locked into a certain amount of climate

change, to which we will have to adapt, but at the same time, by

having a secure and sensible energy policy, we can reduce the potential future impacts. Climate change doesn’t happen on its own,

it happens in a context of social change. Wildlife habitats are unable to adapt to rapidly changing climate. The coasts—we are

spending tens of millions of dollars on armoring the eastern coasts

at the moment. As sea level accelerates over the next century, then

that will be an increased cost, so we shouldn’t always just talk

about the cost of reducing emissions, we should also talk about the

cost of not reducing emissions. I think the coastal zone is one of

the areas where we need to look at that more closely.

Senator VOINOVICH. Dr. Baliunas.

Ms. BALIUNAS. The reason I abstained on the vote on the earlier

bill is because I hadn’t seen the full bill. I like Bush’s bill because,

for some reason, one is it focuses on the science, and the science

is clearly the driver of the issue here. The models need improvement. They need improvement in the major greenhouse effect,

which are 02 water vapor and the effect of clouds. Those are poorly

to improperly modeled at present in all climate models. All climate

models assume them to be, especially water vapor, strong positive

feedback that amplifies any warming that would be there from,

say, doubling carbon dioxide concentrations in the air. That is

wrong. That has been demonstrated incorrect from the satellite

data and the balloon data that we have. Those models are incorrect

based on the surface data measurements. They are exaggerating

the warming.

So anything that affords science to progress in those areas will

give us a better definition of the risk, the amount, the amplitude

of climate change from manmade sources. This has to be weighed

against the cost.

Talking about cutting energy use in this country, carbon dioxide

emissions, by 20 percent on a time scale of a decade is extremely

costly. There is no way around it. One can only look at what Senator Chafee called the sad reality of nuclear to replace these. Renewables won’t do it. Hydro is not going to expand in this country.

Solar is not going to add on that scale. Wind towers are not going

to add on that scale. So we’re going to end up shutting down coal,

adding a lot more natural gas, and adding nuclear. I just don’t see

how it is possible to do that.

But, in any case, the science says that the manmade emissions

that are present are having a very small climate effect.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

Mr. WHITTAKER. I would only add that, from a business standpoint, certainly the policy encourages technology development, and

if I was with a cogeneration or with a combined heat and power
39

company right now, I would be quite pleased. I think my business

is going to improve over the next few years.

We ask about how can we encourage China and India to embrace

these new technologies. Well, there is a mechanism under the

Kyoto Protocol called ‘‘a clean development mechanism,’’ which is

designed precisely to do that and to credit U.S. companies for doing

so.

I would have liked to have seen mandatory reporting. I think disclosure on issues brings consistency, and the consistency of information is very valuable for those wishing to estimate companies,

certainly in the financial services industry, which brings me on to

my final point.

I would like to see more of a dialog with Wall Street and with

the investment community. I think institutional investors are increasingly invested in the equities markets and have tremendous

sway over companies, and the slightest level of concern expressed

by investors would be a powerful catalyst, I think, for companies

to look at this issue more seriously.

Senator JEFFORDS. Dr. Rowland.

Mr. ROWLAND. I should register dissent to what Dr. Baliunas

said about the modeling of the clouds and the modeling of water

vapor. In the consensus discussion of the Academy scientists that

were involved, they agree that there are some uncertainties involved in any of that, but at the present modeling, assuming that

the relative humidity would be the same and handling clouds as

they are is as good as you can do at the present time for doing the

modeling. It is not introducing a bias one way or the other.

Ms. BALIUNAS. I want to register dissent to the dissent, and that

is they may be the best we can do today, but they are insufficient

for making projections 50 to 100 years in the future. We cannot

even explain the lower troposphere temperature of the last 20 to

40 years, where we’ve gone almost halfway to a doubling of carbon

dioxide, equivalent carbon dioxide in the air—that is, summing all

the greenhouse gases in the air.

The models make an error of a factor of at least five in projecting

the warming. That error has to be due to the largest feedback, the

largest gain, which is water vapor. It is a distribution of water

vapor in the air. We don’t have good measurements for it, the

vertical distribution of it, and we don’t know how it interacts with

the rest of the climate system. Ditto for clouds.

Mr. PIELKE. I could. This dialog is exactly what’s wrong with the

climate change debate. This country spends an enormous amount

of money—about $20 billion over the last 10 or 12 years—on climate change research, and, while we have a much better understanding and much better sense that yes, people can affect the climate, esteemed scientists such as these will be debating these

issues far into the future. That’s how science progresses.

But what hasn’t come out of the Nation’s $20 billion investment

in research are more alternatives, more choices. The choices that

we face today are essentially the same that were discussed in 1982,

in 1985. It’s, ‘‘Do we reduce CO2? Yes or no?’’ There are thousands, if not millions, of decisions made about climate every single day in each of your States, in my State, around

the world. I think it is fair to ask if the scientific community is pro-
40

viding information that leads to a greater range of choices with respect to mitigation and adaptation to climate change. There’s clearly a lot of reasons to change energy policy independent of climate

and a lot of reasons to better adapt a climate independent of

change.

It seems to me that the research that we’re funding as a country

is not leading to those choices, meaning that all of the science we

get is fed into the same very narrow range that we’ll be talking

about in 10 years. So I think maybe it is time to think a little bit

more broadly about the problem, because this hearing and the debate among scientists, if you look in 1985 or even 1982, when Representative Al Gore held hearings, is very similar, and yet our

choices remain the same.

I would encourage you to do what you can to expand the choices

available.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Cogen.

Mr. COGEN. Thank you, Senator.

In responding to President Bush’s proposals, I will take the same

approach I took to Senator Jeffords’ bill, which is not actually have

an opinion, but I will say that we represent a lot of very large

emitters, a lot of industrial companies are typically the companies

that hire us—many, in fact, in the State of Ohio. There’s three

things that they’re looking for in a bill, and I think maybe that’s

what I’d like to point out and focus.

One is flexibility. Universally they support market-based mechanisms for dealing with the problem as far as their solutions.

The second, which is the hardest to get under any environment,

is some sort of regulatory certainty.

Senator VOINOVICH. Is what?

Mr. COGEN. Regulatory certainty. It is very hard to make investment decisions for long-term assets when you think the law might

change in 5 or 6 years and you’re talking about a 30-year asset.

Another issue, which goes to the issue of the voluntary nature of

programs, is protection of baselines. That is, a number of companies have witnessed this, and certainly there has been talk over the

years of credit for early action. I think that gets to the heart of it.

It is very hard to take a voluntary action now as a corporation

for all of the good corporate citizens reasons and find out years

later that you are now established at a lower baseline from which

you must reduce because of a mandatory program, where if that is

the case the best economic solution is, in fact, put as much carbon

out as you can now so that you have a higher baseline that you

have to reduce 10 percent off of.

That’s the situation that we are actually seeing, especially under

the trading program proposed in the European Union, that right

now, for example, some chemical firms have taken great efforts and

expense in reducing their nitrous oxide output, and we’re finding

that, in fact, the chemical industry is not under the trading program at all. Then there’s talk, as a secondary, ‘‘Well, we’ll put them

in and then we’ll establish the baseline pretty much on basic level,

as they’re doing now,’’ when some of them have spent 10 years actually reducing their CO2 equivalent out put. It might just all go

away for them.
41

That, to me, is maybe the key issue that can be addressed is: if

you’re going to have any sort of voluntary program, how do you

protect it? What assurances can be given that it is going to count

later?

Senator JEFFORDS. Anyone—Dr. Rowland.

Mr. ROWLAND. I have just a comment about satellite measurements of temperature. We all know how thermometers work. We’ve

all used them. A satellite can’t do what a thermometer does, and

that is contact the material directly. So if a satellite wants to measure temperature, it has to measure some kind of emission that

gives radiation that travels 500 miles to the satellite. It doesn’t get

it just from the place that you want to measure it. It gets it from

all through the atmosphere, so you have to have an algorithm that

calculates it.

The history of the satellite measurements of temperature in the

troposphere have been that the algorithm was shown that existed

for quite a period of time, 5 or 10 years, had some problems in it.

The same satellite doesn’t stay there. There have been 9 or 10 of

these satellites, and their orbits decay, and then you have to pass

it from one to the next. So it is not just sticking your thermometer

in and measuring it, which that at least we know how to do. It is

a very—it often takes adjustment of the algorithm 5 or 10 times,

and it is not clear to me that we’ve got the final algorithm for

measuring tropospheric temperatures by satellite.

In the end, satellites always give you the global coverage that is

needed, but interpretation of the measurement that actually

reaches the satellite is a complicated thing, which is very valuable

if more than one research group—if there are several research

groups and they repeat and they can come together on it, and I

don’t think we’re in that position on the tropospheric temperatures.

Senator JEFFORDS. Yes.

Mr. LEGATES. I agree, and that’s one of the things I point out in

my statement is that we need more work on satellite measurements. But I disagree strongly that a thermometer is a perfect

measurement. A thermometer can measure temperature at a given

point. The problem with that is a thermometer is good for measuring a temperature here but not for across the room, so we have

a single thermometer located at, say, a National Weather Service

observing site. It is representative only of that site, not of the larger region.

Now, the problem is that things change on that site over time.

We’ve moved a lot of the stations around, for example, in the

1940’s, early 1950’s. We decided we really didn’t need the Weather

Services offices downtown, it was better to have them out at the

airports, so we moved our thermometers out to the airports, which

created discontinuity.

Well, what’s happened over time? We’ve had urbanization. So the

thermometers, which originally were in land outside of the cities,

and now with a growing metropolis a lot of cases, these thermometers now are associated with urbanization right around the site.

That is, the growth of cities leads to more asphalt and warmer conditions so we have the effect of urbanization biasing our measurement with the thermometers.
42

We also have changes in thermometers over time. We don’t necessarily use the same type of thermometer in 1930 that we do now,

so there is a discontinuity in instrumentation.

Most importantly, we only put thermometers over land surfaces.

We have most of our observations associated with locations that

are over land, that are at lower altitudes, that are generally in wetter conditions and in more economically developed countries.

So thermometer-based measurements are good only for a single

point, but they don’t give you a good indication as to what the actual background change has been, because there is a lot of variability and bias associated with taking a thermometer measurement.

Ms. BALIUNAS. I want to add that the lower troposphere measurements by satellite have been independently validated by balloons that are launched daily and make measurements in situ, and

there are at least four sets of balloon measurements that are made

independently across the world, groups that analyze it, and they

agree with a high degree of correlation with the tropospheric data

from satellites.

So the argument is that the lower troposphere data are probably

on a very good footing. They cover almost essentially all the globe,

as opposed to between 10 and 20 percent for the ground-based thermometer measurement data that have, as Dr. Legates has pointed

out, have changed substantially over time and have many corrections made to their algorithms, as well.

Mr. PIELKE. Yes. I’d like to suggest that there’s really no solution

to the problem of climate change, but we can do better. I’d like to

go on record as saying I’m a big supporter of using less energy,

being cleaner in our energy use, and so on, but we don’t need better thermometers, better satellites, or any of that to start making

progress. There’s a lot of so-called ‘‘low-hanging fruit.’’ National security, alone, provides a compelling reason to be more efficient in

our energy use.

It seems to me that in tackling the greenhouse gas emissions of

6 billion people focused on understanding the science 100 years in

the future, we couldn’t have created a problem that could be more

easily gridlocked.

There’s a lot of relatively easy, by comparison, steps—no regrets

adaptation and no regrets mitigation—for which the debate over

the science, while important, shouldn’t stand in our way. We ought

to be being better with our energy use and reduce our vulnerability

to climate in any case, and we should start taking those steps. We

should have taken them before, but we should start now instead

of trying to wait for science to resolve itself.

Senator JEFFORDS. I’ll give you all a last shot here. Dr. Rowland.

Mr. ROWLAND. I have no more.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Legates.

Mr. LEGATES. [Shaking head negatively.]

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Markham.

Mr. MARKHAM. Just to say that I think the risks from greenhouse gas emissions are very great. The science—we have good,

sound science. It’s getting stronger every day. We know a lot more

than we did 5, 10, or 15 years ago. As. Dr. Pielke says, there are

many low-cost actions we can take now, which include both voluntary and hopefully regulatory actions like your bill.
43

Ms. BALIUNAS. The science has gotten extraordinarily better. The

models still cannot be used to make reliable, credible predictions in

the future. They fail validation by scientific testing. We should not

hold this to energy policy.

Mr. WHITTAKER. Only to say that this is very definitely a business issue. It is a business risk and it is a business opportunity,

and it will intensify in the coming years.

Mr. COGEN. Yes. I’ll agree with that. From the business point of

view, people are looking to the Senate for leadership. Businesses

are taking actions and they want to see some regulatory framework

for it.

Senator JEFFORDS. Let me ask this last question. Do any of you

believe that it is safe to continue increasing manmade greenhouse

gas emissions without any limit?

[All witnesses indicate in the negative.]

Senator JEFFORDS. No one says yes, and so that must be no, and

we’ll see you later. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the chair.]

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

I thank Chairman Jeffords for calling this important hearing on the economic and

environmental risks associated with increasing greenhouse gas emissions, and

thank him for his leadership on this issue. The issues are timely, they are important, and the witnesses are impressive. I am sorry that I could not personally attend; I had a conflicting duty to chair a hearing of the Governmental Affairs Committee. I want to leave no doubt about the importance of this hearing.

The causes and potential effects of global warming have been well documented

through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an international process

that is engaged in by over 2,000 scientists from around the world. The potential effects are serious and far-reaching.

Global warming is a global problem that requires a global solution. The international community has come together under the auspices of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change to address the problem. The original

1992 agreement, signed by then-President Bush and unanimously ratified by the

U.S. Senate, contained no mandatory targets or timetables for greenhouse gas emissions. It was important, however, for recognizing the problem and committing the

countries of the world to an ongoing multilateral process to seek ways to reduce the

threat of global warming. In 1997, the international community negotiated the

Kyoto Protocol, which included binding targets and timetables for industrialized

countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a little over 5 percent by 2008–

2012, as a first step in reducing global emissions of greenhouse gases. The United

States committed to a 7 percent reduction. Other countries, including the European

Union and Japan, are moving toward ratification of this agreement. The current administration has rejected the Kyoto Protocol and offered us what can best be described as a tepid response to what even the President describes is a very serious

issue.

The United States has a large stake in the climate change debate; among other

things, we have a very large land mass, with thousands of miles of coastline, and

a very large population, magnifying the health threats associated with climate

change. We also emit about 25 percent of the entire world’s emissions of carbon dioxide, the most prevalent greenhouse gas, even though we have less than 5 percent

of the world’s population. We have a responsibility to ourselves as well as the world

community to take action to reduce greenhouse gases. We led the international effort to protect the stratospheric ozone layer, and found a way to bridge differences

between developed and developing countries. That system is working and we should

be proud of the leadership the United States exhibited.

I fear we have now abdicated our leadership role. In 1989, then-President Bush,

talking to Congress about the issue of acid rain declared that the ‘‘time for study

alone is over . . . the time for action is now.’’ The President then went on to work
44

with the Congress to establish a market-based cap and trade program that significantly reduced emissions of sulfur dioxide, the main ingredient of acid rain. I would

suggest that the current administration follow this example for carbon dioxide. I

have been working with Chairman Jeffords and other progressive-minded Senators

to move toward passage of S. 556, the Clean Power Act of 2001, which would set

limits on carbon dioxide emissions from electric power plants, which are responsible

for about 40 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. We have been working with

colleagues from the other side of the aisle on this important first step on greenhouse

gas emissions, and hope that we can reach an agreement to move forward. I am

also working with Senator McCain to develop an economy wide cap and trade proposal for greenhouse gas emissions as one more step in re-establishing U.S. leadership in this critical area. As our distinguished witness Dr. Rowland, a Nobel laureate wrote in his testimony: ‘‘The increasing global temperatures will have many

consequences, often adverse in the long run. Because of the many causes of this

temperature increase have their origins in the activities of mankind, actions can

and should now be taken which will slow this rate of increase.’’

Thank you Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF COLORADO

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome all of the witnesses, especially

Professor Roger Pielke of the University of Colorado.

I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony and hope that we can use your collective knowledge to reach a better understanding of the economic and environmental

impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on global climate change.

Climate change or global warming has become one of the most talked about environmental issues for the last several years. The United States and other nations

have spent millions of dollars to study climate change. It seems that the more we

spend and study, the more we realize that we don’t know.

Our studying climate change for the last 10 years has led us to two conclusions:

First, human activity has had an impact on the global climate. In announcing his

global climate change strategy, President Bush acknowledged this fact.

However, our years of careful study have made, for policymakers, an even more

important conclusion: that we have inadequate evidence to demonstrate humanity’s

affect on climate change. Since our science is unable to tell us the level of causation,

science can’t tell us what mitigation strategies we, in Congress, should pursue.

Throughout my career of public service I have tried to base my decisions on the

best available information, particularly when those decisions have dramatic consequences on the lives of Coloradans. Unfortunately, in the case of global climate

change, we are seeking to craft a policy with profound implications on completely

inadequate and speculative information.

In his book, The Skeptical Environmentalist, Bjorn Lomborg (Bee-Yorn Lom-Borg)

simply asked, ‘‘Do we want to handle global warming in the most efficient way or

do we use global warming as a stepping stone to other political projects.’’

Even Mr. Lomborg, a Danish statistician, noted the political salience of the climate change debate. Unfortunately, this important issue has become so politicized

that many people look past the facts and, instead, focus on doomsday scenarios.

In noting our lack of understanding of the Earth’s climate system, one of our very

own witnesses made an equally important point. In her testimony today, Doctor Sallies Baliunas stated, ‘‘A value judgment is prerequisite to evaluating the need for

human mitigation of adverse consequences of climate change.’’

Again, ‘‘a value judgment is prerequisite.’’ In short, since we don’t have enough

information, some suggest that we just assume that humans can mitigate adverse

consequences of climate change.

Well, this Senator is not ready to make that assumption when making that leap

of faith could result in the loss of countless U.S. jobs.

I am happy that the President has chosen to look at the facts in rejecting the

Kyoto Protocol. He properly noted that greenhouse gas emissions is directly attributable to U.S. production and economic growth. In my state of Colorado, implementing Kyoto would have translated in the loss of 47,400 jobs and $2 billion in

tax revenue by 2010.

I am not ready to make decisions with such consequences without adequate information.

We all make ‘‘value judgments’’ in policymaking. I would ask my friends to ask

themselves what it is they value.
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In making that ‘‘value judgment’’ I would ask them to consider the words of John

Adams when he said: ‘‘Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes,

our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts

and evidence.’’ I look forward to the distinguished panel’s testimony, and ask that my testimony

be reported in the Record.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. F. SHERWOOD ROWLAND, BREN PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY AND

EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, IRVINE, CA

A natural greenhouse effect has existed in Earth’s atmosphere for thousands of

years, warming the Earth’s surface for a global average of 57 °F. During the 20th

Century, the atmospheric concentrations of a number of ‘‘greenhouse gases’’ have increased, mostly because of the actions of mankind. Our current concern is not

whether there is a greenhouse effect, because there is one, but rather how large will

be the enhanced greenhouse effect from the additional accumulation in the atmosphere of these greenhouse gases.

The Earth intercepts daily energy from the sun, much of it in the visible wavelengths corresponding to the spectrum of colors from red to violet, and the rest in

ultraviolet and nearby infrared wavelengths. An equal amount of energy must escape from the Earth daily to maintain a balance, but this energy emission is controlled by the much cooler average surface temperature of the Earth, and occurs in

wavelengths in the Afar infrared’’. If all of this terrestrially emitted infrared radiation were able to escape directly to space, then the required average temperature

of Earth would be 0 °F. However, the greenhouse gases—carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and others—selectively intercept some of this far infrared radiation, preventing its escape. A warmer Earth emits more infrared radiation, and Earth with an average surface temperature of 57 °F was able to make

up the shortfall from greenhouse gas absorption. However, at Exist slowly during

the 19th century and then more rapidly throughout the 20th century, the atmospheric concentrations of these greenhouse gases increased, often because of the activities of mankind. Other greenhouse gases have also been added, such as the

chlorofluorocarbons or CFCs, (CCl2F2, CCl3F, etc.) and tropospheric ozone (O3). With

more of these gases present in the atmosphere, more infrared will be intercepted,

and a further temperature increase will be required to maintain the energy balance.

Carbon dioxide is released by the combustion of fossil fuels—coal, oil and natural

gas—and its atmospheric concentration has increased from about 280 ppm as the

19th century began to 315 ppm in 1958 and 370 ppm now. Water (H2O) is actually

the most significant greenhouse gas in absorbing infrared radiation, but the amount

of gaseous water is controlled by the temperature of the world’s oceans and lakes.

Methane has a natural source from swamps, but is also released during agricultural

activities—for example, from rice paddies while flooded, and from cows and other

ruminant animals—and by other processes, increasing from about 0.70 ppm in the

early 1800’s to 1.52 ppm around 1978 and 1.77 ppm currently. Nitrous oxide concentrations grew from 0.27 to 0.31 ppm during the 20th century, formed by microbial action in soils and waters on nitrogen-containing compounds including fertilizers. The chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were not a natural part of the atmosphere,

but were first synthesized in 1928, and were then, applied to a variety of uses—

propellant gases for aerosol sprays, refrigerants in home refrigerators and automobile air conditioners, industrial solvents, manufacture of plastic foams, etc. The

CFC concentrations started from zero concentration in the 1920’s, and rose rapidly

during the latter part of the 20th century until the early 1990’s. They are no longer

increasing because of the Montreal Protocol, an international ban on their further

manufacture. Tropospheric ozone is a globally important compound formed by photochemical reactions as a part of urban smog in hundreds of cities. Other potential

influences on temperature changes for which the globally averaged data are still

very sparse include the concentrations of particulate matter such as sulfate and

black carbon aerosols.

Measurements of surface temperatures only became sufficiently broad in geographical coverage about 1860 to permit global averaging with improved coverage

as the years passed. The globally averaged surface temperature increased about

1.1 °F during the 20th century, with about half of this change occurring during the

past 25 years. 1998 was the warmest year globally in the entire 140-year record,

and the 1990’s were the warmest decade. Fluctuations in solar activity have been

directly observed wince the invention of the telescope 400 years ago, but accurate,

direct measurements of total solar energy output have only been possible with the
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advent of satellite measurements in the late 1970’s. These satellite data exhibit a

small but definite cyclic variation over the last two decades, paralleling the 11-year

solar sunspot cycle, but with little long term difference in solar energy output contemporary with the rising global temperatures of the past two decades.

Predictions of future temperature responses require atmospheric model calculations that effectively simulate the past, and then are extrapolated into the future

with appropriate estimates of the future changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas

concentrations. These models calculate the direct temperature increases that additional greenhouse gases will cause, and the further feedbacks induced by these temperature changes. One of the most prominent of these is the change in albedo (surface reflectivity) in the polar north—when melting ice is replaced by open water (or

melting snow replaced by bare ground), less solar radiation is reflected back to

space, and more remains at the surface causing a further temperature increase. The

models also assume that more water will remain in the atmosphere inn response

to the temperature increases, providing another positive feedback. There is an additional possible feedback from the changes in clouds—amount, composition, and altitude. In present models, the cloud feedback is assumed to be small, but data for

better evaluation are very difficult to obtain.

Extrapolations for 50 or 100 years in the future necessarily include hypotheses

about future societal developments, including population growth, economic activity,

etc. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) developed a large set

of scenarios about the possible course of these events over the next century, with

resulting model calculations of globally averaged temperature increases for the year

2100 relative to 1990 ranging from 2.5 ° to 10.4 °F (1.4–5.8 °C). These results were

only a small part of the three IPCC reports issued during 2001 about Climate

change. Volume I of the IPCC reports treated the ‘‘Scientific Basis’’, Volume II covered ‘‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’’, and Volume III ‘‘Mitigation’’.

The National Academy of Sciences, in response to a May 2001 request from the

White douse, and following discussions between the administration and the Academy over some questions raised by the former, convened an 11-member scientific

panel, which issued in June a 24-page report ‘‘Climate Change Science. An Analysis

of Some Key Questions’’ from a select committee of atmospheric scientists. I quote

the first few sentences of this report, and have appended the entire report to this

testimony: ‘‘Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result

of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising. The changes observed over the

last several decades are likely mostly due to human activities, but we cannot rule

out that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of natural variability.’’

The increasing global temperatures will have many consequences, often adverse

in the long run. Because many of the causes of this temperature increase have their

origin in the activities of mankind, actions can and should now be taken which will

slow this rate of increase.
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RESPONSES OF SHERWOOD ROWLAND TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. The Academy’s 2001 report, which you helped write, was stunningly

clear. It confirmed the seriousness of human-induced climate change. And, it contains a real sense of urgency about the problem. Beyond the comments you made

at the hearing, are there other things that the U.S. Government should do to reduce

the risks that the report outlines and to clear up related scientific uncertainties?

Response. I believe that it is important to begin carrying out diverse policies

which will have an ameliorating effect on climate change. For too many years, the

world has operated with little regard to the long term effects of increasing population, increasing energy use per capita, and rather indiscriminate discharge of

waste materials into the environment. The global system is so immense and so complicated that a very large set of policy changes are needed. What we need is the

establishment of a mind-set that recognizes these problems, and begins to take steps

toward solutions. Once the general direction begins to change, more and more opportunities will appear which can accelerate the progress.

Question 2. The Academy’s report says that ‘‘national policy decisions made now

. . . will influence the extent of any damage suffered by vulnerable human populations and ecosystems later in this century.’’ The Administration’s new policy decision appears to be business as usual. How will this policy affect the future, in terms

of greenhouse gas concentrations?

Response. The history of the past two centuries is a period in which most of the

advances in standard of living have been accompanied by the progressive substitution of animal power for human power and then machine power for animal power.

These changes have been accompanied, of course, by the increasing use of energy

to supply the machine power—first steam from wood burning, then coal, oil and natural gas combustion as power sources. We urgently need to develop policies by

which the major industrial powers can maintain sustainable prosperity, while the

developing countries seek sustainable development. These changes will surely need

to be accompanied by more careful disposal of the waste products from energy production.

Question 3. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not safe to continue

increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit. What needs to be done to assure

that we can avert the point of no return or ‘‘dangerous levels’’ of ‘‘greenhouse gas

concentrations?

Response. We are unlikely to know enough because of the extreme complexity of

the global system and its interconnections to permit identification of ‘‘points of no

return’’ or to know a precise value of a ‘‘dangerous level’’ until we have passed the

first, or exceeded the latter. Under the circumstances, this argues for doing what

we can to slow the rate of change in the hope that we can recognize the dangers

before we have passed the choke point.

Question 4. The NAS report advocates, ‘‘Maintaining a vigorous, ongoing program

of basic research, funded and managed independently of the climate assessment activity, will be crucial for narrowing . . . uncertainties . . . In addition, the research

enterprise dealing with environmental change and the interactions of human society

with the environment must be enhanced.’’ ‘What are your views of current Federallevel research programs’ direction and budgets for achieving these ends?

Response. The need for separation of research versus assessment is the difference

between exploring and judging. Assessment involves judging the adequacy of the

present understanding of the system by, for example, its ability to reproduce the observations in that system. Exploring will often mean the postulation of a different

possible explanation, devising an appropriate test, and then discarding the explanation if it fails the test—but carrying out a continuing series of postulates and

tests.

Question 5. To date, much of the research regarding the environmental, human

health, or economic impacts of climate change has been limited to projections for

the next 100–150 years, or assuming a doubling of atmospheric CO2. What are the

risks of climate change on a longer timeframe, or those associated with a tripling

or quadrupling of atmospheric CO2? Does the NAS plan to update its 2001 report?

Response. Answering the second question first, the main purpose of the NAS report of 2001 was evaluation of the state of understanding of the Earth’s climate system, for which the IPCC 2001 report, and particularly in its Volume 1 on the ‘‘Scientific Base’’, was the latest and most complete compilation. This NAS report was

prepared in about 5 weeks by a group of 11 scientists quite familiar with the content and preparation of the IPCC report, while the IPCC report itself was the prod-
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uct of 5 years of work by about 3,000 scientists. Until the next IPCC report is ready

in 2006 or 2007, another NAS report is quite unlikely. Reports on specific, limited

aspects can certainly be anticipated, as that need rises.

The further out in the future the projection, the greater the uncertainty. Probably

the ultimate worry is captured by the phrase ‘‘runaway greenhouse’’, as applied to

our sister planet Venus, which has an atmospheric much thicker than ours, composed mostly of carbon dioxide, and surface temperatures which will not permit biological life, at least in the forms existing on Earth. Of course, no one knows the history of the Venusian atmosphere, so that the phrase might be totally misleading.

Question 6. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30–50 years, of

continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas emissions? And, what is the

most feasible way to reduce or eliminate that risk?

Response. My experience with the atmospheric problem of ‘‘stratospheric ozone depletion’’ makes me answer this question with the reply ‘‘some problem that has not

yet been identified, some surprise.’’ In 1984, the scientific community was quite

aware that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were reaching the stratosphere and decomposing there with the release of chlorine atoms, which could then react with the

molecules of ozone in the stratosphere. What only a few scientists knew then was

that were particles, polar stratospheric clouds, present in the very cold stratosphere

over Antarctica. What only a few other scientists knew then—none of them in the

first group, who likewise were ignorant of this other development—was that some

chemical reactions between two types of chlorine containing molecules, hydrogen

chloride and chlorine nitrate, could occur on the surfaces of particles, thereby facilitating the removal of ozone. Then, the ‘‘Antarctic ozone hole’’ was discovered, and

reported in 1985 by the British scientist Joe Farman, and suddenly the 1984 view

that ozone loss would occur slowly over a period of several decades was replaced by

the knowledge that ozone loss could occur extremely rapidly, and that major losses

were already happening every spring in the Antarctic.

What would be the surprise? Probably the unexpected collapse of some ecosystem.

I won’t provide an example of an unexpected collapse, because then it would probably be said that I, or scientists in general, expected it. The basic point is that the

climate system is still very much under study, and when and how it goes about

changing an area under active investigation.

RESPONSES OF SHERWOOD ROWLAND TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR SMITH

Question 1. Dr. Pielke testified that ‘‘the primary cause for . . . growth in impact

is the increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in climate, per se.’’ Do you agree with this claim?

Why or why not?

Response. The first 75 years of the 20th century were a time of great population

growth, and relatively little change in climate. During the last 25 years, the global

temperature has risen steadily, and signs of climate change are beginning to be seen

in many locations. Over the whole century then, climate change should not be expected to have caused a great change in impacts. The questions for the future include a mixture of the consequences from increasing global population coupled with

the extra impositions from temperature rise. The larger the temperature increase

the larger the role this climatic fluctuation will play in impacts on civilization.

Question 2. Dr. Pielke also stated that ‘‘the present research agenda is focused

. . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate future’’ and that ‘‘instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no . . . we might be better served by addressing

things like the present drought....’’ Do you agree with that proposition? Why or

why not?

Response. The arguments in most of the scientific world are not about global

warming, yes or no, but rather about the nuances of the global warming which is

occurring. There are always the simultaneous needs for putting out the present fire,

and also developing a long term strategy to use non-combustible materials and install sprinkler systems.

Question 3. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto Protocol? Do you

agree with the assertion that full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would only

avert the expected temperature change by 6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why

not?

Response. I wrote in the summer of 2000 the following (see ‘‘U.S. Policy and the

Global Environment’’, Donald Kennedy and John Riggs, editors) ‘‘None of the currently available remedial responses, such as the Kyoto Protocol, provide a solution
85

to the problems brought about by climate change. Rather they are directed toward

slowing the pace of change, amelioration, and adaptation rather than cure. Consequently, the climate change problem will be much more serious by the year 2050

and even more so by 2100.’’

The development of an adequate response to the climate change problem will

surely require many different approaches, strengthening and altering possible control efforts over time. The Kyoto Protocol is one possible initial step, and the only

one that is seriously on the table at the present time. It has some built-in weaknesses, such as the basic rule built into the future negotiations during the 1992 Rio

de Janeiro conference that excluded India and China and other developing countries

from any control efforts in Kyoto. By now, too, the choice of 1990 as the base comparison year might well be replaced by some year nearer to the present. However,

the most important need is a signal to the world that global warming is a problem

about which many different groups should be thinking and acting in efforts to slow

it down-and if Kyoto is not the signal, then another process should be proposed that

would also provide a start toward the control of emissions of greenhouse gases.

Question 4. Since the hearing there has been much press attention paid to the

breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion ton iceberg known as

‘‘Larsen B,’’ that has been attributed to climate change. What scientific evidence is

there that climate change is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of

Larsen B?

Response. The temperatures in Antarctica seem to be simultaneously warming on

the low altitude fringes and cooling in the central ice plateau. The breakup of the

Ice Sheet occurs at sea level, and the warming there may facilitate the breakup.

There are also quite plausible scientific suggestions that link central-cooling/peripheral-warming observations to the lesser amounts of ozone now found in the Antarctic stratosphere, and the consequent lesser conversion of ultraviolet light to heat

in the absence of ozone in the central core of the polar vortex. But sole cause? Almost all geoscientific events occur under circumstances in which there are a mixture

of causes, although sometimes these second and third contributing causes are minor.

Question 5a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening statement was

a Swiss Re report titled, ‘‘Climate research does not remove the uncertainty; Coping

with the risks of climate change’’. Please explain why you agree or disagree with

the following assertions or conclusions from that report: ‘‘There is not one problem

but two: natural climate variability and the influence of human activity on the climate system.’’

Response. Certainly. Any changes induced by man’s activities are superimposed

on a system which has its own inherent variability to begin with.

Question 5b. It is essential that new or at least wider-ranging concepts of protection are developed. These must take into account the fact that maximum strength

and frequency of extreme weather conditions at a given location cannot be predicted.

Response. I am not in the insurance business. If there are really no parametric

limits to the maximum strength and frequency of extreme weather conditions at a

given location, then it is hard for an outsider to see how the company would set

their insurance rates. I would think the largest problem an insurance company encounters in considering climate change is that the statistically observed probability

of disasters over the previous 100 or 200 years may no longer be applicable to the

new, warmer climate.

Question 5c. Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the case for a collapse

of the climate system, as this will stir up fears which-if they are not confirmed will

in time turn to carefree relief; and (2) to play down the climate problem for reasons

of short-term expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires

that today’s generations take responsible measure to counter a threat of this kind.

Response. These are straw-man arguments-’’collapse of the climate system’’ versus

‘‘short-term expediency’’

Question 6. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions

is increasing? Why or why not?

Response. I can’t give a why/why-not answer to this question. Vulnerability is a

function of the strength of the precautions taken. When processes for strengthening

are developed, people allow this improvement to push into areas that were formerly

thought to be vulnerable.
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RESPONSES OF SHERWOOD ROWLAND TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global CO2 concentration target of 550 ppm

CO2 by 2100 which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed

countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of 550 ppm by 2100

is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on emissions for the United States

by 2050? By 2100?

Response. I have not devoted any scientific time to emission estimates for 100

years from now. The largest present question for me is the future demand for nuclear power. I can imagine either limit might turn out to be the world situation 50

years from now—either that nuclear power will be essentially banned worldwide by

2050, or that nuclear power will be the dominant global energy source by 2050, furnishing more electricity than coal, oil and natural gas combined.

Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you provide this analysis?

Response. I would certainly assume that the conclusions about the economic impact of carbon dioxide reductions would be drastically dependent upon the global acceptance of nuclear power at that point in the future.

Question 2. Where do we need to concentrate research to better understand climate modeling and the scientific uncertainties?

Response. A constant tension exists between the demand for a more finely gridded

atmospheric model in order to look for the regional effects of climate change, and

the need for a more elaborate data set with which to compare the model calculations. Higher powered computers are needed for more detailed calculations; measurements are needed to furnish the ‘‘ground truth’’ which can validate the models.

Question 3. What technologies offer the most realistic opportunity to reduce manmade emissions with the least detrimental impact to the economy?

Response. Nuclear power is the obvious answer here, but whether the country will

accept nuclear power as a replacement for coal, oil and gas remains to be seen. One

doesn’t read much about the French experience with their heavy reliance on nuclear

power. Every energy source has its associated environmental problem(s) but nuclear

power plants are not a source of greenhouse gas emissions.

Question 4. What are the effects of removing black soot from the atmosphere?

Response. From a theoretical point of view, black soot serves to absorb solar energy into the soot particle, rather than reflecting the radiation back to space. From

a quantitative point of view, the contribution of black soot is an enormous question

mark. The material does not last long in the atmosphere before dropping out, and

is quite variable in time and space. Measurements of the global effects of black soot

would require detailed daily measurements all over the world in order to have an

appropriate average for the world. Such data do not exist.

Question 5. What are the benefits of using U.S. clean coal technology in countries

like China and India in terms of removing black soot?

Response. To the locals, obviously cleaner air. On a global warming basis, highly

uncertain in the absence of the global daily coverage mentioned above.

Question 6. Who wrote the Summary of the NRC’s June 2001 ‘‘Climate Change

Science’’ report? Can you document the uncertainties reflected in the underlying report?

Response. The first conference call led to agreement among the committee members about the general nature and the individual components of the report, and then

to multiple assignments to create drafts on particular topics. As the report took

shape, the chairman began drawing out the essence of each and circulating that for

comment and discussion. Basically, the report and its summary were written by the

committee members with the chair a very active participant in almost all of the individual discussions.

The decision was made early not to provide individual documentation and references for this report because of the time constraints. Almost all of the uncertainties mentioned in the ‘‘Climate Change Science’’ report are discussed in the IPCC

reports, both the Summary for Policy Makers, and Volume One, ‘‘The Scientific

Base’’, but are not individually referenced.

Question 7. Please provide the documentation of how the NRC report addressed

the satellite, weather balloon and surface temperature measurements.
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Response. This question had been addressed separately by another NRC committee, with a report issued in 1999. The chairman of that committee was a member

of the Climate Change Science committee.

Question 8. Who wrote the IPCC summary for policymakers?

Response. I was not part of the IPCC process, and know only anecdotally that the

listed authors appear to have worked much like the Climate Change Science committee, except that their interactions were stretched out over months and years.

Question 9. Which uncertainties in the underlying IPCC Working Group reports

were also reflected in the NRC (June 2001) report?

Response. I think that the same general sets of uncertainties were involved in

both, but the IPCC Working Group reports cover more than 2500 pages as published

and obviously can discuss uncertainties on a more micro scale.

Question 10. In your written testimony you said that increased greenhouse gas

concentrations are ‘‘often because of the activities of mankind.’’ Yet in you oral comments you said they were ‘‘mostly caused by the activities of man.’’ There is a significant difference between ‘‘often’’ and ‘‘mostly.’’ Many people attach much meaning

to the individual words of the IPCC Reports and other Climate Reports. Could you

explain what you meant in your two different testimonies?

Response. The two terms ‘‘often’’ and ‘‘mostly’’ are complementary, and both are

different from ‘‘always’’ because some of the emission sources for some of the greenhouse gases are of natural origin. For those molecules with both natural sources and

releases by the activities of mankind, the source is no longer distinguishable when

the molecule is in the atmosphere, but the increase in the atmospheric concentration

is then usually caused by the addition of the anthropogenic source rather than by

a change in the non-human processes. There are many different greenhouse gases

and many different ways in which mankind causes them to be put into the atmosphere. Thirty years ago discussions about global warming might be alternately described as ‘‘the carbon dioxide problem’’. Then, in the 1970’s a succession of measurements showed increasing concentrations in the atmosphere of methane, nitrous

oxide, and the chlorofluorocarbons (CFC–11, CFC–12 and CFC–113, and the alternate description became ‘‘the greenhouse gas problem’’. The only important greenhouse gas not listed as such is water vapor, for which the atmospheric concentration

is controlled by the temperature of the ocean through evaporation. With further research, the greenhouse gas list was expanded to include sulfur hexafluoride, the

perfluorocarbons (such as CF4 and C2F6) and the hydrofluorocarbons (such as

CH2FCF3, now the common refrigerant 134A in automobile air conditioners.). Volume One of the IPCC 2001 report lists 64 greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have been components of the atmosphere for hundreds of

thousands of years, and have always had natural sources. However, for each of

three molecules, there now exist substantial sources of emissions under the control

of mankind, and most of the increase, in their concentrations arises from these widely varying activities of mankind: burning of coal, gas and oil for carbon dioxide, release from rice paddies and cattle for methane, microbial action on fertilizers for nitrous oxide. For the other 60+ molecules, no natural sources are known and their

presence in the atmosphere results from chemical synthesis by man, and then release to the atmosphere unchanged. These compounds are used in a very wide variety of human activities, with the common characteristic that release to the atmosphere unchanged is the usual occurrence. When it comes to evaluation of the cumulative greenhouse effect of all of these gases, then carbon dioxide is the most important, accounting for roughly half of the total, with methane and nitrous oxide having

significant roles. The incremental changes in the total greenhouse gas effect are

mostly the product of some activity of mankind.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER, CO

I thank the chairman and the committee for the opportunity to offer testimony

this morning on the economic and environmental risks associated with increasing

greenhouse gas emissions.

My name is Roger Pielke, Jr. and I am an Associate Professor of Environmental

Studies at the University of Colorado where I also direct the CIRES Center for

Science and Technology Policy Research. My research focuses on the connections of

science and decisionmaking. A short biography can be found at the end of my written testimony.

In my oral testimony I’d like to highlight six ‘‘take home points,’’ which are developed in greater detail in my written testimony and in the various peer-reviewed scientific papers cited therein.
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TAKE HOME POINTS

• Weather and climate have growing impacts on economies and people around the

world.1

• The primary cause for the growth in impacts is the increasing vulnerability of

human and environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes

in climate per se.2

• To address increasing vulnerability, and the growing impacts that result, requires a broader conception of ‘‘climate policy’’ than now dominates debate.3

• We must begin to consider adaptation to climate to be as important as matters

of energy policy in discussion of response options. Present discussion all but completely neglects adaptation.4

• Increased attention to adaptation would not mean that we should ignore energy

policies, but instead is a recognition that changes in energy policy are insufficient

to address the primary reasons underlying trends in the societal impacts of weather

and climate.5

• The nation’s investments in research could be more efficiently focused on producing usable information for decisionmakers seeking to reduce vulnerabilities to

climate. Specifically, the present research agenda is improperly focused on prediction of the distant climate future.6

The remainder of this document develops these points through a case study focused on tropical cyclones. Considerably more detail can be found in the set of peerreviewed articles cited in support of the arguments presented here.

Policy debate and advocacy on the issue of climate change frequently focus on the

potential future impacts of climate on society, usually expressed as economic damage or other human outcomes. Today I would like to emphasize that societal impacts

of climate are a joint result of climate phenomena (e.g., hurricanes, floods, and other

extremes) and societal vulnerability to those phenomena. The paper concludes that

policies focused on reducing societal vulnerability to the impacts of climate have important and under-appreciated dimensions that are independent of energy policy.

In the climate change debate, people often point to possible increases in extreme

weather events (e.g., hurricanes, floods, and winter storms) as a potentially serious

consequence of climate change for humans around the world. For instance, the January 22, 1998 issue of Newsweek carried the following headline: ‘‘THE HOT ZONE:

Blizzards, Floods, and Hurricanes, Blame Global Warming.’’ In this testimony I use

the case of hurricanes to illustrate the interrelated climate-society dimensions of climate impacts. Research indicates that societal vulnerability is the single most important factor in the growing damage related to extreme events. An implication of

this research for policy is that decisionmaking at local levels (such as related to land

use, insurance, building codes, warning and evacuation, etc.) can have a profound

effect on the magnitude and significance of future damage.7

Figure 1 shows economic damage (adjusted for inflation) related to hurricane

landfalls in the United States, 1900–1998.8 Because damage is growing in both frequency and intensity, one possible interpretation of this figure is that hurricanes

have become more frequent and possibly stronger in recent decades. However, while

hurricane frequencies have varied a great deal over the past 100+ years, they have

not increased in recent decades (Figure 2, provided courtesy of C. Landsea, NOAA).9

To the contrary, although damage increased during the 1970’s and 1980’s, hurricane

activity was considerably lower than in previous decades.
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90

To explain the increase in damage it is necessary to consider factors other than

climate. In particular, society has changed enormously during the period covered by

Figure 2. Figures 3a and b show this dramatically. Figure 4a shows a stretch of

Miami Beach in 1926. Figure 3b shows another perspective of Miami Beach from

recent years. The reason for increasing damages is apparent from the changes easily

observable in these figures: today there is more potential for economic damage than

in the past due to population growth and increased wealth (e.g., personal property).

Figure 4b shows the increase in population along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts for

168 coastal counties from Texas through Maine (Figure 4a). In 1990, the population

of Miami and Ft. Lauderdale (2 counties) exceeded the combined population of 107

counties from Texas to Virginia.10 Clearly, societal changes such as coastal population growth have had a profound effect on the frequency and magnitude of impacts

from weather events such as hurricanes.11

One way to present a more accurate perspective on trends in hurricane-related

impacts is to consider how past storms would affect present society. A 1998 paper

presented a methodology for ‘‘normalizing’’ past hurricane damage to present day

values (using wealth, population and inflation). Figure 5 shows the historical losses

of Figure 1 normalized to 2000 values.12

The normalized record shows that the impacts of Hurricane Andrew, at close to

$40 billion (2000 values), would have been far surpassed by the Great Miami Hurricane of 1926, which would cause an estimated $90 billion damage had it occurred

in 2000. We can have confidence that the normalized loss record accounts for societal changes because the adjusted data contains climatological information, such as

the signal of El Nin ̃ o and La Nin ̃ a.13
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The normalization methodology provides an opportunity to perform a sensitivity

analysis of the relative contributions of climate changes and societal changes, as

projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to future topical cyclone damages. Figure 6 shows the results of this analysis.14 The three blue

bars show three different calculations (named for their respective authors) used by

IPCC in its Second Assessment Report for the increase in tropical cyclone-related

damage in 2050 (relative to 2000) resulting from changes in the climate, independent of any changes in society. The four green bars show the sensitivity of tropical cyclone-related damage in 2050 (relative to 2000) resulting from changes in society based on four different IPCC population and wealth scenarios used in its Third

Assessment Report. These changes are independent of any changes in climate.

Figure 6 illustrates dramatically the profound sensitivity of future climate impacts to societal change, even in the context of climate changes projected by the

IPCC. The relative sensitivity of societal change to climate change ranges from 22

to 1 (i.e., smallest societal sensitivity and largest climate sensitivity) to 60 to 1 (i.e.,

largest societal sensitivity and smallest climate sensitivity). This indicates that insofar as tropical cyclones are concerned, steps taken to modulate the future climate

(e.g., via greenhouse gas emissions or other energy policies) would only address a

very small portion of the increasing damages caused by tropical cyclones. Similar

results have been found for tropical cyclone impacts in developing countries,15 flooding,16 other extremes,17 and water resources.18
92

The perspective offered in this discussion paper raises the possibility that the

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) has a critical, but largely

unrecognized flaw with profound implications for policy. Under the FCCC the term

‘‘climate change’’ is defined as ‘‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or

indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere

and which is in addition to natural climate variability over comparable time periods.’’ This definition stands in stark contrast to the broader definition used by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which states that climate

change is ‘‘any change in climate over time whether due to natural variability or

as a result of human activity.’’

As a consequence of the FCCC definition, ‘‘adaptation’’ refers to actions in response to climate changes attributable solely to greenhouse gas emissions. It does

not refer to efforts to improve societal responses to ‘‘natural’’ climate variability.

Consequently, adaptation has only ‘‘costs’’ because adaptive responses would by definition be unnecessary if climate change could be prevented. Hence, it is logical for

many conclude that preventative action is a better policy alternative and recommend adaptive responses only to the extent that proposed mitigation strategies

will be unable to prevent changes in climate in the near future. But this overlooks

the fact that even if energy policy could be used intentionally to modulate future

climate, other factors will play a much larger role in creating future impacts and

are arguably more amenable to policy change.

Based on these results implicit in the work of the IPCC and shown in Figure 6,

an increased focus on ‘‘adaptation’’ makes sense under any climate scenario. But the

Framework Convention is structured to deal only with the growth in impacts related

to the greenhouse gas impacts on the climate (the blue bars) and not the profound

societal vulnerability (green bars) that will dominate future climate impacts under

any climate change scenario.

Consider that the International Red Cross estimates that in the 1990’s around the

world, weather and climate events were directly related to more than 300,000

deaths and more than U.S. $700 billion in damages.19 Many of these human losses

are preventable and economic losses are manageable with today’s knowledge and

technologies.20 Simple steps taken to reduce societal vulnerability to weather and

climate could also make society more resilient to future variability and change. Seen

from this perspective, costs of adaptation could easily be exceeded by the benefits

of better dealing with the impacts of climate, irrespective of future changes in climate and their causes. The Framework Convention’s definitional gerrymandering of

‘‘climate change’’ according to attribution prejudices policy and advocacy against

such common sense activities.

An implication of this work is that policy related to societal impacts of climate

has important and under-appreciated dimensions that are independent of energy

policy. It would be a misinterpretation of this work to imply that it supports either

business-as-usual energy policies, or is contrary to climate mitigation. It does suggest that if a policy goal is to reduce the future impacts of climate on society, then

energy policies are insufficient, and perhaps largely irrelevant, to achieving that

goal. Of course, this does not preclude other sensible reasons for energy policy action

related to climate (such as ecological impacts) and energy policy action independent

of climate change (such as national security, air pollution reduction and energy efficiency).21 It does suggest that reduction of human impacts related to weather and

climate are not among those reasons, and arguments and advocacy to the contrary

are not in concert with research in this area.
93

The arguments presented in this testimony highlight a need to distinguish ‘‘climate policy’’ from ‘‘energy policy’’ (Figure 7). ‘‘Climate policy’’ refers to the actions

that organizations and individuals take to reduce their vulnerability to (or enhance

opportunities afforded by) climate variability and change.22 From this perspective

governments and businesses are already heavily invested in climate policy. In the

context of hurricanes and floods, climate policies might focus on land use, insurance,

engineering, warnings and forecasts, risk assessments, and so on. These are the

policies that will make the most difference in reducing the future impacts of climate

on society.

The conventional view is that climate policy is energy policy. However, much of

the debate and discussion on climate change revolves around energy policy and ignores the fact that such policies, irrespective of their merit, can do little to address

growing societal vulnerabilities to climate around the world. In all contexts, improving policies targeted on the societal impacts of climate depends on a wide range of

factors other than energy policy. Consequently, in light of the analyses presented

here, a common interest objective of climate policy would be to improve societal and

environmental resilience to climate variability and change, and to reduce the level

of vulnerability. Climate policy should be viewed as a complement, not an alternative, to energy policies.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

Figure 1. U.S. hurricane damage 1900–1998, adjusted for inflation to 1998 values.

Figure 2. U.S. hurricane landfalls, 1851–1998, figure courtesy of C. Landsea.

Figure 3a. Miami Beach, 1926. Photo from the Wendler Collection, Florida State

Archives.

Figure 3b. Miami Beach, recent decades. Undated photo from the NOAA Arcive.

Figure 4a. Map of 168 coastal counties from Texas through Maine.

Figure 4b. Population of the 168 coastal counties from Texas through Maine for

1930 and 1990 based on U.S. Census data.

Figure 5. Historical losses from hurricanes adjusted to 2000 values based on inflation, population, and wealth. The graph suggests the damage that would have occurred had storms of past years made landfall with the societal conditions of 2000.

Figure 6. A sensitivity analysis of the impacts of tropical cyclones in 2050 based

on the assumptions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The green

bars show sensitivity of future impacts to societal changes and the blue bars show

sensitivity to climate changes. Societal changes are the overwhelmingly dominant

factor.

Figure 7. How our perspective on ‘‘global warming’’ might change. Rather than defining climate policy as energy policy, we might instead more clearly distinguish the

two with implications for research and policy.

ENDNOTES

1For a review, see Kunkel, K., R. A. Pielke, Jr., S. A. Changnon, 1999: Temporal

Fluctuations in Weather and Climate Extremes That Cause Economic and Human

Health Impacts: A Review, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society,

80:1077–1098, online at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp—roger/pdf/

bams8006.pdf 2For documentation of this assertion, see Pielke and Landsea (1997), Kunkel et

al. (1999), Pielke et al. (2000), Pielke and Downton (2000), Downton and Pielke

(2001), cited in the endnotes below. 3For an in depth presentation of this perspective, see Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke,

Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-Warming Gridlock. The Atlantic Monthly, July:55– 64, online at

http://www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/2000/07/sarewitz.htm

4For discussion, see Pielke, Jr., R. A., 1998: Rethinking the role of adaptation in

climate policy. Global Environmental Change, 8:159–170, online at

http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp—roger/pdf/1998.13.pdf 5See Pielke, Jr., R. A., R. Klein, and D. Sarewitz, 2000: Turning the Big Knob:

An Evaluation of the Use of Energy Policy to Modulate Future Climate Impacts, Energy and Environment, 11:255–276, online at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/

pielke/knob/index.html 6On the use of predictions in decisionmaking see Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr.,

and R. Byerly, (eds.), 2000: Prediction: Science, Decision-Making and the Future of

Nature. Island Press: Washington, DC. On the history and performance of the U.S.

global Change Research program, see Pielke, Jr., R. A., 2000. Policy History of the

U.S. Global Change Research Program: Part I, Administrative Development. Global

Environmental Change, 10:9–25. Pielke, Jr., R. A., 2000: Policy History of the U.S.
94

Global Change Research Program: Part II, Legislative Process. Global Environmental Change, 10:133–144. Pielke Jr., R. A., 1995. Usable Information for Policy:

An Appraisal of the U.S. Global Change Research Program. Policy Sciences, 38:39–

77, online at: http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp—roger/pdf/1995.07.pdf 7See Sarewitz and Pielke 2000, op. cit.

8For discussion, see Pielke, Jr., R. A., and C. W. Landsea, 1998: Normalized Hurricane Damages in the United States: 1925–1995. Weather and Forecasting, 13:351–

361, online at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp—roger/pdf/wf13.pdf 9See Landsea, C. L., R. A. Pielke, Jr., A. Mestas-Nun ̃ ez, and J. Knaff, 1999: Atlantic Basin Hurricanes:

Indicies of Climate Changes, Climatic Change, 42:89–129, online at http://

www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/atlantic/index.html

See also Landsea, C. W., C. Anderson, N. Charles, G. Clark, J. Partagas, P.

Hungerford, C. Neumann and M. Zimmer, 2001: The Atlantic Hurricane Data base

Re-analysis Project: Documentation for the 1851–1885 Addition to the HURDAT

Data base. Chapter for the Risk Prediction Initiative book, R. Murnane and K. Liu,

Editors. Online: http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/hurdat/index.html 10Pielke, Jr., R. A., and R. A. Pielke, Sr., 1997: Hurricanes: Their Nature and Impacts on Society.

John Wiley and Sons Press: London.

11See Kunkel et al. 1999, op. cit. 12After Pielke and Landsea, 1998, op. cit. 13Pielke, Jr., R.A., and C.W. Landsea, 1999: La Nin ̃ a, El Nin ̃ o, and Atlantic Hurricane Damages in the United States. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 80:2027–2033, online at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp—roger/

pdf/bams8010.pdf 14Details on this sensitivity analysis can be found in Pielke et al. 2000, op. cit. 15Pielke, Jr., R. A., J. Rubiera, C. Landsea, M. Molina, and R. Klein, 2001: Hurricane Vulnerability in Latin America and the Caribbean, Natural Hazards Review,

(in review). 16Pielke, Jr., R.A., and M.W. Downton, 2000: Precipitation and damaging floods:

Trends in the United States, 1932–1997. Journal of Climate, 13:3625–3637, online

at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp—roger/pdf/jc1320.pdf and, Downton,

M. and R. Pielke, Jr., 2001. Discretion Without Accountability: Climate, Flood Damage and Presidential Politics, Natural Hazards Review, 2:157–166, online at http:/

/sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/pielke/hp—roger/pdf/downtonpielke2001.pdf 17See Kunkel et al. 1999, op. cit. 18C. J. Vo ̈ro ̈smarty, P. Green, J. Salisbury, and R. B. Lammers, 2000. Global

Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and Population Growth,

Science 289: 284–288. D.P. Lettenmaier, A.W. Wood, R.N. Palmer, E.F. Wood, and

E.Z. Stakhiv, 1999, Water Resources Implications of Global Warming: A U.S. Regional Perspective, Climatic Change, 43:537–579. 19International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC),

2000.World Disasters Report, www.ifrc.org. 20See, e.g., D. Mileti, 2000. Second Assessment of Natural Hazards, (Joseph

Henry Press). 21See, e.g., F. Laird 2001, Just say no to emissions reductions targets, Issues in

Science and Technology, Winter, online: http://www.nap.edu/issues/17.2/laird.htm

R. Brunner 2001. Science and the Climate Change Regime, Policy Sciences 34:1–33. 22Note that here I use the broad definition of ‘‘climate change’’ used by the IPCC:

‘‘. . . related to any source’’ rather than the more restricted definition of the FCCC

which defines climate change only in terms of those changes directly or indirectly

attributable ‘‘to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere

. . . ’’ For discussion, see Pielke, Jr., R. A., 1998, op. cit.

RESPONSES OF DR. ROGER A. PIELKE, JR. TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. In your testimony, you provided some estimates of the costs of adapting our communities and infrastructure to a changing climate. Obviously, we need

to do a much better job of discouraging development in vulnerable areas. How do

your cost projections take into account the risks associated with abrupt climate

changes described in the Academy’s December 2001 report?

Response. The sensitivity analyses reported in my testimony (based on Pielke et

al. 2000) rely on the assumptions of the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for both changes in climate and
95

changes in society. Because the IPCC did not consider abrupt climate changes for

the particular impacts we evaluated, neither does our analysis.

I served as a member of the Academy committee that prepared the Abrupt Climate Change report. We discussed at great length the topic of economic and ecological impacts associated with abrupt climate change, and Chapter 5 of our report focused on that topic. The committee’s main recommendation that focused on reducing

risk associated with abrupt climate change is entirely consistent with the approach

recommended in my testimony. I reproduce that particular recommendation (number 5 in the report, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises, National Research

Council, 2002, pp. 164–165) in its entirety here:

Recommendation 5. Research should be undertaken to identify ‘‘no-regrets’’ meas- ures to reduce vulnerabilities and increase adaptive capacity at little or no cost. Noregrets measures may include low-cost steps to: slow climate change; improve climate forecasting; slow biodiversity loss; improve water, land, and air quality; and

develop institutions that are more robust to major disruptions. Technological

changes may increase the adaptability and resiliency of market and ecological systems faced by the prospect of damaging abrupt climate change. Research is particularly needed to assist poor countries, which lack both scientific resources and economic infrastructure to reduce the vulnerabilities to potential abrupt climate

changes.’’ Reference: Pielke, Jr., R. A., R. Klein, and D. Sarewitz, 2000: Turning the Big

Knob: An Evaluation of the Use of Energy Policy to Modulate Future Climate Impacts. Energy and Environment, 11, 255–276.

Question 2. How do those cost projections consider the impacts on intangible assets, such as cultural heritage, scenery, and other quality of life-related matters?

Response. The sensitivity analysis presented in my testimony was based on three

different analyses used by the IPCC for projecting tropical cyclone damage in 2050.

Pielke et al. 2000 summarizes these projections as follows: • Cline (1992) relied on Emanuel’s (1987) estimate that the destructive potential

of tropical cyclones could rise by 40–50 percent under a doubling of greenhouse gases. The study assumed U.S. annual average hurricane losses of $1.5 billion and

that damage would rise linearly with increased intensity. Cline thus multiplied $1.5

billion by 50 percent to project an increase in annual U.S. hurricane-caused damages of $750 million. Cline assumed that increased damage from global warming

would be more than linear in relation to rising temperatures and estimated that annual hurricane-related damages from a 10 °C warming could be as high as $6.4 billion (Cline 1992). • Fankhauser (1995) assumed worldwide annual average tropical cyclone dam- ages of $1.5 billion and loss of 15,000–23,000 lives. This study also relied on

Emanuel’s estimate of a 40–50 percent increase in tropical cyclone intensity resulting from a 4.2 °C warming. It adjusted this to 28 percent for a 2.5 °C warming and

assumed storm damages increase exponentially with intensity. Thus, the study multiplied 28 percent by 1.5 by $1.5 billion to arrive at an estimate of $630 million in

additional worldwide annual average hurricane-related damages due to a 2.5 °C

warming. It also estimated that an additional 8,000 deaths would occur, which were

valued at $2.1 billion, bringing total additional tropical cyclone-related worldwide

losses to $2.7 billion. Fankhauser estimated that the U.S. share of these damages

would be $223 million ($115 million from destruction, $108 million from lost lives).

• Tol (1995) assumed that tropical cyclone intensity will increase 50 percent due

to a 2.5 °C warming, and that a fraction of the damages are related quadratically

to an increase in intensity. This study estimated that additional tropical cyclone-related damages from a doubling of greenhouse gases in 1988 dollars will be $.3 billion in the United States and Canada and $1.4 billion worldwide, but did not describe the baseline damage estimates.

Reference and source for references cited above: Pielke, Jr., R. A., R. Klein, and

D. Sarewitz, 2000: Turning the Big Knob: An Evaluation of the Use of Energy Policy

to Modulate Future Climate Impacts. Energy and Environment, 11:255–276.

Question 3. As you know, this committee is very interested in the effects of disasters on public infrastructure. We have jurisdiction over FEMA, water supplies, highways, etc. What work is being done to quantify the costs of investments that could

be made now to reduce the impacts of disasters and climate change on human-made

and natural systems?

Response. I suggested in my testimony ‘‘the possibility that the U.N. Framework

Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) has a critical, but largely unrecognized flaw

with profound implications for policy. Under the FCCC the term ‘‘climate change’’

is defined as ‘‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human

activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addi-
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tion to natural climate variability over comparable time periods.’’ This definition

stands in stark contrast to the broader definition used by the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which states that climate change is ‘‘any change

in climate over time whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.’’ As a consequence of the FCCC definition, ‘‘adaptation’’ refers to actions in

response to climate changes attributable solely to greenhouse gas emissions. It does

not refer to efforts to improve societal responses to ‘‘natural’’ climate variability.

Consequently, adaptation has only ‘‘costs’’ because adaptive responses would by definition be unnecessary if climate change could be prevented. Hence, it is logical for

many to conclude that preventative action is a better policy alternative and recommend adaptive responses only to the extent that proposed mitigation strategies

will be unable prevent changes in climate in the near future. But this overlooks the

fact that even if energy policy could be used intentionally to modulate future climate, other factors will play a much larger role in creating future impacts and are

arguably more amenable to policy change.’’

As a consequence, very little work (both in an absolute and relative sense) has

been done to evaluate adaptation alternatives. In 1996 the IPCC wrote that adaptation offers a ‘‘very powerful option’’ for responding to climate change and ought to

be viewed as a ‘‘complement’’ to mitigation efforts (IPCC 1996, 187–188). Yet, the

IPCC also wrote ‘‘little attention has been paid to any possible tradeoff between both

types of options.’’ (IPCC 1996, 250). These conclusions, in my view, remain current

today.

Reference: Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1996. Climate

Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change, J. P. Bruce et

al. (eds.), Cambridge University Press.

Question 4. You mention in your testimony that ‘‘decisionmaking at local levels

. . . can have a profound effect on the magnitude and significance of future damage.’’ Are local governments beginning to make the connection between urban and

land use planning and vulnerabilities to climate change? Do you know of any efforts

to disseminate academic research findings and recommendations regarding climate

change adaptation techniques to local governments and communities?

Response. If local governments are beginning to make the connection between

urban and land use planning and vulnerabilities to climate change, they are doing

so on an ad hoc and unsystematic basis. A considerable effort in government, academia and the private sector exists in the United States (and globally) to improve

decisionmaking with respect to ‘‘hazards.’’ However, this effort is largely separate

in both research and action from the climate change community. In 1997 I wrote

of this in an editorial (http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/zine/archives/1–29/

5.html):

‘‘The concept of ‘‘mitigation’’ is central to the natural disaster policy in the United

States. At the same time, the concept of ‘‘mitigation’’ is also central to ongoing debate about global climate change. But as used by the natural disaster community

and the climate change community, the term ‘‘mitigation’’ takes on almost exactly

opposite meanings. Natural hazard mitigation is defined by the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) as ‘‘a sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate

the long-term risk to people and property from natural hazards and their effects.’’

A recent FEMA report on Costs and Benefits of Natural Hazard Mitigation provides

examples of mitigation, which include business interruption insurance, wind shutters, building codes, and community relocation. Climate change mitigation is defined

by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as ‘‘actions that prevent

or retard the increase of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations by limiting current and future emissions from sources of greenhouses gases and enhancing potential sinks.’’ What the natural hazards community calls mitigation, the climate

change community calls ‘‘adaptation’’ which the IPCC defines as ‘‘any adjustment—

whether passive, reactive, or anticipatory—that can respond to anticipated or actual

consequences associated with climate change.’’ The different use of terminology creates a situation that is potentially confusing for policymakers and other practitioners. While academics often work in communities that are relatively isolated from

one another, policymakers typically do not. And since natural hazards are one of the

threats being associated with climate change, it is probably worth paying attention

to the words used in this regard. At a minimum, the conflicting terminology is

symptomatic of the general lack of interaction between the hazards and climate

change communities. In the climate change world, there is a tension between those

who seek to prevent climate change through energy policies (i.e., climate change

mitigation) and those who emphasize adaptation (i.e., natural hazards mitigation).

To date, the advocates of prevention have dominated the debate. This creates a disincentive for the natural hazards community to play a significant role in the devel-
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opment of climate policy, which is unfortunate, as without a doubt the knowledge

gained by the hazards community has an important role to play in the climate policies of the future.’’

Question 5. You also state, ‘‘Many . . . human losses are preventable and economic losses are manageable with today’s knowledge and techniques . . . . [C]osts

of adaptation could easily be exceeded by the benefits of better dealing with the impacts of climate, irrespective of future changes in climate and their causes.’’ What

are some specific examples of adaptation strategies or investments that you recommend vulnerable coastal communities implement today that could prove to be

cost-effective in the long-term?

Response. There is a considerable list of activities that might be considered under

the label ‘‘adaptation’’ for reducing vulnerability to climate impacts along the coasts,

including improving land use, insurance, evacuation, ecosystem management, and

other policies. A starting point for understanding the breadth of such activities is

the NOAA Coastal Services Center, http://www.csc.noaa.gov/. In collaboration with

the H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment, the

NOAA CSC contributed to the publication of a book that discusses a wide range of

efforts that would address coastal vulnerability:

The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards: Implications for Risk Assessment and Mitigation. Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000. 220 pp. ISBN 1–55963–756–0 (paper).

Question 6. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not safe to continue

increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit. What needs to be done to assure

that we can avert the point of no return or ‘‘dangerous levels’’ of greenhouse gas

concentrations?

Response. I reject the premise underlying this question. As I stated in my testimony, any policy designed to reduce risks and vulnerabilities to climate impacts on

environment and society is necessarily incomplete if focused exclusively on energy

policies. Consequently, any energy policy including instantaneous, magical abatement of emissions would be insufficient to address growing risks and vulnerability

to future climate impacts. As I concluded in my testimony:

‘‘It would be a misinterpretation of this work to imply that it supports either business-as-usual energy policies, or is contrary to climate mitigation. It does suggest

that if a policy goal is to reduce the future impacts of climate on society, then energy policies are insufficient, and perhaps largely irrelevant, to achieving that goal.

Of course, this does not preclude other sensible reasons for energy policy action related to climate (such as ecological impacts) and energy policy action independent

of climate change (such as national security, air pollution reduction and energy efficiency). It does suggest that reduction of human impacts related to weather and climate are not among those reasons, and arguments and advocacy to the contrary are

not in concert with research in this area.’’

Question 7. In an answer to a question from Senator Chafee regarding your opinion on achieving the 1990 level of emissions, our UNFCC target, by the date (2007)

set in the Clean Power Act, you said that ‘‘. . . full and comprehensive implementation of the Kyoto Protocol around the world . . . is not going to do much at all to

address the environment and economic risks associated with climate change.’’ Does

that mean you believe that the potential social, economic, and environmental costs

associated with long-term global warming cannot or will not be reduced by reducing

anthropogenic emissions? If so, how does that comport with the statement in question 5?

Response. This question focuses on the issue raised in the sensitivity analysis presented in my testimony. Climate impacts are a joint result of climate events and

the vulnerability to such impacts of human or natural systems. Both climate and

human and natural systems are subject to change. The assertion presented in my

testimony was, ‘‘The primary cause for the growth in impacts is the increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability and change,

not changes in climate per se.’’ This is borne out by a growing body of research. If

impacts are indeed the result of changes in climate and vulnerability, it would only

make sense that policies designed to address climate-related risks would focus on

both changes in climate and vulnerability. This is the essence of my proposal to recognize that climate policy has important and under-appreciated dimensions that are

independent of energy policy. Such dimensions would include the sorts of adaptation

strategies referred to in Question 5 above. Further, because there are important reasons to improve the nation’s energy policies other than climate change (e.g., for reasons of national security, human health, and economic efficiency), it may make pragmatic sense to expand national discussion of energy policy beyond a narrow focus

on global warming to the exclusion of other, perhaps more compelling, reasons for
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improving national energy policies. The bottom line is that even if the Kyoto Protocol were fully and successfully implemented, it would do little to address ‘‘social,

economic, and environmental costs associated with long-term global warming’’ and

additional steps would be needed. Thus, whatever one’s perspective on the Kyoto

Protocol, whether viewing it as a ‘‘first step’’ or a ‘‘dead end,’’ there is no controversy

that additional efforts are needed.

Question 8. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30–50 years, of

continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas emissions? And, what is the

most feasible way to reduce or eliminate that risk?

Response. I see two risks. First, when humans alter the Earth system, there are

risks of unforeseen, unintended effects on that system. A second risk, which has

largely gone unnoticed, is that in focusing primarily on the potential risks to the

Earth system resulting in changes to that system, we neglect to observe that (a) environmental and societal impacts associated with human-climate interactions can in

many cases be addressed through a focus on reducing vulnerability to those impacts,

and (b) that there are many ‘‘no-regrets’’ energy policy actions that make immediate

sense irrespective of climate change. Both the science and policy communities appear to be neglecting the second type of risk and as a consequence there is a large

opportunity cost in actions not taken to improve climate policies and energy policies.

The most feasible way to address both types of risk is to follow a ‘‘no-regrets’’ strategy of reducing vulnerability to climate variability and change (i.e., to improve adaptation) and as well to improve the nation’s energy policies with respect to national

security, human health, and economic efficiency.

On this, see:

Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-Warming Gridlock. The

Atlantic Monthly, 286(1), 55–64. http://www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/

2000/07/sarewitz.htm

RESPONSES OF DR. ROGER A. PIELKE, JR. TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR SMITH

Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ‘‘during the 20th Century, the atmospheric

concentrations of a number of greenhouse gasses have increased, mostly because of

the actions of mankind.’’ Do you agree with that statement? Why or why not?

Response. I agree with the IPCC conclusions.

Question 2. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto Protocol? Do you

agree with the assertion that full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would only

avert the expected temperature change by 6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why

not?

Response. See my answer to Question 7 from Senator Jeffords. There is no controversy that if the goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce the risks of future climate

impacts on the environment and society, even if fully implemented, it cannot meet

this goal, for reasons discussed at length in my testimony. Consequently, whether

or not Kyoto is fully implemented, considerable additional policy action will be needed to address climate impacts on society and the environment. However, as I noted

in the question and answer period of the hearing, there are other reasons to implement the Kyoto Protocol, such as considerations of international relations, national

security, environmental symbolism, etc. It may well be that such considerations lead

to support for full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, completely independent of

risk associated with climate impacts. My testimony and this answer focus on the

role of the Kyoto Protocol in reducing risk of climate impacts.

Question 3. Since the hearing there has been much press attention paid to the

breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion ton iceberg known as

‘‘Larsen B,’’ that has been attributed to climate change. What specific evidence is

there that climate change is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of

Larsen B?

Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this subject.

Question 4a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening statement was

a Swiss Re report titled ‘‘Climate research does not remove the uncertainty; Coping

with the risks of climate change’’ (copy attached). Please explain why you agree or

disagree with the following assertions or conclusions from that report: ‘‘There is not

one problem but two: natural climate variability and the influence of human activity

on the climate system.’’
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Response. I would frame the problem a bit differently. There are changes in climate, caused by many reasons, including human activity. There are also changes

in society and caused by society to the environment that result in increased vulnerability to climate impacts. This definition of the problem underlies the recommendations presented in my testimony.

See Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-Warming Gridlock.

The Atlantic Monthly, 286(1), 55–64. http://www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/

2000/07/sarewitz.htm

Question 4b. It is essential that new or at least wider-ranging concepts of protection are developed. These must take into account the fact that the maximum

strength and frequency of extreme weather conditions at a given location cannot be

predicted.

Response. Agreed. Along with colleagues we have examined the role of prediction

in decisionmaking and arrive at substantially similar conclusions.

See: Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., and R. Byerly, (eds.), 2000: Prediction: Science,

Decision-Making and the Future of Nature. Island Press: Washington, DC.

Question 4c. Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the case for a collapse

of the climate system, as this will stir up fears which—if they are not confirmed—

will in time turn to carefree relief; and (2) to play down the climate problem for

reasons of short-term expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires that today’s generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of this

kind.

Response. Agreed and I point you to my answer to Question 1 from Senator Jeffords for elaboration.

Question 5. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions

is increasing? Why or why not?

Response. Vulnerability to extreme weather has increased as populations and

wealth have grown and more people have located in exposed locations. This perspective is now well documented in the peer-reviewed literature. A 1999 review (Kunkel

et al. 1999) concluded, ‘‘. . . increasing losses are primarily due to increasing vulnerability arising from a variety of societal changes, including a growing population

in higher risk coastal areas and large cities, more property subject to damage, and

lifestyle and demographic changes subjecting lives and property to greater exposure.’’ Numerous other references supporting this conclusion are provided in my testimony.

Reference: Kunkel, K., R. A. Pielke Jr., S. A. Changnon, 1999: Temporal Fluctuations in Weather and Climate Extremes That Cause Economic and Human Health

Impacts: A Review. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 80:1077–1098.

RESPONSES OF DR. ROGER A. PIELKE, JR. TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global CO2 concentration target of 550 ppm

CO2 by 2100 which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed

countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of 550 ppm by 2100

is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on emissions for the United States

by 2050? By 2100?

Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this subject.

Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you provide this analysis.

Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this subject.

Question 2. Please provide an assessment of the approaches of various States to

address normal beach erosion?

Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this subject.

Question 3. How significant are the effects of land use changes versus other input

to climate models?

Response. I have no special expertise to contribute to this subject.

Question 4. If the estimates that Kyoto would cost the United States between

$100 and $400 billion per year to implement are true and the results would just

be a change of 0.06 degrees Celsius; would money be better spent on programs like

Project Impact (a program at FEMA which helps communities mitigate against future natural disasters by encouraging different building techniques in disaster-prone

areas)? Are Kyoto-like reductions cost effective? Please explain.
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Response. The answer to this question is predicated upon the answer to a prior

question, ‘‘Cost effective with respect to what criteria and outcomes?’’ If the goal of

the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce future climate impacts, then it is clearly insufficient,

and perhaps even irrelevant. However, there are other reasons why implementation

of the Protocol might make sense, which would lead to different conclusions as to

its cost effectiveness. See my answer to Question 2 from Senator Smith for discussion.

See Sarewitz, D., R. A. Pielke, Jr., 2000: Breaking the Global-Warming Gridlock.

The Atlantic Monthly, 286(1), 55–64. http://www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/o/issues/

2000/07/sarewitz.htm

RESPONSE OF DR. ROGER A. PIELKE, JR. TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM

SENATOR CAMPBELL

Question. You mentioned in your testimony that, ‘‘The present research agenda

is improperly focused on prediction of the distant climate future.’’ I am inclined to

agree. What sorts of research, in your expert opinion, would be of immediate benefit

in relation to adaptation to climate change?

Response. To answer this question I point you to the testimony at an April 17,

2002, House Science Committee hearing of my colleague Radford Byerly, who was

asked by the committee:

‘‘How could a climate initiative yield information of greater relevance to endusers, people who make decisions related to climate?’’

Dr. Byerly’s response is worth quoting at length.

‘‘To assure that a research program generates information of great relevance to

end-uses, the users must be involved in planning and evaluating the research. That

is, they must have a say in what research is done and in what counts as a success.

Users must be able to ensure that research addresses their problems, and delivers

usable results.

In the present program climate scientists typically develop information they want

to develop, i.e., answers to scientific questions, and then try to get bewildered users

to use it (the users may never have heard of the scientific question). Research results become a solution looking for a problem.

Sound research programs dedicated to problem solving typically have three

phases: A beginning—planning, a middle—the research, and an end—application

and evaluation. The present program is almost all in the middle phase, that is, it

is scientific research on scientific questions.

A better program, i.e., a program that would do more toward solving identified

problems, would be conducted as follows: Research would be preceded by a planning

phase in which users and scientists would identify and define specific problems to

be attacked, as well as specific questions and information needs, and would look

ahead to the application of the results. At this planning stage the primary sources

of information about the problems are future users, the owners of the problems, not

climate scientists. This planning process can be thought of as the researchers taking

joint ownership of the problem with the users. The researchers do not relieve the

users of responsibility, but together they take responsibility for solving the problem.

Then in the middle the research is done, and new information is obtained and published. This second phase is often erroneously considered the entire project. Finally,

in the third phase the results are applied in the field by the users on their problem

and the research is evaluated in terms of how it helps solve the problems.

We hope that users will eagerly, fruitfully use the information, since they participated in planning the research. But such planning is hard and unfamiliar. Users

may not express their needs clearly, or researchers may not hear them, and not

every project will succeed. This is why the projects must be evaluated based on success in the field. Research projects unsuccessful in addressing the problem are terminated and successful ones are continued or replicated in a new context, as appropriate. That is, you correct and iterate.

Of course provision is made for projects that are making good progress in a demonstrably practical direction. In this way a program of projects solving real problems is grown. Along the way good science of a different kind is done.’’

Dr. Byerly’s testimony can be view in its entirety at:

http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/homepages/rbverly/house testimony apr 2002/

index.html
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STATEMENT OF DAVID R. LEGATES, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CLIMATIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

I would like to thank the committee for inviting my commentary on the important

topic of the economic and environmental risks associated with increasing greenhouse gas emissions.

As a matter of introduction, my background in global change research has focused

primarily on precipitation measurement and an examination of precipitation variability. My Ph.D. dissertation resulted in the compilation of the most reliable, highest

resolution, digital air temperature and precipitation climatology available to date.

Today, these fields still are being used to evaluate general circulation model (GCM)

simulations of present-day climate and to serve as input fields for hydrological and

climatological analyses. In particular, my research has focused on the accuracy of

and biases associated with precipitation measurement and on the attempt to use existing climatological time-series to determine long-term fluctuations in climate. I

also was a member of the United States delegation at the joint USA/USSR Working

Meeting on Development of Data Sets for Detecting Climate Change held in

Obninsk, Russia on September 11–14, 1989 where a joint protocol for data exchange

was signed.

Indeed, an answer to the question, ‘‘Do we have the capability to determine

whether we are changing our climate’’ is of obvious concern to both scientists and

policymakers. I agree strongly that we need to enact sensible environmental policy—one that is based on scientific fact with foreseeable outcomes that can reasonably be expected to have beneficial results. As a scientist, I choose here to focus my

comments on the scientific basis of climate change and the capabilities of the climate models, as that is my area of expertise. In the past, we have recognized a need

for cleaner air and cleaner water, demonstrated the problems associated with detrimental human influences, and developed policy that has resulted in our air and

water becoming markedly cleaner than they were just 30 years ago. I urge that this

issue be treated with the same common-sense approach.

PROBLEMS WITH THE OBSERVATIONAL RECORD LEAVES QUESTIONS UNANSWERED

In light of my research on climatological observations, particularly precipitation,

I have come to realize that looking for long-term trends in climate data is a very

difficult undertaking. Precipitation data, for example, exhibit many spurious trends

resulting from, in part, biases associated with the process of measuring precipitation. Indeed, attempts to measure snowfall using automatic methods have proven

to be largely useless and, given the biases associated with measuring snowfall by

traditional human-observed rain gages, our estimates of snowfall can be underestimates by almost a factor of two. Urban development of the environment surrounding the rain gage and, in particular, changes in rain gage design and the location of rain gages over time has adversely affected our ability to ascertain climatic

trends in precipitation. Even a cursory examination of our most reliable records of

precipitation shows that we frequently move meteorological stations, change instrumentation, and even the environment surrounding the site changes over time, which

undermines attempts to answer the question ‘‘Is the climate changing?’’ Furthermore, precipitation is a highly variable field so, from a purely statistical standpoint,

it is difficult to ascertain a small climate change signal from this high year-to-year

variability. Air temperature measurements also are subject to these same measurement difficulties; in fact, the IPCC agrees that—as much as one-fifth of the observed

rise in air temperature may be attributable to urbanization effects. As some of this

change may be a direct result of natural climatic fluctuations, attributing a cause

to any detected changes also is an extremely difficult undertaking. Indeed, as has

been argued, ‘‘the data are dirty’’!

Moreover, nearly all of our surface-based observations are taken from land-based

meteorological stations, leaving the nearly 70 percent of the Earth’s surface covered

by oceans largely unobserved. In particular, location of these land-based stations is

biased toward midlatitudes, low elevations, wetter climates, and technologically developed nations. Efforts to use sea surface temperatures over the oceans as a surrogate for air temperature measurements are largely invalid as the two temperatures

are not often commensurate. This ‘‘land’’ bias, in my view, is one of the main limiting factors in using the observational record to infer global trends.

Satellite observations of air temperature and precipitation have proven very useful in addressing the climate change question in that they provide a complete coverage of the Earth’s surface and are not subject to the biases associated with meteorological observing sites on the ground. Spencer and Christy’s analysis of air temperature changes over the lower portion of the troposphere for the last 20 years exhibits no significant climate change signal as does an analysis using regularly
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launched weather balloorigi,—This is in stark contrast to the observed surface air

temperature rise of 0.6 ° ± 0.2 °C that has occurred over the entire twentieth century. A blue-ribbon panel convened to address this apparent discrepancy concluded

that the temperature of the lower atmosphere might have remained relatively constant while an increase in near surface air temperature was observed. Some have

argued that the surface warming is a delayed response to warming that had earlier

occurred in the troposphere, although the abrupt warming of the troposphere is not

consistent with expected scenarios of anthropogenic warming. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded that the difference between surface air temperatures and those of the troposphere was real but inconsistent with anthropogenic

warming scenarios. In particular, the NAS only considered whether the satellite and

surface records could both be correct and yet contradictory; they never addressed

the issue of whether the surface records could, in fact, be biased.

Another problem in tying the observed increases in air temperature to an anthropogenic cause is timing. Most of the warming in the observed record occurred during

two periods: 1910 to 1945 and 1970 to present. Much of the warming actually predates the rise in anthropogenic trace gas emissions, which makes it difficult to ascribe anthropogenic causes to the entire record. Indeed, we know that our observed

record began in the late 1800’s when air temperature measurements were sparse

and more prone to bias. This timing also coincides with the demise of the Little Ice

Age—a period of cooler-than-normal conditions that lasted from the middle portion

of the last millennium to about the mid-1800’s. Thus, it is unclear how much of the

observed warming should be attributed to anthropogenic increases in atmospheric

trace gases and how much of it is simply natural variability or measurement bias.

MODELING THE COMPLEX CLIMATIC SYSTEM IS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TASK

In theory, therefore, climate models should be our best ability to study climate

change. With models, we are not constrained by biased and limited observing systems or by contamination by other signals; but rather, we can alter the simulated

climate and see ‘‘what if’ while holding everything else constant. Such models, however, are predicated on their ability to replicate the real climate—after all, if climate

models cannot replicate what we observe today, how can their prognostications of

climate change possibly be expected to be transferable to the real world? Although

I am not a climate modeler, much of my research has focused on comparing observations with climate model simulations of present-day conditions. Thus, I am very familiar with what climate models can and cannot do.

I am dismayed by the fact that much of the rather limited success in simulating

average conditions by most climate models is achieved at the expense of changing

some parameters to highly unrealistic values. For example, some models drastically

change the energy coming from the sun to levels that are well beyond those that

solar physicists have observed. Many models employ what are called ‘‘flux adjustments’’, which can only be described as finagling factors to make the average,

present-day surface air temperatures look reasonable. One has to question why such

overt deviations from reality are necessary if, in fact, the models are able to realistically represent our climate system.

In defense of climate modelers, I will say that they have a very difficult and

daunting task. The climate system is extremely complex. Clouds, land surface processes, the cryosphere (ice and snow), precipitation forming mechanisms, the biosphere, and atmospheric circulation, just to name a few, are complex components

of the global climate system that are not well understood or modeled appropriately

at the scale employed by general circulation models. In essence, the climate change

response can be directly affected by our parameterizations of many of these components. For example, an important question that now is being asked is ‘‘Why is the

warming exhibited by transient climate models not being seen in the observed

record?’’ There has been much discussion on the impacts of aerosols, black soot, high

altitude clouds, and other so-called ‘‘wild cards’’ in the climate system—are they

masking the climate change signal or should they be adding to it? How climate modelers treat these unknown processes in their models can affect dramatically the

model simulations. Indeed, there are likely additional issues that we have not yet

encountered.

CLIMATE MODELS CANNOT REPRODUCE A KEY CLIMATIC VARIABLE: PRECIPITATION

Despite these issues, do climate models well represent the Earth’s climate? On

three separate occasions—in 1990, 1996, and again in 2000—I have reviewed the

ability of state-of-the-art climate models to simulate regional-scale precipitation. In

general, the models poorly reproduce the observed precipitation and that characteristic of the models has not substantially changed over time. One area where
103

the models have been in continued agreement has been in the Southern Great

Plains of the United States. In all three studies, the varied models I have examined

agree that northeastern Colorado receives substantially more precipitation than

northwestern Louisiana! That is in marked contrast with reality where Louisiana

is obviously wetter than Colorado. But the important ramification of this is that if

precipitation is badly simulated in a climate model, then that will adversely affect

virtually every other aspect of the model simulation. Precipitation affects the energy, moisture, and momentum balances of the atmosphere and directly affects the

modeling of the, atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the biosphere, and the cryosphere.

In turn, a bad representation of these components will again adversely impact the

precipitation simulation. In short, anything done wrong in a climate model is likely

to be exhibited in the model simulation of precipitation and, in turn, errors in simulating precipitation are likely to adversely affect the simulation of other components

of the climate system. Given its integrative characteristic, therefore, precipitation is

a good diagnostic for determining how well the model actually simulates reality, especially since simple ‘‘tuning’’ adjustments cannot mask limitations in the simulation, as is the case with air temperature.

If we examine climate model output a bit further, we uncover another disturbing

fact—climate models simply do not exhibit the same year-to-year or even within-season variability that we observe. Precipitation in a climate model does not arise from

organized systems that develop, move across the Earth’s surface, and dissipate. Instead, modeled precipitation can best be described as ‘‘popcorn-like’’, with little if

any spatial coherency. On a year-to-year basis, both air temperatures and precipitation exhibit little fluctuation, quite unlike what we experience. This is particularly

important because it is the climatic extremes and not their means that have the

biggest adverse impacts. Simply put, climate models cannot begin to address issues

associated with changes in the frequency of extreme events because they fail to exhibit the observed variability in the climate system.

I attach a piece I wrote regarding the climate models used in the National Assessment and their evaluation with my climatology, which further highlights our uncertainties in climate models. In fact, the National Assessment itself recognized that

both the Canadian Global Coupled Model and the Hadley Climate Model from Great

Britain used by the, Assessment provide more extreme climate change scenarios

than other models that were available and that had been developed in the United

States. Neither model is reasonably able to simulate the presentday climate conditions.

OUR OBSERVATIONAL CAPABILITIES ARE IN JEOPARDY

Given that our observational record is inconclusive and that model simulations

are fraught with problems, on what can we agree? In my view, there are two main

courses of action that we should undertake. First, we need to continue to develop

and preserve efforts at climate monitoring and climate change detection. Efforts to

establish new global climate observing systems are useful, but we need to preserve

the stations that we presently have. There is no surrogate for a long-term climate

record taken with the same instrumentation and located in essentially the same environmental conditions. Modernization efforts of the National Weather Service to

some extent are undermining our monitoring of climatic conditions by moving and

replacing observing sites, thereby further introducing inhomogeneities into these climate records. Some nations of the world have resorted to selling their data, which

has adversely impacted our assessments of climate change. However, given that

oceans cover nearly three-quarters of the Earth’s surface, we need to exploit and

further develop satellite-derived methods for monitoring the Earth’s climate. We

also need to better utilize the national network of WSR88D weather radars to monitor precipitation.

But foremost, we need to focus on developing methods and policy that can directly

save lives and mitigates the economic devastation that often is associated with specific weather-related events. Climate change discussions tend to focus on increases

in mean air temperatures or percentage changes in mean precipitation. But it is not

changes in the mean fields on which we need to place our efforts. It would be rather

easy to accommodate even moderately large changes in mean air temperature, for

example, if there were no year-to-year variability. Loss of life and adverse economic

impact resulting from the weather occurs not when conditions are ‘‘normal’’; but

rather, as a result of extreme climatic events: heat waves, cold outbreaks, floods,

droughts, and storms both at small (tornado, thunderstorm, high winds, hail, lightning) and large scales (hurricanes, tropical storms, nor’easters). The one thing that

I can guarantee is that regardless of what impact anthropogenic increases in atmospheric trace gases will have, extreme weather events will continue to be a part of
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our life and they will continue to be associated with the most weather-related

deaths and the largest economic impact resulting from the weather.

Ascertaining anthropogenic changes to these extreme weather events is nearly impossible. Climate models cannot even begin to simulate storm-scale systems, let

alone model the full range of year-to-year variability. Many of these events are extremely uncommon so that we cannot determine their statistical frequency of occurrence from the observed record, let alone determine how that frequency may have

been changing over time. While we need to continue to examine existing climate

records for insights and to develop reliable theory to explain plausible scenarios of

change, the concern is whether we can enact policy now that will make a difference

in the future.

However, is there cause for concern that anthropogenic warming will lead to an

enhanced hydrologic cycle; that is, will there be more variability in precipitation resulting in more occurrences of floods and droughts? The IPCC Summary for Policy

Makers states:

Global warming is likely to lead to greater extremes of drying and heavy rainfall and increase the risk of droughts and floods that occur with El Nin ̃ o events

in many different regions.

However, if one reads the technical summary of Working Group I, we find that:

There is no compelling evidence to indicate that the characteristics of tropical

and extratropical storms have changed. Owing to incomplete data and limited

and conflicting analyses, it is uncertain as to whether there have been any longterm and large-scale increases in the intensity and frequency of extra-tropical cyclones in the Northern Hemisphere. Recent analyses of changes in severe local

weather (e.g., tornadoes, thunderstorm days, and hail) in a few selected regions

do not provide compelling evidence to suggest long-term changes. In general,

trends in severe weather events are notoriously difficult to detect because of their

relatively rare occurrence and large spatial variability.

The IPCC goes on to further state ‘‘there were relatively small increases in global

land areas experiencing severe droughts or severe wetness over the 20th century’’. Karl and Knight, who conducted a detailed study on precipitation variability across

the United States, concluded that as the climate has warmed, variability actually

has decreased across much of the Northern Hemisphere’s midlatitudes, a finding

they agree is corroborated by some computer models. Hayden, writing for the Water

Sector of the U.S. National Assessment, agrees that no trend in storminess or storm

frequency variability has been observed over the last century and that ‘‘little can

or should be said about change in variability of storminess in future, carbon dioxide

enriched years.’’ Soden concluded, ‘‘even the extreme models exhibit markedly less

precipitation variability than observed.’’ In addition, Sinclair and Watterson have

noted that, in fact, climate models tend to indicate that increased levels of atmospheric trace gases leads to a ‘‘marked decrease in the occurrence of intense storms’’

outside the tropics and they argue that claims of enhanced storminess from model

simulations are more the result of models that fail to conserve mass. Clearly, claims

that anthropogenic global warming will lead to more occurrences of droughts, floods,

and storms are wildly exaggerated.

Thus, I believe it stands to reason that we need to focus on providing real-time

monitoring of environmental conditions. This will have two benefits: it will provide

immediate data to allow decisionmakers to make informed choices to protect citizens

faced with these extreme weather events and, if installed and maintained properly,

it will assist with our long-term climate monitoring goals. Such efforts are presently

being developed by forward-looking states. For example, I am involved with a

project, initiated by the State of Delaware in cooperation with FEMA, the National

Weather Service, and Computational Geosciences Inc. of Norman, Oklahoma, to develop the most comprehensive, highest resolution, statewide weather monitoring

system available anywhere. Louisiana and Texas also have expressed interests in

using our High-Resolution Weather Data System technology for real-time statewide

weather monitoring. Regardless then of what the future holds, employing real-time

monitoring systems, with a firm commitment to supporting and maintaining longterm climate monitoring goals, proves to be our best opportunity to minimize the

impact of weather on human activities.

FINAL THOUGHTS: THE SCIENCE IS NOT YET IN

In 1997, I had the pleasure to chair a panel session at the Houston Forum that

included seven of the most prominent climate change scientists in the country. At

the close of that session, I asked each panelist the question, ‘‘In 2002, given 5 more

years of observations, 5 more years of model development, and 5 more years of tech-
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nological advances and knowledge about the climate system, will we have an answer

to the question of whether our climate is changing as a result of anthropogenic increases in trace gas emissions?’’ The panel, which consisted of both advocates and

skeptics, agreed that we would have a definitive answer probably not by 2002, but

certainly by 2007. I disagreed then and I continue to disagree today. I fear that the

issue has become so politically charged that the political process will always cloud

the true search for scientific truth. But more than that, I feel the climate system

is far more complex than we ever imagined—so much so that we still will not have

a definitive answer by 2007.

I again thank the committee for inviting my commentary on this important topic.
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RESPONSES OF DR. DAVID R. LEGATES, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not safe to continue

increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit. What needs to be done to assure

that we can avert the point of no return or ‘‘dangerous levels’’ of green house gas

concentrations?

Response. In response to your question, I would ask, ‘‘What are ‘dangerous levels’

or the ‘point of no return’?’’ I do not think there is a definition of dangerous levels

of carbon dioxide in this context—we are not anywhere near levels of carbon dioxide

that would inhibit our ability to extract sufficient oxygen from the atmosphere.

Given too that many actions to reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas production are

concomitant with additional problems, I do not see that I can define a level beyond

which we cannot pass.

My suggestion would be that we should seek to reduce the production of greenhouse gases where there clearly is another benefit to the reduction. For example,

less reliance on foreign sources of fossil fuels would be beneficial to our national security and if they could be replaced by conservation, enhanced efficiency, and/or

‘cleaner’ sources, then less greenhouse gases would be produced. Thus, I am in favor

of technology that reduces emissions of greenhouse gases as a by-product; but I

strongly argue that reduction of greenhouse gases for reduction sake is not cost effective or, in many cases, even potentially beneficial.

Question 2. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30–50 years, of

continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas emissions? And, what is the

most feasible way to reduce or eliminate that risk?

Response. To be able to define risk, one must be able to ascertain solid evidence

of the effect of our actions. At present, we can neither determine the effects of anthropogenic increases in greenhouse gases nor guarantee that all effects will be detrimental. Most arguments in favor of reducing emissions are that if there is an impact, it must be detrimental because change is always bad. Over the last 1,000

years, we have seen climate change dramatically—from the Medieval Warm Period

to the Little Ice Age to the warmer period we now enjoy. During those periods, civilization has adapted to that change and I do not see why adaptation to a globally

warmed world cannot be considered. Moreover, I remain unconvinced that (1) global

climate change will be detrimental to either humans or ecosystems as a whole or

(2) that it will be as significant as climate models purport that change will be.

Personally, I feel that the greatest risk we face in the next 30–50 years as a result

of the atmosphere will come from extreme weather events. Floods, droughts, heat

waves, cold spells, and storms from hurricanes to nor’easters to flash flooding to

lightning and high winds to tornados will take the most lives and cause the most

economic damage. We will still be forced to face these extreme weather events regardless of what climate change scenario plays out. Thus, in keeping with my earlier Senate testimony, the most feasible way to reduce our risk from climate change

is to develop strategies to mitigate the effects of extreme weather events. Forwardlooking efforts such as the Delaware Environmental Observing System (DEOS) that

is supported by the State of Delaware will yield benefits now and in the future—

especially if global warming results in an increase in the frequency and intensity

of these extreme weather events (a scenario that is not supported by current research, however). I would argue that money spent toward disaster mitigation (education, evacuation, and minimization of the impact) would be much better utilized

than money spent toward the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

RESPONSES OF DR. DAVID R. LEGATES, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR SMITH

Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ‘‘during the 20th Century, the atmospheric

concentrations of a number of greenhouse gasses have increased, mostly because of

the actions of mankind.’’ Do you agree with that statement? Why or why not?

I do not think this statement is debatable. We know that many industrialized activities emit carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases either as a direct

result (e.g., burning fossil fuels) or an indirect result (e.g., cattle feedlots which increase methane production) of human activities. Virtually all long-term measurements of greenhouse gases (most notably in Hawaii and Antarctica) have exhibited

an increase in these gases as industrialization has occurred. Thus, the rise in concentrations of these gases is well documented and we have explicit anthropogenic

sources for the rise in their concentrations.
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Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ‘‘the primary cause for . . . growth in impact

is the increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in climate, per se. ‘‘ Do you agree with this claim?

Why or why not?

Response. Whether climate change occurs or not is largely irrelevant, what is relevant is the impact climate change is likely to have on ecosystems and human activities. In some sense, to state that we are increasingly vulnerable to climate variability and change is to recognize that an increasing population base is more likely

to be vulnerable to a change of any kind. Thus my answer is a qualified ‘‘I agree’’,

with a caveat that a definition of ‘‘increasing vulnerability’’ must be provided. I do

not agree that all climate change must necessarily be bad, nor do I agree that

human and environmental systems cannot adjust to climate change.

Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ‘‘the present research agenda is focused

. . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate future’’ and that ‘‘instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no . . . we might be better served by addressing

things like the present drought . . . ‘‘ Do you agree with that proposition? Why or

why not?

Response. In my testimony, I argued that both human and environmental systems

are most vulnerable to climate extremes—floods, droughts, heat waves, cold outbreaks, and severe weather. Debating whether the temperature will rise 1.5°C or

4 °C is academic; what will claim the most lives and provide the greatest economical

damage are the extreme events. That is why in my testimony I focused on whether

research indicates climate extremes are likely to change. Since we cannot state with

any certainty that a future, warmed world is likely to exhibit any higher frequencies

of extreme weather events, our focus therefore is better placed on efforts to prepare

and warn our citizens for these extreme events. That was essentially a conclusion

of my testimony.

As for a discussion of the present drought, a quest for the cause for the drought

is an academic exercise. Regardless of the cause, I can guarantee that we will have

droughts again in the future. Thus, we would be better served by addressing how

we can better manage our existing water resources in the future, than in focusing

on whether drought frequency is likely to change in the future.

Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto Protocol? Do you

agree with the assertion that full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would only

avert the expected temperature change by 6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why

not?

Response. As it exists, I would agree that the Kyoto Protocol should not be ratified

by the United States. In ignoring obvious sources of greenhouse gas emissions from

developing countries and in focusing on a system of ‘‘credits’’, it appears to be more

of a political ‘‘we’re doing something’’ statement rather than an attempt to address

the true issue. In my testimony, I cited an American Viewpoint survey of State and

regional climatologists who agreed by nearly a 2-to-1 margin that going back to

1990 emission levels (a more stringent approach than Kyoto) would have little or

no impact on global warming. I agree with the majority of these climatologists and

note that such measures are likely to have dire economic consequences for virtually

no return on the climate change issue. Thus, I would argue that a better approach

would be one that reduces emissions where other benefits outweigh the climate

change concern and one that allows us to cope with extreme weather events.

I also do not agree with a modified Kyoto Protocol where restrictions in greenhouse gas emissions are relaxed in times of an economic downturn. All this would

do is ignore climate change when the economy is bad and enact restrictions to

squelch a booming economy. The Kyoto Protocol, in my view, is bad for the United

States economy while doing virtually nothing to the climate. It is a system that

should be abandoned and not tweaked.

Question 5. Since the hearing there has been much press attention paid to the

breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion ton iceberg known as

‘‘Larsen B, ‘‘ that has been attributed to climate change. What scientific evidence

is there that climate change is the sole cause for the phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of

Larsen B?

Response. There is no scientific evidence that climate change is the sole cause for

the phenomenon. The hydrology of Antarctica is one of mass balance. In most of the

United States, it snows and the snow melts, eventually. But the temperature of Antarctica is so cold that it does not melt, and subsequent yearly snowfall is added to

the snow that already exists. This snowpack becomes compressed and forms ice,

which slowly migrates out to the ice shelves over the oceans. Due to the topography,
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ice breaks off rather frequently forming the traditional icebergs that we find in the

North Atlantic, for example. But in Antarctica, the ice extends over water until it

becomes fragile and breaks off. Thus, calving (breaking off) of icebergs is a relatively

common event.

Before satellites, we did not have frequent observations of Antarctica. Thus, we

do not know how frequent icebergs of this size form. With satellites, we are able

to see them when they occur but our limited observational period precludes an assessment of the frequency of occurrence. Given though that it is a natural process,

I cannot agree that climatic change is the sole cause. However, winds over the

Southern Ocean during El Nin ̃ o events are diverted southward over the Antarctic

Peninsula. Researchers have noted that sea ice decreases during this time, which

allows winds to pound surf against the ice sheet resulting in weakening of the structure. This may be a reason why large breakups of the Larsen Ice Sheet has occurred

during major El Nin ̃ o events.

Prescribing anthropogenic assistance to the breakup of Larsen B is extremely difficult. How is it possible to know whether anthropogenic influences provided any assistance in the breakup of Larsen B? Although I am not a supporter of them, we

could turn to climate models for assistance. Assuming that climate models provide

our best assessment of climate change effects, I note that in the latest analysis of

the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) model (Dai et al., Journal

of Climate, February 2001) that near the Antarctic Peninsula (where Larsen B is

located), a change of less than 1 °C is shown for the climate of 2100. This value is

the least amount of any change anywhere over the Southern Ocean. So, I think it

would be fair to say that climate models indicate little climate change for this region, which leads me to conclude that little scientific evidence exists that anthropogenic influences played a substantial role in the breakup of Larsen B.

Question 6a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening statement was

a Swiss Re report titled ‘‘Climate research does not remove the uncertainty; Coping

with the risks of climate change’’ (copy attached). Please explain why you agree or

disagree with the following assertions or conclusions from that report: There is not

one problem but two; natural climate variability and the influence of human activity

on the climate system.

I would agree that there are two issues that must be considered when trying to

assess causes for climate change—natural climate variability and anthropogenic effects. In that sense, I would agree. However, the article postulates that we need to

avert anthropogenic influences on the climate (problem #1), while simultaneously

preparing for unexpected extreme weather occurrences (problem #2). I agree wholeheartedly with arguments to offset the second proposed problem. However, science

has not determined the extent, either in magnitude or in effect, of the anthropogenic

influence. In that light, how can we determine risk if we do not have solid evidence

of the effect of our actions? Their argument seems to be that if there might be an

impact, it will be detrimental because change is always bad and therefore the

change must be averted. Environmental systems have adapted to change for eons

and the human journey has been to both cause change (usually for the better) and

adapt to changes. Their ‘‘global climate protection’’ is ‘‘to avoid anthropogenic intervention in the natural climate system when potential consequences cannot be foreseen.’’ Since science cannot ascertain the consequences, we must avert all possible

changes. But taken literally, it is impossible to remove all human influences on the

climate—cities must be eliminated, we must go back to a pre-industrial revolution

age, etc. Good risk strategy is not to avoid all change at all costs; but rather to assess the effects of such change and outweigh the bad with the good.

Question 6b. ‘‘. . . it is essential that new or at least wider-ranging concepts of

protection are developed. These must take into account the fact that the maximum

strength and frequency of extreme weather conditions at a given location cannot be

predicted.’’

This statement is the crux of my Senate testimony. We need to be more concerned

with protecting ourselves from extreme weather conditions and be less concerned by

the small changes that may occur to mean global air temperature. We can be sure

that this new century will contain floods, droughts, heat waves, and storms of all

kinds and sizes. And we have no evidence the frequency or magnitude of these

events will change in a globally warmed world. Moreover, we cannot guarantee that

we have seen the worst event that is possible under current natural conditions.

Therefore, I agree with this statement—natural disasters will not abate in the future, regardless of any effects of anthropogenic climate change, and we must be

poised to deal with them.

Question 6c. ‘‘Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the case for a collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears which—if they are not con-
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firmed—will in time turn to carefree relief, and (2) to play down the climate problem

for reasons of short-term expediency, since the demand for sustainable development

requires that today’s generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of

this kind.’’ In essence, this is simply common-sense practice—don’t cry wolf and don’t ignore

the problem. As for fear mongering, every extreme weather event is accompanied

by ‘‘This could be caused by global warming!’’ or ‘‘We can expect more of these with

global warming!’’ It helps drum up support for the cause and when the future is

2100, it becomes difficult to ever find unconfirmed claims. Moreover if mitigation is

undertaken, then unconfirmed claims are cause for celebration—‘‘See, we did something about it!’’—while the occurrence of extreme events are a rally for still more

action. In the case of climate change, it seems that fear mongering yields substantial benefits with little concern for the onset of carefree relief due to the fact that

effects are likely to occur only in the distant future.

As for ignoring the problem for short-term expediency, I would agree. Ignoring potential problems can have serious ramifications at a later date. However, with respect to anthropogenic climate change, we have not ascertained the degree to which

humans are changing the climate nor have we determined the extent to which anthropogenic climate change poses a hazard. To determine risk, you have to be able

to determine the probability of occurrence. In this debate, we have neither determined what will occur nor its probability. Thus, it is irresponsible to simply declare

that the change must be bad and it must be stopped at virtually all costs, particularly when the result of such actions can have dire consequences themselves.

As a climatologist, I find the phrase ‘‘a collapse of the climate system’’ unintelligible. Economic systems can collapse, infrastructures can collapse, and buildings can

collapse. But the climate system is a process that continues on. Too much carbon

dioxide in the atmosphere will NOT bring an end to climatic processes or the

Earth’s climate. As such, the physics of the climate system will not collapse; they

will continue on. In attempting to quantify the ‘‘system collapse’’, Swiss Re postulates that ‘‘small increases in average temperature . . . can cause low pressure systems to shift from their usual paths and the frequency of heavy rainfall in a particular region to suddenly increase significantly’’. What this tells me is that the authors of the Swiss Re piece do not have a good understanding of the climate system

or the issues that are involved. No research of which I am aware indicates that such

changes are likely. Little credible evidence exists to suggest that a small increase

in air temperature will result in a major shift to precipitation patterns. In fact, precipitation is so poorly simulated in climate models, that traditional low pressure systems are not even represented by them.

Question 7. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions

is increasing? Why or why not?

Response. As per my Senate testimony, I definitely do agree that our vulnerability

to extreme weather conditions is increasing. More people demanding more water

usage will exacerbate droughts when they occur. Channelization of rivers (e.g., the

Mississippi and the Missouri) will enhance flood peaks and confine river flow, resulting in flooding of downstream areas that are not protected by levees or flooding

large portions of inhabited areas if a levee break occurs. Continued building on and

urban development of coastal areas will put larger numbers of people at risk and

require more extensive evacuation procedures during nor’easters and tropical storm/

hurricane landfalls. With more people, the impact of thunderstorms, hailstorms,

lightning, high winds, and tornadoes are bound to increase.

Note that in my testimony, I indicated little evidence points to an enhancement

of extreme weather conditions under a globally warmed world. The above-mentioned

extreme weather conditions presently lead to the greatest loss of life and the greatest economic impact of weather—not the increase of mean global air temperature.

They will continue to do so in the future. Thus, I will continue to argue that better

warning systems and preparation for these extreme weather events should be our

primary meteorological concern, not global warming.

RESPONSES OF DR. DAVID R. LEGATES, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global CO2 concentration target of 550 ppm

CO2 by 2100 which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed

countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of 550 ppm by 2100

is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on emissions for the United States

by 2050? By 2100?
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Response. My question is ‘‘what is so magical about 550 ppm?’’ That number is

as contrived as any other number—there is no way to guarantee that effects resulting from 550 ppm will not be detrimental but that effects from, say 575 ppm, will

be. As I am not an advocate of the Kyoto Protocol, I cannot advocate specific CO2

concentration targets. Moreover, CO2 is not the only greenhouse gas. Note that levels of methane (CH4) have leveled off to rates far below those postulated by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Moreover, water is the most

important greenhouse gas; more important than carbon dioxide or methane. Thus,

defining CO2 levels is a nice way to perform bookkeeping but not a good way to conduct science.

Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you provide this analysis?

Response. Unfortunately, economics is not my area of expertise, as I am a climatologist. Thus, I am not aware of any economic analyses of the effect of such reductions.

Question 2. Please provide your assessment of the surface temperature measurements including documentation of the location of the measurement sites on land and

at sea.

Response. In my testimony, I indicated that I felt thermometer measurements

were generally good estimates of the temperature record at that location. Given that

the effect of urbanization (growth of cities around the stations) has been prevalent

during the twentieth century, we would expect that surface air temperature measurements would exhibit significant air temperature increases. Sites where urbanization has not been observed usually show little trend. Moreover, weather stations

tend to be moved over time. This is done for a variety of purposes (e.g., moving stations from downtown to the airports in the 1940’s) but it results in a discontinuity

in the station record—the new site is seldom identical to the old location. Thus, a

bias is introduced which is difficult to distinguish from a climate change signal.

My view is that surface air temperature measurements are too biased to provide

a complete picture of global patterns of air temperature. First, they tend to be biased toward lower elevations, middle-latitudes, denser populations, and industrialized countries (see Addendum #1). Moreover, they only provide coverage of about

two-thirds of the globe with oceanic areas remaining underrepresented. Ship reports, used by Legates and Willmott (Addendum #2) are useful for producing climatological averages but not for discerning temporal trends. Second, they represent

the temperature at a height of only about 5.5 feet. This is well within the atmospheric boundary layer where urbanization and other biases due to the station location are prevalent.

Locations of the 17,986 terrestrial air temperature stations that were used in my

global precipitation data base are presented in Addendum #1. This figure is taken

from Legates and Willmott (1990), the text of which is included as Addendum #2.

Note section 2.3, Reliability Concerns, that discusses the assessment of the surface

temperature measurements.

Question 3. Has there been any comprehensive assessment of the accuracy of the

surface temperature measurements?

Response. I include Addendum #2 that includes a paper describing my global air

temperature climatology. It contains a summary of and several references to papers

that describe the accuracy of air temperature measurements.

I also would note the National Research Council Report, Reconciling Observations

of Global Temperature Change, chaired by John M. Wallace. Although many media

outlets touted this report as the death-knell for climate change skeptics, the report

does provide an assessment of surface temperature records (which show substantial

warming) relative to satellite and radiosonde observations (which show little warming). Moreover, the report concludes that warming is real and that surface thermometers and satellites and radiosondes are likely measuring different things, most notably that the thermometers are solely surface observations (below 10 feet) whereas

satellites and radiosondes (balloon observations) integrate temperature over the

lower troposphere.

Question 4. What are the effects of removing black soot from the atmosphere?

Response. In February 2001, Stanford scientist Mark Jacobson published an article in Nature which indicated that the warming effect from the atmospheric aerosol

carbon (black soot) was more than twice what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has assigned to it. Black soot also is likely to reduce cloud

cover by heating portions of the atmosphere, thereby evaporating condensed water.

This implies that much of the warming the IPCC projected to occur as a result of

policies to reduce atmospheric aerosols would be offset since black carbon would also
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be removed. This has posed a problem since some have suggested that sulfate

aerosols have countered the warming the climate models indicate should have occurred. Thus, anti-pollution measures to remove sulfate aerosols would result in a

dramatic increase in the Earth’s temperature.

Black soot, however, exerts a warming effect that is exceeded by emissions only

of carbon dioxide and is almost equal to the cooling caused by sulfate aerosols,

Jacobson concluded. What this means is that the removal of both sulfate aerosols

and black soot using electrostatic precipitators in smokestacks—which occurs since

both particles are about the same size—negates any effect the IPCC suggests should

occur as a result of anti-pollution efforts.

From a health standpoint, it is desirable to reduce the concentrations of black soot

and sulfate aerosols. From a climatic change standpoint, the removal of black soot

would remove a large contributor to global warming. This would occur with obvious

health benefits. Moreover, anti-pollution measures should have no net effect on the

Earth’s temperature since the net effect of sulfate aerosols and black soot should

be near zero.

What this entire argument on black soot and sulfate aerosols should indicate is

that the science of climate change is still highly uncertain. The effects of both black

soot and sulfate aerosols come with large uncertainties. Removal of black soot would

seem to be a benefit both to atmospheric pollution concerns as well as to those concerned about anthropogenic warming. But further research might find that there

are other effects—maybe positive, maybe negative—that can be attributed to the

presence of these aerosols. Thus, I reiterate that it is impossible to determine the

extent of our risk when the effects of atmospheric composition are extremely uncertain.

Question 5. What are the benefits of using U.S. clean coal technology in countries

like China and India in terms of removing black soot?

Response. Although this is not in my area of expertise, I would argue that clean

coal technology would be beneficial to developing countries whose economies are still

dependent on coal. However, I always am concerned about exporting technology and

how it may be used in ways that we did not intend. Clean coal technology should

decrease emissions of pollutants (sulfate aerosols and black soot), which are a particular problem in developing countries. However, by increasing burning efficiency,

more CO2 will be released as a result.

Question 6. Please provide your assessment of the models used in the New England Regional Assessment referred to by Mr. Markham. Also, please comment on

the use of these models for driving impact studies. If available, please provide any

alternative assessments for States in New England.

Response. The U.S. National Assessment prescribed the models used in the New

England Regional Assessment. Thus, the models used were the Canadian Climate

Centre Model and England’s Hadley Centre Model. I have provided an extensive assessment of these models in a manuscript published by the George C. Marshall Institute. That manuscript was appended to my Senate testimony.

In summary, these models were out of date at the time the National Assessment

went to press. Moreover, they provided two of the most extreme climate scenarios

of all models the Assessment had from which to choose. As for driving impact studies, I will note that for current conditions, both models simulated a wetter climate

for eastern Colorado than for northwestern Louisiana! The ‘‘trick’’ that is used is

to simply ignore the current field but look at changes from the present-day simulation to the doubled CO2 Simulation. Obviously, if one is interested in regional-scale

impacts, it is important that the model reproduces the salient features of the regional climate.

Question 7. Please provide an assessment of the models used in the reports by

Swiss RE and Munich RE, including their use to predict local impacts.

Response. In their discussion, Swiss RE cites only the Switzerland National Research Programme 31 (NFP 31) as a source for their information. The Swiss National Research Programme is their equivalent of our National Science Foundation.

In the documentation of NFP 31, I found the following climate model reference: ‘‘A

regional climate model for the Alpine region,’’ by Lu ̈thi et al. (1997). Only an abstract is available but they note, ‘‘The modelling suite employed comprises a doubly

nested system with an outer coarse mesh model (horizontal resolution ∼56km) capable of capturing synoptic-scale features and an embedded fine-mesh model . . . (horizontal resolution ∼14km) that can simulate meso-scale flow systems.’’ Regional climate models are driven by General Circulation Models (GCMs) but the report gives

no mention as to the specific model references.
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As there are no large-scale modeling groups in Switzerland, my educated guess

would be that their model would not be substantially different from those cited by

the IPCC, and may likely include the Hadley Centre GCM. I provide an assessment

of the climate models used in the U.S. National Assessment in my manuscript published by the George C. Marshall Institute and appended to my original Senate testimony. Many of the same criticisms of these two models hold for other models as

well.

As for the prediction of local impacts, this study appears to use nested modeling— an approach where higher resolution models are used to look at local fluctuations.

These models are driven by the coarser resolution GCMs and, as a consequence, inherit their biases and errors. Thus, the local assessments are only as good as the

large-scale forcing which, for GCMs, is not very accurate.

RESPONSES OF DR. DAVID R. LEGATES, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR CAMPBELL

Question 1. In your testimony, you expressed concern over what you termed ‘‘land

bias’’. That nearly three fourths of the Earth’s surface is covered by water and goes

largely unobserved. Therefore, much of our available data on global warming may

not in fact be wholly accurate. You also mention that some countries actually sell

their data to interested parties, also potentially tainting that information. What efforts are being made to correct these situations?

Response. Clearly, it is virtually impossible to instrument the oceans in the same

way we have instrumented land areas. We do have ship reports; however, they tend

to be biased in a number of ways. First, ships, for obvious reasons, tend to avoid

storms if at all possible. This provides a ‘‘fair weather bias’’ that affects our estimates. Second, most ships are moving targets (there are some reports from fixedposition ships) and provide air temperature estimates that are integrated over large

areas and do not represent a single point. Third, ships are large metal objects that

generate their own heat and have different characteristics than the open ocean. This

problem is akin to the urbanization effect we see with land-based thermometers.

Thus, our only real source of obtaining a spatially representative sample of global

air temperatures is through remote sensing. Much of the work by Roy Spencer and

John Christy has been based on attempting to compile a long-term temperature

record using satellite remote sensing. Using their analysis, we see that satellite-derived air temperature has not exhibited a marked increase as suggested by landbased thermometers. This lack of a trend has also been observed with radiosonde

data (balloons); traditionally, weather balloons are used twice daily around the

world to sample the vertical profile of the atmosphere, including air temperature.

As for the fact that countries have been selling their data, Dr. Mike Hulme of the

Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia relayed this information

to me. His unit has been the source of many of the air temperature and precipitation time-series that have been displayed. These countries are largely Third World,

which see the data as a potential source of income. Efforts are ongoing to encourage

these countries to participate in the global telecommunication of weather data,

largely through the World Meteorological Organization. In some cases, financial

support has been supplied. I participated in the first protocol that allowed the U.S.

and USSR to exchange data for climate research (back in 1990); such efforts have

now been extended to an international scope. However, I would conclude that global

cooperation in this area is still lacking.

Question 2. You mention in your testimony that perhaps 20 percent or less of the

observed global increase in temperature may be due to the activities of mankind.

What are other likely causes of global warming?

Response. I believe my intent was to state that 20 percent or less of the observed

global increase in temperature was due to anthropogenic increases in greenhouse

gases. Variations in solar output are an obvious source of some of the changes in

global temperatures we have seen. Dr. Sallie Ballunias probably can offer comment

that is more up-to-date on this topic. However, I also would strongly argue that

much of the observed global increase in air temperature is due to the effect of urbanization. Over time, weather stations that originally were sited in open, rural settings have become increasingly surrounded by sprawling urban areas. Several researchers have documented time-series of air temperature for rural versus urbanized stations and have found that air temperature increases with urbanization,

while little change occurs with rural observations. This effect is well documented;

the ‘‘urban heat island’’ occurs due to a decrease in evaporation and an increase in

absorption of solar radiation that results when forests and grasslands are replaced

by cities. While urbanization technically can be considered as a humaninduced ef-
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fect, I strongly differentiate increased temperatures due to urbanization from a rise

in air temperature resulting from increased greenhouse gases. Thus, urbanization,

in my view, is largely responsible for most of the air temperature rise that we have

seen in the observed, land-based air temperature record.

I would further argue that land surface changes (such as urbanization, but also

including deforestation and desertification) have probably a bigger effect on the

Earth’s climate than atmospheric constituents. Land surface interactions are a big

component of the surface energy balance, although they are not well represented

within climate models. Models are more tuned to study the radiative balance of the

atmosphere, which is probably why the models are very sensitive to changes in

greenhouse gases.

Natural climatic variability is also another likely source of rising air temperatures. In the late 1800’s, we emerged from a relatively cool period known as the

‘‘Little Ice Age’’. It is therefore not unexpected that air temperatures would rise during the last century after the end of a period during which colder temperatures were

experienced for 300 to 400 years. Before then, the Medieval Warm Period exhibited

globally warmer air temperatures. I would note that many civilizations thrived during this period even though they were in a lesser position than we are to adapt to

climate change.
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STATEMENT OF ADAM MARKHAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET,

PORTSMOUTH, NH

Good morning Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. My name is Adam

Markham and I am the executive director of Clean Air-Cool Planet, a small nonprofit working to achieve reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in the Northeast.

Thank you for inviting me here today to talk about likely impacts of continued climatic change.

New England is coming to end of what will almost certainly be the warmest winter on record, and much of the region has been in the grip of severe or extreme

drought for many months. These individual weather events are not, in themselves,

indicators of climate change but they are providing a taste of what climate change

might bring. New Hampshire is currently experiencing the second worst drought in

more than 100 years and Maine’s last 12 months were the driest on record. Lake

Winnipesaukee is at its lowest level in a generation, wells are running dry, and concerns are being raised about hydroelectric power shortages, fish populations and forest fire risk.

As with the rest of the country, we are experiencing a long-term warming trend.

On average, New England has warmed by 0.7 °F since 1895. Winters have warmed

more than summers, and the greatest warming has been in New Hampshire,

Vermont and Rhode Island. Annual precipitation for the region as a whole has increased, especially in southern New England where the change has been more than

25 percent over the last century. More rain is falling in intense storms than in the

past.

On the other hand, there has been a significant decrease (15 percent) in snowfall

in northern New England since 1953. Snow is lying on the ground 7 days less than

it was 50 years ago and the ice comes off lakes a few days earlier now than 100

years ago. Other documented indicators of a shorter winter include progressively

earlier flowering of lilacs and the fact that frogs have advanced their spring calling

by several weeks.

The New England Regional Assessment (NERA), which was carried out under the

auspices of the U.S. Global Change Research Program and coordinated by Dr. Barrett Rock of the University of New Hampshire, was published in September 2001.

Four years in the making, the report reviewed some of the risks associated with continued global warming. The warming scenarios described in the report suggest a

likely 6–10 °F warming over the next century. In crude terms, such a change would

result in Boston getting the climate of Richmond, VA in the best case, and that of

Atlanta, GA in the worst case. Either way, the climate of New England would be

irreversibly transformed with far-reaching and negative, economic and environmental impacts.

SUGAR MAPLE

Let me start by describing the threat to one of the icons of New England culture,

and one that I know is close to Chairman Jeffords’ heart—the sugar maple. According to all credible forest models, the sugar maple is one of the tree species most sensitive to warming temperatures. Business as usual emissions scenarios are almost

certain to eventually drive the sugar maple northwards out of New England entirely. Even before that happens climate change will start to take a toll.

New England and New York produce approximately 75 percent of the maple syrup

produced in the U.S. today. U.S. maple syrup production is worth more than $30

million annually. For Vermont, it is a more than $100 million industry with over

2,000 mainly family owned sugar producers. Many of these families have been careful stewards of these forests for generations and they have a strong interest in the

legacy that is passed to their children and grandchildren. Maple trees take decades

to mature and new stands are planted for the benefit of future generations. According to NERA this heritage and industry ‘‘may be irreparably altered under a changing climate’’. There are indications that sugar production tends to be better in colder

years, and it is established that droughts during the growing season adversely affect

production in subsequent years. For example, sugarmakers expect to see impacts of

the current drought, which started last summer, in production numbers for this current season.

There is a very short time in the year when conditions are right for sugar production. Sap generally flows during late February and early March. Sugar bushes need

a prolonged period of temperatures below 25 °F to convert starch to sucrose and to

get high sugar content in the sap. A freeze/thaw cycle of cold nights and warm days

(above 38–40 °F) is required to get the sap moving. When the nights no longer freeze

the season is over.
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According to Dr. Tim Perkins, Director of the Proctor Maple Research Center at

the University of Vermont, sugarmakers are reporting that the season is starting

earlier and earlier. Traditionally, in much of Vermont, tapping coincided with Town

Meeting Day (the first Tuesday in March). But this is changing, and during the last

decade approximately a quarter of Vermont’s sugar production has occurred before

Town Meeting Day. This year’s warm winter triggered one of the earliest sugaring

season starts anyone can remember.

With such a short window of opportunity, the decision on when to tap the trees

is critical to successful production. Tap too early and you risk ‘‘drying out’’ the tree

too soon, but tap too late and you may miss some of the best sap runs. By making

the beginning of the season more unpredictable and increasing temperature fluctuations, global warming will make the decision on when to tap even more difficult.

There is little data available yet with which to predict more accurately the likely

impacts of climate change on maple trees or its possible interplay with other threats

to the maple industry, including acid rain, land-use change and pests such as the

Asian longhorned beetle. The Proctor Maple Research Center plans to begin a vigorous program of research on global warming impacts in the very near future. High

quality field data they have been collecting for a number of years will enable them

to construct a computer model of sap flow in maple trees under varying conditions.

This will then be used to simulate sap flow under various climate change scenarios

to predict the effect on production.

SKIING AND WINTER SPORTS

Winter sports are especially vulnerable to global warming. Because of the strong

relationship between winter skiing conditions, the number of customers, and subsequent successes or failures in the ski industry, a changing climate may have severe

repercussions for New England’s winter tourism economy. There are 80 ski resorts

now operating in the region.

Although economic analyses for New England have been limited, studies from

Canada suggest that global warming could have major economic impacts for the ski

industry there. For example, one analysis indicated that an increase of 3.5–3.7 °C

could decrease the number of skier days by 50–70 percent at resorts in Southern

Quebec. This could mean a loss of up to $1.7 billion in revenue for Quebec.

A recent study by Brian Palm, a Dartmouth College alum and post-graduate student at Oxford University, of the past 19 years of weather data for Vermont and

New Hampshire showed an average of 700,000 fewer ski visits in the years with

the worst snow conditions.

Vermont and New Hampshire have the most ski-dependent economies in New

England. Together, the two states receive approximately 6 million ski visits annually. Skiers generate some of the highest per capita spending of any tourists. In New

Hampshire the industry generated $566 million in visitor spending in 2000. This

spending is critical to the state government’s budget, and in 2000 it accounted for

nearly $58 million in tax revenue. The skiing industry also creates more than 10

percent of the winter jobs in New Hampshire.

Capital investment in the region’s ski industry is highly significant and would be

at risk from shorter winters and a warmer, less snowy climate. Recent single-season

improvements at Sugarbush (VT) and Sunapee (NH) cost $28 million and $11 million respectively. Resort operators have increasingly had to make costly improvements to snowmaking technology to smooth out inconsistent winters. Vermont and

ski areas increased the area covered by snowmaking by 15 percent in the last 12

years and resorts in New Hampshire spent $24.2 million to increase acres covered

by snowmaking by 18 percent during the last decade. At Attitash in New Hampshire, snowmaking costs about $750,000 per year and accounts for approximately 20

percent of total operating costs.

In 2001, the November temperature for the Northeast averaged 43.6 °F, some

5.3 °F higher than the 107-year average. This was the third warmest November on

record. In 2001, Killington Ski Resort, the largest area in the east, recorded its latest opening date in more than 15 years.

Downhill skiing is not the only winter recreation to be affected. This year, some

cross-country skiing trails have been devoid of snow, and ice-skating and

snowshoeing opportunities have been unusually few and far between. Ice fishing has

been sparse or non-existent in southern New England and many snowmobiling

trails have been closed for much of the season.

FOREST ECOSYSTEMS

Climate models predict that in the longer term global warming will eventually

transform the conifer forest of northern New England into the type of forest now
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found farther south—either the deciduous forest of the Mid-Atlantic States, or the

mixed forests characteristic of southern New England.

The conditions that currently support northern hardwood forests will shift up to

300 miles north during the next 100 years, causing the loss of these forests over

much of the landscape. The distributions of white spruce, black spruce, red spruce,

balsam fir and other species of cool climates will move north and these trees are

likely to disappear from most of their current ranges in the Northeastern United

States. If disturbances such as fire or storms increase as has been predicted by some

scientists, this would hasten the decline and facilitate the northward spread of

southern species like oak and hickory.

More than 300,000 people in New England and New York are employed in the

forestry and forest products sector. Milder winters will likely increase the vulnerability of commercial forests to insect pests including eastern spruce budworm,

gypsy moth and pear thrips. Any economic losses are likely to disproportionately affect smaller, non-industrial private landowners. More than 250,000 private forest

landowners are likely to be affected in New England alone.

Global warming will tend to favor opportunistic, fast-moving and adaptable species. It is likely to prove to be a boon for many pests and invasive species that

threaten regional biodiversity. Purple loosestrife, garlic mustard, Tartarian honeysuckle and Morrow honeysuckle are some of the troublesome non-native species that

are predicted to benefit as others decline or disappear.

Higher summer temperatures and increased pollution from road traffic will likely

contribute to greater ground-level ozone formation with the effect of reducing forest

productivity and harming commercial tree species like red spruce and white pine.

Ozone impacts are expected to be worst in southern New York and central and

southern New England.

Changing temperature and precipitation patterns could harm the multi-million

dollar fall foliage industry by muting autumn colors. Without sugar maple the autumn experience in New England would be very different. Fall-foliage tourism accounts for 20–25 percent of total annual tourism in Vermont and Maine. NERA estimated that a 50 percent drop in fall foliage tourism could result in approximately

20,000 job losses.

Climate change is a significant threat to the forest and alpine ecosystems of the

most important public lands in the region, including Acadia National Park, the

Allagash Wilderness Waterway, Baxter State Park, the White Mountains National

Forest, and the Mount Washington State Park.

WILDLIFE IMPACTS

For some animals and plants, climate effects could prove to be disastrous. Many

species characteristic of the northern forest will be forced to find new habitat as climate changes. Species already living at the southern edges of their ranges—like

martens, fishers and snowshoe hares—will be among the most affected. Bird species

that live in northern spruce and spruce/fir forests, including the gray jay, boreal

chickadee, spruce grouse and the threatened Bicknell’s thrush, are particularly vulnerable to diminished habitat in New England.

A modeling study published by The World Wildlife Fund and Clean Air-Cool Planet in 2000, shows the habitats of the Northern Forest of New England and upstate

New York to be especially vulnerable to climate change. According to this study up

to 44 percent of Maine’s, and 35 percent of New Hampshire’s, existing terrestrial

habitats are likely to be transformed into other ecosystem types under the most

credible climate scenarios. In the most heavily impacted areas, the rates at which

plant and animal species may be required to shift their ranges in response to global

warming in the next 100 years may be as much as ten times faster than at the end

of the last ice age.

According to a recent report by the American Bird Conservancy and the National

Wildlife Federation, a great many species of birds will be affected by climate change.

Birding has become a major recreational activity in recent decades, with far-reaching economic consequences. In New England alone, in 1996, people spent more than

$ 1.8 billion feeding and watching birds and other wildlife.

Several species of wood warbler are expected to extend their ranges northwards,

perhaps by hundreds of miles, while disappearing at the southern edges of their current ranges. Five species, including the bay-breasted warbler and Cape May warbler

are predicted to disappear from New England entirely. These birds help to keep

spruce budworm outbreaks in check by consuming millions of larvae during the

breeding season. If they are pushed northwards many forests could become much

more vulnerable to insect pests. A study of 35 North American warbler species
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showed that 20 percent of them have already shifted their ranges an average of 65

miles northwards during the last 25 years.

PUBLIC HEALTH

The White Mountains are within a day’s drive of 77 million people and receive

more visitors (7–8 million) every year than Yellowstone and Yosemite national

parks combined. Recreational visitors in some of these areas may suffer increased

health risks as a result of global warming. Sixty thousand hikers a year visit Mount

Washington and the major peaks for the White Mountains. On hot summer days

there are often high levels of ground-level ozone, particulates and acid aerosols. All

of these pose a threat to hikers. According to NERA, there is a striking correlation

between hot days (warmer than 90 °F, sunny skies and high levels of ozone pollution. Because long-distance transport of air pollutants appears to occur at the

boundary between the mixing layer and the stable layer of the troposphere, at

around 3,200 feet, hiking at these elevations or higher may expose hikers to damaging concentrations of dangerous air pollutants not experienced lower low down.

According to a study by Harvard Medical School, the Harvard School of Public

Health and the Appalachian Mountain Club, prolonged exposure to levels of ozone

often encountered on trails in the White Mountains can reduce lung function and

is especially damaging to people with a history of asthma or other respiratory problems.

Also a risk for people outdoors, even on the golf course or in their backyards is

Lyme disease, which is already on the increase in New York and parts of New England. If undetected, the disease can lead to permanent neurological disability. Because it is passed along to humans by ticks, Lyme disease poses a special threat

to people who enjoy outdoor pursuits like hiking, birding and fishing. Swedish research on ticks suggests that warmer winters could increase the incidence of the disease and push its potential range further into northern New England.

Heat waves kill more people in the United States than hurricanes, flooding or tornadoes. Dr. Laurence Kalkstein, Associate Director of the Center for Climatic Research at the University of Delaware has suggested that heat-related deaths in the

summertime could double under likely U.S. global warming scenarios. Northern cities are especially vulnerable to heat waves because people are not used to, or acclimated to, high temperatures and humidity. Also building design in the north is

more oriented toward keeping heat in during the winter than letting it out during

the summer. The elderly and low-income households in urban areas are at highest

risk.

COASTAL COMMUNITIES & FISHERIES

The costs of climate impacts in the coastal zone may be particularly large. Sea

levels are currently rising at about a foot per century. This rate is increasing and

New England coastal communities will likely have to deal with sea level rise of

around two feet this century. The State of New Hampshire has calculated that this

will massively increase the area of the Seacoast vulnerable to flooding and could

turn 100-year storms into 10-year storms. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) a two-foot sea level rise would inundate about 10,000 square

miles of coastline. Costly beach nourishment and shoreline armoring is already

transforming the coast of New England. A three-foot sea level rise would result in

half of our natural wetlands and beaches being lost and replaced with armored

shores. Coastal development is rapidly closing off the option of natural retreat for

many wetlands.

Coastal marine ecosystems and fisheries are also at risk. Warmer temperatures

are expected to increase the incidence of toxic algal blooms and help the spread of

warm water diseases of shellfish such as oysters. Winter seawater temperature in

Narragansett Bay have already warmed by more than 5 °F since 1960 and winter

flounder populations have been in decline for 25 years. The flounders migrate

inshore in the late fall and spawn in early spring. Winter flounders are adapted for

low water temperatures in which most fish can’t survive and warm winters are hypothesized to be harming populations through reduced hatching rates and increased

predation on larvae.

SOLUTIONS & LEADERSHIP IN THE NORTHEAST

The Northeast States have long been leaders in reducing air pollution. The region

also is now beginning to lead the way in responding to global warming.

• In 2000, New York was the first state to enact a law promoting environmentally

friendly and energy efficient building practices through tax incentives
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• In 2001, Massachusetts Governor Jane Swift signed a new multi-pollutant regulation making the state the first to control CO2 emissions from existing power stations.

• New Hampshire was the first state to create a voluntary registry for greenhouse

gas emissions and a bi-partisan 4-pollutant bill was recently passed in the House.

• The Connecticut Clean Energy Fund is at the forefront of efforts to support the

development of commercial fuel cell technologies.

• Efficiency Vermont is the Nation’s first public utility dedicated solely to achieving energy efficiency improvements.

In August 2001, the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers

signed a Climate Change Action Plan with the long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gases by 75–85 percent from current levels. The Governors and Premiers concluded that global warming’s ‘‘multiple impacts will have substantial consequences

for the cost and quality of life of the region’s citizens’’. They noted that U.S. national

CO2 emissions have been growing more than 1 percent a year and stated ‘‘Given

these increases in the face of doing nothing, this plan seeks to reverse the trend.’’

Northeast leadership is not restricted to the states, however. Thirty-five cities and

counties in the region have joined the Cities for Climate Protection Program of the

International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives. These municipalities have

all passed resolutions pledging to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement

local climate action plans. For example, Burlington Vermont has adopted an ambitious plan—the ‘‘10 percent Challenge’’—to reduce the city’s greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent from 1990 levels by 2005.

Colleges and universities throughout the region are doing their part too. Tufts

University has pledged to meet or beat the Kyoto Target. Clean Air-Cool Planet has

worked with the University of New Hampshire to produce the most detailed greenhouse gas emissions inventory carried out for any college in the country—the precursor to a campus-wide climate plan. Similar projects are underway with the University of Vermont and Bates College in Maine. Students at Connecticut College

have voted with their pocketbooks and signed the campus up for green electricity.

Many businesses in the Northeast are showing the way for the corporate sector.

IBM (NY) and Johnson and Johnson (NJ) were the first to set ambitious greenhouse

gas reduction targets as members of the Climate Savers program of World Wildlife

Fund and the Center for Energy and Climate Solutions. Pitney Bowes (CT) is a

leader in developing corporate markets for green power and Timberland (NH) has

partnered with Clean Air-Cool Planet and Vermont-based NativeEnergy to invest in

new wind energy and permanently retire the CO2 credits from tradable renewable

energy certificates (T–RECS). Other companies are convincingly demonstrating that

common sense investments in energy saving can pay off handsomely.

For example, Massachusetts-based Shaw’s Supermarkets has 185 stores and employs nearly 30,000 people in New England. In 2000, Shaw’s realized $3.7 million

from energy savings alone. Typically, a supermarket would have to sell $150 million

worth of groceries to make that much money.

New York-based Verizon is another important leader in energy conservation. Its

efforts are now producing $20 million a year in net savings. Verizon’s projects range

from encouraging employees to turn off personal computers when not in use (saving

approximately $50 in energy costs for each PC each year), and removing more than

200,000 unnecessary lights, to carrying out energy audits in more than 500 buildings and developing fuel cell systems.

NEED FOR FEDERAL ACTION TO CONTROL CO2

These stories are just the tip of the iceberg. All over New England and the Northeast, individuals, institutions and corporations are inventing, exploring and implementing innovative solutions to climate change. But this is not enough. John Donne

famously said ‘‘no man is an island; entire of itself. Every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main’’. No individual, no city, no State and not even a region

as big as a middle-sized nation, as the Northeast is, can solve the problem of climate

change on its own. As everyone knows by now, the United States is the world’s largest single emitter of greenhouse gases. Without action by the United States we cannot hope to stabilize the world’s climate. Without national legislation, regional efforts such as those in the Northeast will founder and ultimately fail.

A strong national response to climate change and a modern energy policy are both

crucial if we are to continue to grow our economy, strengthen the country’s energy

security and act as responsible stewards of our environment.

Energy efficiency and alternative fuels are the real routes to energy security, not

drilling in pristine wilderness areas. If we are serious about reducing our reliance

on foreign oil and about competing in world markets we must produce more efficient
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automobiles. If we want energy security and more jobs we should aim to be producing 20 percent of our electricity for renewable resources—wind, solar, biomass

and geothermal—by the year 2020.

Federal controls on CO2 are essential and urgently needed. By dealing with all

four pollutants at once and promoting energy conservation the Clean Power Act can

save us tens of millions of dollars in comparison to three pollutant strategies that

focus only on end of pipe solutions and ignore carbon dioxide. Local and regional

leadership such as is commonplace in the Northeast is important and

groundbreaking. But, there can be no substitute for coordinated national action, and

eventually, economy-wide controls on CO2.

Despite the fact that there is considerable uncertainty about the precise costs of

impacts of climate change on New England, there is very little doubt that it will

have a transformative effect on many of the attributes that make the region unique.

The loss of sugar maples, changes in the northern forest, warmer winters, more frequent heat-waves and destruction of coastal wetlands will radically diminish the

New England experience and may ultimately deliver a body blow to elements of the

region’s economy.

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I would be happy to try

to answer any questions you may have.

RESPONSES BY ADAM MARKHAM TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. Your testimony illustrated well the potential environmental and economic impacts facing New England in a warmer climate, and you also enlightened

us about current pro-active business projects aimed at lowering greenhouse gas

emissions. In your experience, what reasons have these companies given to explain

their motivation for early action on energy conservation and climate change mitigation?

Response. In my experience, the prime motivation has been a recognition that by

seeking to reduce wasteful energy use, a company can invariably save significant

amounts of money. Bottom-line benefits translate to increased shareholder value

and confidence and often to increased competitiveness in the market. Other reasons

we often hear include:

• Wanting to be seen as an environmentally responsible

• Certain actions, such as increased day-lighting in buildings help with worker

productivity and employee retention

• Increasing business efficiency

• Recognition that customers want to buy from environmentally responsible companies

• Getting ahead of potential future legislation

• Taking advantage of available new technologies

Question 2. The findings of the New England Regional Assessment are very disturbing. The assessment describes a significantly changed regional environment.

What do people in New England think about it?

Response. It is difficult to answer this question with more than anecdotal information as I know of no recent New England specific public opinion work on this topic.

But on the evidence of newspaper articles, letters to the editor and many conversations with people in a variety of sectors, as well as national opinion polls and focus

groups, I would say that people are generally convinced that global warming is happening, that it is a serious problem and that we ought to do something about it,

sooner rather than later. In New England, there is growing concern about shorter

winters and the potential for increased drought and worse snow and ice conditions.

In southern New Hampshire, where I live, at least, it is a common topic of conversation that winters are warmer than they used to be and that summers appear hotter

and drier, with worse air pollution. People are particularly worried about the threat

to coasts, forests and public health. New Englanders appear to feel that there is a

lack of commitment to solving this problem in Washington, and in common with

people in many parts of the country they lay much of the blame on the oil and auto

industries.

Question 3. Has this year’s unusual weather and the drought in the Northeast encouraged people to pay closer attention to climate change issues?

Response. I don’t think there can be any doubt that the current drought and a

series of unusual and extreme weather events over the last few years have made

many people think much more seriously about the potential consequences of climate

change. Of course, no single weather event can be attributed to global warming, but

people see a pattern of change that is beginning to concern them.
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Question 4. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not safe to continue

increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit. What needs to be done to assure

that we can avert the point of no return or ‘‘dangerous levels’’ of greenhouse gas

concentrations?

Response. I believe that we need to take immediate action to reduce greenhouse

gas emissions. The current Senate 4-pollutant bill would be a very important step

forward if passed into law. Strengthened CAFE standards are also an essential element of a strategy to prevent dangerous levels. We will eventually also need economy-wide measures to reduce greenhouse gases. In the near future we need to see

renewable portfolio standards and strong appliance efficiency standards as well as

increased incentives for the development and marketing of renewable energy technologies and building energy efficiency.

Question 5. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30–50 years, of

continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas emissions? And, what is the

most feasible way to reduce or eliminate that risk?

Response. The greatest risk is that we fail to act urgently and responsibly to

begin reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Failure to act will lock us into accelerating sea-level rise causing massive economic losses in the coastal zone and increased loss of habitat and species extinction. The most feasible way to reduce the

risk is to regulate CO2 first from power stations and then economy-wide, while at

the same time giving incentives for energy efficiency and the development and use

of renewable technologies and alternate sources of energy.

RESPONSES BY ADAM MARKHAM TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SMITH

Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ‘‘during the 20th Century, the atmospheric

concentrations of a number of greenhouse gasses have increased, mostly because of

the actions of mankind.’’ Do you agree with that statement? Why or why not?

Response. I do agree with that statement, based on the conclusions of the Third

Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the recent review by the National Academy of Sciences.

Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ‘‘the primary cause for . . . growth in

impact[] is the increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in climate, per se.’’ Do you agree with this

claim? Why or why not?

Response. While it is true that human and environmental systems are increasingly vulnerable to climate change and variability, I do not believe that this is the

primary cause of growth in impacts (except perhaps in the particular case of fast

developing coastal areas). For example, worldwide glacier recession, melting permafrost and unprecedented bark beetle infestation in Alaska, earlier Northern hemisphere spring and changes in species distribution are entirely independent of

human vulnerability.

Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ‘‘the present research agenda is focused

. . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate future’’ and that ‘‘instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no . . . we might be better served by addressing

things like the present drought. . . .’’ Do you agree with that proposition? Why or

why not?

Response. In general I do not agree with this statement. However, it is certainly

true that we need to increase and expand our research efforts to understand the

impacts of climate change. Improving the ability of computer models to simulate future potential climate scenarios is an essential part of this effort. I do agree that

we are not well served arguing ‘‘yes or no’’ about global warming. There is clear scientific consensus that we are already experiencing human induced global warming.

Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto Protocol? Do you

agree with the assertion that full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would only

avert the expected temperature change by 6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why

not?

Response. Yes, I believe we should fully implement the Kyoto Protocol. As far as

I know the 6/100 of a degree figure is not within the generally accepted range of

impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, but I have not specifically reviewed the paper in

question. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the Kyoto Protocol targets are

merely first steps toward reaching the levels of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations that we need to stabilize at. The Kyoto Protocol contains review mechanisms to allow policymakers to react to new scientific findings.
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Question 5. In the hearing there has been much press attention paid to the breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion ton iceberg known as ‘‘Larsen

B,’’ that has been attributed to climate change. What scientific evidence is there

that climate change is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific

evidence that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of Larsen B?

Response. I have no expert knowledge on this question.

Question 6. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening statement was

a Swiss Re report titled ‘‘Climate research does not remove the uncertainty; Coping

with the risks of climate change’’ (copy attached). Please explain why you agree or

disagree with the following assertions or conclusions from that report:

Response. ‘‘There is not one problem but two: natural climate variability and the

influence of human activity on the climate system.’’

This statement is undoubtedly true and it is highly significant that the insurance

industry has recognized the addition of the new threat of human-induced climate

change.

‘‘. . . it is essential that new or at least wider-ranging concepts of protection are

developed. These must take into account the fact that the maximum strength and

frequency of extreme weather conditions at a given location cannot be predicted.’’

I agree that under natural climate variability and in the case of increased vulnerability due to global warming, it is not possible to accurately predict the worst case

scenario for any individual weather event in a particular place. We can, however,

prepare for the likelihood of hanges infrequency and intensity of extreme events in

general and should expect to have to deal with worse impacts in the future. Risk

minimization can no longer be assessed in the expectation of a continuing stable climate.

‘‘Swiss Reconsiders it very dangerous (1) to put the case for a collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears which—if they are not confirmed—will in

time turn to carefree relief, and (2) to play down the climate problem for reasons

of short-term expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires

that today’s generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of this kind.’’

I agree that we should not over-emphasize worst case scenarios and I agree

strongly that short-term expediency should not lead anyone to ignore or play down

the potential impacts of climate change. We should provide the best possible information to the public and policymakers about the full range of potential scenarios

and impacts.

Question 7. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions

is increasing? Why or why not?

Response. Vulnerability to extreme weather seems to be increasing. This is likely

because of changes in demographic patterns and, particularly, increased development pressures in sensitive ecosystems and coastal areas.

RESPONSES BY ADAM MARKHAM TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global CO2 concentration target of 550 ppm

CO2 by 2100 which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed

countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of 550 ppm by 2100

is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on emissions for the United States

by 2050? By 2100?

Response. If such a target was adopted (as I believe it should be in order to safeguard U.S. ecosystems, communities and economic well-being) these caps would be

the subject of negotiations among the ratifying parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The

United States has given notice of its intent not to participate in such negotiations,

nor abide by their results.

Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you provide this analysis.

Response. I am not personally aware of any recent economic analysis of this sort.

Question 2. Do your projections of impacts on New England depend on foreign

models?

Response. Some of the research results outlined in my testimony are based on foreign models, others are not. The New England Regional Assessment was carried out

under the auspices of the U.S. Global Change Research Program and at the time

of it’s initiation, the best available models were Canadian and British. If carried out

today, the best available models would certainly include the newest U.S. versions.
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Other studies dealing with Impacts of climate change on sugar maple forests, sea

level rise and ecosystems outlined in the report use both foreign and U.S. models

but rely mainly on U.S. developed climate models.

Question 3. Do your projections of impacts depend on using models to project regional and local climate change?

Response. Most projections of potential climate impacts rely on model scenarios.

The computer models provide the best available tools for creating plausible future

climate scenarios in order to undertake risk and sensitivity analyses. Model scenarios do not provide predictions of future climate, only potential scenarios, based

on best current knowledge and analytical capability.

Question 4. What happens if the climate effects are lower than the lowest scenario

in the NERA study?

Response. Presumably there would be a different set of impacts from those

analysed in NERA, just as there would be if the climate effects were higher than

the highest scenario. NERA assessed a middle range of scenarios, not the highest

or lowest.

Question 5. Please provide your most recent filings of Form 990’s.

Response. Provided separately by fax. (Copy retained in the committee’s file.)

RESPONSE BY ADAM MARKHAM TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM

SENATOR CAMPBELL

Question. You have given us multiple examples of the impacts of climate change

in New England and I am sure many of these would apply to the rest of the country

as well. My question to you is this: if we don’t know whether human activity is a

direct cause of the global change in climate, how can we make any determination

that a change in the energy policy of the United States could effectively prevent it

from continuing? Let’s assume that we can’t. Wouldn’t it also be of great value for

us to find ways to reduce our vulnerability to climate change?

Response. Current scientific consensus is that emissions released to the atmosphere as a result of human activities are increasing atmospheric concentrations of

greenhouse gases and that this is the most likely cause of observed global warming

during the last century. The primary source of anthropogenic greenhouse gases is

the burning of fossil fuels so it stands to reason that changes in energy policy would

impact global warming.

I believe we should attempt to both reduce the source of the problem and reduce

our vulnerability to its impacts.

STATEMENT OF DR. SALLIE BALIUNAS, ASTROPHYSICIST, HARVARD-SMITHSONIAN

CENTER FOR ASTROPHYSICS

Fossil fuels currently provide around 84 percent of energy consumed in the United

States, and roughly 80 percent of the energy produced worldwide. Those energy resources are key to improving the human condition and the environment.

Human use of fossil fuels has increased the amount of greenhouse gases, in particular, carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is essential to life on

Earth. Moreover, the greenhouse effect is important to life on Earth in that the

greenhouse gases help retain energy near the surface that would otherwise escape

to space. Based on ideas about how climate works, the small additional energy resulting from the air’s increased carbon dioxide content should warm the planet.

Projections of future energy use, applied to the scientifically most sophisticated

computer simulations of climate, have yielded wide-ranging forecasts of future temperature increases from a continued increase of carbon dioxide concentration in the

air. These have been compiled by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC). The middle range forecast of their estimates of future

warming, based on expected growth in fossil fuel use without any curbs, is for a 1

degree Celsius increase between now and 2050. A simulation counting in the effect

of the as yet unimplemented Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997 and calling for a

worldwide 5 percent cut in carbon dioxide emissions from 1990 levels, would reduce

that increase to 0.94C—an insignificant 0.06C cut (Figure 1). That means if increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are a major problem, then

much steeper cuts than those outlined in the Kyoto Protocol are warranted.

One key scientific question is: What has been the response of the climate thus

far to the small amount of energy added by humans from increased greenhouse

gases in the air? To prove the reliability of their future forecasts, computer simula-
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1W. Soon, S. Baliunas, S.B. Idso, K. Ya. Kondratyev and E.S. Posmentier, 2001, ‘‘Modeling

climatec effects of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions: unknowns and uncertainties,’’ Climate Research, 18:259–275. See attached.

tions need verification by testing past, well-documented temperature fluctuations.

New Federal investment in technology, especially that of space-based instrumentation, has helped address the issue of observed response of the climate to the air’s increased greenhouse gas concentration. Two capitol tests of the reliability of the

computer simulations are the past decades of surface temperature and lower troposphere change.

RECORD OF SURFACE TEMPERATURE

In the 20th century the global average surface temperature (Figure 2) rose about

0.5C, after a 500-year cool period called the Little Ice Age. The uncharacteristic cold

had followed a widespread warm interval, called the Medieval Warm Period (ca.

800—1200 C.E.). The 20th century warming trend may have a human component

attributable to fossil fuel use, which increased sharply in the 20th century. But a

closer look at the 20th century temperature shows three distinct trends:

First, a strong warming trend of about 0.5C began in the late 19th century and

peaked around 1940. Next, the temperature decreased from 1940 until the late

1970’s. Recently, a third trend has emerged—a modest warming from the late 1970’s to the present.

Because about 80 percent of the carbon dioxide from human activities was added

to the air after 1940, the early 20th century warming trend had to be largely natural. Human effects from increased concentrations of greenhouse gases amount to

at most 0.1C per decade—the maximum amount of the surface warming trend seen

since the late 1970’s. This surface warming would suggest a temperature trend of

about 1C per century, which is less than that predicted by the computer simulations

of the air’s increased human-made greenhouse gas content. Accumulated over a century, civilization will readily adapt to such a modest warming trend. However, the

recent trend in surface warming may not be primarily attributable to human-made

greenhouse gases.

RECORD OF LOWER TROPOSPHERE TEMPERATURE

Computer simulations of climate in which the air’s greenhouse gas concentrations

increase owing to human activities predict detectable warming not only near the

surface but also in the layer of air above the surface, the lower troposphere, which

rises in altitude from roughly two to eight kilometers. Records from NASA’s Microwave Sounder Units aboard satellites extend back 21 years and cover most of the

globe (Figure 3). The satellite-derived record is validated independently by measurements from NOAA balloon radiosonde instruments, and those records extend back

over 40 years (Figure 4). Those records show that the temperature of the lower troposphere does vary, e.g., the strong El Nin ̃ o warming pulse of 1997–98 is obvious.

However, no meaningful human warming trend, as forecast by the computer simulations, can be found.

The radiosonde record from balloons confirms the results of the satellites. Although the radiosonde record lacks the dense spatial coverage from satellites, the

radiosonde record extends back to 1957, a period that includes the recent rapid rise

in the air’s carbon dioxide concentration. The balloon record shows no warming

trend in global average temperature prior to the dramatic shift in 1976–77. That

warming, known as the Great Pacific Climate Shift of 1976—1977, is not attributable to human causes but is a natural, shift in the Pacific that occurs every 20

to 30 years, and can affect global average temperatures.

When compared to the observed response of the climate system, the computer

simulations all have forecast warming trends much steeper over the last several

decades than measured. The forecasts exaggerate to some degree the warming at

the surface, and profoundly in the lower troposphere.

The complexity of the computer simulations of climate is one reason the forecasts

are unreliable.1 The simulations must track over 5 million parameters. To simulate

climate change for a period of several decades is a computational task that requires

10,000,000,000,000,000,000 degrees of freedom. To improve the forecasts, much better information is required, including accurate understanding of the two major, natural greenhouse gas effects—water vapor and clouds.

NATURAL CLIMATE VARIABILITY: THE SUN’S INFLUENCE

Given the lack of an observed warming trend in the lower troposphere, the result

is that most of the surface warming in recent decades cannot owe to a human-
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caused enhanced greenhouse effect. What might cause the surface warming, especially in the early 20th century when greenhouse gases from human activities had

not significantly increased in concentration in the atmosphere? The 20th century

temperature pattern shows a strong correlation to energy output of the sun (Figure

5). Although the causes of the changing sun’s particle, magnetic and energy outputs

are uncertain, as are the responses of the climate to the Sun’s various changes, the

correlation is pronounced. It explains especially well the early 20th century warming trend, which cannot have much human contribution.

Based on the key temperature measurements of the last several decades, the actual response of the climate to the increased concentration of carbon dioxide and

other human-made greenhouse gases content in the air has shown no significant

man-made global warming trend. The magnitude of expected human change is especially constrained by the observed temperature trends of the lower troposphere.

This means that the human global warming effect, if present, is small and slow

to develop. That creates a window of time and opportunity to continue and improve

observations and computer simulations of climate to better define the magnitude of

human-made warming. Proposals like the Kyoto agreement to sharply cut greenhouse gas emissions are estimated in most economic studies to have enormous economic, social and environmental costs. The cost estimates for the United States

alone amount to $100 billion to $400 billion per year. Those costs would fall disproportionately on America’s and the world’s elderly and poor.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

Figure 1—Forecast of year-to-year temperature rise from years 2000 to 2050 C.E.

(thin line) assuming an increase in the air’s greenhouse gas concentration from

human activities, based on the Hadley Center’s model (UKMO HADCM3 IS92A

version). The upper line (labeled ‘‘Without Kyoto’’) is the linear trend fit to the model’s forecast temperature rise, without implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The

lower line is the estimate of the impact on temperature with the implementation

of the Kyoto Protocol. By the year 2050, around 0.06C global warming is averted

by the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.

Figure 2—Surface temperature changes sampled worldwide and analyzed by Cambridge Research Unit (CRU) and NASA-Goddard Institute of Space Studies (GISS).

The pattern of 20th century temperature change has three distinct phases: an early

20th-century warming, a mid-century cooling, and a late 20th-century warming.

Figure 3—Monthly averaged temperatures sampled nearly globally for the lower

troposophere (roughly 5,000 to 28,000 feet altitude) from Microwave Sounder Unit

(MSU) instruments onboard NASA satellites. The large spike of warmth resulted

from the temporary natural warming of the Pacific Ocean by the 1997—1998 El

Nin ̃ o event. The linear trend is +0.04C per decade (data are from http://

wwwghcc.msfc.nasa.gov/temperature/)

Figure 4—The seasonal average temperature anomaly sampled worldwide for the

lower troposphere as measured by radiosonde instruments carried aboard balloons.

Although a linear trend of +0.09C per decade is present if fitted across the entire

period of the record, that trend is affected by the presence of the abrupt warming

that occurred in 1976–1977, owing to the action of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation

(PDO). The trends before and after the 1976–1977 Great Pacific Climate Shift indicate no evidence of a significant human-made warming trend (source of data http:/

/cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/temp/angell/glob.dat)

Figure 5—Changes in the sun’s magnetism (as evidenced by the changing length

of the 22-year, or Hale Polarity Cycle, dotted line) and changes in Northern Hemisphere land temperature (solid line) are closely correlated. The sun’s shorter magnetic cycles are more intense, suggesting periods of a brighter sun, then a fainter

sun during longer cycles. Lags or leads between the two curves that are shorter

than 20 years are not significant, owing to the 22-year timeframe of the proxy for

brightness change. The record of reconstructed Northern Hemisphere land temperature substitutes for global temperature, which is unavailable back to 1700 (S.

Baliunas and W. Soon, 1995, Astrophysical Journal, 450, 896).
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RESPONSES BY DR. SALLIE BALIUNAS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. You indicated that a ‘‘Kyoto-type cut would avert the temperature rise

by the year 2050 by only .06 degrees Centrigrade.’’ Using the same assumptions

that brought you to that conclusion, how much warming would occur by 2050, if

U.S. emissions continue to grow at the current annual rate (2 percent) until then?

Response. By 2050 one published model (M. Parry et al., 1998, Nature, 395, 741)

forecasts a temperature rise of approximately 1.4C with continued U.S. emissions

growing at the current rate, and no emission cuts by developing nations.

Question 2. How much warming would be avoided by a ‘‘Kyoto-cut’’ in the year

2100, assuming U.S. participation in the Kyoto timeframe?

Response. By the year 2100 the model cited above should forecast approximately

0.1C of warming averted if the United States implemented a Kyoto-type cut according to the current Kyoto Protocol timeframe.

Question 3. Balloon radiosonde records confirm satellite results, according to your

testimony. However, the radiosonde record extends back only to 1957. Why does it

make sense to use these records to determine the absence of a significant warming

trend, when competing and reliable temperature recordings date back to the preindustrial era—before humankind began emitting large quantities of greenhouse

gases?

Response. No reliable globally averaged surface temperature records date back to

the preindustrial period. The present surface temperature record gotten from thermometers that sample locations worldwide reaches back to the mid-19th century.

Some of the thermometer readings are prone to warming from local urbanization.

That uncertainty, plus the sparse coverage of the surface readings—only about 20

percent of the surface of the Earth, with especially poor coverage of the Southern

Hemisphere oceans are sampled in the thermometer record, introduce uncertainty

not easily quantified in the surface record. In contrast, the satellite records cover

more than 80 percent of the globe, and are validated by the independent records

from balloon radiosonde instruments. For a technical discussion, see W. Soon et al.,

1999, Climate Research, 13, 149.

Question 4. As you and all the other witnesses indicated, it is not safe to continue

increasing greenhouse gas emissions without limit. What needs to be done to assure

that we can avert the point of not return or ‘‘dangerous levels’’ of greenhouse gas

concentrations?

Response. As a rhetorical question, the statement is philosophically true. However, it is not possible for science to give a reliable, quantitative assessment of ‘‘dangerous’’ in that context.

Question 5. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30–50 years, of

continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas emissions? And, what is the

most feasible way to reduce or eliminate that risk?

Response. According to the key measurements of the lower troposphere, there is

little risk of catastrophic global warming risk in the next 30 to 50 years from the

expected profile of the atmospheric increase in human-made greenhouse gas emissions. To reduce the uncertainty, an enhanced, targeted program of decisive climate

research—both measurements and theory—should be implemented and supported

for a decade or longer period.

RESPONSES BY DR. SALLIE BALIUNAS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR SMITH

Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ‘‘during the 20th century, the atmospheric

concentrations of a number of greenhouse gases have increased, mostly because of

the actions of mankind.’’ Do you agree with that statement? Why or why not?

Response. I agree that during the 20th century the air’s content of certain greenhouse gases, most notably carbon dioxide, have increased owing to human activities.

The key question is what has been the response of climate to the increased in the

air’s concentration of greenhouse gases.

Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ‘‘the primary cause for . . . growth in

impact[] is the increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in climate, per se.’’ Do you agree with this

claim? Why or why not?

Response. I agree that vulnerability to climate change has increased in some, but

by no means all, situations. For example, hurricanes are the most costly destructive
180

natural phenomena in the United States. While hurricane damage and property

losses have increased greatly in the last 100 years, loss of life has acutely declined.

A powerful, unnamed hurricane struck Galveston in 1900, killing more than 8,000

people. An also powerful hurricane, Andrew, struck a very densely populated area

of south Florida in 1991. Hurricane Andrew tragically killed around 50 people, yet

thousands of lives were saved by technological advances such as sturdy buildings

and satellite imagery that gave early hurricane strike warning. The insurable property damage for Hurricane Andrew hit a record tens of billions of dollars. Expensive

development in areas of likely hurricane strike has made society more vulnerable

to hurricanes in terms of property loss. On the other hand, Hoover Dam built in

the 1930’s has reduced environmental, property and human catastrophe that had

occurred with the recurrent but unpredictable flooding of the Colorado River.

Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ‘‘the present research agenda is focused

. . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate future’’ and that ‘‘instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no . . . we might be better served by addressing

things like the present drought . . .’’ Do you agree with that proposition? Why or

why not?

Response. I agree that more attention should be paid to predicting, mitigating and

adapting to weather phenomena like hurricanes, hailstorms, blizzards, streamflow

flooding, early frosts and tornadoes. To the extent that research funding for those

ever-present weather calamities needs to be obtained from study of climate simulations over distant horizons, that is a policy decision I am unequipped to make.

Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto Protocol? Do you

agree with the assertion that full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would only

avert the expected temperature change by 6/100 of a degree Celsius? Why or why

not?

Response. Implementing the Kyoto Protocol would make no meaningful difference

in the averted temperature rise forecast for the next 50 or 100 years, according to

the predictions shown by, e.g., the U.N. IPCC TAR.

Question 5. Since the hearing there has been much press attention paid to the

breakup of the Anarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion ton iceberg know as

‘‘Larsen B’’ that has been attributed to climate change. What scientific evidence is

there that climate change is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of

Larsen B?

Response. No reliable evidence posits the calving of the Larsen B iceberg to

human-made global warming. The peninsula on which the Larsen Ice Shelf rests

has warmed over the last 50 years. However, the climate simulations say the entire

region of Antarctica should have shown a warming trend over the last several decades; in the last 50 years the majority of the Antarctic continent has cooled. The

calving of the Larsen B iceberg must therefore be a natural phenomenon, caused

in part by the local, natural temperature rise and also by changes in, e.g., sea salinity, orography, wind, and sea currents.

Question 6a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening statement was

a Swiss Re report titled ‘‘Climate research does not remove the uncertainty: Copying

with the risks of climate change’’ (copy attached). Please explain why you agree or

disagree with the following assertions or conclusions from that report: A. ‘‘There is

not one problem but two natural climate variability and the influence of human activity on the climate system.’’

Response. Because natural climate variability is the backdrop against which

human climate effects must be judged, understanding natural variability is prerequisite to detecting human climate effects. The problems are closely interrelated.

Question 6b. ‘‘. . . it is essential that new or at least wider-ranging concepts of

protection are developed. These must take into account the fact that the maximum

strength and frequency of extreme weather conditions at a given location cannot be

predicted.

Response. The statement is tantamount to saying that models have no regional

credibility for predicting weather events, which is scientifically true.

Question 6c. Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the case for a collapse

of the climate system, as this will stir up fears which—if they are not confirmed—

will in time turn to carefree relief, and (2) to play down the climate problem for

reasons of short-term expediency, since the demand for sustainable development requires that today’s generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of this

kind.
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Response. The consequence of Swiss Re’s statement is that technology ought to

proceed in a timely and sufficiently supported way to understand natural climate

variability, as well as adaptation and mitigation to dangerous weather events that

have, and will continue, to wreck destruction on humans and the environment.

Question 7. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions

is increasing? Why or why not?

Response. Some developing nations have become more vulnerable to extreme

weather events, but the events have not been demonstrated to owe to the air’s increased content of human-produced greenhouse gases. The United States should

continue to lead in mitigating weather vulnerability by committing to elevating

those nations from poverty, starvation and lack of education.

RESPONSES BY DR. SALLIE BALIUNAS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global CO2 concentration target of 550 ppm

CO2 by 2100 which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed

countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of 550 ppm by 2100

is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on emissions for the United States

by 2050? By 2100?

Response. The United States by the year 2050 would be required to produce zero

emissions of carbon dioxide and other human-made greenhouse gases. By the year

2100, U.S. emissions would have to be negative.

Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you provide this analysis.

Response. In my estimation, no study adequately addresses the enormous economic costs to the United States for such a scenario.

Question 2a. Please provide your assessment of the validity of the various temperature measurements including their coverage of the globe: Satellite.

Response. The satellite Microwave Sounder Unit Measurements, covering about

85 percent of the globe, are validated by several sets of independent balloon radiosonde measurements. Where the measurements overlap, the satellite and balloon

records have a nearly perfect correlation—with a 99 percent correlation coefficient.

The satellite measurements seem precise to 0.01 C.

Question 2b. Please provide your assessment of the validity of the various temperature measurements including their coverage of the globe: Weather balloon.

Response. The balloon radiosonde measurements are in substantial agreement

with the satellite records where they overlap. Both therefore give reliable trends of

the temperature of the lower troposphere because they are independent measurements.

Question 2c. Please provide your assessment of the validity of the various temperature measurements including their coverage of the globe: Surface—land.

Response. It is difficult to estimate the global surface temperature to within a

tenth of a degree C. Land surface measurements over the United States and parts

of Europe are the most reliable going back about a century. The records have been

corrected as best as possible for, e.g., the urban heat island effect produced by increased population, urban mechanization, vegetation removal, albedo changes, etc.,

but the corrections are uncertain. The sea surface records are scarce. It is difficult

to estimate the uncertainty owing to the lack of sampling for nearly 80 percent of

the globe in the averaged surface temperature, where vast areas of the Southern

Hemisphere oceans were not sampled.

Question 2d. Please provide your assessment of the validity of the various temperature measurements including their coverage of the globe: Surface—ocean.

Response. It is difficult to estimate the global surface temperature to within a

tenth of a degree C. Land surface measurements over the United States and parts

of Europe are the most reliable going back about a century. The records have been

corrected as best as possible for, e.g., the urban heat island effect produced by increased population, urban mechanization, vegetation removal, albedo changes, etc.,

but the corrections are uncertain. The sea surface records are scarce. It is difficult

to estimate the uncertainty owing to the lack of sampling for nearly 80 percent of

the globe in the averaged surface temperature, where vast areas of the Southern

Hemisphere oceans were not sampled.

Question 3. Can you provide documentation that includes temperature proxy indications for at least the last 1,000 years covering the Medieval period?
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Response. A very few of the numerous articles documenting climate change going

back at least 1,000 years include J. Esper et al., 2002, Science, 295, 2250; J.M.

Grove, 2001, Climate Change, 48, 53; C. Pfister et al. 1998, Holocene, 8, 535; and

W.S. Broecker, 2001, Science, 291, 1497.

Question 4. What are the effects of removing black soot from the atmosphere?

What are the benefits of using U.S. clean coal technology in countries like China

and India in terms of removing black soot?

Response. The effect of removing significant amounts of black soot from the atmosphere would be to improve substantially the health of humans and the environment from this pollutant. Efforts should be made to help severe pollution producers

like China and India to prevent emission of soot from their coal burning facilities.

Question 5. What are the magnitudes of the various inputs to the climate and

what are their contributions (cooling, warming)?

Response. This is the capitol question. The magnitudes of the inputs, and, critically, the responses of the climate system to those agents of climate forcing are inaccurately known. For example, all climate simulations assume water vapor in the

upper troposphere produces a large amplification of the small warming that occurs

from doubling the air’s carbon dioxide concentration. Yet satellite measurements of

the amount of water vapor in the upper troposphere suggest that that layer of air

is too dry to support the presumed amplification mechanism. Moreover, the lower

troposphere should have responded with a significant global warming trend over the

last two decades—but the reliable, verified satellite temperature record shows little

human-made warming trend. Thus, all models make an assumption that is unsupported by the existing evidence. As Prof. Richard Lindzen of MIT has said of this

assumption, it is likely a ‘‘computational artifact’’ that serves to produce exaggerated trends of human-made global warming. Second to water vapor in producing the

strongest positive feedback effect is the influence of clouds, whose properties and

interactions with the climate system remain highly uncertain.

Question 6. Can you document the uncertainties reflected in the NRC June 2001

‘‘Climate Change Science’’ underlying report?

Response. Several of the uncertainties have been previously discussed, for example, W. Soon et al., 2001, Climate Research, 18, 259, as attached to my original testimony.

Question 7. Please provide the documentation of how the NRC report (June 2001)

addressed the satellite, weather balloon, and surface temperature measurements.

Response. The report largely did not resolve the discrepancy between the satellite

and surface discrepancy. For a technical discussion of the underlying issue, please

see W. Soon et al., 1999, Climate Research, 13,149.

Question 8. Given your interpretation of gradual change in climate, what is the

recommended course of action with regard to scientific modeling?

Response. First, assume that the results of the climate models, whose global

warming trends calculated for the last two decades of satellite data are roughly a

factor of five too high compared to the validated observations, are, perplexingly, correct. A delay of up to three decades in implementing sharp greenhouse gas emission

cuts should produce a negligible additional warming by the year 2100 compared to

natural fluctuations in the climate, even in the case of the current climate models

that exaggerate the present global warming trends. And, if the human global climate trend is much smaller than the models predict, as the scientific evidence now

suggests, then the window of opportunity for improving climate science is longer

than three decades. In terms of action, one might consider: getting critical measurements meant improve understanding of natural climate variability, including the

physics of water vapor, clouds and important sunclimate interactions.

Question 9. Dr. Baliunas, when Dr. Lindzen testified before this committee last

year he made a statement that ‘‘no model explains any major feature of the climate.’’ Could you explain this for me. Are our models capable of explaining climate

phenomena?

Response. As Prof. Lindzen correctly stated, no general circulation model of global

climate change properly simulates any major feature of the climate. That includes

natural phenomena like El Nin ̃ o Southern Oscillation (ENSO), sea ice variability,

decadal oscillations such as the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and the Pacific

Decadal Oscillation (PDO), the Quasi-Biennial Oscillation (QBO), circulation of energy from the equator to the polar regions, clouds, precipitation patterns and water

vapor. The fact that no global model correctly accounts for any of these features of

climate means that no global model can possibly account for all of those features.
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Current global climate simulations cannot yet make reliable forecasts, especially

100 years into the future.

RESPONSE BY DR. SALLIE BALIUNAS TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM

SENATOR CAMPBELL

Question. In your testimony, you say that it is ‘‘impossible to have a verified and

validated climate model’’ due to the variability of natural systems. It would seem

then that predicting climate change would be like predicting chaos. How accurately

are you able to make sense of the madness?

Response. Technically speaking, chaos is a deterministic mathematical tool that

can yield calculated results that are widely separated even for only slightly different

starting points in the calculation. The results are repeatable, but may be extremely

sensitive to slightly different starting points. The climate system may be partly or

wholly chaotic, but the information is not yet available to determine if climate is

so. Some research focuses on chaos calculations in climate simulations. The lack of

a reliable global climate forecast of which I spoke depends on having as an essential

starting point a verified and validated global simulation, which does not yet exist.

One reason why the global simulations lack validity is that the physics of the major,

relevant factors in natural variability are simply not known with enough certainty

at present. In that regard, it is also not useful to consider as a reliable forecast an

average of a suite of forecasts from different climate simulations, each of which fails

validation. Improving the reliability of forecasts requires significantly reducing the

uncertainty of natural variability—the fluctuations against which human climate effects must be estimated.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARTIN WHITTAKER, INNOVEST STRATEGIC VALUE ADVISORS, INC.

‘‘The greatest challenge facing the world at the beginning of the 21st century is

climate change . . . Not only is climate change the world’s most pressing problem,

it is also the issue where business could most effectively adopt a leadership role.’’

Proceedings of the World Economic Forum Annual General Meeting, Davos, February 2000.

Climate change is rapidly becoming a major issue for U.S. companies and fiduciaries. The increasingly global nature of industrial competition, institutional investment strategies, and legislated disclosure requirements mean that company directors and other fiduciaries in North America should see climate change as a major

business risk—and opportunity.

In the private sector, climate change has rapidly developed into a major strategic—and practical—issue for both industrial corporations and their investors. The

competitive and financial consequences for individual companies can be huge:

Innovest’s own research has indicated that the discounted future costs of meeting

even ‘softened’ Kyoto targets correspond to 11.5 percent of total current market

value for the most carbon-intensive U.S. electric utility to 0.2 percent in the least;

and up to 45 percent of current share value. Increasingly severe climatic events

have the potential to stress P&C insurers and reinsurers to the point of impaired

profitability and even insolvency; indeed, insurance analysts at one major U.S. investment bank are already known to have lowered their earnings estimates to account for ‘what appears to be a higher-than-normal level of catastrophes’ during

early 2001.

By the same token, recent studies give grounds for optimism that the right blend

of market based policies, if skillfully introduced, can substantially reduce the direct

and indirect costs of mitigation and perhaps even produce a net economic benefit.

Indeed, several leading insurance, fund management and industrial companies are

already poised with risk management programs and innovative new solutions that

promote both GHG emissions reductions and their own bottom lines. Our research

shows that, for a variety of reasons, businesses practicing sound environmental

management also enjoy enhanced competitive advantage and superior share price

performance.

There is therefore an increasingly compelling need for corporate board members,

pension fund trustees, and asset managers to take the climate change issue far

more seriously than they have to date as a major and legitimate fiduciary responsibility.

A number of major drivers are currently converging to propel climate change to

a much more prominent place on the agendas of company directors and executives,

as well as those of a growing number of institutional investors:
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1 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises, March

2002. 2 U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Insurance Industry Perspectives on Global Climate Change,

February 2001. 3See, for example, the IPCC Third Assessment Report 2001.

STRENGTHENING SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS

The most recent report by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change) actually strengthened warnings from its earlier work regarding the rate,

extent and consequences of climate change. The report accelerated climate change

time horizons and identified the possibility that at some unknown threshold, sudden

and largely irreversible shifts in global climate pattern may occur. Developing countries are predicted to bear the brunt of future climate turbulence.

A new report by the U.S. National Academy of Scientists released in March 2002

corroborated these findings, adding that exceeding the threshold limits could precipitate sudden and abrupt changes which are far more dramatic than anything that

preceded them.1 Simulation modeling indicates that the cost of a single extreme

hurricane could reach as much as $100 billion, on the same scale as the accumulated pollution damage in the USA since industrialization began.

IPCC scientists also believe that North America has already experienced challenges posed by changing climates and changing patterns of regional development

and will continue to do so. Varying impacts on ecosystems and human settlements

will exacerbate differences across the continent in climate-sensitive resource production and vulnerability to extreme events.

GROWING RECOGNITION OF THE GRAVITY OF POTENTIAL FINANCIAL IMPACTS FROM

WEATHER EXTREMES

Over the past 15 years alone, the word has already suffered nearly $1 trillion in

economic losses due to ‘‘natural’’ disasters, roughly three-quarters of which were directly weather-related.2

Munich Re, one of the world’s largest reinsurers, recently estimated that climate

change will impose costs of several billion dollars each year unless urgent measures

are taken to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In the year 2000 alone, global

damage reached $100 billion, mostly uninsured, and already simulation modelling

shows that the cost a single extreme hurricane could reach $100 billion, on the same

scale as the accumulated pollution damage in the USA since industrialisation

began.

These concerns have now been echoed by other leading mainstream financial institutions including Swiss Re, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank. The costs of continued inaction are potentially astronomical, yet there is growing evidence that aggressive mitigation measures need not cause the economic harm and dislocation initially

feared by many conservative economic commentators.3

NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE BREADTH OF SECTORAL IMPACTS

‘‘As we are beginning to appreciate within the reinsurance industry, the effects

of climate change can be devastating . . .’’, Kaj Ahlman, ex-CEO, Employers Re.

Conventional wisdom suggests that the effects of climate change will be limited

to sectors directly associated with the energy value chain (including oil and gas, natural gas, pipelines and electric utilities on the downside, and renewable energy) and

those industries consuming large amounts of energy (steel manufacturing, smelting

and such like).

Recent research makes it clear, however, that the business ramifications relate

not just to energy-intensive industries but also sectors such as telecommunications

and high-technology (which influence societal resource consumption and provide enabling technologies); forestry (an integral part of the sustainable energy cycle); automotive (the primary users of petroleum products and leaders in fuel cell development); electronics, electrical industries and other equipment suppliers (where fuel

cell technologies are already creating whole new markets); agriculture (where industries ranging from animal farming to winegrowing face major potential impacts),

tourism and other sectors.

NEW EVIDENCE ON COMPANY-SPECIFIC IMPACTS

In addition to the massive aggregate risk exposures noted above, recent evidence

on company-level impacts has revealed:
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4See, for example, Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, Electric Utilities Industry Sector Report, 2002

5 Innovest sector research; Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Corporate GHG Reduction

Targets, 2001 6 R.A.G. Monks, The New Global Investor, John Wiley, 2001 7See, for example, Baker & McKenzie (Virginia L. Gibson, Bonnie K. Levitt, and Karine H.

Cargo), ‘‘Overview of Social Investments and Fiduciary Responsibility of County Employee Retirement System Board Members in California,’’ Chicago, 2000

a. That in some high-impact sectors such as energy and electric utilities, the

climate change-driven threat to shareholder value could represent as much as

30 percent of the total market capitalization of major companies; and

b. That even within the same industry sector, firm-specific climate risk can

vary by a factor of nearly 60 times.4

c. Companies are increasingly finding ways of benefiting from proactive action

on tackling greenhouse gases, either through win-win energy savings activities

or the development of new products and services based around greater energy

efficiency or GHG-reducing technologies5. It clearly behooves fiduciaries and investors to know which industry sectors and

companies are exposed to the greatest risks and opportunities, and what measures

if any are being taken to identify and manage those risks.

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PENSION FUND INVESTMENT

Ten years ago, only 3.3 percent of U.S. pension funds’ equity investments were

in non-U.S. company securities. Today, that proportion has more than tripled to

over 11 percent.6 A similar internationalization of pension fund investing is occurring in virtually every OECD country. What this means for U.S. fiduciaries is simply this: The competitiveness of their investee companies—and therefore their fiduciary responsibilities—will not permit them to ignore or remain isolated from climate change policy and regulatory developments in other parts of the world.

LEGITIMIZATION BY MAINSTREAM INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS

Major international investment houses such as AMP Henderson and Friends Ivory

& Sime have developed sophisticated guidelines for assessing companies’ strategic

and operational responses to the climate change threat. What is more, they have

begun to communicate the importance of the issue to their clients. This initiative

by a mainstream investors will go a considerable distance toward ‘‘legitimizing’’ climate change to conservative investors.

A broad coalition of global institutional investors is already forming to press management at the world’s largest companies on shareholder risks associated with climate change via the ‘Carbon Disclosure Project’ (CDP). The CDP is a non-aligned

Special Project within the Philanthropic Collaborative at the Rockefeller Brothers

Foundation with the sole purpose of providing a better understanding of risk and

opportunities presented to investment portfolios by actions stemming from the perception of climate change. To date, institutions representing over $2 trillion in assets have already joined the initiative.

In the United States, climate change-related shareholder resolutions are anticipated against ExxonMobil, Chevron-Texaco, and Occidental Petroleum during the

current (2002) proxy season. Major institutional investors including the city of New

York and the State of Connecticut are beginning to flex their financial muscles on

the climate change issue.

EXPANDED VIEW OF FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES

Historically, fiduciary responsibilities have been interpreted rather narrowly in

both the United States and Europe. Fiduciaries’ principal obligation was the maximization of risk-adjusted financial returns for pension plan beneficiaries, investors,

and shareholders. Since environmental performance was widely seen as injurious or

at best irrelevant to financial returns, the prevailing ethos held that they were of

necessity beyond the legitimate purview of fiduciaries. This ethos has now begun to

shift dramatically: A growing body of research is making it clear that companies’ environmental performance may well affect financial returns, and is therefore a

wholly legitimate concern for fiduciaries. Legislative reforms of pension legislation

in a number of European countries, is codifying this new ethos into law7. Recent independent back-test evidence indicates that a diversified portfolio of more ‘‘sustainable’’ companies can be expected to out-perform one comprised of their

less efficient competitors by anywhere from 150 to 240 basis points or more per

annum. In particularly high-risk sectors such as chemicals and petroleum,
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8 Baruch Lev, Intangibles: Management, Measurement and Reporting. Washington, DC. Brookings Institution, 2001

Innovest’s own research has revealed that this ‘‘out-performance premium’’ for topquintile companies can be as great as 500 basis points or even more.

As the chart below illustrates, depending on how much emphasis was given to environmental performance factors, the out-performance margin ranged from 180–440

basis points (1.8—4.4 percent). None of this out-performance can be explained by

traditional securities analysis; it appears to be pure ‘‘eco-value’’.

NEW EMPHASIS ON INTANGIBLE VALUE AND DISCLOSURE

‘‘Reputation is something which, unlike a petrochemical feedstock plant, can disappear overnight. We are increasingly getting firms which are conceptual and Enron

being a classic case whose value depends on reputation and trust. And if you breach

that, that value goes away very rapidly.’’ Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S.

Federal Reserve Bank, Speaking at the Senate Enron Inquiry on Capitol Hill, Washington DC., January 25, 2002.

As recently as the mid-1980’s, financial statements captured at least 75 percent

on average of the true market value of major corporations; today the figure is closer

to only 15 percent8. That leaves roughly 85 percent of a company’s true market

value which CANNOT be explained by traditional financial analysis The yawning

disconnect between companies’ book value (hard assets) and what they are really

worth—their market capitalization—is at an all-time historical high.

This leaves institutional investors and fiduciaries with an enormous information

deficit, as the recent implosion of Enron vividly demonstrated. Intangible value drivers are now the strongest determinants of companies’ competitiveness and financial

performance.

The growing importance of intangibles to company valuations in the United States

was underscored in a March 2002 announcement by the U.S. Financial Accounting

Standards Board that it will be issuing binding disclosure requirements about companies’ intangible assets within the next 12 months. This will clearly accelerate the

integration of intangibles into mainstream financial analysis. Internationally, the

growing momentum of other major ‘‘transparency initiatives’’ such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) are certain to add climate change as a significant new

source of business and investment risk.

INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE MOMENTUM

The European Union has already committed itself to a legally binding timetable

for Kyoto implementation, including compulsory taxes on GHG emissions above prescribed limits, starting in 2005. Taxes on greenhouse emissions are either proposed

or already in effect in Scandinavia, and the Canadian, Australian and Japanese governments are also in the process of establishing national emissions abatement

plans. Japan, the U.K. and Canada have both signaled their intent to ratify the

Kyoto Protocol within the coming weeks, probably before the forthcoming Earth

Summit in South Africa. The imperatives of global competition will clearly impact
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9For example, ‘Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future’, Oak Ridge; Argonne; Pacific North West;

Lawrence Berkeley; National Renewable Energy Labs, for U.S. Department of Energy, 2001

U.S. companies regardless of any tax or other regulatory measures which may or

may not be forthcoming in the United States.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL MOMENTUM

In response to both domestic and international pressure for a robust response to

Kyoto, President Bush announced his new climate change policy on February 14,

2002. The administration’s Clear Skies Initiative commits the United States to reduce it greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent over the next 10 years, and includes

substantial financial incentives for renewables and clean technologies. The President’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2003 increases spending on climate change

mitigation to $4.5 billion per year.

On February 20, 2002, EPA Administrator Christine Whitman launched one of

the key components of the Bush Administration’s new climate policy, the Climate

Leaders protocol. That initiative encourages companies to report on their emissions

of the six major GHG’s, using a reporting framework developed by the World Resources Initiative and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. In

concert with similar initiatives elsewhere, this should make a significant contribution to increasing the level of transparency of carbon risk exposures and, as a result,

increase accountability for both corporate directors and investment fiduciaries.

In the United States, there are a number of bipartisan bills, resolutions and legislative proposals currently before the 107th Congress, several of which, among other

things, propose significantly increased company disclosure of carbon risks, measurement of emissions, and increased research and development.

NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION MEASURES

The economics of climate change has been a source of considerable uncertainty

and controversy. Several high-profile studies have estimated the costs of mitigation

to be extraordinarily high, particularly in the United States. However, these estimates have invariably used worst-case assumptions that necessarily imply high

costs, for example, highly limited or none existent emissions trading activity, a need

to meet short term targets, or limited use of non-carbon fuels.

Recent studies give grounds for optimism that the right blend of policies, if skillfully introduced, can substantially reduce the direct and indirect costs of mitigation

and perhaps even produce a net economic benefit9.

THE NEED TO LOOK BEYOND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

Effectively addressing climate change can only be achieved via the adoption of

more sustainable development pathways that simultaneously attend to interdependent social, economic and environmental challenges. While the Kyoto Protocol

is a crucial first step in managing the problem, focusing entirely on the agreement

would encompass too narrow a set of interests and divert attention away from some

of the more fundamental social, environmental, technological and economic issues

at stake. The broader sustainability context of climate change simply must be appreciated if the issue is to be effectively managed.

Taken separately, few of these trends are sudden or radically new. What is new,

however, is their confluence at a single point in time. Taken together, they form a

kind of ‘‘perfect storm’’ which has already begun to redefine the responsibilities of

fiduciaries in the early 21st century. Together, Innovest believes that they are rapidly moving climate change to a position of growing prominence on both corporate

and institutional investor’s agendas.

Providing the right blend of regulatory pressure and market mechanisms to allow

institutions to incorporate climate-related factors into future underwriting, lending

and asset management activities is a critical step. Directing institutional capital toward supporting organic development of new clean energy technologies in their

investees is also crucial. The renewables and clean power technology markets are

becoming increasingly compelling in the search for ‘win-win’ outcomes; the nascent

GHG, CAT bonds, weather derivatives and microfinance/microinsurance markets

also hold substantial promise for strategic finance and insurance companies.

Ultimately, It is Innovest’s belief that unleashing the creative instincts of the private sector is by far the most effective way of dealing with environmental pressures.

Our research shows that businesses that practice sound environmental management

also enjoy enhanced stakeholder and customer capital, operate with reduced costs

and less risk, are faster to innovate and generally foster a higher level of manage-
188

ment quality. More importantly, our research also shows that these benefits translate into sustainable competitive advantage and superior share price performance.

This linkage between environmental and financial performance therefore creates a

virtuous circle, in which proactive firms are rewarded by investors and encouraged

to continue in their endeavors. Less proactive firms are also provided with a powerful incentive to adopt more positive responses. In the ensuing battle for best-in-sector leadership, the only surefire winner is the American public, who benefit from

a more competitive private sector whose interests are better aligned with the broader tenets of sustainable development, with all the quality-of-life benefits this brings.

INNOVEST STRATEGIC VALUE ADVISORS, INC.

Innovest Strategic Value Advisors is an internationally recognized investment research firm specializing in environmental finance and investment opportunities.

Founded in 1995 with the mission of delivering superior investment appreciation by

unlocking hidden shareholder value, the firm currently has over US$1-billion under

direct sub-advisement and provides custom research and portfolio analysis to leading institutional investors and fund managers throughout the world. Innovest’s cur- rent and alumni principals include senior executives from several of the world’s foremost financial institutions, as well as a former G7 finance minister. The company’s flagship product is the Eco Value 21 platform, which was developed in conjunction

with strategic partners including PricewaterhouseCoopers and Morgan Stanley

Asset Management. Innovest is headquartered in New York, with offices in London

and Toronto.

RESPONSES BY DR. MARTIN WHITTAKER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. It is clear that, regardless of the remaining uncertainties concerning

exactly when and how climate change will impact our world, perceptions of climate

risk have grown to such an extent that companies here and abroad are considering

changing their practices to improve their long-term financial stability. How have investors in this and other countries begun to reorganize their financial portfolios to

favor more climate-friendly businesses?

Response. From a traditional asset management perspective, few investors have

taken steps to adjust investment actions due to climate change considerations alone.

The only segment of the asset management universe that has adjusted portfolios on

account of climate change issues is the socially responsible investment community

(which constitutes anywhere between 3–8 percent of total assets under management

in the United States). Mainstream asset managers, regardless of location, have not

begun to adjust their portfolios, indeed, our research indicates that many fund managers or analysts do not even recognize that climate change is an issue that would

prompt them to consider reorganizing their assets. The overriding feeling on climate

change within the non-SRI institutional investment community is that the financial

implications of climate change (or, more accurately, the manifestations of climate

change on the one hand, and exposure to regulations limiting GHG emissions on the

other) are not proven. Unfortunately, this belief is not based upon any rigorous financial analysis of potential impacts to equity or debt valuations. Were such analyses to be conducted, our research indicates that the financial community would be

a willing listener.

Rather than adjusting portfolios, there is a small but growing number of pension

fund trustees and pension policy professionals (including, for example, the State of

Connecticut Treasurer’s department) that recognizes climate change as an issue of

potential concern, and that is preparing to engage companies to urge them to manage the issue more proactively on account of fiduciary concerns. The Carbon Disclosure Project, which now has backing of over $2 trillion in assets under management,

and includes Merrill Lynch Investment Management, the Credit Suisse Group, and

Walden Asset Management, is an example of this. We expect that the engagement

approach, rather than the asset adjustment approach, will be favored by most pension funds, and that this approach has the potential to exert major influence over

corporate management strategies on the climate change issue.

Elsewhere within the broader financial services sector, we know of several commercial banks that are examining whether there is a need to adjust credit risk calculation due to climate change factors. For example, in the hotel and leisure sector,

there are reports that financing of winter resorts dependent upon snowy conditions

has been affected; Fitch and Standard and Poor’s, the credit rating agencies, have

begun to examine exposure to potential GHG legislation at the company-specific

level in the utilities and power sectors; and private equity and project finance spe-
189

cialists have steered more money toward clean, low carbon technologies on account

of the market opportunities being created by actions (regulatory and otherwise) to

lower GHG emissions. Finally, in the insurance industry, climate change is exacerbating concerns over weak economic conditions within the insurance industry and

forcing companies such as Swiss Re to reexamine their business mix. The P&C business in particular continues to experience weak premium pricing power and increased losses, with catastrophic event (CAT) losses contributing to poor results. The

P&C industry has also been plagued by excess underwriting capacity, the effect of

which has been to depress prices, shift product mixes into banking and other financial services, and force firms into expanding into overseas markets where climaterelated regional impacts may be more acute.

I would be happy to elaborate with specific details on any of the points made

above.

Question 2. You work with companies that have started to internalize the risks

of emitting greenhouse gases. Why are some companies taking this step, while others hang back? What and why should investors know about a company’s carbon

risk?

Response. Companies that have taken action to manage climate-change related

risks thus far have done so for one or more of the following reasons: (i) to comply

with current or anticipated regulations restricting GHG emissions (notably in Europe); (ii) to realize efficiency gains within their operations (notably through energy

conservation initiatives); (iii) to reinforce a positive environmental reputation; (iv)

to act upon concerns over the effects of future climatic changes on their business;

(v) to gain a perceived competitive advantage over peers in technological innovation,

particularly in industries with long capital planning cycles (next generation technologies in most industrial settings often confer GHG emissions benefits as a side

effect); (vi) in response to concerns expressed by shareholders.

A key determining factor on company stance is its geographic location. For European firms, the primary drivers appear to be reputation (they operate in a marketplace more cognizant of environmental pressures) and regulatory requirements.

Companies hang back in this market either because they do not feel exposed to consumer sentiment about climate change or because they do not anticipate being effected by future regulations. In the United States, primary drivers appear to be

international competitiveness and operating excellence. U.S.-based multinational

companies such as Exxon-Mobil have made it clear that they will act to curtail emissions and internalize risks in those areas of the world where they are required to

do so, which may result in different strategies by business units within the same

company. In our opinion, U.S. companies hanging back do so primarily because they

do not perceive a need to act, either due to lack of regulatory compulsion or because

their client base does not require action of them.

At this stage, knowing what we know about potential climate effects and the impacts of emissions regulation, I think it’s prudent for financial market investors—

particularly those with a long-term investment horizon—to require more information and reliable analysis on how these risks might affect equity valuations or debt

quality, so that they can then factor such risks into their own preferred investment

style. For investment banking and project finance specialists, there is a more immediate need to understand how the costs of reducing GHG emissions might reduce

rates of return and influence capital spending decisions (companies such as BG and

Shell are already calculating the sensitivity of project returns to carbon price movements, as they would examine sensitivity to oil price fluctuations or interest rate

movement). On the flip side, the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund experiences

has shown that the generation and sale of carbon credits can augment returns to

the point by several percentage points.

In view of on-going post-Enron concerns over off-balance sheet risks, the possibility that climate change may well be a market risk capable of inflicting damage

to investor returns has taken on a new significance. The essential point is that company competitiveness and profitability in a wide range of industrial sectors—automotive, chemicals, coal, electric power, manufacturing, oil and gas, refining, water,

steel, tourism, food and agriculture, cement—could be seriously affected by climate

change. Moreover, there will be substantial differentials in company carbon risk exposure within particular industry segments, differentials that are not currently

being picked up by traditional securities analytics.

Question 3. As you know, I’m a cosponsor of legislation to cap carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, S. 556. If there is no cap in the near future, what do you

think will be the effect on carbon markets and companies’ carbon risk management

activities in the United States and abroad?
190

Response. My chief concern is that without a cap, carbon is unlikely to be assigned a value, and without much of a value, the notion of a carbon market is unlikely to have any legs. Markets function on the basis that something of value is

being exchanged. Voluntary or uncapped emissions targets, particularly when applied to the highest emitting sector (and the one most likely to act as buyers of

emissions credits/offsets), will not create the conditions necessary for a fully functioning marketplace, with the result that emissions trading is unlikely to prosper

except for certain multinational and transnational companies.

Of course, from an environmental emissions perspective, the absence of a cap is

unlikely to focus the mind of corporate emitters on mitigation activities. Under an

uncapped scenario, carbon risk management is less likely to come down to the simple objective of reducing emissions, and more likely to focus on (i) internal efficiency

initiatives, where the prospect of economic gain through enhanced efficiency is the

chief driving force, and, (ii) in the long term, clean technology development, where

economic gain through new product offerings and process innovation is foremost.

These are worthy goals for any firm to pursue but they may not produce the emissions reductions required to combat climate change over the time periods identified

by the IPCC.

Question 4. What do you think is the greatest risk, in the next 30–50 years, of

continuing to increase human-made greenhouse gas emissions? And, what is the

most feasible way to reduce or eliminate that risk?

Response. From a global perspective, to my mind the greatest risk is the potential

exacerbation and intensification of poverty-inducing conditions within the developing world. Less developed countries (LDCs) stand to bear the brunt of any disruptions to climate shifts and have less capacity to deal with those disruptions as and

when they occur. Aside from broader moral humanitarian concerns, this may also

carry an economic penalty for OECD countries, in the form of accelerated immigration from poor regions, lower productivity in basic industries situated in LDCs,

stresses on the public purse (due to, for example, health costs and disaster relief)

in LDCs with attendant currency woes, requirements for more aid and foreign direct

investment from rich countries, and sizable opportunity costs relating to a failure

to capture inherent entrepreneurial talents and skills of LDC populations struggling

to cope with deteriorating domestic infrastructures.

The most feasible way to reduce that risk is the expedited development, commercialization and transfer of clean power production and transportation technologies.

Transportation and stationary power production are the two greatest anthropogenic

sources of greenhouse gas emissions; they are also the two areas of civic infrastructure most in need of advancement within poorer countries, primarily in view of their

catalytic role in general economic development. India and China play an especially

important role in global GHG emissions and international trade, and both present

clear market opportunities for U.S. business. The Indian electric power sector is the

largest consumer of capital in that country, drawing over one-sixth of all Indian investments. The United States is the largest supplier of foreign direct investment in

India, much of it in the power sector. As part of efforts to reduce dependency on

coal, India has a significant program to support renewable power, exemplified by

wind power capacity that rose from 41 megawatts in 1992 to 1,025 megawatts in

1999, which should present U.S. exporters with appreciable opportunities.

Similarly, in China, which reportedly ranks second in the world in energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, power generating capacity and power consumption are expected to nearly triple by 2015 from their values in 1995, requiring

some $449 billion in total costs. The China Daily reports that Chinese and U.S.

trade ministers agreed in Beijing in April 2002 to set up a new consultation mechanism under which U.S. Trade and Development Agency (U.S. TDA) will provide

funding for projects in China in the areas of e-commerce, renewable energy and

solid waste treatment. According to Chinese government officials, wind power, solar

energy, hydropower and other renewable and new energy resources will account for

0.7 percent of the total annual commercial energy used in China by the end of 2005,

and 2 percent by 2015—again, major opportunities for U.S. clean power developers.

All of this is to say that the renewables and clean power technology markets are

becoming increasingly attractive for investors and provide a clear possibility for a

‘win-win’ outcome involving LDCs; the nascent markets for greenhouse gas emissions credits, ‘green’ power certificates (based on Renewable Portfolio Standards),

catastrophic event (CAT) bonds, weather derivatives and microfinance/microinsurance also hold substantial promise for forward-looking finance and insurance companies. Indeed, commercially viable technologies exist today (such as combined heat

and power, and cogeneration approaches) whose introduction could go a long way
191

toward reducing GHG emissions in the short term, while more developmental clean

technologies are brought to the market.

RESPONSES BY DR. MARTIN WHITTAKER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR SMITH

Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ‘‘during the 20th century, the atmospheric

concentrations of a number of greenhouse gasses have increased, mostly because of

the actions of mankind.’’ Do you agree with that statement? Why or why not?

Response. On matters relating to the science of climate change, including the

buildup of GHG concentrations and the potential effects on global climate conditions, I take my lead from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which

I believe to be an authoritative source on the subject. To the extent that Dr. Rowland’s statement reflects the opinion of the IPCC, yes, I agree with his statement.

A brief point on the issue of scientific discourse: As a scientist by training I realize

that uncertainty and debate are fundamental to the process of scientific and technological advancement. While it is clear that uncertainties remain, and that there are

scientists whose opinions differ from those of the IPCC, it appears that the balance

of probability has shifted toward the view that anthropogenic influences have accelerated the buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere, and that this buildup is likely to

be causing changes in the Earth’s climate.

Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ‘‘the primary cause for . . . growth in

impact[] is the increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in climate, per se.’’ Do you agree with this

claim? Why or why not?

Response. As I recall, Dr. Pielke was trying to point out that the heightened economic impact of climate variability was due to more to the increased vulnerability

of human systems than to climate change per se (in other-words, modern day society

was more exposed to climate variability by virtue of the fact that urban centers,

coastal developments, etc., were likely to suffer greater economic impacts from extreme weather events). I agree that human and environmental systems are more

vulnerable to climate variability than was previously the case; the recent reports

from Swiss Re, Munich Re and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory/U.S.

DOE strongly support this view. But the same reports also present compelling evidence that the incidence and severity of extreme weather conditions is also rising,

implying that it is not just the economic consequences of climate variability that is

worrying, but that the variability is also becoming greater.

Ultimately, however, I am not sure that I recognize a huge distinction between

the two points of view in terms of what it means for how we go about addressing

the problem. If impacts are growing because of increasing vulnerability of human

and environmental systems to climate variability (and if anthropogenic GHG emissions are increasing climate variability) then it is still prudent to adapt more effectively to changing climate conditions and deal with anthropogenic GHG emissions.

Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ‘‘the present research agenda is focused

. . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate future’’ and that ‘‘instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no . . . we might be better served by addressing

things like the present drought. . .’’ Do you agree with that proposition? Why or why

not?

Response. I believe that Dr. Pielke is right to stress the importance of dealing

with more immediate climate-related problems (such as droughts, famines, etc.),

which have tended to become forgotten in terms of the overall global warming debate (although not within broader development circles). However, given the possible

causal connections that exist between the short-term problems he alludes to and the

longer term issue of global warming, I don’t believe that we can afford to dismiss

the need to better understand future climate conditions altogether. IPCC data presented in the Third Assessment Report and the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios implies that one cannot successfully deal with one issue without tackling the

other, and make plain the links between short- and long-term climate issues, and

the critical importance of broader demographic, technological and political trends in

determining future emissions scenarios. The integrated, interdependent nature of

these broader factors, captured within the image of sustainable development, has

been overlooked in my opinion within the climate change debate (which has focused

more on Kyoto instead). I would certainly concur that less focus on esoteric matters

of perceived scientific relevance and more urgency around action to improve the

lives of ordinary people and the world in which we live is desirable.
192

Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto Protocol? Do you

agree with the assertion that full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would only

avert the expected temperature change by 6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why

not?

Response. I believe that the Kyoto Protocol is a valuable first step toward reducing global GHG emissions and that it also has importance as an expression of collective commitment to addressing the climate change issue, and a point around which

national efforts to can be coordinated and consolidated. True, as you state in the

question, even if fully implemented, the Kyoto targets would have a negligible effect

on atmospheric GHG concentrations and expected temperatures. However, I don’t

believe that this should be used to dismiss the Kyoto Protocol, rather to point out

its importance as the precursor to a more comprehensive and ambitious emissions

reduction process.

That said, the critical questions to my mind are whether anthropogenic GHG

emissions are causing climate variations and, if society believes that to be so, how

can we bring about emissions reductions in an optimal fashion. Whether this reduction effort is within the terms of the Kyoto Protocol or not is, in the bigger picture,

of secondary importance. In this sense, I concur with the implication of the question,

i.e., that Kyoto is not necessarily the answer to the climate problem, and that a

longer-term solution needs to be identified.

Question 5. Since the hearing there has been much press attention paid to the

breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion ton iceberg known as

‘‘Larsen B,’’ that has been attributed to climate change. What scientific evidence is

there that climate change is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any scientific evidence that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of

Larsen B?

Response. I’m afraid I do not feel qualified enough on the Larsen B issue to offer

any insights as to the specific scientific causes. I would only note that the Larsen

B story is the latest in a long line of reports of changing environmental conditions

in polar regions, the general thrust of which is that global warming is the root

cause.

Question 6a. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening statement was

a Swiss Re report titled ‘‘Climate research does not remove the uncertainty; Coping

with the risks of climate change’’ (copy attached). Please explain why you agree or

disagree with the following assertions or conclusions from that report: ‘‘There is not

one problem but two: natural climate variability and the influence of human activity

on the climate system.’’

Response. I agree that distinguishing human-induced climate changes from natural variations is an important issue the resolution of which will clearly help to determine the extent to which efforts to curb climate change through limiting anthropogenic emissions will be successful.

Question 6b. ‘‘. . . it is essential that new or at least wider-ranging concepts of

protection are developed. These must take into account the fact that the maximum

strength and frequency of extreme weather conditions at a given location cannot be

predicted.’’

Response. By protection I assume that Swiss Re is referring to safeguarding the

integrity of global human and environmental conditions.

Swiss Re’s assertion that the characteristics of extreme weather events at specific

locations cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy is most worrying to me

when set against their belief that extreme weather events are generally increasing

in frequency and severity (conclusions arrived at from studies of past events). If this

is indeed the case, then yes, provisions must be made to manage extreme weather

risks particularly in those regions where in a general sense the Capacity to deal

with extreme weather is weakest, or the human and economic effects could be greatest. For example, the use of weather derivatives, catastrophe bonds, and other insurance tools could help the industry deal with such varying conditions by improving liquidity and widening insurance coverage. ,

Question 6c. ‘‘Swiss Re considers it very dangerous (1) to put the case for a collapse of the climate system, as this will stir up fears which—if they are not confirmed—will in time turn to carefree relief, and (2) to play down the climate problem

for reasons of short-term expediency, since the demand for sustainable development

requires that today’s generations take responsible measures to counter a threat of

this kind.’’

Response. I absolutely agree with this call for moderation. Indeed, within the financial community Innovest serves, the major barriers to stimulating widespread

action to examining climate related risks have been (i) the predictions of cata-
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1 IPCC Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report

strophic and unmanageable climate disruptions, which tend to turn off many people

who might otherwise be sympathetic, and (ii) a disconnect between short term economic interests and what is perceived to be an exclusively long term climate change

issue. Our work has focused on providing robust, reasoned, independent analysis of

the business impacts for precisely this reason.

To my mind, the inherent characteristics of climate change as a potential risk

issue for ordinary people all work against taking action: it is rather ethereal and

therefore doesn’t seem ‘real’ (you can’t touch, feel or see it, unlike, say, asbestos);

the risk is perceived to be long term, and is therefore instinctively discounted; it

is an issue which affects the collective, as opposed to the individual, which again

leads people to discount it as a threat to personal well-being; people are generally

familiar with it, and therefore don’t feel especially worried; and it seems to be out

of any one person’s control. Long-term, illusory, scattered and unmanageable risks

that affect everyone are simply not regarded as matters of any great urgency.

Question 7. Do you believe that our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions

is increasing? Why or why not?

Response. On the issue of environmental and economic vulnerability, I believe

that the evidence presented by the IPCC (selected passages presented below) and

other sources of similar international standing is sufficiently worrying to warrant

action and indicates that indeed our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions is

increasing: • According to the IPCC, the Earth’s average surface temperature will rise 1.4 to

5.8oC (2.5—10.4 oF) between 1990 and 2100. Sea levels could rise between 9 and

88 cm over the same period. The decade of the 1990’s was the hottest of the last

century and is warmer than decade in the last 1,000 years in the Northern Hemisphere. • According to December 2000 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) statistics, 2000 was the 22d consecutive year with global mean surface temperatures

above the 1961–1990 normal. 1999 was the 5th warmest year in the past 140 years,

bested only by 1998, 1997, 1995 and 1990. • Severe weather events also continued to increase in size and number. Record

rainfall and flooding in Western Europe, severe cold conditions in East Asia and

Russia, heat waves and drought in China, Central Asia and the Middle East, and

mudslides and typhoons in Southern Africa and Latin America all reached significant proportions over the course of 2000. • Recent IPCC figures for climate-related influences on healthcare costs, vector

borne diseases, coastline erosion, crop yields and other metrics all point toward increasing negative impacts on Earth ecosystems.

RESPONSES BY DR. MARTIN WHITTAKER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1a. Advocates of the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive reductions in emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global CO2 concentration target of 550 ppm

CO2 by 2100 which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed

countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of 550 ppm by 2100

is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on emissions for the United States

by 2050? By 2100?

Response. Innovest has not prepared forecasts of this nature and I would be reluctant to do so without sufficient background preparation. I can only refer you to the

IPCC, which has recommended to UNFCCC signatories that atmospheric GHG concentrations should be stabilized at 550 ppmv of CO2 equivalent (or twice pre-industrial levels), which would require a 60 percent cut in GHG emissions relative to

1990 levels1.

Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you provide this analysis.

Response. I am not aware of any reliable analysis on this particular subject.

Question 2. What economic analysis is there for the impacts of implementing

Kyoto and reductions beyond Kyoto on the Canadian economy?

Response. The Government of Canada does not have an official estimate of the

economic impacts of meeting its Kyoto target. That said, the Federal Analysis and

Modelling Group has estimated that impacts,on GDP could be (in the worst case)

up to 3 percent between now and 2010; over the same period, the country’s GDP

is expected to grow 30 percent. In other words, Kyoto could shave up to 3 percent
194

off GDP growth over the next 8 years and result in 450,000 jobs lost. This, approximates to a reduction of roughly C$11 billion, or C$400 per capita. On the other

hand, the best case scenario according to AMG is a ‘slight positive’ effect on GDP

and the net creation of 65,000 jobs.

Cost estimates from other sources (academic and specialist research houses) tend

to range from 0.2 percent to 2.5 percent GDP reduction, and a March 2002 Industry

Canada report estimates that costs will be in the region of 1.5 percent of GDP, or

about C$17 billion in 2010.

In terms of direct costs relating to reducing emissions, AMG describes 2 approaches; in one, expenditures to reduce emissions minus the energy efficiency gains

under a carbon ‘cost’ scenario of C$10–25 per tonne would result in net benefits of

about C$3 billion per year. In the other, the additional costs to do with transactions,

downtime to adjust business configuration and other anticipated indirect expenditures associated with the shift toward lower carbon fuels are factored in. In this approach, under the same carbon price scenarios, costs are estimated to be in the

order of C$1.1 billion per year, or about C$40 per person.

A recent popularly discussed report issued by the Canadian Manufacturers Exporters Association, a group opposed to Kyoto ratification, pegged the costs of Kyoto

to the Canadian economy at 450,000 jobs by 2010 and describes a multitude of negative consequences for ordinary Canadians ranging from having to drive in smaller

cars and refit their homes with expensive energy conservation equipment to paying

more taxes.

Question 3. What are companies doing in other countries to mitigate their business risk?

Response. As you might expect, companies’ actions to mitigate business risks depend on their reasons for wanting to act in the first place. We have identified several reasons why businesses feel it necessary to take mitigative action.

(a) Compliance (or Anticipated Compliance) particularly in Canada, Europe and

Japan; A recent study among Canadian natural gas utilities showed Enbridge Consumers Gas as the only company to achieve a net greenhouse gas emissions decrease (30 percent) between 1990–7. In 2000, ECG introduced a program to promote

energy-efficient equipment in the residential marketplace. Since 1996, the firm’s demand-side management program has reduced customers’ emissions by 364,000

tonnes of CO2 equivalent. Dupont Canada, partly in expectation of future emissions

constraints, report that CO2 equivalents (including CFCs) have decreased from 160

billion lbs. in 1998 to 120 billion lbs. 1999, and the company aims to achieve a 65

percent reduction in GHG by 2010 from 1990 base year.

(b) Improved efficiency; Deutsche Telekom, for example, reports that it has saved

over DM 8 million in energy costs and reduced carbon dioxide emissions simply by

adjusting the output of air-conditioning systems. Pasquale Pistorio, President and

CEO of STMicroelectronics (an Innovest ‘AAA’-ranked firm), reported returns on energy conservation efforts within 2 years and estimated savings of nearly $1 billion

on energy costs between 1994 and 2010 due to use of clean energy alternatives and

efficiency measures. And NTT, which will need roughly 4.7-billion kWh of electricity

in 2000 and is Japan’s largest single purchaser of electric power, is pursuing an energy conservation vision that aims to produce savings of 100 billion yen over 10

years over a business-as-usual scenario, thereby reducing indirect greenhouse gas

emissions.

(c) Reputation; In Othello, Shakespeare’s lago notes that ‘He that filches my good

name . . . makes me poor indeed’. Many leading firms have also recognized the true

value of reputation and the importance of climate change to this reputation. ABB,

the Swedish engineering and power equipment firm, has already adopted product

specifications around greenhouse gas intensity to help distinguish its products in

the market place, and Electrolux, BP, Baxter and Suncor have associated their

brands very closely with climate friendliness.

(d) Voluntary Targets: The flip side of the reputation issue, many firms are walking the talk and demonstrating their climate credentials by setting themselves voluntary targets. Entergy, which is clearly not yet formally obliged to reduce emissions, purchased 10,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide allowances for under $5 per

metric ton as part of its recently announced efforts to voluntarily cut greenhouse

gas emissions over the next few years working with Environmental Defense. By virtue of this action, Entergy will be able to lock in relatively cheap emissions reduction credits and take significant steps toward meeting its voluntary targets.

(e) Concerns over exposure to changing weather conditions; Natural gas companies have begun to hedge their exposure to warmer weather (which depresses demand for natural gas used in heating) through the purchase of weather derivatives.

Food product firms are also particularly exposed on this front. Due to warm weather
195

and severe storms, Central American farmers harvested their banana crop earlier

than normal in late 1997 and early 1998, increasing production by 13 percent.

Prices fell as the fruit flooded the North American market, forcing down Dole’s mar- gins. In March 1998, Dole’s stock price dropped 12 percent in one day. Continued

extremes in weather resulting from climate change could also have serious repercussions on food markets due to direct damage to operations. Hurricane Mitch caused

massive damage to Honduras, in part because of mudslides exacerbated by deforestation in the region. Both Dole Foods and Chiquita suffered extensive damage to operations in that country which reduced profits and pushed stock prices downwards.

(f) Competitiveness drivers and the need to innovate; In the U.K., Johnson

Matthey’s ‘‘smart’’ technologies, which contribute to climate. protection by facilitating smaller, lighter and more energy efficient products and processes, typify the

kind of innovation opportunities that climate change is creating. In the mining industry, Inco’s nickel hydride battery technologies, which contribute to climate protection by facilitating smaller, lighter and more energy efficient hybrid vehicles, are

a prime example of how climate change concerns are causing established, ‘old-economy’ companies to reexamine their business mix.

I would be happy to provide more details of individual company activities and initiatives on climate change, drawn from Innovest’s data base on corporate environmental positioning.

STATEMENT OF JACK D. COGEN, PRESIDENT, NATSOURCE LLC

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify. My name is Jack Cogen and I am the president of Natsource LLC,

an energy environmental commodity broker headquartered in New York City with

offices in Washington, DC, Europe, Japan, Canada, and Australia. My testimony

will address the financial risk associated with climate change policy.

At the outset, I want to acknowledge that there are legitimate differences of opinion as to what should be the nature, degree and timing of policy responses to the

risk associated with climate change itself. However, the role of Natsource is to work

with clients who decide it is in their best interest to evaluate the extent of their

financial exposure under possible greenhouse gas policies. Our clients make the

threshold decision that they are at risk financially. After that, the next step for

them is to analyze the extent of their financial risk and develop strategies that

make sense for mitigating that risk. Natsource contributes its policy and market expertise to helping clients assess and manage risk.

The client base of Natsource includes multinational corporations as well as foreign

and domestic firms. Natsource assists them in quantifying their financial exposure

under different policies that might be adopted to limit greenhouse gas emissions.

Our experience indicates that companies consider a variety of factors when they

weigh the degree of risk they face and what to do about it. The primary factors are

(1) the probability they will be subject to emission limitation policies, and (2) the

potential direct and indirect cost of those policies to the company.

Natsource provides analysis, strategic advice, and market intelligence once a company decides to undertake a comprehensive risk assessment. Generally, we help clients assess their financial exposure by identifying policies that might be adopted;

assigning probabilities to those policies; quantifying the net emissions ‘‘shortfall’’ or

‘‘surplus’’ the company faces under each policy; and estimating potential compliance

costs based on the company’s emissions profile, internal reduction opportunities, and

our knowledge of various commodities available in the greenhouse gas emission

markets. Multinational companies face an especially complicated risk because they

operate across multiple jurisdictions with different policies. In addition, many of

these companies must evaluate the effect of climate change policies on the market

demand for their products in different countries.

If potential compliance costs are substantial and the probability of emission limitations is significant enough, the next step for many companies is to develop a costeffective risk management strategy. This involves assembling an optimal mix of

measures for reducing or offsetting emissions. These include internal and external

emission reduction projects, internal emission trading programs, and external trading markets.

Companies choose to undertake emission reduction measures in spite of or because of policy uncertainty for a variety of reasons, including to reduce future compliance costs, gain experience in the greenhouse gas markets, maintain or enhance

their environmental image, and place a value on internal reduction opportunities.

Greenhouse gas markets are evolving and will continue to evolve over the next

several years. In the future, these markets will function more smoothly and with
196

lower transaction costs as greenhouse gas policies become clearer and markets become more liquid. Even now, more sophisticated financial instruments such as call

options are being used as a hedge against risk.

Natsource recently completed the first comprehensive analysis of the greenhouse

gas trading market for the World Bank. The analysis identified approximately 60

greenhouse gas transactions involving some 55 million tons of emissions. These

numbers actually underestimate the total number of transactions because they do

not include internal-only transactions and small volume transactions. Current market prices for greenhouse gas commodities range from less than a dollar to over $9

per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent, depending on the type of commodity and vintage.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, a small but growing number of companies are beginning to more carefully analyze their financial risk under possible greenhouse gas

policies. For a variety of reasons, some companies have decided to take steps now

to reduce emissions even though final policy decisions, in most cases, are still pending. As a consequence, these companies are able to take advantage of the most costeffective opportunities to reduce their financial exposure. As the markets for sulfur

dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions in the United States have shown, emission

markets can provide an efficient way to lower the cost of reducing emissions.

That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to answer any questions you or other Members of the committee might have.

RESPONSES BY JACK D. COGEN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SMITH

Question 1. Dr. Rowland testified that ‘‘during the 20th century, the atmospheric

concentrations of a number of greenhouse gases have increased, mostly because of

the actions of mankind.’’ Do you agree with that statement? Why or why not?

Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing brokerage services

and strategic risk assessment and risk management advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or research issues associated with climate change.

Consequently, I am not able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.

Question 2. Dr. Pielke testified that ‘‘the primary cause for . . . growth in impact

is the increasing vulnerability of human and environmental systems to climate variability and change, not changes in climate per se.’’ Do you agree with this claim?

Why or why not?

Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing brokerage services

and strategic risk assessment and risk management advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or research issues associated with climate change.

Consequently, I am not able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.

Question 3. Dr. Pielke also stated that ‘‘the present research agenda is focused

. . . improperly on prediction of the distant climate future’’ and that ‘‘instead of arguing about global warming, yes or no . . . we might be better served by addressing

things like the present drought . . .’’ Do you agree with that proposition? Why or

why not?

Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing brokerage services

and strategic risk assessment and risk management advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or research issues associated with climate change.

Consequently, I am not able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.

Question 4. Do you believe we should fully implement the Kyoto Protocol? Do you

agree with the assertion that full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would only

avert the expected temperature change by 6/100 of a degree, Celsius? Why or why

not?

Response. Natsource does not have a position with respect to either the ratification or implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Natsource’s expertise and the services

and advice we provide our clients do not include assessing the climatic consequences

of implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, I am unable to provide any opinion

on possible temperature changes.

Question 5. Since the hearing there has been much press attention paid to the

breakup of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, especially a 500-billion ton iceberg known as

‘‘Larsen B’’ that has been attributed to climate change. What scientific evidence is

there that climate change is the sole cause of this phenomenon? Is there any sci-
197

entific evidence that anthropogenic influences bore any role in the breakup of

Larsen B?

Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing brokerage services

and strategic risk assessment and risk management advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or research issues associated with climate change.

Consequently, I am not able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.

Question 6. Included in the hearing record as part of my opening statement was

a Swiss Re report titled ‘‘Climate research does not remove the uncertainty; Coping

with the risks of climate change’’ (copy attached). Please explain why you agree or

disagree with [certain] assertions or conclusions from that report.

Response. The Swiss Re report offers ideas that many people will find useful in

the debate over climate change and others will dispute. Natsource’s expertise does

not include issues associated with science or research, so we are not in a position

to either agree or disagree with the conclusions of the report. The Swiss Re report

states that the firm ‘‘is involved in the political debate about global climate protection . . .’’ Natsource is not involved in the political debate over climate change.

Rather, Natsource works with clients—many of whom are involved in the debate—

to help them assess and manage financial risk due to policies to limit greenhouse

gas emissions.

Question 7. Do you, believe that our vulnerability to extreme weather conditions

is increasing? Why or why not?

Response. My expertise and that of Natsource lies in providing brokerage services

and strategic risk assessment and risk management advice to our clients. Our expertise does not cover scientific or research issues associated with climate change.

Consequently, I am not able to provide a response that would be helpful to the committee.

RESPONSES BY JACK D. COGEN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1a. Advocates for the Kyoto Protocol expect aggressive reductions in

emissions beyond 2012. Some advocate a global CO2 concentration target of 550 ppm

CO2 by 2100 which will require substantial reductions in the emissions of developed

countries (including the United States). If a concentration target of 550 ppm by 2100

is adopted, what is your estimate of the caps on emissions for the United States

by 2050? By 2100?

Response. Natsource’s expertise does not include the ability to evaluate the relationship between atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and emissions

caps. Therefore, we are not able to provide any estimate with regard to emission

caps.

Question 1b. Are you aware of any economic analysis of the impact of these reductions beyond the initial Kyoto target? If so, can you provide this analysis?

Response. We are aware of general analysis of this issue conducted by preeminent

research institutes.

Question 2. What portion of Natsource’s business is dependent on the establishment of a trading scheme for CO2?

Response. Natsource is engaged in brokering transactions involving energy-related

commodities. These commodities include electricity, natural gas, coal and emissions.

Emissions brokering is provided by dozens of other firms. Natsource has provided

emissions brokering services for SO2 and NOx since the firm’s establishment in

1994. These brokerage services contribute to the liquidity of emission markets and,

ultimately, to finding the most cost-effective strategies for companies to reduce

emissions. Natsource became engaged in the emerging market for greenhouse gas

emissions because clients sought our expertise—and the expertise of similar firms—

in assessing and managing the risk they face because of the uncertainty of future

greenhouse gas policies in the United States and other countries. For some companies, a risk management strategy for greenhouse gases involves taking advantage

of past reduction efforts (e.g., sequestration) and obtaining additional reduction

credits through various types of market transactions. These market transactions can

involve the purchase of various types of reductions, the purchase of call options or

the swapping of emission reductions between different jurisdictions, to name a few.

As I mentioned in my testimony on March 13, our clients decide they are at risk

because of policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions and we help them to develop

and implement strategies to mitigate their risk.
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As far as Natsource’s business with respect to CO2 trading is concerned, we have

been involved in brokering a number of greenhouse gas transactions in the United

States and in other countries. Many of these transactions have taken place either

to comply in the most cost-effective way with government policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions, or to begin reducing emissions cost-effectively in anticipation

of expected policies to limit emissions. This later type of risk mitigation is similar

to the purchase of business insurance. While Natsource has been involved in

brokering transactions, our main focus has also been on providing strategic counsel

on risk assessment and risk management. Currently, a very small portion of

Natsource’s business is dependent on greenhouse gas trading. It is unlikely that the

public policy debate over climate change will be concluded soon. Therefore,

Natsource will continue to provide strategic counsel to domestic and international

clients.

Question 3. Has Natsource (including any of its staff) ever been involved in advocating the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol?

Response. In order to provide the highest quality strategic counsel to our clients,

Natsource is pleased to have staff that have served in senior positions in the U.S.

Government under different Presidents. In their official capacity as representatives

of the U.S. Government, some of these staff advocated adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. However, Natsource neither supports nor opposes adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, nor do any of Natsource’s staff support or oppose adoption. Natsource has clients with a variety of views on the Kyoto Protocol.
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EAST-WEST CENTER,

Honolulu, HI, March 28, 2002.

Hon. JAMES JEFFORD,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR JEFFORDS: Thank you for the kind invitation to share some

thoughts on the recently concluded first U.S. National Assessment of the Consequences of Climate Variability and Change. I had privilege of coordinating the Pacific Islands regional contribution to that important endeavor and I am delighted

to join my colleagues in the Northeast and the other regional programs in summarizing some of the insights we gained during the process. I have enclosed a copy

of the final report of the Pacific Assessment and I hope that you and your staff will

find it helpful in your efforts.

The Pacific Assessment explored the consequences of climate variability and

change for the American Flag Pacific Islands (Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa and

the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) and the U.S.-affiliated Pacific

Islands that include the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Republic of Palau. The Pacific Assessment was supported through

a grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF) with resources from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration (NASA), and the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI).

I was the Principal Investigator and the East-West Center coordinated the Pacific

Assessment in collaboration with scientific partners from the University of Hawaii,

the University of Guam and NOAA (most notably the National Weather Service Pacific Region and the National Centers for Environmental Prediction of the National

Weather Service), and the National Center for Atmospheric Research as well as regional organizations such as the Pacific Islands Development Program, the Pacific

Basin Development Council and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme.

In addition to a scientific program of data analysis, research and modeling aimed

at developing a more complete understanding of the regional consequences of climate variability and change, the Pacific Assessment focused on the establishment

of a sustained, interactive dialog between scientists and decisionmakers designed to

promote the use of climate information to address critical issues in the region. The

research and dialog activities supported through the Pacific Assessment have identified a number of specific actions that can be taken to reduce climate-related vulnerability and enhance the resilience of Pacific Islands in the following critical areas:

• Providing access of freshwater resources;

• Protecting public health;

• Ensuring public safety and protecting community infrastructure;

• Sustaining agriculture and sustaining tourism as two particularly significant

economic sectors; and

• Promoting the wise use of coastal and marine resources (including coral reefs

and fisheries).

More than 200 individuals representing the scientific community, Government

Agencies, businesses, NGO’s and community leaders contributed their insights and

expertise to the Pacific Islands Regional Assessment process and the findings and

recommendations reflected in the final report are already being used by each of

those stakeholder groups throughout the region.

Perhaps the most important recommendation to emerge from the effort was that

the Pacific Assessment should be a continuing process of research and dialog with

the overarching goal of nurturing the critical partnerships necessary to develop climate information to support decisionmaking. We have taken this recommendation

to heart and are actively seeking resources to address some of the critical research

and information gaps identified during the Pacific Assessment process including:

• improving our understanding of climate-related extreme events;

• enhancing Pacific Island efforts to reduce vulnerability to patterns of natural

climate variability such as El Nin ̃ o and, thereby, enhance regional capabilities to

adapt to long-term climate change;

• improving our ability to document and model climate processes and consequences on local, island and regional scales;

• developing reliable projections of climate variability and change on various

timescales; and

• enhancing our understanding of the consequences of changes in climate on the

region’s unique ecosystems and natural resources, including the consequences of

those changes for critical economic sectors such as tourism, fisheries and agriculture.
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Like our colleagues in other regions, we are committed to securing the resources

required to help establish a Pacific regional climate information service—an integrated scientific and decision support system that will support the development and

application of new scientific insights in response to the information needs identified

by the governments, businesses, resource managers, public interest groups and communities that participated in the Pacific Assessment.

We would, of course, like to see a similar commitment on the part of the U.S.

Global Change Research Program Agencies that supported the first National Assessment. While we seen promising indications of continued interest in Pacific Assessment activities within individual Agencies such as NOAA and EPA, the absence of

a clear national, interagency commitment to sustaining this important regional assessment process discouraging and unfortunate.

In welcoming the regional participants to the Pacific Assessment’s November 2000

Workshop on Climate and Island Coastal Communities, East-West Center President

Charles Morrison offered the following thought:

The impacts of the 1997–1998 El Nin ̃ o are fresh in our minds, and the latest

reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change confirm what all of

you already know—changes in climate matter to individuals, communities, businesses and governments who call islands home. Your valuable natural resources, traditional ways of life, critical economic sectors, community support

infrastructure and, to a great extent, your future depend on developing an effective response to the challenges presented by climate variability and change.

Similar statements have emerged from the Northeast and other regional assessments conducted as part of the first National Assessment. Changes in climate matter to this region, this Nation and the world. As the individual and collected programs initiated during the first National Assessment process demonstrated, the scientific community, governments, businesses and communities around this Nation

and throughout the world can meet the challenges and capitalize on the opportunities that changes in climate present to us when we combine our individual expertise, insights and assets in a continuing program of shared learning and joint problem solving. The first National Assessment represented a critical step in the emergence of such a new climate partnership. The interest that you and your congressional colleagues have shown in continuing the National Assessment process is encouraging and I’m sure that my regional assessment colleagues join me in expressing our willingness to work with you and the Agencies of the U.S. Global Change

Research Program in this important, shared endeavor.

Thank you, again for the opportunity to share some of my thoughts on the National Assessment process. If you or your staff have any questions or would like to

discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Alona pumehana,

EILEEN L. SHEA,

Climate Project Coordinator.

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