Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, March 17, 2004 UNMANNED AERIAL 

VEHICLES 

Major Management Issues 

Facing DOD's Development 

and Fielding Efforts 

Statement of Statement of Neal P. Curtin, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

and 

Paul L. Francis, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

GAO-04-530T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-530T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Neal Curtin at 

(202) 512-4914 or curtinn@gao.gov; or Paul 

Francis at (202) 512-2811 or 

francisp@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-530T, testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, House Committee on 

Armed Services 

March 2004

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Major Management Issues Facing DOD's 

Development and Fielding Efforts 

GAO's most recent report points out that while DOD has taken some positive 

steps, its approach to UAV planning still does not provide reasonable 

assurance that the significant Congressional investment in UAVs will result 

in their effective integration into the force structure. In 2001, DOD 

established the joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts and to 

establish interoperability standards. To communicate its vision and promote 

UAV interoperability, the task force issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap. While 

the Roadmap provides some strategic guidance for the development of UAV 

technology, neither the Roadmap nor other documents represent a 

comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and other DOD 

agencies focus development efforts on systems that complement each other, 

will perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid duplication. 

Moreover, the Task Force has only advisory authority and, as such, cannot 

compel the services to adopt its suggestions. 

GAO’s prior work supports the need for effective oversight of individual UAV 

programs at the departmental level. UAVs have suffered from requirements 

growth, risky acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding support within 

the services. Some programs have been terminated. Success has been 

achieved as a result of top-level intervention and innovative acquisition 

approaches. For example, in 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

had to intervene to keep the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program viable. 

As UAV programs grow in the future, they will face challenges in the form of 

increased funding competition, greater demand for capabilities, and 

spectrum and airspace limitations. Moreover, UAVs are no longer an 

additional “nice-to-have” capability; they are becoming essential to the 

services’ ability to conduct modern warfare. Meeting these challenges will 

require continued strong leadership, building on the UAV Roadmap and 

Planning Task Force as GAO has recommended. 

The Air Force Predator UAV 

The current generation of 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 

has been under development since 

the 1980s. UAVs were used in 

Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 

2003 to observe, track, target, and 

strike enemy forces. These 

successes have heightened interest 

in UAVs within the Department of 

Defense (DOD). Congress has 

been particularly interested in 

DOD’s approach to managing the 

growing number of UAV programs. 

GAO was asked to summarize (1) 

the results of its most current 

report on DOD’s approach to 

developing and fielding UAVs1

 and 

the extent to which the approach 

provides reasonable assurance that 

its investment will lead to effective 

integration of UAVs into the force 

structure, and (2) the major 

management issues GAO has 

identified in prior reports on UAV 

research and development. 

In our most recent report, GAO 

recommends that DOD (1) 

establish a strategic plan to guide 

UAV development and fielding and 

(2) designate the UAV Task Force 

or other appropriate body to 

oversee the plan’s implementation, 

ensuring sufficient authority is 

provided. 

______________________________ 

1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: 

Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance 

DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004). 
Page 1 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

major management issues that we identified in our current and prior work 

on the research, development, and fielding of the latest generation of 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by the Department of Defense (DOD). 

The current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense 

applications since the 1980s, and as DOD continues to transform the way 

in which it conducts military operations, UAVs are becoming a vital part of 

the force structure. 

For our statement today, you asked us to discuss the results of our most 

recent report to the subcommittee, which is being released today.1

 In this 

report, we summarized recent UAV costs and funding, and analyzed DOD’s 

approach to developing and fielding UAVs to see to what extent the 

approach provides reasonable assurance that UAV programs will be 

efficiently integrated into the force structure. You also asked that we 

summarize the major management issues we have identified in prior 

reports on UAV programs, including our 2003 report on the unmanned 

combat aerial vehicle.2

In our report being released today, we point out that funding for UAV 

research and development and procurement has been increasing in recent 

years, and Congress has actually provided more funds for UAV acquisition 

than DOD requested. During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided 

about $2.7 billion in funding for UAV development and procurement as 

compared with about $2.3 billion requested by DOD. Additionally, 

spending on operations and maintenance for UAVs has been increasing as 

DOD has begun using UAV systems in recent military operations. This 

growing spending reflects the importance that Congress has placed on 

UAVs as they have demonstrated success in recent operations. We also 

report that DOD’s approach to planning for UAVs does not provide 

reasonable assurance that the investment will result in the effective 

 1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can 

Enhance DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

17, 2004). 

2

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with 

Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success, 

GAO-03-598 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). 

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

integration of UAV programs into the force structure. We recognize that 

DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the UAV program’s 

management. For example, to help manage UAV development, in 2001 

DOD established a joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts 

and to establish interoperability standards. Also, to communicate its vision 

and promote UAV interoperability, the Task Force issued the 2002 UAV 

Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential missions 

for UAVs, and provides guidance on developing emerging technologies. 

Our concern, however, is that neither the Roadmap nor other defense 

planning documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure 

that the services and other DOD agencies focus development efforts on 

systems that complement each other, will perform the range of priority 

missions needed, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the joint UAV Planning 

Task Force does not have program directive authority and serves only in 

an advisory capacity to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, 

Technology, and Logistics. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body 

with sufficient authority to implement the plan, DOD risks poorly 

integrating UAVs into the force structure, which could increase 

development, procurement, and logistics costs, and increase the risk of 

future interoperability problems. Consequently, in our most recent report 

we recommended that DOD (1) establish a strategic plan to guide UAV 

development and fielding and (2) designate the joint UAV Planning Task 

Force or other appropriate body to oversee the plan’s implementation, 

ensuring sufficient authority is provided. 

Our prior work on UAV systems identifies the growing importance of 

UAVs to effective military operations and the need for the effective 

oversight of service programs at the departmental level. Over the years, 

UAV acquisition programs have suffered from requirements growth, risky 

acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding support within individual 

services. Some of these programs have been terminated. Program success 

has been achieved as a result of leadership intervention and the use of 

innovative approaches like the Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration.3

 DOD’s experience with the Unmanned Combat Air 

Vehicle program is a case in point; intervention by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense was necessary to keep the program viable. Over the 

 3

 The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program was initiated by DOD in 1994 

as a way to get new technologies that meet critical military needs into the hands of users 

faster and at less cost than the traditional acquisition process. 
Page 3 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

years, we have reported that DOD has faced some expensive lessons in 

managing its UAV program. As UAVs become more and more integral to 

the way the U.S. military carries out operations, it will become even more 

important that the department manages its program effectively. UAVs are 

no longer an additional “nice-to-have” capability; they are becoming 

essential to the services’ ability to conduct modern warfare. The 

acquisition environment for new UAVs will be characterized by increased 

funding competition, greater demand for UAV capabilities, and 

electromagnetic frequency spectrum and airspace limitations. This will 

require strong leadership at the departmental level, building on the UAV 

Roadmap and efforts of the joint UAV Planning Task Force, to ensure that 

the most cost-effective solutions are adopted as we have recommended in 

our previous work. 

DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a 

human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic 

forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be 

expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. 

Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight control station; 

information and retrieval or processing stations; and, sometimes, wheeled 

land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms. 

UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions for 

many years. After the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane in 1960, 

certain UAVs were developed to monitor Soviet and Chinese nuclear 

testing. Israel used UAVs to locate Syrian radars and was able to destroy 

the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon in 1982. The United States has 

used UAVs in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation Enduring Freedom, 

and Operation Iraqi Freedom for intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance missions and to attack a vehicle carrying suspected 

terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The United States is also considering using 

UAVs to assist with border security for homeland security or homeland 

defense. 

The current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense 

applications since the 1980s. UAVs won considerable acceptance during 

military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003, respectively. 

They were used in these operations to observe, track, target, and in some 

cases strike enemy forces. These and similar successes have heightened 

interest in UAVs within DOD and the services. In fact, by 2010, DOD plans 

to have at least 14 different UAVs in the force structure to perform a 

variety of missions. Moreover, in the fiscal year 2001 National Defense 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Authorization Act, Congress established the goal that one-third of the Air 

Force’s deep-strike capability be provided by UAVs by 2010.4

The overall management of UAV programs has gone full circle. In 1989 the 

DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering set up the UAV Joint 

Project Office as a single DOD organization with management 

responsibility for UAV programs. With the Navy as the Executive Agency, 

within 4 years the Joint Project Office came under criticism for a lack of 

progress. Replacing the office in 1993, DOD created the Defense Airborne 

Reconnaissance Office as the primary management oversight and 

coordination office for all departmentwide manned and unmanned 

reconnaissance. In 1998, however, this office also came under criticism for 

its management approach and slow progress in fielding UAVs. In that same 

year, this office was dissolved and UAV program development and 

acquisition management was given to the services, while the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and 

Intelligence was assigned to provide oversight for the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Our report being issued today (Force Structure: Improved Strategic 

Planning Can Enhance DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO04-342, Mar. 17, 2004) analyzes recent funding trends for UAVs and makes 

recommendations to strengthen DOD’s strategic planning and 

management approach for UAVs. 

During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided funding for UAV 

development and procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by 

DOD, and to date the services have obligated about 99 percent of these 

funds. To promote the rapid employment of UAVs, Congress appropriated 

nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs from fiscal year 1999 

through fiscal year 2003, compared with the $2.3 billion requested by DOD. 

The majority of the funds—$1.8 billion (67 percent)—have been for UAV 

research, development, test, and evaluation. Figure 1 displays the trends in 

research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement funding from 

fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003. 

 4

 P.L. 106-398, Section 220. 

GAO’s New Report 

Calls for Improved 

Strategic Planning 

UAV Funding Has 

Increased 
Page 5 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Figure 1: UAV Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and 

Procurement Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003 

Over these 5 years, only three systems—the Air Force’s Predator and 

Global Hawk, and the Army’s Shadow—have matured to the point that 

they required procurement funding, amounting to about $880 million by 

fiscal year 2003 and another estimated $938 million needed by fiscal year 

2005. 

Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the 

services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For 

example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 

Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million, enough to buy 29 

Predators. The Air Force had obligated 71 percent of the Predator’s fiscal 

year 2003 funding during its first program year. 

The Hunter, Predator, Pioneer, and Shadow are among the UAV systems 

currently being used, and therefore we determined the level of DOD’s 

operations and maintenance spending from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal 

year 2003 for these systems. Operations and maintenance funding has 

steadily increased over that period from about $56.6 million for three of 
Page 6 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

the systems to $155.2 million in 2003 for all four. These increases are the 

result of a larger inventory of existing systems and the introduction of new 

systems. Figure 2 displays the operations and maintenance spending for 

these UAV systems for fiscal years 1999 to 2003. 

Figure 2: Operations and Maintenance Funding for UAVs, for Fiscal Years 1999 to 

2003 

DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the management of the 

UAV program by establishing a program focal point in the joint UAV 

Planning Task Force and trying to communicate a common vision for UAV 

development, the UAV Roadmap. While the creation of the Task Force and 

the UAV Roadmap are important steps to improve the management of the 

program, they are not enough to reasonably assure that DOD is developing 

and fielding UAVs efficiently. The Task Force’s authority is generally 

limited to program review and advice, but is insufficient to enforce 

program direction. Moreover, the UAV Roadmap does not constitute a 

Progress Made, but 

Challenges Remain in UAV 

Planning 
Page 7 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

comprehensive strategic plan for developing and integrating UAVs into 

force structure. 

Since 2000, DOD has taken several positive steps to improve the 

management of the UAV program. In October 2001, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint UAV 

Planning Task Force as the joint advocate for developing and fielding 

UAVs. The Task Force is the focal point to coordinate UAV efforts 

throughout DOD, helping to create a common vision for future UAVrelated activities and to establish interoperability standards. For example, 

the Task Force is charged with developing and coordinating detailed UAV 

development plans, recommending priorities for development and 

procurement efforts, and providing the services and defense agencies with 

implementing guidance for common UAV programs. 

The development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force’s primary 

product to communicate its vision and promote interoperability. The 

Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAV development 

through 2027, and describes current programs, identifies potential 

missions, and provides guidance on developing emerging technologies. 

The Roadmap is also intended to assist DOD decision makers to build a 

long-range strategy for UAV development and acquisition in such future 

planning efforts as the Quadrennial Defense Review or other planning 

efforts. 

The joint UAV Planning Task Force’s authority is generally limited to 

program review and advice, but is insufficient to enforce program 

direction. The Task Force Director testified before the House Armed 

Services Committee in March 2003 that the Task Force does not have 

program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and recommended 

actions.5

 Without such authority, according to the Director, the Task Force 

seeks to influence services’ programs by making recommendations to 

them or proposing recommended program changes for consideration by 

the Under Secretary. According to defense officials, the Task Force has 

attempted to influence the joint direction of service UAV efforts in a 

variety of ways, such as reviewing services’ budget proposals, conducting 

 5

 Statement of the Director, Joint UAV Planning Task Force before the Subcommittee on 

Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2003. 

Some Positive Steps Have Been 

Taken to Improve Program 

Management 

The Joint UAV Planning Task 

Force Has Limited Authority 
Page 8 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

periodic program reviews, and participating in various UAV-related task 

teams and has had some successes, as shown below: 

• The Task Force has encouraged the Navy to initially consider an 

existing UAV (Global Hawk) rather than develop a unique UAV for its 

Broad Area Marine Surveillance mission. 

• The Task Force has worked with the Army’s tactical UAV program to 

encourage it to consider using the Navy’s Fire Scout as an initial 

platform for the Future Combat System class IV UAV. 

• The Task Force convinced the Air Force to continue with the 

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air 

Force wanted to terminate it, and the Task Force ultimately helped the 

then-separate Air Force and Navy programs merge into a joint program. 

• The Task Force convinced the Navy not to terminate the Fire Scout 

rotary wing UAV program as planned. 

However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its 

suggestions and consequently has not always succeeding in influencing 

service actions. For example, according to DOD officials, no significant 

progress has been made in achieving better interoperability among the 

services in UAV platform and sensor coordination, although efforts are 

continuing in this vein. 

Neither the Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents represent a 

comprehensive strategy to guide the development and fielding of UAVs 

that complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and 

avoid duplication. DOD officials acknowledged that the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense has not issued any guidance that establishes an 

overall strategy for UAVs in DOD. While high-level DOD strategic-planning 

documents—such as the National Military Strategy, the Joint Vision 2020, 

and the Defense Planning Guidance—provide some general 

encouragement to pursue transformational technologies, including the 

development of UAVs, these documents do not provide any specific 

guidance on developing and integrating UAVs into the force structure. 

DOD Has No Comprehensive 

Strategic Plan 
Page 9 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

At the same time, while the Joint Requirements Oversight Council6 has 

reviewed several UAVs and issued guidance for some systems, neither the 

Joint Staff nor the council has issued any guidance that would establish a 

strategic plan or overarching architecture for DOD’s current and future 

UAVs. In June 2003, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the 

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to provide a topdown capability-based process. Under the system, five boards have been 

chartered, each representing a major warfighting capability area as 

follows: (1) command and control, (2) force application, (3) battle space 

awareness, (4) force protection, and (5) focused logistics. Each board has 

representatives from the services, the combatant commanders, and certain 

major functions of the Under Secretary of Defense. Each board is tasked 

with developing a list of capabilities needed to conduct joint operations in 

its respective functional areas. The transformation of these capabilities is 

expected, and the boards are likely to identify specific capabilities that can 

be met by UAVs. Nonetheless, according to Joint Staff officials, these 

initiatives will not result in an overarching architecture for UAVs. 

However, the identification of capabilities that can be met by UAVs is 

expected to help enhance the understanding of DOD’s overall requirement 

for UAV capabilities. 

Moreover, according to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

the UAV Roadmap was not intended to provide an overarching 

architecture for UAVs. The Roadmap does state that it is intended to assist 

DOD decision makers in building a long-range strategy for UAV 

development and acquisition in such future planning efforts as the 

Quadrennial Defense Review. Nonetheless, the Roadmap represents a 

start on a strategic plan because it incorporates some of the key 

components of strategic planning, as shown below: 

Long-term goals—The Roadmap states its overall purpose and 

what it hopes to encourage the services to attain. The Roadmap

refers to the Defense Planning Guidance’s intent for UAVs as a 

capability and indicates that the guidance encourages the rapid 

advancement of this capability. At the same time, it does not 

clearly state DOD’s overall or long-term goals for its UAV efforts. 

Similarly, while it states that it wants to provide the services with 

 6

 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is a joint organization made up of senior 

representatives from each of the services to review joint experimentation and make 

appropriate recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3180.1 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2002). 
Page 10 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

clear direction, it does not clearly identify DOD’s vision for its UAV 

force structure through 2027. 

Approaches to obtain long-term goals—The Roadmap’s

“Approach” section provides a strategy for developing the 

Roadmap and meeting its goal. This approach primarily deals with 

identifying requirements and linking them to needed UAV payload 

capabilities, such as sensors and associated communication links. 

The approach then ties these requirements to forecasted trends in 

developing technologies as a means to try to develop a realistic 

assessment of the state of the technology in the future and the 

extent to which this technology will be sufficient to meet identified 

requirements. At the same time, however, the Roadmap does not 

provide a clear description of a strategy for defining how to 

develop and integrate UAVs into the future force structure. For 

example, the Roadmap does not attempt to establish UAV 

development or fielding priorities, nor does it identify the most 

urgent mission-capability requirements. Moreover, without the 

sufficient identification of priorities, the Roadmap cannot link 

these priorities to current or developing UAV programs and 

technology. 

Performance goals—The Roadmap established 49 specific 

performance goals for a variety of tasks. Some of these goals are 

aimed at fielding transformational capabilities without specifying 

the missions to be supported. Others are to establish joint 

standards and control costs. Nonetheless, of the 49 goals, only 1 

deals directly with developing and fielding a specific category of 

UAV platform to meet a priority mission-capability requirement—

the suppression of enemy air defenses or strike electronic attack. 

The remaining goals, such as developing heavy-fuel aviation 

engines suitable for UAVs, are predominantly associated with 

developing UAV or related technologies as well as UAV-related 

standards and policies to promote more efficient and effective joint 

UAV operations. However, the Roadmap does not establish overall 

UAV program goals. 

Performance indicators—Some of the 49 goals have 

performance indicators that could be used to evaluate progress, 

while others do not. Furthermore, the Roadmap does not establish 

indicators that readily assess how well the program will meet the 

priority mission capabilities. 
Page 11 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

As the services and defense agencies pursue separate UAV programs, they 

risk developing systems with duplicate capabilities, potentially higher 

operating costs, and increased interoperability challenges. The House 

Appropriations Committee was concerned that without comprehensive 

planning and review, there is no clear path toward developing a UAV force 

structure.7 Thus, the committee directed that each service update or create 

a UAV roadmap. These roadmaps were to address the services’ plans for 

the development of future UAVs and how current UAVs are being 

employed. Officials from each of the services indicated that their UAV 

roadmap was developed to primarily address their individual service’s 

requirements and operational concepts. However, in their views, such 

guidance as the Joint Vision 2020, National Military Strategy, and Defense 

Planning Guidance did not constitute strategic plans for UAVs to guide the 

development of their individual service’s UAV roadmap. These officials 

further stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 UAV 

Roadmap provided some useful guidance, but was not used to guide the 

development of the service’s UAV roadmaps. Moreover, they did not view 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Roadmap as either a DOD-wide 

strategic plan or an overarching architecture for integrating UAVs into the 

force structure. According to service officials developing the service-level 

UAV roadmaps, there was little collaboration with other services’ UAV 

efforts. 

As we have described for you today, DOD has an opportunity to enhance 

its strategic planning to improve the management of UAV development 

and fielding. In the report released to you today, we make two 

recommendations to assist DOD to enhance its management control over 

the UAV program. We recommend that DOD establish a strategic plan or 

set of plans based on mission requirements to guide UAV development and 

fielding. We also recommend that DOD designate the joint UAV Planning 

Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the 

implementation of a UAV strategic plan. In responding to our report, DOD 

stated that it partially concurred with the first recommendation but 

preferred to address UAV planning through the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System process. DOD disagreed with the 

second recommendation saying that it did not need to provide an 

organization within the department with more authority because it 

believes that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology already has sufficient authority to achieve DOD’s UAV goals. 

 7

 Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 2003 Report, H.R. Rep. No. 107-532 at 207. 
Page 12 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Our report states clearly that we continue to support both 

recommendations. We believe that the growth in the number and cost of 

UAV programs, and their importance to military capabilities, will need 

more formalized oversight by DOD. 

Our reviews of system development efforts over the last several decades 

show that the road to fielding operational UAVs has not been easy. 

Success has been achieved as a result of intervention by leadership and 

the use of innovative processes. Even when put on a sound footing, these 

programs have continued to face new challenges. In the future, UAVs will 

be growing in number, sophistication, and significance, but will also have 

to compete for increasingly scarce funds, electromagnetic frequency 

spectrum, and airspace. 

Since the mid 1970s, we have reviewed many individual DOD UAV 

development efforts.8

 A list of our reports is attached in the section 

entitled “Related GAO Products.” Our previous work has highlighted 

problems that addressed congressional efforts to bring the development 

process under control and subsequently led to the termination or redesign 

and retrofit of a number of these development efforts. 

In 1988 we reported on a variety of management challenges related to UAV 

development.9

 At that time, congressional committees had expressed 

concern about duplication in the services’ UAV programs, which ran 

counter to the committees’ wishes that DOD acquire UAVs to meet 

common service needs. In 1988, we noted that DOD was to provide, at 

minimum, a UAV master plan that (1) harmonized service requirements, 

(2) utilized commonality to the maximum extent possible, and (3) made 

trade-offs between manned and unmanned vehicles in order to provide 

future cost savings. After budget deliberations for fiscal year 1988, 

Congress eliminated separate service accounts for individual UAV 

programs and consolidated that funding into a single Defense Agencies 

account. This in turn led to the formation of DOD’s UAV Joint Projects 

Office, which promoted joint UAV efforts that would prevent unnecessary 

 8

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Status of the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Programs. 

GAO/PSAD-77-30 (Washington, D.C.: February 18, 1977). 

9

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD’s Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 1988). 

Oversight Challenge 

Is Framed by 

Experiences of the 

Past and Demands of 

the Future 

Lessons From Past 

Experience 
Page 13 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

duplication. This effort was led by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance 

Office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which has since been 

disbanded. 

Our analysis of DOD’s 1988 UAV master plan identified a number of 

weaknesses: (1) it did not eliminate duplication, (2) it continued to permit 

the proliferation of single-service programs, (3) it did not adequately 

consider cost savings potential from manned and unmanned aircraft tradeoffs, and (4) it did not adequately emphasize the importance of common 

payloads among different UAV platforms. 

In testimony presented in April 1997, we recognized the strong support 

that Congress had provided for DOD’s UAV acquisition efforts and how it 

had encouraged the department to spur related cooperation between the 

services.10 We noted that problems with UAV development continued and 

were leading to cost, schedule, and performance deficiencies; continued 

duplication of UAV capabilities; and even program cancellations in many 

instances. In 1997, only one UAV—the Pioneer—had been fielded. 

Since 1997, we have continued to evaluate the department’s UAV 

development efforts, including plans to develop a lethal variant of UAVs 

called unmanned combat air vehicles. Our reviews over the last 27 years 

have revealed several reasons why UAV efforts have not been successful, 

including requirements that outstrip technology, overly ambitious 

schedules, and difficulties integrating UAV components and UAV testing. 

We have also found that UAV system acquisitions processes were not 

protected from what is known as “requirements creep.” These 

requirements changes increase development and procurement costs 

significantly. For example: 

• The Aquila was started in 1979 with a straightforward mission to 

provide small, propeller-driven UAVs to give group commanders realtime battlefield information about enemy forces beyond ground 

observers’ line of sight.11 Requirements creep increased complexity and 

development and anticipated procurement costs significantly. For 

 10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts, 

GAO/T-NSIAD-97-138 (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997). 

11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Its Potential 

Battlefield Contribution Still in Doubt, GAO/NSIAD-88-19 (Washington, D.C.: October 26, 

1987). 

Factors That Limit UAV 

Development 
Page 14 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

example, in 1982 a requirement for night vision capability was added 

which increased development costs due to the additional payloads and 

air vehicles needed to meet the new requirement. During operational 

tests, the Aquila successfully fulfilled all requirements in only 7 of 105 

flights. 

• When the Air Force’s Global Hawk reconnaissance UAV was started in 

1994, it was expected to have an average unit flyaway price of $10 

million. Changes in the aircraft’s range and endurance objectives 

required the contractor to modify the wings and other structural parts, 

and by 1999 its cost had increased by almost 50 percent. In our April 

2000 report, we concluded that the cost of air vehicles to be produced 

could increase still further, because the Air Force had not finalized its 

design requirements.12 In 2002, the Global Hawk program adopted a 

higher-risk strategy that calls for both a larger, more advanced aircraft 

and an accelerated delivery schedule. 

• In June 2003 we reported that the original requirements for the Air 

Force’s unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) program posed 

significant, but manageable challenges to build an air vehicle that is 

affordable throughout its life cycle, highly survivable, and lethal.13

Subsequently, however, the Air Force added requirements—adding a 

mission and increasing flying range. This action widened the gap 

between requirements and resources and increased the challenge for 

the development program. 

Aside from the air vehicle, other ground and airborne systems are also 

needed for the UAV to be complete. DOD’s practice of buying systems 

before successful completion of testing has repeatedly led to defective 

systems that were terminated, redesigned, or retrofitted to achieve 

satisfactory performance. Our reviews have shown that, before production 

begins, DOD needs to test to ensure that all key parts of the UAV system 

can work successfully together, and that it can be operated and 

maintained affordably throughout its lifecycle. 

 12 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global 

Hawk Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, GAO/NSIAD-00-78 (Washington, 

D.C.: April 25, 2000). 

13 GAO-03-598. 
Page 15 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

• In March 1999, we examined the Medium Range UAV, which began in 

1989 as a joint effort of the Navy and Air Force.14 The Air Force was to 

design and build the sensor payload, including cameras, a videotape 

recorder, and a communications data link that would send back the 

imagery from the UAV. The Navy was to design and build the air 

vehicle. Splitting and then integrating these development efforts 

became problematic. The Air Force ran into major payload 

development difficulties, which impacted payload development costs. 

As a result of the difficulties, the payload program fell behind schedule, 

developmental tests on a surrogate manned aircraft15 were 

unsuccessful, and the payload was too big to fit in the space the Navy 

had allotted inside the aircraft. In 1993, the program was terminated. 

• In 1999, the Army began low-rate initial production of four Shadow 

systems at the same time that it began the engineering and 

manufacturing development phase. In February 2001, the Army sought 

to revise its acquisition strategy to procure four additional Shadow 

systems before conducting operational tests. We recommended in a 

2000 report that the Army not buy these four additional systems until 

after operational testing is completed.16 In our opinion, only operational 

testing of the system in a realistic environment can show whether the 

overall system would meet the Army’s operational needs. Subsequently, 

we reported that problems encountered during early tests forced the 

program to delay completion of operational testing by one year. The 

results of operational tests revealed that the Shadow was not 

operationally suitable, survivable, and may not be affordable. 

Our body of UAV work also made several observations about factors that 

contribute to success, including the use of innovative approaches and 

high-level interventions by individuals and organizations. In August 1999, 

we concluded that DOD’s use of Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration projects improved UAV acquisitions because it focused on 

maturing technology and proving military utility before committing to a 

 14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System 

Components Do Not Fit, GAO/NSIAD-91-2 (Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991). 

15 A surrogate manned aircraft is a conventional aircraft with unmanned controls that is 

being operated as a UAV with a pilot on board to override controls in the event of an 

emergency. 

16 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for 

Revisions to Shadow 200 Acquisition Strategy, GAO/NSIAD-00-204 (Washington, D.C.: 

September 26, 2000). 

Factors That Lead to UAV 

Success 
Page 16 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

UAV.17 We found that DOD’s Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration approach was consistent with the practices that we 

typically characterize as leading commercial development efforts. 

Predator UAV used a 30-month Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration approach and prototypes were deployed in Bosnia in 1995 

and 1996 as part of the demonstration. Performance data gathered there 

convinced military users that Predator was worth acquiring. 

High-level individuals intervened to set resource constraints and 

encouraged evolutionary acquisition strategies on the Air Force’s Global 

Hawk, the Army’s Shadow UAV, and the Joint Unmanned Combat Air 

System programs. 

• In the initial Shadow program, the Army’s top military acquisition 

executive reached an agreement with his counterpart in the 

requirements community that limited the program to “must have” 

capabilities and restrained resources such as cost. This resulted in the 

need to make trade-offs—so the Army lowered the performance 

requirement for the imagery sensor so that existing technology could 

be used.18

• In the Global Hawk program, the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) became personally involved 

and insisted that the program take an evolutionary approach, 

developing and fielding different versions of increasingly capable 

UAVs. He also placed cost constraints on the initial version, which 

enabled more advanced imagery sensor capabilities to be deferred for 

later versions of the UAV. 

• In our report on the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program, we 

reported on Air Force plans to have initial deliveries of a lethal-strikecapable aircraft by 2011.19 The Air Force had abandoned the Unmanned 

Combat Air Vehicle initial low-risk approach to development, and 

increased requirements and accelerated its program schedule shortly 

 17 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Demonstration 

Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: August 

30, 1999). 

18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources 

Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 

2001). 

19 GAO-03-598. 
Page 17 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

before it was to shift to the product development stage. As previously 

reported, it took intervention by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

to resolve requirements and funding challenges and maintain strong 

oversight over the program. The Task Force also was instrumental in 

getting the funding restored to the program, creating a joint effort 

between the Air Force and Navy, and accelerating the Navy’s version. 

Their strong oversight and intervention might have saved the program, 

which is now known as the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System 

program. 

Over the next decade, DOD plans show that UAV investments will 

increase, greater numbers will be fielded, and these systems will play more 

significant roles than in the past. In addition to overcoming the problems 

and pressures that have impaired past programs, managers of future UAV 

programs will face increasing competition for money, electromagnetic 

frequency spectrum bandwidth, and airspace. 

By 2010, DOD plans to invest $11 billion in UAV acquisitions, quadrupling 

the number of systems in its inventory today. As UAV programs vie for 

increased funding, they will have to compete against very large programs, 

such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. If the costs of acquisition 

programs continue to exceed what has been set aside in the budget, 

competition will intensify and funding could be jeopardized. 

Initially, UAVs were seen as complementary systems that augmented 

capabilities the warfighter already had. They were, in a sense, “another 

pair of eyes.” We are already seeing the evolution of UAVs into more 

significant roles, for which they provide primary capability. For example, 

the Global Hawk is being seen as replacing the U-2 reconnaissance 

aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle may eventually perform 

electronic warfare missions that the EA-6 Prowler aircraft performs today. 

UAVs are figuring prominently in plans to transform the military into a 

more strategically responsive force. UAVs are expected to be an integral 

part of this information-based force. For example, UAVs may serve as 

relay nodes in the Future Combat System’s command and control 

network. As UAVs perform increasingly significant roles, their payloads 

and designs will likely become more sophisticated. 

UAVs depend on the available space in the electromagnetic frequency 

spectrum to send and receive signals. Such signals are essential to UAV 

control, communications, and imagery. As the number of UAVs grows, the 

systems will have to compete for more room on the spectrum. Spectrum 

Future Challenges in 

Oversight of UAVs 
Page 18 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

resources are scarce and facing increased demands from sources other 

than UAVs. Because of the changing nature of warfighting, more and more 

military systems are coming to depend on the spectrum to guide precision 

weapons and obtain information superiority. Recently, because of 

advances in commercial technology, a competition for scarce frequency 

spectrum has developed between government and nongovernment users. 

Moreover, as the growing number of UAV systems become available for 

military units and civilian agencies, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security, their operation will also need to be integrated into the national 

airspace system. Currently, the Federal Aviation Administration requires 

detailed coordination and approval of UAV flights in the national airspace 

system. The Federal Aviation Administration and DOD are working on 

how to better integrate military UAVs within the national air space system. 

In the future, UAVs are going to be used for homeland security, and their 

acceptance into civil airspace may be difficult to accomplish until 

significant work is accomplished in the areas of reliability, regulation, 

communications, and collision avoidance. 

Recent operations are convincing military commanders that UAVs are of 

real value to the warfighter. That success on the battlefield is leading to 

more and more demand for UAVs and innovative ways of using them, 

creating pressures such as a greater need for interoperability of systems 

and competition for limited resources like money, electromagnetic 

frequency spectrum, and airspace. The UAVs that are successful today 

survived an environment characterized by a number of canceled programs, 

risky strategies, uncoordinated efforts, and uncertain funding. It took 

additional measures for them to succeed, not the least of which was strong 

management intervention. In recent years, DOD has taken positive steps to 

better manage the development of UAVs by creating the joint UAV 

Planning Task Force and the UAV Roadmap. The question is whether 

these steps will be sufficient to make the most out of current and future 

investments in UAVs. We believe that DOD should build on these good 

steps so that it will be in a better position to provide stewardship over 

these investments. Taking these steps will give Congress confidence that 

its investments’ in the technology will produce optimum capabilities 

desired of UAVs. 

- - - - - 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy 

to answer any questions that you or Members of the subcommittee may 

have. 

Concluding Remarks 
Page 19 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements 

For future questions about this statement, please contact Mr. Curtin at 

(202) 512-4914, Mr. Francis at (202) 512-2811, or Brian J. Lepore at (202) 

512-4523. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include 

Fred S. Harrison, Lawrence E. Dixon, James K. Mahaffey, James A. 

Driggins, Jerry W. Clark, Jose Ramos, Jr., R.K. Wild, Bob Swierczek, and 

Kenneth E. Patton. 
Page 1 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington, D.C.: March 

17, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of 

Cruise Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology 

Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175. 

Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to 

the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success. GAO-03-598. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 

200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.: 

September 26, 2000. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced 

Concept Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: 

April 25, 2000. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Demonstration Approach Has 

Improved Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 

30, 1999. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude 

Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.: 

December 15, 1998. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate 

to Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.: 

September 23, 1997. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts. GAO/ T-NSIAD97-138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy 

Fleet Use. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995. 

Related GAO Products 
Page 2 GAO-04-530T Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short Range System Still in 

Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of 

Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4, 

1992. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not 

Fit. GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production 

of Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 

28, 1990. 

Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Master Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988. 

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