Filed 4/13/22 In re J.G. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re J.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D079755 

 (Super. Ct. No. EJ4682)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Affirmed. 

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, and Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy 

Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

M.M. (Mother) appeals dispositional orders entered in juvenile 

dependency proceedings declaring her daughter, J.G., a dependent pursuant 
2

to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361, subdivision (d) and ordering 

family maintenance services. The San Diego County Health and Human 

Services Agency (the Agency) initiated the proceedings when J.G. was seven 

years old after her parents discovered she was being sexually abused by their 

roommate. 

On appeal, Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

ordering her to participate in a nonprotective parent group. We disagree and 

affirm the orders. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Initiation of J.G.’s Dependency Proceedings

On August 20, 2021, the Agency received a referral that J.G. had been 

sexually abused by her family’s roommate, D.A. According to the referral, 

Mother and G.W. (Father)2 had gone out and left J.G. in D.A.’s care. When 

they returned home, Mother found J.G. and D.A. both naked in D.A.’s bed. 

D.A. was lying face up and J.G. was lying face down on top of him. Mother 

called law enforcement and the parents left the home with J.G. 

Law enforcement then transported the family to Rady Children’s 

Hospital so that J.G. could undergo a sexual abuse examination (SART

exam). During the SART exam, medical staff took a urine sample and a swab 

of J.G.’s neck. However, Mother terminated the exam after J.G. began to feel 

uncomfortable. 

Mother reported to the social worker that she spoke with J.G. the 

following day about what happened with D.A. J.G. told Mother she asked 

D.A. to clean her up after she had defecated in her pull-up, and then started 

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

2 Father is not a party to this appeal. 
3

jumping on D.A.’s bed. Mother asked J.G. if D.A. touched her private part 

and J.G. said “no.”

Mother further reported that the parents had known D.A. for 12 years. 

She discussed how D.A. paid the family’s living expenses and said J.G. 

considered him to be “like a big brother, like family.” She also told the social 

worker that D.A. had cleaned J.G. many times before. When the social 

worker asked Mother what she saw when she walked in and found J.G. in 

D.A.’s bed, she claimed she never saw D.A. naked but admitted he was not 

wearing a shirt or pants. She also confirmed that J.G. was naked and on top 

of D.A. She stated, “I just wish I would have spoken to [D.A.] about what I 

saw before going to the police. I feel like I have broken our trust of so many 

years over a complete misunderstanding. . . . This entire situation was blown 

out of proportion and that’s my fault.”

During J.G.’s interview with the social worker, she reported she was in 

D.A.’s room when her parents came home and that Mother started 

screaming, but she did not remember why. She reported she was naked and 

that D.A. did not have any clothes on when her parents came home. She also 

said she had a scratch on her stomach from when D.A. removed her clothes. 

When the social worker asked what they were doing in D.A.’s bed, J.G. looked 

down, her hands were closed in tight fists, she seemed frightened, was 

breathing rapidly, and said she did not remember anything else. At the 

forensic interview a few days later, J.G. denied having a roommate or 

knowing who D.A. was. She did not report any abuse or neglect and 

answered “I don’t remember” for many questions. 

The social worker also spoke to the detectives assigned to J.G.’s case. 

One of the detectives informed the social worker that J.G. had tested positive 

for a sexually transmitted disease (STD). However, Mother was refusing to 
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take J.G. to Rady Children’s Hospital for further testing and treatment. 

Instead, Mother was planning to bring J.G. to her primary doctor but refused 

to provide the doctor’s information. The detectives were concerned Mother 

was refusing medical care that was necessary to investigate the sexual abuse 

and treat J.G. for the STD, which could lead to further medical complications 

if not treated properly. The detectives were also concerned that Mother did 

not believe the abuse occurred. She repeatedly told the detectives she felt 

they were treating J.G. “too much like a victim,” and that the incident with 

D.A. had all been a “misunderstanding.” 

The Agency filed a petition on September 1, 2021, under section 300, 

subdivision (d).3 The petition alleged: “On or about August 20, 2021, [J.G.’s] 

roommate, [D.A.], a member of said child’s household, sexually abused said 

child by lying in bed naked with the minor, who was also naked and sitting 

atop [D.A.] The minor subsequently tested positive for a sexually 

transmitted medical condition. The parents have refused to obtain the 

necessary medical testing of the minor which has delayed treatment and the

mother vacillated about whether she believes the abuse even occurred, 

therefore, the child is in need of the protection of the Juvenile Court.” In the 

detention report, the Agency recommended family maintenance services. The 

Agency also requested the juvenile court order no-contact between J.G. and 

D.A., and for an order requiring the parents to allow J.G. to receive a SART

exam. 

3 Section 300, subdivision (d) provides the juvenile court with jurisdiction 

when “[t]he child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that 

the child will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal

Code, by the child’s parent or guardian or a member of the child’s household, 

or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child from 

sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have 

known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse.” 
5

At the detention hearing on September 2, 2021, the parents submitted 

on the Agency’s recommendations. Mother’s counsel addressed her refusal to 

allow J.G. to receive the SART exam, explaining Mother was worried the 

invasiveness of the exam would be traumatizing for J.G. However, Mother

had since scheduled an appointment at Rady Children’s Hospital for J.G. to 

undergo the exam. Mother’s counsel further noted that the parents had 

obtained a temporary restraining order against D.A. and were pursuing a 

permanent restraining order against him. After hearing the parties’ 

statements, the juvenile court found the Agency made a prima facie showing 

on the petition, ordered the parents to provide J.G. with all the necessary 

medical testing, and ordered no-contact between J.G. and D.A. 

J.G. had the SART exam on September 9, 2021. J.G.’s urine and rectal 

samples taken during the exam tested positive for a sexually transmitted 

infection. Dr. Nicole Ayson, the child abuse specialist who conducted the 

exam, reported to the social worker that Mother insisted on a repeat urine 

test because she believed the test was incorrect. Mother also made comments 

that the medical staff and investigators were overreacting and causing her 

and J.G. more trauma. Dr. Ayson expressed concerns about Mother’s ability 

to protect J.G., stating, “Caregivers who are incapable of recognizing that the 

child has been abused are unlikely to identify future abusive events or to 

respond to them in a protective fashion.” 

During subsequent interviews with the parents, the social worker 

determined that both parents had suffered their own “significant trauma” as 

children and lacked a strong support system. Mother was removed from her 

parents’ home when she was a young child, stayed in group homes, and was 

on probation as a teenager. As for Father, he tested positive for drugs at 
6

birth and spent some of his childhood in foster care. He was estranged from 

his family and began experiencing mental health issues as a teenager. 

The social worker also noted that the parents struggled with 

homelessness and unemployment for several years leading up to the 

dependency proceedings. As a result, the family relied on D.A. for housing, 

and Mother described him as the “financial backbone” of the family. She 

stated she was still in contact with D.A. regarding the family’s finances, but 

that D.A. had not been in the home or around J.G. She stated that detectives 

informed her that D.A. admitted to abusing J.G., and Mother was working on 

cutting all ties with him. She also reported that they had obtained a fiveyear restraining order against him. 

The social worker also discussed with Mother whether she would be

willing to participate in a nonprotective parent group. The goals of the group 

were to ensure the child remain safe in the parents’ care and to provide the 

parents with education to prevent future abuse. The curriculum for the 

group, as described in the Agency’s report, included the following: describing 

the types of denial of sexual abuse, and discussing the parent’s own denial, 

reasons for the denial, and triggers for denial; identifying the emotional and

behavioral effects of child sexual abuse and how to effectively and 

appropriately manage them if they appear; describing offender patterns of 

grooming, triggers, and opportunities or high-risk situations for abuse; 

describing components of safety planning and the parent’s own prevention 

and intervention plan. 

Mother stated that attending the nonprotective parent group would 

make her feel judged and she preferred individual therapy. She stated, “Now 

I truly realize that something happened. I want to know what, when, how, 

but do I really truly want to know? I’ve been overwhelmed and I want the 
7

questions to stop and do as best we can, do as much as I can. I’m tired of 

[being] judged quite a bit because someone mistook what I said. We just 

want this to go away. With everyone involved it’s not going away.” The 

social worker noted that the services provided by the group were not punitive

but intended to provide the parents with education to prevent future abuse 

and to help the parents process their own trauma associated with the sexual 

abuse of their child. The social worker asked Mother to try the group, and if 

she did not like it, the Agency could reassess if individual therapy was more 

appropriate. 

Following this conversation, the social worker recommended in the 

Agency’s jurisdiction and disposition report that Mother participate in the 

nonprotective parent group. The social worker further recommended Mother 

write a list of warning signs that indicated J.G. was being sexually abused by 

D.A., and the corresponding steps she planned to take if she sees these signs 

again. 

In a subsequent interview, the social worker readdressed with Mother 

her willingness to participate in a nonprotective parent group. Mother 

indicated she had not followed up with the therapist to enroll in the group 

because her attorney advised her that she was not required to participate. 

She stated, “I’m tired, I feel like I’m having to defend everything.” She also

complained generally that the Agency did not need to be involved with their 

case, and she accused the social worker of having “speculated and lied” in the 

jurisdiction and detention report. She took specific issue with the social 

worker’s recommendation that Mother should write a list of the warning 

signs that indicated J.G. was being abused. She claimed she could not 

comply with this recommendation because there were no warning signs, 

stating, “I’m not going to do that. I’m not going to perjure myself.” 
8

On October 8, 2021, the social worker contacted the therapist from the 

nonprotective parent group. The therapist reported that she had left two

voicemail messages for Mother but had not heard back. When the social 

worker discussed this with Mother, Mother explained she found it 

unprofessional that the therapist had contacted her on a Saturday. 

In the Agency’s addendum report, the social worker noted that despite 

receiving an explanation of the purpose of the nonprotective parent group, 

Mother continued to discount the need or potential benefits of the services. 

Moreover, due to COVID-19 restrictions, the services were being offered as an 

individual therapy rather than in a group setting. The social worker stated, 

“Due to the parents’ numerous complaints and vacillations between agreeing 

to services and stating the services are unnecessary, the Agency is concerned 

that the parents will not follow through with the services voluntarily.” The 

social worker concluded the case was not appropriate for voluntary services 

and requested the juvenile court order Mother to participate in the 

nonprotective parent group.

B. Contested Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing 

The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing was held on 

November 12, 2021. At the hearing, the juvenile court received into evidence 

the Agency’s detention report, the jurisdiction and disposition report, and the 

addendum report. 

During her testimony, Mother stated that in the six years her family 

lived with D.A., she had no reason to believe he would sexually abuse a child.

She also indicated she was fully cooperating with the district attorney in 

D.A.’s criminal case. 

Mother also testified that J.G. began receiving therapy in 2020 based 

on behavioral problems she was having. After starting therapy, J.G. was 
9

diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and separation anxiety disorder. 

Mother stopped taking J.G. to therapy after a few months because J.G. was 

not cooperating and Mother believed the therapy was no longer beneficial. 

Mother stated she was now committed to ensuring J.G. received trauma 

therapy and emphasized that her “main focus” was on J.G. receiving services

to address the sexual abuse. 

Mother claimed, however, that she did not need to participate in a 

nonprotective parent group. She expressed discomfort with the phrase 

“nonprotective parent,” because it suggested she knew the abuse was 

happening, which she did not. She believed she would not benefit from the

group because she was doing her “own education” and had begun to realize

signs she missed that suggested J.G. was being abused. As an example, 

Mother cited a conversation she had with J.G. earlier that year, when J.G. 

told her that she did not want to use the same bathroom as D.A. When J.G. 

could not explain why she felt like that, Mother did not ask any follow-up 

questions. Additionally, Mother noticed J.G. was much calmer now that D.A. 

was no longer in the household. Mother also noted that D.A. suffered from 

his own disabilities, acted more like a child than an adult, and collected 

children’s toys, which she now realized was inappropriate. 

When asked if she was educated about warning signs for sexual abuse, 

Mother clarified that she had not received any formal education, and these 

were just her personal observations. She claimed, though, that she would not 

benefit from any education, because J.G. was no longer vulnerable to further 

abuse with D.A. out of the house. According to Mother, “[J.G.] does not go on 

outings. She does not go on sleepovers. She’s always with [Father] and 

[me].” When asked by the juvenile court if she believed J.G. was at a greater 

risk of sexual abuse given her history of past abuse, Mother maintained that 
10

J.G. is never outside the parents’ presence. She admitted, however, that

abuse could occur when J.G. is older and is allowed to go out with friends. 

The court also asked Mother if she was familiar with the word “grooming.” 

Mother responded she had heard the word but was not familiar with it. 

Following Mother’s testimony, Father testified regarding his difficulties 

in childhood and that he was committed to J.G. receiving trauma therapy. 

After the close of evidence, the Agency requested the juvenile court 

sustain the petition and order Mother’s participation in the nonprotective 

parent group. The Agency noted Mother had little understanding of 

grooming or the red flags for future abuse, and her only plan to keep J.G. safe 

was isolating J.G. The Agency emphasized that the services offered by the 

group were educational rather than punitive, and contended Mother’s courtordered participation would help mitigate the risk of future abuse. 

J.G.’s counsel joined in the Agency’s arguments and requested the 

juvenile court maintain jurisdiction and adopt the Agency’s dispositional 

recommendations. Counsel believed the parents would benefit from 

participating in the nonprotective parent group, as J.G.’s abuser was a longterm member of the household, and there was some indication the abuse was 

ongoing. 

Mother’s counsel countered that the juvenile court should dismiss the 

petition in its entirety. As to jurisdiction, counsel specifically objected to the 

allegations that Mother had delayed the medically necessary treatment for 

J.G., or that Mother ever vacillated about whether the abuse occurred. 

Counsel further contended that even if the court assumed jurisdiction, 

Mother should not be ordered to participate in the nonprotective parent 

group. Counsel emphasized that D.A. was no longer a threat to J.G.’s safety, 

and suggested that Mother could be educated about red flags for future abuse 
11

through therapy with J.G. Further, the Agency had not identified any red 

flags the parents missed since J.G. never reported any abuse. For these 

reasons, counsel concluded that Mother did not need the services offered by 

the nonprotective parent group. 

After closing arguments, the juvenile court made true findings on the 

petition by a preponderance of the evidence under section 300, subdivision 

(d). However, the court struck the allegations from the petition that the 

parents refused to obtain the necessary medical treatment, and that Mother 

vacillated about whether the abuse occurred. As to disposition, the court

ordered a family maintenance plan and required the parents to participate in 

the nonprotective parent group. The court stated that the curriculum offered 

by the group would help both parents “deal with all of the potential problems 

that J.G. may be facing in the future.” The court noted that survivors of 

sexual abuse often have difficulties in school and in their personal 

relationships, which particularly concerned the court given J.G.’s preexisting

disabilities. The court recognized that the parents felt judged but 

emphasized that the purpose of the group was not to punish them but to 

prevent future abuse. The court then set the case for a review hearing on 

May 12, 2022. 

Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by ordering her to attend the nonprotective parent group. She

asserts that because the Agency did not allege in the petition that she failed 

to protect J.G. from the sexual abuse, the juvenile court erred by requiring 

her participation in the group. She further contends that there is no evidence 

to show that she failed to protect J.G. or that she would fail to protect J.G. in 
12

the future, and concludes that the factual circumstances of this case do not 

warrant her court-ordered participation in a nonprotective parent group.

1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review

After the juvenile court finds jurisdiction under section 300, it must 

determine the appropriate disposition for the child. (§§ 360, subd. (d), 361, 

362; In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169.) The court’s “principal 

concern” at the dispositional phase is the child’s best interests. (In re Rodger 

H. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1174.) Section 362, subdivision (a) provides that 

once a child is adjudged a dependent of the court, “the court may make any 

and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct 

maintenance, and support of the child[.]” Such orders may include a 

requirement that the parent participates in a counseling or education 

program. (§ 362, subd. (d).) In assessing how to support the child’s welfare 

and safety, it is appropriate for the juvenile court to consider a parent’s past 

conduct as well as present circumstances. (In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 

453, 461; In re Troy D. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 889, 900.) At the same time, 

dispositional orders must be “ ‘ “appropriate for each family and be based on 

the unique facts relating to that family.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Christopher H. 

(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006 (Christopher H.).) The statute provides: 

“The program in which a parent or guardian is required participate shall be 

designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding the child 

is a person described by Section 300.” (§ 362, subd. (d).) 

“The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best 

serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order 

accordingly. On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear 

abuse of discretion.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) 

However, since section 362 requires that the programs in which a parent is 
13

required to participate “be designed to eliminate” the conditions that led to 

the assertion of jurisdiction, dispositional orders require facts showing the 

parent’s participation in the specified program is reasonably necessary to 

address the conduct that brought the child within the court’s jurisdiction. (In 

re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 770 [“rote assumption” that a parent 

could not be an effective single parent without parenting courses did not 

support the imposition of such courses]; In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 

Cal.App.4th 177, 180 [same]; see also In re Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 

957, 960 [dispositional order requiring father to submit to random drug tests 

reversed where only evidence of father’s drug use was “unsworn and 

uncorroborated allegation”]; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172 

[substance abuse component of dispositional order reversed where only 

evidence to support existence of substance abuse problem was mother’s

occasional odd behavior], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 

In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239-1242.) 

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Ordering Mother to 

Participate in the Nonprotective Parent Group

Mother contends there was an insufficient basis for the juvenile court’s 

order requiring her participation in a nonprotective parent group. She notes 

that the Agency did not allege in the petition that she failed to protect J.G. 

from abuse, nor did the court make such a finding when it sustained the 

petition. She concludes that because there were no explicit findings involving 

her failure to protect, the court erred by ordering her to participate in the 

nonprotective parent group. 

Contrary to Mother’s contention, however, “[t]he problem that the 

juvenile court seeks to address [in a dispositional order] need not be described 

in the sustained section 300 petition.” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 
14

Cal.App.4th 297, 311 (Briana V.).)4 For instance, in Briana V., the juvenile 

court ordered the father to participate in sexual abuse counseling based on 

his criminal history of sexual assault, even though the court acknowledged 

there was no evidence the children were at risk of sexual abuse. (Briana V., 

at p. 307.) On appeal, the father argued the imposition of sexual abuse 

counseling was improper because it was not reasonably necessary to 

eliminate the conditions that led to the dependency proceedings. (Id. at 

p. 311.) The court of appeal rejected this argument, explaining, “At 

disposition the juvenile court is not limited to the content of the sustained 

petition when it considers what dispositional orders would be in the best 

interests of the children. [Citations.] Instead, the court may consider the 

evidence as a whole.” (Ibid.) The appellate court noted that the father’s 

status as a registered sex offender was one of the conditions that led to the 

proceedings, and the evidence showed he had violated his probation by 

visiting schools, possessing children’s clothing, having a computer, and caring 

for his children. (Id. at pp. 311-312.) Under those circumstances, the 

reviewing court was unable to say the court exceeded the bounds of reason by 

ordering him to attend sexual abuse counseling. (Id. at p. 312.) 

Similarly, in Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, although the 

juvenile court dismissed an allegation in the petition that the father’s 

4 In fact, numerous courts of appeal have held that the juvenile court’s 

dispositional orders can be imposed on the nonoffending parent. (See Briana 

V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [“[T]here need not be a jurisdictional 

finding as to the particular parent upon whom the court imposes a 

dispositional order”]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [“A 

jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is not 

necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that parent, once 

dependency jurisdiction has been established”]; In re A.E. (2008) 168 

Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [juvenile court was within its discretion to order 

nonoffending parent to participate in counseling].) 
15

problems with alcohol negatively affected his ability to care for and supervise 

his child, the court ordered him to participate in random drug and alcohol 

testing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, relying on evidence in the 

record indicating that the father struggled with drug and alcohol abuse, 

stating, “[T]he [juvenile] court would have been remiss if it failed to address 

appellant’s substance abuse even though that problem had not yet affected 

his ability to care for [the child].” (Id. at p. 1008.) 

The foregoing authority demonstrates that the juvenile court is within 

its discretion to consider the “evidence as a whole” when formulating its 

dispositional orders and is not limited to the allegations in the petition. 

(Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 307.) Accordingly, the absence of 

allegations in the petition regarding Mother’s failure to protect J.G. from 

sexual abuse is not a basis on which this court can, as a matter of law, 

overturn the component of the dispositional order requiring her participation 

in the nonprotective parent group. 

Mother attempts to distinguish her case from Briana V. and 

Christopher H., contending that the record here is insufficient to support her 

court-ordered participation in a nonprotective parent group. She contends 

that although the facts in Briana V. and Christopher H. warranted the 

imposition of the specified programs, there is “simply no evidence” that one of 

her deficiencies was a failure to protect J.G. She asserts it is therefore 

unreasonable to require her to participate in a program designed to address a 

problem she does not have. 

We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by 

ordering Mother to attend a nonprotective parent group. As stated

throughout the dependency proceedings, the purpose of the nonprotective 

parent group was not to place blame on Mother or punish her. Rather, the 
16

purpose of the group was to provide Mother with the tools to prevent future 

sexual abuse. The record indicates that Mother could benefit from these 

services, as she demonstrated a limited understanding of the dynamics of 

sexual abuse and was unable to articulate a comprehensive plan for 

protecting J.G. from future incidents of abuse. For example, Mother initially 

told the social worker she did not need to write down a list of warning signs 

that indicated J.G. was being sexually abused by D.A., because there were 

none and she did not want to perjure herself. She also testified during the 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing that she had no reason to believe D.A. 

was capable of sexually abusing a child. Yet she later testified on crossexamination that she did not need the group because she was able to 

recognize the red flags of abuse on her own. She then described how prior to 

discovering the abuse, J.G. started to use a different bathroom in the house 

because of D.A. She also could now recognize that D.A. had his own deficits 

and disabilities, acted more like a child, and collected children’s toys. 

Mother’s inconsistent and vague statements regarding the warning 

signs of abuse suggested she may be unable to recognize the warning signs of 

abuse in the future. She also failed to acknowledge during her testimony 

that J.G. was sexually abused by a member of the family’s household and 

long-term friend who the parents’ depended upon financially. She also 

admitted she was not familiar with the word “grooming” when asked directly 

by the juvenile court. Mother’s lack of familiarity with basic concepts of 

sexual abuse dynamics indicated she stood to benefit from the services 

offered by the nonprotective parent group. Indeed, an aspect of the group’s 

curriculum provided parents with education on the warning signs of sexual 

abuse, including the patterns of grooming, opportunities for abuse, and highrisk situations.
17

Mother also lacked a realistic plan for protecting J.G. from further 

abuse. When asked how she was going to protect J.G. in the future, she 

indicated J.G. was no longer at risk of sexual abuse because she intended to 

keep J.G. isolated from friends and other social situations. However, Mother 

even admitted the limitations of this plan, as she acknowledged that there 

would eventually be times when J.G. was outside the parents’ presence. The

curriculum for the nonprotective parent group could help Mother address the 

deficiencies in her safety plan, since the curriculum included strategies for 

safety planning and formulating a prevention and intervention plan.

To support her argument that she should not be required to participate 

in the nonprotective parent group, Mother focuses on evidence in the record 

showing the appropriate steps she took to protect J.G. once she discovered 

the abuse, such as cooperating with law enforcement, obtaining a restraining 

order, and removing D.A. from the home. Although these efforts are 

laudable, this court cannot reweigh the evidence under the abuse of 

discretion standard of review. Instead, “ ‘ “[t]he appropriate test for abuse of 

discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When 

two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the 

reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial 

court. [Citations.]” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) 

Under the circumstances of this case, requiring Mother to participate in the 

nonprotective parent group does not exceed the bounds of reason. (Briana V., 

supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 312.) 
18

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed. 

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.