This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 THOMAS WULF, 2 Petitioner-Appellant, 3 v. No. 36,303 4 LISA REINECKE WULF, 5 Respondent-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 7 Kea W. Riggs, District Judge 8 Barbara A. Patterson Law Firm, P.C. 9 Barbara A. Patterson 10 Roswell, NM 11 for Appellant 12 Ragsdale Law Firm 13 Luke W. Ragsdale 14 Roswell, NM 15 for Appellee 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 GARCIA, Judge. 182 {1} Petitioner (ex-husband) appe als from the district court’s order granting 1 Respondent’s (ex-wife’s) motion to showcause and judgment awarding Respondent 2 $87,000 plus reasonable attorney fees and interest for Petitioner’s failure to re-list 3 marital property for sale within a reasona ble time since the entry, and the district 4 court’s approval and adoption, of the amended marital settlement agreement (the 5 amended MSA). Unpersuaded th at Petitioner demonstrated error, we issued a notice 6 of proposed summary disposition, propos ing to affirm. Petitioner has filed a 7 memorandum in opposition to our notice. We have duly considered Petitioner’s 8 response and remain unpersuaded that th e district court erred. We affirm. 9
{2} On appeal, Petitioner contends that the district court erred by modifying the 10 amended MSA to include that Petitioner mu st sell the property “within a reasonable 11 time period[,]” [DS 4] and by holding Petitioner in contempt for failing to sell the 12 property within a reasonable time period. [DS 4-5] Petitioner maintains that the 13 district court’s imposition of a reasonable time frame in which Petitioner was 14 supposed to have complied with the amende d MSA was a modification of an order of 15 the court that could be achieved onl y through Rule 1-060 NMRA. Underlying 16 Petitioner’s contention seems to be the belief that once the district court approved and 17 adopted the amended MSA, then it became anorder of the court for all purposes. 18 [MIO 6-9] We are not persuaded. 193 {3} Our courts often recognize: “Generally , once an agreement between divorcing 1 parties has been adopted and incorporated into the final divorce decree, the underlying 2 agreement is deemed to have merged w ith the decree, extinguishing any independent 3 right one of the parties mi ght assert in contract.” Ottino v. Ottino , 2001-NMCA-012, 4 ¶ 19, 130 N.M. 168, 21 P.3d 37. The merger of an MSA with a court’s order finally 5 dissolving a marriage has specific purposes and “is not a rule to be blindly applied[.]” 6 Id. “Merger is an equitable doctrine, premised upon the principles of res judicata.” Id. 7 ¶ 18. “That is, its purpose is to prevent the relitigation of decided issues.” Id. ¶ 21. 8 Also, “settlement agreements are typically merged with divorce decrees in order to 9 bring the court’s contempt powers to bear on defiant former spouses.” Id. A merger 10 does not destroy the “legal vitality” of the contract. Id. ¶ 17. The merger of a contract 11 into a judgment of the court “change s the [nature] of [the] action,” Tindall v. Bryan , 12 1950-NMSC-008, ¶ 8, 54 N.M. 114, 215 P. 2d 355, from one alleging a breach of 13 contract to one that enforces a judgment, for example. “‘[T]he doctrine of merger will 14 not be carried any further than the ends of justice require.’” Ottino , 2001-NMCA-012, 15 ¶ 19 (alteration omitted) (quoting Tindall , 1950-NMSC-008, ¶ 8). Thus, for example, 16 “where application of the doc trine would operate to preven t the enforcement of a valid 17 and recognized right, it need not be applied.” Id. ¶ 22. In sum, Petitioner does not 18 persuade us that merger converts an MSA into an order of the court that is 194 mechanically treated as such for all purposes. 1
{4} Specifically, we observe that our courts routinely recognize that where a court 2 approves and adopts an MSA, resulting ina merger into a final judgment of 3 dissolution marriage, we nevertheless cons true the MSA under contract principles. 4 See, e.g. , Cortez v. Cortez , 2009-NMSC-008, ¶¶ 3, 13-30, 145 N.M. 642, 203 P.3d 5 857 (observing that the MSA was merged into a final divorce decree and applying 6 contract principles in construing it; incl uding, examining the nature of the parties’ 7 bargain, their intentions, and applying equityto interpret the silence in the contract). 8 Similar to the equity our Supreme Court applied in Cortezto interpret the silence in 9 the contract with regard to the manner and timing of payment at issue there, our notice 10 proposed to affirm the district court’s imposition of a reasonable time frame to fill the 11 silence on the timing of Petitioner’s required compliance with the terms of the 12 amended MSA. [CN 2-5] See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Lyons , 2013-NMSC-009, ¶ 67, 13 299 P.3d 844 (“[W]hen a contract is silent on an issue, the law implies a reasonable 14 term to cover that issue.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Castle v. 15 McKnight , 1993-NMSC-076, ¶ 14, 116 N.M. 595, 866 P.2d 323 (“We hold today that 16 reasonableness in performance will be imp lied in fact by this Court in a contract 17 dispute if a requirement of reasonablene ss in performance will achieve the apparent 18 intent of the parties and the purposes of th e contract, and so long as the parties do not 195 expressly state a contrary intention.”). 1
{5} As our notice explained, in the currentcase, the amended MSA, as adopted by 2 stipulated order of the district court, required Petitioner to pay Respondent $87,500 3 due at closing on the sale by Petitioner of 1908 Carolina Way, and did not specify a 4 time for Petitioner’s performance of this ob ligation. [RP 335] Res pondent fulfilled her 5 obligations under the terms of the amended MSA. [RP 443] Petitioner, however, 6 removed the house from the market and failed to re-list the house for about four years 7 thereafter. [RP 437] Upon Respondent’s motion for an order to show cause, the 8 district court read into the amended MSA that the home was to be sold within a 9 reasonable period of time, stating that “[t] o conclude otherwise would frustrate the 10 intent of the [amended] MSA.” [RP 444] Wesee no error with the district court’s 11 inference of reasonableness with respect to the timing of Petitioner’s performance, in 12 the absence of a contractual time line or an expressly-stated intent to the contrary. 13 See Castle , 1993-NMSC-076, ¶ 14. 14
{6} We continue to be unpers uaded by Petitioner’s argument that the inference of 15 reasonableness with respect to the dead line for Petitioner’s performance constituted 16 a modification of the district court’s order, such that the district court lacked 17 jurisdiction to so in the absence of a motion under Rule 1-060(B). [MIO 6-8] See Hall 18 v. Hall , 1992-NMCA-097, ¶ 38, 114 N.M. 378, 838 P.2d 995 (“As a general rule, 196 while a court has jurisdiction after the judgment to enforce that judgment, it lacks 1 jurisdiction to modify the judgment excep t under limited circumstances.”). “ ‘Enforce’ 2 means to compel obedience to, or to cause the provisions to be executed.” Id. ¶ 41. “ 3 ‘Modify’ on the other hand means to alter, change, or vary.” Id. We continue to 4 believe that the district court was enforcing its judgment, not modifying it. 5
{7} In Hall , the district court changed the di vorce decree from an award of a ten6 year payout to the wife to anaward of property to the wi fe that the final decree had 7 awarded to the husband as his separate property. Id. ¶¶ 39-40, 42. We held that, 8 although the district court was attempting toenforce the money award to the wife in 9 its final decree, the district court’s order constituted an improper modification of the 10 final decree that should have been sought under Rule 1-060(B). Hall , 1992-NMCA11 097, ¶¶ 38, 42. 12
{8} The district court’s order and judgment in the current case did not change any 13 award of the assets or redistribute the property in a manner contrary to the terms of the 14 amended MSA. Cf. id. ¶ 42. Rather, the district court’s order simply enforces the 15 terms of the amended MSA and guarantees th at the parties’ reasonable expectations 16 with regard to the property at 1908 Caro lina Way be satisfied in a more timely 17 fashion, by preventing Petitioner from unilaterally delaying those expectations any 18 further. See Hadrych v. Hadrych , 2007-NMCA-001, ¶ 18, 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.3d 197 593 (rejecting the husband’s argument that th e district court was modifying, rather 1 than enforcing, the final decree by prohib iting his unilateral attempt to convert the 2 wife’s retirement benefits to disability be nefits, where the decree was silent on the 3 matter, and holding that the district court’s “order simply enforces the division set by 4 the final decree, guarantees th at the reasonable expectations of the parties concerning 5 the allocation of the retirement benefits would be protected, and ensures that [the 6 h]usband’s unilateral attempt to reduce [thew]ife’s benefits would go unrewarded”); 7 cf. Palmer v. Palmer , 2006-NMCA-112, ¶ 18, 140 N.M . 383, 142 P.3d 971 (holding 8 that remedial enforcement against the diminishment of a spouse’s entitlement to 9 property “is not a modification seeking an additional or different value”). If we were 10 to hold otherwise, then we would permit a mechanical app lication of either the merger 11 doctrine or contractual silence to prevent the enforcement of a valid and recognized 12 right and deprive Respondent of her bargaine d-for benefit indefinitely. Based on the 13 foregoing, we are not persuaded that the district court improperly modified the 14 amended MSA. 15
{9} Lastly, Petitioner argues that the districtcourt erred by holding him in contempt 16 for failing to pay Respondent $87,500, becausePetitioner was necessarily unaware of 17 the implied term the district court read into his obligation. [MIO 4-5] We are not 18 persuaded that Respondent can disavow anobligation to act reasonably under a 198 contract that the court can enforce under its contempt pow ers, nor are we persuaded 1 that Petitioner was unaware of his obligati on under the express terms of the amended 2 MSA. See ConocoPhillips Co. , 2013-NMSC-009, ¶ 67 (“[W]hen a contract is silent 3 on an issue, the law implies a reasonable term to cover that issue.” (internal quotation 4 marks and citation omitted)). By taking the home off the market and never paying 5 Respondent $87,500, Petitioner was inviolation of the distri ct court’s order requiring 6 him to sell the home in order to give $87, 500 to Respondent at closing. Petitioner kept 7 the home off the market for nearly four years when Respondent filed the motion for 8 an order to show cause. [RP 437] We are not persuaded that these facts give rise to 9 any concern that the district court was reading language into the amended MSA to 10 hold him contempt. Cf. Hall , 1992-NMCA-097, ¶ 2 (acknowledging that a district 11 court can “enforce the ‘property division’ award through the use of its contempt 12 powers”). Additionally, “[w] hat constitutes a reasonable time, under the evidence, is 13 a question of fact” for the fact-finder. Smith v. Galio , 1980-NMCA-134, ¶ 5, 95 N.M. 14 4, 617 P.2d 1325. Under the evid ence, we hold that the district court could properly 15 rule that Petitioner acted in defiance of th e amended MSA, and that, after nearly four 16 years, an unreasonable time period had laps ed before Petitioner made any efforts to 17 comply with the amended MSA. See Ottino , 2001-NMCA-012, ¶ 21 (stating that 18 “settlement agreements are typically merged with divorce decrees in order to bring the 199 court’s contempt powers to bear on defiant former spouses”). We see no error in the 1 district court’s ruling. 2
{10} For the reasons stated above and in our notice, we affirm the district court’s 3 order. 4
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

__________________ ______________ 6 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 7 WE CONCUR: 8

_______________________________ 9 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 10

_______________________________ 11 MICHEL E. VIGIL, Judge 12