Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST 

Tuesday, March 30, 2004 AVIATION SECURITY

Improvement Still Needed 

in Federal Aviation Security 

Efforts 

Statement of Norman J. Rabkin 

Managing Director, Homeland Security 

 and Justice Issues 

GAO-04-592T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-592T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Norman J. 

Rabkin at (202) 512-8777 or 

rabkinn@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-592T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate 

March 2004

AVIATION SECURITY

Improvements Still Needed in Federal 

Aviation Security Efforts 

Numerous challenges continue to face TSA in its efforts to improve the 

nation’s aviation security system. First, key activities in the development of 

CAPPS II have been delayed and TSA has not yet completed important 

system planning activities. TSA is behind schedule in testing and developing 

initial increments of CAPPS II due to delays in obtaining needed passenger 

data for testing from air carriers because of privacy concerns and has not 

established a complete plan identifying specific system functionality to be 

delivered, the schedule for delivery, and estimated costs. TSA also has not 

fully addressed seven of eight issues identified by Congress as key elements 

related to the development, operation, and public acceptance of CAPPS II. 

Additionally, three other major challenges—international cooperation, 

program mission expansion, and identity theft—need to be adequately 

addressed to ensure CAPPS II’s successful implementation. 

Second, TSA continues to face challenges in hiring, deploying, and training 

its screener workforce. Staffing shortages and TSA’s hiring process continue

to hinder its ability to fully staff screening checkpoints without using 

additional measures, such as mandatory overtime. Further, TSA continues 

to have difficulty deploying and leveraging screening equipment and 

technologies because of competing priorities in a tight budget environment. 

Third, the rapid expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service has 

encountered a number of operational and management problems. To 

accommodate the expansion, the Service revised and abbreviated its training 

curriculum. The Service developed an advanced training course for newly 

hired marshals to provide additional skills but funding cutbacks have 

delayed completion of this training for all air marshals. Most recently, budget

constraints have not permitted the Service to reach its target staffing levels 

and are delaying efforts to develop its field location infrastructure and its 

automated system to schedule air marshal missions. 

Fourth, DHS and TSA face other challenges as they continue to address 

threats to the nation’s aviation system. Significant challenges include 

developing measures to counter the growing concerns over portable surfaceto-air missiles, improving airport perimeter and access controls, and 

addressing security concerns related to air cargo and general aviation. 

Screening Passengers and Cargo are Aviation Security Concerns. 

 Source: FAA. Source: Cargo King, Ltfd. 

The security of the nation’s 

commercial aviation system has 

been a long-standing concern. 

Following the events of September 

11, 2001, Congress enacted 

numerous aviation security 

improvements designed to 

strengthen aviation security, 

including the development of a 

passenger prescreening system and 

the federalization of airport 

screeners. Despite these changes, 

challenges continue to face the 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) 

efforts to improve aviation 

security. GAO was asked to 

summarize the results of previous 

and ongoing aviation security 

work. These include: (1) the 

development of CAPPS II to assist 

in identifying high-risk passengers, 

(2) the management of passenger 

and baggage screening programs, 

(3) the operations of the Federal 

Air Marshal Service, and (4) other 

aviations security related efforts, 

such as cargo, that remain a 

concern. 

In prior reports and testimonies, 

listed at the end of this statement, 

GAO has made recommendations to 

improve aviation security and to 

strengthen various security efforts 

underway. We also have several 

ongoing reviews assessing certain 

issues addressed in this testimony 

that will be published under 

separate reports at a later date. 
Page 2 GAO-04-592T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

security of our nation’s aviation system and the numerous efforts under 

way to improve it. Protecting the nation’s air transportation system is an 

evolving process that requires continuously adjusting protective measures 

to meet the ever-changing nature of terrorist threats. Since the late 1960s 

and early 1970s when passenger screening was first initiated, increasing 

and improving aviation security has been a learning experience. Each 

incremental increase in security was usually the result of some 

catastrophic event, the most recent being the September 11, 2001, attacks. 

Following that tragic event, aviation security efforts have been refocused 

and reorganized through the creation of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the 

strengthening of federal leadership and responsibility for aviation security, 

and the funding of billions of dollars each year for programs and initiatives 

to maintain and enhance aviation security. Yet despite this large and 

focused effort, concerns over the security of our aviation system remain. 

My testimony today focuses on DHS’s and TSA’s aviation security efforts 

in four areas: (1) the development of the new Computer-Assisted 

Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) to help identify high-risk 

passengers prior to arriving at the airport, (2) the management by TSA of 

its passenger and baggage screening programs, (3) the operation of the 

Federal Air Marshal Service, and (4) other aviation security-related efforts 

that remain a concern. This testimony is based on our prior and ongoing 

work and review of recent literature. A listing of our prior reports is 

contained in appendix I. 

In summary, we found that: 

• Key activities in the development of CAPPS II have been delayed and 

TSA has not completed important system planning activities. TSA is 

behind schedule in testing and developing the system’s initial 

increments due to delays in obtaining passenger data needed for testing 

from air carriers because of privacy concerns, and it has not 

established an overall plan identifying specific system functionality that 

will be delivered, the schedule for delivery, and estimated costs. TSA 

also has not completely addressed seven of the eight issues identified 

by the Congress as key areas of interest related to the development, 

operation, and public acceptance of CAPPS II. Additionally, there are 

three major challenges—international cooperation, program mission 
Page 3 GAO-04-592T 

expansion, and identity theft—that could prevent the successful 

implementation of CAPPS II if not adequately resolved by TSA. 

• TSA continues to face challenges in hiring, deploying, and training its 

screener workforce even though it met the mandate to establish a 

federal screener workforce by November 2002. Staffing shortages and 

TSA’s hiring process continue to hinder its ability to fully staff 

screening checkpoints without using additional measures, such as 

mandatory overtime. Additionally, TSA has taken steps to enhance its 

screener training programs, but staffing shortages and lack of highspeed connectivity at many airport training facilities have made it 

difficult for screeners to fully utilize these programs. Further, TSA 

continues to face challenges in deploying and leveraging screening 

equipment and technologies because of competing priorities in a tight 

budget environment. 

• The rapid expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service has 

encountered a number of operational and management problems. In 

order to deploy its expanded workforce by July 1, 2002, the Service 

developed an advanced training course to provide additional training 

for newly hired air marshals, but funding cutbacks have delayed 

expected completion of this training by all air marshals until mid-2004. 

More recently, because of budget constraints, Service officials said that 

the number of air marshals has not reached target levels and may be 

declining, equipment and facilities for field locations cannot be 

obtained, and the development of systems to schedule and manage air 

marshal missions have been delayed. 

• DHS and TSA face a number of other challenges as they continue to 

address threats to the nation’s aviation system. Significant challenges 

include developing measures to counter the growing concerns over 

portable shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, improving airport 

perimeter and access controls, and addressing broad security concerns 

related to air cargo and general aviation. We have work in progress that 

is examining these issues. 

The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a longstanding concern. Over the years, numerous initiatives have been 

implemented to strengthen aviation security. However, as we and others 

have documented in numerous reports and studies, weaknesses continue 

to exist. It was due in part to these weaknesses that terrorists were able to 

hijack four commercial aircraft on September 11, 2001, with tragic results. 

Concerns continue to exist regarding the security of the aviation system, 

as evidenced by the cancellations of several, mostly transatlantic flights to 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-592T 

and from the United States in response to intelligence information 

regarding specific threats to those flights. 

With hundreds of commercial airports, thousands of commercial aircraft, 

tens of thousands of daily flights, and millions of passengers using the 

system daily, providing security to the nation’s commercial aviation 

system is a daunting task. In an effort to strengthen the security of 

commercial aviation, the President signed into law the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on November 19, 2001.1

 ATSA created 

TSA and mandated actions designed to strengthen aviation security, 

including the federalization of passenger and baggage screening at over 

440 commercial airports in the United States by November 19, 2002, and 

the screening of all checked baggage using explosive detection systems. 

On March 1, 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,2

 TSA 

was transferred from the Department of Transportation to the newly 

created Department of Homeland Security. 

Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside within DHS, and 

most of these are with TSA, including conducting passenger and baggage 

screening, and overseeing security measures for airports, commercial 

aircraft, air cargo, and general aviation. Only the Federal Air Marshal 

Service, which was recently moved from TSA to DHS’s Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is not within the responsibilities 

of TSA. Taken together, these programs are intended to form a layered 

system that maximizes the security of passengers, aircraft, and other 

elements of the aviation infrastructure. 

One effort under way to strengthen aviation security is TSA’s development 

of a Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, known as CAPPS 

II, to replace the current prescreening system now in use. CAPPS II will 

evaluate each passenger’s level of risk before they reach the check-in 

counter at the airport by accessing commercial and government databases 

to authenticate the passenger’s identity and generate a risk score. The risk 

scores will be used to determine if passengers need additional security 

measures or, if warranted, be denied boarding and/or detained by law 

enforcement. 

 1

Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

2

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 

Significant Challenges 

Face Implementation 

Of Computer-Assisted 

Passenger 

Prescreening System 
Page 5 GAO-04-592T 

However, as we recently reported, TSA faces numerous challenges that 

could affect CAPPS II’s successful development and implementation.3

 Key 

activities in the development of CAPPS II are behind schedule and TSA 

has not developed critical system plans; numerous developmental, 

operational, and privacy issues of concern to the Congress remain 

unresolved by TSA; and other significant challenges exist that could affect 

the successful implementation of CAPPS II. As a result, the potential for 

CAPPS II to improve aviation security remains questionable until TSA 

addresses the numerous concerns raised and challenges facing the 

program. 

Key activities in the development of CAPPS II have been delayed and TSA 

has not yet completed critical system planning activities. TSA is 

developing CAPPS II in nine increments, with each increment providing 

increased functionality. As each increment reached completion, TSA 

planned to conduct tests that would ensure the system meets the 

objectives of that increment before proceeding to the next increment. The 

development of CAPPS II began in March 2003 with increments 1 and 

2 being completed in August and October 2003, respectively. However, 

TSA has not completely tested these initial two increments because it was 

unable to obtain the necessary passenger data for testing from air carriers. 

Air carriers have been reluctant to provide passenger data due to privacy 

concerns. As a result, TSA deferred completing these tests until 

increment 3. 

Completion of increment 3, however, has been delayed. Due to the 

continued inability to secure passenger data for testing, TSA delayed the 

completion of increment 3 from October 2003 until the end of March 2004. 

Moreover, the functionality that this increment was expected to achieve 

has been reduced. Increment 3 was originally intended to provide a 

functioning system that could handle live passenger data from one air 

carrier in a test environment to demonstrate that the system can satisfy 

operational and functional requirements. However, TSA officials reported 

that they recently modified increment 3 to instead provide a functional 

application of the system in a simulated test environment that is not 

actively connected to an airline reservation system, and they are uncertain 

 3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger 

Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO-04-385

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

Program Delays and 

Critical Plans Incomplete 
Page 6 GAO-04-592T 

when testing that was deferred from increments 1 and 2 to increment 3 

will be completed. As a result, all succeeding increments of CAPPS II have 

been delayed. 

Further, TSA has not yet developed critical elements associated with 

sound project planning, including a plan for what specific functionality 

will be delivered, by when, and at what cost throughout the development 

of the system. For example, although TSA established plans for the initial 

increments of the system, it lacks a comprehensive plan identifying the 

specific functions that will be delivered during the remaining increments; 

such as, which government and commercial databases will be 

incorporated, the date when these functions will be delivered, and an 

estimated cost of the functions. In addition, TSA officials are uncertain 

when CAPPS II will achieve initial operating capability—the point at 

which the system will be ready to operate with one airline. Project officials 

also said that because of testing delays, they are unable to plan for future 

increments with any certainty. Until project officials develop a plan that 

includes scheduled milestones and cost estimates for key deliverables, 

CAPPS II is at increased risk of not providing the promised functionality, 

not being fielded when planned, and being fielded at an increased cost. 

TSA has not fully addressed seven of eight issues identified by the 

Congress as key areas of interest related to the development and 

implementation of CAPPS II. At this time, only one issue—the 

establishment of an internal oversight board to review the development of 

major systems that includes CAPPS II—has been addressed. DHS and TSA 

are taking steps to address the remaining seven issues; however, they have 

not yet 

• determined and verified the accuracy of the databases to be used by 

CAPPS II, 

• stress tested and demonstrated the accuracy and effectiveness of all 

search tools to be used by CAPPS II, 

• developed sufficient operational safeguards to reduce the opportunities 

for abuse, 

• established substantial security measures to protect CAPPS II from 

unauthorized access by hackers and other intruders, 

• adopted policies to establish effective oversight of the use and 

operation of the system, 

• identified and addressed all privacy concerns, and 

Issues Identified by 

Congress Remain 

Unresolved 
Page 7 GAO-04-592T 

• developed and documented a process under which passengers 

impacted by CAPPS II can appeal decisions and correct erroneous 

data. 

Although TSA is in various stages of progress to address each of these 

issues, TSA has not established milestones for some and delayed others 

without estimating a new completion date. For example, TSA planned to 

conduct stress and system tests by August 2003; however, stress testing 

was delayed several times due to TSA’s inability to obtain the passenger 

data needed to test the system. Completion of stress testing was moved to 

March 31, 2004, but this testing has been postponed again and currently no 

estimate exists for when these tests will be conducted. Although TSA 

program officials contend that their ongoing efforts will ultimately address 

each issue, program officials were unable to identify a time frame for 

when all remaining issues will be fully addressed. 

CAPPS II faces three other challenges that, if not adequately resolved, 

pose major risks to its successful development, implementation, and 

operation. First, for CAPPS II to operate fully and effectively, it needs data 

not only on U.S. citizens but also on foreign nationals on all international 

flights coming to, or departing from, the United States as well as all 

domestic flights. However, obtaining international cooperation for access 

to these data remains a substantial challenge. The European Union, in 

particular, has objected to its citizens’ data being used by CAPPS II, 

whether a citizen of a European Union country flies on a U.S. carrier or an 

air carrier under another country’s flag, because it may violate the civil 

liberties and privacy rights of its citizens. According to a December 2003 

report from the Commission of European Communities, the European 

Union will not be in a position to agree to the use of its citizens’ passenger 

data for CAPPS II until internal U.S. processes have been completed and it 

is clear that the U.S. Congress’s privacy concerns have been resolved. 

Discussions with the European Union on this issue are ongoing. 

Second, the original purpose of CAPPS II may be expanded and this 

expansion may in turn affect program objectives and public acceptance of 

the system. The primary objective of CAPPS II was to protect the 

commercial aviation system from the risk of foreign terrorism by 

screening for high-risk or potentially high-risk passengers. However, TSA 

has said that the system would seek to identify domestic terrorists as well 

as foreign terrorists and that the system could be expanded to identify 

persons who are subject to outstanding federal or state arrest warrants for 

violent crimes and those individuals who are in the United States illegally 

Other Challenges Could 

Affect Successful 

Implementation of 

CAPPS II 
Page 8 GAO-04-592T 

or who have overstayed their visas. DHS officials contend that such 

changes are not an expansion of the system’s mission because they believe 

these additional objectives will improve aviation security and are 

consistent with CAPPS II’s mission. However, concerns exist that 

expanding CAPPS II’s mission could also lead to an erosion of public 

confidence in the system, increase the costs of passenger screening and 

the number of passengers erroneously identified as needing additional 

security attention, and put TSA at risk of diverting attention from the 

program’s fundamental purpose. 

Third, the successful operation of CAPPS II depends on the system’s 

ability to effectively identify passengers who assume the identity of 

another individual. TSA officials said that CAPPS II should detect 

situations in which a passenger submits fictitious information such as a 

false address. These instances would likely be detected since the data 

being provided would either not be validated or would be inconsistent 

with information in the databases used by CAPPS II. However, the officials 

acknowledge that some identity theft is difficult to spot, particularly if the 

identity theft is unreported or if collusion, where someone permits his or 

her identity to be assumed by another person, is involved. TSA officials 

said that there should not be an expectation that CAPPS II will be 

100 percent accurate in identifying all cases of identity theft, and that 

although not foolproof, CAPPS II represents an improvement in identity 

authentication over the current system. 

One of the critical layers of our nation’s aviation security system is 

passenger and baggage screening. All passengers on commercial airliners 

must pass through airport screening checkpoints and have their carry on 

and checked baggage screened. TSA manages the screening operations 

and uses electronic searches, manual searches, and other measures to 

determine if threat objects, including explosives, are in the possession of 

the passengers or in their baggage. Following the events of September 11, 

2001, airline passenger and baggage screening became a federal 

responsibility and is now carried out by TSA employees or, in the case of 

five airports, by private screening companies under the direction of TSA.4

 4

Consistent with the provisions of ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract 

screeners at five commercial airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot program is to 

determine the feasibility of using private screening companies rather than federal 

screeners. 

Efforts to Improve 

Screening Face 

Challenges 
Page 9 GAO-04-592T 

Our recent work on screening has found that numerous challenges impede 

TSA’s progress in improving screening.5

 Four key areas of concern include 

TSA’s efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and baggage screeners, 

(2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure screener performance in 

detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and deploy screening equipment 

and technologies. 

TSA accomplished a significant goal by hiring and deploying more than 

55,000 screeners by November 19, 2002. However, its initial staffing efforts 

created imbalances in the screener workforce. While some airports had 

too many screeners, others had too few. To address these imbalances, as 

well as congressional concerns regarding overall screener-staffing levels, 

TSA began attempting to right-size its screener workforce. Specifically, 

TSA established a goal to reduce its screener workforce by 3,000 screeners 

by June 1, 2003, and an additional 3,000 screeners by September 30, 2003. 

These reductions were achieved through attrition, voluntary transfers 

from full to part-time, and involuntary transfers to part-time or 

terminations based on screeners’ scores on competency-based 

examinations. 

However, TSA continues to struggle to achieve the right number of 

screeners at airport passenger and baggage checkpoints and has not yet 

achieved a stable screener workforce. To accomplish its security mission, 

TSA needs a sufficient number of screeners trained and certified in TSA 

security procedures and technologies. Currently, TSA’s screener staffing 

level is below a congressionally imposed staffing cap of 45,000 full-time 

equivalents.6

 According to TSA officials, TSA has experienced an average 

annual attrition rate of 14 percent for screeners, with some of the larger 

airports reportedly experiencing annual attrition rates ranging from 15 to 

36 percent. TSA has also experienced difficulties in hiring new staff. TSA’s 

hiring process is designed to ensure that its hiring practices are 

standardized and consistent throughout all airports. However, this process 

has hindered the ability of some Federal Security Directors (FSD)7

 to 

adequately staff passenger and baggage screening checkpoints. In 

 5

U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist is Stabilizing and 

Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

6

One full-time equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-overtime hours. 

7

FSDs are responsible for overseeing security at each of the nation’s commercial airports. 

Concerns Remain 

Regarding Hiring and 

Deploying the Screener 

Workforce 
Page 10 GAO-04-592T 

addition, TSA has also experienced challenges in attracting needed parttime screeners. As a result, FSDs at some of the larger airports we visited 

had to frequently require mandatory overtime, particularly during the 

holiday season, to accomplish screening functions. 

To help right-size and stabilize its screener workforce, TSA hired a 

consultant in September 2003 to conduct a study of screener staffing levels 

at the nation’s commercial airports. Specifically, the consultant was tasked 

with, among other things, evaluating TSA’s current staffing methodology 

and systems to establish a baseline, developing a comprehensive modeling 

approach that accounts for the considerable variability that occurs among 

airports,8

 integrating modeling parameters into TSA’s screener scheduling 

system, and delivering user friendly simulation software that will 

determine optimum screener staffing levels for each of the more than 440 

commercial airports with federal screeners. TSA expects the consultant’s 

study to be completed in April 2004. 

TSA is also trying to compensate for screener shortages and to enable 

operational flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat. In October 

2003, TSA established a National Screening Force to provide screening 

support to all airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under 

other special circumstances that require a greater number of screeners 

than regularly available to FSDs. The National Screening Force currently 

consists of over 700 full-time passenger and baggage screeners, of which 

about 10 percent are screening supervisors. TSA officials said that they 

determine where to deploy members of the National Screening Force 

based on priorities. For example, the highest priority is given to those 

airports that need additional screeners in order to be able to screen 100 

percent of checked baggage using Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and 

Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) systems. TSA is also currently drafting 

standard operating procedures for the National Screening Force. We have 

ongoing work that will examine TSA’s use of the National Screening Force 

and other staffing issues. 

 8

TSA officials said that it required the contractor to validate the staffing model using 

statistical samples of all staff and equipment operations at all category X airports and as 

many category I, II, III, and IV airports as necessary. 
Page 11 GAO-04-592T 

TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for screeners. 

However, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed connectivity at airport 

training facilities have made it difficult for screeners to fully utilize these 

programs. Specifically, TSA recently revamped its screener training 

program to include three main components: (1) training all screeners in 

the skills necessary for both passenger and baggage screening (replaces 

basic screener training); (2) recurrent (skills refresher) screener training; 

and (3) technical screener training/certification for EDS. In addition to 

strengthening its basic and recurrent training programs, TSA is enhancing 

and standardizing remedial training for screeners who fail testing 

conducted by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review. TSA 

has also established leadership and technical training programs for 

screening supervisors. 

Despite these efforts, however, some FSDs said that ensuring screeners 

received required training continued to be a challenge. For example, FSDs 

at 5 of the largest airports said that due to staffing shortages, they were 

unable to let screeners take training because it would impact FSDs’ ability 

to provide adequate screener coverage. Consequently, screeners received 

an average of only 3 hours of recurrent training per month, far less than 

the required 3 hours per week.9

 In an attempt to ensure screeners receive 

required training, several FSDs provided training through overtime, or 

established training relief teams with the sole purpose of staffing 

screening checkpoints while screeners participated in training. 

TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of 

passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA has 

collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In 

July 2003, TSA completed a study of the performance of its passenger 

screening system, which identified numerous performance deficiencies, 

such as inadequate staffing and poor supervision of screeners. These 

deficiencies were in turn caused by a lack of skills and knowledge, low 

motivation, ineffective work environment, and wrong or missing 

incentives. In response to this study, in October 2003 TSA developed a 

short-term action plan that identified key actions TSA plans to take to 

strengthen the performance of passenger screeners. These actions built on 

 9

TSA requires passenger and baggage screeners to participate in 3 hours of recurrent 

training per week, averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to be devoted to X-ray 

image interpretation, and the other 2 hours on screening techniques or reviews of standard 

operating procedures. 

Screener Training 

Programs Enhanced, but 

Access to Programs Is 

Sometimes Limited 

TSA Continues to 

Strengthen its Efforts to 

Measure Screener 

Performance in Detecting 

Threat Objects 
Page 12 GAO-04-592T 

several initiatives that TSA already had underway, including enhancing 

training for screeners and supervisors, completing installation of the 

Threat Image Projection system,10 and conducting annual recertifications 

of screeners. TSA is also increasing covert testing of passenger and 

baggage screeners in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass threat 

objects through screening checkpoints to identify systematic problems 

affecting the performance of screeners. 

While TSA is making progress in each of these areas, it has collected 

limited data on the performance of its baggage screening operations. 

Officials said that they have collected limited performance data related to 

baggage screeners due to their initial focus on passenger screener 

performance, but plan to collect additional performance data in the future. 

TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening operations, but 

continues to face operational and funding challenges in screening all 

checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by 

ATSA. Although TSA has deployed EDS and ETD equipment to all airports, 

TSA has not been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent 

of checked baggage for explosives by the congressionally mandated 

deadline of December 31, 2003, due to screener and equipment shortages 

and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. When 

TSA cannot screen 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD, 

TSA continues to use alternative means, including K-9 teams, manual bag 

searches, and positive passenger bag match. TSA has ongoing initiatives to 

increase the efficiency of screening checked baggage using EDS, including 

the development and construction of in-line baggage screening systems at 

larger airports—which streamlines the screening processes. 

TSA is also conducting research and development activities to strengthen 

passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve 

detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current technologies, 

and to develop the next generation of EDS equipment. However, progress 

on this research was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA used $61 

million of its $110 million research and development funds for other

programs that TSA viewed as higher priorities. As a result, TSA had to 

delay several key research and development projects, including developing 

 10The Threat Image Projection system places images of threat objects on X-ray screens 

during actual screening operations and records whether screeners identify the objects. 

TSA Faces Challenges in 

Its Efforts to Deploy and 

Leverage Screening 

Equipment and 

Technologies 
Page 13 GAO-04-592T 

a device to detect weapons, liquid explosives, and flammables in 

containers found in carry-on baggage or passengers’ effects, and further 

development and testing of a walk-through chemical trace detection portal 

for detecting explosives on passengers. 

Although measures are taken to keep dangerous individuals and items off 

aircraft, the possibility still exists that terrorists and dangerous objects can 

still get on board aircraft. Consequently, a number of other layers of 

security are in place to enhance the security of commercial aircraft while 

in transit. One such layer is the Federal Air Marshal Service, which places 

specially trained and armed teams of civil aviation security specialists on 

board aircraft to protect passengers, crew, and aircraft from terrorist 

activities on both domestic and international flights. 

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Service rapidly 

expanded. The organization grew from about 50 air marshals to 1,000s,11 as 

the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Transportation—the Service’s 

then parent agency—established a goal of hiring, training, and deploying 

the new air marshals by July 2002. The Service’s budget grew 

commensurately, from $4.4 million in fiscal year 2001 to $545 million in 

fiscal year 2003. The rapid expansion led to a number of operational and 

management control issues for the Service. These included reviewing 

nearly 200,000 applications for federal air marshal positions, initiating 

thousands of background investigations for top-secret clearances, training 

the new workforce, and scheduling the air marshals for flight duty. 

These operational and management control issues have caused a number 

of problems. As we discussed in a November 2003 report,12 to deploy the 

requisite number of air marshals by July 2002, the Service revised and 

abbreviated its training program. It modified the air marshal training 

program from 14 weeks to about 5 weeks for candidates without prior law 

enforcement experience and to about 1 week for candidates with such 

experience. The training curriculum no longer included airplane cockpit 

familiarization, visits to airlines, and some of the instruction on the 

Service’s policies and procedures. Moreover, air marshal candidates no 

 11The number of air marshals is classified. 

12U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is 

Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions 

Needed, GAO-04-242 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003). 

Expansion of The 

Federal Air Marshal 

Service has 

experienced problems 
Page 14 GAO-04-592T 

longer had to pass an advanced marksmanship test to qualify for 

employment, although the candidates still had to pass a basic test. To 

provide the newly hired air marshals with the additional skills, the Service 

developed an advanced training course that the air marshals were required 

to complete by January 2004. However, cutbacks in funds have delayed the 

expected completion of this training by all air marshals until mid-2004. 

Ongoing work that examines the funding of the Service indicates that 

problems may be continuing. Specifically, the number of air marshals has 

not reached established target levels and may be declining. The budget for 

the Service in fiscal year 2003—the year it was expected to achieve its 

target staffing level—was reduced by the department from $545 million to 

$450 million as part of a $763 million reprogramming by TSA to cover a 

number of funding shortfalls. As a result, the Service had to forgo the 

hiring of additional air marshals, further delay training, and reduce efforts 

to develop and equip much of its field operations infrastructure. The 

limitations on the funding for the Service, and on its ability to increase the 

number of air marshals to target levels, has resulted in the number of air 

marshals being less at the end of fiscal year 2003 than anticipated. Officials 

from the Service have said that if budget trends continue, they expect that 

at the end of fiscal year 2004 they will have fewer air marshals than they had 

at any point since mid-2002. Additionally, Service officials said that they do 

not have sufficient funding to develop the facilities needed to provide its 

field locations with key equipment and specialized space necessary for 

training and for providing updates on tactics and intelligence and to 

update the Service’s automated mission scheduling system to enable it to 

schedule and manage all air marshal missions. 

In addition to the concerns with the CAPPS II program, passenger and 

baggage screening, and the expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service, 

TSA and DHS face a number of other programmatic and management 

concerns in strengthening aviation security. The concerns include 

developing measures to counter the Man-Portable Anti-aircraft Defense 

Systems (MANPADS) threat against commercial aircraft, implementing 

commercial airport perimeter and access controls, developing effective 

measures for ensuring the security of air cargo, and strengthening general 

aviation security. We have ongoing work that is examining DHS’s and 

TSA’s efforts in all of these areas. 

The threat of terrorists using MANPADS—shoulder-launched surface-toair missiles—against commercial aviation has increased in recent years, as 

many thousands of these missiles have been produced and are in national 

Concerns Exist in 

Other Aviation 

Security Areas 

MANPADS 
Page 15 GAO-04-592T 

arsenals and black markets throughout the world. In late 2002, terrorists 

fired surface-to-air missiles at an airliner departing from an airport in 

Kenya, marking the first time they had been used to attack commercial 

aircraft in a non-combat zone. Following the attack, the White House 

convened a task force to develop a strategy to reduce the MANPADS 

threat against commercial aircraft, and the Congress directed DHS to 

submit a plan to develop and demonstrate a counter-MANPADS device for 

commercial aircraft. In January 2004, DHS initiated a 2-year program to 

migrate existing military counter-MANPADS systems to the civil aviation 

environment and minimize the total lifecycle cost of such systems. 

DHS faces significant challenges in adapting current military counterMANPADS systems to commercial aircraft. These challenges include 

establishing system requirements, maturing the counter-MANPADS 

technology and design, and setting reliable cost estimates. For example, 

DHS has to account for a wide variety of aircraft types in designing and 

integrating the system. Further, the current generation of missile warning 

systems have high false alarm rates and high maintenance costs. In a 

January 2004 report,13 we noted the benefits of following the knowledgebased approach used by leading developers in industry and government to 

reduce program risks and increase the likelihood of success and 

recommended that the department adopt this approach to develop a 

counter-MANPADS system for commercial aviation. DHS concurred with 

our recommendation and said that it will be using knowledge-based 

evaluations throughout the program. 

We are continuing to examine U.S. efforts to control the international 

proliferation of MANPADS and DHS’s efforts to develop technical 

countermeasures to minimize the threat of a MANPADS attack. We expect 

to issue a report discussing these issues by late April 2004. 

Prior to September 2001, work performed by us and others highlighted the 

vulnerabilities in controls for limiting access to secure airport areas. In 

one report, we noted that our special agents were able to use fictitious law 

enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas, bypass 

 13U.S. General Accounting Office, The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully 

Adopt a Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program, 

GAO-04-341R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).

Perimeter and Access 

Controls 
Page 16 GAO-04-592T 

security checkpoints, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates.14

The agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes, could have 

carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. 

Concerns over the adequacy of the vetting process for airport workers 

who have unescorted access to secure airport areas have also arisen, in 

part, as a result of federal agency airport security sweeps that uncovered 

hundreds of instances in which airport workers lied about their criminal 

history, or immigration status, or provided false or inaccurate Social 

Security numbers on their application for security clearances to obtain 

employment. 

ATSA contains provisions to improve perimeter access security at the 

nation’s airports and strengthen background checks for employees 

working in secure airport areas and TSA has made some progress in this 

area. For example, TSA issued several security directives to strengthen 

airport perimeter security by limiting the number of airport access points, 

and they require random screening of individuals, vehicles, and property 

before entry at the remaining perimeter access points. Further, TSA made 

criminal history checks mandatory for employees with access to secure or 

sterile airport areas. To date, TSA has conducted approximately 1 million 

of these checks. TSA plans to review security technologies in the areas of 

biometrics access control identification systems (i.e., fingerprints or iris 

scans), anti-piggybacking technologies (to prevent more than one 

employee from entering a secure area at a time), and video monitoring 

systems for perimeter security. Further, TSA plans to solicit commercial 

airport participation in a pilot airport security program and is currently 

reviewing information from interested airports. TSA plans to select 20 

airports for the program. 

Although progress has been made, challenges remain with perimeter 

security and access controls. Specifically, ATSA contains numerous 

requirements for strengthening perimeter security and access controls, 

some of which contained deadlines that TSA is working to meet. A number 

of technologies could be used to secure and monitor airport perimeters, 

including barriers, motion sensors, and closed-circuit television. Airport 

representatives have cautioned that as security enhancements are made to 

airport perimeters, it will be important for TSA to coordinate with the 

Federal Aviation Administration and the airport operators to ensure that 

 14U.S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports, 

GAO/T-OSI-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000).
Page 17 GAO-04-592T 

any enhancements do not pose safety risks for aircraft. To further examine 

these threats and challenges, we have ongoing work assessing TSA’s 

progress in meeting ATSA provisions related to improving perimeter 

security, access controls, and background checks for airport employees 

and other individuals with access to secure areas of the airport, as well as 

the nature and extent of the threat from shoulder-fired missiles. We expect 

to report on the results of this work by May 2004. 

As we and the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General have 

reported, vulnerabilities exist in ensuring the security of cargo carried 

aboard commercial passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The Federal Aviation 

Administration has reported that an estimated 12.5 million tons of cargo 

are transported each year—9.7 million tons on all-cargo planes and 

2.8 million tons on passenger planes. Potential security risks are 

associated with the transport of air cargo—including the introduction of 

undetected explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard 

aircraft. To reduce these risks, ATSA requires that all cargo carried aboard 

commercial passenger aircraft be screened and that TSA have a system in 

place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the 

security of cargo on all-cargo aircraft. However, according to a September 

2003 report by the Congressional Research Service, less than 5 percent of 

cargo placed on passenger airplanes is physically screened.15 TSA’s 

primary approach to ensuring air cargo security and safety is to ensure 

compliance with the “known shipper” program—which allows shippers 

that have established business histories with air carriers or freight 

forwarders to ship cargo on planes. However, we and the Department of 

Transportation’s Inspector General have identified weaknesses in the 

known shipper program and in TSA’s procedures for approving freight 

forwarders, such as possible tampering with freight at various handoff 

points before it is loaded into an aircraft. 

Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance 

cargo security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in 

October 2002. The database is the first phase in developing a cargo 

profiling system. However, in December 2002, we reported that additional 

operational and technological measures, such as checking the identity of 

individuals making cargo deliveries, had the potential to improve air cargo 

 15Congressional Research Service, Air Cargo Security, Sept. 11, 2003. 

Air Cargo Security 
Page 18 GAO-04-592T 

security in the near term.16 We further reported that TSA lacks a 

comprehensive plan with long-term goals and performance targets for 

cargo security, time frames for completing security improvements, and 

risk-based criteria for prioritizing actions to achieve those goals. 

Accordingly, we recommended that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for 

air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, includes 

a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing actions. TSA 

agreed with this recommendation and, in November 2003, issued its Air 

Cargo Strategic Plan. TSA also introduced a random inspection process for 

air cargo and outlined steps to strengthen the known shipper program. We 

will shortly begin a comprehensive review of air cargo security 

procedures, including these recent actions taken by TSA. 

Not only are commercial aircraft a concern, but general aviation aircraft 

can be a security concern. TSA has taken limited action to improve general 

aviation security, leaving general aviation far more open and potentially 

vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation is vulnerable 

because general aviation pilots and passengers are not screened before 

takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are not screened at any 

point. General aviation includes more than 200,000 privately owned 

airplanes, which are located in every state at more than 19,000 airports.17

In the last 5 years, about 70 aircraft have been stolen from general aviation 

airports, indicating a potential weakness that could be exploited by 

terrorists. This vulnerability was demonstrated in January 2002, when a 

teenage flight student stole and crashed a single-engine airplane into a 

Tampa, Florida, skyscraper. Moreover, general aviation aircraft could be 

used in other types of terrorist acts. It was reported that the September 

11th hijackers researched the use of crop dusters to spread biological or 

chemical agents. 

We reported in September 2003 that TSA chartered a working group on 

general aviation within the existing Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee.18 The working group consists of industry stakeholders and is 

 16U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential 

Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO-03-344 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002). 

17Of the 19,000 general aviation airports, 5,400 are publicly owned. TSA is currently 

focusing its efforts on these publicly owned airports. 

18U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Progress since September 11th, and 

the Challenges Ahead, GAO-03-1150T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003). 

General Aviation Security 
Page 19 GAO-04-592T 

designed to identify and recommend actions to close potential security 

gaps in general aviation. On October 1, 2003, the working group issued a 

report that included a number of recommendations for general aviation 

airport operators’ voluntary use in evaluating airports’ security 

requirements. These recommendations are both broad in scope and 

generic in their application, with the intent that every general aviation 

airport and landing facility operators may use them to evaluate that 

facility’s physical security, procedures, infrastructure, and resources. TSA 

will use these recommendations as a baseline to develop a set of federally 

endorsed guidelines for enhancing airport security at general aviation 

facilities throughout the nation. TSA is taking some additional action to 

strengthen security at general aviation airports, including developing a 

risk-based self-assessment tool for general aviation airports to use in 

identifying security concerns. We have ongoing work that is examining 

general aviation security in further detail; we expect to report on this work 

in the fall of 2004. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Norman J. 

Rabkin at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony include J. Michael Bollinger, Adam Hoffman, and John R. 

Schulze. 

Contact Information 
Page 20 GAO-04-592T 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of ComputerAssisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 17, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, 

D.C.: February 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 

Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. 

Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 

Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 

of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions 

Needed. GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 

Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress 

Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: 

September 24, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the 

Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address 

Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot 

Certification Process. GAO-03-248NI. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003. 

(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION). 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-286NI. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

(NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION). 

Appendix: Related GAO Products 
Page 21 GAO-04-592T 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by 

Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO-03-30C. Washington, D.C.: 

December 3, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 

Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 

2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial 

Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection 

Equipment. GAO-02-713C. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2002. 

(CLASSIFIED). 

Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation's Air 

Transportation System. GAO-01-1164T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 

2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION). 

Aviation Security: Information on the Nation's Air Transportation 

System Vulnerabilities. GAO-01-1174T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 

2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION). 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2001. 
Page 22 GAO-04-592T 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access 

Security Improvements. GAO-01-1069R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 

2001. 

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access 

Security Improvements. GAO-01-1068R. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 

2001. (RESTRICTED).

FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing 

Weaknesses. GAO-01-171. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in 

Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/RCED-00-181. Washington, D.C.: 

September 29, 2000. 

FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses 

That Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-330. Washington, 

D.C.: September 27, 2000. 

FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other 

Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/AIMD-00-252. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 

2000. 

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners' 

Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems 

Detecting Dangerous Objects. GAO/RCED-00-159. Washington, D.C.: June 

22, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION).

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO/T-OSI-00-10. 

Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2000. 

(440309) 
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