IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KEMPIS SONGSTER : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. : NO. 04-5916

:

JEFFREY A. BEARD, et al. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Savage, J. July 29, 2014

The issue in this § 2254 habeas action is whether the holding in Miller v. 

Alabama1 that a mandatory life without parole sentence for juvenile homicide 

defendants is unconstitutional may be applied retroactively to cases on collateral 

review. The Third Circuit has yet to decide. The Eleventh Circuit, the only circuit court 

to address the issue, held that Miller is not retroactive.2

 District courts and state courts 

are divided. 

Those courts which have held that Miller applies retroactively have reached the 

result by different paths. Some based their decisions on the Miller Court’s application of

its holding to the companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs,

3 which was on collateral review.4

 

1 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

2 In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 717 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 

2013). 

3 Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Miller v. 

Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

4 See, e.g., In re Rainey, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court 

specifically held the new rule applied not only to the defendant in Miller, but also to the defendant in 

Jackson on collateral review . . . . There would have been no reason for the Court to direct such an 

outcome if it did not view the Miller rule as applying retroactively to cases on collateral review.”), review 

granted and opinion superseded by In re Rainey, 326 P.3d 251 (Cal. 2014); State v. Mantich, 287 N.W.2d 

716, 731 (2014) (“We also find it noteworthy that the Court applied the rule announced in Miller to 

Jackson, who was before the Court on collateral review . . . . [W]e are not inclined to refuse to apply the 

rule announced in Miller to a defendant before us on collateral review when the Court has already applied 

 

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Others engaged in the retroactivity analysis set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 

(1989). Among these, some found that Miller announced a new substantive rule 

qualifying for retroactive application under the first Teague exception.5 One court 

the rule to a defendant before it on collateral review.”); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 

N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013) (“Our conclusion is supported by the fact that in Miller . . . the Supreme 

Court retroactively applied the rule that it was announcing in that case to the defendant in the companion 

case who was before the Court on collateral review.”); People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022-23 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2012) (“Our decision is reinforced by the fact that one of the two Miller defendants was before 

the United States Supreme Court on collateral review following completion of his direct appeal and 

received relief in the same manner as Miller himself.”); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 

2013) (“The procedural posture of the Miller decision further supports retroactive application . . . . [T]he 

Supreme Court specifically held the new rule applied not only to the defendant in Miller, but also to the 

defendant in Jackson on collateral review . . . . There would have been no reason for the Court to direct 

such an outcome if it did not view the Miller rule as applying retroactively to cases on collateral review.”).

5

 See, e.g., Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“We conclude that [the 

Miller rule] is a new substantive rule that puts a juvenile’s mandatory life without parole sentence outside 

the ambit of the State’s power.”) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); In re Rainey, 168 

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 725 (“Thus, the Miller rule constitutes a new substantive rule, and is not subject to 

Teague’s retroactivity bar, because it prohibits a certain category of punishment [life without parole] for a 

class of defendants [juvenile offenders convicted of homicide] because of their status [chronological age 

and its hallmark features] or offense.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 

730 (“In essence, Miller amounts to something close to a de facto substantive holding, because it sets 

forth the general rule that life imprisonment without parole should not be imposed upon a juvenile except 

in the rarest of cases where that juvenile cannot be distinguished from an adult based on diminished 

capacity or culpability.”) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281 

(“The rule explicitly forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punishment – mandatory life in 

prison without the possibility of parole – on a specific class of defendants: those individuals under the age 

of eighteen when they commit the crime of murder.”); Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022 (“Miller constitutes a 

new substantive rule . . . . Miller mandates a sentencing range broader than that provided by statute for 

minors convicted of first degree murder who could otherwise receive only natural life imprisonment.”); 

Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-16 (holding that although Miller mandates a new procedure for sentencing 

minors, the procedural rule results from a substantive change in the law that prohibits mandatory life 

without parole sentences for juveniles, i.e. it “bars states from imposing a certain type of punishment on 

certain people”); Jones v. Mississippi, 122 So.3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013) (“Prior to Miller, everyone 

convicted of murder in Mississippi was sentenced to life imprisonment and was ineligible for parole. 

Following Miller, Mississippi’s current sentencing and parole statutes could not be followed in homicide 

cases involving juvenile defendants. Our sentencing scheme may be applied to juveniles only after 

applicable Miller characteristics and circumstances have been considered by the sentencing authority. 

As such, Miller modified our substantive law by narrowing its application for juveniles.”); Toye v. Florida, 

133 So. 3d 540, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (applying Florida’s own retroactivity analysis, and not the 

Teague analysis).

Two federal district courts have summarily concluded that the Miller rule applies retroactively as a 

new substantive rule. See Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 

2013) (holding the Miller rule is retroactive to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiffs who challenged the 

constitutionality of a Michigan statute that prohibits the Michigan parole board from considering for parole 

those sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder). The court noted that “if ever there was a legal 

rule that should – as a matter of law and morality – be given retroactive effect, it is the rule announced in 

Miller. To hold otherwise would allow the state to impose unconstitutional punishment on some persons 

but not others, an intolerable miscarriage of justice.” Id. at *2 (emphasis in original). In a footnote, the 

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applied it retroactively as a “watershed rule of criminal procedure” qualifying under the 

second Teague exception.6 

Courts holding that Miller is not retroactive have concluded that the new rule 

announced in Miller was a procedural one and did not qualify as a “watershed rule of 

criminal procedure.”7

 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the rule is not 

court stated it “would find Miller retroactive on collateral review, because it is a new substantive rule, 

which ‘generally applies retroactively.’” Id. at *2 n.2 (citation omitted); see also Alejandro v. United 

States, No. 13 Civ. 4364, 2013 WL 4574066, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2013) (granting petitioner’s 

successive motion to set aside sentence of life imprisonment for conviction of murder in aid of 

racketeering and related charges committed when petitioner was fifteen years old, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255, and concluding that Miller was retroactive on collateral review as a substantive rule).

6 People v. Croft, 6 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). However, the Illinois state appellate courts 

are divided over whether Miller is substantive, or a watershed procedural rule. The court in People v. 

Croft considered the Miller rule a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure, while the same court, but 

different division, in Morfin, found it was a substantive rule. Compare Croft, 6 N.E.2d at 745, with Morfin, 

981 N.E.2d at 1022; cf. People v. Johnson, 998 N.E.2d 185, 194-95 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 9, 2013) (finding the 

Miller rule to be both a substantive rule and a watershed rule of criminal procedure). 

7 See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1367 (“Miller changed the procedure by which a sentencer 

may impose a sentence of life without parole on a minor by requiring the sentence to take into account 

how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a 

lifetime in prison. And the Court declined to consider a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, 

or at least those 14 and younger.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Craig v. Cain, No. 12-

30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (“Miller does not satisfy the test for retroactivity 

because it does not categorically bar all sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles; Miller bars only 

those sentences made mandatory by a sentencing scheme. Therefore, the first Teague exception does 

not apply.”) (citations omitted); Thompson v. Roy, No. 13-cv-1524, 2014 WL 1234498 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 

2014); Sanchez v. Vargo, No. 3:13-cv-400, 2014 WL 1165862, at *4-6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2014); 

Contreras v. Davis, No. 1:13-cv-772, 2013 WL 6504654, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Indeed, the 

Supreme Court’s language indicates that it intended the Miller rule to be procedural, rather than 

substantive.”) (citing Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2471 (“Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a 

class of offenders or type of crime – as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham.”)); Johnson v. Ponton, 

No. 3:13-cv-404, 2013 WL 5663068, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013) (“The Supreme Court’s language 

indicates that it intended the Miller rule to be procedural, rather than substantive.”); Ware v. King, No. 

5:12-cv-147, 2013 WL 4777322, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2013) (“For the reasons set forth by the Fifth 

Circuit in Craig, Miller is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”); State v. Tate, 2012-

2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, 837 (“[Miller] simply altered the range of permissible methods for 

determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for such a 

conviction, mandating only that a sentence follow a certain process – considering an offender’s youth and 

attendant circumstances – before imposing a particular penalty.”) (citations and internal quotations 

omitted) (emphasis in original), rehearing denied (Jan. 27, 2014); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 

A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013) (“Since, by its own terms, the Miller holding does not categorically bar a penalty for 

a class of offenders, it is procedural and not substantive for purposes of Teague.”) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328-39 (Minn. 2013) (concluding the rule in 

Miller is procedural and not substantive because first, the rule does not categorically ban life 

imprisonment without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide; second, relevant federal decisions, i.e. 

Craig, have concluded Miller is procedural; and third, unlike Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Miller

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retroactive to cases on collateral review. Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 

(Pa. 2013). 

We conclude that the Miller Court both applied the new rule to the case on 

collateral review and established a substantive constitutional rule that applies to all

defendants similarly situated to the petitioner in Jackson, Miller’s companion case, who 

was on collateral review.8 Therefore, Songster, who was fifteen years old at the time he 

committed the murder for which he was convicted and sentenced to serve a life without 

parole sentence, is entitled to the relief mandated by Miller and must be resentenced.

Miller Applied Its Holding Retroactively

Only the Supreme Court can make a new rule retroactive. Tyler v. Cain, 533 

U.S. 656, 662 (2001). It does so only “through a holding.” Id. at 663. Nevertheless, it is 

not necessary for the Supreme Court to expressly state that the new rule is retroactive. 

Such an explicit statement “is not a sine qua non” of retroactivity for purposes of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Id. at 668 (O’Connor, J. concurring). The Court can do so by 

applying its holding logically. As Justice O’Connor explained, “the holdings must dictate

the conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the 

rule applies retroactively.” Id. at 669 (emphases in original).

does not announce a new element that must be proven); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 710 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 2012) (“The Miller Court indicated that its ruling was procedural in nature, stating, ‘Our decision does 

not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime . . . it mandates only that a 

sentencer follow a certain process – considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics –

before imposing a particular penalty.”) (quoting Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2471) (emphasis in original).

8 When it granted certiorari, the Court ordered that Miller and Jackson be argued “in tandem.” 

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011); Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). It did not order the 

cases consolidated. Instead, it ordered the two cases, each in a different procedural posture, to be 

argued one after the other. 

The decision could just as easily have taken the moniker Jackson rather than Miller. Miller was 

the earlier docket number, No. 10-9646, and Jackson was No. 10-9647. Fortuitously, Miller was given the 

earlier number. As a consequence, the new principle bears Miller’s name, rather than Jackson’s.

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Miller v. Alabama, a case on direct appeal, was argued with Jackson v. Hobbs, a 

case on collateral review. The Court applied the new rule to both cases. Had it not 

intended its holding to apply retroactively, it could have declined to take Jackson; or,

once having taken it, the Court could have then made it clear that its holding applied to 

Miller, but not to Jackson because the latter was on collateral review. Instead, it applied 

the new rule to Jackson and remanded his case for resentencing. 

In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the ruling was applied retroactively to 

Roper who was on collateral review. The Court did not have to explicitly state that it 

was retroactive because it applied it to Roper.9

Similarly, when the Miller Court applied its holding to Jackson, it did more than 

announce a new rule. It made the new rule retroactive by applying it to the case before 

it. 

It would be fundamentally unfair to find that because Jackson was paired with 

Miller he gets relief in the form of resentencing and the possibility of release while 

others similarly situated will not and will die in prison. Therefore, considering the 

Court’s application of the new rule to Jackson, who was on collateral review, it logically 

follows that the Miller holding applies retroactively.

9 Landry v. Baskerville, 3:13CV367, 2014 WL 1305696, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2014) (“[B]y the 

combined effect of the holding in Roper and the holding in Saffle [v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990),]

regarding the parameters of the first Teague exception, the substantive rule in Roper was made 

retroactive to cases on collateral review as a matter of logical necessity.”) (citing In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 

258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011)); Schafer v. Clark, CIV S-08-1114, 2009 WL 3157453, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 

2009); State v. Morgan, 626 S.E.2d 888, 889 (S.C. 2006); Arroyo v. Dretke, 362 F. Supp. 2d 859, 883 

(W.D. Tex. 2005); Little v. Dretke, 407 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823-24 (W.D. Tex. 2005); Holly v. Mississippi, No. 

3:98CV53, 2006 WL 763133, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2006). But see Williams v. Ryan, 05CV0737, 

2010 WL 3768151, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2010) (“Although there is a valid argument that Roper

announced a new rule of constitutional law which is retroactive on collateral appeal, Petitioner has failed 

to demonstrate that the Supreme Court itself has made Roper’s holding retroactive.”) (internal citations 

omitted), aff’d, 472 F. App’x 457 (9th Cir. 2012).

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The Miller Rule is a Substantive Rule

Miller is not only retroactive because it was applied to a case on collateral review, 

it is retroactive under the Teague analysis. The new rule falls within the first Teague

exception as a substantive rule. 

In Teague, the Supreme Court announced the general rule that “new 

constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which 

have become final before the new rules are announced.” 489 U.S. at 310. It then 

identified two exceptions when the new rule applies retroactively. Thus, a new rule 

applies retroactively to cases on collateral review only if it falls within one of the 

exceptions. Id. at 310. 

A new rule falling within the first exception is one that “places ‘certain kinds’ of 

primary, private conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 

proscribe.” Id. at 311. The second exception is a “watershed rule of criminal 

procedure” that “requires the observance of ‘those procedures’ that . . . are implicit in

the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 307. 

Since it created the two exceptions to the general rule of non-retroactivity in 

Teague, the Supreme Court has elucidated the retroactivity analysis. In Schriro v. 

Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), it clarified the difference between the two exceptions –

the first one is a substantive rule and the second is a procedural rule. Substantive rules 

are applied retroactively. Id. at 351. Procedural rules, on the other hand, are rarely, if 

ever, retroactive. Id. at 352.10 Thus, the first step in the Teague analysis is to 

determine whether the rule is substantive or procedural. 

10 “[B]ecause any qualifying rule would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or 

guilt that it is unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge, it should 

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A substantive rule is one that “places a class of private conduct beyond the 

power of the state to proscribe,” Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990), or addresses 

a constitutional determination “prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of 

defendants because of their status or offense.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329 

(1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)). 

Such a rule is retroactive because the failure to apply it retroactively “necessarily 

carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does 

not make criminal,’” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998), or “faces a 

punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352.

Summerlin made clear that “[a] rule is substantive rather than procedural if it 

alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” 542 U.S. at 

353 (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620-21, and Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495). The rationale for 

retroactivity of new substantive rules is that they “necessarily carry a significant risk that 

a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Summerlin, 

542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620).

The Miller rule has both substantive and procedural elements. Substantively, it 

bans mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide defendants. 

Procedurally, it mandates a minimal process for sentencing those in that class of 

defendants. The former is a new substantive rule of criminal law. The latter is an 

implementation of the substantive rule. 

Miller struck down sentencing schemes that mandated life without parole for 

juveniles. In doing so, it declared that states could not impose such a sentence on a 

come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception.” 

Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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class of persons – juveniles convicted of murder. It eliminated the “significant risk” that 

a punishment that the law cannot impose would be imposed – a juvenile would be 

sentenced to die in prison when he would not otherwise be sentenced because of his 

peculiar characteristics associated with his youth.

In reaching its decision in Miller, the Court relied and built upon the rationale for

the Roper v. Simmons11 and Graham v. Florida12 holdings, specifically stating that its 

decision was based upon two lines of precedent, one of which adopted “categorical 

bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of 

offenders and the severity of a penalty.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Graham, 130 

S. Ct. at 2022-23). As the Court did when it categorically banned the death penalty for 

juvenile offenders in Roper and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 

juvenile non-homicide offenders in Graham, the Miller Court categorically banned a

sentencing practice or scheme as applied to juveniles. In essence, the substance of the 

Miller rule is no different than the rules established in Roper and Graham, which were 

applied retroactively.13

The Miller court drew on Graham’s “likening life-without parole sentences 

imposed on juveniles to the death penalty itself.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. After 

11 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

12 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).

13 See, e.g., In re Evans, 449 F. App’x 284 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Loggins v. Thomas, 654 

F.3d 1204, 1221 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding Graham applies retroactively because it fit under the Teague

exception for “new rules ‘prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because 

of their status or offense.’”); In re Sparks, 657 F.3d at 262 (“By the combined effect of the holding of 

Graham itself and the first Teague exception, Graham was therefore made retroactive on collateral review 

by the Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler.”); Landry, 2014 WL 1305696, at *6; 

Schafer, 2009 WL 3157453, at *4 (“Roper is a new rule which, if applicable to petitioner’s claim, would 

apply retroactively and commence the limitations period as to that claim.”); Morgan, 626 S.E.2d at 889

(applying Roper retroactively); Arroyo, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 883; Little, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 823-24; Holly, 

2006 WL 763133, at *1.

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explaining why juveniles must be treated differently than adults, the Miller Court stated 

that in Graham “because we viewed this ultimate penalty for juveniles as akin to the 

death penalty, we treated it similarly to that most severe punishment. We imposed a 

categorical ban on the sentence’s use, in a way unprecedented for a term of 

imprisonment.” Id. (citation omitted). These statements are an acknowledgment that 

there is no real difference between the death penalty and life without parole in the case 

of a juvenile defendant. Therefore, it follows that Miller, like Graham and Roper, must 

be applied retroactively.14

Those courts holding that Miller is not retroactive have concluded that the Miller

rule is procedural and not substantive.15 These courts rest their holdings on the Miller

Court’s declination to ban all life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of 

murder. This means, in their view, that Miller simply requires a process that is not in 

place before a juvenile can be sentenced to life without parole. In other words, those 

courts maintain that because the Miller Court did not preclude a life sentence without 

parole, such a sentence can be imposed on a defendant despite his status as a 

juvenile. They ignore that Miller categorically banned a punishment that the law cannot 

impose upon juveniles, a mandatory life without parole sentence. They fail to recognize 

that those defendants who were sentenced before Miller were sentenced to terms of life 

imprisonment that were unconstitutional. 

14 Because we conclude that Miller, through its holding and as a substantive rule, is retroactive, 

we do not consider whether the second Teague exception applies.

15 It is no surprise that courts are divided in their characterizations of the Miller rule as substantive 

or procedural. See United States v. Tayman, 885 F. Supp. 832, 841 (E.D. Va. 1995) (agreeing with the 

government that “the line separating procedure and substance is not always a bright one”) (citing 

Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1978) (“[W]e would not suggest that the distinction that we draw is 

an ironclad one that will invariably result in the easy classification of cases in one category or the 

other.”)).

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Miller may not have banned a sentence of life without parole for juveniles 

convicted of murder. But, it did categorically ban mandatory imposition of such a 

sentence. That ban is substantive. Thus, contrary to the attempt of those courts to 

distinguish Roper and Graham from Miller because the former cases banned a specific 

sentence and the latter case did not, there is no real distinction because the substantive 

bases of all three holdings are the same.

Miller may allow the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a convicted 

juvenile murderer. But, it explicitly does not allow it to be imposed automatically, and 

any sentencing scheme that mandates such a sentence is unconstitutional. Thus, 

because it categorically bans a sentencing practice or a scheme as applied to all 

juveniles convicted of murder, Miller announces a new substantive rule.

At the time Songster was sentenced, there was no process or procedure in place 

in Pennsylvania. Juveniles convicted of first degree or second degree murder were 

automatically sentenced to life without parole, regardless of their age, their individual 

characteristics and the circumstances of the crime.16 There was no discretion and no 

consideration of any factors, let alone those peculiar to juvenile offenders. Sentencing 

was a mere formality. The Miller Court struck down such a mandatory scheme. 

Therefore, like Jackson, Songster must be resentenced.

16 In response to Miller, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the state sentencing law to 

eliminate mandatory life without parole and to provide a different sentencing scheme for juveniles 

convicted of murder. The amendments only apply to individuals convicted after June 24, 2012. See 18 

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1102.1 (2014).

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