1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M. DIANE KOKEN, : CIVIL ACTION

INS. COMM’R OF PA, IN HER : NO. 04-4342

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS :

LIQUIDATOR OF RELIANCE INS. :

CO., :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY : 

CORP. (PBGC), :

: 

Defendant. :

M E M O R A N D U M

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J. JULY 14, 2005

This action involves a dispute between the Insurance

Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, M. Diane Koken

(the “Commissioner"), in her official capacity as Liquidator of

Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance") and the Pension Benefit

Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”). The PBGC is seeking to enforce

several perfected statutory liens it holds against certain

subsidiaries of Reliance. On August 25, 2004, the Commissioner

filed a petition in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the liens held

by the PBGC are void. The PBGC timely removed to this Court. 

The case raises complex issues concerning the allocation of

federal and state responsibility for the administration of an

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 1 of 18
1 Under 29 U.S.C. § 1301,

(A) "controlled group" means, in connection

with any person, a group consisting of such

person and all other persons under common

control with such person;

(B) the determination of whether two or more

persons are under "common control" shall be

made under regulations of the corporation

which are consistent and coextensive with

regulations prescribed for similar purposes by

the Secretary of the Treasury under

subsections (b) and (c) of section 414 of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C. §

414(b), (c)] . . . . 

29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(14); PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 630 F.2d 4, 6 (1st

Cir. 1980).

2

insolvent insurance company’s pension benefits. Before the Court

is the Commissioner’s motion to remand to the Commonwealth Court. 

For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Reliance “Controlled Group”

Reliance is an insolvent Pennsylvania insurance company

now in liquidation proceedings in the Commonwealth Court of

Pennsylvania. Reliance is reportedly part of a “controlled

group”1 of corporations, as that term is defined under the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 2 of 18
2 Reliance’s immediate and ultimate parent companies are 

each currently in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S.

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. See In

re Reliance Group Holdings, Inc., No. 04-13404 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

filed June 12, 2001). 

3 RCG is reported to be a holding company.

3

U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Reliance’s controlled group consists of

six tiers: 

• Tier One: Reliance Group Holdings, Inc., the ultimate

parent company;

• Tier Two: Reliance Financial Services Corporation,

Reliance’s immediate parent company2; 

• Tier Three: Reliance;

• Tier Four: RCG International, Inc. (“RCG”)3;

• Tier Five: RCG Moody International Limited and RCG

Information Technology; 

• Tier Six: Moody International Limited and Moody

International, Inc.

On May 29, 2001, the Pennsylvania Insurance Department

placed Reliance in rehabilitation and appointed the Commissioner

as the Rehabilitator of Reliance. On October 3, 2001, the

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania granted the Commissioner's

petition to place Reliance in liquidation and appointed the

Commissioner as Liquidator of Reliance.

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 3 of 18
4 This program guarantees pension benefits in the event a 

plan is terminated before being fully funded. See 29 U.S.C. §§

1082, 1301-1461; PBGC. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720

(1984). 

4

The controlled group, consisting of the above six tiers

of corporations, established two single-employer pension plans

covered by the federal pension plan termination insurance

program:4 (1) the Reliance Insurance Company Employee Retirement

Plan (the “Reliance Pension Plan”), and (2) the Reliance Group

Holdings, Inc. Pension Plan (the “RGH Pension Plan”).

Under ERISA, Reliance Group Holdings, Inc. (the

ultimate parent corporation) and Reliance, as sponsors of their

respective single-employer pension plans, must make periodic

contributions and installments to their plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1082. 

Plan sponsors also must pay premiums under the mandatory pension

plan termination insurance program established under Title IV of

ERISA. Id. § 1307. Additionally, if a plan sponsor fails to

make the requisite contributions and installments to its plan, or

pay the requisite premiums, each member of its controlled group

becomes “jointly and severally liable for payment of such

contribution or required installment,” as well as for “any

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 4 of 18
5 Section 1082 provides, in part:

(11) Liability for contributions.

 (A) In general. Except as provided in

subparagraph (B), the amount of any

contribution required by this section and any

required installments under subsection (e)

shall be paid by the employer responsible for

contributing to or under the plan the amount

described in subsection (b)(3)(A).

 (B) Joint and several liability where

employer member of controlled group.

 (i) In general. In the case of a plan

other than a multiemployer plan, if the

employer referred to in subparagraph (A) is a

member of a controlled group, each member of

such group shall be jointly and severally

liable for payment of such contribution or

required installment.

29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(11)(B).

Section 1307 provides, in part:

If the contributing sponsor of any

single-employer plan is a member of a

controlled group, each member of such group

shall be jointly and severally liable for any

premiums required to be paid by such

contributing sponsor.

Id. § 1307(e)(2).

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premiums required to be paid by such contributing sponsor.”5 Id.

§§ 1082(c)(11)(B), 1307.

B. The PBGC 

The PBGC is a wholly owned U.S. government corporation

that administers the pension plan termination insurance program. 

Id. §§ 1301-1461. Modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 5 of 18
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Corporation, the PBGC was established “to prevent the ‘great

personal tragedy’ suffered by employees whose vested benefits are

not paid when pension plans are terminated.” Nachman Corp. v.

PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 374 (1980) (citation omitted). Under ERISA,

the PBGC becomes the statutory trustee of any plan terminated

without sufficient funds to pay guaranteed benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§

1322, 1342, 1361. Each company within the plan sponsor’s

controlled group is jointly and severally liable for the required

minimum funding contributions. Id. § 1082(c)(11). If the

required contributions are not made, and the total amount of

missed contributions exceeds $1 million, a lien in favor of the

pension plan arises in the total amount of missed contributions. 

Id. § 1082(f)(1). The lien attaches to “all property and rights

to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person

and any other person who is a member of the same controlled group

of which such person is a member.” Id. Once the lien attaches,

the PBGC is authorized to perfect and enforce the lien on behalf

of the pension plan against the contributing sponsor and each

member of its controlled group. Id. § 1082(f)(5).

When a pension plan covered by the federal pension

termination insurance program terminates, the contributing

sponsor and each member of its controlled group also become

jointly and severally liable to the PBGC for the amount of the

plan’s unfunded benefit liabilities, and to the statutory trustee

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 6 of 18
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for all unpaid minimum funding contributions owed to the plan. 

Id. § 1362(a),(b),(c). The PBGC invariably is appointed

statutory trustee of a terminated underfunded pension plan, and

upon its appointment, it becomes responsible for paying a

terminated plan’s benefits, subject to statutory limitations. 

Id. § 1322, 1342, 1361.

C. RCG International Inc.’s Sale of Its Subsidiaries and

the PBGC’s Liens

On February 12, 2004, RCG International, Inc. (“RCG”),

a wholly owned subsidiary of Reliance, entered a contract for the

sale of one hundred percent of the shares of RCG Moody

International Limited (“Moody”) and all RCG’s shares in two of

Moody’s subsidiaries to Moody International Finance Limited,

which is a company outside of Reliance’s controlled group of

corporations. The contract gave Moody International Finance

Limited one hundred percent ownership of Moody and its

subsidiaries.

On April 2, 2004, three days prior to the closing on

the sale of Moody and its subsidiaries, the PBGC perfected liens

on the assets of (1) RCG, (2) Moody and its subsidiaries, the

sale of which was scheduled to be completed, and (3) certain

unidentified RCG subsidiaries. It is these PBGC liens on the

assets of direct and indirect subsidiaries of Reliance which

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 7 of 18
6 The substantive dispute between the parties can fairly 

be characterized as one of claim priority. The Commissioner

argues that, under 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 221.44, the PBGC’s

claims are at best entitled to third-priority status. According

to the Commissioner, the PBGC’s act of perfecting liens on the

assets of certain Reliance subsidiaries improperly elevates the

PBGC’s claim status above that of a third-priority claim, in

contravention of 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 221.44. In response,

the PBGC argues that federal law, i.e., 29 U.S.C. § 1082,

authorizes it to perfect an enforce liens on the assets of the

Reliance subsidiaries, and the PBGC’s liens on those

subsidiaries’ assets are not subject to the priority scheme

outlined in the Insurance Department Act of 1921, 40 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 221.1, et seq.

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prompted the Commissioner to petition the Commonwealth Court for,

inter alia, a declaration that the PBGC’s liens are void. The

Commissioner’s petition, in turn, prompted the PBGC to exercise

its statutory right to remove the action to federal court. The

Commissioner has timely filed a motion to remand in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

II. THE MOTION TO REMAND

Although the parties dedicate a substantial portion of

their legal briefs to the merits of the ultimate dispute, which

involves the question whether the PBGC’s liens are valid and, if

so, whether they are subject to Pennsylvania’s priority scheme,

the merits are not currently before the Court.6 Rather, the

question presented by the Commissioner’s motion to remand is

simply: Which court, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court or this

Court, gets to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute. The

PBGC bears the burden of proving that its removal to this Court

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 8 of 18
7 Under ERISA, "a person is a fiduciary with respect to a 

plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority

or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or

exercises any authority or control respecting management or

disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for

a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to

any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority

or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary

authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration

of such plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); In re Mushroom Transp.

Co., 382 F.3d 325, 346 (3d Cir. 2004). The Commissioner falls

within ERISA’s definition of fiduciary because she exercises

discretionary authority or control respecting management of a

plan or the disposition of its assets. See O'Reilly v. Ceuleers,

912 F.2d 1383, 1386 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The Director [of

Insurance] does not, of course, have complete discretion over the

management and disposition of the assets of the Trust, but the

fact that a court oversees and must approve many of the

Director's decisions does not bely the fact that the Director

negotiates, solicits, drafts contracts and acts in general as the

manager of the Trust. An individual is a fiduciary to the extent

that he exercises any discretionary authority or control

respecting management of a plan or the disposition of its

assets.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Mutual Life Ins. Co. of

N.Y. v. Yampol, 840 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1988)).

9

was proper. Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d

Cir. 1990). It satisfies its burden by showing that this Court

has subject matter jurisdiction and that it has complied with the

procedure for removal. Id.

The Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the present

action. Congress has vested “the district courts of the United

States [with] jurisdiction of actions brought under this

subsection [§ 1303(f)] without regard to the amount in

controversy.” 29 U.S.C. § 1303(f)(6). The Commissioner, as a

fiduciary7 who claims she is “adversely affected by any action of

the [PBGC] with respect to a plan in which [she] has an interest

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 9 of 18
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. . . , may bring an action against the [PBGC] for appropriate

equitable relief in the appropriate court.” Id. § 1303(f)(1)

(emphasis added). Section 1303(f)(2) defines “appropriate court”

as: 

(A) the United States district court before

which proceedings under section 4041 or 4042

[29 USCS § 1341 or 1342] are being conducted,

(B) if no such proceedings are being

conducted, the United States district court

for the judicial district in which the plan

has its principal office, or 

(C) the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia.

Id. § 1303(f)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, only a federal district

court is an “appropriate court” to adjudicate the Commissioner’s

claim. Moreover, the parties do not dispute that venue is proper

in this judicial district. 

In turn, Section 1303(f)(7) authorizes the PBGC to

remove actions brought against it in state court, provided it

complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1446:

In any suit, action, or proceeding in which

the corporation [PBGC] is a party, or

intervenes . . . , in any State court, the

corporation may, without bond or security,

remove such suit, action, or proceeding from

the State court to the United States district

court for the district or division in which

such suit, action, or proceeding is pending by

following any procedure for removal now or

hereafter in effect.

 

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 10 of 18
8 Congress has expressly granted other federal 

corporations rights of removal similar to the PBGC’s. See, e.g.,

12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) (providing that, subject to an

exception not applicable here, “the [Federal Deposit Insurance]

Corporation may, without bond or security, remove any action,

suit, or proceeding from a State court to the appropriate United

States district court before the end of the 90-day period

beginning on the date the action, suit, or proceeding is filed

against the Corporation or the Corporation is substituted as a

party.”); id. § 1441a(l)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision

of law, any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the

[Resolution Trust] Corporation is a party shall be deemed to

arise under the laws of the United States, and the United States

district courts shall have original jurisdiction over such

action, suit, or proceeding.”). The removal statutes governing,

e.g., the PBGC, the FDIC and the RTC, “evidence[] Congress’[s]

desire that cases involving [these corporations] should generally

be heard and decided by the federal courts.” Spring Garden

Assocs., L.P. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 26 F.3d 412, 416 n.8 (3d

Cir. 1994). 

11

Id. § 1303(f)(7).8 It is not contended that the PBGC has not

complied with the procedure for removal. Because the Court has

subject matter jurisdiction and the PBGC has properly followed

the removal procedure, this Court has a “virtually unflagging

obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given [it].” Hi

Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 303 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Commissioner advances three arguments in support of

its conclusion that the Court should nevertheless remand the case

to state court: (1) the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012,

requires remand to the state court, (2) this Court should abstain

from hearing the dispute pursuant to Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 11 of 18
9 In relevant part, the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides:

No Act of Congress shall be construed to

invalidate, impair, or supersede any law

enacted by any State for the purpose of

regulating the business of insurance, or which

imposes a fee or tax upon such business,

unless such Act specifically relates to the

business of insurance: Provided, That after

June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as

amended, known as the Sherman Act [15 U.S.C.

§§ 1 et seq.], and the Act of October 15,

1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act,

and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as

the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended

[15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.], shall be applicable

to the business of insurance to the extent

that such business is not regulated by State

law.

15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).

12

U.S. 315 (1943) and its progeny, and (3) the Princess Lida

doctrine, born from Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson,

305 U.S. 456 (1939), requires remand because the state court has

already asserted in rem jurisdiction over property that is the

subject of this action. None of the arguments is persuasive.

First, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012,9 is

not relevant to the issue of the Court’s jurisdiction. The

McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that a state law enacted “for the

purpose of regulating insurance” escapes federal preemption. 15

U.S.C. § 1012(b); U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491,

493 (1993) (holding that a state “priority statute, to the extent

that it regulates policyholders, is a law enacted for the purpose

of regulating the business of insurance” and therefore escapes

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 12 of 18
10 ERISA directs that, “in insolvency proceedings, the

lien imposed under subsection (a) of this section [i.e., a lien

held by the PBGC pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a)] shall be

treated in the same manner as a tax due and owing to the United

States for purposes of Title 11 or section 3713 of Title 31.” 29

U.S.C. § 1368(c)(2). Under the federal priority statute,

(a)(1) A claim of the United States Government shall be

paid first when--

(A) a person indebted to the Government is insolvent

and--

 (i) the debtor without enough property to pay all

debts makes a voluntary assignment of property;

 (ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is

attached; or

 (iii) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or

(B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody

of the executor or administrator, is not enough to pay

all debts of the debtor.

 (2) This subsection does not apply to a case under

title 11.

(b) A representative of a person or an estate (except a

trustee acting under title 11) paying any part of a debt

of the person or estate before paying a claim of the

Government is liable to the extent of the payment for

unpaid claims of the Government.

31 U.S.C. § 3713.

13

federal preemption by the federal priority statute). Thus, that

Act is relevant, if at all, only to the merits of any priorityof-claims dispute that may arise from a clash between the federal

priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3713, and the Pennsylvania priority

scheme.10 See, e.g., Fabe, 508 U.S. at 493 (where a federal

court addressed a priority-of-claims question involving claims

filed by the United States in an insurance liquidation

proceeding). 

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 13 of 18
11 Even if there were timely and adequate state-court 

review available, “a federal court sitting in equity must decline

to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state

administrative agencies: (1) when there are ‘difficult questions

of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public

import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at

bar’; or (2) where the ‘exercise of federal review of the

question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of

state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a

matter of substantial public concern.’” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361

(citation omitted). The instant case involves questions not of

state law but of federal law, namely, (1) whether the PBGC has

properly exercised its authority under federal law to file liens,

and (2) whether, if so, those liens are subject to the

Pennsylvania priority scheme, in which case the Court would have

to determine whether, under the circumstances of this case, the

McCarran-Ferguson Act operates to save Pennsylvania’s priority

scheme from preemption by the federal priority statute. 

Moreover, for the reasons stated in this Memorandum’s discussion

of the Princess Lida doctrine infra, this Court’s resolution of

the federal questions involving the PBGC will not disrupt

Pennsylvania’s efforts to establish a coherent policy with

respect to the orderly liquidation of insolvent insurance

companies.

14

Second, Burford abstention is inappropriate here. In

New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New

Orleans ("NOPSI"), the Supreme Court expressly required that, as

a threshold matter, for Burford abstention to apply, “timely and

adequate state-court review [must be] available.” 491 U.S. 350,

361 (1989); see also Hi Tech Trans, LLC, 382 F.3d at 304 (quoting

NOPSI). Here, the only “appropriate court” that may adjudicate

the issues presented in this case is a federal district court. 

29 U.S.C. § 1303(f)(2). Therefore, there is no timely and

adequate state-court review available to the parties.11 Riley v.

Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 773 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Where a state court

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 14 of 18
15

lacks jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim, Burford abstention

is clearly inappropriate because there can be no opportunity for

‘timely and adequate state court review’ of a claim that a court

has no power to decide.”) (citation omitted).

Finally, the Princess Lida doctrine does not require

remand. Under the Princess Lida doctrine, a court, federal or

state, “first assuming jurisdiction over property may maintain

and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other

[court].” 305 U.S. at 466. The Princess Lida doctrine does not

apply, however, where a court’s declaration “of the existence and

amount of a claim against the debtor [and, a fortiori, against

the assets of a debtor’s subsidiaries] in no way disturbs the

possession of the liquidation court, in no way affects title to

the property, and does not necessarily involve a determination of

what priority the claim should have.” Gross v. Weingarten, 217

F.3d 208, 221 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Here, the

Commissioner seeks, inter alia, a declaration that the PBGC’s

liens on the assets of certain subsidiaries of Reliance, an

insolvent insurance company, are void. The Court’s resolution of

this question does not interfere with the Commonwealth Court’s

possession of Reliance’s assets for at least two alternative

reasons. 

One, although the Commissioner asserts that the assets

of Reliance’s subsidiaries could, at some undetermined point in

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 15 of 18
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the future, be sold for the benefit Reliance’s estate, at this

juncture the assets of the subsidiaries are not necessarily part

of Reliance’s estate. “A corporate parent which owns the shares

of a subsidiary does not, for that reason alone, own or have

legal title to the assets of the subsidiary; and, it follows with

even greater force, the parent does not own or have legal title

to the subsidiaries of the subsidiary.” Dole Food Co. v.

Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (U.S. 2003). This is so because

"[s]ubsidiaries, even if wholly-owned, are presumed separate and

distinct entities from their parent corporations." Glidden Co.

v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 700 A.2d 555, 1997 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

1997). If the assets of the subsidiaries are not part of

Reliance’s estate, then the PBGC’s liens on them, if valid, are

not subject to Pennsylvania’s priority scheme.

Alternatively, even if the PBGC’s liens are deemed

assets of Reliance’s estate, any declaration by this Court that

the PBGC’s liens are valid does not involve a determination of

what priority the liens should have under Pennsylvania’s priority

scheme. Rather, as the Supreme Court has stated, such a scenario

would implicate the question whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act

operates to save the state priority scheme from preemption by the

federal priority statute. See Fabe, 508 U.S. at 493. 

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 16 of 18
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III. CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Commissioner’s

motion to remand will be denied. An appropriate order follows.

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 17 of 18
18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M. DIANE KOKEN, : CIVIL ACTION

INS. COMM’R OF PA, IN HER : NO. 04-4342

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS :

LIQUIDATOR OF RELIANCE INS. :

CO., :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY : 

CORP. (PBGC), :

: 

Defendant. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 14th day of July, 2005, upon

consideration of plaintiff’s motion to remand (doc. no. 3), and

defendant’s response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the

Motion is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an initial pretrial

conference shall be held on July 22, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. in

Courtroom 11A, United States Courthouse, 601 Market Street,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

Case 2:04-cv-04342-ER Document 7 Filed 07/15/05 Page 18 of 18