IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Malloy and Edward C. :

Malloy, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1027 C.D. 2022

:

Nicole Aileen Feigenbaum, Barry C. :

Dozor, and Geoffrey Moulton : Submitted: February 6, 2024

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PER CURIAM FILED: April 9, 2024

In this appeal, Appellants Deborah R. Malloy and Edward C. Malloy

(collectively Appellants) challenge the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware 

County’s (Common Pleas) December 28, 2021 order, through which Common Pleas 

sustained Appellees Nicole Aileen Feigenbaum’s, Barry C. Dozor’s, and Geoffrey 

Moulton’s (collectively Appellees)1 preliminary objections to Appellants’ 

“Amended (Sixth) Complaint” (Sixth Amended Complaint) and dismissed that 

action with prejudice. Upon review, we affirm.

I. Background

On April 16, 2021, Appellants filed an abuse of process action against 

Appellees in Common Pleas, to which Appellees responded by filing preliminary 

objections. Thereafter, the parties engaged in a repetitious dance of sorts, whereby 

Appellants would file a new, slightly revised version of their complaint, thereby 

rendering moot Appellees’ existing preliminary objections, only to have Appellees 

respond by submitting a new round of preliminary objections. Eventually, 

1 As will be discussed infra, each appellee is, or was, employed by our Commonwealth’s 

judiciary.
2

Appellants filed their Sixth Amended Complaint, which is the subject of this appeal, 

on November 5, 2021. Therein, Appellants confusingly allege that Appellees have 

abused the legal process by repeatedly challenging several other lawsuits filed by 

Appellants in Common Pleas via preliminary objections;

2 Appellants characterize

the arguments put forth by Appellees in those preliminary objections as being 

entirely spurious and improper. R.R. at 4a-36a.

On November 24, 2021, Appellees responded to the Sixth Amended 

Complaint via preliminary objections. Specifically, Appellees argued that 

Appellants’ action should be dismissed for several reasons. First, Appellants’ abuse 

of process claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 64a-67a. Second, these 

claims were also barred by judicial privilege. Id. at 67a-68a. Third, Appellants’ 

claims against Dozor were barred by judicial immunity. Id. at 68a-71a. Fourth, 

Appellants had failed to state any legally viable claims for which relief could be 

granted. Id. at 71a-75a. Fifth, Appellants’ claims were barred by the doctrine of lis 

2 Those underlying lawsuits revolve around Appellants’ belief that Dozor, a Common Pleas 

judge, has repeatedly failed to comply with the administrative case disposition reporting 

requirements imposed upon him by Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 703, as well as 

that Moulton, who was the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts’ (AOPC) Court 

Administrator until his retirement on September 30, 2023, was statutorily required to report such 

noncompliance to our Supreme Court and/or the Judicial Conduct Board (JCB). See Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 4a-21a, 25a-32a; Pennsylvania Supreme Court Announces Upcoming Retirement 

of State Court Administrator Geoff Moulton, THE UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA. (Apr. 25, 2023), 

https://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/news/news-detail/1134/pennsylvania-supremecourt-announces-upcoming-retirement-of-state-court-administrator-geoff-moulton; Pa. R.J.A. 703 

(judges in this Commonwealth are required to submit biannual reports to the AOPC’s Court 

Administrator, in which they must list all matters which have been assigned to them and have 

remained undecided for 90 or more days, while the Court Administrator must notify the JCB in 

the event a judge fails to file a timely report and, “where appropriate,” shall forward to the JCB 

any reports that list “one or more matters which have remained undecided for one year or more”).

Feigenbaum is an attorney with the AOPC, who represented Dozor and Moulton in those lawsuits, 

and is Appellees’ attorney of record in this appeal. See R.R. at 21a-24a, 33a-36a; Appellees’ Br. 

at 33.
3

pendens, due to the fact that they had preexisting, pending cases, through which they 

were pursuing the same claims against Appellees as in this matter. Id. at 75a. Finally, 

Appellants had failed to state a legally viable conspiracy claim. Id. at 76a-77a.

On December 28, 2021, Common Pleas sustained Appellees’ preliminary 

objections, dismissed Appellants’ Sixth Amended Complaint with prejudice, and 

precluded Appellants from filing a seventh amended complaint.3Id. at 97a. 

Appellants appealed this ruling to our Court shortly thereafter.

II. Discussion

Appellants’ arguments are difficult to parse, as they are not coherently 

articulated in their brief, but we interpret them as falling into two categories. First, 

Common Pleas erred by concluding that Appellees were immune from Appellants’ 

abuse of process suit. Appellants’ Br. at 9-10, 13-15. Second, Common Pleas also 

erred when it determined that Appellants had failed to state a viable abuse of process 

claim against Appellees. Id. at 8-12.

We need only address the second question in order to dispose of this appeal.4

“To prove a claim for abuse of process, the plaintiff must show that the defendant 

3 On September 23, 2022, Common Pleas issued an opinion, in which it explained that it 

had sustained Appellees’ preliminary objections on the bases of demurrer and immunity. See R.R. 

at 111a-14a.

4

“Our standard of review in [an] appeal arising from an order 

sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is de 

novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Raynor v. D’Annunzio, 

243 A.3d 41, 52 (Pa. 2020). A “demurrer is a preliminary objection 

to the legal sufficiency of a pleading and raises questions of law[.]” 

Raynor, 243 A.3d at 52. [A court can] sustain a demurrer only when 

the law undoubtedly precludes recovery; if doubt exists, [a court]

should overrule the demurrer. Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The 

Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 2005). “When ruling 

on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to the complaint.” 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
4

used a legal process against them primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the 

process was not designed.” Morley v. Farnese, 178 A.3d 910, 919 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2018).

The common law tort of abuse of process involves the 

perversion of legal process after it has begun in order to 

achieve a result for which the process was not intended. 

Abuse of process has been described by the Supreme 

Court as the “use of legal process as a tactical weapon to 

coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of 

the process.” In order to state a cause of action for abuse 

of process it must be alleged that the defendant used a legal 

process to accomplish a purpose for which the process was 

not designed. The classic example is the initiation of a civil 

proceeding to coerce the payment of a claim completely 

unrelated to the cause of action sued upon. It is not enough 

that the defendant had bad or malicious intentions or that 

the defendant acted from spite or with an ulterior motive. 

Rather, there must be an act or threat not authorized by the 

process, or the process must be used for an illegitimate aim 

such as extortion, blackmail, or to coerce or compel the 

plaintiff to take some collateral action.

Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1024-25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) 

(quoting Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 644 A.2d 188, 191-92 (Pa. Super. 

1994)). “There is no liability [for abuse of process] where the defendant has done 

nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though 

Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “Thus, 

the court may determine only whether, on the basis of the plaintiff’s 

allegations, he or she possesses a cause of action recognized at law.” 

Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v. City of Phila., 

267 A.3d 531, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).

RT Partners, LP v. Allegheny Cnty. Off. of Prop. Assessment, 307 A.3d 801, 805 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2023) (cleaned up).
5

with bad intentions.” Di Sante v. Russ Financial Co., 380 A.2d 439, 441 (Pa. Super. 

1977) (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, TORTS § 100, at 669 (2d ed.1955)) (cleaned up).

5

Given this framework, it is plainly evident that Appellants failed to articulate 

a viable abuse of process claim in this matter against Dozor, Feigenbaum, or 

Moulton. The gravamen of Appellants’ lawsuit is that Appellees have filed 

preliminary objections in other, related proceedings that contain entirely spurious 

arguments, including that Common Pleas could not exercise jurisdiction over those 

matters; Appellees were immune from suit; Appellants lacked standing to pursue 

their actions; and Appellants failed to state claims for which legal relief could be 

granted. See R.R. at 4a-36a. Those arguments, however, are of the type which 

defendants often raise at the preliminary objection stage, in order to short-circuit 

pending litigation early on, and are regularly adjudicated at that point by trial courts.6

5

“In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer 

persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 

Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

6 Strictly speaking, immunity must be raised as an affirmative defense in new matter, rather 

than by preliminary objection. Pa. R.Civ.P. 1030(a). This is not an ironclad rule, though.

“Should a plaintiff wish to contest the defense on this procedural 

ground, the plaintiff must file a preliminary objection to the 

preliminary objection.” Orange Stones, 87 A.3d at 1022.

When a party responds to the preliminary objections, instead of 

challenging the procedure by filing its own preliminary objections, 

the party has waived any challenge to the form of pleading the 

defense. See Feldman v. Hoffman, 107 A.3d 821 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014). Generally, however, when not objected to in preliminary 

objections, courts have been moving away from this strict 

interpretation and it is now currently accepted that immunity is a 

defense that may be raised by preliminary objection “when to delay 

a ruling thereon would serve no purpose.” Faust v. Dep’t of 

Revenue, 592 A.2d 835, 838 n.3 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991). But see Rufo v. 

Bastian-Blessing Co., 207 A.2d 823 (Pa. 1965) (trial court may only 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

Where, as here, such arguments are made in the normal course of litigation and 

carried to their “authorized conclusion,” they cannot form the basis for a viable abuse 

of process claim, even if those arguments were put forth “with bad intentions.” Di 

Sante, 380 A.2d at 441. Accordingly, we conclude that Common Pleas did not 

commit an error of law by sustaining Appellees’ preliminary objections on the basis 

of demurrer.

III. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm Common Pleas’ December 28, 

2021 order.

consider immunity defense raised by preliminary objection if 

plaintiff does not object).

Further, “Pennsylvania courts have long recognized a limited 

exception to this rule and have allowed parties to plead the 

affirmative defense of immunity as a preliminary objection where 

the defense is clearly applicable on the face of the complaint.” 

Feldman, 107 A.3d at 829-30 (emphasis added) (citing string of 

cases); see also Logan v. Lillie, 728 A.2d 995 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) 

(involving suit against judicial defendants and successful assertion 

of judicial immunity). In fact, “[w]here, however, the asserted 

affirmative defense is clearly applicable on the face of the 

complaint, the court will consider it unless the plaintiff advances 

some reason, ‘other than prolonging the matter,’ to defer 

consideration.” Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of 

Harrisburg, 218 A.3d 497, 515 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting 

Feldman, 107 A.3d at 835) (when method of raising immunity 

defense challenged, upheld overruling of preliminary objection 

because immunity was not clear on face of complaint).

Chasan v. Platt, 244 A.3d 73, 80-81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (cleaned up).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Malloy and Edward C. :

Malloy, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1027 C.D. 2022

:

Nicole Aileen Feigenbaum, Barry C. :

Dozor, and Geoffrey Moulton :

PER CURIAM

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of April, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court 

of Common Pleas of Delaware County’s December 28, 2021 order is AFFIRMED.