ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 

Appeal of --

Patriot Pride Jewelry, LLC 

Under Contract No. 11-PS-006 

APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: 

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 

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ASBCA No. 58953 

John J. Hoke, Esq. 

Smith Hoke, PLLC 

Albany, NY 

Raymond M. Saunders, Esq. 

Army Chief Trial Attorney 

CPT Evan C. Williams, JA 

Trial Attorney 

OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE PEACOCK 

PURSUANT TO RULE 12.3 

This timely appeal involves a dispute concerning a retail agreement executed by 

Patriot Pride Jewelry, LLC ("Patriot Pride" or "appellant") and the Army & Air Force 

Exchange Service ("AAFES" or "government"). Appellant has elected to have the 

appeal processed pursuant to the Board's accelerated procedures prescribed in Rule 12.3 

and the parties have submitted the appeal for decision on the record under Rule 11. We 

deny the appeal. 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

The Agreement 

1. On 25 October 2011, Patriot Pride and the AAFES entered into AAFES Retail 

Agreement No. 11-PS-006 (the "Agreement") which contained standard terms and 

conditions that would apply to future transactions between AAFES (as retailer) and 

Patriot Pride (as vendor) (R4, tab 1 at 1). 

2. AAFES is a non-appropriated funds instrumentality (NAFI) of the United 

States Government for which the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does not apply 

(R4, tab 1at4). Ms. Pamela Thompson is employed by AAFES as a merchandise 

manager (supp. R4, tab 2 at 2). 
3. The agreement stated that it would become effective on 25 October 2011 and 

end 24 October 2018, unless sooner terminated with an estimated value of $50,000 (R4, 

tab 1 at 1). 

4. Under the heading "VENDOR TERMS - Negotiable Payment Terms," the 

agreement expressly provided there to be no minimum quantity with respect to individual 

purchase orders (R4, tab 1 at 1). No other provision of the agreement required the 

government to order any minimum quantity during the duration of the contract. 

5. Also under the heading "VENDOR TERMS -Negotiable Payment Terms," 

Patriot Pride inserted as one of its "vendor terms" that it required a "lead time" of "5 days 

after receipt of order" or the ship date on the purchase order to deliver the costume 

jewelry (R4, tab 1 at 1). The agreement also stated, "Vendor agrees to receive orders and 

send advanced ship notices (ASNs) and invoices via EDI unless specifically waived by 

AAFES" (id.). 

6. The agreement contained the following provision under the heading 

"TERMINATION BY NOTICE": 

Either party may terminate any and all performance under 

an individual purchase order, provided such notice is given 

not less than ten (10) calendar days before performance is 

required. Notice must be given in writing, to include 

electronic mail. 

(R4, tab 1 at 4) 

7. The Agreement's "DISPUTES" clause stated in relevant part: 

a. Each contract resulting from, or referencing, this 

agreement is subject to the Contract Disputes Act of 

1978, as amended (41 U.S.C. 601-613). Except as 

provided in the ACT, all disputes arising under or 

relating to this contract shall be resolved under this 

clause. 

f. The contracting officer will mail, or otherwise furnish, a 

written decision in response to a contractor claim 

within the time periods specified by law. Such decision 

will be final and conclusive unless: 

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(R4, tab 1 at 4-5) 

( 1) Within 90 calendar days from the date of 

contractor's receipt of the final decision, the 

contractor appeals the decision to the Armed 

Services Board of Contract Appeals 

(ASBCA) .... 

8. The Agreement also contained the following clause: 

AAFESNENDOR PARTNERSHIP MARKETING 

PROGRAM (JUL 94). The AAFES Marketing Program 

consists of numerous elements to enhance the sale of 

consumer products and services. At the Contractor's 

request, AAFES will give the Contractor the opportunity to 

participate in selected elements of the program. All 

participation will be in conjunction with the sale of 

authorized products and services to authorized customers. 

AAFES reserves the right to limit the degree of 

participation based on availability, designated themes of 

special events, and the overall goals of the program. 

(R4, tab 1 at 21) 

9. The agreement also included, by reference, various sections of the AAFES 

Supplier Requirements - Agreement 03-01 ("Supplier Requirements") (R4, tab 1 at 8). 

Of particular relevance to this appeal, the following sections were specifically identified: 

Section 1 A - Paragraphs 

Section 8 - Fine Jewelry 

Section 10 - Exchange Mail Order Catalog/Internet 

Section 11 - Retail Merchandise 

(R4, tab 1 at 2) 

10. Specifically, Section 10 of the Supplier Requirements included terms 

regarding how delivery orders were to be placed, shipping/packing instructions, invoicing 

and returns (R4, tab I at 55-56). 

11. Also on 25 October 2011, the parties executed an AAFES Business Terms 

Agreement ("Business Terms Agreement") in reference to the Agreement (R4, tab 2 at 

1). The Business Terms Agreement obligated Patriot Pride to pay AAFES a 3% fee on 

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any sales made as a result of"Co-op Advertising" (id.). This 3% was to be paid annually 

if AAFES advertised Patriot Pride's merchandise (id). 

12. Under the agreement, an authorized patron could purchase an item of costume 

jewelry from AAFES using its online catalog - this purchase would then trigger the 

issuance of the purchase order by AAFES to Patriot Pride for that same item (R4, tab 4 at 

2; supp. R4, tab 2 at 4). 

13. In October 2011, AAFES elected to advertise Patriot Pride's costume jewelry 

in its online catalog (R4, tab 8). AAFES advertised the costume jewelry as AAFES 

products with online purchasers to place orders with and make payment to AAFES 

(supp. R4, tab 2 at 4). 

14. Between 12 May 2011and18 January 2013, AAFES sold 182 items of 

Patriot Pride's costume jewelry to authorized patrons. AAFES sold the 182 units to its 

customers for $8,529. (R4, tab 6) 

15. During a review of its online catalog, AAFES determined that it was no 

longer in its business interest to advertise Patriot Pride's costume jewelry considering 

unit sales and profitability (supp. R4, tab 2 at 5, tab 3). Although profitability standards 

were not included in the agreement, these standards were determined by AAFES business 

practices and decisions (supp. R4, tab 2 at 5). 

16. On 25 February 2013, Ms. Thompson notified Patriot Pride, via telephone, 

that its products would no longer be listed online (supp. R4, tab 2 at 5-6). However, 

AAFES did not terminate the agreement. 

17. Under the agreement, AAFES can still place orders with Patriot Pride for 

costume jewelry (supp. R4, tab 2 at 5). Specifically, AAFES may decide in its business 

judgment to advertise Patriot Pride's costume jewelry again, potentially leading to 

additional purchase orders (id.). Also, an authorized patron wishing to order an item of 

costume jewelry from the Patriot Pride assortment no longer online could contact the 

AAFES customer service team who could place a special order (id.). 

18. On 17 May 2013, Patriot Pride submitted a claim to AAFES for $41,071.43 the 

"remaining value of the contract" (R4, tab 7). 

19. On 11July2013, Ms. Thompson sent a letter to Patriot Pride denying its claim. 

In the letter, Ms. Thompson explained: 

The AAFES Retail Agreement is simply [an] agreement to 

do business, not a contract. It outlines what is required to 

do business. 

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(R4, tab 8) 

Patriot Pride alone made the decision to purchase 

inventory before actual purchase orders were placed. 

AAFES is not responsible for the $41,071.43 requested. 

20. Appellant timely appealed the denial of its claim by letter to the Board dated 

8 October 2013. 

21. The agreement has not been terminated and remains in effect until its 

expiration date of 24 October 2018 (R4, tab 1 at 1 ). 

DECISION 

Appellant contends that AAFES had an obligation to advertise its products in the 

AAFES online catalog, apparently for the entire seven-year term of the Agreement. The 

government argues that we lack jurisdiction to resolve the claim. Assuming arguendo 

that the Board has jurisdiction, the government maintains that nothing in the Agreement 

requires AAFES to continue to advertise appellant's products and that, in any event, 

Patriot Pride has failed to prove that it suffered damages as a consequence of the alleged 

breach. 

Jurisdiction 

The government contends that the Board's jurisdiction is dependent on whether 

the Agreement qualifies as a CDA "procurement" contract. See Coastal Corp. v. United 

States, 713 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1983). It notes that because the AAFES is a NAFI 

described in 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l) (2000), CDAjurisdiction would normally extend to 

its contracts as prescribed in 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)(l)-(2). However, the Agreement here 

is not one of the types of "procurement" contracts identified in the statute to which the 

Board's CDAjurisdiction extends, according to the government. We agree. 

Pursuant to the agreement, authorized AAFES patrons can purchase costume 

jewelry items, among other ways, using the AAFES online catalog, triggering the 

issuance of a purchase order under the Agreement by AAFES to appellant for the jewelry 

item to be shipped directly by Patriot Pride to the patron. In essence, AAFES merely acts 

as a retailer/middleman facilitating transactions between appellant and third-party buyers. 

AAFES does not purchase, or even receive the goods, in fulfilling its intermediary 

function. No traditional "buyer-seller" relationship exists between AAFES and appellant 

through which goods or services are transferred to the government. Cf Rick's Mushroom 

Service, Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The principal 

purpose of the Agreement is not to acquire property or services. Consequently, there is 

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no acquisition by AAFES of property or services within the meaning and coverage of the 

CDA. See also New Era Construction v. United States, 890 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (Fed. 

Cir. 1989) (construction financing arrangement between Department of Housing and 

Urban Development and nonfederal agency not a CDA contract because no acquisition 

for the direct benefit or use of the federal government); Florida Power & Light Co. v. 

United States, 307 F .3d 1364, 1371-74 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (contracts for the furnishing by 

the government of uranium enrichment services to utilities were not covered by the 

CDA). 

The fact that the Agreement itself provided that orders issued pursuant to the 

contract were "subject to" the CDA is not controlling. It is well settled that contractual 

language cannot confer jurisdiction not authorized by the statute. Florida Power & 

Light, 307 F.3d at 1370-71 (and cases cited); DRC, Inc., ASBCA No. 54206, 04-2 BCA 

~ 32,652 at 161,612 (USAID merely acted as a financier in connection with an underlying 

construction contract; no intent to procure goods or services and no "buyer and seller" 

relationship). Accordingly, to the extent jurisdiction exist, it is not derived from the 

CDA. 

Nevertheless, we consider that the Disputes clause in the Agreement provides an 

independent basis for jurisdiction. Although it inaccurately references the CDA, the 

clause unequivocally grants the Board authority to "all disputes arising under or relating 

to" the Agreement without limitation. By virtue of the parties' consensual agreement 

reflected in the clause, we have jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Cf G.E. Boggs 

& Associates, Inc., ASBCA No. 34841 et al., 91-1BCA~23,515 at 117,906 (and cases 

cited) (parties could not confer CDA jurisdiction by consent under non-procurement 

contract to mitigate effects of legislation on certain impacted AID contracts; Board 

assumed jurisdiction under non-CD A Disputes clause), transferred, G.E. Boggs 

& Associates v. Roskens, 969 F.2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirmed Board's conclusion 

that CDA not applicable to contracts; accordingly, case transferred to then Claims Court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988)); see also GAP Instrument Corp., ASBCA 

No. 51658, 01-1BCA~31,358 at 154,865 (although CDAjurisdiction likely present, 

Board noted that it could alternatively assume jurisdiction under Disputes clause even if 

license agreement was a nonprocurement contract). 

We note in this case that the Agreement does not lend itself to straightforward 

categorization. However, we consider it most similar to a basic agreement or basic ordering 

agreement and that well-established rules associated with such contracts and indefinite 

quantity contracts generally are germane in discussing the nature of the parties' rights 

and duties relating to the Agreement. Most importantly, the Agreement contains no 

guaranteed minimum quantity that the government must order or the appellant must supply. 

Only an estimated dollar amount ($50,000) for the total seven year term of the Agreement 

is prescribed. The Agreement itself simply sets forth a framework and terms for future 

orders of indefinite quantity that may be issued. Until such orders are issued, the parties' 

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obligations are illusory and unenforceable and no contract is formed for lack of mutuality 

and consideration. See, e.g., Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 

493 (1923); Crewzers Fire Crew Transport, Inc. v. United States, 741F.3d1380 

(Fed. Cir. 2014); Coyle 's Pest Control, Inc. v. Cuomo, 154 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 

Modern Systems Technology Corp. v. United States, 979 F.2d 200, 202-04 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 

Mason v. United States, 615 F.2d 1343, 1346 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 

(1980); Ridge Runner Forestry v. Veneman, 287 F.3d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2002); 

Apex International Management Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 38087 et al., 94-2 BCA ii 26,842 

at 133,550, aff'd on recon., 94-2 BCA ii 26,852; Julian Freeman, ASBCA No. 46675, 94-3 

BCA ii 27,280 at 135,906. 

In this case the Agreement has been partially performed through issuance of 182 

orders by AAFES for appellant's jewelry. Accordingly, even ifthe Agreement was 

unenforceable ab initio, it became valid and enforceable to the extent of that 

performance. See, e.g., Willard, Sutherland & Co., 262 U.S. at 493; Foreman Industries, 

ASBCA No. 25674, 83-2 BCA ii 16,828 at 83,719. On the other hand, Patriot Pride 

generally would be entitled to compensation only for the goods actually ordered by 

AAFES and supplied by appellant. See, e.g., Coyle 's Pest Control, Inc., 154 F .3d at 

1306. Mere partial performance does not make the Agreement binding and enforceable 

to the extent that it is executory. Cf, e.g., A.C. Ball Co., ASBCA No. 19375, 75-1 BCA 

ii 11,298 at 53,863. We consider that in light of the partial performance of the 

Agreement, the dispute and claim regarding the parties' advertising rights and obligations 

should be viewed as falling within our jurisdiction. The gravamen of the claim impacts 

both the partially performed and executory portions of the contract. 

The Merits 

Appellant's claim in this case is that the government breached the Agreement 

because it opted to discontinue advertising appellant's products in its online catalog. The 

claim is without merit. There is no provision in the contract that requires the government 

to advertise appellant's products. The sole obligations of the parties with respect to 

online advertising requires appellant to compensate the government 3 % of the order 

amount only if an order is placed as a result of inclusion and advertising of appellant's 

jewelry in the catalog. 1 Otherwise, the agreement affords the government considerable 

discretion with respect to advertising options based on its business judgment. It is 

unreasonable to interpret the 3% payment percentage inserted by appellant in the BTA 

for actual orders as a commitment by AAFES to advertise appellant's products online for 

seven years regardless of AAFES' s best business judgment and the marketability and 

1 Whether the 3% compensation due the government for orders placed via the online 

catalog is negotiable and whether the parties' have considered a higher 

percentage in order to induce the government to readvertise the items in the 

catalog is uncertain. 

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profitability of the jewelry. Given this discretion, and the unenforceability of the 

agreement generally until orders are placed, we consider that the government 

interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation of the Agreement when read as a 

whole. 

We also note that there is no requirement that appellant sell its products 

exclusively through AAFES or solely via AAFES online catalog orders. Finally, 

appellant could elect under the Termination by Notice clause to terminate "any and all 

performance" of orders issued pursuant to the Agreement.2 This provision permitted the 

appellant to opt out of any order it was unable or unwilling to perform. 

The appeal is denied. 3 

Dated: 9 June 2014 

I concur 

~~# Administrative Judge 

Vice Chairman 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

2 Although appellant inserted as one of its "vendor terms" that it required a "lead 

time" of "5 days after receipt of order," we do not consider that it thereby 

negated its right to terminate orders under this clause with ten days notice. 

Reading the contract reasonably as a whole and giving meaning to all its 

provisions, appellant's self imposition of a five-day lead time presumes that it 

elects to accept rather than terminate an order. 

3 The scope of this appeal encompasses all issues regarding both entitlement and 

quantum. In light of our conclusions herein, we need not reach issues regarding 

the adequacy and persuasiveness of appellant's evidence of its alleged damages. 

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I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 

Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 58953, Appeal of Patriot 

Pride Jewelry, LLC, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 

Dated: 

9 

JEFFREY D. GARDIN 

Recorder, Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals