PRESENT: All the Justices 

LAKEITHA D. BRICKHOUSE 

v. Record No. 080130 OPINION BY 

JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA October 31, 2008 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 

erred in affirming the conviction of Lakeitha D. Brickhouse 

(“Brickhouse”) for possession with the intent to distribute 

cocaine as a principal in the second degree. 

 Brickhouse was charged, in the Circuit Court of the City 

of Portsmouth, with possession of cocaine with the intent to 

distribute. Code § 18.2-248. After a bench trial, Brickhouse 

was found guilty and sentenced to serve a term of five years 

in prison, with three years and six months suspended. The 

Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished 

opinion. Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3128-06-1 

(Dec. 18, 2007). Brickhouse appeals. 

FACTS

 At approximately 2:30 p.m. on May 10, 2006, Portsmouth 

police officers executed a search warrant for a residence at 

103 Lexington Drive in Portsmouth. The targets of the 

warrant, Garnet Brown and Tywon Wilkins (“Wilkins”) were not 

present; however, police found Brickhouse just outside of the 
residence. Officer G.B. Smith (“Smith”) explained to 

Brickhouse why the police were there and took her inside the 

residence. Officer Smith testified that Brickhouse told him 

that she knew why the police were there, whom they were there 

for, and that “she wasn’t the one doing it.” Officer Smith 

also testified that Brickhouse told him that she had, at some 

point in time, seen Wilkins with bags of cocaine at the 

residence. 

While searching the residence, the officers discovered 

thirteen bags of crack cocaine weighing approximately 45 grams 

behind an air-conditioning vent in an upstairs bedroom closet. 

The officers found personal papers belonging to both 

Brickhouse and Wilkins and drug-packaging materials in that 

bedroom. 

Police also discovered a digital scale with cocaine 

residue in the living room, a razor blade on top of a 

microwave oven in the kitchen, and suspected heroin in another 

bedroom. Additionally, drug-packaging material was found 

throughout the residence. At trial, an expert witness 

testified that the amount of cocaine, considered along with 

the other items found at the residence, was inconsistent with 

the personal use of the cocaine. 

The only person in the residence at the time of the 

search was a man, identified as a “user,” who was found in the 

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upstairs bathroom, approximately fifteen feet from the closet 

where the cocaine was found. Brickhouse testified that the 

man in the bathroom was the eldest brother of Wilkins and 

Brown and that he had entered the residence to use the 

bathroom. Brickhouse further testified that he had been in 

the bathroom for about an hour when the police arrived. 

Brickhouse testified that she resided in the home along 

with her aunt and uncle. Brickhouse stated that Wilkins, her 

boyfriend, had a key to the residence and had been in the 

residence at times without her. Brickhouse further testified 

that she did not have any knowledge of drugs stored in or sold 

from the residence. There was no evidence presented 

concerning who owned, rented, or had legal possession of the 

residence. 

The officers did not find anything illegal on 

Brickhouse’s person. Also, upon testing, her fingerprints 

were not identified on the drugs or the drug paraphernalia. 

The circuit court found the evidence sufficient to find 

Brickhouse guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute as a principal in the second degree. Focusing on 

the evidence found in plain view, such as the digital scale, 

the razor blade, and the drug packaging material, the court 

found that “[Brickhouse] knew these folks were using her house 

essentially as a drug house, either to stash or to sell.” The 

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Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction stating that “she 

actually provided her home as a venue for the operation of a 

drug distribution scheme.” Brickhouse, slip op. at 3. 

ANALYSIS

 Brickhouse alleges that the evidence presented at trial 

was insufficient to find her guilty of possession with intent 

to distribute cocaine. When a defendant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth. Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 524, 659 

S.E.2d 311, 319 (2008); Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 

425-26, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998). However, we will not 

sustain a trial court’s judgment that is plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. McMorris v. Commonwealth, 276 

Va. 500, 504, 666 S.E.2d 348, 350 (2008); Jay, 275 Va. at 524, 

659 S.E.2d at 319. 

The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the charged 

crime. McMorris, 276 Va. at 504, 666 S.E.2d at 350. 

“ ‘Suspicion of guilt, however strong, or even a probability 

of guilt, is insufficient to support a conviction.’ ” Rogers 

v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 (1991) 

(quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 

599, 608 (1990)). 

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Brickhouse was found guilty of possession with the intent 

to distribute cocaine as a principal in the second degree. To 

prove that a defendant is guilty as a principal in the second 

degree, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant 

procured, encouraged, countenanced or approved the criminal 

act. Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306 S.E.2d 

886, 888-89 (1983); Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523, 

526-27, 79 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1954). Evidence of a defendant’s 

mere presence at a crime scene is insufficient to sustain a 

conviction as a principal in the second degree. Hall v. 

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 533, 536, 303 S.E.2d 903, 904 (1983); 

Augustine, 226 Va. at 124, 306 S.E.2d at 888; Underwood v. 

Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 1048, 243 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1978). 

“The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant consented to 

the felonious purpose and the defendant contributed to its 

execution.” McMorris, 276 Va. at 505, 666 S.E.2d at 350. 

There must be evidence that Brickhouse committed an overt act 

knowingly in furtherance of the commission of the crime, 

possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, or that she 

shared in the criminal intent of the principal committing the 

crime. See id. at 505, 666 S.E.2d at 351. 

 The Commonwealth does not contend that Brickhouse shared 

in the criminal intent of the principal in the first degree, 

the unknown person who placed the cocaine in the vent. 

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Rather, Brickhouse’s conviction is based upon the finding that 

she committed an overt act in furtherance of the crime by 

permitting the residence to be used as a haven for the 

distribution of cocaine or the storage of cocaine intended for 

distribution. 

 The status of the accused as a principal in the second 

degree may be established by any combination of circumstantial 

evidence or direct evidence. Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 

96, 100, 18 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1942). Here, there is no direct 

evidence that Brickhouse gave permission for the drugs to be 

stored in the air conditioning vent in the bedroom. The 

circuit court’s holding, therefore, is based upon evidence 

that is wholly circumstantial. Consequently, “ ‘all necessary 

circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and 

inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable 

hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Rogers, 242 Va. at 317, 410 

S.E.2d at 627 (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 

228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)). 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the evidence shows that the home in which Brickhouse resided 

contained drug paraphernalia in plain view, such as a digital 

scale with cocaine residue in the living room, a razor blade 

on the microwave oven in the kitchen, and drug-packaging 

materials throughout the residence. The evidence demonstrates 

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that Brickhouse knew why the police came to the residence, who 

they were looking for and why. Such evidence indicates that 

Brickhouse was aware of the drug activity; however, the 

Commonwealth must prove more than Brickhouse’s knowledge of 

the crime. See Hall, 225 Va. at 536, 303 S.E.2d at 904; 

Augustine, 226 Va. at 124, 306 S.E.2d at 888; Underwood, 218 

Va. at 1048, 243 S.E.2d at 233. 

 Brickhouse stated that she lived at the residence with 

her aunt and uncle. The Commonwealth admits that no evidence 

was presented concerning who had legal possession of the 

residence in which the drugs were found. Given that the 

principal in the first degree is unknown, and it was not 

proven that Brickhouse had exclusive control and authority 

over the residence where the drugs were found, the 

circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth failed 

to exclude all reasonable inferences inconsistent with 

Brickhouse’s guilt as a principal in the second degree. Even 

if Brickhouse knew the drugs were being stored at the 

residence, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that she 

is the person who permitted it, as opposed to another 

resident. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to support the 

conviction of Brickhouse of possession with the intent to 

distribute cocaine as a principal in the second degree. 

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 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals affirming Brickhouse’s conviction of possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute, vacate Brickhouse’s 

conviction, and dismiss the indictment against her. 

Reversed, vacated, and dismissed.