IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

JEFFREY GIDDINGS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

EDWARD KLEM, et al., 

Respondents. 

KELLY, ROBERT F. 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-CV-3847 

FILED 

MAY 2 3 2018 

MEMORANDUM KATE BARKMAN, Clerk 

By Dep. Clerk 

May~~ ,2018 

Petitioner filed his third motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) on November 4, 2017. Petitioner filed his petition for habeas corpus 

relief in this matter on August 13, 2004. This Court denied the petition on June 17, 2005, 

because it was untimely. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied 

Petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability on September 18, 2005. Petitioner filed his 

first Rule 60(b) motion on September 26, 2011. This Court denied that motion on February 10, 

2012. Petitioner filed his second Rule 60(b) motion on August 15, 2012. It was denied on 

November 17, 2012. The Third Circuit denied Petitioner's second request for a certificate of 

appealability on April 11, 2013. 

In the instant motion Petitioner again argues that he is entitled to Rule 60(b) relief and 

relies upon Satterfield v. District Attorney of Philadelphia, 872 F.3d 152 ( 3d Cir. 2017) in 

support of his position. Specifically, Petitioner claims that he is actually innocent, lacked the 

mens rea required to commit murder, and did not receive due process. In Satterfield the Third 

Circuit examined the application of the Supreme Court's decision in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 

U.S. 383 (2013). In McQuiggin, the Supreme Court held that a convincing showing of actual 

innocence may overcome the one-year statute oflimitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l). 569 U.S. at 386. 

However, McQuiggin also held that for the untimeliness of a habeas petition to be excused under 

the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception a petitioner must "persuade[ ] the district court 

that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" and "present[ ] evidence of innocence so strong that a court 

cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial 

was free of nonharmless constitutional error." Id. at 386, 401. 

In Satterfield, the Third Circuit reversed the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion filed by a 

petitioner who claimed that McQuiggin was a change in law which constituted extraordinary 

circumstances and justified relief under Rule 60(b). 872 FJd at 155. The Third Circuit 

remanded to the district court and directed a full consideration of equitable circumstances 

because the panel considered that the district court had not "articulate[ d] the requisite equitable 

analysis." Id. The Third Circuit directed that on remand the district court consider: 

Id. 

The nature of the change in decisional law must be weighed appropriately in the analysis 

of pertinent equitable factors. McQuiggin implicates the foundational principle of 

avoiding the conviction of an innocent man and attempts to prevent such a mistake 

through the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. If [the petitioner] can make the 

required credible showing of actual innocence to avail himself of the fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exception had McQuiggin been decided when his petition was 

dismissed, equitable analysis would weigh heavily in favor of deeming McQuiggin 's 

change in law, as applied to [the petitioner]'s case, an exceptional circumstance justifying 

Rule 60(b) relief. 

Despite his assertions to the contrary, Petitioner has not demonstrated extraordinary 

circumstances which warrant granting the requested relief. Petitioner has not presented evidence 

that no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Neither Satterfield nor McQuiggin in altered the requirement that a petitioner seeking Rule 60(b) 

relief must show extraordinary circumstances. See, Gonzalez v. Crosby, 126 S.Ct. 2641, 2647-48 

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(2005). Therefore, there is no reason to disturb this Court's judgment of June 17, 2005, which 

denied the petition for habeas corpus relief as untimely. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue because reasonable jurists would not debate 

the correctness of this Court's procedural ruling. See, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000). 

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