T h e H on or abl e Ja mes S. G wi n of t h e U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct C ou r t f or t h e N or t h er n D i s t r i ct of O h i o, s i t t i n g by 1/ d esi gnat i o n. -1 - UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - : MI CHAEL

BO ARDL EY, : CASE NO. 1:07-CV-01986 : Plaintiff, : : vs. : OPI NI ON & ORDER : [R esolvingDoc. 64
. ] UNI TED STATES DEPARTMENT : OF T HE I NTERI OR, et al ., : : De fe nd ants
. : :

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - J AMES S. GW I

N, UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE: 1/ Pla int if f M ic ha e l B oa

rd le y se e ks a jud g me nt f

or c os ts a nd att orn ey

e xpe ns e s a ft e r h is
succe ssful First-Ame ndment challeng e to r e g u la ti ons promulgated by

the Depa rtment of the Interior. [Doc. 64 .] F or

the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , th e Court G RA NT S t h e motion in part, and DE NI ES it i n pa rt
. I. Plaintiff Mi ch ae l Bo ardle y “filed this ac tion, seekinga dec laration that the [ National Park Service ] regulations are unc onstitut ional and violative of the Religious F ree dom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U .S.C. § 2000bb–1, on t heir fa ce a nd as applied to him.” B o a rd l e y v . U .S . D e p’ t of Interior , 615 F.3d 508, 512- 13 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
. As the Court

of Ap pe a ls i nte rp re te d th e re gulatio ns , [t ]h e tw o r e gu lati o n s c h a ll e n g e d h e r e g o v e r

n“ [p ]u b li c a s s e mb li e s , me e ting s,” 36 C.F.R. § 2.51 , and the “ [s] ale or distribution of printed matter,” id. § 2.52 , within the natio na l pa

rk s. . . . F ir st, the y c a ll fo r the de signatio n of wh at the g overnm ent cal ls
“ fr e e sp e e c h are a s. ”
. . . Se c on d, the re gulatio ns pr oh ibi t “ [p]ub lic asse mbl ie s,Case No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

-2 - me eti ngs, gathe ri ngs, dem on st rat io ns , p arad es an d o th er publ ic e x pres si on s o f v ie ws ” and “ [t]he sa le or dis tr ibutio n of [non -c omm e rc ia l] pr int e d matte r” wi thi n pa rk are a s, unless “a pe rmit [ authorizing the a ctivity ] has been issued by the superintende nt.” Id. §§ 2.51(a) , 2.52(a)
. Boardley , 615 F.3d at 512
. Th e Court of Ap pe a ls fo un d the re gulatio ns fata lly ov e rb oa rd be c a us e the y a pp lie d to sma ll g roups and individuals, and e ven in desig nated f ree speec h are as. Id. at 520-23
. Noting that “neither party has ar gued that we should sever the regulations in order to leave part of them intact,” the Court of Appe als struck them down in their e ntirety
. Id . at 525
. Ha vin gob ta ine d s ome of

the re lie f h e so ught—B oa rd le y ha d a lso so ught dama g e s— on so me of his pr op os e d b a se s, B oardl ey fi le d th is p e tit ion

fo r f e e s a nd c os ts und e r t

he Eq ua l A c c e ss t o J ustice Ac t (“EAJA”). [Doc. 64
. ] II. The EAJA provides in ce rtain circ umstances f or aw ard of

attorney ’s fees an d co s t s to a lit ig ant who pr e va ils in a

laws uit a g a ins t th e Un ite d St ate s: A cour t sha ll awar d to a pre vailing pa rty other than the United States fee s and other expenses, in addition to any costs
. . . incurre d by that party in a ny civil a ction . . . including pr ocee dings f

or judicial revie w of ag ency action, broug ht by or ag ainst the United States in any

court having jur isdiction of that action, unless the cour t finds that the position of the United States was substa n t i al l y justified or that specia l c ir c ums tanc e s ma

ke an a wa rd un jus t.

. . . The c ourt, in its dis cre tion, may reduc e the amount to be awa rded . . . or deny an awa rd, to the extent that the preva iling par ty duringthe cour se of the pr oceed i n gs eng ag ed in conduc t which unduly and unrea sonably protrac ted the fina l resolution of th e m at t e r

i nc o n tr o v e r s y 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)
. “Onc e a plaintiff has been shown to be a preva iling party , the burden is on the g overnme ntCase No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

-3 - to show that its li tigation posit ion was subst antially justified on the law a nd the fa cts.” Cin c iare lli v. Re agan , 729 F.2d 801, 806 ( D.C. Cir. 1984) . To show substantial justification for purpose s of the EAJA, the Government must show that its posit ion was “justified in substance or in the main – that is, justi fied to a de g ree that could satisfy a re asonable person.” Piercev. Unde rwood , 487 U.S. 552, 5 65 ( qu o tati o n o mi tt e d )
. I t mu s t s h o w th at it s p o s it io n w a s “ mo r e th an me r e ly un d eserving of sanctions for f

rivolousness.” Id. at 566
. Where the merits panel finds the Gover nm en t ’s p o s ition
was e ntirely

without m er i t , it is notsubstantially justified for EAJA purposes. See Halverson v

. Slater , 206 F.3d 1205, 1211 ( D.C. Cir. 2000)
. The Gove rnment’s “ position” for EAJA purposes “includes, in a ddition to t he position taken by the Un ite d St ate s in

the c ivi l a c tio n, the a c tio n or fa ilure to a c t by the a g e nc y up on wh ic h th e c ivi l action is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)( D)
. “While the parties’ postures on individual matters may be more or less justified, the EAJ A— l i k e o t h er fee- shifting statutes—f avors tre atinga ca se as a

n inclusive whole, rather than a s atomiz ed line-items.” Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean , 496 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1990) . N on e the le ss, [i ]n som e ca ses a plaintiff may prese nt in one lawsuit distinctly differ ent claims for relief that are based on differ ent fac ts a nd leg al theories.
. . . The cong ressional intent to limi t awar ds to prevailingparties r equire s that these unre lated cla ims be treate d as if they had bee n raised in separate l awsuits, and ther efor e no fe e may be aw arde d for se rv ic e s o n th e un su c c e ssf ul c la im. He ns le yv . Ec k e rh ar t , 461 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1983) ; see J ean , 496 U.S. at 161 (ap p l yi n g Hensley ’s int e rp re tatio n of “ pr e va ili ngpa rt y” to t he EA JA) ; se e als o Gatimi v. Holder , 606 F.3d 344, 350 ( 7th Cir. 2010) ; Trip oli

Ro c k e try As s'n, In c . v . A TF

, 698 F. Supp. 2d 168, 175 (D.D .C. 2010)
. III . The Gove rnment conc edes that Boa rdley is a preva iling par

ty , [Doc. 69 at 8]and does notCase No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

T h e G ov er n men t a l s o s ay s t h at B oar dl ey ’ s f i l i n g v i ol at ed 2/ Lo c a l Ru l e 7( m) b e c a u se he faile d to c o n su lt w ith d e fen se c o u n se l. T h e C o u rt d isa g re e s. A n E A J A m o tio n is ‘ d isp o sitive ,’ a n d thu s falls o u tsid e the sc o p e o f Ru l e 7( m)
. Tr i pol i Rock et r

y As s ’ n, I

nc. v . ATF , 698 F. Su pp. 2d 168, 173 ( D
. D
. C. 2010)
. -4 - point to special circ umstances that would make an aw ard unjust. Instead, the G overnme nt say s that it was substantially

justified in promulgating, maintaining , and def endingthe re gulations. [ Doc. 69 at 8.] I t say s that it prevailed on m an y i s s u es and that Boar dley did not obtain all of the relief he soug ht. [Doc.

2/ 69 at 10-11.] Boa rdley say s that at least with re g ard the “other public expression of views” phr asing , and the r egulations’ failure to exempt individuals and sm all g roups, the De partment was not substantially

justified. [ Doc. 64 at 5.] He notes that he obtained invalidation of the entire regulation. [ Doc. 71 at 19.] But , B oardle y

broug ht two disti nctly

differ ent sets of c laims: his su c c e s s f u l F irst Amendment overbr eadth c halleng e, and his unsucc essful cla ims pre mised on differ ent leg al rig hts and some eve n ag ainst differ ent def

endants. [Doc. 1 .] T he se tw o s ets of c la ims c on sti tut e “ dis tin c tly dif fe re nt”
ac ti o n s , p r e mi s e d o n d if

f e r e n t f a c tu a l p r e d ic ate s an d d if f e r e n t le g a l th e o r ie s . Wh il e the former de se rv e s r e imb ur se me nt, the latte r d o n ot. A. Fre e S p ee ch a n d Du e Pr o ce s s Cl a i ms Throug hout this l itigation, the Gove rnment maintained that the reg ulations did not violate the fre e-spe ech c lause of the First Amendme nt. And the Court of Ap p ea l s found t he re g ulations
c on sti tut ion a lly

de fi c ie nt in toto . See Boardley , 6 1 5 F.3d at 525 . Acc ording ly , evaluating the Go ve rnme nt’ s f

re e sp e e c h p os iti on

ho lis tic a lly , th e Court

fi nd s that the Go ve rnme nt fa ils to c arr y its burden of showingsubstantial justi fication for its positi on. 1. Re as on ing

of t heCou rt o

f A pp e als ” In “conside ring whether conduct is substantially justified, [ a cour

t] should look to t he reasonCase No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

T he sc o p e co nstructi o n fi t s wit h the p urp o ses o f t he E A JA i n the o ve rb rea d t h c o ntex t
. T he E A JA f av o rs a 3/ si ngl e p o si t i o n and places t he b urden o n t he G o vernm ent t o s ho w t hat i t s p o si t i o n was s ub st ant i al l y jus t ifi ed
. I f t he G over nment coul d s how s ubs t ant i al j us t i f i cat i on by ca r r y i ng i t s bur den f or one s et of

va l i d a pp l i cat i ons , t hen E A JA f ees wo ul d rar el y , i f

ever, be ap p rop ri at e when a p l ai nt i f f bri ngs an o verbread t h chal l enge. Indee d , t he G o vernm ent m i ght e sc a p e E A J A li a b ili ty in s o m e c irc u m sta n c e s w h e re , o n the m e rits, it s a rg u m e n t i s w e re frivo lo u s b e c a u se no re a so n a b le p ers o n co ul d f

i nd t he jus t i f

i cat i o n s uf

f i ci ent t o jus t i f

y t he regul at i o n’ s b read t h. -5 - the ag ency

action wa s invalidated.” Le P ag e 's 2 0 0 0

, I n c . v . P o s ta l R e

gu la to r yCo m m 'n , 674 F.3d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (empha sis in orig inal). The Court of Appea ls found the re gulations “antithetical to t he c or e F ir st Am e ndme nt pr inc ipl e that re str ic tio ns on fr e e sp e e c h in a pu bli c fo rum ma

y be va lid only if narr owly

tailored. B eca

use these r egulations penalize a s ub s t an t ial amount of spee ch that does not impinge on the Gover nment’s interests, [t he court] f [ound] them overboa

rd.” Boardley , 615 F.3d at 508
. Over brea dth doctrine prote cts ag ainst fre e-spe ech- chilling r egulation. See id. at 513 (quoting Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Move ment , 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992) )
. I t th u s e xis ts in s o me tension with the EAJA’s “substantial justi fication” require ment: Substantial justification might re fer to the quality of the ra tionale for the re gulation or scope of the re gulation’s tailoring . The Court finds no
rea son to choose one c onstruction over the other a nd finds the latter more applicable here
. 3/ Th e ratio na le the Go ve rnme nt of fe r fo r t he re gulatio ns , whil e jus tif ie d in so me a pp lic atio ns , was incongruous with the broa d rea ch of the regulations. See Boardley , 615 F.3d at 519 . The Court of Appe als particula

rly noted two shortcoming s. First, the Court of A ppeals obser

ved that the “ ‘fr ee speec h are as’ made available wit hin national parks
. . . are subject to the same pe rmit require ment as all ot her loc ations within the national parks.” Id. at 515
. But, “ by definition, these ar e not ar eas wh e re the Go ve rnme nt h a s a pa ra mou nt i nte res t in mainta ini nga ‘p e a c e fu l and

tr anq uil environment.” I

d. at 521 . Acc ording ly , the Court of Appe als found that “w ithin ‘free speec hCase No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

T he G over nment al s o s ay s t hat i t ca bi ned t he l ang uag e of t he r egu l at i on t hr ough i t s manag ement pol i ci es, 4/ w h ic h o ff

e re d “a b ind ing a n d p re c ise inte rp re ta tio n o f t h e ter m .” [D o c . 69 at 1 6
. ] T hi s p o si t i o n i s i nco herent : i f t he p h ra se ’s na rr o w m e a n ing h a d b e e n “c le a r” , i t wo u ld no t ha v e ne e d e d c la rifying . M o re o v e r, o n initial c o n sid e ra tio n , t h is C o u rt d e te r m in e d t h a t th e in te rp re ta tio n , “[i]f a n ythin g . . . giv e s o ff ic ia ls m o re d isc re tio n tha n the re g u la tio n it se lf. ” [D o c . 56 at 11- 12
. ] And t he C our t of Ap peal s appare nt l y f

ound t he manag ement pol i cy s o i ns i gn i f i can t t hat i t decl i ned -6 - are as,’the Gover

nment has exceeding ly littl e basis for hushing ‘lone pamphletee r[s]
. . . .’” Id

. (fur ther c itation omit ted). Eve n afte r consider ing the justifiable applications of the re g ulation, the C o urt o f Ap p e a l s f

o un d th i s d e f e c ts o g r av e th atth e r e gu l at i o nc o u l d n o tb e s av e d

b y s e v e r a

b i l i ty. See id. at 522-23 . That it so found sug g ests just how unj ustifiably overbr oad the r egulations were
. Second, the Court of A

ppeals found “conside rable support from thi s and other circ uits” that the fa ilure of the r egulations to ex empt small gr oups and lone individuals rende red the regulations defe ctively

overbr oad. Id. at 520 . Indeed the Court of Appea ls noted t hat t he Ninth Circuit found tha t “ w e an d a l m o s t e v e r y o th e r c i r c u i t t o h av e c o n s i d e r e d th e i s s u e h av e r e f u s e d to uph old reg istration require ments that apply to individual speakers or small g roups i n a publi c forum.” Id
. (qu o t i n g Be rge r v . Ci ty

of S e att le , 569 F.3d 1029, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) ). Such a string of losses is indicative. See Pierce , 487 U.S. 569
. The re asoningof the Court of Appe als thus sug g ests that the reg ulations unjusti fiably rea ched
su bs tanti a lly

be y on d a ny legitim ate sw e e p. An d, wh ile , in an a pp ro pr iate c a se , s ome ov e rb re a dth might n ot r e nd e r de fe nd ing a re gulatio n sub sta nti a lly un jus tif ie d, in thi s ca se , the Court of Ap pe a ls sug g ested that the ta iloring differ ed so fa r fr om the regulations’ leg itimate sweep a s to lack substantial justi fication. Moreove r, t he C ourt of Appeals’s findi ng that the re gulations could not be
sever ed sug g ests that differ entiatingthe extent of t he legitimate swe ep ag ainst the overboa rd portion would have been a

fool’s er rand. The illegitimate swe ep so over whelmed the le g itimate sweep a s to r e nd e r t he re gulatio ns de fu

nc t a s a wh ole
. Th e se c on sid e ra tio ns c ou ple d w ithe xistin gpr e c e de nts 4/Case No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

to c o n sid e r it at a ll. -7 - sug g est that the Gove rnment wa s not substantially j u s t i fi ed in m aintainingand def endingthe
re gulatio ns . 2. Prece dent in Support of the Gov ernme nt’s Position Th e Court

of App eal s’ re lia

nc e on ov e rb re a dth

a lso re nd e rs the Ei g ht C ir c uit ’s ho ldi ngin Un ite d Sta te

s v . Ki stn e r and the opinion of a Mag istrate Judge in United St ates v. Sued unhe lpf ul i n
c arr yingthe Go ve rnme nt’ s bur de n of sho wi ng that its posi tio n w a s su bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d. F ro m a strateg ic per spective the se ca ses upholding the regulations sugg est that the Gove rnment would be
su bs tanti a lly

jus tif ie d in c ontin uin gto d e fe nd

the re gulatio ns . N on e the le ss, the fact t h at one other

court a g ree d or disag ree d with the Gover nment does not establis h wh et h er its position was substantially justified. Conceivably , the Gover nment could take a

position t hat is not substantially just i fi ed, yet win; even more likely , it could take a position that is substantially justified, y et lose. Pierce , 487 U.S. at 569 . Ag ain, the Court “look[s] to the reason the ag ency action wa s invalidated,” in this case, over

brea dth. LePage's 2000 , 674 F.3d at 866 (empha sis in original). Neither Kistner

nor Sued addre ssed over

brea dth. Kis tne r expli citly noted that the cour t took no position on overbrea dth. The Eig ht Circuit ex plained: [Kis tne r] d oe s no t sp e c if

ic a lly a lle g e tha

t the po lic y

state me nt ( or

re gulatio n) sh ou ld be invalidated f

or over brea dth. He also doe s not identify a sig nificant diff

ere nce be tw e e n h is c la im that th e po lic y state me nt i s unc on sti tut ion a l a s a pp lie d t o h is particula r ac tiviti es and a

claim that the policy

statement is invalid f

or over brea dth. See V an Bergen v . State of Minn., 59 F.3d 1541, 1549–50 ( 8th Cir.19 9 5) ( sta tute would not be reviewed for ove rbreadth becauseappellant failed to identif y a sig nif ic an t di ffe re nc e be twe e n h is c lai m tha t the sta tute was ov e rb ro ad an d h is c lai m that it w as unconstitutional as applied

). United St ates v. Kistner , 68 F.3d 218, 220 n.5 ( 8th Cir. 1995) (empha sis added). Kistner thus offer s no support for the r egulations’ validity in the fac e of a

n overt bre adth cha lleng e.Case No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

-8 - Sued likewise foc used on case -spec ific fa ctors. The court e mphasized that Sued “could have eng ag ed in leaf

leting a nd public assembly in othe r suitable are as, such as the vicinity of the B attery Park F acility

from which the fer

ries to the Statute of L i b er t y embar k.” United States v. Sue d , 143 F. Supp. 2d 3 4 6 (S
. D. N. Y. 2001) . The c ourt’s conc lusion was “buttresse d by the Park Servic e’s
un dis pute d r e pr e se ntatio ns that pe rm its fo r p ub lic a sse mbl y or the dis tr ibutio n o f wri tte n mate ri a ls at the Statute of L iberty

are never denied.” Id. at 352
. Thus, the opi nion cannot r easona bly be re ad
a s c on sid e ri ngthe re gulatio ns ’ o ve rb re a dth writ l arg e . Ind e e d, the Court of Ap pe a ls here we nt t o g reat leng ths to pointout that it found the regulations unconstituti onal bec ause the y applied to zones de signate d a s “ fr e e sp e e c h a re a s, ” —th e ve ry

are a s Sued found important in c urin g co n s t i t u tional infirmity
. See Boardley , 615 F.3d at 521
. This is a rea sonably

close c ase. Tw o case s upholding the r egulations might ty pically be
su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w s ub sta

nti a l ju sti fi c atio n. B ut Kis tne r and S u ed wer e insuffic ient to establish the validity of the re gulations in every national park under ever

y leg al theory
. Cf. Boardley , 615 F.3d at 515 . Co ns ide re d i n con te xt of the re a so ns on

wh ic h th e Court

of Ap pe a ls a c tua lly

de c ide d th is
case , these c ases c annot ca rry the Gover

nment’s burde n. B. Claims under the F ree -Exerc ise Clause and th e Re ligiou s F ree dom Restor ation Act Stil l, that Boa

rdley preva iled on one set of cla ims does not entitle Boar dley to reimburseme nt fo r t he c os ts of

his e nti re laws uit . B oa

rd le y ’s a s- a

pp lie d c ha lle ng e s and

his re lig iou s f

re e do m c la ims
wer e unsucc essful. [Doc. 56 at 4-7.] He had no pr ospect of show ing that the Gover nment had vio late d th e pr inc ipl e of c onte nt- ne utr a lity , and late r he c on c e de d that the re gulatio ns we re c onte ntneutra l. [ Id. ] I t follows that the Gover nment was substantially justified in opposing the RFRA a nd fre e-e x erc ise ca

uses of a ctio n . S ince, these cause s of ac tion were “distinctly differ ent” f

rom theCase No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

-9 - fac ial challeng e, and be cause the Gover nment preva iled on this a rra y of cla ims, the Court will not order compensation. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435
.

C. Claim s against In divid ual Defend ants Although the y

involved the same f

acts a nd leg al theorie s as the main actions in this case, the Bi v e ns a c t i o n s c an n o tg i v e r i s e t o at t o r n e y s ’ f e e c o mp e n s at i o n , r e g ar d l e s s o f th e i r m e r i t s . T h e E A JA specifie s that it pr ovides compensation only for actions ag ainst “the United States,” whic h it defines to incl u d e “ an y

a g e n c y an d an y o f f ic ia l o f th e U n it e d

St ate s a c ti n gin

h is o r h e r o f f ic ia l c apac ity .” 2 8 U
. S
. C
. § 2 4 1 2 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( C)
. Bi v e ns claims are premised on pe rsonal liability
. See Bivens v . Six U n k n o wn Na m e d

A g e n ts o f t h e F e d

. B u r . o f N a rcotics , 4 0 3 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) . Boa rdley ’s Complaint specifies that all offic ials are beingsued in both “indiv i du al an d o fficia l capa cities.” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 16.] I t follows that any eff orts expended solely

on the Bivens claims, must be excluded from B oardle y ’s fe e aw ard. See GasPlus, L.L.C. v. U.S. De p’t of Interior , 593 F. Supp. 2d 80, 89 (D.D.C. 2009)
. IV. “The essential g oal in shifting f ees ( to either pa

rty ) is to do roug h justice, not to achieve
a ud iti ngpe rf

e c tio n. So tri a l c ourt s ma y ta ke int o a c c ount the ir ov e ra ll s e ns e of a su it, and may us e estimates in calc ulating and allocating an attorney' s time.” Fox v . Vice , 131 S. Ct . 2205, 2216 (2011)
. B oa rd le y br ou g ht f ive c a us e s o f a c tio n. Ul tim ate ly , he wa s su c c e ssf ul on on e . He so ught d ama g e s, bu t obtained only

invalidation of the re gulation. The ca se involved no discover y . The CourtCase No. 1:07-CV- 01986

G w i n , J.

T he p art i es’ bri ef i ng engages i n pro t ract ed , l i ne- b y - l i ne d i sput e o ver t he subm i t t ed bil l i ng s t at em ent s. T he 5/ G o v e rn m e n t d o e s n o t co n te st tha t a c o st o f l ivin g a d ju stm e n t is a p p ro p ria te [D o c . 69 at 21 n. 5], y et decr i es an y addi t i onal a w a rd fo r “sp e c ia liz a tio n a n d /o r e x p e rtise ,” a n d m a k e s n o su g g e stio n o f an a p p ro p ria te ho u rly ra te . [D o c . 69 a t 2 2 .] B o a rd le y se e k s c o m p e n sa tio n fo r a w e e k ’s w o rth o f p a ra le g a l tim e fo r t h e p re p a ra tio n o f his fee p e tit io n . [D o c s. 74 a t 2 2 ; 75 at 2.] T he G o vernm ent de cri es t hese f ees as unreas o nab l e and p rop o ses a 2 0 % reduc t i o n i n f ees f o r t i m e spent i n prep ari ng t he f

ee p et i t i o n, y et , need l ess l y p rotr act s t hi s p hase o f t he l i t i gat i o n by pro t est i ng a bil l i ng of “64
. 7 5 f o r a t r an s cr i pt of

t h e or al a r g u men t
. . . be ca u s e t h er e i s n o i n di ca t i on t h at t h e t r an s cr i pt w as n ec es s ar y f or t h e pr epa r at i on of a n y m o tio n s o r b rie fs.” [D o c . 69 a t 28. ] “ B oar dl ey a dmi t s t h e v al i di t y of t h es e obj ec t i on s w i t h r es pec t t o t h e t r an s cr i pt f ee a n d t h e ex pen s e of

s er v i n g of

f i ci al s i n t h ei r i n di v i du al c apa ci t i es , ” an d a cc or di n g l y a g r ee s t o a r edu ct i on of $395. 75. [D o c . 71 at 2 1 .] S t i l l , he rea sserts t ha t he sho uld b e re i m b urse d f o r his pro hac vi ce a d m issio n fee s. [D o c . 71 a t 2 1 .] B ot h par t i es al s o dev ot e cons i dera bl e t i me t o di s cus s i ng t he r eas onabl ene s s of bi l l i ng 0. 1 hour s f

or c er t ai n e mai l s . [ D oc. 69 a t 2 5 ; 71 a t 1 7 .] -1 0- acc ounts for these c onsiderations, ag ainst the bac kdrop af forde d by the Supreme Court’s obse rvation that it need not “be come gree n-[a] ey eshade acc ountant[] .” 5/ Id
. A substantial portion of the wor k in this case involved cla ims whe re fe e shi ftingis not
ava ila ble . T he Court

a c kn ow le dg e s th at B oa

rd le y ha s alr e a dy de c lin e d to mak e fe e c la ims fo r s ome work done on these fa i l ed cl ai m s. But g iven the limited succe ss when mea sured a g ainst all the
c la ims that ha d be e n mad e , the Court fi nd s f ur the r r e du c tio n a

pp ro pr iate . A c c or din g ly , th e Court wi ll g rant B oardle y

half of his re quested a

war d and half

of the e x penses r equeste d. V. Conclusion F or the se re a so ns , th e Court G RA NT S Boa rdley ’s motion for costs and f ee s i n part but DE NI ES it i n p art . T he Court awa rd s Pla int if

f $ 74 ,5 54 .7 4 in

fe e s a nd e xpe ns e s. I T I S SO ORDERED.

Date d: F e br

ua ry 7, 20 13 s/ Jame

s S. Gwin J A M E S S
. G W IN UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE