THE VIABILITY OF U.S. ANTISATELLITE (ASAT) POLICY: 

MOVING TOWARD SPACE 

CONTROL 

Joan Johnson-Freese 

INSS Occasional Paper 30 

Space Policy Series 

January 2000 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

paper is approved for public release by SAF/PAS; distribution is 

unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

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 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vi 

Executive Summary viii 

Introduction 1 

The Evolution of ASAT Policy 3 

 Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 10 

1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 11 

 Similarities and Differences 17 

Things Begin to Change 18 

New Rationales 24 

Conclusions 31 

Endnotes 32 
vi

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this thirtieth volume in the

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). It is particularly timely that with the increased 

emphasis on space within the US Air Force, in light of the ongoing HQ 

USAF efforts toward air and space integration into a true aerospace 

force, and in the wake of the 1998 INSS conference "Spacepower for a 

New Millennium," this work represents the initiation of our Space Policy 

Series of INSS Occasional Papers. In this paper, Dr Joan JohnsonFreese presents an examination of past U.S. policy and international 

treaty interpretations on anti-satellite weapons (ASATS) in space within 

the context of the organizational politics surrounding questions of 

developing and deploying these systems. With the ever-increasing 

American commercial and military reliance on space, these questions are 

particularly timely, and it is our hope that the debate on ASATS—indeed 

on the larger issues of weaponization of space—can be better informed 

by this paper. 

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US 

Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF 

Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI); the 

Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (incorporating the sponsorship of the 

Defense Special Weapons Agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency); 

the Army Environmental Policy Institute; the Plans Directorate of the 

United States Space Command; the Air Force long-range plans 

directorate (XPXP); and the Nonproliferation Center of the Central 
vii

Intelligence Agency. The mission of the Institute is “to promote national 

security research for the Department of Defense within the military 

academic community, and to support the Air Force national security 

education program.” Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest 

to our organizational sponsors: arms control, proliferation, regional 

studies, Air Force policy, information warfare, environmental security, 

and space policy. 

 INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects 

researchers from within the military academic community, and 

administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private 

and government organizations. INSS is in its eighth year of providing 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We 

appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

Director
viii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The United States has the highest reliance on satellites of any 

country in the world, not only in the national security sector, but the 

private sector as well. Although it has recognized the importance of 

protecting satellites as strategic assets since their inception, different 

times and circumstances have yielded different approaches regarding 

how and how vigorously this should be accomplished. During most of 

the Cold War, the United States’ desire to protect its satellites was 

overridden by wanting to avoid what were considered potentially 

destabilizing efforts, and what seemed as an inevitable arms race in space 

that would result from those latter efforts. During the Reagan 

Administration, however, the United States tacitly engaged in a space 

arms race with the Soviet Union, called the Strategic Defense Initiative 

(SDI, or Star Wars). 

This paper suggests that the varied strategic arguments that 

pervaded in past ASAT debates are now, for the most part, gone. 

Another broader argument has, however, replaced them, and in some 

ways presents a more nuanced organizational issue. That issue concerns 

determination of the relative importance of space weaponry designed 

toward negating space-based threats, the traditional role of ASATs, 

within the parameters of U.S. space control capabilities specifically and 

military planning generally. In that context, it is argued that although 

past political impediments to the development of ASATs have dissipated, 

ASAT development will likely continue conservatively much as it has in 

the past, now as a part of a broader spectrum of efforts. In a change from 

the past, however, organizational politics and fiscal prioritization rather 

than macro strategic political and public debate now determine such a 

course. 
ix

Previously, because the ASAT debate was a macro political and 

sometimes public issue, assessing the viability of U.S. ASAT policy 

required that three interrelated, critical elements be considered: policy, 

law, and programs. Recognizing the difference between policies and 

programs, and why they might be rationally assumed as linked, manifests 

a definitional nuance cum essential difference rarely acknowledged. A 

policy is "a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and 

acceptable procedures."1

 Paraphrased, it is a statement of intent. A 

program, on the other hand, in governmental terms is an activity which 

has been substantively approved (authorization) and for which funds 

have been made available (appropriation). Theoretically, programs are 

the vehicles for carrying out policies. In the United States, however, it 

has been the case that policies and programs sometimes do not match. 

This has been particularly true in the space field, because space policy so 

often evolves as a subset of foreign or defense policy.2

 One can argue it 

is through funded activity that actual governmental priorities can be 

determined. Aaron Wildavsky states "budgeting is a process of 

discovering and enforcing preferences."3

 Therefore, in considering 

ASAT policy, it has been necessary to consider both policy and funded 

programs, because the two did not necessarily match. 

U.S. action, or inaction, must also be considered within the 

context of international treaties to which the United States is a party, and 

relevant domestic laws. Although the ability to dictate policy is 

theoretically driven by these parameters, it is argued in this paper that 

has not actually been the case. Indeed when the legal parameters have 

become inconvenient toward achieving political goals, the tack has been 

to simply find a lawyer who can give a more acceptable interpretation to 

the law than that which had formerly held. These permeable legal 

interpretations have played a critical role in perpetuating the approachavoidance ambivalence previously characteristic of U.S. ASAT policy. 
x

There has been more-or-less official ASAT policy, and additionally, 

though not necessarily related, several ASAT programs at different 

developmental stages under several policy justifications, and various 

sponsors. 

The examination begins by looking at the past as prologue to 

the present and future. It is important to understand the depth and 

assumptions behind past philosophic positions in support of and against 

ASATS in order to appreciate how remarkable it is that in a period of 

about a decade, those positions have been subsumed by organizational 

politics. The past also provides a beginning for understanding the 

origins of the attitudes that now shape the organizational politics. 

 

1 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, MA: MerriamWebster, Inc., 1997) Tenth Edition, 901. 

2

 Joan Johnson-Freese and Roger Handberg, Space, the Dormant 

Frontier: Changing the Paradigm for the 21st Century, (Westport, CN, 

Praeger, 1997), 37-44. 

3

 Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process (New 

York: Harper-Collins, 1992). 
The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) 

Policy: Moving Toward Space Control 

INTRODUCTION

The United States has the highest reliance on satellites of any country in the 

world, not only in the national security sector, but the private sector as well. 

Although it has recognized the importance of protecting satellites as strategic 

assets since their inception, different times and circumstances have yielded 

different approaches regarding how and how vigorously this should be 

accomplished. During the Cold War, whereas hardening military satellites 

against potential destruction was commonplace, for example, development of 

specific weapons to target hostile satellites or threats to U.S. satellites was 

politically eschewed. The United States’ desire to protect its satellites was 

overridden by wanting to avoid what were considered potentially destabilizing 

efforts, and what seemed as an inevitable arms race in space that would result 

from those latter efforts. During the Reagan Administration, however, the 

United States tacitly engaged in a space arms race with the Soviet Union, 

called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars). 

It is the intent of this paper to suggest that the strategic arguments 

that pervaded in past ASAT debates are now, for the most part, gone, but 

replaced by another broader, and in some ways more nuanced organizational 

issue. That issue concerns determination of the relative importance of space 

weaponry designed toward negating space-based threats—the traditional role 

of ASATs—within the parameters of U.S. space control capabilities 

specifically and military planning generally. In that context, it will be argued 

that although past political impediments to the development of ASATs have 

dissipated, ASAT development will likely continue conservatively much as it 
2

has in the past, now as a part of a broader spectrum of efforts. In a change 

from the past, however, organizational politics and fiscal prioritization rather 

than macro strategic political and public debate now determine such a course. 

Because of the increased complexity of the entire space control issue, 

including protection of our own satellites and negation of those which are a 

threat to U.S. national security, it is also important to specify what is meant by 

ASAT in the context of this paper. ASAT here uses the traditional definition, 

referring to the narrow category of hardware designed to disable, temporarily 

or permanently, satellites in orbit. Although some would argue that ASAT is 

an obsolete term because the same goal can often be achieved through a 

variety of other routes, the existence of programs such as Kinetic Energy Antisatellite (KE-ASAT), Mid Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL), and 

others, justifies such a use and an examination. 

Previously, because the ASAT debate was a macro political and 

sometimes public issue, assessing the viability of U.S. ASAT policy required 

that three interrelated, critical elements be considered: policy, law and 

programs. Recognizing the difference between policies and programs, and 

why they might be rationally assumed as linked, manifests a definitional 

nuance cum essential difference rarely acknowledged. A policy is "a highlevel overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures."1

 

Paraphrased, it is a statement of intent. A program, on the other hand, in 

governmental terms is an activity that has been substantively approved 

(authorization) and an activity for which funds have been made available 

(appropriation). Theoretically, programs are the vehicles for carrying out 

policies. In the United States, however, it has been the case that policies and 

programs sometimes do not match. This has been particularly true in the 

space field, because space policy so often evolves as a subset of foreign or 

defense policy.2

 One can argue it is through funded activity that actual 

governmental priorities can be determined. Aaron Wildavsky states, 

"budgeting is a process of discovering and enforcing preferences."3

 
3

Therefore, in considering ASAT policy, it has been necessary to consider both 

policy and funded programs, because the two did not necessarily match. 

U.S. action, or inaction, must also be considered within the context of 

international treaties to which the United States is a party, as well as relevant 

domestic laws. Although the ability to dictate policy is theoretically driven by 

these parameters, it will be argued in this paper that has not actually been the 

case. Indeed when the legal parameters have become inconvenient toward 

achieving political goals, the tack has been to simply find a lawyer who can 

give a more acceptable interpretation to the law than that which had formerly 

held. These permeable legal interpretations have played a critical role in 

perpetuating the approach-avoidance ambivalence previously characteristic of 

U.S. ASAT policy. There has been more-or-less official ASAT policy, and at 

the same time, though not necessarily related, several ASAT programs at 

different developmental stages under several policy justifications and various 

sponsors. 

The examination will begin with a look at the past as prologue to the 

present and future. It is important to understand the depth and assumptions 

behind past philosophic positions both in support of and against ASATS in 

order to appreciate how remarkable it is that in a period of about a decade, 

those positions have been subsumed by organizational politics. The past also 

provides a beginning for understanding the origins of the attitudes that now 

shape the organizational politics. 

THE EVOLUTION OF ASAT POLICY 

Traditionally, an ASAT has been defined as a device that makes a satellite 

inoperable by negating its payload. There are a number of ways to accomplish 

that, including "shining" energy on the satellite from a ground or space-based 

illuminating device; placing co-orbiting "mines" in space adjacent to the 

satellite one may want to negate; direct ascent; achieving a co-orbit with the 

satellite and "catching up" to it; and launching a device from a high-altitude 

aircraft. Why the United States might desire to develop the capability to 
4

pursue such a course of action dates back to strategic thinking in the PostWorld War II era. 

In the 1940’s and 1950’s strategic thinking was dominated by the 

Pearl Harbor syndrome, and the desire to avoid surprise attack in the nuclear 

age. Multiple avenues were followed in this regard, from space-based 

reconnaissance in pursuit of the ultimate high-ground to development of 

capabilities to defend against such threats as the Soviet Fractional Orbital 

Bombardment System (FOBS), which involved ballistic missile intercept 

technology symbiotic to ASAT technology. This era of strategic thinking was 

interrupted by what has been called the Golden Age of Arms Control in the 

1960’s and 1970’s. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), a political rather 

than a military strategy, dominated thinking. In that context, ASATs and other 

weaponry of its sort were characterized as destabilizing, because of their 

potential to upset the precarious balance necessary for MAD to be credible. 

Although classical military strategists continued to argue that anything that 

impeded the enemy in achieving its goals was inherently an advantage, the 

arguments fell on deaf ears. It was then also that the arms-race-in-space 

argument was advanced, further deterring the political will to develop any 

potentially “destabilizing” military space programs.4

Between 1957 and 1968, U.S. efforts in the ASAT field were 

primarily in response to concerns about Soviet deployment of orbiting nuclear 

weapons in space. The always prudent Eisenhower Administration envisioned 

multiple systems to address this anticipated problem: satellite inspection 

methods from our own satellites (satellite to satellite), an air-launched ASAT, 

and a ground-launched ASAT, both with nuclear warheads. In the groundlaunched category, the U.S. Army proposed converting the Nike Zeus antiballistic missile to an ASAT role as early as November 1957. Eisenhower, 

however, was the first but not the last president to feel compelled to take the 

conservative route regarding ASATs. It was during his presidency that the 

question of whether maintaining space for "peaceful" purposes, later key in a 
5

legal debates, meant non-military, non-combatant, defensive, passive, or 

something else. Subsequently, Eisenhower focused on the Satellite Inspector 

(SAINT) program. Although the Air Force always intended to convert it to a 

true anti-satellite program,5 the Eisenhower policy is reflected in the Purcell 

Panel's report, which received presidential approval on March 26, 1958. 

Much has been written about space as a future theater of 

war, raising such suggestions of satellite bombers, military 

bases on the moon and so on. For the most part, even the 

more sober proposals do not hold up well on close 

examination or appear to be achievable at an early date.6

A policy of passive-only military use of space prevailed. 

The first successful U.S. ASAT test took place in 1963, during the 

Kennedy Administration. This program, known as Project Mudflap or 505, 

lasted until 1966. It was a variant of the earlier Army Nike Zeus system. 

Approval for that program, though highly secret, led to speculation that an 

operational version of SAINT would also be approved. Initially in the 

Kennedy Administration the Air Force had a good chance of regaining its 

ascendancy in space, some of which had been lost to NASA and through interservice rivalries. Indeed the Air Force geared up for a role in the manned 

space effort,7

 only to later be ingloriously shot down by Secretary of Defense 

McNamara. 

The Air Force did test and deploy several Thor rockets modified for 

use as ASATs, between 1964-1970, illustrating that programs persisted even 

when policy rejected or inhibited an operational use. Air-launched ASAT 

efforts were a part of programs to develop air-launched ballistic missiles in the 

1950's and early 1960's, evidencing the conjoint nature of the technologies. 

These included the Air Force Bold Orion program, launching rockets from a 

B-47 bomber, and the Navy Hi-Ho tests using F-4 fighters. Neither resulted in 

an operational system for technical reasons, subsequently sidestepping the 

political considerations. 
6

Technology limitations at the time, specifically regarding guidance 

systems, meant that ASATS could be counted on only to place a warhead 

within a few miles of their target, which meant that they had to use a nuclear 

warhead. Tests in the early 1960's demonstrated that the electromagnetic 

pulse from the explosion carried for a considerable distance. Subsequently, 

U.S. satellites became vulnerable to as much damage as the intended targets. 

The military utility of such an indiscriminate weapon was minimal. 

Additionally, the anticipated threat of orbiting nuclear weapons had never 

materialized. 

In the meantime too, the United States was deeply involved in Viet 

Nam, further reducing the priority of new space assets generally and ASAT's 

specifically. Although the Soviets were launching considerably more military 

satellites at this time than was the United States, U.S. satellite technology was 

better, and subsequently lasted longer. The Soviets needed to replace their 

satellites more often, raising their launch rate. By this time, the United States 

had a clear dominance in space. 

During the Nixon years, 1968 specifically, the Soviets tested a coorbital, non-nuclear warhead ASAT. The results were marginal. How to 

respond was problematic. Deterrence, threatening to shoot down a Soviet 

satellite if they shot down a U.S. satellite, was weak in that the U.S. had 

already become more dependent on satellites than the Soviets because ours 

worked better. Further, the Soviet tests were so inconclusive that there was no 

specific technology that the United States could directly respond to. The 

sanctuary status of space, evident since the Kennedy Administration decision 

to limit U.S. military space activities to those of a “passive” nature, also 

continued to prevail. Taken together, the Nixon Administration did not want 

to overreact and shake the fragile détente being constructed, so U.S. ASAT 

efforts continued to languish. 

The contribution of the abbreviated Ford Administration to the ASAT 

evolution is an ironic one, evidencing the somewhat schizophrenic nature of 
7

politics. In an incongruous case of role reversal, for a short time it was the 

White House pushing for expanded military space programs, including 

ASATs, while DOD and the Air Force held back. The White House position 

was based primarily on the recognition of ever increasing U.S. dependency on 

satellites. The DOD position can perhaps be characterized best as ambiguous. 

The Air Force, however, had lost its taste for space after the defeats with 

McNamara, and reverted back to its traditional "air" culture almost 

exclusively.8

 Therefore, when U.S. policy changed in January 1977 with Ford 

authorizing anti-satellite development, it was from White House impetus. 

This left making the hard decisions to the Carter Administration, which 

apparently was part of the intent. "....A number of nasty decisions were made 

in the final days of the Ford administration in order to influence the agenda for 

the incoming Carter Administration."9

 The Carter Administration approach was two-track: 1) start an 

advanced air-launched ASAT program with 2) the clear intention of being 

willing to bargain it away in arms negotiations. Indeed negotiations on an 

ASAT treaty were initiated in 1978 but broke off in 1979 due to the Soviet 

invasion of Afghanistan. When the U.S. broke off the talks, the Soviet Union 

used that opportunity to showcase its efforts in ASAT arms control being 

stymied by the United States. Indeed it presented and publicized draft ASAT 

treaties in the United Nations in 1981 and 1983.10 

By this time U.S. efforts were shifting to non-nuclear kinetic kill 

mechanisms. The Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV), launched from 

an F-15 fighter, was the primary U.S. ASAT effort in the early 1980's. That 

system carried a heat-seeking Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) that could 

destroy its target by direct impact at high speed. The last Soviet co-orbital 

ASAT was tested in 1982, prompted by U.S. ASAT testing plans and the SDI 

program. 

The Reagan Administration in the 1980’s was both heralded and 

decried for ushering in what was called the “militarization of space,” though in 
8

reality space had been a military domain for longer than it had been a civilian 

one. The concept of “space control” began to be discussed in earnest, most 

often with analogies drawn to control of the high seas. The characteristics of 

space control at that time included 1) protection of U.S. assets 2) full 

surveillance and 3) negation capabilities, with ASATs thought of at this time 

as hard-kill negation. 

The Reagan Administration initially wanted no part of negotiations 

with the Soviet "evil empire." ASAT treaty discussion was part of the 

"defense and space" segment of the tripartite Geneva Nuclear and Space 

Talks, but with little enthusiasm on the part of the United States.11 Rather 

ironically, although the Reagan Administration is particularly credited with 

advancing space-weapons technology through the Strategic Defense Initiative 

(SDI), or Star Wars, the policy aspect of ASATs became particularly muddled 

during that same period, due to assumptions made that were perhaps 

overstated. For example: 

... subsequent changes in Soviet offensive and defensive 

capabilities invalidated much of the anti-ballistic missile 

defense argument. President Reagan is not today hampered 

by the anti-military industrial complex arguments of the 

Vietnam era; he has largely been successful in arguing for 

congressional approval of exotic defense programs. But 

most important, recent advances in ground-based and spacebased component technology have led many people to 

believe that a defense to the enhanced Soviet threat is not 

feasible. For the first time, many thought it was feasible to 

add outer space as a base for providing "depth" to a missile 

defense system.12

The principle "kill" technologies being considered at that time were: 

pulsed laser, continuous wave laser, continuous particle beam, mass 

accelerator (hyper-velocity gun), and self-propelled missile. The 

self-propelled missile and hyper-velocity gun system evolved from 

earlier ground-based ballistic missile defense proposals. Others, e.g. 

the x-ray laser, excimer laser, free electron laser, chemical laser, and 
9

neutron particle beam, were considered exotic devices, and hence the 

Star Wars designation given the SDI program. 

Policy arguments aside too, despite vigorous rhetorical and financial 

support, even the Reagan Administration was unable to deploy an operational 

ASAT force. Although an operational force of 100 ALMV interceptors was 

planned at one time, by 1986 the program was so far over-budget (from initial 

estimates of approximately $500 million to something approaching $5.3 

billion completion), cost reduction measures were vigorously sought. 

Subsequently, the MHV program was scaled back in 1987 by two-thirds. In 

1988, the program was eventually cancelled due to technical problems with 

the homing guidance system and testing delays, both of which had added to 

the significant cost growth. 

The Bush Administration also supported ASAT programs. That 

administration was indeed criticized for pursuing Open Skies proposals, where 

satellites serve the essential role of the eyes for verification aspects of arms 

control agreements, and simultaneously asking for funds to pursue ASAT 

programs which could jeopardize those assets required for verification.13

In assessing the viability of current U.S. ASAT policy it is also 

essential to recognize how inextricably linked any analysis of that issue is with 

that of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The similar requirements and 

methods to detect, track and intercept both missile and satellites make BMD 

and ASAT research and development almost symbiotic in technical nature and 

political issue involvement. The symbiotic technical relationship between 

BMD and ASATs goes back to the conversion of the Nike Zeus missile to an 

ASAT role in 1957. Therefore, despite occasional forays in that direction, 

there is no ASAT treaty, but the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is the 

legal document of record that prefaces any discussion of the viability of 

current U.S. ASAT policy. 

Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 
10

The OST has been called both "the Constitution for Outer Space" and the 

"Magna Carta of Space." Although it does provide a framework for legal 

considerations, like any framework it is also fraught with ambiguities. The 

ambiguity that has overshadowed all others since the time of its writing is the 

difficulty defining "peaceful purposes." There is the U.S. view that it means 

"non-aggressive." Even within the U.S., however, what is included in 

aggressive has changed over time, from the "passive systems only" doctrine of 

Kennedy to the Reagan Administration's eager embrace of active systems. 

The military view has always, understandably, focused on the more liberal 

interpretation, occasionally to the exclusion of consideration of others. 

Another view is that what is not prohibited in Article IV of the OST is 

permitted, and the Treaty clearly does not prohibit all military activities. On 

another extreme of the debate is the idea that the Outer Space treaty served to 

completely demilitarize space. Professor Mark G. Markoff, Professor of 

International law at University of Fribourg, Switzerland, particularly supports 

that view.14 Language interpretations also have been considered. "In Russian, 

the word for 'military' essentially means warlike rather than pertaining to the 

armed services of a country; in the United States 'peaceful' is not regarded as 

the opposite of 'military'—we think of 'peaceful' as 'non-aggressive.'"15 Some 

argue that regardless of academic and public pronouncements, what is 

important is recent practice. If that is the case, then peaceful has indeed been 

increasingly evolving to mean non-aggressive. Still, the issue cannot simply 

be dismissed, as some countries and groups of countries have defined 

"peaceful" as meaning non-military in their legal instruments. That makes it 

difficult if not sometimes impossible to try embark on a joint endeavor 

deemed peaceful by U.S. definitions, but not by theirs. Some of these 

definitionally-restricted countries are now considering modifying their own 

parameters. 

 Regarding ASATs and the OST, it has been concluded that "nonnuclear ASAT weaponry is...legal."16 Bruce Hurwitz concludes that since 
11

ASATs are not weapons of mass-destruction they are legal according to the 

letter of the OST. Considering the spirit of the law, "the conclusion appears to 

be that anti-satellite weapons are legal, de lege late, but should be illegal, de 

lege ferenda."17 The type of ASAT system being considered becomes critical. 

While there is no formal delimitation of outer space, earth orbit is most often 

considered outer space. Therefore, an orbital (space-based) defense would be 

subject to international law, where a ground-based system would not. 

1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that extended from November 1969 to 

May 1972 resulted in two agreements: the ABM Treaty and an "Interim 

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of 

Strategic Offensive Arms," commonly called SALT I. This bi-lateral ABM 

treaty provides that space-based laser weapons are illegal for intended use 

against ballistic missiles. The treaty was singed at the peak of détente in 1972 

after vigorous debate. There were five basic arguments that predominated 

alone and in combination against anti-ballistic missile defense: the system 

would not work; even if it would work, it was not needed; it would destroy the 

stability of deterrence; it would create a threat to particular localities it 

purported to defend; and it was a project ultimately motivated to benefit 

primarily the military-industrial complex. Taken together, it was felt that an 

operational ABM system would result in a destabilizing arms-race and as well 

promoting crisis-instability in general by extricating the owner country of 

first-strike vulnerability, thereby negating the concept of deterrence. 

The question then becomes where does the ABM Treaty leave 

ASATs from a legal perspective. There is, not surprisingly, more than one 

answer. Hurwitz believes that "all extraterrestrial autonomous weapons are 

illegal. However, non-nuclear weapons, which are not autonomous, may be 

stationed and, in accordance with generally accepted principles of 

international law, used in earth orbit."18 A more simplified approach says that 
12

"Antiballistic missiles based on laser or particle beam techniques are not 

weapons of mass destruction. Since they are meant to be a defense system, 

they are by definition nonaggressive, and their deployment in earth orbit 

would therefore not represent a violation of international space law."19 This 

view can be nuanced though. "Generally speaking, the ABM Treaty bans a 

territorial ballistic missile defense system, but permits the development, 

testing, and deployment of fixed, ground-based radars, interceptor missiles, 

and interceptor missile launchers under very tight constraints. The 

development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air based, space-based, or 

mobile land-based systems or of components for such systems is prohibited."20

The relevant section of the ABM treaty regarding ASATs is that 

which deals with anticipated advancements in ABM technology. To decrease 

the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic 

balance, both parties to SALT agreed to prohibit development, testing, or 

deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their 

components, along with mobile land-based ABM systems. Should future 

technology result in new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" 

than those employed in systems in existence in 1972, it was agreed that 

limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the Treaty's 

provisions for consultation and amendment. 

Within that relatively simple premise, however, considerable debate 

has resulted as to definitional intentions and parameters. 

Article II of the ABM Treaty defines an ABM "system" as 

"a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their 

elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) 

AMB interceptor missiles...(b) ABM launchers...(c) ABM 

radars." The treaty does not mention lasers, particle beams, 

or any of the other 'exotic' technologies being considered 

under SDI. Because of this, many ABM critics argue that 

Article II explicitly limits the definition of an ABM system 

to the particular technologies cited in the article: ABM 

interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. A logical 

conclusion from this line of thinking is that, since they were 

not then "currently available," the new technologies are not 
13

the kinds of "ABM systems" that are limited by the treaty; 

therefore, they may be developed without restraint. 

A more reasonable interpretation of Article II is that the 

United States and the Soviet Union intended to include new 

"exotic" ABM technologies with the definition of "ABM 

systems." The use of the phrase "currently consisting of" 

implies that the drafters contemplated the possibility that 

future ABM systems could incorporate technologies other 

than those that were feasible at the time.... As Article III 

permits only land-based systems to be deployed, Agreed 

Statement D therefore provides a means by which ABM 

system "based on other physical principles" might be 

deployed within the geographical and quantitative confines 

of Article III. "Exotic" systems that are meant for 

deployment at the two land-based sites permitted under 

Article III may be researched, developed and tested, as the 

treaty does not prohibit these activities for land-based 

systems. But before they are deployed, specific limitations 

on the new systems are subject to good faith bilateral 

consultation. If amendments to the treaty are deemed 

necessary to accommodate the "exotic" land-based 

technology, they of course may be proposed and agreed 

upon by the parties.21

Clearly, maneuvering rooms exists for lawyers to make a claim one way or 

another in support of including or excluding some programs from the scope of 

the ABM Treaty. 

The Reagan Administration unilaterally adopted a broad 

interpretation of that section, requisite to allow for development, testing and 

deployment of SDI systems. This bold move both utilized and resulted in 

some embarrassingly ambiguous and tenuous legal premises, and subsequently 

created a flurry of controversy domestically and internationally. Then-White 

House National Security Affairs Advisor, Robert C. McFarlane appeared on 

the television show "Meet the Press," on October 6, 1985 and provided what 

was called the Reagan administration's "new interpretation" of the ABM 

Treaty. Accordingly to McFarlane, Agreed Statement D of the Treaty 

provided "that research on new physical principles or other physical principles 

is authorized as is testing and development." He suggested that only 
14

deployment was foreclosed. McFarlane's statements quickly were confirmed 

as representing the administration's policy. But, Gerard C. Smith, who led the 

ABM Treaty negotiations, and other previous administration officials who had 

been involved in arms control negotiations, disagreed. They immediately 

criticized the "new interpretation," contending that it went beyond the 

traditional "restrictive" interpretation, which recognized the treaty's implicit 

approval of research, development, and testing of fixed, land-based systems, 

by extending these activities to the space-based systems that are envisioned 

under SDI. Moreover, the "new interpretation" apparently would permit the 

Agreed Statement to modify express language in Article V, which prohibits 

the United States and the Soviet Union from developing, testing, or deploying 

space-based ABM systems. They felt that allowing the Agreed Statement to 

stand on an equal footing with the treaty article was contrary to accepted 

principles of treaty interpretation.22

 But in essence, the thrusts and parries being made were central to a 

political battle as much or more than a legal one. In follow-up statements such 

as that made by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle, it became 

increasingly clear that the administration had a course of action in mind and 

did not intend to be swayed by legalisms. 

In my judgement there is one correct view of what the treaty 

provides... After one wages through all of the ambiguities 

and reads carefully the text of the treaty itself and the 

negotiating record...with respect to the systems based on 

"other physical principles"...we have the legal right under 

the treaty to conduct research and development and testing 

unlimited by the terms of the treaty.23

Clearly, however, the backing of a legal opinion, however tenuous, was 

desired. 

Apparently, Perle and MacFarlane based their positions on a 19-page 

report on the subject prepared by a former New York assistant district 

attorney, Philip Kunsberg. Kunsberg concluded that as part of the ABM 

Treaty negotiations, the United States had sought a tight ban on "exotic" future 
15

AMB systems except for those in a fixed land-base mode. But, he stated, the 

Soviets had consistently objected. Although that appears to be correct, the 

record is unclear as to exactly what agreement was then reached. 

Classification of documents is part of the problem in that regard.24 

Chief Negotiation Gerard Smith wrote a letter to the editor of the 

New York Times to weigh in with his view of history. "It was not our intention 

that any type of technology for space-based ABM systems could be developed 

or tested under the treaty. This has been the official view of the United States 

government for more than 13 years.... The treaty does permit a small 

deployment of fixed land-based ABM missile using traditional technology. It 

also permits development and testing of new technology for such fixed landbased defenses—but not deployment."25 Law and politics were clearly being 

kludged in ways intended to support various positions. 

 Congressional democrats in Congress were, not surprisingly, appalled 

at the "new interpretation." Paul H. Nitze, special advisor to Reagan on arms 

control, was sent to reassure a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the 

"new interpretation" would not be applied to SDI. Secretary of State George 

Schultz was given the lead in assuring allies that SDI was designed as a 

research program to fall within the narrower definition of the ABM Treaty's 

provisions. Much to the chagrin of many, however, the "new interpretation" 

was not repudiated by the Administration. That seemed to leave open the 

future possibility that could reverse its "policy" which advocated a "restrictive 

interpretation" of the meaning of Agreed Statement D, in favor of the "broad" 

new interpretation. 

The adage "politics always wins" certainly seemed exemplified in 

this battle of legal interpretations, evidencing that legal parameters seem 

permeable at best. Clearly, the Reagan Administration did consider the ABM 

Treaty to apply to the exotic new technologies associated with SDI. It was not 

clear, and never tested, how and to what extent the treaty was seen as limiting 

SDI and similar technologies. 
16

 Hurwitz's survey of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) led 

him to conclude that the SDI, or rather its development, violated the 1972 

ABM Treaty.26 Others have concluded similarly, suggesting that if the U.S. 

was to proceed with the development, testing and eventual deployment of a 

system, (basically, anything beyond research) then Treaty withdrawal would 

be necessary. Having stated that though, it is also pointed out that the 

distinction beyond research and development is not clear-cut. Herein lies 

another ambiguity still overshadowing the entire policy debate. ASATs are 

not specifically mentioned in the ABM Treaty and therefore are not prohibited 

per se. But, ASAT weapons violate Article IV if they are given ABM 

capabilities. Since the technologies overlap so much, many elements needed 

for an ABM system may be tested or even deployed under the guise of ASAT 

tests. 

Similarities and Differences 

While the ABM Treaty apparently prohibits the use of directed-energy 

weapons in the ABM mode, the same technology when used in the 

development/testing/deployment of ASATs is not prohibited. Some legal 

analysts suggest that it may sometimes be impossible to distinguish between 

ABM directed-energy space vehicles and those deployed exclusively for 

antisatellite purposes. This apparent loophole may be exploited, particularly 

in the development and testing phases. 

Subsequently, in response to SDI and the new interest in ASATs in 

the United States, which Congress believed opened the door to an arms race 

for a weapon of questionable effectiveness, ASAT testing was banned in 

1985. On August 20, 1985, President Reagan certified, pursuant to the 

congressional resolution limiting ASAT test funds, that further testing of a 

U.S. ASAT system was in the national security interest, despite good faith 

efforts on the part of the United States to negotiate a strict ASAT treaty with 
17

the Soviet Union.27 In December 1987, the Air Force proposed termination of 

the current ASAT system as a cost-cutting measure.28 Congress wisely 

calculated that the military would continue research in the field, but could only 

go so far without testing. 

In 1996, reversing 7 years of Republican policy, the Clinton 

Administration informed the Senate that it would return to adherence with the 

traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The reasons were primarily 

political. 

The return to the original interpretation gives the White 

House a concrete policy justification for sharply reducing 

ABM spending down the road. The move may also help 

President Clinton repair his sullen relations over the gay 

issue in the military with Senate Armed Forces Committee 

chief Sam Nunn, the leading advocate of the original 

interpretation. In their quest for a space-based ABM 

defense under SDI, Reagan and Bush pressed unilaterally 

for a broad interpretation that would have allowed both 

testing and development of mobile and space-based exotic 

weapons technology—"exotic" referring to technologies not 

current in 1972. Nunn, a lawyer, argued that a unilateral, 

and belated, interpretation raised profound Constitutional 

questions. He also argued it was illegal to test or develop 

SDI kinetic kill vehicles under either interpretation.29

So while the United States returned to a more conservative 

interpretation of the ABM treaty, for domestic political reasons, 

under the Clinton Administration the legal parameters are still 

ambiguous, but with the ambiguities defined in a less volatile and 

visible political environment. 

Debate continues on whether the AMB Treaty should be revised or 

dismantled to accommodate U.S. plans for National Missile Defense (NMD) 

and Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and international politics still play a role 

in that debate. Dialogue between Russian president Boris Yeltsin and U.S. 

president Bill Clinton regarding Russian perceptions of the issue is essential, 

for example, toward avoiding actions that could subsequently yield unintended 
18

political consequences. But, the strategic realities of emerging threats and the 

inextricably linked technologies between ASATs and BMD compel a 

reevaluation of the parameters imposed by the ABM. 

While the macro debate about the future of the ABM Treaty goes on 

at one level, however, a perhaps even more important and subtler debate on 

ASATs as a component of space control has become the more dominant 

determinant of future directions. Here is where the major change in the ASAT 

debate has occurred. Whereas in the past, macro-level strategic considerations 

framed the political debate, now the debate is primarily a domestic resource 

one based on varying assessments of the appropriateness and need for the 

technology. 

THINGS BEGIN TO CHANGE 

In 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the entire strategic 

environment began to change dramatically. The Soviet Bear that had 

challenged the United States for so long became increasingly unable 

to present a viable challenge because of its own internal difficulties. 

ASAT proposals in the early 1990's were still debated from Cold War 

premises though. The arguments which had characterized ASAT 

debates since the Kennedy Administration still dominated: the “space 

as a sanctuary” argument, the undermining strategic stability 

argument, and the arms race argument. All had worked effectively 

before, so a similar effort seemed again in order. The problem was, 

the reality of two of the three arguments was quickly disintegrating, 

much like the Soviet Union against which the arguments were based. 

 The Gulf War in 1990-91 also changed the equation for 

consideration of ASATs. Referred to as the first “space war,” 

perhaps the biggest realization of the importance of space in 

warfighting during that war came to the Air Force. Although the 

primary owner of space assets, many felt they were (and continue to 

be) third behind the Army and Navy in utilization. In the Gulf War, 
19

however, the pilots who run the Air Force were confronted with the 

advantages of utilizing space as a force enhancer. Indeed virtually 

every element of modern warfare utilizes space capabilities for 

communications, intelligence, early warning, weather forecasting, 

and navigation.30

 Subsequently, military pressure for space control capability grew 

more intense after the experience of Desert Storm, when the tremendous 

advantages of space were experienced by the allied coalition. The military's 

lesson drawn from that conflict has been that the ability to leverage space 

assets must be preserved by the U.S. and its allies, and denied to adversaries, 

e.g. space control. Recognition of the wide range of capabilities that would 

entail, beyond traditional ASAT hardware, came through the same avenue that 

most doctrine is written, retrospect based on experience. 

 Post-Cold War and post-Gulf War, the strategic arguments 

that had dominated the ASAT debate dissipated, except for perhaps 

the purist position supporting space as a sanctuary. They began 

being replaced, however, with other concerns. First, the Clinton 

White House let its opposition to military-space programs be known 

through both words and actions. Later, debate within the Defense 

Department generally and the Air Force specifically began on the role 

of ASATs within the increasingly sophisticated definition of space 

control, and where space control fit into budget priorities. 

When the Clinton Administration came into office, ASAT 

proponents, including Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall and 

Air Force General Charles Horner, tried to raise ASATs as a political 

issue to be addressed.31 The White House resisted, particularly 

regarding the Army's Kinetic Energy Anti-satellite (KE-ASAT).32 

The Clinton White House supported the space sanctuary view 

generally, and did not support “kill” weapons or what it considered 

“adventurous” military space programs specifically. 
20

Congressional supporters though, like New Hampshire Senator Bob 

Smith, have backed military space programs and kept some of them alive, 

despite sometimes-strong opposition from the White House and intra-service 

ambivalence. Congress, for example, approved $30 million in 1996 funds for 

KE-ASAT, but Clinton tried to rescind the money. Congress rejected that 

action June 9, 1996. Indeed KE-ASAT became a budget battle, with pet 

projects of Clinton's held hostage. The 1997 DoD budget authorization bill 

contained provisions, called fences, to withhold money from the space control 

element of the Pentagon's space architecture study and technological studies 

and analyses for counter-proliferation efforts. Among Clinton's favored 

programs, they were held hostage pending the release of all of the 1996 and 

1997 money for KE-ASAT.33 

Then with the FY 1998 budget, Clinton wielding his newly 

acquired power to veto specific programs, and cut $38 million from 

the KE-ASAT. But Congress kept finding ways to keep the program 

alive, and in May 1998, KE-ASAT scientist Mark Fisher stated that 

"If there's money available in 1999 we could conduct a proof-ofprinciple flight within 18 months. I would need $65 million to do 

two flight tests."34 There was money in 1999, but from previous 

years' funding, and apparently not enough as far as the Pentagon is 

now concerned. A request for a monetary infusion of $41 million for 

the FY00 budget was requested to keep the program going. Almost 

certainly though, political opposition and timelines notwithstanding, 

KE-ASAT will continue.35

 Perhaps even closer to deployment than KE-ASAT is the Mid 

Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) currently in existence at the 

White Sands testing range in New Mexico. Originally an SDI anti-missile 

program, it is now in the process of adapting the laser for use against satellites. 

In additional to MIRACL, the Pentagon is working on both excimer- and free-
21

electron lasers as ground-based ASAT systems. These directed energy 

systems can respond in a much more timely manner than kinetic kill systems. 

Internal prioritization given to these programs by the services, 

initially at least, was often not high. Clues regarding the importance of 

particular military policies and programs can often be garnered in several 

ways, including 1) whether or not they appear in the Five Year Development 

Plan (FYDP) from which services plan and 2) what organization takes the lead 

as their champion. When funds are unrequested by DOD or individual 

services, it can generally be assumed that the programs are rogues rather than 

mainstream priorities. 

Programs were often championed by Congress, particularly the 

Senate as noted prior, rather than in the services themselves. Clementine 2, a 

program that lived and died between 1996-98, is another exemplary story of 

the opposition encountered by ASAT missions from inside and outside the 

Pentagon. It was conceived as a follow-on mission to the highly successful 

Clementine 136 mission that for $5 million mapped the Moon and provided 

evidence of ice on the surface. Clementine 2 was originally scheduled for 

launch in 1998. It would have been the first mission specifically intended to 

study asteroids from an impact mitigation perspective. As pointed out earlier, 

targeting an asteroid involves many of the same technical issues as targeting a 

satellite.37 The space probe was to be built by the Air Force, and at one point 

was provided $120 million toward achieving its goals,38 and fit with 

instrument-packed three-foot-long missiles. Those missiles were to be 

released into the path of two asteroids selected by NASA: 1986JK, a halfmile wide chunk of rock to be encountered in May 2000; and Toutatis, an 

asteroid about two miles across, to be intercepted about five months later. The 

instrumented missiles would first take close-up pictures and make scientific 

measurements before slamming into their targets. The idea was to provide 

scientists with information about strength and make-up of the objects, 
22

specifically vital to understanding how to counter a potential Earth-impact, as 

well as to gain information on targeting space objects generally. 

 Externally, opposition to Clementine 2 came from multiple quarters. 

Politicians and scientists both voiced concern about the use of military 

technology in space, seeing Clementine 2 as a stalking horse to justify military 

space budgets and BMD research. Lawyers were concerned that it had been 

specifically designed to meet the stipulations of the Outer Space Treaty of 

1967, or circumvent the intent, depending on how you look at it. 

Internally, Clementine 2 did not make the FYDP,39 considered a key 

indicator of the priority DOD puts on a program. Except for key proponents, 

the Air Force apparently was not particularly interested for several reasons. 

First, the Clinton White House had made it very clear that they were not 

interested in planetary defense, and told DOD to stay away from it. The Air 

Force has been willing to oblige if the mission did not come with additional 

funding. At one point elements within the Air Force apparently did attempt to 

include language in the Space Surveillance Operational Requirements 

Document (ORD). The Army and Navy opposed it in the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council (JROC), eliminating even the surveillance part, as they did 

not want the Air Force to get a new "mission" which would compete for 

scarce money. And then there's the giggle factor too. Warriors fight enemies, 

not rocks. 40

At one point too, the military control of space, including plans for the 

protection of satellites, was assigned to the (DoD) Space Architect's office. 

The difficulties of that office have also been chronicled,41 especially with 

regard to persuading the individual services to actually implement the 

"architectures" it is charged with designing in terms of both doctrine and 

acquisitions. Although overlapping areas of responsibility can sometimes 

provide alternative homes, or at least support, for orphaned programs such as 

Clementine 2, that did not occur in this instance. The Space Architect's Office 

was neither willing nor able to lend support. Clementine 2 did not survive.42
23

 In 1996, President Clinton issued a new National Space Policy. It 

was intended to reflect a post-Cold War evaluation of the strategic and 

political environment. It directed that: 

 ...consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will 

develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities to 

ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny 

such freedom of action to adversaries. 

With respect to the denial aspect of space control, negation activities 

are permitted under international law for individual and collective 

self-defense. Hence the path was increasingly being cleared for a 

broad-spectrum of space control efforts, subject to prioritization 

within DoD. 

Perhaps most importantly, what began to change during the Clinton 

Administration were the assumptions upon which the entire ASAT debate had 

persisted before and during the Cold War. Certainly, for example, there were 

no other countries in a position to engage in an arms race with the United 

States. Further, it became both clear and articulated that hard kill negation of 

space assets was often not the only, nor the easiest, nor even the best way to 

deal with the array of issues potentially confronting the security community in 

space. The military led the effort to recognize that the space capabilities of 

other countries, technologies, and the information age had progressed to the 

extent that defining “space control” had become a far more sophisticated task. 

Hence, space control slowly and quietly, taking advantage of the diminished 

"risk of strategic imbalance" argument which resulted from the ending of the 

Cold War, evolved to include: 

1. Surveillance of space, 

2. Protection of U.S. space assets, 

3. Negation of adversary space systems and services used for 

purposes hostile to U.S. national security interests: the ability to 

disrupt, deny, denigrate and destroy space systems, including 

temporary and reversible measures, and 
24

4. Prevention of adversary exploitation of other’s space systems and 

services used for purposes hostile to U.S. national security. 

Clearly, ASAT fits into this definition of space control through negation, as in 

the past, but its relative role in space control, and perhaps its importance, is 

diminished. 

NEW RATIONALES

The arguments offered by ASAT proponents internally and externally to DOD 

during the Clinton Administration initially varied little from those of the past. 

That might be part of the reason they fell on deaf-ears, as they were heard as 

more of the same old thing offered by the usual suspects. Eventually, 

however, some new premises were offered, including the need to protect 

space-based “global utilities.” The argument basically says that increased 

public reliance on private or publicly owned satellites, like the Global 

Positioning System (GPS) or telecommunication satellites, requires a similarly 

increased capability to protect them from interruption.43 This argument has 

been critiqued as inappropriately drawing an analogy between the need to 

protect sea-lanes and the need to protect space-based global utilities because 

there is no similar force-on-force threat in space as there can be on the seas.44 

That position in and of itself, however, then raises the point that the threat 

need not be terrestrial based, as it could come from near-Earth-objects (NEO), 

such as meteors, negating the force-on-force requirement. 

The NEO argument is refuted by critics, however, with the 

proposition that the military already has the responsibility for protecting its 

strategic assets and will do so according to the perceived risk. It was the Air 

Force, for example, that led observation efforts of the Leonid meteor showers 

in 1998 and 1999, due to concern over potential damage to space-based assets. 

If it is private assets that need protection though, private companies do not 

seem to be demanding such protection. 

In the case of private companies driven by profit margins, increasing 

the cost of their hardware to protect against dangers that they have not so far 
25

encountered simply is not in the business plan. If an incident were to occur, 

however, that could change. Until the incident with the Hughes Galaxy 4 

satellite in 1998 that resulted in pagers all over the United States failing, 

commercial companies did not see redundancy as a necessity as they had 

never had such a failure before. Indeed, that all pager signals were run off the 

same Hughes satellite evidences the perhaps naïve confidence companies had 

in their ability to provide uninterrupted service. After the Galaxy 4 incident, 

the way companies did business, at least Hughes, changed. Redundancy and 

diversity were integrated into operational planning. If a commercial satellite 

had been damaged or destroyed during the Leonid showers though, leaving 

thousands or millions of people unable to use their ATM cards, for example, it 

is not unlikely that a loud cry for protection would have quickly followed. 

Crisis-response is the typical public policy operation model in the 

United States. It is also effective. But in the meantime, for the national 

security community, there are other, equally compelling reasons to pursue 

space control at some agreed-upon-as-appropriate pace. 

The simple, yet compelling argument for space control capabilities, 

including ASATs, is that capabilities-based planning, rather than threat-based 

planning, dictates development of space control, including ASAT, 

technologies. The May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) implied 

that it was desired capabilities that would drive the future forces, based on 

threat, risk, and opportunities assessments. Indeed that premise is suggested 

in the Secretary's message that set the parameters for the QDR.45 

We started with a fresh, unblinking look at the world both 

today and over the temporal horizon to identify the threats, 

risks, and opportunities for U.S. national security. In 

addition, we recognized that the world continues to change 

rapidly. We cannot expect to comprehend fully or predict 

the challenges that might emerge from the world beyond the 

time lines covered in normal defense planning and budgets. 

Our strategy accepts such uncertainties and will prepare our 

armed forces to deal with them. 
26

From that analysis of the global environment, we developed 

an overarching defense strategy to deal with the world today 

and tomorrow, identify required military capabilities, and 

define the programs and policies needed to support them. 

The services have been only slowly integrating that approach into their 

doctrine though. Perhaps because of Army reliance on doctrine more than the 

other services,46 one of the first places it has become obvious is in the Army's 

Opposing Forces Manuals.47 Within the Air Force, the leap ought to be a 

rather natural one to make as, accordingly to many scholars, airplane 

acquisition has been done that way for years, with considerable success.48 

Space doctrine, however, has been and continues to be spartan at best. The 

argument in favor of capabilities based planning for space control is reflected 

and supported in the 1999 DOD Space Policy. 

 In July 1999, DOD released its first new Space Policy since 1987. It 

reiterates the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space 

control, and force application, and the need for capabilities necessary to carry 

out such. Throughout the document capabilities-based preparation and 

readiness more-or-less as the threat warrants is stressed, rather than any 

implication of operational capabilities to be deployed immediately. Hence, 

again, there is no intent or desire to politically raise an operational ASAT 

issue. 

Within the document, definitions are given that clarify a 

considerable amount of ambiguity that has clouded space doctrine 

discussions in the past.49

• E2.1.1 Force Application. Combat operations in, through, and 

from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict. The 

force application mission area includes: ballistic missile defense 

and force projection. 

• E2.1.1. Force Enhancement. Combat support operations to 

improve the effectiveness of military forces as well as support 

other intelligence, civil, and commercial users. The force 
27

enhancement mission area includes: intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance; tactical warning and attack assessment; 

command, control, and communications; position, velocity, time, 

and navigation; and environmental monitoring. 

• E2.1.3. Space Control. Combat and combat support operations to ensure 

freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when 

directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space. The space control 

mission area includes: surveillance of space, protection of U.S. and 

friendly space systems; prevention of an adversary’s ability to use space 

systems and services for purposes hostile to U.S. national security 

interests; negation of space systems and services used for purposes hostile 

to U.S. national security interests; and directly supporting battle 

management, command, control, communications and intelligence. 

Information contained in the Space Control Technology Plan presented to 

Congress by the DOD outlines efforts underway and planned in support of 

space control. 

• Regarding Surveillance, the diverse Space Surveillance Network (SSN) 

provides “space object cataloguing and identification, warning of attacks 

on satellites, timely notification to U.S. forces of satellite flyover, space 

treaty monitoring, and scientific and technical intelligence gathering. In 

addition, the SSN would provide targeting and damage assessment 

information to support space control operations. The SSN is comprised of 

the Navy Fence, phased array and mechanical radars, and optical sensors 

as well as the Space Control Center located in Cheyenne Mountain. The 

current SSN, however, is aging. Consequently, we are pursuing extensive 

research and development activities through a variety of Program 

Elements (PE) in the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.” 

• Regarding protection, “DOD space systems are designed, developed and 

operated to assure the survivability and endurance of their space mission 

capabilities in peace, crisis, and through appropriate levels of conflict 
28

commensurate with national security requirements. The survivability of 

DOD space systems is enhanced though such protection measures as 

ground station protection, satellite proliferation, hardening, 

communication crosslinks, encryption, communications security 

protection, and threat warning sensors.” Many of these protections are 

designed against the variety of negation techniques that the U.S. also 

pursues. 

• Regarding prevention, it is the newest aspect of space control, necessary 

and evident due to the proliferation of space systems, private and public. 

Political, legal, and technical measures are pursued as part of prevention. 

“Space prevention involves measures to preclude an enemy’s use of data 

or services from U.S. and friendly space systems and services used for 

purposes hostile to U.S. national security interests. This includes 

encryption of satellite control and payload data to prevent unauthorized 

access. In addition, U.S. government monitors the licensing of 

commercial satellites. Licenses for private remote sensing space system 

operations, for example, include provisions for encryption devices to 

prevent unauthorized access as well as to limit data collection and/or 

distribution during periods when national security may be compromised.” 

• Regarding negation, “there are a range of potential negation options to 

deny an adversary use of space systems or services for purposes hostile to 

U.S. national security interests. These include: physical damage of 

ground segment; electronic jamming of data; temporary disruption of 

satellite functions; and physical destruction of the space segment. The 

Department’s philosophy is that physical destruction of satellites is not 

the preferred approach. (emphasis added) It could undercut U.S. 

commercial interests that depend on global cooperation, such as 

frequency spectrum allocation, as well as potentially damage other U.S. 

systems from collateral damage and debris. Moreover, commercial space 

assets are increasingly being utilized for a wide range of defense 
29

application. Terrestrial-oriented negation measures thus may be more 

consistent with long-term American interests. Nonetheless, we must 

retain the option for irreversible denial. Doctrinally, we have 

characterized these actions as deny, disrupt, degrade and destroy actions 

with the first two being temporary and reversible and the later two 

permanent.” 

This set of parameters clearly suggests that a full-spectrum of capabilities will 

be needed to achieve the desired objectives. 

In order to support this full-spectrum effort, the U.S. Congress authorized 

and appropriated an additional $7.5 million in FY99 to pursue an enabling 

research and technology development. Further, in what is a noteworthy action 

as an indication of prioritization, DOD says it proposes to continue funding 

for the program in the FYDP. Allocations within the spending plan are: (1) 

surveillance - $0.5 million (2) protection - $1.5 million; (3) prevention - $0.8 

million, and (4) negation - $4.7 million.50 

The amount, while welcome, is not large compared to others in the FY99 

research, development, technology and evaluation (RDT&E) programs within, 

for example, the Air Force.51 Apparently, however, it is just about at the level 

most people within DOD feel is appropriate, considering the threat. Whether 

this also considers desired long-term capabilities is, however, less certain. 

Even more disconcerting is that many analysts and proponents question the 

survivability of the RDT&E money for space control, as the military utility 

will be questioned. Whether utility will be questioned based on threat, 

culture, or something else then becomes key. With funding for the F-22, once 

thought inviolable, being challenged, programs considered more esoteric, 

including ASATs broadly defined, will likely find it difficult to compete in the 

annual budgets and the FYDP without strong internal organization champions 

and support. Supporters of space control are appropriately concerned and 

anxious to build momentum behind their efforts. In Washington, inertia can 

be as important as substance. 
30

Clearly, the situation is now one where the primary question 

concerning ASAT development is that of defining the appropriate pace. 

Along the spectrum of opinions there will continue to be a small contingent of 

pure "space sanctuarians" who will oppose any and all space control asset 

development. There will also be those who feel that the weaponization of 

space is inevitable. In the middle, however, are those who want to continue to 

develop capabilities at a level commensurate with need, considering budget. 

The issue for the future which will determine the appropriate pace for space 

control capabilities development appears to be whether those in the middle 

will base their need assessment on a realistic look at the future, or if they will 

be driven primarily by more parochial considerations. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The military is clearly in the lead in its thinking about satellite system 

vulnerabilities. Ironically, however, institutional priorities and a more nuanced 

political and technical environment than in the past seem to dictate that the 

conservative course of action traditionally pursued regarding ASATs, 

characterized by only occasional program R&D support, will continue. Now, 

though, conservatism is apparently the result of fiscal prioritization of 

programs within the military itself, rather than strategic political and legal 

debate. 
31

ENDNOTES 

 

1 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, MA: MerriamWebster, Inc., 1997) Tenth Edition, 901. 

2

 Joan Johnson-Freese and Roger Handberg, Space, the Dormant Frontier: 

Changing the Paradigm for the 21st Century, (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1997), 

37-44. 

3

 Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process (New York: 

Harper-Collins, 1992). 

4

 See: Marc J. Berkowitz, "Antisatellites and Strategic Stability," Airpower 

Journal (Winter 1989). 

5

 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space, U.S. Policy 1945-84, (Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 112. Stares' book provides a 

comprehensive history of the different positions and input of the various 

presidential administrations to ASAT development. See also the Federation of 

American Scientists website for a short, alternative historic and program 

overview. www.fas.org

6

 Stares, 47. 

7

 Roger Handberg and Joan Johnson-Freese, "The return of the American 

military to crewed spaceflight: hypersonic and other visions," Space Policy 

(November 1997): 295-304. 

8

 Stares, 176-187; Joan Johnson-Freese, "Transitioning to a Space and Air 

Force: Moving Beyond Rhetoric?" INSS sponsored paper, 1998. 

9

 Stares, 179. 

10 See Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of USSR Request for Inclusion of a 

Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the 38th Session: Conclusion of a Treaty 

on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space Against 

Earth 1-2, U.S. Doc. A/38/194 (1983). 

11 "Administration Resists Demands for ASAT Ban," 222 Science 394, 394-95 

(1983) 

12 Major John E. Parkerson, Jr., "International Legal Implications of the 

Strategic Defense Initiative," 116 Mil. L. Rev. 67.
32

 

13 David A. Koplow, "Back to the Future and Up to the Sky: Legal 

Implications of 'Open Skies' Inspection for Arms Control," 79 Calif. L. Review 

421, citing Grossman, "Keep the Eyes in the Skies," Christian Science 

Monitor, June 30, 1989, at 19, col.1. 

14 Mark G. Markoff, "Disarmament and 'Peaceful Purposes' Provisions in the 

1967 Outer Space Treaty," 4 J.Space Law, 11 (1976). 

15 Major William A. Hill, Jr., United State Air Force, Permissible Scope of 

Military Activity in Outer Space, 24 A.F.L. Review 157, 163-164 (1984).

16 Bruce A. Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization (North-Holland, 

1986), 127. 

17 Hurwitz, 128. 

18 Hurwitz, 135. 

19 Pamela Meredith, "The Legality of A High-Technology Missile Defense 

System: The ABM and Outer Space Treaties," The American Journal of 

International Law (April 1984). 

20 Major John E. Parkerson, Jr., "International Legal Implications of the 

Strategic Defense Initiative." 116 Mil L. Rev. 67 (Spring 1987): 66-156.

21 Parkerson 99, 100. 

22 Parkerson 101, See also fts. 192-197. 

23 Washington Post, October 9, 1985, A21. 

24 Parkerson, 102. 

25 New York Times, October 23, 1985, A22. 

26 Hurwitz, 165. It should also be noted that the Soviet Union was widely 

believed to have violated the Treaty by building a large ballistic missile radar 

station near the city of Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. 

27 Determination No. 19, 50 Fed. Reg. 34, 441 (1985) 

28 Richard Halloran, "Air Force Proposes Abandoning Anti-Satellite Weapon 

to Reduce Budget," The New York Times, 18 December 1987, A35. 
33

 

29 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 July 1993. 

30 Department of Defense, Space Control Technology Plan, Report to 

Congress provided in response to the FY1999 National Defense Authorization 

Act Conference Report. 

31 Steve Weber, "ASAT Proponents Fail to Reverse White House Policy," 

Space News, 19-25 September 1994, 7. 

32 Pat Cooper, "U.S. Political Battles Threaten Antisatellite Project," Space 

News, 17-24 June 1996, 6. The Washington Post reported in January 1985 

that the Army was progressing rapidly with the ground-based leg of SDI, and 

that parts of the system could be deployable prior to 1990. Named Army 

projects centered on rocket-launched sensing devices, the airborne optical 

system, a mobile radar system, and new interceptor missiles with non-nuclear 

kill mechanism. January 30, 1985, A1. 

33 Pat Cooper, "U.S. Political Battle Threaten Antisatellite Project," Space 

News, 24 June 1996, 6. 

34 Jonathan Wright, "Connected: U.S. military moves closer to star wars," The 

Daily Telegraph, London, 21 May 1998, 4. 

35 For an update on the KE-ASAT saga, see: Defense Daily, "Kinetic Energy 

Anti-Satellite System Hangs in the Balance", June 29, 1999, 1. 

36 "Space on a Shoestring," Discover, June 1995, 60. Clementine 1 won the 

1995 "Discover" Aviation and Aerospace award. 

37 James Adams, "Pentagon in missile plan to save world," The Times, 

London, March 24, 1996, 1. 

38 Adams. 

39 Clementine 2 was included as an area of "possible collaboration" between 

NASA and the Air Force Space Command in an agreement signed in April 

1997. "NASA and Air Force Space Command Announce Cooperative 

Efforts," Press Release 97-68, 16 April 1997. 

40 Unpublished paper, Joan Johnson-Freese and Jim Knox, "Preventing 

Armageddon: Hype, Heroes, Hollywood...& Reality," April 1999. 
34

 

41 "Searching for Policy Coherence: The DoD Space Architect as an 

Experiment," with Roger Handberg, Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 

1997. 

42 See "NASP as an American Orphan: Bureaucratic Politics and the 

Development of Hypersonic Flight," with Roger Handberg, 

Spaceflight, March 1991, for another example of a cancelled 

aerospace program which was a bureaucratic orphan. 

43 See: John Shaw and Simon P. Worden, "Space, Power, and Strategy II," 

University of Hull, U.K. 1999. 

44 This argument draws on the same logic that is sometimes heard in 

conjunction with why there should be no separate space force: because if 

there would be, then the weaponization of space follows as an inherent 

consequence, in support of the as yet undefined but apparently force-on-forcerequired related mission. That proposition, however, begs the question of 

whether that assumed weaponization is not or will not intrinsically occur 

without the existence of a space force. See, for example, the programs such as 

spaceplanes discussed in: Bill Sweet, "Securing Space for the Military," Jane's 

International Defense Review, March 1, 1999, 1; Riley D. Mison, John A. 

Corder, "Battle Space Control—something is missing," Naval Institute 

Proceedings, January 1998, 84-85. 

45 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, "The Secretary's message," 

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, May 1997. 

46 The Army was looking at doctrinal changes, including capabilities-based 

planning, even before the QDR. See: David Jablonsky, "U.S. Military 

Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs," Parameters, Autumn 1994, 

18-36. 

47 See: U.S. Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 350 series, or Opfor Battle Book at 

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/ctac/refpubs/st100-3/index.htm 

48 See: Michael Brown, Flying Blind (Cornell University Press, 1995); James 

Lebovic, Foregone Conclusions, (Westview, 1996); David S. Sorenson, The 

Politics of Strategic Aircraft Modernization, (Greenwood Publishing, 1995). 

49 DODD 3100.10, July 9, 1999. 

50 Department of Defense, Space Control Technology Plan, Report to 

Congress provided in response to the FY1999 National Defense Authorization 

Act Conference Report. 
35

 

51 See: www.dtic.mil/comptroller/99budget/r1unclas.pdf for a complete listing.