MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	74

Docket: Yor-19-215

Argued: January 9,	2020

Decided: May	26,	2020

Revised: June	23,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.*

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

NICHOLAS	E.	WESTGATE

JABAR,	J.

[¶1]		Nicholas	E.	Westgate	appeals	from	a	judgment	of	conviction	of	five	

counts	 of	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact,	 (Class	 B),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 § 255-A(1)(E-1)	

(2020), and	 one	 count	 of	 visual	 sexual	 aggression	 against	 a	 child	 (Class	 C),	

17-A M.R.S.	 § 256(1)(B)	 (2020),	 entered	 after	 a	jury	 trial.	 We	 conclude	that	

Westgate	received	a fair	 trial with	properly	admitted	expert	 testimony and	a	

clear	guilty	verdict. We	affirm the	judgment.	

 * Although	 Justice	 Alexander	 participated	 in	 the	 appeal,	 he	 retired	 before	 this	 opinion	 was	

certified.		Chief	Justice	Saufley also	sat	at	oral	argument	and	participated	in	the	initial	conference,	but	

she	resigned	before	this	opinion	was	certified.		
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I.	 BACKGROUND

[¶2]		The	following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	evidence	admitted	at	trial,	

viewed	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	State.		See	State	v.	Graham,	2015	ME	

35,	¶ 2,	113	A.3d	1102.

[¶3]		During	the	month	of June 2009,	Westgate	committed	five	separate	

incidents	 of	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact	 and	 one	 incident	 of	 visual	 sexual	

aggression,	all against	an	eleven-year-old	victim.		

[¶4]		In	2012,	Westgate	was	charged	by	indictment	with	 five	counts	of	

unlawful	sexual	contact (Class	B),	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 255-A(1)(E-1),	and	one	count	

of	visual	sexual	aggression	against	a	child	(Class	C),	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 256(1)(B).		

A. First	Trial

[¶5]	 	 Following	 several	 motions	 to	 continue	 the	 dates	 set	 for	 jury	

selection	and	trial,	the	court	(York	County,	O’Neil,	J.)	held	a	three-day	jury	trial	

in	May	2014.		On	May	21,	2014,	the	jury	returned	a	guilty	verdict	on	all	counts.		

Following	 this first	 trial,	 Westgate	 appealed, arguing	 that	 the	 trial	 court	

provided	deficient	jury	instructions.		On	September 20,	2016,	we	vacated	 the	

jury’s	 verdict,	 agreeing	 that	 the	 jury	 was	 not	 properly	 instructed. We	

determined that “[t]he	 trial	court	read	 the	indictment	 to	 the	jury	but	did	not	

specify	what	the	elements	of	the	criminal	charges	were,	including	the	element	
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that	 the	 victim	 must	 have	 been	 under	 the	 age	 of	 twelve	 when	 the	 conduct	

occurred.”		State	v.	Westgate,	2016	ME	145,	¶ 19,	148	A.3d	716.		

B. Second	Trial

[¶6]		A second	trial	began	in	May	2017.		After	deliberations,	the	jury	was	

deadlocked.		The	court	(Douglas,	J.)	discharged	the	jury	and	declared	a	mistrial.		

C. Third	Trial

[¶7]		The	third	trial—the	one	at	issue	here—took	place	over	three days

in	October	2018. Prior	to	the	trial,	the	court	held	a	motion	hearing	addressing	

the	 State’s	 motion	 in	 limine	 to	 introduce	 expert	 testimony.	 	 The	 proposed	

witness was	trained	in	the	forensic	interviewing	of	child	victims	and	was the	

program	manager	of	the	Children’s	Advocacy	Center	of	York	County.		The	State	

argued	that	because	the	victim	had	been	interviewed	by	law	enforcement,	the	

witness’s expertise	would	help	the	jury	understand	and	evaluate	the	interview	

methods	used. The	State	indicated	that it	would	not	ask the	expert	witness to	

testify	as	 to	whether	 the	 victim	was	 telling	 the	 truth.		The	court	granted	 the	

motion	in	limine,	allowing	the	witness to	testify.		

[¶8]		On the	first	day	of	trial,	the	State’s	witnesses	testified	that	the	victim	

disclosed	incidents of	sexual	acts to	them.		The	witnesses	also testified	to	the	
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victim’s	manifestations	of	anxiety,	and	other	changes	in	her	behavior,	during	

the	summer	when	the	incidents	occurred.		

[¶9]		On	the	second	day	of	trial,	the	State	called	its expert	witness.1		The	

expert testified	that	methods	of	interviewing	child	victims	of	sexual	abuse	had

evolved	in	the	past	decade.		

[¶10]	 	 On	 the	 final	 day	 of	 the	 trial,	 Westgate	 testified	 that	 he	 never	

sexually	touched the	victim.	 At	the	close	of	evidence,	the	court	instructed the	

jury—over	 Westgate’s	 objection—with	 the	 State-requested	 instruction	 on	

lesser-included	charges. The	court	instructed	the	jury,

If	 the	 State	 does	 not	prove	 beyond	 a	 reasonable doubt	 each	 and	

every	one	of	those	facts,	as	I	have	just outlined	them	with	respect	

to	each	particular	count,	you must	find	Mr.	Westgate	not	guilty	of	

that	particular count	or	counts.

If	you	conclude	with	respect	to	any	of	the counts,	any	or	all	of	

the	counts	in	Counts	1	through	5,	that	the	State	has	proven	all	but	

the	age,	in	other words,	the	State	has	proven	beyond	a	reasonable	

doubt that	Nicholas	Westgate	intentionally	subjected	[the	victim]

to	sexual	contact	in	. . . the	summer	of	2009 and	at	the	time	he	was	

three	years—at least	three years	older	than	she	was	and	she	was	

not	his	spouse,	but the	State	has	not	proven	beyond	a	reasonable	

doubt	 that the	 offense	 or	 offenses	 occurred	 prior	 to	 her	 12th

birthday	 but	 you	 find	 that	 the	 State	 has	 proven	 beyond	 a

reasonable	doubt	 that	 for	 that	count	 or	counts	 that	 the unlawful	

sexual	contact	occurred	prior	to	her	14th birthday,	then	you	would	

convict	 Mr.	 Westgate	 of	 the lesser	 included	 offense	 of	 unlawful	

 1		Westgate	did	not cross-examine the	witness and	did	not object	to	her	testimony.		
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sexual	 contact against	 a	 person	 under	 the	 age	 of	 14	 for	 that	

particular count	or	counts.

On	the	other	hand,	if	you	find	that	the	State has	not	proven	

beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 any	 one	 of	 the facts	 required	 to	 be	

proven	 as	 outlined	 above	 with respect	 to	 the	 lesser	 included	

offense,	 including, without	 limitation,	 that	 the	 offense	 occurred	

prior	 to [the	 victim’s] 14th	 birthday,	 then	 you	 must	 acquit	

Mr. Westgate of	 the	 lesser	 included	 offense	 with	 respect	 to	 any

particular	count	or	counts.

The	court	provided	similar	instructions	as	to	Count	6.	

[¶11]		During	its	deliberations,	the	jury	submitted	notes	with	questions.		

Specifically,	the	jury	asked	for	written	copies	of	the	six	charges,	“to	be	clear	on	

each	one.”		Furthermore,	the	jury	asked,	“If we	cannot	agree	on	guilty	for	under	

12,	 will	 we	 be	 then	 asked	 about	 the	 under	 14	 charge?”	 	 The	 court,	 after	

conferring	 with	 Westgate	 and	 the	 State,	 provided	 the	 jury	 with	 the	 written	

copies	of	the	six	charges	and	responded	to	the	jury’s	second	question	with the	

word,	“Yes.”		

[¶12] After	 deliberating for	 approximately	 thirty	 minutes,	 the	 jury	

returned	a	unanimous	verdict	finding	Westgate	guilty	of	all	charges.		The	jury’s	

verdict	was	delivered	to	the	court	as	follows:

THE	CLERK:	Members	have	you	agreed	upon	a	verdict?

THE	FOREPERSON:	We	have.	

JURORS:	Yes.	
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THE	 CLERK:	 What	 say	 you,	 Mr.	 Foreperson,	 is	 the	 defendant	

Nicholas	Westgate	 guilty	 or	 not	 guilty	 of	 the	 offense	 of	 unlawful	

sexual	contact	whereof	defendant	stands	charged	in	Count	1?

THE	FOREPERSON:	Guilty.	

THE	CLERK:	Guilty	or	not	guilty	of	the	offense	of	unlawful	sexual	

contact	whereof	defendant	stands	charged	in	Count	2?

THE	FOREPERSON:	Guilty.	

THE	CLERK:	Guilty	or	not	guilty	of	the	offense	of	unlawful	sexual	

contact	whereof	defendant	stands	charged	in	Count	3?

THE	FOREPERSON:	Guilty.	

THE	CLERK:	Guilty	or	not	guilty	of	the	offense	of	unlawful	sexual	

contact	whereof	defendant	stands	charged	in	Count	4?

THE	FOREPERSON:	Guilty.	

THE	CLERK:	Guilty	or	not	guilty	of	the	offense	of	unlawful	sexual	

contact	whereof	defendant	stands	charged	in	Count	5?

THE	FOREPERSON:	Guilty.	

THE	 CLERK:	 Guilty	 or	 not	 guilty	 of	 the	 offense	 of	 visual	 sexual	

aggression	 against	 a	 child	 whereof	 defendant	 stands	 charged	 in	

Count	6?

THE	FOREPERSON:	Guilty.	

THE	 CLERK:	 Mr.	 Foreperson,	 have	 you	 correctly	 report[ed]	 the	

verdict?

THE	FOREPERSON:	I	have.	
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THE	CLERK:	So	say	you,	Mr.	Foreperson?

THE	FOREPERSON:	Yes.	

THE	COURT:	So	say	you	all?

JURORS:	Yes.	

After	the	verdict	was	read,	the	jury	was	polled	at	Westgate’s	request.		Westgate	

made	no	objections	at	the	reading of	the	verdict	or	at	any	other	time	before	this	

appeal.

[¶13] On	February	5,	2019,	the	court	sentenced	Westgate	to	ten	years’	

imprisonment	with	all	but	sixty-eight	months	suspended	on	Count	5,	with ten	

years	of	probation,	and	concurrent	 sixty-eight-month	sentences	on	 the	other	

four	counts	of	unlawful	sexual	contact	(Counts	1–4).		As	to	the	charge	of	visual	

sexual	 aggression,	 the	 court	 imposed a	 concurrent	 sentence	 of	 two	 years’	

imprisonment.		The	court	imposed	$210	in	fines.		

[¶14] On	 February	 7,	 2019,	 the	 State	 filed	 a	motion	 for	 correction	 or	

reduction	 of	 sentence.	 	 The	motion	was	 continued	 and	was	later	 granted	 on	

May 6,	 2019.	 	 The	 court amended	Westgate’s	 sentences	 for	 Counts 1	 to	 4	 to	

increase	 them	 from	sixty-eight	months	 to	ninety-six	months.		The	suspended	

portion	of	the	sentence	on Count	5	was	increased	to	ninety-six	months.		As	to	

Count	6,	Westgate’s	 sentence	was	 reduced	 to	 twelve	months.		Save	 for	 those	
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alterations,	 Westgate’s	 sentence	 remained	 unchanged.	 	 Westgate	 timely	

appealed	on	May 15,	2019.		M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(2)(D).		

II.	 DISCUSSION

[¶15]		On	appeal,	Westgate	argues	that	(A) the	court	erred	in	accepting	

the	jury’s	verdict,	(B) prosecutorial	misconduct	deprived	him	of	a	fair	trial, and	

(C) the	 court	 erred	 in	 admitting	 the expert’s testimony.	 	 We	 address	 each	

argument	in	turn.	

A. Jury’s	Verdict

[¶16]	 	 Westgate	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 by accepting	 the	 jury’s	

verdict because,	he	contends,	the	verdict	was	ambiguous.

2		Because	Westgate	

did	not	raise	this issue	in the	trial	court—indeed,	his	attorney	contributed	to	

the	 court’s	 resolution	 of	 the	jury’s	 questions3—we review	 for	obvious error.		

See State	v.	Schofield,	2005 ME	82,	¶¶ 28-36,	895 A.2d	927;	Clewley	v.	Whitney,	

 2		Westgate	seems	to	characterize	this	error	as	a	Sixth	Amendment	violation.	 Although	we	have	

never	addressed	the	issue,	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	has	described	the	right	to	a	particular	

“level	of	verdict	specificity”	as	a	“due	process	right	[rather]	than	one	under	the	Sixth	Amendment.”		

Schad	v.	Arizona,	501	U.S.	624,	634	n.5	(1991).		Whatever	the	precise	source	of	the	right,	however,	

we	see	nothing	problematic	in	the	general	proposition	that	“[i]f	the	evidence	could	have	supported	a	

conviction	for	[more	than	one]	offense,	and	there	is	nothing	in	the	record	to	indicate	which	offense	

was	meant,	a	verdict	of	 this	type	is	unalterably	ambiguous	and	a	conviction	on	 the	greater	charge	

cannot	stand.”		State	v.	Baillargeon,	470	A.2d	915,	917	(N.H.	1983) (quotation	marks	omitted);	see

United	States	v.	Cannon,	903	F.2d	849,	850	(1st	Cir.	1990).

3		The	court,	the	State,	and	Westgate	all	participated	in	developing—and	all	agreed	to—the	jury	

instructions	and	the	answers submitted	by	the	court	to	the	jury’s	questions.
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2002	ME	61,	¶ 10,	794	A.2d	87.		“To	demonstrate	obvious	error,	the	defendant	

must	 show	 that	 there	 is	 (1)	 an	 error,	 (2)	 that	 is	 plain,	 and	 (3)	 that	 affects	

substantial	rights.”		State	v.	Dolloff,	2012	ME	130,	¶ 35,	58	A.3d	1032 (quotation	

marks	 omitted).		 “Even	if	 these	 three	conditions	are	met,	we	will	 set	aside	 a	

jury’s	verdict	only	if	we conclude	that	(4)	the	error	seriously	affects	the	fairness	

and	integrity	or	public	reputation	of	judicial	proceedings.”		Id.		

[¶17]		Westgate	argues	 that	 the	verdict	here	is	ambiguous	because	 the	

jurors	 could	 have	 been	 referring	 to	 either	 the	 named	 counts	 or	 their	

lesser-included	charges.		We	disagree.	 When	the	jury	asked	for	clarification	of	

the	procedure	for	considering	the	lesser-included	charge,	the	court	instructed	

the	jurors	that	if	they	could	“not	agree	on	guilty	under	12,”	they	would	then	“be	

asked	about	 the	under	14	charge.”		This	instruction	was	sufficient	 to	apprise	

the	jurors	 that,	when	 the	court	asked	if	 they	had	 reached	 a	 verdict	as	 to	 the	

various	 charges	 “whereof	 the	 defendant	 stands	 charged,”	 they	 were	 being	

asked	for	their	verdict	as	to	the	named	charges,	not	the	lesser-included	charges.	

See United	States	v.	Cannon,	903	F.2d	849,	852-53	(1st	Cir.	1990).	 Furthermore,	

the	transcript	of	the	subsequent	polling	of	the	jury	reflects	no	equivocation	or	

uncertainty	on	the	part	of	any	individual	juror	concerning	which	charges	were	
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being	addressed.		There	was	no	obvious	error.		See	Clewley	v.	Whitney,	2002	ME	

61,	¶ 10,	794	A.2d	87.		

B. Prosecutorial	Misconduct

[¶18]		Here,	Westgate	alleges	seven	instances	of	misconduct.		He	objected	

on	 two	 instances,	 and	 five	 went	 without	 objection.4 “The	 importance	 of	

bringing	alleged error,	including	prosecutorial	misconduct,	immediately	to	the	

attention	of	the	trial	court	is	manifested	in	the	standards	of	review	for	errors	

that	were	objected	to	at	trial	and	those	that	were	unpreserved.”		Dolloff,	2012	

ME	 130,	 ¶ 31,	 58	 A.3d	 1032.	 	 When	 an	 objection	 has	 been	 made	 to	 a	

prosecutor’s	 statements	 at	 trial,	 we	 review to	 determine	whether	 there	was	

misconduct	and, if	so,	whether	the	misconduct	was	harmless	error.		Id. ¶ 33.

[¶19]		“When	an	objection	has	been	made	to	a	prosecutor’s	statements	at	

trial,	we	review	to	determine	whether	there	was	actual	misconduct,	and, if	so,	

whether	the	trial	court’s	response	remedied	any	prejudice	resulting	from	the	

misconduct.”		Id. ¶ 32 (citations omitted).		

[¶20]	 	 “Harmful	 error	 is	 error	 that	 affects	 the	 criminal	 defendant’s	

substantial	rights,	meaning	 that	 the	error	was	sufficiently	prejudicial	 to	have	

 4	 	Westgate’s	 five	 arguments	 regarding prosecutorial	misconduct	 on	questions	and	arguments	

made	during	closing	to	which	he	never	objected are	unpersuasive	and	we	do	not	address	them. Cf.

State	v.	Scott,	2019	ME	105,	¶ 25,	211	A.3d	205.		
11

affected	 the	outcome	of	 the	proceeding.”		Id. ¶ 33	(quotation	marks	omitted)	

(citations omitted).		“We	determine	the	effect	of	error	by	looking	to	‘the	totality	

of	the	circumstances,	including	the	severity	of	the	misconduct,	the	prosecutor’s	

purpose	 in	 making	 the	 statement	 (i.e.,	whether	 the	 statement	 was	 willful	 or	

inadvertent),	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 verdict,	 jury	

instructions,	and	curative	instructions.’”		Id. ¶ 33 (quoting	United	States	v.	De	La	

Paz-Rentas,	613	F.3d	18,	25	n.2	(1st	Cir.	2010)).		“[T]he	State	has	the	burden	of	

persuasion	on	appeal	in	a	harmless	error	analysis.”		Id. ¶ 39.

[¶21]		Westgate	first	challenges	 the	State’s	argument during	its closing	

argument that	the	victim	was	eleven when	the	incident occurred	and	that she	

has	 maintained this	 statement consistently	 over	 several years.	 	 Westgate	

objected,	 contending that	 the	 prosecution’s	 argument appeared	 to	 be

witness-vouching.		The	court	overruled	the	objection.

[¶22]		As	we	have	previously	pronounced,	prosecutors	cannot	vouch	for	

their	witnesses.	 State	v.	Hassan,	2013	ME	98,	¶ 33,	82	A.3d	86 (“A	lawyer	shall	

not	 state	a	personal	 opinion	as	 to . . . the	credibility	 of	a	witness.” (quotation	

marks	 omitted)).	 	 Here,	 because	 a prosecutor	 is	 free	 to	 comment	 on	 the	

consistency	of	a	witness’s	testimony—just	as	the	defense	is	free	to	comment	on	
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the	inconsistency	of	a	witness’s	testimony—the	prosecutor’s	statement	did	not	

constitute	vouching.	 There	was	no	misconduct.

[¶23]		Westgate	next	argues	that	the	prosecutor	committed	misconduct	

by asking	 him,	 during	 cross-examination, whether	 he	 attended	 the	 victim’s	

mother’s	 funeral.	 	 Westgate	 objected and	 initially	 sought	 a	 curative	

instruction—explaining	 that	 he could	 not	 attend	 the	 funeral	 because	 of	 bail	

conditions	restricting	him	from	being	near	the	victim.	 Westgate	answered	the

question	by	stating	that	he	was	unable	to	attend,	never	mentioning	that	his	bail	

conditions	prevented	him	from	attending. At	sidebar,	the	prosecutor	explained	

that	he	sought	to	demonstrate	that	Westgate	knew	of	the	death	of	the	victim’s	

mother.		Westgate then	withdrew	his	request	for	a	curative	instruction.		Here,	

the	prosecutor’s	question	regarding	Westgate’s	attendance	at	the	funeral was	

likely	irrelevant	and	probably	improper,	but	it	was	also	insignificant because

Westgate	 gave	 an	 innocuous	 explanation as	 to	 why	 he	 did	 not	 attend the	

funeral.

C. Expert	Testimony

[¶24]		Lastly,	Westgate	challenges	the	admission	of	the	expert	testimony	

regarding	 forensic	interviews	of	children. “We	review a	court’s	 foundational	

finding	that	expert	testimony	is	sufficiently	reliable	for	clear	error,	and	review	
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for	an	abuse	of	discretion	a	court’s	decision	to	admit	an	expert’s	opinion	after	

finding	it	 reliable.”		State	v.	Maine,	2017	ME	25,	¶ 16,	155	A.3d	871 (citation	

omitted).		“A	court	abuses	its	discretion	in	ruling	on	evidentiary	issues	if	 the	

ruling	arises	from	a	failure	to	apply	principles	of	law	applicable	to	a	situation	

resulting	in	prejudice.” Id.	¶ 23 (quoting	State	v.	Bennett,	658	A.2d	1058,	1062	

(Me. 1995)).

[¶25]	 	 At	 trial,	 the	 State presented	 expert	 testimony	 concerning	 the	

protocols	for interviewing	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 victims.	 	Westgate	 argues	 that	

there	is	a	considerable	risk	that	jurors	interpreted	the	expert’s testimony	as	an	

endorsement—from	 an	 experienced	 interviewer	 trained	 to	 identify	 sexually	

abused	 children—that	 the	 victim	 was	 truthful.	 	 Westgate	 contends that	 the

unfair prejudice	 resulting	 from	 the	 expert’s testimony	 substantially	

outweighed	its	relevance.	

[¶26]		“Expert	testimony	must	meet	a	threshold	level	of	reliability,	and	

must	(1)	be	relevant	in	accordance	with	M.R.	Evid.	401,	and	(2)	assist	the	trier	

of	fact	in	understanding	the	evidence	or	determining	a	fact	in	issue.”		Id. ¶ 17	

(quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 Here,	 the	 court	 provided	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 in	

justifying	its	admission	of	the	expert	testimony.		Specifically,	the	court	stated,

[I]f an	 expert	is	 properly	 qualified	 and	 the	 field	 of	 expertise	is	 a	

reliable	 field,	 then	 the	 [c]ourt	 must	 determine	 whether	 [it	 is]
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relevant	 and	 whether	 it	 would	 assist	 the	 jury	 in	 this	 case	 in	

understanding	the	evidence	or	determining	a	fact	in	issue.		

As	 to	 the	 first	issue,	 as	 to	whether	 the	 witness	is	 properly	

qualified	in	the	fields,	her reports	and	her	testimony	presented	two	

distinct	but	related	areas	of	expertise	or	information;	one	having	to	

do	 with	 general	 psychological	 or	 neurological	 principles	 of	

memory	 formation	 and	 recall,	 and	 the	 second	 having	 to	 do	with	

the—the	 developing	 practice	 of	 forensic	 interviewing,	 which	

prescribes	certain	 protocols	and	 formats	 for	questioning	 to	elicit	

in—or	elicit	 from	child	 victims	 of	 sexual	abuse,	perhaps	physical	

abuse	 but	 in	 this	 case	 sexual	 abuse,	 complete,	 consistent	 and	

reliable	answers.	

[¶27]		The	trial	court	found	that	the	witness	was qualified	as	an	expert	in	

the	 field	 of	 forensic	 interviewing	 and	 that	 forensic	 interviewing	 is	 an	

established—though	developing—field	that	has	some	reliability.		

[¶28]		Because	the	trial	court	properly	analyzed	the	facts	before	it	as	they	

related	to	the	admissibility	of	the	expert	witness’	testimony, the	court	did	not	

clearly	err	in	finding	the	State’s	witness to	be	a	qualified	expert	witness.	 See	id.

¶ 21;	see	State	v.	Ericson,	2011	ME	28,	¶ 12,	13	A.3d	777 (delineating	the	indicia	

of	threshold	reliability);	see also State	v.	Black,	537	A.2d	1154,	1156	(Me.	1988)

(permitting	 expert	 testimony	 in	 part	 to	 explain	 timing	 and	 sequencing	

inconsistencies	in	the	victim’s	testimony)

[¶29]		Because	the	trial	court	determined	that	the	expert’s	opinion	would	

assist	the	jurors,	the	trial	court’s	determination	as	to	the	evidence	it	admitted	
15

was	reasonable	and	within	the	bounds	of	its	discretion. See	Maine,	2017	ME	25,	

¶ 20,	 155	 A.3d	 871 (finding	 no	 error	 in	 a	 trial	 court’s	 admission	 of	 expert	

testimony);	see	State	v.	Bickart,	2009	ME	7,	¶ 24,	963	A.2d	183;	see	also Black,	

537	A.2d	at	1156	(“Under	the	Maine	Rules	of	Evidence	[702],	a	qualified	expert	

possessing	specialized	knowledge	may	testify	in	order	to	assist the	trier	of	fact	

to	understand	the	evidence	or	to	determine	a	fact	in	issue.”).

[¶30]		As	the	trial	court	noted,	forensic	interviewing	techniques	may	be	

beyond	the	knowledge	of	the	average	juror. To	that	end,	the	court	allowed	the	

expert’s testimony	with	respect	to	the questioning	of	the	victim.		However,	the	

trial	court	did	not allow	the	witness	to	offer	opinion	testimony	about	either	the	

veracity	of	the	victim’s	testimony	or	whether	the	methodologies	employed	by	

the	prior	questioners	were	scientifically	valid	methods	of	truth-seeking.		

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.	

Rory	 A.	 McNamara,	 Esq. (orally),	 Drake	 Law,	 LLC,	 Berwick,	 for	 appellant	

Nicholas	E.	Westgate

Kathryn	L.	Slattery,	District	Attorney, and	Matthew	Richwalder,	Asst.	Dist.	Atty.	

(orally), Prosecutorial	District	#1,	Alfred,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

York County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CR-2012-1285

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY