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89–350 PDF 2004

S. HRG. 107–983

CROSS BORDER TRUCK AND BUS OPERATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 18, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

(

(II)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MAX CLELAND, Georgia 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director 

MOSES BOYD, Democratic Chief Counsel 

MARK BUSE, Republican Staff Director 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican General Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 18, 2001 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of Senator Allen ..................................................................................... 7

Statement of Senator Boxer .................................................................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Statement of Senator Breaux ................................................................................. 141

Statement of Senator Dorgan ................................................................................. 5

Statement of Senator Ensign .................................................................................. 14

Statement of Senator Fitzgerald ............................................................................ 48

Statement of Senator Hollings ............................................................................... 1

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2

Statement of Senator Kerry .................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Statement of Senator McCain ................................................................................. 3

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 50

Statement of Senator Stevens ................................................................................ 45

WITNESSES

Acklie, Duane W., Chairman, American Trucking Associations .......................... 132

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 135

Claybrook, Joan, President, Public Citizen ........................................................... 76

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 78

Emmett, Edward M., President, The National Industrial Transportation 

League ................................................................................................................... 65

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66

Hoffa, James P., General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters .. 68

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70

Mead, Hon. Kenneth M., Inspector General, Department of Transportation ..... 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25

Mineta, Hon. Norman Y., Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation ......... 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17

Pantuso, Peter J., President and CEO, American Bus Association ..................... 128

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 129

Vaughn, Captain Steve, President, Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance ........... 55

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57

APPENDIX

Donohue, Thomas J., President and CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 151

Giermanski, Dr. James R., Professor and Director, International Business 

Studies, Belmont Abbey College, prepared statement ...................................... 154

Gillan, Jacqueline S., Vice President, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 157

Johnston, Jim, President, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, 

Inc., prepared statement ..................................................................................... 162

La Sala, James, International President, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL–

CIO, prepared statement ..................................................................................... 165

Pikrallidas, Susan G., Vice President, Public Affairs, AAA, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 153

Wytkind, Edward, Executive Director, Transportation Trades Department, 

AFL–CIO, prepared statement ........................................................................... 168

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CROSS BORDER TRUCK AND BUS 

OPERATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 2001

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SR– 253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST HOLLINGS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The Committee will come to 

order. This morning we have a hearing on Mexican trucking and 

it would probably be in order to say that this is not a hearing to 

repeal NAFTA, as somebody would think my holding the hearings 

due to my opposition to NAFTA at the time, this would be my first 

chance to repeal it. 

The truth of the matter is that I have the highest regard for this 

new President, President Fox, and the opportunity, I think we really do have a chance with Mexico and I am going to do my dead 

level best to make NAFTA work. In that light, when I see the 

headlines this morning, United States files scrutiny of trucks, of 

tougher policy for Mexican carriers. Not tougher at all in what we 

require of our own trucks and truck drivers. 

I hear that that is the irony of what we are going to use is use 

this to block Mexican trucking. On the contrary, we are not doing 

anything to discriminate against Mexican trucks. We have to make 

sure our trucks and trucking is not discriminated against. And it 

is a two-way street. We have got some catch up ball to practice in 

the sense that two years ago, almost, well, a year and a half, we 

created the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and the 

Clinton Administration appointed Clyde Hart the acting administrator, who helped us write it, and since January, this new administration hasn’t even appointed one, so all of us politicians are running around flailing about safety, safety, safety, and we hadn’t 

even appointed a safety administrator. 

The 27 checkpoints coming in from Mexico to the United States, 

and 22 of them have inspection facilities, so we have got to get 

some inspection facilities there. We have got to beef up our own 

work. I want to commend Senator Murray of Washington, the 

chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation 

because she has fashioned the right requirements on the appropriations bill that was marked up yesterday in the full—day before, 

2

last week, I guess it was, the transportation appropriation measure 

that will be debated probably tomorrow. 

Those provisions in there are objective and necessary and the 

ones that would be required of us, and, Mr. Secretary, I see there 

is some plans on course that the administration has, but we are 

going to have to get into that, because, for example, we found that 

the administration was opposing the fact of making a safety check 

at the site so that we could see the facilities and everything else 

down in Mexico, and the administration was saying no, all that 

was unnecessary, was just to send the paperwork up and we would 

audit the paperwork. 

That is not a safety check. Those are the kind of things that we 

want to be fair to our own trucking, and we want to be fair to 

Mexican trucking. With that, I put my full statement in the record 

and yield to our distinguished ranking member. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST HOLLINGS, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

I would like to welcome all of the witnesses here today, including Secretary Mineta, to discuss this very important issue. 

If the Administration wants to open the border, we need to address safety concerns and make sure Mexican drivers and companies are playing by the same set 

of rules that our companies and drivers are held to. 

The language in the Senate Appropriations bill increases the amount of funding for border safety activities to $103 million—$15 million more than the Administration’s request. 

The DOT IG asserts that more inspectors and improved inspection facilities are 

needed to ensure that unsafe Mexican trucks and drivers do not come into the 

United States and endanger American lives. We don’t have these safeguards today. 

We should not ignore all of the safety and worker regulations that United States 

companies are required to comply with in the name of free trade. This debate demonstrates the problems associated with treaties like NAFTA. Because these trucks 

will be operating on our highways and in our towns we are finally looking at the 

difference between operating a business in the United States and operating a business in Mexico. 

We already have an important trade relationship with Mexico. United States Customs data show that there were over 4.5 million commercial motor vehicles crossings at the United States-Mexico border in 1999 into the commercial zones. No one 

is proposing that we stop that existing traffic. We will however, require safety improvements before the DOT can grant authority for Mexican trucks to travel beyond

those commercial zones. 

It is one thing to allow Mexican trucks to operate in defined border zones, but 

it is an entirely different proposition when they will be operating in your town or 

my home town. 

This language is not discriminatory, but requires that there be adequate funding 

for inspectors and facilities, and to ensure that we have the needed access to information about Mexican trucks and drivers and access to Mexican trucking companies 

to perform safety audits. These measures will allow us to open the border safely. 

Yes, the panel ruling required the United States to lift the blanket moratorium 

on Mexican trucks. But the panel ruling very clearly stated that the ‘‘United States 

may not be required to treat applications from Mexican trucking firms in exactly 

the same manner as applications from United States or Canadian firms, as long as 

they are reviewed on a case-by-case basis’’. It seems to me that safety ought to be 

a higher priority than increasing our truck traffic across the border. 

If you want to talk about free trade and our obligations under NAFTA, that is 

fine. But we have an obligation to the American public, to our citizens—it is our 

responsibility to ensure the safe operation of trucks within U.S. territory, whether 

ownership is United States, Canadian or Mexican—we should prioritize our obligations and put safety at the top of the list. 

Questions have been raised about the effectiveness of the Mexican drug and alcohol testing program for commercial drivers. About 10 years ago, I pushed through 

an amendment to make sure that we required drug and alcohol testing because it 

3

would save lives—this same standard should apply to all truck drivers on United 

States highways, regardless of where the truck is registered. 

We know that Mexico allows heavier trucks on their highways. We also know that 

one fully loaded 18-wheeler does the same amount of damage to the highway as 

9,600 cars. The safety issues and costs of heavier Mexican trucks on United States 

roads must be addressed before we open the border.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

morning’s hearing. It is particularly appropriate in light of an appropriations bill, which included provisions concerning the crossborder implementation of NAFTA, that may be on the floor as early 

as today or certainly very soon. I think it is a very important hearing. Some will be approaching today’s hearing from a trade perspective, others will be taking a truck safety perspective. I will be 

approaching it from both. 

I firmly believe that we must abide by all of our obligations 

under NAFTA. I believe we must implement the cross border provisions and can do so while carrying out a strong and balanced safety 

enforcement agenda. While Chairman Hollings and I may hold differing views on NAFTA as it relates to trade, we have worked 

closely over the years in an effort to promote safety, which has 

been one of this Committee’s top priorities. 

Senator Hollings and I worked on a bipartisan basis to help craft 

the safety provisions included in TEA–21. We also joined together 

in sponsoring legislation to create the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration, working to ensure the critical issue of motor carrier safety was not overlooked within the Department. Ken Mead 

and his staff were critical to this legislative initiative, designed to 

improve truck and bus safety and to make our highways safer. And 

the continued work by the IG in monitoring work with the new 

safety agency remains key to our Committee’s oversight efforts. 

In my judgment, we must continue to address motor carrier safety across the board and on a nondiscriminatory basis. I will remain 

a strong advocate of highway safety, and will do so as an equally 

enthusiastic advocate of free trade. 

Let me say from the outset I strongly support the President’s 

plan to implement the cross border provisions under NAFTA. Since 

the Clinton Administration’s last-minute announcement to prevent 

cross border operations in the four border states in December 1995, 

I have consistently and repeatedly prodded the Administration to 

let us know what was needed from the Congress, what resources 

were necessary in order for us to comply with our legal obligations 

under the trade agreement—I emphasize our legal obligations—to 

address any legitimate safety issues and safety concerns, to address the Administration’s publicly stated rationale for the delay. 

Of course, these efforts landed largely on deaf ears because the 

former Administration simply did not intend to open the border. Its 

goal was simply to appease special interests. Period. 

On February 6th, the former Administration’s blanket refusal to 

implement the cross border provisions was determined by a dispute 

panel to be in violation of the North American Free Trade AgreeVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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ment. In response to that finding, President Bush announced the 

United States would open the border and do so by the end of year. 

I applaud the President for understanding the necessity of abiding by our trade agreement and also for proposing additional resources to ensure safety resources to carry it out at the same time. 

If we do not comply with NAFTA, the Mexican government holds 

full authority to impose harsh sanctions on our exports into their 

country. 

The Mexican government could impose sanctions immediately 

but has demonstrated the willingness to allow the United States 

additional time in order to finalize rules that will ensure compliance with our federal laws and regulations and to ensure safety of 

Mexican trucks that will be operating in the U.S. 

Unfortunately, the other body has taken action as part of the fiscal year 2002 DOT Appropriations bill to prevent the President 

from abiding by NAFTA. It adopted an amendment to prohibit the 

federal approval of any Mexican carriers to operate in this country. 

This is wrong. It is in direct violation of NAFTA. It is discriminatory. And, it must not prevail. 

Last week, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its 

version of the DOT Appropriations bill, which could be brought before the Senate any time. This appropriations bill provides significant funding to enable the Department of Transportation to hire 

more inspectors and build more inspection facilities at the southern 

border, and I commend the Committee for this action. I have concerns, however, over a number of requirements included in the bill 

that if enacted without modifications, could effectively prevent the 

opening of the border indefinitely. 

I strongly support balanced transportation safety initiatives, and 

stand ready to work with my colleagues to strengthen our safety 

enforcement regime uniformly. But I cannot support provisions 

that place unnecessary requirements on Mexican operators that are 

not required of Canadian or American operators. I am also concerned that while some of the provisions are well-intended, they 

could be improved upon to ensure the most efficient use of resources. Above all, I cannot support provisions designed to simply 

prevent the opening of the border and maintain delay under the 

guise of safety. 

Given the DOT Appropriations bill could be on the floor as soon 

as today, I will be very eager to hear Secretary Mineta’s views regarding the pending bill’s provision. I urge this Committee to consider the Secretary’s views carefully as he is one of the most respected members of the Cabinet and a former colleague of ours. I 

am also very interested in hearing the views of the DOT Inspector 

General and the rest of the witnesses. 

I pledge to do all I can to ensure the scare tactics of the special 

interests do not prevail. I will fight to ensure that the border is 

opened by the end of this year and is done so in a safe and balanced manner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Senator Dorgan. 

5

STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON DORGAN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It is not 

a secret that I think NAFTA has been a failure both on the Mexican side and Canadian side for U.S. interests. This discussion is 

broader than just that, and let me just describe my concerns. We 

are trying to plug together two economies that in many ways are 

very difficult to connect. The Inspector General report of just May 

8th of this year has the following information. 

Currently, the only permanent inspection facilities at the United 

States Mexican border are in Calexico and Otay Mesa, California. 

Two of them. At 20 crossings, of the other 25 border crossings, 

FMCSA inspectors did not have dedicated telephone lines to access 

databases and validate commercial driver’s licenses. At 19 crossings, inspectors had no space to inspect more than one or two 

trucks at a time. At 14 crossings inspectors had one or two spaces 

to park vehicles placed out of service. 

The Inspector General’s report is 2 months old. Go to the San 

Francisco Chronicle, a reporter did a fascinating report, riding with 

a Mexican trucker. Rode 3 days, the trucker slept 7 hours, 3 days, 

7 hours. There are no minimum standards of service. There are no 

logbooks, there is a requirement but they do not keep logbooks, no 

drug testing. The fact is there isn’t anything near the standards we 

impose on American truckers with respect to the Mexican truck industry and it seems to me we have every right in this country to 

want to make sure we have continued safety on America’s highways. Mexican truckers are paid an average of about $7 a day. In most 

circumstances, they are driving trucks that when inspected at our 

borders show very significant serious safety violations. I won’t go 

over that, but it is in the IG’s report. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, the ultimate perversion of our trade policies 

it seems to me will be a future in which unsafe Mexican trucks 

haul unfairly subsidized Canadian wheat into U.S. cities. And you 

will pardon me for thinking that is just nuts. The fact is it is not 

radical to demand policies that require both fair trade and safe 

highways, and that is what this issue is about. There isn’t anyone 

who in my judgment can tell us that there is a ghost of a chance 

in any near term to have a system with respect to the Mexican 

truck industry that anywhere nearly equates to what we do in this 

country to assure safety on America’s highways, safety inspections, 

logbooks, minimum hours of service, drug testing and on and on 

down the line. 

That does not now exist with the Mexican trucking industry, and 

we ought not point to some trade agreement which incidentally I 

did not support in the first instance, but we ought not point to a 

trade agreement to suggest that requires us to allow that trucking 

industry to move those vehicles into this country. 

So, Mr. Chairman, this will be a fascinating hearing. I think it 

is very important. I do not know whether I will offer an amendment to adopt the House standards on the Senate floor, but I am 

considering that, and my feeling is at this point we simply ought 

to say no, you cannot do this until we have standards that assure 

safety on United States highways with respect to Mexican trucks. 

6

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Senator Boxer. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,

U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I asked for it and you complied and I greatly appreciate it. It is a very important issue to my home state as Mr. 

Mineta knows. My state has about 23 percent of all the NAFTA 

truck traffic. If our nation’s highways are completely open to these 

trucks, I am concerned that there will be many unsafe trucks or 

I should say I know there will be many unsafe trucks driving on 

our highways and our roads. 

In 1999, there were 4.5 million commercial motor vehicles crossing at the border. It is estimated that most of those crossings were 

made by 80,000 trucks. The opening of the border is expected to increase the number of NAFTA trucks. Currently, the DOT has 190 

applications from companies wanting full access. Unless safety 

standards are improved and enforced, the result will be that Californians, whether driving to work or whether driving their kids to 

soccer games, Mr. Chairman, will be sharing the road with drivers 

who are sleep deprived and whose trucks are not safe. 

And I respect my colleagues who say that my opposition to this 

is a special interest, and I plead guilty. I have a special interest 

in ensuring that the people of my state who I represent are safe. 

That is my concern and that is my interest. I would ask unanimous 

consent that my statement be entered into the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Good morning. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you holding a hearing on this important topic today. 

This is a key issue for the state of California. My state has about 23 percent of 

all of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) truck traffic. If our nation’s highways are completely open to these trucks, I am concerned that there will 

be many unsafe trucks driving on our highways and roads. 

In 1999, there were 4.5 million commercial motor vehicles crossing at the border. 

It is estimated that most of these crossings were made by 80,000 trucks. 

The opening of the borders is expected to increase the number of NAFTA trucks. 

Currently, the Department of Transportation has 190 applications from companies 

wanting full access. Unless safety standards are improved and enforced, the result 

will be that Californians-whether driving to work or to their children’s soccer gamewill be sharing the road with drivers who are sleep deprived and whose trucks are 

not safe. 

There are several issues that I hope will be addressed today. 

First, I am concerned about the safety standards of NAFTA drivers. If we compare 

U.S. standards to those in Mexico, we can see that Mexican workers are not protected. For example, U.S. drivers can drive up to ten hours consecutively and work 

up to 15 consecutive hours, with a mandatory eight hours of rest. Overall, U.S. 

truck drivers cannot drive more than 70 hours during each eight day period. Mexican drivers do not have such protections. They are forced into working long hoursand tired drivers are not safe on our highways. 

For the protection of all drivers on the highways, U.S. drivers have random drug 

tests, medical condition disqualifications, and must be 21 to receive a commercial 

drivers’ license. This is not true for cross-border truck drivers. 

Second, I am concerned about the condition of the trucks. Cross-border trucks are 

not required to have as comprehensive standards as U.S. trucks in areas such as 

anti-lock brakes, underride guards, night visibility, and front brakes. 

Cross-border trucks have a higher weight limit of 135,000 pounds versus 80,000 

in the U.S. Trucks that weigh more than the limit will cause highways and roads 

7

to deteriorate more quickly. Also, heavier trucks result in accidents because they 

cannot brake as quickly. For example, a 100,000 pound truck travels 25 percent further after the driver steps on the brakes than will an 80,000 pound truck. 

Third, I am concerned about lax standards in hazardous materials. If there is an 

accident and certain chemicals are not labeled, this can be a life-threatening situation for police and firefighters who arrive at the scene of the accident. 

Fourth, I am concerned about enforcement. Currently, one percent of all trucks 

crossing the border are inspected. The Inspector Generator has stated that more inspectors-at least 139-are crucial as a deterrent to unsafe trucks. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing these issues with the witnesses, and 

I thank you again for holding this hearing.

Senator BOXER. In about 1 minute I’d like to share with the 

Committee a chart that summarizes my concerns. It is kind of 

small, but I am going to read it. In the United States, the rules 

on hours of service, 10 hours of consecutive driving, up to 15 hours 

of consecutive duty, 8 hours consecutive rest, maximum of 70 hours 

of driving in the 8-day period. 

In Mexico, hours of service laws, zero. There are none. Random 

drug tests. In America, yes for all drivers. In Mexico, none. Medical 

condition disqualification, in the United States, yes, you can disqualify a driver because of a medical condition. In Mexico, no. Driver’s age for interstate driving, 21 in America. 18 in Mexico. 

Logbooks in Mexico, not required. Are they required in our country? Yes. Maximum weight, 80,000 pounds in the United States, 

135,000 pounds in Mexico. Roadside inspections, yes in the United 

States, no in Mexico. Vehicle safety standards, we have comprehensive standards for components such as anti-lock brakes, night visibility of vehicles and front brakes. In Mexico, less rigorous, for example, front brakes are not required. Hazardous material rules. We 

have district standards, training, licensure and inspection regime. 

In Mexico, it is lax, fewer identified chemicals and substances and 

fewer licensure requirements. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator BOXER. So, Mr. Chairman, I don’t think that you need 

a degree in truck safety to understand the differences here. As Senator Dorgan has said, you are talking about two very, very different regimes here, and the important thing is that we make sure 

that the trucks on our highways are safe and that the drivers in 

those trucks are rested. 

Anything less than that is putting our people at risk. Period. End 

of quote. I do not see how we could rationalize it any other way. 

I want to see this trade go forward, but I want to see it go forward 

in a manner which protects the people who are on the highways. 

And that is, that is the essence of my statement. And I again thank 

you so much for this hearing. I think it is timely and very important. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Senator Allen. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am coming here, 

Mr. Chairman, to get more information because I know there may 

be a vote, however inappropriate it may to be have policy amendVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
8

ments on appropriations bills, this is probably the place these 

issues ought to be discussed—in the Committee that deals with 

transportation. I know that Senator McCain argues very strongly 

for proper discipline and protocol in legislating matters and process. 

As far as NAFTA, I do not think that this is so much an argument over whether NAFTA is good or bad. I generally think on balance NAFTA has been very good for our country, and respectfully 

disagree with Senator Dorgan on one aspect. It doesn’t matter what 

they are hauling, whether it is wheat or avocados. The question is 

more like what I believe Senator Boxer said, and the question is 

really safety, the issue of safety and that is it and the fact that the 

United States has entered into the NAFTA agreement means that 

we have to comply with certain agreements. 

Well, I think we should keep our word, and again, I do think on 

balance, NAFTA is been very good for both countries. But on the 

issue of safety, the United States retains the right and jurisdiction 

to monitor safety and have safety standards on our roads. And we 

do want to have free trade, but the safety of our roads cannot be 

compromised. We have a right to set standards. And, if Mexico 

wants to have speed limits that are higher than ours, it may. I 

wish our speed limits were higher on our interstates personally, 

but regardless, that is set by the states in our country, and if Mexico wants to set higher ones, that is fine, on their roads. On the 

other hand, they have to abide by our laws when they are on our 

roads and that is simply a matter of our sovereignty and jurisdiction. 

Regarding the Mexican license procedures, they can have whatever they choose, but it seems to me that we ought to be assured 

that those drivers from Mexico or residents of Mexico who are driving on our roads do meet whatever our requirements are for our 

safety. Whether they have front and back brakes and so forth on 

trucks in Mexico is up to the people of Mexico, however, if a Mexican truck is going to drive on the roads of California, Virginia, 

Texas, or New Hampshire, they ought to have the same safety 

equipment that we require on our roads. 

And the fact that Mexico doesn’t have hours of service rule, I almost wish you had your chart there, but regardless, the fact is they 

do not have many hours of driving restrictions or they have no requirements, and that is their business. The only thing that would 

matter to us on that issue would not be to make Mexico have the 

same rules as we do on their roads, but to have some assurance 

that when a driver is coming into the United States, find out how 

long have they been behind the wheel prior to coming to our border 

in those previous 24 hours. That is all that matters to us. 

So there are some parts of that that are probative and useful. 

There are other parts that I don’t think are. But that is the only 

way that I think it matters to us is what have they been doing for 

the 24 hours previously. I think that our open policy is one that 

is fully consistent and dependent on the safety issues involving 

both trucks and the men and women who are behind the wheel and 

driving them. 

I personally do not have a great deal of confidence in the ability 

at this point of the Federal Government or the states to implement 

9

a plan to ensure the safety of our roads and further advance economic benefits of free trade for both the people of Mexico and the 

people of the United States. And I think it is very important, Secretary Mineta, Mr. Mead, to address these safety concerns and 

these inadequacies with our current system. 

No one should be blissfully saying everything is fine and we can 

handle it, and I think that the administration’s efforts and specifically it is not just efforts, it is actual allocation of money, appropriations, to hopefully address these inadequacies to make sure 

there are those safety inspections of those trucks as well as our 

trucks, United States trucks, as well as making sure that the drivers are properly licensed and capable of handling these rigs on our 

roads is very important and I think that is going to be the most 

essential thing to me is convincing not just this Senator from Virginia, but other Senators that these appropriations and the increased staffing and the facilities that would be created for inspections generally at the border will adequately protect the safety of 

motorists on the roads of the United States. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having 

this hearing. I’d like to ask unanimous consent the full text of my 

statement be put in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Senator KERRY. I sent a letter together with nine colleagues to 

the administration recently reflecting our concern, the concern that 

a number of us who have been pro-trade about the question of, the 

Senator I just heard him talking about safety issues, and I am 

deeply concerned about the gap between what happens in the 

United States, what happens, we are all familiar with the issue 

here of the safety inspection itself, concerns about increased pollution on our roads, as there is no compliance in certain cases with 

inspections there, safety. The question of drivers who are fatigued, 

who come into the United States by a whole different standard in 

this country. 

Normally, in the trade relationship, Mr. Chairman, as you know 

better than anybody, we are talking about goods going from one 

country to another. Last year in Massachusetts, we exported over 

$1.1 billion worth of goods to Mexico. That was a 60 percent increase over the prior year, but in this particular case, you are not 

just talking about the goods crossing the border, you are talking 

about a vehicle and an individual in the sense of job coming across 

that continues from what took place in another country here and 

our country. 

It is really a variance on the norm that has guided our thinking 

about these relationships, so I think it is appropriate for us to be 

thinking considerably differently about what is proper for us, even 

in the context of NAFTA and the agreements and the finding of the 

board recently about what our requirements are. There were some 

very clear imperatives that ought to guide us in this. 

10

I might add that I wrote the President last month to express the 

dissatisfaction a number of us had. I was joined by nine colleagues, 

all of whom have very strong free trade credentials. We have yet 

to have any kind of substantive response to those concerns that we 

have expressed, so I am glad you are having this hearing today as 

an opportunity to explore some of these concerns. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely hearing. 

I’d like to make clear at the outset that I take very seriously the importance of 

honoring our international trade agreements. If we are to expect other nations to 

abide by international agreements, we must play by the rules as well. So I fully support the President’s stated desire to open the border to Mexican-domiciled trucks so 

that we are in compliance with the February ruling of the NAFTA arbitration panel. 

Mexico is a valuable trading partner for my state and a strong ally for our nation. 

Last year, Massachusetts exported $1.1 billion million worth of goods to Mexico—

a 60 percent increase over the previous year. Since NAFTA took effect in 1994, our 

state’s exports to Mexico have more than doubled. Mexico is now Massachusetts’

seventh-largest trading partner. Clearly, I do not want to see damage done to our 

relationship with this important trade partner. 

That being said, I believe that when it comes to allowing Mexican trucks on 

United States highways, highway safety and our international obligations need not 

be mutually exclusive. 

I think it’s pretty clear that the Administration’s rhetoric regarding highway safety did not match the rules that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

promulgated this spring. Last month, I wrote to the President to express my dissatisfaction with these rules and I was joined by nine of my colleagues, all of whom 

have very strong free trade credentials. Unfortunately, we have yet to receive a substantive response. 

According to the rules proposed by the Administration, Mexican-domiciled trucks 

will not be subject to thorough safety reviews until at least 18 months after receiving full access to American roads, and may not ever be subject to on-site safety reviews. I believe that this delay could seriously jeopardize highway safety, road conditions and environmental quality. The Mexican government does not have a domestic truck safety system that is equivalent to United States law—a fact acknowledged 

by the NAFTA panel. Mexico does not have hours-of-service laws and has only recently proposed the use of logbooks to record driving history. These facts raise the 

possibility that cross-border truckers could easily enter United States highways in 

fatigued condition. The Department of Transportation Inspector General has argued 

repeatedly that ‘‘fatigue is a major factor in commercial vehicle crashes.’’

The lack of sufficient inspection resources at the border and the proposed 18-

month delay between the approval of general cross-border trucking applications and 

actual safety enforcement means that trucks may easily enter the United States 

over federal weight and size limits, a condition both inherently more dangerous to 

travelers and more stressful to our roadways. The sheer size of these vehicles ensures that when trucks are involved in highway accidents, the damage is disproportionately greater than in non-truck crashes. Although large trucks were involved in 

only 4 percent of injury-only and property-only motor vehicle crashes in 1998, they 

were involved 9 percent of fatal crashes. Greater truck size or weight could easily 

lead to more serious accidents, resulting in more truck-related fatalities on our highways. 

I am pleased that Senator Murray—working with my good friend Senator 

Hutchison who is on this committee—has crafted language in the Transportation 

Appropriations bill that addresses many of these safety concerns. 

I would also like to see the bill address some of the environmental concerns 

raised. I’m afraid that without the ability to safeguard emissions standards on 

trucks entering the US, we may find a further dirtying of the air in cities not only 

around the border, but up to Dallas, Little Rock and other cities on major interstates that connect to border crossings. I may offer an amendment to address this 

problem by requiring a joint DOT and EPA study of the impact on US air quality 

of full implementation of NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provisions as a precondition for a full border opening. 

11

Nevertheless, I know that Senator Murray and Senator Hutchison worked many 

hours to develop the language in the bill, and I am grateful, Senator Hutchison, for 

the leadership that you both have demonstrated and I thank Chairman Hollings for 

his leadership on this issue as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a second now, Mr. Secretary. I am going to 

insert in the record what you will find in the Committee report on 

the transportation appropriation bill on the Senate side entitled on 

the one side the problem and the solution on the other. The Murray 

truck provisions that are included in that appropriations bill. You 

can see it outlined actually, I think, the administration had asked 

for 80 million and we increased it some 15 million dollars to see 

if we couldn’t beef up these inspection points, otherwise there was 

that question, too, of the blanket refusal to permit Mexican trucks 

into the United States and it came before the NAFTA arbiter panel 

in the matter of cross border trucks and I will include that finding 

also in the record, but I quote just a couple of sentences. 

It is not disagreeing, that is, the finding is not disagreeing that 

the safety of trucking services is a legitimate regulatory objective, 

nor is the panel imposing a limitation on the application of safety 

standards properly established, and apply pursuant to the applicable obligations of the parties under NAFTA. 

United States authorities are responsible for the safe operation 

of trucks within United States territory, whether ownership is 

United States, Canadian or Mexican, so we are not in violation of 

NAFTA, and we welcome you to the Committee and are delighted 

to hear from you at this time. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The Problem 

Absence of Border Inspectors 

At present, federal and state border inspectors are on duty 24 hours-a-day at only 

2 of 27 border crossings. Mexican trucks crossing the border during off hours are 

not subject to inspection. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border until the DOT Inspector General certifies that all border crossings accommodating Mexican trucks 

have inspector coverage when the border is open.

[Note: ‘‘Mexican trucks’’ here, and hereafter in this document, refer to Mexicodomiciled commercial motor vehicles operating beyond the commercial zone] 

The Problem 

More Fully Trained Inspectors Needed 

At present, the level of inspector resources is not adequate to handle even the current level of limited traffic from Mexican trucks—much less the influx of trucks expected once the border is fully opened. It takes anywhere from 6 months to a year 

to actually hire and fully train a new safety inspector. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Appropriations bill fully funds the Administration’s request for 80 additional 

border inspectors. The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border 

until the DOT Inspector General certifies that all of these inspectors are fully 

trained as safety specialists capable of conducting compliance review and that the 

Administration has not accomplished this goal by transferring experienced inspectors elsewhere in the country to the border so as to undermine the level of inspection coverage and safety elsewhere in the nation. 

12

The Problem 

Inspection Plans Are Inadequate 

The DOT plans to issue conditional operating certificates to Mexican trucking 

firms to enter the United States based largely on the answers from a questionnaire. 

The DOT will perform a full safety audit of these firms within 18 months of the 

operating certificate being granted. The firm can operate freely in the United States 

throughout this 18-month period. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision requires the DOT to perform a full safety audit of each 

Mexican trucking firm before any conditional operating certificate is granted and 

then perform a full follow-up safety audit again within 18 months before a permanent operating certificate can be granted. 

The Problem 

Inspection Venue is Inadequate

The DOT is planning to perform its safety audits of Mexican trucking firms at 

the border rather than at each firm’s facilities. For both United States and Canadian trucking firms, the DOT conducts compliance reviews at each firm’s facilities. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision requires that all safety audits of Mexican trucking firms 

take place on-site at each firm’s facilities. 

The Problem 

Mexican Trucks Have No Record Of Compliance with Hours-Of-Service 

Only in the last few months has Mexico established hours-of-service rules and the 

vast majority of Mexican truckers are exempt. As such, Mexican truckers will have 

no experience with compliance with such rules and United States inspectors will not 

know how long a trucker has already been driving when they arrive at the border. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border until the DOT Inspector General certifies that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has 

implemented a policy to ensure compliance on the part of Mexican truckers with 

pertinent hours-of-service rules. The DOT will be required to give a distinctive DOT 

number to all Mexican trucks operating beyond the commercial zone to assist state 

inspectors in enforcing hours-of-service regulations. 

The Problem 

Validity of Driver’s Licenses, Vehicle Registration and Proof of Insurance Are Not 

Verifiable And Are Not Routinely Checked 

Most border crossing inspection stations do not even have telephone lines much 

less computer linkages to confirm that licenses carried by Mexican truckers are 

valid. Many state inspectors do not routinely check the status and validity of the 

licenses, registration or insurance of Mexican drivers/vehicles that are inspected at 

the roadside. This is true even where the telephone or computer links do exist. The 

Mexican computer databases regarding licenses are terribly inadequate. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border until the DOT Inspector General certifies that the information infrastructure of the Mexican authorities is sufficiently accurate and accessible to verify licenses and that adequate telephonic and computer links exist at all border crossings and in all mobile enforcement units operating adjacent to the border to ensure the opportunity to verify licenses. The DOT will require all federal and state inspectors to electronically verify 

the status and validity of the license of every Mexican trucker crossing the border. 

The Problem 

Federally-Funded Inspectors Not Enforcing Federal Regulations 

Even though most state truck inspectors are compensated largely with federal tax 

dollars, many inspectors at the border do not enforce federal registration regulations 

when they differ from state requirements. For example, only California inspectors 

require Mexican trucks to show proof of operating authority. Moreover, state inspectors, when they find a deficiency that is a violation of federal but not state law, do 

not always refer the case to a federal inspector for enforcement. 

13

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border until the DOT requires that all state inspectors funded in part or in whole with federal funds will 

check for violations of federal regulations. All violations detected by state inspectors 

of federal law will be either enforced by state inspectors or forwarded to federal authorities for enforcement action. 

The Problem 

Inadequate Facilities for Truck Inspections 

At seventy percent of border crossings, motor carrier inspectors currently have 

space to only inspect 1 or 2 trucks at a time. At more than half of the border crossings, inspectors currently have only 1 or 2 spaces to park vehicles placed out of service, undermining the ability of the inspectors to order unsafe trucks off the road. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border until the DOT Inspector General has certified that there is adequate capacity to conduct a sufficient 

number of meaningful truck inspections to maintain safety. 

The Problem 

Insurance Should be Valid, Easily Verified, and carry the same minimum liability 

requirements applied to US and Canadian motor carriers 

Public liability insurance is a basic requirement for motor carriers operating in 

the US. Different minimum levels exist for passenger, household goods, hazmat and 

cargo operations. In addition, US insurers have a working relationship with the 

DOT and notify them in situations where a motor carrier’s insurance lapses, at 

which time the DOT will revoke operating authority. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision would require that a motor carrier provide proof of valid 

insurance with an insurance company licensed and based in the United States. 

These same requirements currently apply to Canadian motor carriers operating in 

the United States. 

The Problem 

Inadequate Capacity To Check Compliance With United States Weight Limitations 

Mexican trucks are currently permitted to operate in Mexico at axle and gross 

weights which are far higher than United States standards. Overweight trucks pose 

a greater safety risk to the driving public but there is little if any infrastructure 

to weigh trucks at the border. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border until the DOT has 

equipped all Mexican border crossings with Weigh-In-Motion (WIM) systems as well 

as fixed scales suitable for enforcement action. The DOT will be required to verify 

the weight of all commercial vehicles entering the United States 

The Problem 

Inadequate Data On Safety Record Of Mexican Trucking Firms and Drivers 

Unlike the United States, Mexico does not currently have a comprehensive mechanism to collect data on the safety record of Mexican trucking firms and drivers. 

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border until the DOT Inspector General certifies that there is an accessible database containing sufficiently 

comprehensive data to allow for safety performance monitoring of all Mexican firms 

applying for operating certificates and for all Mexican drivers that may enter the 

United States. Also, the DOT IG must certify that measures are in place similar 

to those in the United States to ensure that Mexican drivers who lose their licenses 

cannot obtain another one through surreptitious means. 

The Problem 

Critical Safety Rules Not In Place 

DOT has rushed to implement the rules to allow Mexican trucks to enter the 

United States. At the same time, several safety-related rulemakings which pertain 

to Mexican carriers and are required by law, have not been finalized. 

14

The Solution as addressed in the Murray Truck Safety Provision 

The Murray provision prohibits the full opening of the border until the DOT publishes in final form the following overdue regulations:

• rules establishing minimum requirements for motor carriers, including foreign 

motor carriers, to ensure they are knowledgeable about federal safety standards, including the administration of a proficiency exam;

• rules implementing measures to improve training and provide for the certification of motor carrier safety auditors;

• rules requiring the development of staffing standards to determine the appropriate number of federal and state motor carrier inspectors for the Mexican border;

• rules prohibiting foreign motor carriers from leasing their vehicles to another 

carrier to transport products to the United States while the firm is subjected 

to a suspension, restriction, or limitation on its right to operate in the United 

States; and

• rules disqualifying permanently from operating in the United States any foreign 

motor carrier that is found to have operated illegally in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. John, excuse me. I apologize. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually have to 

apologize. I have a Banking Committee markup and I have to be 

going to that, but I am pleased that you are having this hearing 

today because I think that this is a very important issue. As somebody living in the Southwest who has the CanaMex Highway coming right through our state, I think it is very important that we 

have absolute safety requirements met for the public, address environmental concerns, and all the various issues that the other Senators have been talking about this morning. I think having a hearing and discussing these issues this morning, making sure that we 

are able to enforce United States laws on United States highways, 

and making sure that the trucks, whether they are from Canada 

or Mexico or the United States, are meeting all of those safety and 

environmental concerns. I think it is very important so I applaud 

you for having this hearing. I apologize. I will be coming in and 

out. Hopefully the Banking Committee markup won’t take too long. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Secretary Mineta. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Secretary MINETA. Mr. Chairman and Senators of the Committee, it is a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to appear before you and to have this chance to explain our plans for 

the safe admission of commercial trucks and buses into the United 

States from Mexico. 

Approved by Congress in 1993, the North American Free Trade 

Agreement was based on a single premise, that all of the countries 

in North America would be integrated into one free trade area. 

However, NAFTA’s requirements that all countries in North America open their borders to commercial vehicle traffic still has not 

been implemented 8 years after ratification. 

15

Last February, a NAFTA arbitration panel determined that the 

United States had violated its legal obligations to Mexico. It authorized Mexico to impose significant economic sanctions. President 

Bush has assured President Fox that the United States would 

move in a timely manner to meet our NAFTA obligations. 

I acknowledge the significant concerns that everyone has expressed, including the public, about the NAFTA issues. Recent 

votes by the United States House of Representatives and the 

United States Senate Appropriations Committee on this matter 

have sent a very clear message. Congress will insist that the 

United States have a rigorous, effective safety program in place 

prior to implementing the truck and bus access provisions of the 

NAFTA. 

Now Mr. Chairman, as all of you know, I have been the Secretary of Transportation since the 25th of January of this year. You 

have my personal assurance that I also share the same commitment that all of you have expressed. The Bush Administration 

wants to work with Congress to reach consensus on a plan to meet 

our NAFTA obligations without sacrificing safety. I am disappointed, therefore, that the House voted to bar the use of any departmental funds in the next fiscal year to process applications for 

Mexican carriers that seek to operate outside United States commercial zones. 

As the Administration has formally stated, on at least one previous occasion, President Bush’s senior advisors would recommend 

that he veto any bill containing provisions that foreclose the possibility of meeting our NAFTA obligations. While I am grateful to the 

Senate Appropriations Committee for providing funding for the inspectors and improvements described later in this testimony, I 

have serious concerns that the numerous conditions that the Committee at this point has placed, that the Committee has placed on 

actions to open the border. I believe that four core principles must 

guide our efforts to implement the NAFTA truck and bus access 

provisions. 

First, safety is the Department of Transportation’s highest priority, and we will not sacrifice safety to implement NAFTA’s trucking and bus provisions. And with the support of Congress, Mexico’s 

government, federal and state enforcement officials, and the industry, I think we can implement an effective safety enforcement program and meet our NAFTA obligations by January 1, 2002. The 

President’s budget lays out requirements to do that. However, if 

our ongoing work should prove that we need more time, then we 

will take it. If we will need more resources, we will insist upon 

them. But in the end, we will do the job right. 

Second, every Mexican firm, vehicle, and driver that seeks to operate in the United States at the border or beyond must meet the 

identical safety and operating standards that apply to United 

States and Canadian carriers. Nothing less than this is acceptable. 

Third, the United States must fully comply with our NAFTA obligations. Not everyone on this Committee supported approval of 

NAFTA in 1993. As a Member of Congress, I did. But only after 

careful consideration of the possible impact on a wide range of 

issues, including safety. I concluded then and I continue to believe 

that the free and open trade fostered by NAFTA is the best, is in 

16

the best interests of the people of this nation and of our economic 

future. The Mexican government has assured the United States 

that it will allow United States trucks access to Mexico, and as 

Secretary of Transportation, now my task is to work with the Congress and decide how to meet our existing and very real international legal obligations. 

Fourth, Mr. Chairman, Mexican carriers lawfully operating in 

the United States must be guaranteed the same high standards of 

fairness and protection that we offer United States and Canadian 

carriers. There is a technical term in NAFTA that gives Canadian, 

Mexican and United States carriers operating in one of the other 

countries so-called national treatment, and that means that we 

must provide a level playing field for competition. Because Mexico’s 

safety enforcement regime differs in significant ways from that of 

Canada and the United States, the arbitration panel granted us 

reasonable flexibility in choosing the best way to ensure a Mexican 

carrier’s compliance with our safety regulations. 

There can be civil discussions about what constitutes reasonable 

flexibility. I must say, however, that I am concerned about the 

tenor of some of the debate. Some seem to argue that a Mexican 

carrier, precisely because it is from Mexico, cannot and will not 

comply with our laws. In implementing NAFTA, President Bush 

and I will insist on full compliance with our safety laws, but we 

will not accept enforcement requirements that create a de facto system that unfairly discriminates against Mexican drivers and carriers. 

As a result of decisions taken by the previous administration, the 

administration or the Department of Transportation did not on 

January 20th of this year have a program that would allow us to 

open our southern border to commercial vehicle traffic, nor did we 

have an adequate plan for developing one. Today, we are well on 

the way to having the effective safety enforcement program that 

will allow us to move forward with NAFTA by the year’s end. 

In May, the Department of Transportation proposed several rules 

relating to the carrier application process that we need to implement for border opening. The public comment period on the draft 

rules closed 2 weeks ago, and we anticipate issuing final rules 

sometime in October. These rules represent only one part of the department’s comprehensive safety implementation plan. The actual 

safety considerations in implementing our NAFTA obligations are 

in fact very different from the picture that has been painted by 

some opponents. 

Our plan places heightened requirements on Mexican carriers 

currently operating in the commercial zone along the border, more 

scrutiny than currently exercised, and it means a new stricter system outside the commercial zone. My written testimony provides 

details of our implementation plan, and the resources that the department needs to carry it out. 

Of course, none of us can guarantee that a Mexican truck, Canadian truck or for that matter a United States truck will never have 

a catastrophic accident somewhere in the United States. However, 

I can guarantee that the United States Department of Transportation directs and will continue to direct its full efforts on a daily 

basis to preventing that accident. Our NAFTA safety implementaVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
17

tion plan will bring greater resources and a substantially enhanced 

focus on enforcement. 

Opening the border to Mexican trucks and buses by the beginning of next year will require considerable effort, but I am thoroughly convinced that we can fulfill our NAFTA obligations while 

putting in place an effective safety enforcement regimen. I will 

close, Mr. Chairman, by reiterating my personal commitment and 

that of the Bush Administration to work with the Congress to find 

an acceptable plan for NAFTA implementation, a plan that allows 

us to meet the four principles of safety and equity that I outlined 

today. Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my statement. I ask unanimous consent that my full statement be made a part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mineta follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you 

today and to have the opportunity to explain our plans for the safe admission of 

commercial truck and bus traffic to the United States from Mexico. 

Introduction 

Approved by Congress in 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement was 

based on a simple premise—that all of the countries in North America would be integrated into one free trade area. Eight years later, one major portion of NAFTA 

has yet to be implemented—the requirement that all countries in North America be 

open to commercial vehicle traffic. This matter has generated vigorous dispute and 

considerable misunderstanding—on both sides of the border, in the public and private sectors. 

A NAFTA arbitration panel ruling in February of this year determined that the 

United States had violated its legal obligations to Mexico. President Bush has assured President Fox that the United States would move in a timely manner to meet 

our NAFTA obligations. 

In May, the Department of Transportation proposed several rules relating to the 

carrier application process, rules that will be needed to implement the border opening. These rules form only one part of the Department’s comprehensive safety implementation plan. The rules themselves will not be final until October, and applications for operating permits cannot be requested by Mexican carriers until then. The 

public comment period on the draft rules closed 2 weeks ago. 

I want to acknowledge the significant concerns that some members of Congress 

and the public have expressed. Recent votes by the House of Representatives and 

the Senate Appropriations Committee on this matter have sent a clear message: 

Congress will insist that the United States have a rigorous, effective safety program 

in place prior to implementing the truck and bus access provisions of NAFTA. 

Mr. Chairman, you have my personal assurance that I share this very same commitment to implementing a truly effective NAFTA safety program. 

You will hear today that the Bush Administration is prepared to enhance and significantly expand our safety implementation plan. I want to work with Congress to 

try to reach consensus on a plan and the resources required to meet our NAFTA 

obligations without sacrificing safety. 

Today I will discuss the practical steps that the Administration is taking to meet 

that objective. My remarks focus on two topics: (1) the four principles that guide 

the Department’s work to implement NAFTA; (2) the specifics of the Department’s 

safety implementation plan regarding Mexico’s truck and bus access. 

Guiding Principles 

Four core principles guide our work to implement the NAFTA truck and bus access provisions. 

First, safety is the Department of Transportation’s highest priority, and 

we will not sacrifice safety to implement NAFTA’s trucking and bus provisions. With the support of Congress, Mexico’s government, Federal and State enforcement officials, and the industry, I think we can implement an effective safety 

enforcement program and meet our NAFTA obligations by January 1, 2002. The 

President’s budget lays out requirements to do that. However, if our ongoing work 

18

should prove that we need more time, we will take it; if we need more resources, 

we will insist upon them. We will do the job right. 

Second, every Mexican firm, vehicle and driver that seeks authority to 

operate in the United States—at the border or beyond—must meet the identical safety and operating standards that apply to United States and Canadian carriers. Nothing less than this is acceptable. 

Third, the United States must fully comply with our NAFTA obligations.

Not everyone on this Committee supported approval of NAFTA in 1993. As a Member of Congress I did, but only after careful consideration of the possible impact on 

a wide range of issues, including safety. I concluded then, and I continue to believe, 

that the free and open trade fostered by NAFTA is in the best interest of the people 

of this Nation and our economic future. The Mexican government has assured the 

United States that it will allow United States trucks access to Mexico. As Secretary 

of Transportation, my task is to work with Congress to decide how to meet our existing and very real international legal obligations. 

Fourth, Mexican carriers lawfully operating in the United States must be 

guaranteed the same high standards of fairness and protection that we 

offer United States and Canadian carriers. There is a technical term of the 

NAFTA that gives Canadian, Mexican and United States carriers operating in one 

of the other countries so-called national treatment. That means we must provide a 

level playing field for competition. Because Mexico’s safety enforcement regime differs in significant ways from that of Canada and the United States, the arbitration 

panel granted us reasonable flexibility in choosing the best way to ensure a Mexican 

carrier’s compliance with our safety regulations. There can be civil discussion about 

what constitutes reasonable flexibility. 

I must say, however, that I am concerned about the tenor of some of the NAFTA 

implementation debate. Some seem to argue that a Mexican carrier—precisely because it is from Mexico—cannot or will not comply with our laws. President Bush 

and I will insist on full compliance with our safety laws. But we will not accept enforcement requirements that create a de facto system that unfairly discriminates 

against Mexican drivers and carriers. 

All four of these guiding principles must be met in implementing NAFTA’s truck 

and bus access provisions. Let me now turn to a summary of the specifics regarding 

the Department’s comprehensive safety implementation plan. 

Implementation of the NAFTA Truck and Bus Access Provisions 

On January 20 of this year, the Department of Transportation did not have a program, nor an adequate plan, that would allow us to open the border. Today we are 

well on the way to having the effective safety enforcement program that will allow 

us to move forward with NAFTA by year’s end. 

None of us can guarantee that a Mexican truck, a Canadian truck or, for that 

matter, a United States truck will never have a catastrophic accident somewhere 

in the United States. I can guarantee that the efforts of three DOT agencies—

FMCSA, FHWA, and NHTSA—are directed, on a daily basis, to helping prevent 

that accident. Our NAFTA safety implementation plan will bring greater resources 

and a substantially enhanced focus on enforcement. 

I know that the actual safety considerations in implementing our NAFTA obligations are very different from the picture painted by some opponents. I would like 

to address a few of those points. 

I will begin with a discussion of the new resources requested by the Administration. I will then describe the comprehensive safety enforcement program we propose 

to carry out, which has five basic elements:

(1) a safety review of truck and bus firms before the awarding of operating authority; 

(2) An expanded vehicle inspection regime, including significantly more safety 

compliance inspections for all commercial vehicles and enough inspectors to 

staff all border crossings during the times commercial vehicles are allowed 

to cross; 

(3) audits of drivers to assure compliance with licensing, hours of service regulations and all other driver requirements; 

(4) significant border infrastructure improvements; and 

(5) an extensive industry education program conducted on both sides of the border.

Full implementation will involve close coordination—already underway—with 

Federal and State officials in the United States, with the Mexican government, and 

with the truck and bus industries on both sides of the border. In short, the program 

focuses on firms, vehicles, drivers, infrastructure and education. 

19

Resources. The Administration’s budget request for FY2002 seeks an unprecedented increase in funds to prepare us for the new cross-border traffic. These funds 

would provide the increased number of Federal and State inspectors and inspection 

facilities that both our Inspector General and a ‘‘Blue Ribbon’’ Commission, which 

I had the honor to chair, called for in 1999. 

To support comprehensive State and Federal safety enforcement activities at the southern border, the Department requested $88.2 million in additional funds, which 

included $13.9 million to hire 80 additional Federal inspectors to perform safety inspections and conduct safety audits of Mexican carriers. We plan to have all Federal 

enforcement personnel hired and trained by December 2001. In addition, we requested $18 million to support staffing of State inspection facilities, increasing significantly State motor carrier safety inspection activities at the border. The Department also requested $54 million to provide the Federal share of costs 

for construction and improvement of State commercial motor vehicle inspection facilities. The Department requested $2.3 million for immediate construction of areas 

to park commercial vehicles that are placed out-of-service for safety violations. We 

anticipate working closely with our Federal and State colleagues to conduct inspections. Currently 23 border commercial crossings do not have permanent inspection 

facilities. We want to help the border States address this gap. 

Operating Authority for Mexican Truck and Bus Firms. On May 3, 2001, 

the FMCSA published three Notices of Proposed Rulemaking to govern the application process for Mexico-domiciled carriers seeking United States operating authority. The purpose of the rulemakings was to specify a process whereby Mexican-domiciled carriers may be granted conditional United States operating authority, and 

later, if its safety compliance record justifies, permanent operating authority. Here 

is how the process would work: 

First, a carrier must specify whether it seeks authority to operate within the commercial zone or outside the commercial zone. Carriers with a currently valid authority to operate within the commercial zone will have a 1-year transition period to 

begin the process described below, leading to permanent commercial zone operating 

authority. 

Second, a carrier must undergo a mandatory safety review by FMCSA to obtain 

conditional operating authority. Mexican-domiciled carriers must provide detailed 

information on their operations, and make specific certifications regarding their 

ability to comply with United States safety regulations before they may obtain conditional operating authority. 

Such requirements include United States safety regulations, including hours-ofservice requirements, drug and alcohol testing regulations, the carrier’s safety monitoring program, and the obligation to maintain an accident register. Carriers would, 

for example, be obligated to supply the name of their insurance carrier and drug 

and alcohol testing service. The FMCSA will independently validate such coverage 

in each case prior to granting conditional authority. To perform these safety reviews, FMCSA will establish a consolidated safety review center. At FMCSA discretion, any such reviews may be conducted in person, at an appropriate Federal office 

at the border or at the carrier’s place of business in Mexico. 

Third, upon successful completion of the safety review, a carrier would be granted 

a provisional operating permit valid for 18 months. 

Fourth, during the 18-month period, FMCSA will begin to collect safety and operational data on the carrier in the Motor Carrier Management Information System 

(MCMIS). The FMCSA will pull all available data from Mexican databases on carriers, vehicles, and drivers, but we will rely on our own information systems to continually monitor the safety of carriers operating in the United States. Data on authority, vehicles, drivers, violations, accidents, insurance, and other safety information will be tracked by United States safety information systems. State and Federal 

inspectors at the border and throughout the United States will have complete access 

to the safety data maintained on Mexican carriers. 

Investigators will review information in MCMIS collected on the carriers and documents required under Federal safety regulations. This includes records on driver 

medical qualifications, hours of service, drug and alcohol testing, and vehicle inspection, repair and maintenance. If safety problems are detected, FMCSA would take 

immediate action to help bring carriers into compliance or remove their provisional 

operating authority. To complement the new entrant regime, it will be necessary to 

modify existing regulations to provide appropriate penalties for any carrier that operates outside the commercial zone without valid operating authority. FMCSA will 

do so this Fall. 

Fifth, after sufficient observation data has been accumulated on a given carrier 

(after approximately 4–12 months), the carrier must submit to a mandatory safety 

audit. The safety audit requires a face-to-face meeting with FMCSA inspectors and 

20

may, at FMCSA’s discretion, take place at an appropriate Federal office at the border or at the carrier’s place of business in Mexico. The safety audit incorporates review of all safety inspection and performance data gathered on the carrier, as well 

as an examination of the carrier’s required records to prove compliance with United 

States carrier, vehicle and driver safety regulations. 

Finally, after successful completion of the safety audit, and prior to the end of the 

18-month provisional operating authority, FMCSA will determine whether to award 

a permanent operating authority. 

Taken in sum, this process will provide considerable scrutiny of the motor carrier’s ability to comply with United States safety standards. It should be noted that 

this new regime means heightened requirements for Mexican carriers currently operating in the commercial zone—more scrutiny than currently exercised—and it 

means a new, stricter system outside the commercial zone. These requirements go 

significantly beyond that imposed on United States and Canadian cross-border operations, for which there are currently no such waiting period or other new entrant 

requirements. The Department considers this regime an appropriate level of scrutiny and consistent with the national treatment provisions of NAFTA. 

The Department expects most of the carriers now operating in commercial zones 

to apply to continue that type of operation. We do not, in other words, expect a large 

number of immediate applications for authority to operate beyond the commercial 

zones. 

Vehicle Compliance. All Mexican-domiciled vehicles seeking United States operating authority must comply with United States safety and performance standards 

for United States commercial vehicles. Based upon consultations with the industry, 

FMCSA believes that Mexican carriers that seek to operate outside the commercial 

zone will be equipped with the modern vehicles that compare favorably with the average over-the-road vehicle in the United States. 

Over 50 percent of northbound trucks get inspected now. Based on United States 

Customs fees and license plate readings, there are at least 63,000 Mexican vehicles 

entering United States commercial zones. Our Inspector General has estimated the 

number may be as high as 85,000. In FY 2000, more than 53,000 safety inspections 

were performed on these Mexican trucks. FMCSA estimates that this is roughly 

twice the rate of inspections performed on domestic commercial vehicles. While 

there are 4.5 million crossings of the border each year, most trucks are engaged in 

drayage operations, making multiple border crossings daily. 

The Department seeks to make routine Level 1 inspections—the most thorough 

type of vehicle and driver check—the rule for all Mexican-domiciled vehicles operating in the United States. Interim facilities must be created for inspections and for 

parking vehicles placed out of service. During the 1-year transition period for 

NAFTA truck and bus access, the Department has planned to deploy teams of inspectors on both sides of the border to make Level 1 inspections available to carriers 

seeking United States operating authority. 

California has already invested in inspection stations and has successfully 

brought out-of-service rates for Mexican commercial vehicles down to a level comparable with United States-based trucks. In that State, a Level 1 inspection—actually getting under the vehicle—is performed on each commercial vehicle that does 

not display a current Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) decal indicating 

that an inspection has been performed within the last 3 months. In FY 2000, the 

out-of-service rate for Mexican trucks inspected in California is 27 percent and the 

national average is 24 percent. 

With construction of additional permanent state inspection facilities and inspectors requested by the President, far more Level 1 inspections can be conducted, and 

a screening system similar to that of California could be implemented all along the 

border. DOT will work with States to locate the new facilities where commercial vehicles cannot evade inspections and ensure that truck size and weight enforcement 

is performed at each location. 

Hiring of more Federal inspectors is underway. The FMCSA is now recruiting 

eighty new Federal inspectors. Combined with our current Federal inspection staff 

of 60, we would more than double our Federal safety presence at the border and 

exceed the level of Federal inspectors recommended by the DOT Inspector General 

in his December 1998 report. 

As stated above, the Department also is seeking $18 million to double the number 

of State safety inspectors. With this increase, a combined State and Federal enforcement staff will total an impressive 496 inspectors. To put that figure in better perspective, there were only seven Federal safety inspectors at the border in December 

1995, and about 45 State inspectors. If our FY 2002 budget request is approved, it 

would provide a 10-fold increase in overall Federal and State inspectors since 1995. 

21

This should allow us to meet DOT’s goal of having vehicle inspectors on duty during 

all hours when the commercial crossings are open for business. 

Driver Standards. The Level 1 CVSA inspections described above also include 

review of driver credentials. The expanded regime that includes vehicle inspections 

will thus also yield greater scrutiny of drivers. There will be no distinction between 

the requirements for drivers from Mexico, the United States or Canada. In the case 

of hours-of-service compliance, for example, the driver must produce logs that indicate authoritatively his or her driving time start and restart periods in Mexico for 

the runs that include a border crossing. The clock does not stop at the border, and 

we will not tolerate lapses. 

Infrastructure Improvements. Our infrastructure improvements apply not only 

to the physical safety inspection facilities covered by the President’s infrastructure 

request. We continue to work with our Mexican colleagues on the information and 

safety networks linking the two nations. Our actions involve a major initiative to 

improve the safety information systems that are available to Federal and State enforcement officials in the United States. We will be able to verify certain carrier application information directly with Mexican transportation officials, automate the review of applications, provide real-time safety performance and other data to Federal 

and State inspectors and effectively monitor the safety performance of Mexican 

motor carriers operating in the United States. All inspectors will have access to 

available United States and Mexican driver license, carrier, and other safety databases by January 1, 2002. 

The Department of Transportation is working with Mexico to increase regulatory 

compatibility between our countries, establish cooperative agreements on the exchange of safety information, and provide technical assistance to build United 

States-compatible compliance and enforcement programs in Mexico. The objective is 

to bring Mexican safety requirements up to United States standards. The adoption 

and implementation of comparable programs in Mexico will provide greater assurance that vehicles entering the United States are already in compliance with United 

States safety standards. 

Implementation and Education. The Department is committed to being 

proactive in helping Mexican carriers understand applicable U.S law and regulations. The FMCSA, in concert with Mexico and the border States, will conduct a series of safety compliance seminars to educate Mexican carriers and drivers about 

compliance with Federal and State motor carrier safety regulations. The seminars 

will take place on both sides of the border this Fall. When rules are finalized, meetings such as this will thoroughly explain the new application requirements. The 

seminars will supplement ongoing efforts to translate and distribute educational 

materials to Mexican carriers and drivers. 

Also, with the Free Trade Alliance San Antonio, the Department is co-sponsoring 

a NAFTA Information Conference in that city on October 21–24, 2001. The conference will include all Federal and State agencies that have border enforcement responsibilities. The Departments of Transportation, Labor, and Agriculture, the 

United States Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 

Environmental Protection Agency, and State enforcement officials will conduct panels explaining the various requirements that motor carriers must meet when operating in the United States. The Governments of Mexico and Canada will make similar presentations about their requirements and all three countries will distribute bilingual reference books that summarize their operating 

Conclusion 

Opening the border to Mexican trucks and buses by the beginning of next year 

will require considerable effort. But I am thoroughly convinced that we can fulfill 

our NAFTA obligations while putting in place an effective safety enforcement regime. 

I am disappointed, therefore, that the House voted to bar the use of any Department funds next fiscal year to process applications for Mexican carriers that seek 

to operate in the United States outside the commercial zone. As the Administration 

has formally stated, President Bush’s senior advisors would recommend that he veto 

any bill containing provisions that foreclose the possibility of meeting our NAFTA 

obligations. While I am grateful to the Senate for providing funding for the inspectors and improvements described in this testimony, I have serious concerns about 

the numerous conditions the Senate has at this point placed on actions to open the 

border. 

I want to close by reiterating my personal commitment, and that of the Administration, to work with the Congress to try to find an acceptable plan for NAFTA implementation—a plan that allows us to meet the four principle s of safety and equity 

22

that I outlined at the beginning of this testimony. Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased 

to respond to any questions you or the Committee may have.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be part of the record. Let us go first with 

Mr. Mead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. MEAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit my prepared 

statement for the record. Our statement today is based on three reports, and it focuses on current conditions at the border, and actions that need to be taken to implement a solid safety strategy. 

I want you all to know, I am honored to be here with Secretary 

Mineta. He and his team are drawing very heavily, and most responsibly on our work. As the law began to focus on this issue, 

what we have seen from our work, including visits from my staff 

to all 27 of these border crossings, is that the United States has 

made some improvements in its inspection presence and controls, 

and Mexico, even, has made some progress, too. 

But it is very clear that substantial additional actions are needed 

to reasonably ensure the safety of trucks and qualified drivers at 

the southern border, especially if they wish to traverse into the interior of the United States. I would like to highlight the actions as 

we see them in the Inspector General’s office, but before doing so, 

I do want to point out that the focus on Mexican trucks ought not 

to obscure the need to continue improving the safety of United 

States trucks and drivers. 

Last year, more than 5,300 people died in United States truck 

crashes, and that is equivalent to a major airline crash every 2 

weeks. Over 9,000 United States motor carriers currently have unsatisfactory safety fitness ratings. I believe safety oversight has 

been strengthened at the Department since passage of the 1999 

Act, and I think it is important that this level of emphasis be sustained, if not indeed increased. 

As for a Mexican truck driver and truck safety, until Mexico fully 

implements safety requirements and has a tight oversight program, 

the fact is that we will need to have sufficient controls in place in 

the United States to ensure safety. We found a direct correlation 

between the condition of Mexican trucks entering the United 

States, the number of inspections, and the level of inspection resources at the border. 

The chart being displayed shows that, and this chart is in my 

prepared statement. This purple line is the out-of-service rate. 

When the safety violations are so serious that you cannot let a 

truck go on the road any longer, it is placed out of service. The outof-service rate for Mexican trucks decreased from 44 percent in fiscal year 1997 to 37 percent in fiscal year 2000. 

That improvement correlates with the increase in the number of 

inspections, which is shown by the dark line, from about 17,000 inspections in fiscal year 1997 to 56,000 in fiscal year 2001. The outof-service rate for United States trucks nationwide is about 24 percent. 

Mr. Chairman, California has an inspection presence during all 

operating hours at its major Otay Mesa facility, and it inspects 

each truck that does not have a current inspection decal. 

23

The out-of-service rate for Mexican trucks crossing at the Otay 

Mesa border crossing is 24 percent, substantially better than the 

Mexican trucks entering through other crossings with a lesser inspection presence. In fact, the rate runs as high as 50 percent outof-service at one border crossing in Texas. Many of the safety program elements that we endorse and we understand DOT plans to 

adopt, are based on that California model. I want to highlight six 

critical elements of a safety strategy that should be in place when 

the border is open. 

First, is staffing, placing inspectors at all commercial border 

crossings during all operating hours. Currently, inspectors are not 

on duty at all border crossings during all hours of operations. For 

example, my staff was at the Laredo facility in Texas, that is one 

of the major crossings, on a weekend day, and the trucks went 

right on through. No inspector was there, and that needs to be corrected. 

In 1998, we estimated 139 inspectors were needed to provide coverage at all border crossings during all operating hours. The Department increased the authorized number of inspectors at the 

southern border from 13 in 1998 to about 60 in fiscal year 2001. 

The President’s budget for 2002 includes about $14 million to hire 

80 additional enforcement people. These funds are really needed. I 

think that chart illustrates why, and it is important that these 80 

people be deployed at the border. Over time, that can change. If the 

States build permanent inspection facilities and increase the staffing, maybe these inspectors can be deployed into other locations. 

But we think it is important that you have inspection coverage at 

the border crossings now. 

Second, is safety reviews and inspections. We feel that performing safety reviews before granting Mexican carriers authority 

to operate in the United States, and inspecting the long haul vehicles and drivers before they enter and operate in the United States, 

would be a good move. 

At least initially, DOT will have to decide on a case-by-case basis 

whether safety reviews need to be performed on-site in Mexico at 

the carrier’s location. That decision is going to depend on a number 

of factors, such as the availability and quality of the applicant safety performance data. And I think the Department will need some 

discretion to decide where it is going to do these reviews. Because 

long-haul carriers will be new entrants, their vehicles ought to be 

inspected as they enter the United States unless the vehicle passed 

a United States inspection within the preceding 3 months. The vehicle will carry a decal just like those at the Otay Mesa facility in 

California. Vehicles come through there, and every 3 months, they 

get inspected and get a new sticker. 

Long haul drivers ought to be inspected at the border to make 

sure they have a valid license and a logbook, and that they are in 

compliance with hours of service rules. This should apply to passenger buses and their drivers as well, which could well be the subject of a separate hearing some day. So inspectors can readily distinguish between these Mexican long-haul trucks and the Mexican 

trucks that are only going to the commercial zone adjacent to the 

border, Mexican long-haul trucks ought to have identification numVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
24

bers that distinguish them from vehicles authorized to operate only 

in the commercial zones. 

Mr. Chairman, the 1999 Motor Carrier Act specifies that new entrant requirements, including safety reviews, will apply to domestic 

and foreign carriers. DOT has not implemented this provision yet 

for United States carriers. It is important that this be done for 

safety reasons, as well as to provide evenhanded treatment to 

United States carriers and Mexican carriers. 

Third, is enforcement—taking strong prompt enforcement action 

against carriers that do not comply with safety regulations, and authorizing states to place vehicles out of service for operating illegally in the United States. In 1999, we reported that 52 Mexican 

domiciled carriers were operating illegally in 20 states outside the 

four Southern border States, and the border had not even been 

opened. 

We found this problem continues. In 2000, inspections throughout the United States show that 56 Mexican carriers operated illegally in 25 states outside the four Southern border States. The 

1999 Act that you enacted provided stiff fines and disqualification 

sanctions for carriers exhibiting this type of behavior. That provision of law is due to expire when the border opens, and we think 

it makes sense that that provision of law be carried over so you can 

take action against carriers operating illegally and evading the 

safety net that the Department puts in place. 

Another point I think needs to be tended to is that DOT has not 

yet issued an order that gives the States the authority to place 

these vehicles out of service if they are found to be operating without authority. I understand DOT will do this. 

Fourth is facilities—providing adequate facilities and space to 

conduct inspections and to place unsafe vehicles out of service. Currently, as you pointed out in your opening remarks, the only permanent facilities at the U.S.–Mexico border are the State facilities 

in California. Construction is under way at two others crossings, in 

New Mexico and Arizona. 

I can give you some interesting statistics here. At the 25 crossings without permanent facilities, the inspectors use space provided 

by the U.S. Customs Service. At eight of those, DOT has small, 

portable buildings, and I mean small. At 19 crossings, inspectors 

only have space to inspect one or two trucks at a time. At 14, and 

this is important, they only have one or two spaces to park trucks 

that they place out of service. If you have an out-of-service rate of 

even 25 percent, that is one in every four trucks, and if you only 

have spaces to park two trucks, you are going to have some trouble. 

This problem is going to require time to be fully resolved, but we 

think there are a number of near-term actions that the Department 

can undertake with the help of some other agencies. We contacted 

the General Services Administration and found that land is available on and adjacent to 16 of these crossings. It is true that the 

other Federal agencies have long-term plans for using that land. 

But many of their plans aren’t yet funded so the Department may 

be able to obtain agreements to use some of it in the near term, 

such as for paving a parking lot. 

The fifth and sixth elements of the strategy are rulemakings and 

education outreach. To establish the elements of the safety strategy 

25

as legal requirements, obviously rulemakings will be required. The 

rulemakings that are currently out in draft will need to be revised 

to reflect the elements of the safety strategy that is outlined in the 

Secretary’s statement. I think education and outreach are necessary for the obvious reason, familiarizing the drivers and carriers 

in Mexico on what the safety requirements are. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to testify on motor carrier safety at the U.S.-Mexico border. Since 1998 we have issued three reports dealing with the Department 

of Transportation’s efforts to improve safety at the border. Our statement today is 

based on those reports and our ongoing work, and focuses on the (1) current safety 

conditions at the southern border, and (2) actions the Department needs to take to 

implement a comprehensive safety strategy for the southern border. 

What we have seen from our work—that includes visits to all 27 commercial border crossings—is a need to strengthen safety controls at the southern border. (Exhibit A, for a map and listing of the border crossings). During fiscal year (FY) 2000, 

37 percent of the Mexican trucks inspected were placed out of service because they 

had serious safety violations. (Exhibit B, for a listing of out-of-service rates by crossing) 

The United States has made improvements in its inspection presence and controls, and Mexico has made progress in establishing safety oversight requirements. 

However, it is clear, that additional actions are needed to reasonably ensure the 

safety of commercial vehicles and drivers as they enter at the southern border, operate within the commercial zones, and traverse the United States. 

Specific actions that need to be taken include:

• Placing inspectors at all commercial border crossings during all operating hours. 

There is a direct correlation between the condition of Mexican trucks entering 

the United States and the level of inspection resources at the border.

• Performing (1) safety reviews before granting Mexican-domiciled carriers conditional authority to go into the interior of the United States, and (2) inspecting 

all long-haul vehicles and drivers before they enter and operate in the United 

States. (Long-haul vehicles are those authorized to travel beyond the U.S. commercial zones.)

• Taking firm enforcement actions against carriers that do not comply with U.S. 

safety regulations, and authorizing States to place vehicles out of service for operating beyond authority or without authority.

• Providing adequate facilities to conduct inspections and place unsafe vehicles 

out of service.

• Revising the recently issued proposed rulemakings on application procedures 

and a monitoring system to require safety reviews and physical inspections of 

trucks and drivers before they operate in the United States, and issuing the 

final rules.

• Conducting workshops and outreach sessions to provide information to potential 

applicants on U.S. procedures and safety regulations.

In the course of developing the Department’s plans for implementing the North 

American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) provisions, the Office of the Secretary, 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), and Office of Inspector General have held extensive discussions about our work and the elements of a comprehensive safety strategy. We understand the Department is committed to incorporating substantially all of the actions discussed above into its safety strategy. This 

would include placing inspectors at all border crossings during all operating hours, 

safety reviews, and physical inspection of trucks and drivers desiring to operate in 

the United States beyond the commercial zones. We endorse this approach and believe, when implemented, it will provide a more solid predicate for ensuring the 

safety of Mexican trucks and drivers operating in the United States. 

26

The key to the effectiveness of the safety strategy will then be in implementation 

of the details, including deploying sufficient inspectors, performing thorough safety 

reviews and inspections, and taking firm enforcement action against carriers that 

do not comply with U.S. safety regulations. We will continue to audit and monitor 

the Department’s progress in developing and implementing its safety strategy. 

The actions needed to support the Department’s safety strategy will also require 

funding. The Administration requested $88.2 million in additional funding for FY 

2002 to facilitate implementation of NAFTA cross-border trucking provisions. The 

FY 2002 Transportation Bill approved by the House of Representatives does not provide additional funds for this purpose, while the Bill approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee provides $103 million in additional funding. 

It is important to note that we should not let the current focus on Mexican commercial vehicles obscure the need to continue to improve the safety of U.S. trucks 

and drivers. In 2000, more than 5,300 people died in truck crashes in the United 

States. This equates to a major airline crash with 200 fatalities every 2 weeks. Also, 

in the United States, one out of every four trucks inspected at a roadside stop is 

placed out of service for safety violations. In FY 2000, 9,900 (2 percent) of the 

560,000 interstate motor carriers operating in the United States had an unsatisfactory safety rating. Moreover, 426,000 (76 percent) of the interstate motor carriers 

had not been subjected to a compliance review by FMCSA and were operating without a safety rating. 

The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 established FMCSA and set 

safety as its highest priority. FMCSA has made progress in increasing the number 

of compliance reviews, increasing civil penalties for noncompliance, and shutting 

down unsafe carriers. It is important that this level of emphasis be sustained domestically. 

Current Safety Conditions at the Border 

The out-of-service rate for Mexican trucks is declining. We determined that 37 

percent of the Mexican trucks inspected in FY 2000 were removed from service because of serious safety violations. This represents an improvement from FY 1997 

when 44 percent of the Mexican trucks inspected were removed from service. The 

out-of-service rate for U.S. trucks inspected nationwide in FY 2000 was 24 percent. 

Available data also show that Mexican drivers were placed out of service at the 

same rate—8 percent—as U.S. drivers nationwide during FY 2000. However, these 

data may not be comparable because U.S. inspectors at the border crossings did not 

have the capability to verify that Mexican Commercial Drivers Licenses (CDLs) 

were current and authentic during FY 2000. That capability is now available so 

data obtained in FY 2001 should provide a comparable basis for driver out-of-service 

rates. 

NAFTA countries agreed to use standards established by the Commercial Vehicle 

Safety Alliance (CVSA) that include minimum safety requirements and criteria for 

placing trucks and drivers out of service for noncompliance. In the United States, 

Federal and State safety inspectors perform vehicle inspections using CVSA criteria. 

A vehicle receives a CVSA decal when it passes a Level 1 inspection—the most rigorous involving a physical inspection of the truck’s compliance with all safety requirements. The decal is valid for 3 months. 

Trucks are put out of service for a variety of serious safety violations, including 

inoperative and defective brakes, defective frames and steering systems, and bad 

tires. Truck drivers are placed out of service because they do not have valid CDLs, 

are not in compliance with hours-of-service rules, or do not have logbooks to document the number of hours they were on duty. 

There is a direct correlation between the condition of Mexican trucks entering the 

United States and the level of inspection, resources at the border. That is, the more 

likely the chance of inspection the better the condition of the vehicle. As the following chart illustrates, out-of-service rates at the border have declined as the number of inspections performed increased.

27

California has an inspection presence during all operating hours at its two major 

crossings and inspects each commercial truck that does not have a current CVSA 

inspection decal. Consequently, the condition of the Mexican trucks entering at the 

Mexico-California border is much better than those trucks entering through all 

other border States that do not have an inspection presence during all operating 

hours. 

For example, during FY 2000, the out-of-service rate for Mexican trucks inspected 

in California was 27 percent. This compares to out-of-service rates of 40, 34, and 

41 percent in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, respectively. During this same timeframe, the range of the out-of-service rates varied significantly among the border 

crossings, from 24 percent in Otay Mesa, California, to 50 percent at the Bridge of 

the Americas in El Paso, Texas. 

Exhibit B shows the out-of-service rates for the last 2 fiscal years at each of the 

southern border crossings.


718mea1.eps 718mea2.eps
28

Until Mexico fully implements safety requirements and an oversight program, the 

United States will need to have sufficient controls in place to ensure the safety of 

Mexican trucks and drivers entering and operating in the United States. At this 

time, there are some outstanding questions about the workload this will generate. 

These questions include how many Mexican carriers will apply for long-haul authority, where the carriers are located, and which and how many trucks they will operate in the United States. 

It is a matter of speculation as to how many carriers will want to operate longhaul vehicles in the interior of the United States beyond the commercial zones. This 

decision will be affected by a number of factors, including economic conditions and 

the need to comply with U.S. safety regulations. While all carriers are not likely to 

apply, available information shows that the number of carriers that could seek to 

operate in the interior could vary significantly. For example:

• 10,000 Mexican carriers currently have authority to operate in the United 

States.

• 4,750 Mexican carriers had vehicles inspected at the southern border in FY 

2000.

• 1,500 of the 4,750 Mexican carriers with vehicles inspected at the border came 

from States south of Mexico’s border States, primarily from the Mexico City 

area.

• Over 70,000 Mexican carriers are domiciled in Mexican States away from the 

border States.

Regarding the number of trucks, a September 20, 2000 FMCSA report estimated 

that about 80,000 trucks were operating at the U.S.-Mexico border and that 63,000 

trucks were from Mexico. One analysis used to make the 63,000 estimate relied on 

1998 data for the total number of trucks registered in Mexico. However, in 1999, 

the number of registered Mexican trucks grew by 18 percent, and indications are 

that this trend is continuing. This would mean that the number of Mexican trucks 

operating at the border could range from 63,000 to 89,000 trucks. Our analysis 

showed that 26,600 Mexican trucks were inspected at least one time at the border 

during FY 2000. 

Actions the Department Needs to Take to Implement a Safety Strategy for 

the Southern Border 

Our work points to the need to strengthen controls at the southern border in 

order to provide reasonable assurance of the safety of Mexican trucks and drivers 

operating in the United States. The Department recognizes the need to strengthen 

controls and is developing a safety strategy. In the near term, developing an inspection capability that includes providing inspectors and inspection facilities at the border crossings, and using that capability to enforce compliance with U.S. safety regulations are key to ensuring the safety of Mexican trucks and drivers. 

In this regard, there are six areas that will need to be addressed in the near 

term as part of the safety strategy. They are: Staffing, Safety Reviews and Inspections, Enforcement, Facilities, Rulemakings, and Outreach. We believe 

these are strong elements that would enhance the Department’s safety strategy, facilitate the implementation of NAFTA’s provisions, and ensure the safety of Mexican 

trucks and drivers operating in the United States.

1. Staffing. Deploying additional onsite inspectors during all operating hours 

at all southern border crossings.

Currently, inspectors are not on duty at all border crossings during all hours of 

operation. In 1998, we estimated that 139 inspectors were needed to provide sufficient coverage at all crossings during operating hours. FMCSA increased the authorized number of inspectors at the southern border from 13 in FY 1998 to 60 in FY 

2001. Currently, 58 of the 60 authorized positions are filled. The following chart 

shows, by border State, the number of Federal inspectors onsite and the number we 

estimated was needed.

29

The Administration’s budget request for FY 2002 includes $13.9 million to hire 

80 additional enforcement personnel for the southern border. Deploying the additional 80 enforcement personnel at the border would bring the total number of authorized Federal inspectors there to 140, and be responsive to our 1998 recommendation. However, over time the requirement for Federal inspectors to be 

physically located at the border crossings is likely to change if the States establish 

permanent inspection facilities and increase their inspection staffs. 

The Department is developing a deployment plan for these 80 enforcement personnel as part of its safety strategy. If the 80 enforcement personnel are not deployed onsite at the border in the near term, sufficient inspectors will not be in 

place at all border crossings during hours of commercial vehicle operations except 

for two of California’s crossings. We will be monitoring the development of the Department’s deployment plan for the 80 enforcement personnel as well as the actions 

taken by the States.

2. Safety Reviews and Inspections. Performing safety reviews before granting 

conditional authority to operate in the United States, and inspecting all longhaul vehicles and drivers before or as they enter the United States.

Safety reviews should be performed and successfully completed before conditional 

authority is granted to new entrant carriers. At least initially, the Department will 

need to decide on a case-by-case basis whether safety reviews should be performed 

onsite at the applicant carrier’s location to: verify the accuracy of safety performance 

data and required safety management programs (including drug and alcohol testing, 

driver qualifications, and driver’s hours-of-service), inspect vehicles, and ensure applicants are knowledgeable of U.S. safety regulations. The decision on where safety 

reviews should be performed will depend on the availability and quality of the applicant’s safety performance data. Also, inspecting vehicles onsite during a safety review would reduce the impact on traffic congestion of performing vehicle safety inspections at the border. 

Because the long-haul carriers are new entrants, their vehicles should be inspected as they enter the United States unless they have a current CVSA inspection 

decal indicating that the vehicle has passed a U.S. inspection within the preceding 

3 months. Long-haul drivers should be inspected at the border to verify they have 

a valid CDL, a logbook, and that they are in compliance with hours-of-service rules. 

For inspectors to readily identify long-haul vehicles, vehicles should be assigned 

identification numbers that distinguish them from vehicles authorized to operate 

only in commercial zones. 

The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Section 210, specifies that 

new entrant requirements shall apply to all motor carriers, domestic and foreign. 

The new entrant requirements call for safety reviews to ensure applicant carriers 

are knowledgeable about Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. FMCSA has not 

yet implemented Section 210 of the Act for U.S. carriers. It is important that this 

be done for safety reasons and to provide evenhanded treatment for U.S. and Mexican carriers. 

Passenger buses also receive access to the United States under NAFTA. During 

FY 2000, there were only 100 passenger buses inspected at southern border crossings. However, the U.S. Customs Service reports that about 300,000 bus crossings 

occurred at the border during FY 2000, and 80 percent of those were at 3 ports of 


718mea3.eps
30

entry: San Diego, California, and Laredo and Hildalgo, Texas. Inspections of buses 

and drivers should also be part of the Department’s safety strategy.

3. Enforcement. Implementing procedures for monitoring the safety performance of new entrants with conditional authority and taking firm action 

against those carriers that do not comply with safety regulations and those 

that evade the safety net and enter the United States without authority.

Effectively enforcing safety regulations requires a system that tracks a carrier’s safety performance and triggers action for noncompliance with U.S. safety regulations. These triggers should initiate the issuance of deficiency letters and suspension 

notices of U.S. operating authority. This will be particularly important during the 

18-month period when new entrants are operating under conditional authority. 

FMCSA’s proposed rulemaking defines the 18-month conditional period as a time of 

enhanced safety oversight for new entrants. At the end of the 18-month period, the 

conditional authority would become permanent if a carrier’s most recent safety review is satisfactory. 

A key element of FMCSA’s ability to take firm enforcement action is a system 

that provides good safety performance data and allows inspectors immediate access 

to those data. To accomplish this, FMCSA is developing a single access system that 

will provide inspectors information from FMCSA and Mexican databases on carrier 

safety performance. FMCSA needs to ensure the system is completed and deployed 

by the end of 2001 as currently scheduled. 

Strong enforcement will be needed for the minority of carriers that are egregious 

offenders and a risk to public safety. The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act 

of 1999, Section 219, provided fines and disqualification sanctions for Mexican carriers operating without authority or beyond their authority in the United States. 

The fines range from $10,000 to $25,000. However, the Act’s provision has not been 

implemented, and this provision will expire when NAFTA cross-border trucking provisions are implemented. A comparable provision will have to be carried over to deal 

with carriers operating beyond or without authority in the United States. 

In 1999, we reported that 52 Mexico domiciled motor carriers were operating improperly in 20 States outside the 4 southern border States, and 202 motor carriers 

were operating improperly beyond the commercial zones within the border States. 

These carriers were operating beyond authority or without authority. Our ongoing 

work shows this problem continues. Data on FY 2000 roadside inspections throughout the United States show that 56 Mexican carriers operated improperly in 25 

states outside the 4 border States. 

Also, FMCSA has not issued an order on enforcement of registration requirements 

provided in Section 205 of the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999. This 

order would give the States the authority to place vehicles out of service if found 

operating without authority or beyond the scope of authority granted. 

FMCSA needs to take swift action to give States the authority to enforce the operating authority requirements.

4. Facilities. Obtaining available land at southern border crossings to provide 

inspectors space and facilities needed to safely perform inspections and park vehicles placed out of service.

Currently, the only permanent inspection facilities at the U.S.-Mexico border are 

the State facilities in Calexico and Otay Mesa, California. Construction is underway 

for two permanent State inspection facilities in Santa Teresa, New Mexico, and 

Nogales, Arizona. Both of these facilities will be adjacent to the U.S. Customs Service port of entry lots. 

At the 25 border crossings where permanent facilities are not available, Federal 

and State inspectors work within the U.S. Customs Service’s port of entry lots. 

FMCSA has provided portable buildings at eight of these crossings. At 19 of the 25 

crossings, FMCSA inspectors have space to inspect only 1 or 2 trucks at a time, and 

at 14 crossings have only 1 or 2 spaces to park vehicles placed out of service. It 

takes at least 2 years to get permanent inspections facilities built. In the near term, 

FMCSA must secure additional space at the border crossings to safely perform inspections and place vehicles out of service. 

Not all of the space requirements can be easily addressed because land is not 

readily available at all border crossings. However, we contacted the General Services Administration (GSA) and found that land is available on or adjacent to the 

U.S. Customs Service port of entry lots at 16 border crossings. Although other Federal agencies have long-term plans for using most of this available land, many of 

the plans are not yet funded. For example, at the Pharr border crossing, with about 

370,000 truck crossings in FY 2000, there are 14 acres in GSA’s inventory for which 

there are no currently funded plans. 

31

FMCSA may be able to obtain agreements to use available land in the near term 

without impacting other Agencies’ long-term plans for the space. Resolving the space 

issue will likely require high-level attention because it will involve extensive coordination with other Federal agencies, tenants, and lessors.

5. Rulemakings. Revising the recently issued proposed rulemakings on application procedures and a monitoring system to require safety reviews and physical 

inspections of trucks and drivers before they operate in the United States, and 

issuing the final rules.

Two proposed FMCSA rulemakings establish new application procedures for Mexican carriers seeking new operating authority beyond and within the commercial 

zones, and require carriers to provide detailed information about their safety practices and to self-certify compliance with U.S. safety regulations. A third rulemaking 

proposes implementing a safety monitoring system to determine whether Mexican 

carriers operating in the United States comply with safety regulations. 

FMCSA issued the three Notices of Proposed Rulemaking on May 3, 2001. The 

period for public comment on the proposed rules closed on July 2, 2001, and FMCSA 

plans to finalize the rules by the end of October 2001. However, the rulemakings 

will need to be revised to incorporate changes that are made as the Department develops its safety strategy. For example, the existing proposed rules do not include 

requirements that a safety review be completed before conditional operating authority is granted, or that long-haul vehicles and drivers be inspected before they enter 

and operate in the United States. 

One of FMCSA’s proposed rulemakings requires carriers currently operating within the commercial zones to reapply for operating authority under the ‘‘new entrant’’

program. Under the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act, the ‘‘new entrant’’ provision applies to carriers seeking ‘‘new’’ authority, not those with existing authority. 

In the near term, FMCSA may be able to reduce its workload by focusing its efforts 

on carriers that are truly new entrants in that they do not have authority to operate 

in the United States at all.

6. Outreach. Conducting workshops and outreach sessions to provide potential 

applicants with guidance on how to complete applications, which should result 

in more complete and accurate applications and facilitateqtimely processing.

FMCSA’s strategy includes provisions to sponsor eight 1-day workshops that provide an overview of the Federal safety rules and the border States’ rules. This would 

also help provide the target audience for the workshop and show motor carriers how 

to apply for operating authority. These workshops should provide excellent opportunities for the Mexican carriers and FMCSA to benefit from an exchange of information. The limitation we see at this time is the plan to conduct these workshops before finalizing the rulemakings covering the application processes and the monitoring system.

32


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718mea5.eps
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The CHAIRMAN. General Mead, your testimony is good, but when 

we learned that there are only two checkpoints of the 27, in other 

words, trucks can come over at 25 other points without inspection, 

you couldn’t be happy about that, can you? 

Mr. MEAD. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. The fact of the matter that we haven’t even appointed a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrator, we have had 

six, going on 7 months, and they have not even sent one to us, you 

cannot be happy about that? 

Mr. MEAD. No. This has been a problem for almost a year and 

a half. 

The CHAIRMAN. NHTSA itself, you only set up the administrator, 

that took 7 months, just last week. But at the end of the year last 

year on the Firestone tire hearing before this Committee, we 

learned that of 99 million recalls, motor vehicle recalls in a 5-year 

period, that NHTSA, National Highway Safety Transportation Administration, had yet to order one of the 99 million. That was Secretary Slater’s testimony at that time. 

The only reason they are being recalled I guess is on account of 

the trial lawyers. It was only on account of the trial lawyers that 

we learned about Firestone, 200 deaths. Then it finally came—in 

other words, we got, I got confidence in you, but we got a lot of 

work to do on the safety side. I mean, we sound strong and pretty 

in our plan and this point, point five, point nine and everything 

else, but we are seeing darn little safety when they do not even set 

up an administrator and they do not even make a recall and 99 

million recalls and when the distinguished chairman on the House 

side said the tires were being replaced with faulty tires, the administration said it would take us months to find out about the replacement tires. We do not know whether they are safe or not. 

So let us gear it up. You are in charge. You are the inspector 

general. Secretary Mineta, with respect to the time it is going to 

take, now, we say we are going to open the border, but we got less 

than 6 months. Do you think we can do all of these things you have 

attested to and General Mead has attested to by January 1st? 

Secretary MINETA. Yes, sir, I do. First of all, there are, our request was for $88.2 million. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Secretary MINETA. Roughly $56 million of it was for facilities. 

$54 million to the states for facilities, and some $2.6 million as I 

recall for Federal, for Federal facilities. And then $18 million is in 

there for additional inspectors. The recommended number by the 

attorney general, I mean by the Inspector General is the number 

that we are following, and so——

The CHAIRMAN. We got enough money because we have given you 

on the Senate side, we plan to give you at least 15 million more. 

Secretary MINETA. The House knocked out all the money and 

then also prohibited us from processing any motor carrier applications. But if we have the financial resources and get the inspectors 

in place, I am still hoping to be able to comply with that, hopefully 

in the January timeframe. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Mead just testified, attested to, what 

about that, are you going to replace those at all of the 27 checkVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
35

points and everything? California is good, but can we get a California check at the other 26? 

Secretary MINETA. Well, what we are hoping is that we will have 

that CVSA decal procedure being followed as part of the procedure 

on inspections. And the—the part about California is that all of the 

states get motor carrier safety money. California receives roughly 

$8 million in MCSAP money. But they have on top of that implemented it with about $30 to $35 million of their own California 

money in order to do the inspection program at Calexico and Otay 

Mesa. 

None of the other states—I take it back. Arizona and New Mexico have some money of their own into it, in addition to the MCSAP 

money. But the other states, the states have not put in as much 

money as the state of California. 

The CHAIRMAN. What about land? We released the land that you 

need now down there or what? 

Secretary MINETA. Land is something that we do need. As the Inspector General mentioned, we need the land to perform the truck 

inspections and to park out of service vehicles. And we are working 

on those agreements right now at the locations. To me, land is not 

going to be a problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. My time is going to be up, Mr. Secretary. With 

respect to conditions, you said in your opening statement you had 

serious concerns about the conditions that the Appropriations Committee in its transportation appropriations bill enunciated. What 

are those things that you have serious concerns about? 

Secretary MINETA. There were a number of things, I am trying 

to recall some of them. Requirements, for instance, of weigh motion 

devices and scales at crossings. I have no problem if we want to 

do both. I am not sure why we would want to put in both weighin-motion devices as well as scales at the border crossings. 

There are a number of issues in terms of certification that are 

being placed on me in terms of the safety of the trucks, in terms 

of, and I have, as I say, no problem with the inspection portion of 

it, but there are a number of the requirements in the Murray 

amendment that were troublesome to me, and raised some concerns. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you itemize those for the Committee and 

give it to us because we will be debating the transportation appropriation bills. Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, we 

are all frustrated at the slow pace of the nominating process, but 

I think it is important and, in light of your previous statement, to 

point out that the office of truck safety administrator was created 

in January 1 of the year 2000. The previous administration never 

sent over a nominee to fill that job. 

The CHAIRMAN. Clyde Hart was enacted. 

Senator MCCAIN. There was never a nomination sent over. To accuse this administration——

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get the post filled. We cannot fill 

it unless they send one over. They did not have to send one over 

under the Clinton Administration. They just put the fellow there 

and he administered. 

Senator MCCAIN. That is curious logic. 

36

The CHAIRMAN. That is not curious logic. It is fact. 

Secretary MINETA. Hopefully at the 1 o’clock briefing that Mr. 

Fleisher has every day, he will be announcing the President’s nomination for the Administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration. 

Senator MCCAIN. Something that hasn’t happened since January 

1st of the year 2000. I thank you, Mr. Mineta. First of all, Mr. 

Mead, do you have any disagreement with Secretary Mineta’s 

statements, not only principles, but specifics as to how the Department of Transportation would implement the NAFTA trucking and 

bus access provisions? Do you have any additions to that, or deletions? 

Mr. MEAD. I think we are in substantial agreement. One point 

needing closure, I believe, is whether the Department establishes 

a rule or a policy that before Mexican trucks can come into the interior States, the trucks will be inspected and pass the inspection, 

and the drivers will be inspected as well. Either that, or the vehicle 

has a current decal indicating that that type of inspection has occurred in the preceding 3 months. 

I know the Administration has committed to increasing very substantially the number of those inspections, but I think the details 

of exactly how that would be implemented will need to be worked 

out. 

Senator MCCAIN. In other words, the model that is now pretty 

much in place in California? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes. Even more robust than California. A difference 

in California, sir, is when trucks come across the border, the truck 

gets inspected, but California does not inspect the carrier per se to 

make sure, for example, that all of its drivers are qualified. The 

Department’s plan will have to go into checking the carrier itself, 

as well as the individual trucks and drivers. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Secretary Mineta, You have stated 

a couple of times now that you have reservations or objections to 

the language which was put into the DOT Appropriations bill that 

will be up on the floor shortly. How serious are those concerns? Are 

you prepared at this time to say whether those concerns are strong 

enough to prompt the threat of a Presidential veto and finally, do 

you believe that those provisions cause the United States to be in 

violation of NAFTA? 

Secretary MINETA. First of all, in my statement, Senator, I did 

indicate that there are senior advisors to the President who have 

indicated they would recommend a veto if the present language 

stays in the bill and does come to the President for signature. 

Senator MCCAIN. The Senate version. 

Secretary MINETA. The Senate version. Yes, sir. And also, as to 

whether or not those provisions are in violation of NAFTA, they 

would indicate that it is. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I know that there will be further discussions and an examination of this issue with the Administration. 

Though there are many people involved in the deliberations, we 

need to have a very definitive position from the Administration on 

this issue since I think it would affect the level and tenor of the 

debate. It would be helpful to know the President’s position not 

only as to whether it will provoke a veto if the Senate AppropriaVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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tions bill language were allowed to stand, but also whether those 

provisions would, upon review of the Administration, be in violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 

Secretary MINETA. We are in the throes of preparing that comparison in terms of the conditions of the Murray amendment, but 

let me just give some general observations, that the terms of the 

amendment are overly rigid and burdensome, and that thought 

about whether or not we could be doing many of the things through 

administrative regulations rather than having it in the statute. 

The cumulative effect of the 22 separate requirements, standing 

alone, many of the requirements would be acceptable, but taken in 

the aggregate, they could result in a violation of our commitments 

under NAFTA. 

The additional cost that would be above what we had submitted 

originally, we, as I said submitted an $88.2 million request. The 

Senate did add, based on I believe it was Senator Hutchinson’s 

amendment, $15 million, but in order to fully implement all of the 

requirements, it would cost an additional $77.3 million above the 

funds that had been requested by the President. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. Mr. Mineta, should all 

Canadian trucks be inspected? Mr. Mead? Yes? No? 

Mr. MEAD. I don’t think the same circumstance applies to the 

condition of Canadian trucks. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Dorgan. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman. Let me ask you, Secretary Mineta, more specifically on the Murray provisions which in my opinion are not as effective as the Sabo amendment in the House. 

Which of the Murray provisions could not be complied with? I 

mean, it seems to me that if you oppose the Murray provisions, it 

is perhaps because you cannot comply with some or all of the provisions. Which of the provisions do you believe you are not able to 

comply with? 

Secretary MINETA. Subsection 1–A of Section 343, that the Department of Transportation must conduct two full compliance reviews with satisfactory or better results of Mexican carriers who 

wish to go operate outside a commercial zone, and one of those 

would be a review prior to granting conditional authority and a second would be prior to granting permanent authority. Again, in 

terms of making sure that our inspection services are not any different from United States to Mexican, to Canadian carriers, that 

is not required of United States or Canadian carriers. 

In terms of——

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Mineta. Mr. Secretary—just on that point, 

we do not require reciprocal requirements. For example, inspect 

meat from Canada. Right now today there is going to be a truckload of fresh meat coming to North Dakota from Canada. We do 

not accept that—we accept that. We have well-established that in 

Canada they have a rigid inspection process for meat which we accept. So it’s not reciprocal treatment all around. 

As we begin this process of certifying whether Mexican trucks 

are safe, this provision, Part A, talks about a full safety compliance 

38

review consistent with and you are saying that that is unnecessary 

or that you cannot comply with it? 

Secretary MINETA. I am saying that when that truck comes into 

the United States, that truck will have to observe all the rules, regulations and laws of the United States. 

Senator DORGAN. But are you not able to comply with that Section A or you just disagree with it? 

Secretary MINETA. No. In terms of conducting two full compliance reviews, to me would be very, very costly, very difficult to do. 

Senator DORGAN. You think unnecessary? 

Secretary MINETA. Compliance reviews, including going to Mexico to the terminals that they operate, and to deal with the inspection of the records at their site. 

Senator DORGAN. So you believe it is unnecessary. Let me go on. 

Other than that one, are there other——

Secretary MINETA. I am not saying it is unnecessary. I am saying 

that under these two requirements of two full compliance reviews 

that that is, I think, more than what we really have to do. 

Senator DORGAN. That is unnecessary. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary MINETA. We will be doing compliance reviews. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, if you think it is unnecessary, 

fine, just say that. If you think it is too costly or unnecessary. I understand. Are there other portions of the Murray amendment that 

you believe you cannot comply with or that you think are unnecessary? 

Let me come back to that just for a moment. I want to ask a 

question about numbers. Mr. Mead, you and Secretary Mineta 

talked about 80 new inspectors at the border. Now, my understanding is that in the budget submission to the Congress, 40 of 

those are in fact inspectors, and 40 of those are investigators. Is 

it your understanding that the investigators, which will be doing 

I think what is anticipated in Part A that the Secretary just described, they are not going to be out there on the line inspecting 

trucks so if you only have 40 rather than 80 as both you and the 

Secretary testified to, that comes up to a substantial number short 

of what you indicated in your testimony is necessary to have full 

coverage at the border. Can you describe that problem? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, it would. We have had some discussions in the 

Department about this. You should know that the 140 inspectors 

figure is one that we calculated in the Inspector General’s office in 

1998, made a recommendation on, and this Administration accepted. It was calculated on the assumption that you have inspectors 

at the border crossing during all hours of operation for each one of 

the crossings. There was some discussion earlier that maybe we do 

not need to deploy all of these inspectors at the border, but I think 

that issue has been resolved in the affirmative: they will be placed 

at the border and they will be inspectors. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Mead, do you agree that we are short of 

that. The Secretary is testifying there are 80 new positions. Is it 

not the fact that 40 of those will not be inspecting trucks at the 

border? 

Mr. MEAD. I believe that the Department is now committed. The 

Secretary will speak to this. We specifically had this discussion, 

39

and I think that they are all going to be inspectors and they are 

all going to be at the border. 

Senator DORGAN. General Mead, they are either going to be inspectors and inspecting trucks or they are going to be conducting 

investigations. My point is that the Secretary’s testimony says that 

we have 80 new inspectors. The submission to the Congress for appropriations talks about 40 inspectors and 40 investigators. Those 

are very difference functions. Now, which of those functions will 

not be done in your judgment? 

Mr. MEAD. Well, I understood that it was 80 inspectors. That is 

what I understood. 

Senator DORGAN. So then where is the resources? Where will the 

resources for the investigations come from? My understanding from 

the appropriations submission is that you are talking about 40 inspectors and 40 investigators, and part of this discussion we just 

had about the Murray amendment is the requirement for safety 

compliance reviews. That is all investigated. 

You are investigating the circumstances of that truck line, that 

industry. That is as opposed to full-time inspectors being available 

when a truck is presented at the border, and I just think someplace 

here we are short 40 people in terms of what is being represented 

in the Committee. 

Mr. MEAD. I see your point. The staffing for the Motor Carrier 

Administration has been increasing sharply since the law was 

passed. And for 2002, they have asked for 850 people, compared to 

714 in 2001. So some of those people would have to do the investigations. 

Senator DORGAN. Let me just for the record, let me indicate that 

the Office of Inspector General report, interim report on the status 

of implementation, you say FMCSA has not released its plan for 

where these additional personnel will be stationed, however 40 will 

be inspectors and 40 will be investigators. Normally inspectors inspect commercial vehicles, drivers and—normally inspectors inspect 

commercial vehicles and drivers and investigators conduct compliance reviews of motor carriers. 

My point is that the 80 number that has been given us today to 

try to assure us that you have got plenty of inspectors is not an 

80 number that complies with what is in your report and in my 

judgment, doesn’t correspond with what Mr. Mineta is saying the 

80 would be used for. So we are missing—something is not being 

represented here. 

Secretary MINETA. May I respond? 

Senator DORGAN. Sure. 

Secretary MINETA. The amount of money that we have requested 

is something like $50 million for facilities and then we have requested some $18 million for inspectors. You are correct. Some of 

those people are investigators, but they are also interchangeable. 

There is also an additional $18 million that will be going for state 

inspectors at the border. So it is not just the 80 additional that we 

are adding to the 60 we already have. 

We are also implementing through the MCSAP program to the 

states additional inspectors at the crossing. Now, you were just 

asking a little while ago, are you going to be conducting compliance 

reviews? Yes, we are. But as you say, those are done by investigaVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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tors, but these are interchangeable in terms of inspectors and investigators. And they can sit there and wear one hat 1 day and 

change it and do their inspections. They are not just clothed as investigators, or clothed as inspectors. They can take their hat off 

and go from a border crossing inspector to do compliance review at 

a terminal site in Guadalajara, Cancun, Chihuahua, or whatever 

and do inspections at the border. If we don’t have that kind of flexibility to do this, then we will have to have more than what we have 

already requested in terms of money for the people we need to do 

the job. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen. 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been reading 

through all this. Senator Dorgan, whatever his bill is, actually lists 

several perspectives or principles that I think make a great deal of 

sense. They meet United States requirements. That there is fulltime enforcement program with respect to compliance requirements, that you implement the Inspector General’s recommendations, there is an ongoing program of monitoring, an evaluation in 

place. 

I think a lot of that is very probative and helpful to me in this. 

One thing you could do is probably translate all this money that 

we are talking about in here into how many more full-time employees. How many more personnel will there be with this? Have you 

done any calculations on how this amount of money will calculate 

into the number of people actually inspecting and ensuring safety 

compliance? 

Secretary MINETA. Our request, original request was based on 

our——

Senator ALLEN. Let us just assume you are adding another $15 

million at least. 

Secretary MINETA. We are adding $18 million in order to, when 

the Inspector General talked about needing 80 additional inspectors. That was what our $18 million request was based on to come 

up with the 80 additional bodies on top of the 60 that were already 

there. And then the balance, there is another $18 million that will 

go for state inspectors. 

Senator ALLEN. How many will that translate to? 

Secretary MINETA. 180 in terms of state inspectors. 

Senator ALLEN. All right. Now, you are talking about needing 

land. If these trucks are defective, you park them. Generally, in the 

United States if they are parked, it is because they simply are not 

going to move them until they fix them. And maybe this is a common sense approach. Why don’t we just require those trucks to 

turn around and go back to Mexico and let Mexico figure out where 

to park them while putting on some markings on it so that they 

do not just change the tractor. 

Say the trailer was the problem, as opposed to the actual tractor. 

Why not just turn around and let Mexico worry about where the 

heck they are going to park them as opposed to us worrying about 

getting more land. Whoever is carrying the freight is pretty upset 

they have to bring another shipment vehicle. 

Mr. MEAD. They often do send them back. It is just that 

logistically, you have all these trucks coming across and the chance 

of getting one that is fatally defective from a safety standpoint is 

41

fairly high right now. They have to have somewhere to put them, 

even temporarily while they write out the paperwork, before they 

can turn them around and send them home. The point here is that 

when you only have room for a couple of trucks, that is not sufficient, and we ought to take advantage of whatever land we can 

use, even temporarily, that is on the site to park these out-of-service trucks. 

Senator ALLEN. You were explaining this as if these trucks are 

just sitting there for a long while until some mechanic comes—or 

whatever they are going to do with them—or bring that tractor and 

send the other back. 

Mr. MEAD. Sometimes that happens. I saw one of these inspections where you wouldn’t want to turn the truck around—it did not 

have any brakes. 

Senator ALLEN. In a roundabout way it might make the compliance people in Mexico be more concerned, as we would be, if that 

truck had gotten through. You mentioned on the analysis of those 

vehicles that had decals and you found the various compliance 

rates or defect rates of 24 percent in California, 50 percent in El 

Paso or somewhere in New Mexico. 

Have you done any analysis of the truck that did have the decals 

to verify the credibility of those inspections and whether those—

even in this country, there are folks who get their vehicles inspected and they wonder why some vehicles are passing inspection 

that shouldn’t be passing it. Do you have any verification of the accuracy or credibility of those with decals? 

Mr. MEAD. I have not done a quantitative analysis, Senator 

Allen, but I have spoken directly to the people at the Otay Mesa 

facility and asked that question. They said yes, they do see a difference—the fact is that the recurring 3-month inspection does 

have an effect. It is true sometimes you get a truck in there with 

the decal on it and it has a safety problem, but it tends not to be 

as grave as some of the others you might find, such as no brakes. 

Senator ALLEN. Mr. Secretary, I think you ought to be quantifying success in whether you are doing things right in the ongoing 

aspects of this, and how are you going to quantify the safety compliance of these tractors and trailers and the capabilities of the 

drivers as this goes forward. 

I think this is a very ambitious program to get this all done by 

the end of this year. But regardless of all of that, how are you 

going to quantify it? What matrix are you going to use to give us 

assurance other than there is a Mexican truck that has gotten in 

a wreck and that is less per mile than it is for United States 

trucks, and that sort of thing, as opposed to waiting until there is 

a wreck and comparing that collision record versus United States 

or Canadian vehicles. How are you going to determine that? 

Secretary MINETA. Let me take first the driver’s side. There is 

a commercial driver license requirement in Mexico. Mexico is building its database so that when that driver comes to the border, we 

are going to be able to have direct online capability into the data 

on that driver, through the commercial driver’s license database, 

and be able to check it out that way. 

We will also require as they are at the border, a physical inspection of the driver in terms of the license requirement, so that both 

42

in terms of what Mexico is developing in its database and improving upon it, building that database, and our ability to get into it, 

I feel that we are working toward making sure that we have driver’s safety requirements built in. 

Second, as it relates to the truck site, again, when you look at 

the amount of traffic at the border, most of it is drayage. Some 4.5 

million trips back and forth. That 4.5 million is across the border, 

just back and forth. Pick up a trailer, bring a trailer over, tractor 

goes back, picks up another trailer. It is back and forth. Those 

opeations are conducted by about roughly 80,000 trucks, I believe, 

is the number generally. 

Now, of the 80,000 trucks, roughly, I think about 63,000, as I recall, 65,000 were Mexican trucks. And of the Mexican trucks, I believe, something like 47,000 were inspected. So of the trucks that 

are back and forth, of the Mexican trucks that are going back and 

forth, we have a relatively high number being inspected right now. 

That will be intensifying in terms of what we are attempting to implement through our appropriations request. 

So that we have both on the driver’s side, as well as on the truck 

side, the ability to do the kind of inspections that the arbitration 

panel said, ‘‘United States, you are in violation of the NAFTA treaty, but also United States, you can impose your rules, regulations 

and laws against the Mexican carriers coming in.’’ And that is all 

we are trying to do is to use those safety regulations, no more, no 

less, and to apply it against those trucks coming in. 

Now, I do not believe we are prepared to be able to deal with the 

whole truck, whether it is coming in just across the commercial 

zone back and forth, or the truck that decides to come through that 

is destined for Cleveland or Chicago or New York. Because under 

the NAFTA agreement, again, I don’t recall the exact dates, but I 

believe it said that by 1995, trucks would be allowed to go beyond 

the commercial zone to within the border of the four border states. 

And then in the year 2000, January 1, 2000, I believe it was, 

they would be able to go anywhere in the United States. Since the 

1995 and 2000 deadlines were not met, we are going to be collapsing both of those to allow both commercial zone traffic, as well 

as beyond commercial zone traffic to be implemented on January 

1, 2002. And we will have again the kind of rigorous inspection of 

the driver and the trucks of those long haul operators. 

On the other hand, my observation has been the long haul operators in Mexico are as good truck operators as United States truck 

companies. And so my concern is really more with the drayage type 

operation. We will have equal focus on the long haul carriers. But 

I have found them to be very good truck operators. 

Senator ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, let me just——

The CHAIRMAN. It is about a 10-minute answer and Senator 

Boxer has been waiting. 

Senator ALLEN. No. 1, if you would provide us a specific bill of 

analysis, legal analysis as to why you think that the Murray 

amendment or any of these somehow are in legal violation of 

NAFTA. 

Finally, gentlemen, I think to get sufficient confidence-at least in 

the Senate-to support what you are trying to do as far as the safety 

compliance, you in the administration are going to have to perform 

43

more duties than you may think are necessary to get enough votes 

for this, so I—— Secretary MINETA. I am willing to step up to that if I am given 

the resources to meet those requirements. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I have to say I cannot 

overstate my concern, and sometimes at hearings you feel better, 

you know, after a while. You come in with a concern. You feel better. I am feeling worse. Mr. Mead, I say to you, you have a lovely 

smile, but you have got some situation to monitor here, and we are 

going to be counting on to you monitor it in the most straightforward way. 

When we talk about Senator Dorgan’s question about 40 inspectors and 40 investigators and Mr. Mineta says well, they are interchangeable. If I had an accident and I go to an insurance company 

and someone investigates that accident, I do not want that guy fixing my car. It is a very different set of skills. So let us be careful 

and precise. 

Now, my understanding is we are currently inspecting, Federal 

Government, 1 percent of the trucks, and out of that 1 percent, and 

you can fudge it any way, you can come up with any number you 

want, and I will show you where I got that, 36 percent of those 

failed that inspection and Mr. Mead talks about a truck, he 

couldn’t bring it back over the border because it had no brakes. 

Well imagine, we are only inspecting 1 percent. 

And then I look at my state that is putting tens of millions of 

dollars of its state money, and we talk about unfunded mandates. 

This was one of the issues with NAFTA that was raised by many 

of us. You know, what happens when the state now has to fund 

some of the problems? 

Mr. Mead, where would you be if California said today, this is 

a Federal Government responsibility, we did not sign on to NAFTA, 

we are out of the inspection business. Where would you be? 

Mr. MEAD. I am glad you raised that. Do you know for years on 

this NAFTA issue, there has been a dispute between the Federal 

Government and the States? 

Senator BOXER. I do not want you to get into that. I am asking 

you where would you be if the state—— Mr. MEAD. If California were to stop inspecting, you would be in 

real trouble; there is no doubt about it. You have nice facilities 

there, and we need to replicate them all along the Southern border. 

Senator BOXER. We have a situation where we are responsible for 

NAFTA and we have a huge unfunded mandate on the states and 

some of the states aren’t stepping up to the plate. Maybe they do 

not have the resources. They have other problems, priorities. I am 

in no position to be critical. But this is very discouraging to me. 

Now, Secretary Mineta, you say that you recommend to the 

President that he veto the bill if the Murray language goes 

through. I want to read to you the description of what Murray is, 

and by the way it is Murray-Shelby, Mr. Chairman. This is bipartisan. 

Language prohibits the DOT from granting operating authority 

until a number of safety and compliance measures are put in place. 

These measures include adequate border staffing, inspection faciliVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
44

ties, the ability to check the validity of Mexican driver’s licenses, 

vehicle registration, and to verify insurance. 

Now, I do not think this is a radical trade busting amendment 

here, and I say this, if the President vetoes this legislation, the 

transportation appropriation because of this, I think he is going to 

be subjected to a lot of criticism and I think it will be well-placed. 

We have to ensure that our people are safe. 

Even with our own truck drivers, we have problems today. A lot 

of us are worried that they are working too long. My goodness. I 

was at a press conference a year ago with victims, and I say this 

to my colleagues, because we all do these, we all meet the families 

of victims. And look in their eyes and trucks where the drivers 

were tired and so on and so forth. I have shown you the difference 

in the laws here. They do not have random drug testing there. 

They get paid 7 bucks a day. We have a different situation than 

we have in countries where we have very similar laws. So I would 

hope there would be no veto threat, but rather that we roll up our 

sleeves and get the work done. 

Mr. Mineta, I want to ask you this. You threatened to veto if the 

Murray-Shelby language goes through. Do you threaten to veto if 

the House action goes through? You did not mention that. 

Secretary MINETA. Senator Boxer, let me recap what I said, and 

I apologize. 

Senator BOXER. I have so little time. Can you just answer the 

question. 

Secretary MINETA. First of all, I misspoke. The—first of all, it is 

not my recommendation about a veto. That came from senior advisors to the President. If I said Murray amendment, I apologize. I 

really meant the House language, the House-passed bill. 

Senator BOXER. Okay. 

Secretary MINETA. I apologize if I said—— Senator BOXER. So in other words, the senior staffers to the 

President are not recommending a veto if the Murray-Shelby language stays. They are if the Don Young—— Secretary MINETA. I am talking about the difficulty in some of 

the requirements in Murray, but the veto was regarding the Housepassed bill. 

Senator BOXER. That is important. I am glad that you clarified 

that because I look at the Murray amendment, I can’t imagine why 

anybody would veto over something I think is pretty mild. I have 

a number of questions and my time is running out so let me just 

before it runs out say the areas I am concerned about. 

The proposed rules for Mexican trucks require carriers to maintain copies of their proof of insurance in all trucks crossing the border. Do Federal inspectors check for the proof of insurance at this 

time? Mr. Mead? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, they do, but the carriers often just buy 1 day insurance when they are coming across. 

Senator BOXER. That is very interesting. 

Mr. MEAD. What we would like to see, based on our work, is an 

inspection of the carrier itself and their certificate of insurance. 

The insurance information would be entered into an automated 

database, and when a truck tries to get clearance to come into the 

United States, an inspector would enter the firm’s identifying inforVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
45

mation and access the database showing evidence that the firm has 

insurance. 

Senator BOXER. My time is up but this has made me even more 

nervous. A 1-day insurance and then by the way, only 1 percent of 

the trucks are inspected. Imagine how many trucks are going back 

and forth with no insurance, and wait until, God forbid, something 

happens to someone we care about in our states. This is a nightmare. We are not ready for this. We will be some day. We are not 

ready for this. I am increasingly concerned. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Stevens. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Secretary, I want to make sure about this 

because I have a substantial disagreement over the current version 

of our transportation bill from the Senator from Arizona. Am I to 

understand that your statement about the veto reference was that 

it applied to the House bill, but not to the Murray-Shelby amendment? 

Secretary MINETA. That is correct. I misspoke on that in terms 

of the veto. The veto message, so to speak, that it applied to the 

House bill. 

Senator STEVENS. I thank you for that and I hope that Senator 

McCain’s assistants will convey that to him because it is going to 

be substantial scrutiny and it changes a statement I was going to 

make, Mr. Secretary, because our Appropriations Committee voted 

unanimously to accept the amendment that is in the bill on the 

basis of the representation that was made to us that the administration preferred that substantially as opposed to the House 

version of the bill, that there was still some items they wished to 

negotiate, but they did support that amendment to go to conference. 

Now, I think it is very important for us to do that, to have that 

understanding of where the administration stands as we go to the 

floor. But one thing that bothers me, Mr. Mead, is as I understand 

it, there is a series of these areas, crossings and I should say parenthetically as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I took 

portions of the Committee down to the border 2 years ago and was 

appalled at some of the things we saw down there in terms of lack 

of inspection and the way trucks were just coming through. How 

many of the border crossings—we do not have full inspection staffs. 

What is that figure? There are 27 crossings, right? 

Mr. MEAD. 25. The example I gave about Laredo, that is probably 

the busiest crossing. They do not have sufficient coverage there for 

all operating hours even during the weekdays. And on the weekends, they had none at all. So that needs to change. 

Senator STEVENS. I apologize for coming in late. I had another 

meeting, and I have got to leave in a few minutes for another. But 

we will not get the full shot of these testimonies today. Did any of 

you talk about the number of these trucks that have been involved 

in accidents in our country? Do we have that accident rate? 

Mr. MEAD. No. And we do not know. 

46

Senator STEVENS. You estimate that the number of Mexican 

trucks operating across the border can range from 63,000 to 89,000 

and that 26,000 of them were inspected at least one time during 

fiscal year 2000, right? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. If we have the funds that are in this bill we 

were talking about, particularly the Senate version, can you give 

us an estimate how much the inspections will increase? If we approve the money that was asked for plus the additional $15 million 

that we have provided in the Senate version bill, do you know how 

many inspections there will be, how that would increase inspections and how many border crossings we will cover? 

Mr. MEAD. We will have every border crossing covered during all 

operating hours. However, the analysis has not been done to determine how many inspections that will translate into, and it probably 

ought to be done. There is also the point Senator Dorgan raised 

about the number of investigators that would be needed to perform 

safety reviews, which would be different from actually inspecting 

the trucks at the border. I apologize for that Senator Dorgan, I did 

not quite grasp the question. 

Senator STEVENS. My memory was when we discussed NAFTA, 

that there was an understanding that these trucks that were not 

inspected would not go beyond 25 miles from the border. Is that 25-

mile limitation still in place? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes. What you are referring to is a commercial zone, 

which is usually 20 miles, and in some cases, I think it is even less 

than that. Mexican trucks can go in there now, but they need operating authority to do so. 

Senator STEVENS. Operating authority in terms of inspection of 

the system that they run, right, rather than individual trucks? 

Mr. MEAD. Sir, now only individual trucks are inspected. 

Senator STEVENS. It is. I thought there was inspection of a system of the organization and that they ran the trucks. 

Mr. MEAD. A review of a Mexican carrier is not yet in place. That 

is part of the Department’s proposal, and it needs to be put in 

place. Right now they just inspect trucks and drivers. 

Senator STEVENS. I am interested in Senator Dorgan’s comparison of the Canadian border to the Mexican border. I am sure we 

have great friends on both sides of the border, but the Canadian 

side is based on an understanding of the totality of inspections on 

their side, as compared to the totality of inspections on our side. 

We have sort of a mirror. What they do, we do, as I understand 

it. Do we have that arrangement with the Mexicans? Do they perform inspections on their side of our trucks? 

Mr. MEAD. We have not seen evidence of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Evidence of it. 

Senator STEVENS. Are our trucks allowed into Mexico as freely 

as their trucks are allowed into our country? 

Mr. MEAD. It is the same restriction. Our trucks do not go into 

the interior of Mexico, they go down to the commercial zone. 

Senator STEVENS. I am interested now in these 25 states where 

they have showed up. How do we get those statistics where, we 

found these trucks in 25 other states? 

47

Mr. MEAD. Because a policeman inspected them, Senator Stevens. A policeman stopped the truck and it turned out to be a 

Mexican truck operating illegally without any authority at all outside the border states. 

Senator STEVENS. Did you have any of your investigations talk 

about violation of immigration laws on those trucks? I heard about 

some. I am wondering if you sent them up? 

Mr. MEAD. No, sir, I’m not familiar with that. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator from Alaska 

yield? 

Senator STEVENS. I do not have any time left, I do have to leave. 

I would say this to my friend, we are committed to this amendment, Mr. Secretary, because we voted unanimously for it. When 

we get to the floor, if you have some suggestions to make, I hope 

you deliver them to us and I hope we do not find opposition to 

something we approved on the basis of representation that is something that the administration favored as opposed to the House bill. 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s exactly why I asked that you list those serious concerns or the conditions, and I would say in the Committee 

bill. Go ahead. 

Senator DORGAN. The Senator from Alaska indicated he felt from 

some discussions that the administration perhaps supported the 

Murray amendment coming out of the Committee. From the testimony here, it wasn’t clear to me whether they simply do not oppose 

it or I guess the testimony is they would veto the Sabo amendment. 

Senator STEVENS. They indicated they preferred it to the House 

version of the bill. 

Senator DORGAN. The reason I ask the question, does that mean 

they support the Murray amendment? 

Senator STEVENS. That was our understanding. They weren’t 

overjoyed with it, but they preferred it to the House bill, and we 

were told there would be some discussion about some of the provisions that we have not had yet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the Committee, do 

you favor the Senate bill? 

Secretary MINETA. No, sir. I do not. 

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? 

Secretary MINETA. Because of the requirements it places on me 

in terms of some of the certification requirements, even in terms 

of as I look at weigh-in-motion devices and scales at the same 

place. I do not know why we would want to do that. Why would 

we want to put weigh-in-motion devices at an inspection station? 

Weigh-in-motion devices cost maybe three quarters of a million dollars. 

Senator STEVENS. May I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that you get together with the chairman and ranking member of that Subcommittee. This bill is going to come up early next week, and it is 

currently scheduled to have 1 day. It sounds to me like it could 

take more than a day to explore this amendment unless we resolve 

some of your objections before it gets there, and I think we could. 

Secretary MINETA. We will do that. Senator, in response to your 

request about accident rates for Mexican trucks within commercial 

zones, the accident rate is .07. Now, as far as I know, there have 

only been 56 trucks that have gone beyond the commercial zone 

48

into other states, and, but that is, that determines the accident 

rate is .07. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. I will wait until the next round. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Fitzgerald? 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER FITZGERALD,

U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS 

Senator FITZGERALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the Secretary and the Inspector General to the Committee. I 

want to compliment the Secretary. I think he has been doing a 

wonderful job as the head of the Department of Transportation and 

I think your experience is showing. You have vast knowledge in a 

wide range of areas. 

I think I just want to reiterate what Senator Stevens said. If we 

could get some clarification as to the DOT’s position with respect 

to the Murray-Shelby amendment, maybe different than the White 

House’s opinion, in any respect, we ought to iron those differences 

out and get some clear guidance before we have that bill on the 

floor. 

This past Sunday, Vincente Fox, the President of Mexico, was in 

Chicago, and Senator Durbin and I had the opportunity to talk to 

him about this very issue. And I do know that this is a very important issue, and our solving it will go a long way toward enhancing 

our friendship with our neighbors to the south. I do hope that our 

country can comply with NAFTA, and I think that if we can put 

a man on the moon or even have a successful test of our missile 

defense system, we should be able to find a way to comply with 

NAFTA while at the same time having proper oversight over the 

safety of our trucks in this country. 

But I do not think that the safety issue should be minimized. It 

is a legitimate issue. As you know, in my state of Illinois, we had 

a situation where there were bribes for commercial driver’s licenses, schemes which resulted in some trucking firms paying 

bribes to have inspectors from the Secretary of State’s office issue 

driver’s licenses to people who are not qualified—commercial driver’s licenses—and we had some serious injuries, even fatalities. 

In one case, an unqualified truck driver was driving a truck just 

south of our northern Illinois border with Wisconsin, a piece fell off 

the truck, it hit the car behind them, there were seven children in 

that car who died in the fiery accident, and the parents survived. 

They lost seven kids. So there are serious consequences that have 

real-life implications if we do not ensure the safety of our trucks. 

I guess I would want to ask, Mr. Mead, do you believe that if you 

received the additional funding that you requested, and that you 

did the things you were going to do, that that would reasonably 

guarantee that the safety of Mexican trucks would be comparable 

to that of United States and Canadian trucks? 

Mr. MEAD. Well, as you know, the Inspector General makes recommendations. We do not administer the programs, but we made 

some recommendations. I believe from the Secretary’s statement 

that the Department is saying that it is prepared in substantial 

part to adopt them. I think this is very ambitious. I think the administration’s budget request of $88 million extra was very much 

49

needed, and I am sure that the plus up that the Senate provided, 

although it wasn’t in the President’s budget request, could probably 

be put to good use at the border. 

Senator FITZGERALD. My understanding is that right now Mexican long haul trucks that are headed for Canada are able to travel 

through the United States, and maybe I am not informed properly 

on that, but if their destination is in Canada, as opposed to in the 

United States, are they able to pass through? 

Mr. MEAD. Technically yes. 

Senator FITZGERALD. They are? 

Mr. MEAD. I think so. 

Senator FITZGERALD. And are they doing that now? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes. 

Senator FITZGERALD. Is there any evidence that those Mexican 

trucks which are passing through the United States on the way to 

Canada are less safe than our United States trucks, or do we have 

any information on that? 

Mr. MEAD. No. No evidence. 

Senator FITZGERALD. But they are driving through on their way 

to Canada right now without restriction? 

Mr. MEAD. That is my understanding. I can’t quantify that. I 

don’t know how much, but it is technically legal. 

Senator FITZGERALD. So that is kind of a—that is a little bit of 

a glitch here then. Also, my understanding is a United States firm 

that owns a Mexican trucking company is able to have its subsidiary company from Mexico drive on our highways. Is that correct? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes. That carrier is considered a Mexican domiciled 

carrier, with U.S. ownership. The trucks we are speaking of today 

are primarily Mexican domiciled carriers, with Mexican ownership. 

Senator FITZGERALD. The bottom line, if you have the United 

States firms that own Mexican trucking companies and you have 

Mexican trucking companies whose destination is Canada, there 

are a lot of Mexican trucks coming through the United States right 

now as we hold this hearing, without restriction. 

Mr. MEAD. I wouldn’t go so far as to quantify it. I can’t support 

the quantification that you just did. 

Senator FITZGERALD. There would be some? 

Mr. MEAD. There would be some. Yes, sir. 

Senator FITZGERALD. Okay. One final question, in that accident 

that we had in Illinois, there was evidence that the driver was unable to read English. And that clearly can be a problem if you cannot read our road signs here in the United States. Has there been 

any discussion about some kind of requirement that the drivers 

from Mexico be able to understand our road signs? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes. They are supposed to be able to do so. 

Senator FITZGERALD. Okay, and that is current law now? Current 

requirements? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes. 

Senator FITZGERALD. Okay. With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you 

very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Back to you, Senator Nelson. 

50

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to refer to 

Senator Boxer’s chart here and ask the two panelists if that is an 

accurate comparison in your understanding of the difference between the Mexican standards and the United States standards? 

Secretary MINETA. Senator Nelson, the—those are United States 

requirements, and it is true that Mexico does not have those laws. 

But by the same token, once their driver or their truck comes into 

the border, then they are required to comply with United States 

laws, rules and regulations. And that is what we are attempting 

to, since I have been there since the 25th of January, my whole effort has been to make sure that trucks and drivers that are coming 

in are safe. 

We could have all the laws that we might have, whether it is on 

trucking or on other things, but they do not necessarily apply in 

a foreign country, and so yes, that is correct. Those are United 

States laws. That is the state of Mexican law, but our laws do not 

apply in Mexico, but our laws do apply to their trucks and drivers 

when they come in. 

Mr. MEAD. There have been a couple of developments in the past 

year that put an asterisk on that. The logbooks, where drivers 

record where they are going and how long they have been driving, 

are now required of Mexican drivers, and that is an important step 

because before March of 2000, Mexico did not require them except 

for hauling hazardous material. 

The next step would be hours of service, but at least logbooks are 

required to record the time that they are driving. We understand 

that they recently adopted vehicle inspection standards. I think it 

is also fair to say they have made some progress in establishing 

databases that record carrier information and which drivers have 

commercial licenses. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I think from this comparison, Mr. Mineta, 

the Secretary, would understand, as well as any of us up here having been a very distinguished member of the House, and representing a constituency, that the American people, if they know 

this and know that trucks from Mexico operating under these 

standards, they are simply not going to tolerate this. The American 

people, if they knew this, that Mexican trucks were operating on 

United States highways with these kind of lax or lessened conditions, you know, are going to absolutely insist of their elected representatives that we not allow this to occur. 

Now, let me ask you, if in fact that the Congress did not provide 

the adequate funding for the inspections, what would the administration respond? Would you continue the current implementation 

schedule? 

Secretary MINETA. I am not sure what you mean, because we 

wouldn’t be able to implement anything. We do not have any, based 

on the House bill, they have knocked out all the $88.2 million funding that we requested, and they adopted the Sabo amendment 

which prohibits us from processing any motor carrier applications. 

So based on the House bill, we have nothing to do. 

Senator NELSON. So if at the end of the day in appropriations, 

it was not provided for all of the additional inspections and so 

51

forth, would those Mexican trucks still be allowed to enter the 

United States and operate on the American highways? 

Secretary MINETA. Within the commercial zone, they would still, 

I believe be able to operate. 

Senator NELSON. And I am sorry that I wasn’t here earlier to 

hear you define the commercial zone. 

Secretary MINETA. 20 miles within the border. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dorgan has one point of clarification. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to go back to this issue 

of inspectors because while I disagree with the Secretary, I have 

great respect for the Secretary and I am pleased that he has come 

today to answer questions. 

The success or failure of what the administration and the Secretary want to do depends directly on a couple of things, one of 

which is having adequate resources to do the inspections, and I 

made the point that the Inspector General indicates that they have 

previously estimated they would need 139 inspectors to provide sufficient coverage at all crossings during operating hours. And that 

there are now 58 inspectors in place, 60 authorized, 58 in place, 

and that there are, according to the Secretary’s testimony, 80 additional Federal inspectors to perform safety inspections. 

But my question was, is it not the case that 40 of those 80 are 

investigators to do the compliance reviews and so on, if so, if that 

is the case, if they are only 40 additional inspectors, it seems to me 

you are short of doing the inspections that you say are necessary 

in order to ensure safety on America’s roads. Mr. Mead wanted to 

speak to that and I want on to another question. Mr. Mead, am I 

correct here in the way that I look at these numbers? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes. There is money in the budget for the state inspectors. What happened here was we did our calculation of how 

many Federal inspectors you would need, inspectors, not investigators, and the number was about 139. We made that recommendation in 1998 based on our calculation. As you know, we make recommendations, people are free to accept or reject them. 

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration thought, yes, 

we can see the point for 140, but of the 80, which is what you are 

referring to, we need 40 of those as investigators, people that would 

do things like safety and compliance reviews, and the other 40 we 

will put right at the border. When we learned of that, and we reflected this in our report to you, we said, ‘‘no’’, our calculation was 

that we needed 139 Federal Inspectors at the crossings to provide 

coverage. Now, if the Department needs additional Federal people 

to do compliance reviews or safety reviews, then they would have 

to provide you an estimate of what the plus up would be to do 

those or which current resources they would use to perform these 

reviews. 

Secretary MINETA. Mr. Chairman, the—in terms of the combination of state and Federal enforcement people, these are inspectors, 

the total will be 496. Now, to put that figure in perspective, in December 1995, there were seven Federal safety inspectors at the border and about 45 state inspectors. So we have gone from roughly 

52

52 now to 496 if we get our request approved. And I am not sure 

really where this division of 40 comes. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, while you are getting that, I 

mean it comes from what I had read previously to you. The—let 

me also just mention that the map that the Inspector General provided in his IG report shows that we have had Mexican trucks in 

North Dakota, and yet you seem to suggest that it is just sort of 

a minimum problem of having these trucks violate the 20-mile 

limit. I do not know. 

Secretary MINETA. I have been told there are 56 trucks in that 

situation. 56 carriers. 

Senator DORGAN. 56 carriers. That is a big difference. But how 

on earth would we know how many trucks have come in if the Inspector General was telling us the states in which they have been 

apprehended and my point is they have been moving up in North 

Dakota. I do not know at this point what’s been happening except 

I do not—look, Mr. Chairman, I don’t think there is a ghost of a 

chance of accomplishing what you want to accomplish at the end 

of this year, and I just think that there is a lot of fuzzy math being 

used in all of these numbers about inspectors and compliance and 

so on. I am only interested in the issues of trucker safety and I do 

not think there is a ghost of a chance of accomplishing what you 

want to accomplish at the end of this year. 

Secretary MINETA. Well, Senator, I am trying my best to try to 

put an effective program together. That is my responsibility. So 

given the resources we have in terms of money and people, and to 

try to—where very little had been done in the past, I am trying to 

get the resources and the people to make sure that safety, because 

that is our paramount interest, that safety is adhered to, and so 

again, I am trying to make sure that in terms of inspections at the 

border, whenever those border crossings are open, that we in fact 

will have inspectors there. To me, that is an obligation that I want 

to follow really closely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman? May I just ask one followup? 

The CHAIRMAN. We have two other panels here. 

Senator NELSON. I understand. Just a very quick followup, Mr. 

Chairman, if I may. I just want to make sure that I did not misunderstand the Secretary. Senator Murray is ready to come to the 

floor, I think tonight with her transportation appropriations bill. 

And in there, she is going to have either an amendment offered or 

it is already going to be in the bill, I know not which. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the bill. 

Senator NELSON. Prohibiting DOT from granting operating authority until a number of safety and compliance measures are put 

in place. And those, Senator Boxer has already articulated, such as 

adequate border staffing, inspection facilities, the ability to check 

the validity of the Mexican driver’s licenses, vehicle registration 

and verifying insurance. 

Now, is it the administration’s position that you do not support 

that provision in the transportation bill? 

Secretary MINETA. You mentioned the insurance provision, Mr. 

Chairman, may I respond on that? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

53

Secretary MINETA. In the Murray language, as I recall, it says 

that the insurance must be provided by an American insurance 

company. There are no other laws that require that United States 

companies be the insurer of a foreign entity doing business here. 

And some questions have been raised as to whether or not that is 

a WTO violation. I have not gotten to the end of the story to see 

whether or not that in fact is true. 

But there are a number of those kinds of requirements in the 

Murray—I can implement or certify to I think in terms of driver 

licenses, we have the ability to get on-line with their information 

system. Their system may not be as robust or as good as ours, but 

I think given the time that they have had to try to implement it, 

I think they have made very strong efforts at trying to get their 

commercial driver’s license requirements up. 

Senator NELSON. So your answer is there are parts that you support. There are parts that you do not support, but when confronted 

with how we will be voting, the administration is opposed to the 

provision included within the transportation appropriation, is that 

correct? 

Secretary MINETA. Because of the certification requirement on 

me. You know, I——

Senator NELSON. Okay. I do not want to take the time of the 

chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have got to move on. Senator Boxer. 

Senator NELSON. I just want to add that I think, Mr. Secretary, 

you are one of the people in government that I admire most and 

I think that policy as articulated by the administration is clearly 

out of step with the American people. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I will be very fast here. Under 

the administration’s proposed rules, Mr. Mineta, for allowing 

NAFTA trucks access, offenses committed by NAFTA motor carriers call for letters to be sent to the company that they work for, 

but for the same violations, United States drivers are subjected to 

fines, suspension of operating authority, and even criminal penalties. 

Now, how is this a level playing field for United States drivers 

which you say that you support? How is it a United States, how 

are United States drivers in a level playing field situation when if 

they have an offense, they are subject to all kinds of fines and revocations and all you need to do is send a letter to the company? 

How could you stand behind that? I don’t understand. 

Secretary MINETA. Well, they will be, first of all, subject to the 

same fines and violations. When you added operating authority, I 

am not sure how we impact on the operating authority of the carrier through a driver violation. On that, I would have to take a look 

at it. But in terms of fines, penalties, those are, would be meted 

out. 

Senator BOXER. Where is the paper on that because the paper we 

saw is quite different. Do you have paper where you made this recommendation? Is it equal to the truck drivers in America, exactly 

equal, the same kind of penalties, because we have not seen that 

information. 

Secretary MINETA. Let me get it for you, but as far as I know——

54

Senator BOXER. Where is it? Where would I find that information? 

Secretary MINETA. In May, we proposed rules. They were in the 

Register. The comment period has now closed on those rules, but 

in that proposed rulemaking, that was in there. 

Senator BOXER. So you are saying there will be equal penalties 

for the Mexican driver as there are for the American driver, and 

I have yet to see that, so I look forward to reading that rule and 

I will do that during the next panel. 

Secretary MINETA. We will get that to you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Mineta, you can tell by the question, 

what we did in the Appropriations Committee, we have worked 

very closely with your Department of Transportation and our staff 

here at the authorizing Committee and for example, with respect 

to insurance, a requirement that they be based in-country, in the 

United States, licensed in the United States is required by Canada 

of us and us from Canada, and you got that information that there 

had to be a United States company license to cover that Mexican 

carrier. 

We got that from your department, so let us get together this 

afternoon here and with your department and outline the various 

points in the Shelby-Murray amendment because we will be debating it and the whole intent that was passed out unanimously from 

our Appropriations Committee is to present a bill that the President would sign. We are not trying to be confrontational. It is very 

interesting and amusing in a sense. Our differences this morning 

is not with Mexico. It is with us. Thank you very, very much. 

Secretary MINETA. I think I want to thank you as well, Mr. 

Chairman. But no, it’s—— The CHAIRMAN. You all both have been very helpful to the Committee. 

Secretary MINETA. It is always been my pleasure to be before 

this Committee and to be with my colleagues from the House, as 

well. I never had the opportunity to serve with you, Senator, but 

you know, in terms of the chairmanship of this Committee, your 

stewardship has been great and so I appreciate your leadership. 

The CHAIRMAN. You have been admired by all of us on the Senate side for years. So thank you very, very much. Will the next 

panel come forward, please, the next two panels. We have Captain 

Steve Vaughn, the president of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, James P. Hoffa, the general president of the International 

Brotherhood of Teamsters, Duane Acklie, the chairman of the 

American Trucking Associations, Edward Emmett, president of the 

National Industrial Transportation League, Ms. Joan Claybrook, 

the president of Public Citizen, and Mr. Peter J. Pantuso, president 

and CEO of the American Bus Association. 

Let us try and do it as orderly and as quickly as we can. The 

reason I am combining the two panels is so that we will get their 

full statements in before the Committee before we have this roll 

call. 

We welcome you all and we really appreciate your patience and 

understanding of the situation we have got here this morning. All 

of the full statements will be included in the record and we will ask 

five or six, at least a half hour there, to try to summarize within 

55

5 minutes your particular presentation. We will start here on the 

left with Captain Vaughn. 

Captain VAUGHN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Move the microphone so you can be heard, Captain. 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN STEVE VAUGHN, PRESIDENT, 

COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE 

Captain VAUGHN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My 

name is Steve Vaughn and I currently serve as the president of the 

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance. Thank you for allowing me to 

testify on behalf of CVSA. 

CVSA represents law enforcement agencies in all 50 states, Canadian provinces, and Mexico. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like 

to submit a written statement for the record that supersedes the 

statement by CVSA on Monday, July 16th, 2001. Technical changes 

were made to Section 4 of our previous submission, and I will give 

that to the Committee. 

Chairman HOLLINGS. Move that microphone a little bit closer, 

please. 

Captain VAUGHN. How is that? 

Chairman HOLLINGS. Go ahead. That is much better. 

Captain VAUGHN. I will offer you today both through the testimony today and through our written statement CVSA’s perspective 

on the most recent border plan for consideration that has been addressed in a very comprehensive manner last week by the Senate 

Appropriations Committee. Also I believe that our written statement addresses the questions and concerns that were discussed 

here earlier by this Committee in the earlier testimony. 

Furthermore, I will discuss the approach the Commercial Vehicle 

Safety Alliance has recommended since the issue has become a 

high priority this year. And last, I will touch upon the rulemaking 

recently proposed by the Department of Transportation. 

CVSA offers its support and assistance in the directive of the Appropriations Committee that a full safety compliance review of 

Mexican carriers be conducted before entering the United States 

However as a practical matter, we suggest that a different approach also be considered. 

As I will shortly point out in more detail, conducting case studies 

is one of the initiatives CVSA recommends in our plan. We think 

this will better serve the intended results of this specific directive 

as well as many of the other provisions. We have studied these provisions of the Appropriations Committee specifying a determination 

of the appropriate level of inspectors at the border and their onduty requirements, as well as the level of other infrastructure facilities. We urge that serious consideration be given to limiting the 

number of openings at the border crossings designated by each 

state as a commercial motor vehicle crossing. 

Almost 96 percent of all commercial vehicle traffic occurs at 10 

of the 27 southern border crossings. By phasing in the opening of 

the border and limiting commercial traffic to the 10 crossings, a 

more realistic determination of the need for full-time staffing and 

other infrastructure requirements can be made. Just as important 

in the short term, it will be easier for both the United States DOT 

56

and border state enforcement agencies to better allocate and concentrate resources where they are most needed. 

As I already indicated earlier this year, when the NAFTA issue 

rose to the forefront, CVSA developed a plan to address this issue. 

It is designed to gather information on and educate those carriers 

that seek authority to do business throughout the United States. 

In all of the NAFTA discussions in recent years, there has been little, if any, data collected on these carriers. 

This lack of information with respect to Mexican carriers is 

largely due to the fact that one, until recently there have been very 

few safety regulatory requirements on Mexican carriers which 

would be comparable to those placed on carriers in the United 

States and Canada. Two, there are a limited number of personnel 

trained and continually performing oversight functions in Mexico. 

And three, the current motor carrier safety information infrastructure has not been in place long enough to capture and record the 

results of the oversight being performed by the Mexican Government. 

The key elements of our plan are to, in conjunction with Mexico, 

prepare an analysis of the Mexican government’s current and 

planned safety regulations, policies, procedures and penalty structures as related to the oversight of the commercial vehicle industry. 

In-depth, 1-day case studies on the Mexican motor carriers seeking cross-border authority. These onsite visits in Mexico will include the evaluation of company safety management practices, review of crash records, knowledge and compliance with United 

States regulations, vehicle inspections, driver selection and training, dispatch operations, maintenance programs, drug and alcohol 

testing programs and overall company management—many of the 

elements that are contained in compliance reviews that were addressed earlier. 

Most importantly, this will be done jointly with the Mexican government officials and this can serve as a training for them as well, 

as they have sought our assistance. 

Conduct CVSA Inspection Familiarization Seminars or similar 

seminars at strategic locations across Mexico, and to be coordinated 

with the government and industry associations. 

Develop educational kits for the motor carriers and drivers which 

can be provided during case studies, inspection seminars and roadside inspections. 

Develop options for technology implementation. In addition, to 

the tools available, which were mentioned by Mr. Mead, we can use 

the CVSA decal which we apply in California as a means to award 

vehicles that are inspected and found not to have any critical safety 

defects. 

Create a database for recording and managing the information 

from the above activities. This information can be fed into the 

Motor Carrier Management Informational System known as 

MCMIS so that both Federal and state enforcement officials in both 

Mexico and the United States have access to the data. 

Mr. Chairman, it is important to recognize that this approach, 

which CVSA is presenting, will allow the existing institutional and 

technology infrastructure to be used to facilitate operations without 

having to make major changes to policy, procedures, legislation, or 

57

expend a large amount of resources. Equally important is that 

these activities are front-loaded so that we can have information to 

make more informed decisions on what to do and what not to do. 

This is extremely critical since our member agencies are implementing commercial vehicle safety programs based on carrier performance. CVSA is uniquely qualified to be a lead partner in carrying out this plan with our mission and goal to foster uniform 

international commercial vehicle safety standards. 

We appreciate the efforts made by the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration in issuing its rulemaking. However we have 

serious reservations about this approach and confining NAFTA 

planning to rulemaking alone. It precludes the necessary cooperation and partnership with the states and with groups such as 

CVSA that can be of great assistance in this effort. 

We also have concerns about DOT’s proposal. It places almost the 

entire emphasis on state enforcement activity along the border and 

thus a greater burden on state inspectors throughout the United 

States and Canada. Our detailed analysis and concerns about the 

proposed rules have been filed in the docket. 

We hope that Secretary Mineta will stress to FMCSA the importance of a cooperative, true partnership approach on the NAFTA 

issue. We believe that provided with the proper direction and authority, by working in a cooperative fashion, we can keep our commitment to Mexico, provide the appropriate safety assurances to 

the traveling public, and limit the operational impacts. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to speak before this Committee 

and I will answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Vaughn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN STEVE VAUGHN, PRESIDENT,

COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE

I. Introduction 

My name is Steve Vaughn, and I currently serve as the President of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA). I am also a Captain with the California Highway Patrol presently serving as the Commander of the Motor Transport Section 

Thank you for holding this hearing and for inviting me to testify on behalf of CVSA 

and the State of California. 

CVSA is an organization of commercial vehicle enforcement agencies and industry 

representatives in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. It’s mission is to achieve uniformity, compatibility and reciprocity of commercial vehicle inspections and enforcement activities throughout North American through effective motor carrier, driver, 

vehicle, cargo safety standards, compliance, education, and enforcement. 

To briefly highlight some of our accomplishments since we were organized in 

1980, we point to the development of the North American Uniform Inspection 

Standard; our internationally recognized inspection sticker that is awarded to commercial vehicles that are found to be defect free which serves as an effective roadside screening process; our uniform Out-of-Service Criteria; a complete training 

course and certification program for over 7,500 inspection officers in North America 

as well as standards for maintaining certification; uniform inspection procedures for 

vehicles transporting spent fuel and high level radioactive and transuranic waste; 

uniform cargo tank inspection procedures, and uniform bus inspection procedures. 

While the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) through its grant 

program to the states serves as the underpinning of a national commercial vehicle 

safety program, CVSA is the organization responsible for the uniform practices and 

procedures of this both national and international inspection and enforcement program. Without CVSA, the MCSAP program would not be the success that it is 

today. 

Mr. Chairman, there are a wide range of issues with respect to NAFTA that I 

know you and other Members of the Committee want to discuss today. To assist 

58

with today’s hearing, we have divided our comments into three parts which we believe should be considered. First, we will comment on the provisions of the very comprehensive NAFTA plan of the Senate Transportation Appropriations bill passed by 

the Appropriations Committee last week. Secondly, we will describe the approach 

to the NAFTA issue that CVSA as an organization has recommended since this 

issue rose to the forefront at the beginning of this year. Thirdly, I will describe in 

some detail how California has been handling the NAFTA issue since the early 

1990’s. As you know, my home state has been anticipating the opening of the border 

for some time and has committed significant state resources to the NAFTA effort. 

We certainly appreciate the fact that the members of this Committee, the Senate 

Appropriations Committee, and indeed, all members of Congress want to be sure 

that the Mexican trucks that cross the border to do business throughout this country are safe and meet U.S. standards. We view the current process of debate and 

discussion on how to deal with this important issue as a constructive process. We 

are confident that in the end a final border plan will be produced that satisfies everyone’s concerns and that will be fair to the United States and Mexico. As the leading safety enforcement association in North America, we pledge our cooperation and 

support to make this happen. 

II. Senate Appropriations Committee Plan 

Our review of the key provisions in the Appropriations bill dealing with NAFTA 

is as follows. 

A. Safety Audits 

With respect to the requirement of a full safety compliance review of a Mexican 

carrier on site before entering the U.S., we would suggest that FMCSA’s effort 

should begin with the current drayage operations (those carriers who are now conducting drayage operations and are applying for the additional authority to go beyond the commercial zones) because they are carriers that have already agreed to 

comply the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. Thus, they should be expected 

to already know U.S. safety requirements and have the supporting documentation 

and evidence with respect to drug testing procedures, maintenance programs, driver 

selection and training and all other major items that are checked when a compliance review is done on a carrier in the U.S. We offer our assistance in conducting 

these reviews. 

The information and data gathered from these audits should be very helpful in 

determining an overall border enforcement plan both in the short and long term. 

With respect to this provision, we offer one technical correction. There are only 

three U.S. carrier rating levels: satisfactory, conditional, and unsatisfactory. 

B. Driver License Verification 

With respect to the requirement that Federal and State inspectors verify electronically the status and validity of the license for each driver of a Mexican motor 

carrier commercial vehicle, we believe this would be too burdensome on inspectors, 

result in excessive and unnecessary bottlenecking at the border, and would not sufficiently accomplish the intended affect. We recommend that the license check be 

done as a part of the complete vehicle and driver inspection process, rather than 

as a separate action. The purpose of this license check should be to determine the 

validity of the Mexican driver’s license. 

C. Distinctive DOT Transportation Number for Mexican Carriers 

We suggest that the purpose of assigning such identification number would be to 

enforce all Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, not just the U.S. hours-ofservice regulations. 

D. Requirement That State MCSAP Funded Inspectors Check Violations of All U.S. 

Federal Regulations 

We recommend that this provision be clarified to specify that these inspectors only 

check for violations of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR) or those 

adopted by their home state that are compatible to the FMCSR. Enforcement of 

other federal regulations is the responsibility of the appropriate federal agency. 

E. Use of Weigh-in-motion (WIM) Systems at All Border Crossings 

As much as we can appreciate the intent and purpose of this provision, after careful consideration, we would propose limiting such requirement to those crossings 

which have been designated by the state as commercial motor vehicle border crossings. 

59

F. Proficiency Examination Requirement for Foreign Motor Carriers as Well as New 

Carriers in the U.S. 

The term ‘‘proficiency’’ should be clearly defined. 

G. New Regulations for Training and Certification of Motor Carrier Safety Auditors 

We actively supported inclusion of this provision in the Motor Carrier Safety Act 

of 1999 and support going ahead with a rulemaking process as soon as possible as 

required in the Senate appropriations bill. 

H. Establishment of Standards for Determining the Appropriate Number of Federal 

and State Inspectors at the Border and the On-duty Requirements for These Inspectors 

We understand the intent of Congress with respect to these issues and after careful deliberation with our border state members, we suggest that very serious consideration be given to limiting the opening of the border to Mexican carriers, at least 

in the first phase, to those crossings which have been designated by the state as 

commercial motor vehicle border crossings (2 in California, 1 in Arizona, 1 in New 

Mexico, and 9 in Texas). We think this is a way to more realistically both determine 

and fulfill the need for full time staffing as well as all other adequate infrastructure 

requirements at the border. Furthermore, we believe the individual border states 

should be permitted flexibility in determining their staffing needs. 

I. Inspector General Certification 

Finally, we support DOT Inspector General certification of all important safety 

measures as identified in the appropriations bill relative to the opening of the border. 

III. What CVSA’s Approach to NAFTA Has Been 

A. NAFTA Border Issue Requires Information and Education First 

A fundamental approach when attempting to address the issue of transportation 

safety, regardless of mode, or whether national or international traffic, is to gather 

enough information so an accurate assessment of the necessary actions can be determined . This couldn’t be more true than when faced with the challenge of assuring 

that Mexican trucks and buses that cross the border to do business throughout the 

United States are safe. Yet even though NAFTA has been a major topic of discussion over the last several years, there has been little, if any, information on the 

safety fitness of such carriers. The safety fitness of the Mexican operators currently 

doing business and being inspected along the borders today in the commercial zones 

may, or may not, be indicative of operators that may engage in long haul travel into 

the U.S. once the border is opened. We believe it is necessary to try and obtain the 

facts with respect to these carriers before the border is opened through a plan I will 

shortly describe. 

This lack of information with respect to Mexican carriers is largely due to the fact 

that: 1) there have been few safety regulatory requirements placed on the Mexican 

industry which would be comparable to those placed on carriers in the United State 

and Canada until recently; 2) there are a limited number of personnel trained and 

continually performing oversight functions in Mexico; and 3) the current motor carrier safety information infrastructure has not been in place long enough to capture 

and record the data resulting from the oversight being performed by the Mexican 

government. 

In addition to obtaining this needed information, we must at the same time lend 

our hand to help educate the Mexican carriers. Therefore, our strategy can be 

summed up as ‘‘gather information, plan, and educate’’. This strategy has been the 

hallmark of CVSA’s approach to all safety challenges since it was created more than 

20 years ago. It has been the key ingredient in the success we have had in getting 

not only all of the state jurisdictions in this country, but also, all of the Canadian 

provinces to agree to uniform and reciprocal North American enforcement standards 

and procedures. We have every reason to believe that this approach will succeed 

with Mexico as well. 

Earlier this year CVSA developed a plan to specifically implement this overall 

strategy. It’s key elements are as follows:

• In conjunction with Mexico, prepare an analysis of the Mexican government’s 

current and planned safety regulations, policies, procedures and penalty structures as related to the oversight of the commercial vehicle industry.

• Conduct 1-day ‘‘Case Studies’’ (audits) on the Mexican motor carriers seeking 

cross border authority. These on site-visits in Mexico will include the evaluation 

of company safety management practices, knowledge and compliance with U.S. 

60

regulations, vehicles inspections, driver selection and training, dispatch operations, maintenance programs, and overall company management. These ‘‘Case 

Studies’’ would be conducted on at least a representative number of those carriers (currently believed to number approximately 200 in total) that have applied for authority to operate in the U.S. beyond the commercial zones. Most 

importantly they would be conducted jointly with Mexican government officials.

• Conduct CVSA ‘‘Inspection Familiarization Seminars’’ at strategic locations 

across Mexico, to be coordinated with the Mexican government and CANACAR, 

CANAPAT, CONATRAM, and ANTP.

• Develop educational kits for motor carriers and drivers which could be provided 

during the case studies, inspection seminars and roadside inspections.

• Develop options for technology implementation that will facilitate freight and 

passenger movements across the borders and provide incentives for deployment.

• Create a database for recording and managing the information from the above 

activities. This information can be fed into the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) so that both federal and state enforcement officials 

in both Mexico and the U.S. have access to the data. This will provide the basis 

for determining what the nature of high-risk Mexican motor carriers may be 

and to develop whatever appropriate roadside enforcement practices may be 

necessary at the border as well as in this country.

A more detailed description of the CVSA plan is attached at the end of this statement. 

CVSA believes this plan can be implemented on a timely basis. It is possible for 

case studies to be done on a significant number of Mexican carriers in 60 to 90 days. 

We feel that as an organization CVSA is uniquely qualified to be the lead partner 

in carrying out this plan. We are an international organization with members in 

Mexico and know how to approach matters from an international perspective Mexican government officials are familiar with and have participated in CVSA activities 

and programs. The case studies would be performed by a team of at least four people: 2 U.S. CVSA state inspectors, 1 FMCSA inspector, and a minimum of one representative of the Mexican government. We believe the CVSA plan will be more acceptable to the Mexicans than if it were to be solely presented to them as a plan 

of the U.S. Department of Transportation alone. 

B. The NAFTA Border Plan Cannot Just Be Confined to Rulemaking Alone 

As you are aware, the U.S. DOT has issued three recent notices of proposed rulemaking on NAFTA border issues. We have reservations about having so rigidly confined this process to rulemaking alone because this approach does not allow for the 

constructive and open dialogue necessary to address all of the safety concerns that 

are being expressed at today’s hearing. To the best of our knowledge, the U.S. DOT 

did not consult or meet with key groups and organizations in this country, including 

CVSA a major safety enforcement partner, to obtain input on dealing with the 

NAFTA issue before assuring the current rulemaking. Certainly a rulemaking is not 

necessary to implement the key elements of the CVSA plan I have just described. 

To advance the cause of safety and to promote free and safe trade with our friends 

to the south, CVSA strongly believes that it will take cooperation from U.S., Canadian and Mexican federal government agencies, as well as state and provincial government agencies and industry. Safety is the responsibility of each of these groups 

and information sharing is critical to advancing the cause and ensuring the utmost 

contribution by each group. 

C. An Analysis of the Current DOT Proposed NAFTA Rules 

While CVSA recommends taking a proactive approach and identifying potential 

issues before the border opens, DOT suggests conducting similar activities after the 

border opens and places a greater burden on state inspectors. We believe that by 

conducting the research before the border opens, and by limiting border crossings, 

either by carrier or border locations, we can enhance safety on our highways. 

To subject the Mexican carriers to a cursory paperwork review process at the border as the DOT proposes to be followed by intensive roadside monitoring through 

the inspection process after they commence operations throughout the United States 

does not reflect proper priority in assuring safety, nor does it adequately address 

the issue of safety compliance. 

In addition, the DOT proposal prescribes ‘‘expedited action’’ to be taken against 

Mexican carriers operating in this country who do not meet seven criteria established in this rulemaking. The expectation by DOT is that the seven items will be 

identified by enforcement personnel during roadside inspections. In all seven cases, 

61

these items cannot currently be established at the roadside. Most of these criteria 

are violations that are discovered only during traditional Compliance Reviews done 

face to face with carrier management and at the carrier’s place of business, not during roadside inspections. Drug testing is an excellent example. Review of detailed 

information at the carriers place of business establishes that the carrier has met, 

or did not meet, federal requirements. In addition, the ASPEN software and other 

systems such as the Inspection Selection System used by roadside enforcement do 

not provide the inspector with the necessary information to assure compliance to the 

established criteria. 

D. Current State of Readiness at the Border 

Much of the discussion about NAFTA to date has been about adequacy of resources at the border including both inspectors and the infrastructure to support inspection activities. Progress is being made. My own state of California has certainly 

made a special effort in this regard which has been ongoing for many years and I 

will speak in more detail about California’s efforts shortly. California’s plan through 

the use of the CVSA inspection sticker ensures that every vehicle that crosses the 

border is inspected, at a minimum, once per quarter. The other border states are 

certainly making every effort to strengthen their resources. At this point, I will 

again put an option on the table we suggested in our comments on the Senate appropriations plan, and that is to initially open the border at only those crossings 

which have been designated by the state as commercial motor vehicle crossings. 

Although the DOT and CVSA plans differ in timing and detail, the common element is a higher level of enforcement oversight at least in the short term. No matter 

what plan this Committee and the Congress may finally decide is appropriate, we 

must realize this is a one-time plan to deal with a very special set of circumstances. 

At some point in time after the border is open, it is certainly our goal and belief 

that operations between Mexico and the U.S. will be no different than our current 

operations with Canada. In the short term, we believe an approach that best ensures safety in this country, but one that is fair to the Mexican carriers, and provides support to the effort of the Mexican government officials can best benefit all 

involved parties. That is why our emphasis on education and outreach to them is 

such an important part of our plan and must go hand in hand with the on-site carrier reviews we recommend, or the safety audits recommended in the Senate Appropriations plan. 

IV. California Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Program NAFTA Preparation Overview 

Since enactment of the NAFTA treaty, the Governor, and the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency (BT&H) of California, have continually supported the 

CHP’s commercial vehicle inspection program. Recognizing that additional facilities, 

personnel, and equipment would be necessary to prepare for additional Mexican 

commercial motor vehicles crossing the border, the Administration approved and 

funded the addition of these resources. 

BT&H, in anticipation of the implementation of NAFTA, directed the California 

Highway Patrol to begin the construction of the Calexico and Otay Mesa Inspection 

Facilities at a combined cost of approximately $32.5 million. The Otay Mesa Inspection Facility opened in May 1996 and the Calexico Inspection Facility opened in December 1996. Their hours of operation mirror the hours of operation at the US Customs commercial port of entry. These facilities provide a means for commercial vehicle inspection personnel to immediately identify and correct problems with drivers 

and commercial vehicles as they cross the border into California. 

The CHP maintains a compliment of nine commercial officers and 15 commercial 

vehicle inspection specialists at the Otay Mesa Inspection Facility. Five commercial 

officers and 9 commercial vehicle inspection specialist have also been assigned to 

the Calexico Inspection Facility. In addition, the Governor has allocated funding to 

allow the CHP’s Rainbow Inspection Facility (seven officers and 12 CVIS) and San 

Onofre Inspection Facility (11 officers and 20 CVIS) to expand their hours of operation and to enforce the NAFTA provisions of the Commercial Zone. Furthermore, 

six Mobile Road Enforcement officers are assigned north of the Commercial Zone 

(San Diego, Orange, and Imperial Counties) to enforce these regulations. 

The California Highway Patrol offers Mexican Inspectors, Motor Carrier Specialists and trucking industry representatives with the opportunity to observe our inspection techniques. With the approval of the Administration, the CHP continues to 

provide Level 1 commercial vehicle inspection training to Mexican enforcement personnel at the Calexico and Otay Mesa Inspection Facilities, the Winterhaven Platform Scale, and at Tijuana and Mexicali. 

62

The California Highway Patrol has continued to provide support to the Mexican 

trucking industry by both providing and participating in training seminars and industry events. Furthermore, industry support has been provided by maintaining an 

effective liaison with Mexican commercial vehicle enforcement representatives. 

With the support of BT&H, the California Highway Patrol continues to confer 

with governmental agencies of the United States and Mexico in an attempt to link 

their computerized Commercial Driver License and Commercial Vehicle Registration 

databases, while retaining the security of each country’s databases. 

Thanks in large part to the Administration’s redirection of state funds, the CHP’s 

commercial vehicle safety program has helped bring about an improved safety compliance rate of Mexican commercial vehicles operating in California. In fact, their 

out-of-service rate is comparable to US commercial vehicles entering California 

through the Otay Mesa and Calexico Inspection Facilities. Since 1999, the out-ofservice rates for both country’s commercial vehicles have remained consistently 

lower than the other border states. Mexican motor carriers want to comply with federal and state safety standards and try to maintain their vehicles to avoid paying 

higher US wages for towing and vehicle repair. However, some Mexican motor carriers understandably are experiencing difficulty interpreting the intricacies of federal and state regulations. 

In 1996, the CHP developed a conversational Spanish training course with emphasis on commercial vehicle nomenclature. The class was provided to all field commercial enforcement officers and commercial vehicle inspection specialists. Departmental personnel also provided train-the-trainer training to law enforcement officers 

from Arizona, New Mexico and Texas 

Enforcement Program 

In 1991 Assembly Bill (AB) 1355 was enacted in California which prohibits foreign based MCs from operating in California beyond specified commercial (border) 

zones without a Certificate of Registration (CR) issued by the ICC. The provisions 

of AB 1355 enacted California Vehicle Code (VC) Sections 34517 (Commercial Zones: 

Vehicles from other Countries) and 22651.4 (Foreign Commercial Vehicles: Impoundment). 

The CHP conducts on-and off-highway commercial vehicle and driver inspection 

throughout the state. The CHP’s commercial program currently consists of nearly 

1,000 personnel involved in full-time enforcement of commercial vehicles. Approximately 240 officers and 280 non-uniformed Commercial Vehicle Inspection Specialists (CVIS) are dedicated to 19 Inspection Facilities and 34 platform scales statewide. An additional 250 non-uniformed Motor Carrier Specialist (MCS) are dedicated to the off-highway inspection of both truck and bus terminals. Finally, approximately 150 officers are funded each year by the Governor and are deployed as 

Mobile Road Enforcement officers throughout the state. 

Through the efforts of these dedicated individuals, California commercial enforcement personnel continue to conduct nearly 22 percent of all roadside inspections. 

Governor Davis, BT&H Secretary Maria Contreras-Sweet, and Commissioner 

Dwight Helmick of the CHP have vowed their continued support for improving the 

safety on California highways and assuring that California is ready for the opening 

of the border with Mexico once the NAFTA issue is resolved. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony today. 

63

Statistics


718vaug1.eps
64


718vaug2.eps
65

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very, very much, Captain Vaughn. 

Mr. Emmett. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD M. EMMETT, PRESIDENT, THE 

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRANSPORTATION LEAGUE 

Mr. EMMETT. Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senators. I am Ed 

Emmett. I appear this morning as president of the National Industrial Transportation League. The League is an organization that 

dates back to 1907 which represents the shippers of freight of all 

kinds using all modes of transportation, both domestic and international. 

In other words, League members are the customers of the trucking industry. And even though all modes of transportation are 

used, there is no question that the vast majority of shippers and 

receivers view trucking as the key to successful operations. Quite 

simply, trucking is the life line of our economy. 

In recent years, there have been some major changes in the 

world of shippers and receivers in the way they do business, and 

I think that comes into play today, certainly seeing some of the 

confusion that came out of the earlier panel. We have in place what 

are called just-in-time delivery systems, where shippers and receivers, retailers and manufacturers of all types, rely on timely delivery of products from source to destination. Along with that, we now 

have a globalization of commerce, much more international commerce, and of course NAFTA is a part of that. 

The combination of those two makes it absolutely critical that we 

have trucking capacity from the United States to Mexico and vice 

versa. Safe, efficient trucks going to and from Mexico need to be 

part of the equation of the United States economy. I must say at 

this point, and I believe it was Senator Allen who raised the issue 

earlier, as far as shippers and receivers in the United States are 

concerned, the only efficient truck is a safe truck. The absolute 

worst thing that could happen to a shipper or receiver would be to 

have their shipment sitting out of service on a truck somewhere 

rather than getting there just in time as the delivery system requires. 

So, we are absolutely committed to having safe, efficient operations. Having said that, we look forward to working with the Congress and the Administration and any of the other groups here to 

be sure that that system gets put in place. However, we believe 

strongly that simply banning all Mexican trucks is the wrong way 

to go. 

We much prefer rigorous enforcement. Senator Boxer’s chart, or 

table, does point out the difference between what occurs in Mexico 

and what occurs in the United States, but it is our clear understanding that any Mexican truck and Mexican driver operating in 

the United States will have to comply with U.S. laws, will be subject to the same penalties as U.S. drivers and so we take that as 

a given and if that needs to be clarified, then we certainly want 

to work with you to clarify that. 

The reason a simple ban, we believe, would be inappropriate, is 

that safety is better addressed directly rather than through economic means. It is better to have the inspectors in place, make 

sure the inspections occur, and deal with it that way. The second 

66

reason is that a total ban produces the maximum economic harm 

for our members, because it says there will be no trucks available 

to do that just-in-time delivery between the United States and 

Mexico. So, we would much prefer a system that allows at least the 

good operators in Mexico into the country. 

Third, and this follows on the second, to make a blanket judgment against all Mexican truckers, is I know it may sound a little 

harsh, but it really borders on racial profiling of a whole nation. 

Because there are some bad apples, no matter what that number 

is, I do not think it is fair to tell a Mexican truck owner, the owner 

of a company who may run an absolutely perfect operation, maybe 

even one of those operators who is going to Canada that was mentioned earlier, it is absolutely unfair to tell them that even if they 

are willing to meet all the criteria you put before them that just 

because they are Mexican, they are not allowed to operate in the 

United States. That just doesn’t strike us as right. 

And fourth, as has been mentioned, and I certainly am not an 

international lawyer so I do not want to get into this too far, but 

to continue the ban does seem to violate NAFTA. We believe that 

the measures of NAFTA need to be fulfilled fully. 

With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I know you have a long day 

and I keep hearing about votes and further meetings. I am actually 

going to give you back a little bit of your time and I will be happy 

to answer any questions, but the League stands ready to work with 

you and the Administration in any way possible. And I was particularly pleased to hear you, Mr. Chairman, at the beginning, talk 

about Senator Murray’s approach as being preferable, I believe in 

what you said, and that is what we wanted to come say, even 

though some of the specifics might need to still be worked out. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Emmett follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD M. EMMETT, PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL

INDUSTRIAL TRANSPORTATION LEAGUE

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am Ed Emmett, 

president of The National Industrial Transportation League. 

The League is a voluntary organization of shippers conducting industrial and commercial enterprises in all States of the Union and all over the world. Formed 94 

years ago, the League is the nationwide organization representing shippers and receivers of all types of commodities, using all modes of transportation, including 

trucks, to move their goods in intrastate, interstate, and international commerce. 

The League representatives of member companies are transportation and logistics 

professionals, the people who design the distribution systems for their products, arrange for their transportation, and pay the transportation bills. Some of our member 

companies also own and operate their own truck fleets. Therefore, the League is vitally interested in this important issue. 

The League has a long history of supporting highway safety for the general public 

as well as for commercial traffic. As customers of trucking companies, League members rely on freight being delivered in a safe manner. The League is also aware of 

the need for efficient transportation if the U.S. economy is to realize its potential. 

Make no mistake, though, transportation safety and efficiency are not counter 

forces. Unsafe transportation is the ultimate inefficiency. 

Given that background, the League is very concerned with provisions in the fiscal 

year 2002 Department of Transportation Appropriations Bill, recently passed by the 

House, that could delay or prohibit the full implementation of the North American 

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with respect to trucking. 

On July 6, the League sent a letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee, 

strongly urging the Committee to delete the House language that prohibits Mexican 

trucks from being granted operating authority and to restore the funding needed to 

ensure effective inspections for U.S.-Mexico cross-border trucks. Our goal was to adVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
67

dress the issue of truck safety directly, rather than through protectionist measures 

masquerading as safety. Over the years, special interests trying to protect their 

market share have used ‘‘safety’’ arguments to keep competitors away. Such arguments have proven false in the past, and, I believe, will be proven false in this instance. 

Please keep in mind that each truck entering the U.S. from Mexico must comply 

with every U.S. safety regulation, both those relating to the truck and those relating 

to the driver. Full implementation of NAFTA will not change that. The League will 

be the first to argue for strong truck safety provisions. However, the House provision is not about safety. It is protectionism. 

If Congress really wants to address international truck safety, then we would support DOT having the additional funding it has requested to inspect trucks and drivers at the U.S.-Mexican border. That is the way to protect the American driver from 

unsafe trucks and drivers, not by refusing to let trucks into the country, whether 

or not they are safe. DOT-funded safety inspectors are the first and best line of defense against those that are unsafe, whether they be Mexican, Canadian, or U.S. 

The more inspectors there are and the better tools they are given, the more trucks 

and drivers they can inspect and decide whether to put out of service. 

I have stated that the proposed ban on Mexican trucks is protectionism. That is 

true, but I fear it could be worse than that. None of these arguments were raised 

about Canadian trucks. Why not? Even if there is a higher percentage of Mexican 

trucks that are deemed unsafe under U.S. laws, why choose to punish all Mexican 

truckers? Those who have supported this all-encompassing approach would never 

support enforcing traffic laws against one race of people differently than against 

others. That would be considered ‘‘racial profiling.’’ If a ban on Mexican truckers is 

put into effect, will that not be viewed as ‘‘racial profiling’’ on a national level? 

It is also important to remember that NAFTA is about partnerships between the 

United States, Canada, and Mexico. Clearly, the U.S. is treating its partners differently and, in fact, has been found in violation of the treaty.* The previous Administration refused to fully implement NAFTA, yet they took no steps to address the 

perceived problems with Mexican trucks. Mexico deserves fair treatment under the 

terms of NAFTA. 

1. A five-member NAFTA Arbitration Panel unanimously determined ‘‘that the 

U.S. blanket refusal to review and consider for approval any Mexican-owned carrier 

applications for authority to provide cross-border trucking services was and remains 

a breach of the U.S. obligations under Annex I (reservations for existing measures 

and liberalization commitments), Article 1202 (national treatment for cross border 

services), and Article 1203 (most-favored-nation treatment for cross border services) 

of NAFTA.’’

In addition to the safety and fairness considerations, there are, obviously, economic considerations. The ‘‘giant sucking sound’’ that NAFTA opponents warned of 

before NAFTA was signed, and which referred to U.S. jobs that would be lost, actually turned out to be the sound of economic benefits accruing to both countries. 

NAFTA has directly led to a three-fold increase in the value of trade between the 

U.S. and Mexico. 

However, the full benefits of NAFTA are not being realized. Shippers and carriers 

find that the way cross-border trucking operations are conducted today is very inefficient, since costly extra handling via ‘‘border shuttle’’ carriers is required. They 

want the increased efficiency and flexibility from running trucks straight through 

to their ultimate destination, without the extra cost of shuttle operations. Giving 

them this flexibility and reducing those costs helps them to compete. 

If the U.S. border is not opened to its trucks, Mexico has announced its intention 

to retaliate by raising customs and import fees on U.S. goods, and has raised the 

possibility of banning the importation of certain commodities. U.S. businesses and 

manufacturers are the ones that will have to pay these higher fees, and U.S. workers and consumers will be the ultimate losers. Given global competition and the economic situation, it would only take a slight increase to price those U.S. goods targeted for retaliation out of the market completely. Ultimately, these increased costs 

will be passed on to the U.S. consumer in the form of higher prices, and to U.S. 

workers in possible layoffs of manufacturing jobs. 

Mr. Chairman and Senators, the continued banning of all Mexican trucks from 

U.S. highways is simply the wrong way to go. It is the wrong way to make our highways safer. It is the wrong way to provide for economic growth. And, it is the wrong 

way to treat a neighboring nation, a partner, and a group of people.

68

The CHAIRMAN. The Murray-Shelby amendments, on to the 

transportation appropriations bill reported out of the floor to the 

United States Senate was unanimous and bipartisan. Mr. Hoffa. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES P. HOFFA, GENERAL PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS 

Mr. HOFFA. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My 

name is James P. Hoffa, I am president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. I want to thank you for the invitation to testify here today regarding the cross border trucking impact on highway safety. The Teamsters Union has submitted extensive comments for the record. I will summarize my testimony in what I am 

going to be saying regarding cross border trucking. 

I recently had the opportunity to meet with the President of 

Mexico, Vincente Fox, last Monday and we had a frank and open 

discussion in the meeting in the half-hour that we had together, 

and I raised the issue of highway safety with him, and he indicated 

an acknowledgment that it is his objective not only to raise the 

standard of living of the people in his country, but also I believe 

he acknowledges that they have a long way to go with regard to 

highway safety and with regard to the equipment they use and 

driver training. 

I give that you comment because it is a recent interview that I 

had with him and met with him. I was impressed with his candor 

with regard to the issue. 

First, let me dispel a few myths about why the Teamsters Union 

is so concerned about this issue. About 625,000 of our 1.4 million 

members turn a key on a truck to start their workday. Their workplace is our nation’s highways and city streets. And these drivers 

deserve as safe a workplace as any person working in a factory. 

Since 1994, the Teamsters Union has been on the record telling 

Congress and the administration that neither the United States 

nor Mexico had the necessary safeguards in place to assure the 

safety on our highways. 

After Congress and many other groups, including the Teamsters, 

raised safety concerns, the Clinton Administration wisely chose to 

institute the current moratorium. Now, for those who would believe 

that the border remain closed as a political favor to the Teamsters, 

they need only read the words of the latest Inspector General’s report. As they should review the administration’s own submission, 

they can also review the administration’s own submission to the 

NAFTA resolution dispute resolution panel. I will get to those in 

a minute. But first I want to address another issue. 

Some claim that the only reason the Teamsters care about Mexican trucks is the fear that lower wage Mexican drivers will take 

our jobs away. While there is a concern that unscrupulous drivers 

will entice and exploit Mexican drivers to violate our laws and to 

make deliveries from point to point in the United States when delivering international loads. However, we welcome an opportunity 

to talk to our Mexican brothers and sisters about working conditions in that country, and we also hope that some day, we will have 

the right to go down there and organize. 

Ultimately, if there is parity in wages and benefits, as there is 

with Canadian drivers, then there is no incentive for employers to 

69

violate our labor laws. Returning to the safety question, there is 

real evidence that trucks from Mexico cannot meet all the United 

States safety standards. Let us look at the facts. 

The Inspector General’s latest report indicates that still only 1 

percent of Mexican trucks crossing into commercial zones are inspected. Of these inspected more than one of three is placed out of 

service for serious safety violations. In Texas and Arizona, for more 

than 75 percent of the Mexican trucks crossing, the out-of-service 

is over 40 percent. There are those that argue that drayage trucks 

are not representative of the fleet of long haul trucks that will be 

utilized once the boarder is open but listen to what the United 

States itself said in its submission to the NAFTA panel. I am going 

to quote it. This is what our people said. 

In terms of safety, the service provided with the drayage trucks, 

those that run with a 25-mile limit, is no different from that provided by the long haul trucks. Furthermore, there is no evidence 

that the Mexican long haul carriers are safer than Mexican 

drayage carriers. They haul goods on the same roads, through the 

same cities and towns through which long haul trucks operate. 

Indeed, many of the Mexican trucks that are now inspected at 

the border have traveled considerable distances from the interior of 

Mexico just to get to the border and thus are in fact, long haul 

trucks just getting to our border. Plus, there is no guarantee that 

drayage truck operators would not seek to operate the trucks beyond the commercial zone which we have already talked about. 

And that is the problem we have been talking about. We talked 

earlier about 65 trucks that have been impounded or found to be 

operating as far as North Dakota. That was last year’s statistic and 

those are the only ones that are caught, so what has changed? Why 

is it that the administration is now in such a rush? 

In fact, the administration’s announcement of its intent to open 

the border by the 1st of the year was a major tactical error. They 

gave away any leverage they had to compel the Mexican government to continue to improve its safety program. Frankly, the 

United States is under no legal obligation to implement the findings of the NAFTA panel. Under the terms of the NAFTA, the 

United States is entitled to disregard the panel’s recommendation 

and simply allow Mexico to take equivalent reciprocal measures. Or 

it could negotiate compensation for a new grant of trade benefits 

to Mexico. 

Now, let us dispel another myth that under NAFTA the United 

States cannot initiate safeguards to protect its own highways. If 

you have not already done so, I encourage each member of this 

panel to read the NAFTA dispute panel’s report. It made a point 

of stating that ‘‘the parties to NAFTA may set the level of protection that they consider appropriate in pursuit of legitimate regulatory objectives. In fact, one of the recommendations of the 

NAFTA panel states that given the different enforcement mechanisms currently in place in Mexico and the United States, it may 

not be unreasonable for the DOT to address legitimate safety concerns by declining to rely largely on self-certification by Mexican 

carriers seeking authority to operate in the United States.’’ That 

ends the quote. 

70

This leads to the one final point I’d like to discuss, the proper 

action for Congress to take to address the safety concerns of the 

Mexican carriers. It is clear from the NAFTA panel report that the 

United States is within its rights to not rely on a stack of paperwork to determine the safety of carriers coming out of Mexico. Unfortunately, representative Sabo’s common sense amendment to require a safety review before the DOT would grant conditional operating authority was not given a chance to be voted on by the 

House. But the vote on his more restricted amendments, barring 

funds from review and processing of any Mexican carrier was 

passed by an overwhelming vote of 285–143. 

I think that vote was indicative of the frustration that many 

Members of Congress feel about the administration’s failure to recognize a serious safety concerns of unsafe trucks on our highways. 

The vote should be a wake-up call to everyone who is ignoring the 

potential danger of this wrong-headed policy. 

DOT needs to put a process in place that ensures the safety of 

our highways and that should include one, more properly trained 

safety inspectors at the border crossings to maintain surveillance 

24 hours a day 7 days a week. 

Two, permanent inspection facilities with enough space to take 

care of out of service trucks so we can put them in a place where 

they cannot be on our highways. 

Three, equipment to weigh the commercial vehicles entering the 

United States. 

Four, an adequate enforcement program to assure that Mexican 

truckers will comply with hours of service regulations. 

And five, a safety audit of Mexican carriers before the DOT 

grants conditional operating authority. These are just a few of the 

criteria that should be met before the cross border trucking provisions of NAFTA are implemented. These and other necessary provisions are included in House Resolution 152 that we support. They 

are also included in the Senate transportation appropriations bill. 

The Teamsters Union strongly supports these legislative measures that ensure the safety of American highways. That is what 

the 285 Members of Congress wanted when they voted for the Sabo 

amendment. That is what the American public wants and that is 

what the Teamsters want and their families, and we deserve no 

less. I will be willing to answer questions if you have any. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffa follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES P. HOFFA, GENERAL PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS

Chairman Hollings, Senator McCain and Members of the Committee: 

My name is Jim Hoffa, and I am General President of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. I am pleased to appear today before this Committee on behalf 

the 1.4 million members of the Teamsters Union and the hundreds of thousands of 

our members who literally make their living on our nation’s highways. 

The Teamsters Union has taken a serious interest in the work that Congress and, 

in particular, this Committee has undertaken to ensure safety on our nation’s highways. It was just 2 years ago that most of the people on this panel and on the following panel were testifying before you on the need to strengthen motor carrier 

safety here in the United States. 

And now, as this Committee moves forward with hearings concerning the issue 

of whether Mexican-domiciled motor carriers should be allowed to operate throughout the United States, we are pleased to have the opportunity to share our views 

on this important safety issue. 

71

In general, the Teamsters Union believes that the United States is not prepared 

to begin approving Mexican carrier applications to operate throughout the United 

States because the safety of Mexican carriers cannot be assured. But before I delve 

into this issue, I think it’s important that we first review how the United States 

got to this point. 

When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was enacted in 1993, 

the existing moratorium on the registration of Mexican motor carriers was initially 

left in place; however, operating authority for Mexican carriers was planned to be 

phased-in over an eight-year period. The first phase was to have occurred in 1995, 

when Mexican trucks were to be allowed to operate beyond the commercial border 

zones into the four border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas). In 

2000, Mexican carriers were scheduled to operate throughout the United States. To 

alleviate safety concerns, the agreement also provided for the establishment of a 

Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee whose function was to implement a 

work program to harmonize the truck and bus safety standards of the United States 

and Mexico. 

In 1995, however, when the first phase was scheduled to occur, and again in 2000, 

it was apparent that Mexico had not yet made the kinds of safety improvements 

that were required when the schedule was agreed upon. Although the Clinton Administration initially planned to implement the first phase of the schedule, when 

Congress and numerous groups including the Teamsters Union made it aware of the 

serious safety concerns it acted responsibly and kept the moratorium in place. These 

concerns were outlined in four separate Congressional letters to the President: One 

in 1997, which was signed by 236 House Members on both sides of the aisle; another 

in June of 1999, which was signed by 258 House Members; another in November 

1999, which was signed by 48 Senators, many of which serve on the Senate Commerce Committee; and another sent just 2 months ago to President Bush by Senator 

John Kerry (D-MA) and 9 other Senators who supported NAFTA but are concerned 

about the safety implications of cross-border trucking. The Teamsters Union wishes 

to submit all of these letters for the record. 

In response to the moratorium, Mexico sought consultations under NAFTA’s Article 20 dispute resolution mechanism. And from 1995 through January 2000 various 

consultations and meetings took place, but the parties could not resolve the serious 

safety issues at hand. An arbitration panel was then formed on February 2, 2000. 

During the year-long panel proceedings, the United States vigorously opposed the 

entry of Mexican carriers into the United States because of serious safety concerns 

and the United States’ inability to adequately ensure the safety of the traveling 

public if Mexican carriers were to enter the United States prior to Mexico’s establishment of a comprehensive safety regime. The United States explained the problem as follows:

Mexico’s existing truck and operator safety rules are not yet compatible with 

those in the United States and large and important gaps remain. Mexico does 

not impose key record-keeping requirements. It has no roadside inspection program and thus does not generate reliable nationwide statistics on vehicle outof-service rates. Mexico has only recently begun a limited program of on-site inspections and audits, and Mexican enforcement resources remain quite limited. 

Mexico and the United States do not yet have a functioning data exchange arrangement.

All this means that when Mexican trucks cross into the United States, there 

is no assurance that, based on the regulatory regime in place in Mexico, those 

trucks already meet U.S. highway safety standards.

In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–

98–2008–01, Counter-Submission of the United States at 48 (Feb. 23, 2000), the 

United States further explained that these safety problems could not be adequately 

addressed through border inspections:

[T]he effectiveness of any [border inspection] program is limited given the huge 

number of trucks that cross the southern border each day, the time and resources required to conduct even a small number of rigorous inspections, and 

the commercial disruptions that would accompany any system other than occasional spot-checks. As a practical matter, the deterrent effect of any reasonably 

practicable system of border safety inspections is limited since the likelihood of 

inspection on any given cross-border transit is small.

Since a border inspection system alone cannot sufficiently assure safety compliance, the United States is in a position in which it must rely on Mexico, much 

72

as it relies on Canada, to ensure that the great preponderance of its trucks already meet U.S. standards by the time they arrive at the border.

On February 6, 2001, the NAFTA panel issued a report which determined that 

‘‘the inadequacies of the Mexican regulatory system provide an insufficient legal 

basis for the United States to maintain a moratorium on the consideration of applications for U.S. operating authority from Mexican-owned and/or domiciled trucking 

service providers.’’ It also held that the United States was and remains in breach 

of its obligations under Annex I (reservations for existing measures and liberalization commitments), Article 1102 (national treatment), and Article 1103 (most-favored-nation treatment) to permit Mexican nationals to invest in enterprises in the 

United States that provide transportation of international cargo within the United 

States. 

It is important, however, to note what the Panel did not determine. According to 

its Findings, Determinations And Recommendations, Secretariat File No. USA–

MEX–98–2008–01, the panel ‘‘is not making a determination that the Parties of 

NAFTA may not set the level of protection that they consider appropriate in pursuit 

of legitimate regulatory objectives. It is not disagreeing that the safety of trucking 

services is a legitimate regulatory objective. Nor is the Panel imposing a limitation 

of the application of safety standards properly established and applied pursuant to 

the applicable obligations of the Parties under NAFTA.’’

In fact, in its report, the Panel even provided U.S. authorities permission to establish inspection and licensing requirements that are not ‘‘like’’ those in place for U.S. 

carriers, so long as their expectations are the result of legitimate safety concerns.

With regard to the inspection and licensing requirements of Mexican trucks and 

drivers operating in the United States, the circumstances may well not be 

‘‘like,’’ even though those trucks and drivers are fully subject to the U.S. regulatory regime. For example, given the different enforcement mechanisms currently in place in Mexico and in the United States as of the date of this Report, 

it may not be reasonable for the Department of Transportation to address legitimate U.S. safety concerns by declining to rely largely on self-certification by 

Mexican trucking firms seeking authority to operate in the United States.

If the United States implements differing specific requirements for Mexican carriers from those imposed on U.S. and Canadian carriers, in order to meet legitimate U.S. safety concerns, it must do so in good faith and those requirements 

must conform with the requirements of Chapter Nine and other relevant 

NAFTA provisions. [Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01 Findings, Determinations, and Recommendations]

Such legitimate objectives are addressed in Article 904.2 of NAFTA: ‘‘Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, each party may in pursuing its legitimate objectives of safety or the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 

the environment or consumers, establish the level of protection that it considers appropriate.’’

Therefore, the United States has two choices: (1) it can establish a program, 

which requires Mexican trucks to meet more stringent standards than is the case 

under current U.S. law. The Teamsters Union believes the United States would be 

acting responsibly in fulfilling its safety obligations to the American public by establishing such a program and that such action would not be in conflict with NAFTA. 

Or (2) it can refuse to implement the findings of the NAFTA Panel because it is 

under no legal obligation to do so. Let me repeat that: The United States is under 

no legal obligation to implement the findings of the NAFTA panel.

Under U.S. law, the health, safety and welfare of U.S. citizens is paramount, and 

to the extent NAFTA conflicts with any U.S. law dealing with health, environment, 

and motor carrier/worker safety, U.S. law prevails. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a). Even under 

the terms of NAFTA, the U.S. is entitled to disregard the panel’s recommendation, 

and simply allow Mexico to take equivalent reciprocal measures or negotiate compensation or a new grant of some trade benefits to Mexico. Indeed, the United 

States has not traditionally allowed foreign countries or international bureaucracies 

to dictate its domestic policy, particularly where the health and safety of U.S. citizens is concerned. 

Despite these options, the Bush Administration has indicated that it plans to 

begin processing Mexican carrier applications at the behest of the NAFTA panel, 

and has set a target date of January 2002 for doing so. It is in accordance with this 

decision that the Department of Transportation (DOT) has proposed three rules, 

which, unfortunately, achieve the opposite of what is permitted under the NAFTA 

Panel ruling. In order to save time, I’d like to dispense with the details of our speVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
73

cific concerns with the proposed rules and instead submit our comments to the docket for the record. 

What I would like to emphasize, however, is that the DOT’s proposals actually 

allow greater latitude in several key areas for Mexican-domiciled carriers and drivers than currently apply to U.S. and Canadian companies and drivers under U.S. 

law. In fact, the Department’s proposed 18- month safety review process for Mexican 

carriers is more lenient and far less comprehensive than inspections of U.S. carriers 

since, among other things, those done for Mexican carriers would be off-site. Affectively, the DOT proposal creates a safe harbor for Mexican-domiciled entrants to the 

market and a competitive disadvantage for U.S. interests. 

Moreover, the rules appear—although surely the DOT is not—to be almost entirely uninformed about the real risks that these dangerous provisions pose to the 

U.S. public. 

We believe that the U.S. is acting far too quickly, with far too little attention to 

the actual and potential costs, and at the risk of causing hazardous material spills, 

horrific truck crashes and other unnecessary suffering and death on U.S. highways. 

After all, the serious safety concerns expressed by the United States before the 

NAFTA panel have not yet been resolved. 

Now I want to take a moment and highlight some of the United States’ own submissions to the NAFTA Panel because I think it is crucial that when this Committee 

considers whether to act on this issue that all of the Members take a close look at 

and compare what the United States Government, under the direction of the DOT 

and the United States Trade Representative (USTR), submitted to the NAFTA 

Panel and what the two agencies are asserting now—two entirely different things.

Trucking firms operate in Mexico under a far less comprehensive and less stringent safety regime than that in place in either Canada or the United States. 

The Mexico safety regime lacks core components, such as comprehensive truck 

equipment standards and fully functioning roadside inspection or on-site review 

systems. In light of these important differences in circumstances, and given the 

experience to-date with the safety compliance record of Mexican trucks operating in the U.S. border zone, the United States decision to delay processing 

Mexican carriers’ applications for operating authority until further progress is 

made on cooperative safety efforts is both prudent and consistent with U.S. obligations under NAFTA. (Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01, June 8, 

2000)

The safety of Mexican carriers cannot be ensured on a case-by-case basis. Rather, as the United States has explained, highway safety can only be assured 

through a comprehensive, integrated safety regime. (Secretariat File No. USA–

MEX–98–2008–01, June 8, 2000)

U.S. safety inspectors may easily audit, inspect, and enforce compliance vis-a ́-

vis firms based in the United States, and can rely on Canadian inspectors to 

enforce Canadian rules and regulations in a similar manner, but this is not the 

case for companies based in Mexico. In light of these important differences, and 

given the experience to-date with the safety compliance record of Mexican 

trucks operating in the U.S. border zone, the United States is within its rights 

to insist that the necessary regulatory and enforcement framework be in place—

and working—prior to authorizing Mexican trucking firms to operate across the 

U.S. roadway system. And, given the high volume of cross-border truck traffic, 

and the fact that truck safety regulation requires a comprehensive, integrated 

regulatory regime, border inspections alone are not sufficient. (Secretariat File 

No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01, April 24, 2000)

Roadside inspections alone, without on-site inspections, accident and carrier information, and other elements of a safety regime, are not sufficient to identify 

problem carriers. Thus, a Mexican carrier’s safety performance cannot be assured simply because, for example, it uses only new trucks in its U.S. operations that are more likely to pass roadside inspections. (Secretariat File No. 

USA–MEX–98–2008–01, June 9, 2000)

The Government of Mexico cannot identify its carriers and drivers so that unsafe conduct can be properly assigned and reviewed. While we understand that 

the Government of Mexico is engaged in an effort to register all of its motor 

carriers and place them in a database that would facilitate the assignment of 

safety data, that database does not contain any safety data. Therefore, Mexico 

cannot track the safety fitness of its carriers and drivers. (Secretariat File No. 

USA–MEX–98–2008–01, June 9, 2000)

74

It is the position of the United States that Mexico must develop and implement 

a safety oversight program that ensures that Mexican carriers planning to engage in cross-border transportation meet minimum safety standards, and which 

allow the Mexican and U.S. Governments to share relevant and complete motor 

carrier noncompliance data. Without such carrier safety performance history, 

the United States cannot conduct a meaningful safety fitness review of Mexican 

carriers at the application stage. In light of this . . . the Mexican case-by-case 

approval scenario would be unworkable. (Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–

2008–01, June 9, 2000)

No review of a Mexican carrier based solely on an unverifiable application for 

operating authority can give the United States a sufficient level of confidence 

regarding the safety of that carrier’s vehicles, no matter how detailed an application is required. (Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01, June 9, 2000)

Mexico has not yet completed the process of establishing safety enforcement 

mechanisms with respect to a number of important areas of truck safety. (Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01, June 9, 2000)

Mexico has neither promulgated final safety standards for motor carrier inspections nor implemented a safety oversight and enforcement program for carriers 

seeking U.S. operating authority. (Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01, 

June 9, 2000)

When Mexican trucks cross into the United States, there is no assurance that, 

based on the regulatory regime in place in Mexico, those trucks already meet 

U.S. highway safety standards. (Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01, 

June 9, 2000)

These admissions become even more disturbing when you read the DOT Inspector 

General’s (IG) interim report, which was issued shortly after the DOT published its 

proposed rules. The report, entitled Status of Implementing the North American Free 

Trade Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions (Report No. MH–2001–059, 

May 8, 2001) found that while some improvements have been made since the IG 

last investigated the safety of Mexican trucks in 1998, Mexican trucks are still not 

as safe as U.S. and Canadian trucks, and U.S. border inspection facilities are still 

inadequate to evaluate and monitor the safety of Mexican trucks as they cross the 

border. 

According to the IG, there are only two permanent inspection facilities, both of 

which are state facilities in California. Of the 25 remaining border crossings, a vast 

majority lack dedicated phone lines to access safety databases and therefore cannot 

perform as simple a safety check as validating a commercial driver’s license. Further, almost all of these inspection facilities lack adequate space to inspect vehicles 

and/or place dangerous vehicles out of service. In addition, there are not currently 

enough inspectors to adequately staff border operations. The IG indicates that DOT 

has requested increased funding to hire additional personnel, and if all such funding 

is approved, DOT will be able to hire and train an additional 80 inspectors. However, this is not enough to implement all three proposed rules. Although the number 

of inspectors would meet the minimum recommended by the IG in its 1998 report 

if all 80 are designated to border operations, only 40 have been designated by the 

DOT as inspectors. The remainder are designated as investigators who will conduct 

compliance reviews. As such, the number of inspectors still falls far short of the 

1998 goal. Indeed, the IG indicates that its 1998 recommendation was conservative 

and that even more inspectors are actually needed. Thus, there is no basis to believe 

the situation will be improved by the time the DOT begins processing Mexican carrier applications to operate throughout the United States, and in each of your congressional districts, by January 2002. 

The IG also reported that over 4.5 million trucks entered the U.S. at the southern 

border in FY2000. Of those, 46,114 inspections were performed—less than one percent. Now, some will claim that this number is skewed: That the 4.5 million trucks 

that entered the U.S. was the result of 80,000 trucks crossing the border more than 

once in FY2000. The Committee Members should not be fooled by this assertion because assuming for a moment that this figure is correct—and it may very well be 

correct—then the situation is even worse than we thought. In fact, this means that 

on average each of those 80,000 trucks traveled across the border about 56 times 

in FY2000. Taking past inspection rates into consideration (less than 1 percent inspected), this would mean that about 800 of those trucks were inspected. The Committee should then question how so many trucks that crossed the border 56 times 

in one year went un-inspected. If the rather low 80,000 figure is accurate, then it 

75

is the Teamsters’ position that every truck should have been inspected, and Mexico’s 

out-of-service rate should be equal to if not better than the United States. 

But the fact is that, of those trucks that were inspected in FY2000, 36 percent 

of them were placed out-of-service as a result of being in an unsafe condition. While 

that rate has improved from the 1997 out-of-service rate of 44 percent, it is still 50 

percent high than the U.S. out-of-service rate and even higher than the Canadian 

out-of-service rate of 17 percent. The Teamsters Union needs not to remind this 

Committee that it was not too long ago that we were all concerned about the United 

States’ own high out-of-service rate of 24 percent. A higher out-of-service rate for 

foreign motor carriers that are not going to be directly monitored by the DOT should 

be an even greater concern. 

The average out-of-service rate for Mexican carriers, however, may not accurately 

reflect the entire picture. But not because of what our opponents have been claiming: That the high out-of-service rates for Mexican carriers are due to the fact that 

most of the trucks taken out of service are drayage trucks that provide a different 

service than that provided by long haul trucks. Even the DOT disagrees with that 

in each of the U.S. submissions to the NAFTA Panel:

In terms of safety, the service provided by drayage trucks is no different from 

that provided by long-haul trucks—they haul goods on the same roads, through 

the same cities and towns through which long-haul trucks operate. Furthermore, the Government of Mexico has presented no evidence that Mexican longhaul carriers are safer than Mexican drayage carriers. Indeed, many of the 

Mexican trucks that are inspected at the border have traveled considerable distances from the interior of Mexico to the border and thus are, in fact, long-haul 

trucks. Plus, there is no guarantee that drayage truck operators would not seek 

to operate their trucks beyond the commercial zone once the moratorium is lifted. [Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01]

In order to truly evaluate the accuracy of the average out-of-service rate for 

Mexican carriers, the Committee must look at the rates for each of the four border states, individually. At the state funded, permanent inspection facility in 

Otay Mesa, California, the out-of-service rate for FY 2000 was 23 percent, comparable to U.S. rates. The total out-of-service rate for California was 26 percent. 

This is because California has a comprehensive state funded inspection program. California, however, only receives 23 percent of the commercial cross-border traffic. By comparison the out-of-service rate for Texas, which receives 69 

percent of all commercial cross-border traffic, was 40 percent. At the El Paso, 

Texas, border crossing alone, the out-of-service rate for FY 2000 was an alarming 50 percent. Meanwhile, the out-of-service rates for New Mexico and Arizona 

are 32 and 40 percent, respectively. Combined, these out-of-service rates make 

up the 36 percent average out-of-service rate. Taken separately, these rates are 

a recipe for disaster, particularly in Texas.

Equally troubling is the fact that Mexico still has not harmonized its safety standards with the United States and Canada, as NAFTA requires. The IG confirmed 

that Mexico still hasn’t established an effective drug and alcohol-testing program. 

Mexico still has no hours of service regulations and has only recently proposed in 

its Diario Official logbook requirements to record hours of service. And to this day, 

no database exists for our two nations to exchange information on past violations 

of Mexican drivers and carriers. 

Despite these serious concerns, the IG found that the DOT does not yet have an 

implementation plan to ensure safe opening of the U.S.-Mexico border to commercial 

vehicles, according to the Inspector General. In this regard, the IG recommended 

that the DOT take the following actions:

Finalize and execute a comprehensive plan that identifies specific actions and 

completion dates for the implementation of NAFTA’s cross-border provisions (including staffing and facilities), and that reasonably ensures safety at the southern border and as the commercial vehicles traverse the United States.

Increase the number of Federal safety inspectors at the U.S.-Mexico border to 

at least 139 (our 1998 estimate of 126 plus the 13 authorized in 1998) to enforce 

Federal registration and safety requirements during all port operating hours, 

and provide the requisite inspection facilities.

Unfortunately, none of these actions have been taken. It is therefore incomprehensible to understand how the DOT will be prepared to begin processing applications 

from Mexican carriers by the end of this year. We are clearly nowhere near ready 

to implement NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provisions. And it is impossible for the 

76

Bush Administration to do in one year what the Clinton Administration could not 

do in eight. 

For these reasons, the Teamsters Union supports House Resolution 152. We also 

support the provisions that were included in both the House and Senate Transportation Appropriations bills. In fact, many of the provisions in the Senate bill came 

out of the House Resolution. 

It is important to stress that we still believe that the ban on cross-border trucking 

should be continued—the U.S. has that option under NAFTA, as explained earlier 

in this testimony. But if Congress chooses against going in that direction, then it 

must at least ensure that the many safety issues highlighted in the IG report are 

resolved before the DOT begins processing Mexican carrier applications—not after. 

Safety should never be an afterthought. 

Now I understand that our opponents will claim that such actions discriminate 

against Mexico and Mexican-citizens. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The 

Teamsters Union has the largest Latino membership amongst all the unions in the 

AFL-CIO, and our members know that this issue has nothing to do with discrimination. In fact, we’d like to submit for the record a letter to both the House and Senate 

from the President of the Teamsters’ Hispanic Caucus, Bob Morales. In it, President 

Morales, writes what this issue is really about: corporate greed.

The Administration does not want the border to be opened for the benefit of the 

poor Mexican driver desperate to reach for a better life. Rather, it will be 

opened for monetary gain to a trucking industry reaching for better and higher 

profits through unrestricted motor carrier access to the United States, and, of 

course, for political gain with Mexican President Vicente Fox.

The impoverished Mexican may drive the truck, but he will never see the profit. 

That will belong to the industry, which will pay him a meager wage, and use 

him to hide behind the official NAFTA policy that exploits the poor in Mexico, 

while endangering both Mexican and Mexican-American U.S. Citizens with unsafe and largely unregulated trucks.

Thus, Mexican drivers are offered at best four things: first, the spur of poverty; 

second, the incentive of a wage slightly higher than the meager wages that consign most of their countrymen to a kind of economic involuntary servitude; 

third, unsafe vehicles, and no rest; fourth, a requirement that they drive across 

the border, into and across the United States, and deliver their cargo on time 

and in good condition. And this is what Latinos, on both sides of the border, 

are supposed to think is a good deal. [Letter to Congress from Teamsters Hispanic Caucus President, July 11, 2001]

The fact is that for Latinos on both sides of the border—the drivers coming across 

from Mexico and the Mexican-American families that are living here in the in the 

United States—this is a potentially dangerous deal. And without a much-needed reevaluation of the NAFTA cross-border trucking provisions, there will inevitably be 

a tragic crash, a loss of life, and a devastated family, on one or both sides of the 

border. 

Mr. Chairman, the Teamsters Union urges you and the members of this Committee to turn this policy around and to get the DOT off the fast track and on the 

right track before it’s too late. 

Thank you again for providing me the opportunity to testify. I’m happy to answer 

any questions that you might have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Ms. Claybrook. 

STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, PUBLIC 

CITIZEN 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the 

Committee. I am pleased to be here to testify on behalf of Public 

Citizen, a national public interest organization that has 150,000 

members around the United States on the issue of Mexican trucks. 

Let me be clear, we endorse what the Senate Appropriations Committee has put together. We think it is absolutely essential. And 

with all due respect to my colleague on this panel, we are not calling for a permanent ban. That is a red herring and our proposals 

77

are not racist and I would like to make that completely clear for 

this record. 

We are concerned about safety. In short, our belief is that the administration’s now revised proposals are totally inadequate and it 

is going to take action by the Congress to correct this problem. We 

believe that the NAFTA ruling when you read it clearly allows for 

the United States Government to set strong safety standards. Not 

only do the Mexican trucks have to meet our standards, but we can 

set tougher requirements under the NAFTA ruling than even for 

the United States itself. 

There is a fatal flaw in NAFTA. It sets a deadline for opening 

the border, but it doesn’t set a deadline for the Mexican trucks to 

meet our standards, and that delinking of those two particular requirements means that we are now in this very difficult situation 

because the Mexican government has not taken the initiatives it 

should have to issue strong safety standards. In fact, the standards 

that they have proposed are extremely weak, much weaker than 

ours. They are voluntary for the first year and their enforcement—

what they would enforce is a paper penalty yet the Administration 

would still allow these trucks to operate in the United States. 

In the United States, these trucks would be put out of service, 

and they wouldn’t be allowed to operate, so there is not comparability between Mexican and United States requirements. That 

puts tremendous pressure on the United States government and on 

the border facilities. 

We believe what the administration has proposed is disgraceful. 

It is totally inadequate. It is a paper audit and it is not an onsite 

audit. The only way that we are going to be able to deal with these 

issues is an onsite audit. The other issue that is very important to 

remember is that when there is a dispute under trade agreements, 

there is a process of negotiation and bargaining if you would, horse 

trading, between countries that does allow some leeway so that 

there is time to meet the government standards in the United 

States, and the U.S. government has not done that. 

They are setting a very short deadline of next January for the 

opening of the border and we think that that is not possible to 

meet and totally beyond the capacity of the Mexican government 

and our border facilities. Among other things, Mexico has no functioning database, so even when Mexican trucks come across the 

border, there is no ability to really check whether or not these 

trucks that are coming across the border have had any problems 

in Mexico. There is no database on the drivers and there is no 

working database on the companies, as there is in Canada, and as 

there is in the United States. 

Mexican trucks are allowed to be heavier than ours. There must 

be a continuous weigh station so that when these trucks come 

across we can catch those that are heavily overweight. Not only are 

they much more dangerous, and many documented studies have 

shown that much heavier trucks are much more dangerous, but 

they also ruin our highways. We have enough trouble with our infrastructure as it is without having more. We cannot rely alone on 

the border facilities, and they must be beefed up, as they are totally adequate on this point. There is no permanent facility in any 

78

of the border areas, except for California, and 66 percent of the 

traffic that crosses comes across in Texas. 

So we have submitted extensive comments to the docket justifying our views, the docket of the Department of Transportation 

submitted as an attachment to my full testimony requiring why we 

think that there has to be onsite audits for these Mexican companies. 

The other thing I would like to mention is as to California. Although California is cited as a model because there is a label that 

is put on the truck and that is considered a very efficient and effective way, I would like to point out three deficiencies in the California model. 

One is that California inspectors cannot verify the validity of the 

truck’s operating authority. The decal may be there, but they have 

no ability to verify the validity of the operating authority. Second, 

the California inspectors have themselves said that there is evidence of the decals being used on more than one truck, that is, blue 

doors on brown trucks and brown doors on white trucks. They take 

that door with the decal on it and they just switch it to another 

truck, and that truck in fact hasn’t been inspected and there is no 

operating authority for it. And then third, California has not, so far 

checked the driver’s hours of service or driver’s licenses. Hours of 

service are basically nonexistent in Mexico and these drivers could 

be very tired and I think the Committee knows there is a tremendous correlation between fatigue and accidents and crashes. With 

these heavy trucks, that fatigue means that people are going to be 

killed, or they are going to be desperately injured. It is going to 

mean that traffic is stopped for hours. 

So we believe that we have to take the initiative here. We urge 

the Congress to do this. We urge the Congress to act on this authority and perhaps the fastest way to do it initially is in the appropriations bill. We are urging the Commerce Committee to do 

this on an authorization basis so that there is no getting around 

these kinds of requirements, which we think are absolutely essential. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

testify. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK,

PRESIDENT, PUBLIC CITIZEN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to offer this testimony on the United States’ and Mexico’s lack of 

preparedness for the opening of the southern border of the U.S. to commercial carrier traffic, under the short-sighted timetable set out in the North American Free 

Trade Agreement (NAFTA). I am President of Public Citizen, a national public interest organization with 150,000 members nationwide that represents consumer interests through lobbying, litigation, regulatory oversight, research and public education. My comments today will focus on the inadequacy of the Bush Administration’s proposed rules for the admission of Mexican carriers and the dire need for further steps by Congress to assure the safety of American motorists, before the border 

is opened to nationwide commercial traffic. 

The Committee is addressing a critical safety issue. Under the current system in 

the U.S., 5,000 people are killed and 101,000 injured every year in crashes involving 

large trucks. Large truck crashes also cause disasters on the highway, including 

hazardous materials spills and costly traffic delays. The Congress, government and 

safety advocates have worked for many years to improve this record, enhancing U.S. 

safety regulations and establishing enforcement mechanisms with teeth. Now we 

79

may see these accomplishments, and the areas where additional work is needed, imperiled by an influx of dangerous large trucks. I urge this Committee to look closely 

at our recommendations and at the recent actions taken by the Senate Appropriations Committee and to delay opening the border until safety is assured. 

NAFTA Failed to Provide Safety Incentives With Teeth, Creating a False 

Double Bind 

I will first address the reason that a trade agreement has put us in a false double 

bind, in which it appears that we must choose between domestic safety and the imperatives of trade. In short, the problem is that NAFTA was drafted with a fatal 

flaw. NAFTA required the United States to open its border to Mexican trucks in 

phases beginning in 1995. While the agreement also required Mexico to draft and 

implement trucking safety regulations commensurate to those in the United States 

and Canada, the agreement failed to link these required Mexican domestic safety 

improvements to the timetable for the U.S. to open the border to Mexican commercial trucks. 

Without acting at all on its domestic obligations, almost 3 years ago the Mexican 

government brought a dispute before a NAFTA arbitration panel to open the southern U.S. border to nationwide commercial traffic. Last summer, the Mexican government finally issued a fledgling set of very basic rules for commercial carrier safety. 

Public Citizen’s analysis of the rules shows that they are deficient in many ways 

and do not compare favorably to U.S. law. 

These new Mexican commercial carrier inspection standards are far weaker than 

those of the U.S. Among other flaws, the new laws require roadside inspections to 

be done within an unreasonably short time period. For hazardous materials carriers, 

inspections must be completed within a mere 20 minutes. They also merely require 

a fine and warning letter for a number of violations that would cause a truck to 

be placed out of service in the U.S. In addition, the rules, which were just issued 

last summer, are voluntary for the first year, and are to be phased in over 2 years. 

Other difficulties show the still-considerable gaps between Mexico’s new rules and 

the absence of any practical consequences for infractions. While Mexico has agreed 

to implement a drug and alcohol testing program, it has no laboratories that are 

U.S.-certified for drug testing. In addition, while Mexico has enacted a law requiring 

driver logbooks, U.S. border officials admitted that they have yet to see a single 

Mexican logbook. 

Most importantly, despite a promise to establish comprehensive domestic safety 

systems, Mexico has not limited its drivers’ hours of service. Mexican officials claim 

that the general labor laws applying to every workplace provide for an 8-hour workday, but there is no evidence that any general limitation on working hours is enforced as to commercial drivers, and anecdotal evidence in news stories suggests 

that working hours are very long indeed. Fatigue is a significant cause of often-catastrophic truck crashes. Although Mexican drivers crossing the border will ostensibly 

be bound by U.S. hours-of-service limits, it will be impossible to enforce U.S. laws 

without both meaningful enforcement of Mexico’s new logbook requirements and enactment of hours-of-service laws in Mexico. 

In short, little has changed since the Clinton Administration, prompted by safety 

concerns, refused to take steps to open the border in 1995. Mexico has not yet put 

in place a regulatory system comparable to that of the U.S. and Canada. The outof-service rate for Mexico-domiciled trucks that cross the border is a significantly 

higher rate - 36 percent - than the out-of-service rate for trucks in the U.S., which 

is 24 percent. Border areas are still woefully short on federal inspectors, who numbered a mere 50 in March 2001, and lack the resources to ensure that unsafe trucks 

are not admitted. 

Despite this well-demonstrated lack of progress on safety standards for commercial carriers in Mexico, the NAFTA panel ruled on February 6, 2001 in Mexico’s 

favor and found that the U.S. was in violation of its treaty obligations under 

NAFTA. While this has been depicted in the press as meaning that the U.S. must 

either open the border or face trade sanctions, the panel’s ruling was actually far 

more solicitous of Clinton Administration’s demonstrated concern for safety than 

has been explained. 

The NAFTA arbitration panel found that the United States may implement different admission procedures for Mexican carriers than apply to U.S. or Canadian 

carriers, in order to ensure that Mexican carriers will be able to comply with U.S. 

regulations. Furthermore, the U.S. may impose requirements on Mexican carriers 

that differ from those imposed on domestic or Canadian carriers, so long as the decision to impose such requirements is made in good faith and with respect to a legitimate safety concern. Therefore, although the panel ruled that the U.S. could not 

maintain its ban on all Mexican carriers, under the ruling the U.S. can evaluate 

80

Mexico-domiciled carriers on a case-by case basis and can refuse to issue them operating authority if a particular carrier will not be compliance with U.S. safety regulations. 

In the aftermath of this ruling, the Bush Administration has adopted the course 

of action that is least likely to protect public safety, and is the most subservient to 

the over-arching goal of free trade. Despite 5 years of U.S. government documentation of major safety problems by such neutral parties as the General Accounting Office and the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General, the Bush 

Administration has rushed to propose a set of three totally inadequate regulations 

for monitoring and oversight of Mexican carriers and the processing of applications 

for operating authority in the border zones and beyond. The Administration’s new proposals fail to hold Mexican carriers even to the same standards U.S. carriers 

must meet. 

This course of action by the U.S. DOT is particularly disgraceful given that there 

are other options available that are far more likely to protect public safety. These 

include both trade mechanisms and opportunities contained in the implementation 

of the panel decision. I will address the trade options first. 

When governments involved in a trade dispute are truly concerned about the disagreement underlying the dispute, and seek to maintain their own laws in the face 

of a hostile ruling, the countries frequently engage in a process of negotiation called 

compensation. In this process, countries will trade off concessions to satisfy outstanding trade rulings. Thus, the United States could exchange its victory in the 

World Trade Organization case against Mexico on high fructose corn syrup to maintain U.S. domestic highway safety rules. Comparable amounts of revenue can also 

be exchanged as compensation to balance accounts between countries. Alternatively, 

the United States could simply award Mexico additional trade benefits to compensate for maintaining our safety rules and restrictions upon U.S. access for Mexican trucks. 

Instead, as I will explain, the Bush Administration’s proposed rules fail even to 

require that Mexican carriers fully comply with existing U.S. law. Because the 

NAFTA panel ruling expressly provided permission for U.S. authorities to establish 

case-by-case review of applications for operating authority as well as inspection and 

licensing requirements that are not ‘‘like’’ those already in place for U.S. or Canadian carriers, the U.S. could establish a program which requires Mexican trucks to 

meet more stringent standards than is the case under for U.S. and Canadian carriers under current U.S. law. This type of accommodation by the panel is highly unusual in a trade ruling, and is an open invitation for the U.S. to act responsibly 

to fulfill its safety obligations to the American public. 

Despite such considerations by the panel, FMCSA has proposed rules which 

achieve the opposite of what is permitted under the ruling. The agency’s proposals 

actually allow greater latitude in several key areas for Mexican-domiciled carriers 

and drivers than apply to U.S. and Canadian trucking companies and drivers. The 

Administration’s proposed rules create an 18-month ‘‘safe harbor’’ for Mexican carriers by limiting their penalties for infractions, undercutting any incentive for Mexican carriers to follow U.S. law and misleading new Mexican entrants as to the seriousness of their infractions. 

For example, under the proposed rules, the agency’s 18-month safety review of 

newly admitted Mexican carriers need not be performed on-site. Compliance reviews 

for U.S. carriers, however, must occur on-site. In addition, during a Mexican carriers’ 18-month ‘‘safe harbor,’’ for the following offenses carriers will be sanctioned 

only by a deficiency letter or an expedited safety review—a review which they presumably would have received within 18 months regardless of the offense:

• using a driver without a valid Commercial Driver’s license or its equivalent;

• operating without insurance,

• using drivers who have tested positive for drugs and alcohol; and

• using a vehicle that has been placed out of service without correcting the violation incurring the penalty.

For U.S. carriers, these violations would incur fines for the driver or the carrier, 

and could even trigger criminal penalties, including jail time. 

Comparisons Between Mexico and Canada on Commercial Carriers Are Inappropriate and Misleading 

Some commentators have misleadingly compared the U.S.-Mexico relationship regarding commercial carrier access to that of the United States and Canada. But this 

is comparing apples and oranges, because Canadian domestic safety standards are 

very similar to those in the U.S. and unlike Mexico, Canada maintains up-to-date 

81

databases on Canadian trucking companies and drivers that are accessible to U.S. 

authorities. Canadian databases, like those in the U.S. and unlike Mexico’s, include 

driver conviction records and carrier out-of-service records. As proof of Canadian 

success in these areas, the out-of-service rate for Canadian trucks traveling in the 

U.S. is even lower than the out-of-service rate for U.S. trucks. In sum, the United 

States can rely on Canada to enforce its own, comprehensive safety regulations with 

respect to Canadian carriers. The United States does not have such a relationship 

with Mexico. 

The Administration’s Proposed Rules Are A Safety Scandal

In its latest series of three proposed rules, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) contemplates granting operating authority to Mexican carriers without creating a process that will assure the safety of American drivers. Despite the clear lack of preparedness, the agency’s proposed rules are scheduled to 

be implemented before the end of the year—in less than 6 months. To evaluate the 

safety fitness of Mexican carriers, the agency intends to rely heavily on an unpopulated—that is, an empty—database that currently lacks the basic information necessary to process Mexican applications or to perform a safety review. 

The agency also allows 18 months to pass before a safety audit is completed, while 

carriers are permitted to cross the border and roam throughout the United States. 

Eighteen months is far too long to wait for verification of a company’s compliance 

and safety record. In addition, it is likely that FMCSA will not perform the audits 

in an expeditious fashion. The proposed rules provide that the agency’s ‘‘safety oversight program’’ will continue indefinitely after the 18-month period has expired if 

the agency fails to conduct a safety review within the allotted time. During this time 

unaudited Mexican carriers can continue to operate throughout the U.S. 

How the Proposed Rules Fail to Assure Safety

In the paper-based universe created by the proposed new DOT rules, operating 

authority is granted by U.S. officials if the application from a carrier is complete. 

This approach falls far short of the assurances that are needed for safety. For example, the application asks carriers to certify their knowledge of, and intention to follow, U.S. regulations by checking boxes indicating the answer is ‘‘yes,’’ yet fails to 

provide a box to check ‘‘no’’! Although applicants must describe their plans to monitor employee logbooks and implement an accident monitoring system, the FMCSA 

has no process in place to verify this or any other information provided the application. The Department of Transportation has never implemented a verification process for Mexican truck registration information, and as a result, according to DOT’s 

own Inspector General, much of the information that the DOT currently has in its 

databases regarding Mexican-domiciled carriers is outdated or unverified. 

Indeed, the instructions on the proposed applications contained in the rule suggest that applicants’ business information cannot be compared or cross-checked, because the application forms instruct applicants to enter the name of the carrier exactly the same way each time a name is required, or, the form implies, the department’s data system may list two slightly different names as two different companies. This instruction suggests that the DOT has no way to cross-check the owners, 

addresses, and other information of a company to ensure that a company is not 

counted twice. A simple typographical error in the name of a carrier for an entry 

of inspection or crash data into the database, then, could prevent the agency from 

matching negative safety data with that carrier. In addition, carriers with a poor 

safety record could re-register under a new name to get a second ‘‘chance’’ in the 

DOT database. 

According to the proposed rules, for the agency’s 18-month Mexican carrier safety 

review, FMCSA will examine ‘‘performance-based safety information’’ in its Motor 

Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS), as well as the documents that 

must be maintained by motor carriers under the rules. FMCSA officials have stated 

that the purpose of the 18-month interval is to allow U.S. officials to compile inspection and truck crash information on a carrier during its operation in the United 

States. At the same time, it is undisputed that the Mexican carriers will face a 

‘‘learning curve’’ similar to that of other new entrant carriers—indicating that these 

new carriers will necessarily be more dangerous in the beginning of their operations. 

Using the public highways as a testing ground for the safety of inexperienced foreign carriers is outrageous and completely unnecessary. 

Mexico is supposed to maintain its own database of inspections and crash information. If Mexico were conducting regular roadside inspections and compiling crash 

data consistently and reliably, this database would be useful in evaluating the safety fitness of Mexican carriers before they are granted operating authority in the 

U.S. Unfortunately, members of the Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee, 

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a group assembled under NAFTA to achieve comparable safety standards among the 

treaty’s countries, admitted that this database is not yet populated with any meaningful data, such as inspection and crash data. There is no evidence of the level of 

access that Mexican authorities on the road have to the database, nor do we know 

whether the information being added has any assurance of reliability. And even if 

the information is being added, it may not be representative of a Mexican carrier’s 

safety fitness on U.S. roads because Mexican inspection standards are considerably 

weaker than those in the U.S. 

According to FMCSA’s proposed rules, the required 18-month safety review may 

be conducted within the United States or at the carrier’s place of business in Mexico. This proposal is inadequate on its face. Any meaningful audit system should, 

without doubt, require an on-site evaluation and inspection of the carrier’s place of 

business. 

The integrity of the application and review process is critical because the high 

out-of-service rates and anecdotal evidence regarding the status of the Mexican 

trucking fleet show that tremendous improvement would be necessary to meet U.S. 

safety standards. This situation is nothing short of critical, given that U.S. border 

inspection facilities lack the resources and large number of new inspectors that will 

be needed to pick up the slack created by weak Mexican regulations and enforcement. 

Our Stretched Border Resources Will Not Protect the Public 

The already inadequate inspection force at the border will be completely unprepared for the influx of newly admitted carriers. The number of federal inspectors 

at the border is less than half of the number that was estimated to be necessary 

in 1998, and that number did not include the investigators that will be necessary 

for the agency to conduct its 18-month safety reviews. Hiring and training a new 

FMCSA inspector requires at least 6 months—additional inspectors, even were they 

authorized today, would not be in place before the end of the year. 

Most states, including the border states, are completely unprepared to deal with 

the increased traffic that will result from opening the border. Texas, which has the 

most border crossings and the highest traffic volume of Mexico-domiciled carriers, 

does not have permanent inspection facilities at any crossing point. The Texas legislature recently passed a resolution asking Congress to recognize the impact that further opening the border to Mexican trucks will have on Texas and its resources. The 

Texas legislature also asked Congress for increased funding, amounting to an amazing $11 billion, to offset the costs of greater infrastructure needs for border crossings 

and trade corridors within its state. 

In fact, most of the border crossings are sorely in need of infrastructure improvements. Most border states do not have full-time state inspectors at the border during all hours of operations. While plans for building projects have been made, no 

permanent inspection facilities have been built since 1998, and no permanent facilities exist outside the California border areas. A recent study documented that border crossings lack Internet connections, inspection space, and space to park out-ofservice vehicles. In preparing a May 2001 DOT Inspector General report, investigators visited all 27 border crossings and found that at 20 crossings, FMCSA inspectors did not have dedicated phone lines to access databases, such as those for validating a driver’s license; at 19 crossings, FMCSA inspectors had space to inspect 

only 1 or 2 trucks at a time; and at 14 crossings, FMCSA inspectors had only 1 or 

2 spaces to park vehicles placed out of service. In addition, the sites’ out-of-service 

space was shared with inspection space at a majority of the crossings. FMCSA must 

address these serious shortcomings before the volume of cross-border traffic increases or trucks crossing the border are operating throughout the United States. 

Our research has also shown that once a truck gets beyond the border, it is not 

likely to face inspection or verification of operating authority, called registration, by 

either state or federal officials. This is truly a tragic impediment to enforcement, 

because the primary means of enforcing U.S. standards for Mexican carriers during 

the 18-month safety oversight program is for U.S. officials to suspend or revoke a 

carrier’s registration. However, trucks crossing the border are only checked for registration when they are inspected, and only 1 percent of trucks crossing the border 

are inspected at all. Even at the border, it is unlikely that illegal trucks will ever 

get caught, because only federal inspectors and California’s state inspectors routinely check for certificates of registration. U.S. customs officials and other state inspectors do not routinely check for valid registration. 

83

Mexican Drivers Will Escape New Penalties for Dangerous U.S. Commercial 

Drivers 

Another proposed rulemaking by FMCSA would disqualify the commercial drivers 

licenses of drivers who are convicted of serious driving violations, such as drunk 

driving, leaving the scene of an accident, violating railroad-highway grade crossing 

signs, excessive speed, and reckless driving, regardless of whether the offense was 

committed while driving a personal vehicle or a commercial vehicle. This new rule, 

a significant step toward insuring the safety of commercial vehicle traffic, cannot 

presently be enforced with respect to Mexican drivers, due to the lack of data in 

the shared Mexico-U.S. database about the personal driving records of Mexican 

truck drivers. Therefore, it appears that FMCSA will not be able to enforce this law 

for Mexican commercial drivers due to practical constraints, demonstrating once 

again that safety steps applicable to U.S. and Canadian commercial drivers will far 

less frequently be applied to Mexican drivers, and that the penalties for infractions 

committed by Mexican carriers and drivers will, for technical reasons, in practice 

be far less severe. 

Recommendations 

We support the well-tailored proposals passed last week by the Senate Appropriations Committee. A plan for strengthening border oversight and crafting a reliable 

system for the admission of safe Mexican commercial carriers cannot be rushed or 

addressed in a piecemeal fashion. Only a comprehensive plan that addresses all of 

these safety concerns will insure the safety of U.S. highways and the public. Our 

recommendations are the minimum that should be required and are as follows:

• As the Senate Committee required, FMCSA must require on-site safety reviews 

of Mexican carriers prior to granting operating authority. FMCSA must not test 

the safety of Mexican carriers on U.S. motorists. On-site safety reviews can 

evaluate factors indicating the ability of a carrier to comply with U.S. laws, 

while review of a paper application cannot. Safety compliance reviews, conducted at a carrier’s place of business with independent federal verification of 

drivers’ license validity, equipment safety, inspection and repair facilities, safety 

management controls, and interviews with on-site company officials, among 

other elements of a complete safety compliance effort, should be the primary 

basis for evaluating the safety of Mexico-domiciled carriers and should be a 

predicate of operating authority, as they are in the United States.

• As recommended by the Senate Committee, FMCSA should require Mexican 

carriers to complete a proficiency test to demonstrate their knowledge of U.S. 

laws and safety regulations. The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 

directs the Secretary of DOT to establish minimum requirements for applicant 

motor carriers to ensure that they are knowledgeable about federal motor carrier safety standards; it also directs the Secretary to consider the establishment 

of a safety proficiency examination for these applicants to test their knowledge 

of safety requirements. This requirement is supported by law and is reasonable 

prior to a grant of operating authority.

• As indicated by the Committee, FMCSA must increase the number of full-time 

federal inspectors at the border and help states to supply state inspectors so 

that inspectors are present at all border crossings during all hours of operation. 

According to the General Accounting Office, each of the 161 state and federal 

inspectors who were on the job in March 2000 would have to inspect an incredible 24,800 Mexican trucks annually to inspect those then crossing the border. 

The DOT Inspector General should be required to certify, as the Committee indicates, that an adequate number of inspectors have been hired and trained to 

perform meaningful border and on-site safety inspections. FMCSA must provide 

for the hiring and training of additional inspectors to conduct the on-site safety 

reviews. As the Committee required, DOT should require that trucks be permitted to cross the border only at times when inspectors are on duty.

• FMCSA must require that the licenses, certificates of registration, and proof of 

insurance of all drivers and trucks crossing the border are checked and verified, 

and that a far more substantial proportion of trucks crossing the border are inspected. In addition, the border should not be opened until DOT has assured 

Congress that Mexico’s information infrastructure is established, accurate, functional and informative, as the Committee specified.

• As the Committee required, FMCSA must ensure that all border crossings have 

permanent inspection facilities that include weigh stations (Weigh-In-Motion 

systems), dedicated phone lines for accessing databases, and ample space to conVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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duct inspections as well as parking places for out-of-service vehicles. Until all 

27 border areas are upgraded, and until the Inspector General certifies that 

telephone connections and computer links exist at all border crossings and mobile enforcement units, commercial carriers should be limited to crossing where 

there are adequate inspection facilities. As the Committee required, DOT should 

be required to electronically verify the license of carriers crossing the border. 

In addition, DOT should be required to electronically verify the registration information of carriers.

• As the Committee provided, the border should remain closed until DOT Inspector General certifies that FMCSA has put in place a plan to ensure compliance 

with U.S. hours-of-service rules. To assist with enforcement, the Inspector General should also certify that DOT has assigned Mexican trucks an operating 

number to allow state inspectors to track the carrier’s movements.

• As the Committee required, state inspectors who receive federal funds should 

be made to check for violations of federal law, including the validity of registration and drivers’ licenses. DOT should also implement, as the Committee required, a system similar to that for U.S. drivers that prevents Mexican drivers 

from being able to acquire a new license if their license has been lost as a penalty for legal infractions.

• As the Committee provided, prior to opening the border, DOT must issue rules 

regarding: (1) proficiency examinations; (2) improved training for domestic safety auditors; (3) staffing standards for inspection sites at the U.S.-Mexico border; 

(4) prohibitions on foreign motor carriers’ leasing vehicles to another carrier 

while suspended for rule infractions; (5) disqualifications of carriers that have 

operated illegally in the U.S.

The border must not be opened until all of these conditions are met. 

In Mexico, Graft Infects Every Aspect of Society

By Laurie Goering 

About 10 times each day in Mexico City, the transit policeman pulls over a traffic 

offender. The encounter is nearly always the same. 

The driver offers a bribe of about $4, eager to avoid a drive to the nearest police 

delegation and a wait of an hour or more to be issued a formal $30 ticket. The officer accepts. On his salary of just $275 a month—too little for a home of his own 

or a car—the extra money is crucial to paying basic bills for his wife and two children, he insists. 

‘‘We have to accept. It’s out of necessity,’’ says the 10-year veteran of the force, 

leaning against his white squad car. ‘‘Anyway, we’re not the ones asking. Corruption 

comes from both sides.’’

Since ending 71 years of one-party rule in Mexico last year, President Vicente Fox 

has made battling Mexico’s deeply entrenched corruption a top priority. But the 

scale of the job—excising a cancer that has metastasized into nearly every aspect 

of Mexican life—is enormous. 

In Mexico, anyone with a few dollars to spare pays for a driver’s license, rather 

than taking the test and standing in line for most of a day. Businessmen seeking 

a license to open a new store are asked for a hefty ‘‘voluntary donation’’ to speed 

the process. Mexican newspapers run almost daily headlines about police involved 

in kidnapping rings, drug traffickers bribing their way out of prison or state companies firing whistle-blowers. 

In the most recent Transparency International ranking, Mexicans themselves put 

their country nearly in the top third of corrupt nations worldwide, closer to Nigeria, 

the most corrupt, than Finland, the least. 

A daunting task 

‘‘Corruption is almost a lifestyle here,’’ says Guadalupe Loaeza, a Mexico City author of books on Mexican social conditions. ‘‘It’s part of our mentality and it’s hard 

for us to fight against it.’’

The fight, however, has begun. In January, Mexico’s first Commission for Transparency and Combating Corruption was installed, and it has moved quickly to begin 

identifying and combating corruption problems, particularly in the nation’s executive and administrative branch. 

An initial study of corruption problems in 205 federal institutions found 5,328 

separate kinds of corruption, said Hugo Gutierrez, the executive secretary of the 

commission. 

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Staff in those offices came up with 7,118 ideas on how to stop corruption—but also 

2,427 kinds of problems standing in the way of doing that, including everything 

from low salaries to reluctance to turn in corrupt colleagues. 

To find solutions, the commission is turning to foreign examples, from cash controls at Las Vegas casinos—‘‘dealers don’t even have pockets in their pants,’’ Gutierrez notes—to transparency agreements that have worked to cut customs and industry corruption in nations like Panama. 

The commission has signed anti-corruption accords with the nation’s major universities, labor groups, farm organizations and bankers and lawyers associations. 

Even the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, which ruled Mexico with a corruption-tainted iron grip for 70 years, has signed on. 

Coordinated attack needed 

What is clear, Gutierrez says, is that successfully cracking down on corruption 

will require a coordinated attack on many fronts, from training public workers in 

professionalism and ethics to ending impunity for violators. Complicated bureaucratic processes will have to be trimmed, sanctions revamped, workers trained to be 

more efficient, and society at large persuaded, through education and public-relations campaigns, not to pay la mordida—the bite. 

‘‘We have to strengthen the ethical infrastructure of our people,’’ Gutierrez said. 

A new sign on his office wall sports an apple with a bite missing, and a bright 

red slash across it. ‘‘Don’t feed corruption,’’ it says. 

The fight won’t be an easy one. Members of the Mexican Congressional Commission and Public Security have begun introducing legislation considered key to the 

anti-corruption effort, including a rewrite of a national law of responsibilities for 

public workers and a measure to allow suspected ill-gotten gains of corruption to 

be frozen while a suspect is tried. 

Anti-corruption advocates also hope to pass a new law giving the public and the 

media access to basic government data, boost penalties for influence peddling and 

create a federal register of public workers to make it easier for government employers to check for past corruption violations. 

Fighting corruption ‘‘is our highest priority,’’ says Armando Salinas, the president 

of the congressional commission and a member of Fox’s National Action Party, or 

PAN. ‘‘Mexicans say they want no more of it.’’

Passing all the new reforms, however, will be a challenge. Miguel Barbosa, another member of the congressional committee, says he has already begun to see lobbying against the measures by powerful interests that have grown rich on corruption and have plenty of money to spread among friendly members of Congress. 

‘‘This isn’t going to be easy,’’ he said. ‘‘Politics have changed in Mexico, but the 

interests have not.’’

Victor Gandarilla, a PRI member on the commission, agrees. 

‘‘People say this is another Mexico, but we’re continuing with the same Mexicans,’’

he said. In his view, the best way to turn Mexicans against corruption ‘‘is for them 

to see it punished.’’

Punishing corruption is critical, analysts say, to the new government’s efforts 

being taken seriously. But some corruption, especially that associated with drug 

trafficking, will be hard to prosecute, much less stop. 

Fernando Tenorio, the head of Secure Cities, a program through Mexico’s National 

Institute of Penal Sciences, says an increasing percentage of Mexico’s corruption is 

‘‘not just corruption but organized corruption’’ that involves rings of criminals, from 

private security officers to prison guards. 

Unraveling those networks, which have based themselves on cartels, will be 

tough. Tenorio believes firings combined with professionalization programs—his program offers master’s and doctorate programs for judges and public administrators—

is the answer. 

‘‘It’s unthinkable that we’re going to eliminate corruption but it could be reduced 

to tolerable levels in 6 years,’’ the length of Fox’s term, he predicted. 

Among other keys to rooting out entrenched corruption in Mexico, national and 

international analysts say, is sending out undercover officers to offer bribes, then 

following up with suspensions, loss of government jobs, fines and arrests and convictions for those who take them. Anti-corruption officials say they plan just that. 

PRI as watchdog 

Mexico’s newly strengthened democracy also should play a key role in the effort. 

With the PRI now out of power and eager to return, it will act as a watchdog on 

spending in Fox’s new PAN government, analysts say. 

Finally, the government will need to boost salaries for key underpaid workers, 

and remove what Alberto Aziz, a professor at the Center for Investigation and AdVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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vanced Study in Social Anthropology calls ‘‘laws so absurd you have to violate 

them,’’ from driver’s exams asking what Violation 36 is, to bureaucratic licensing 

processes that take years unless bribes are paid to bypass the system. 

Perhaps the best sign that things really might change in Mexico is an increasingly 

evident shift of attitudes on the street. A foreign businessman who told Mexican colleagues recently about paying off a traffic cop was met not with knowing nods but 

with disdain. 

‘‘How is the country ever going to change if you keep doing that?’’ they demanded 

angrily. 

Since Fox’s election and the end of one-party rule in Mexico, ‘‘people are feeling 

more like citizens,’’ Tenorio suggests. ‘‘I think if the government puts forward a good 

example, people will follow it. 

Recent Mexican Trucking Rules Do Not Solve Serious Safety Hazards: 

NAFTA Ruling Could Expose U.S. Public to Dangerous Cross-Border Trucks 

February 7, 2001

A final ruling was handed down February 6, 2001 following a complaint filed by 

Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in which Mexico 

argued that its commercial trucks should be allowed unlimited access to U.S. highways. A NAFTA arbitration panel, after meeting for months in secret, found that 

the U.S. must allow Mexican commercial trucks to carry cargo throughout the U.S. 

or else pay trade sanctions for our refusal to comply, regardless of a well-documented history of U.S. safety concerns. 

NAFTA outlined an arbitrary schedule that allowed Mexican carriers limited access to U.S. border states in 1995 and access to the entire U.S. by January 2000. 

NAFTA also created cross-border working groups on vehicle standards and safety, 

and Mexico agreed to improve safety at home. But the safety provisions of NAFTA, 

predictably, have no teeth, because the timelines for both partial and full commercial access were not linked to any progress in the safety of Mexico’s trucking fleet. 

And the promised improvements have not been made. Due to the serious and unresolved concerns about the grave risk to U.S. motorists of crashes with dangerous, 

overloaded trucks, until the panel decision, Mexican trucks were limited to a small 

zone near the border. Last January, President Clinton explained that the Mexican 

highway inspections and monitoring system was inadequate to assure safety. 

Although Mexican trucks in theory have to comply with U.S. law before they can 

cross the border, in practice the U.S. needs Mexico to improve safety at home because U.S. border inspectors cannot possibly check every cross-border truck. In fact, 

studies by the Department of Transportation Inspector General and the General Accounting Office showed that even though less than one percent of cross-border Mexican trucks were inspected, 35 percent of those trucks had to be taken out of service 

because of serious safety violations. For all of these reasons, the Clinton Administration’s policy was that Mexican trucks would not be allowed full access to the U.S. 

until considerable safety and oversight improvements were complete. 

Last July, the Mexican government finally established a set of fledgling ‘‘standards’’ for commercial trucks and the authority and guidelines for roadside inspections. But a majority of the new inspection standards for critical items such as tires, 

headlights and hazardous materials are merely voluntary in the first year. Even 

once they become mandatory, the new rules are far from comprehensive, and in 

many cases they could provide legal cover for very dangerous practices. 

The rules provide the basis for roadside inspections only on Mexico’s federal highways—only 10 percent of Mexican roads— without additional money for inspectors 

or inspection sites. Until a system of privately owned inspection areas is established, the rules say that inspection checks will be ‘‘random’’ and done by ‘‘General 

Road Inspectors.’’ There is no mention of special training programs or of any increase in the number of safety checks near border areas. 

I. Summary of Flaws and Omissions in the Recently Enacted Mexican Rules 

When the final ruling was announced, the United States Trade Representative 

stated that President Bush supports allowing the Mexican trucking fleet unlimited 

access to the U.S. Public Citizen examined the new rules issued by Mexico to ascertain whether they are likely to reduce the risks posed by a fresh onslaught of Mexican trucks. Across every category, researchers found, the rules come up short. 

87

A. General Problems:

Industry Wrote the Rules: Industries that will profit from the lack of adequate safety rules for cross-border trucks had a heavy hand in crafting the regulations. The second and third pages of the Mexican government’s new rules 

identify the participating groups as the National Association of Producers of 

Buses, Trucks, and Tractor Trailers, the National Chamber of Motor Transport 

Hauling, the National Chamber of Rubber Industry, the National Chamber of 

Iron and Steel Industries, and the National Association of the Chemical Industry, as well as about twenty other companies and industry alliances.

Very Limited Application: Only a very small portion of the roads in Mexico 

are part of a national set of highways and thus under federal oversight. Over 

90 percent of the surface mileage in Mexico on which trucks operate are under 

provincial and local jurisdiction. Trucks on these roads are not subject to inspection under the new rules.

Severe Time Limits on Inspections: Although the new inspection process requires 31 separate equipment checks, with more than 143 actions to test components of the truck, the rules state that the maximum time for an inspection of 

a general cargo carrier is 30 minutes, while an inspection of a hazardous materials carrier is limited to an even less generous 20 minutes. In the U.S., there 

is no time limit for inspections, and discovery of a serious infraction may trigger 

a comprehensive safety inspection, which can take hours.

Total Lack of Monitoring and Oversight: Although creation of a joint U.S.-

Mexico database is in progress, it is years from completion. Company and driver 

safety records will be difficult to track until much better systems (that include 

roadside compliance data) are developed and fully implemented as an enforcement and monitoring tool.

Still No Hours-of-Service Limitations: Hours-of-service regulations limit the 

number of hours that commercial drivers may spend behind the wheel of large, 

dangerous trucks and have been a focus of safety efforts in the U.S. Mexico has 

no limitations in this area whatsoever. In fact, Mexico’s new rule on logbook inspections states that ‘‘The driver’s hours of service is designed by company, according to its needs.’’ This statement surely was enshrined in regulation by companies that profit by maintaining control over their workers’ hours and, in context, evinces a near-total disregard for the safety of other drivers on the highway.

Two-Year Across-the-Board Exemptions for New Vehicles: New vehicles 

are exempt from all standards and inspections for 2 full years from the date 

of manufacture.

Safety Problems Are Treated in Isolation: The rules do not work cumulatively, so vehicles with multiple, but borderline, safety problems will be able to 

stay on the road.

The Deterrence Effect of Fines is Unclear: Although fines are authorized, 

the rules do not state their amount or consider their deterrent effects against 

industry profits.

II. Severe Safety Defects Are Systematically Overlooked by the New Rules 

To fully convey the serious limitations of the newly-created Mexican inspection 

and certification regime, we compiled a list of the safety failures covered by the regulations. The violations listed below would result in a vehicle’s automatic or very 

probable removal from U.S. highways (called an ‘‘out-of-service order’’). In Mexico 

these safety violations merely incur a fine and a promise to fix the problem within 

twenty days. 

Sections of the Recent Mexican Regulations 

That Allow Unsafe Mexican Vehicles to Remain on the Road

For the following types of failures, an out-of-service order would be automatic

under U.S. law, but in Mexico will merely incur a ticket and a promise to fix the 

problem within 20 days:

Transport of Hazardous Materials (Section 4.2)

1. Incompatible materials in the same shipment 

2. Bulk loads improperly blocked or secured 

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3. Identifications and warnings do not match material being transported 

4. More than 25 percent of anchoring components are missing 

5. Use of tanks not designed or authorized for transported products 

6. Escaping, leaking or spilling material from a transport tank 

7. Failure to carry the appropriate Transport Emergency information 

Logbooks (Section 4.2)

1. Non-existent

For the following types of failures, an out-of-service order would be extremely probable under U.S. law, but in Mexico will merely incur a ticket and a promise to fix 

the problem in 20 days: 

Lighting Systems (Section 4.1)

1. Electrical system fuses missing and bridged instead with wire, aluminum or 

other materials 

2. Worn, exposed wires, missing insulation, wire twisted with other cables 

3. Headlights missing or inoperable when needed for climatological reasons or 

night travel 

4. Brake lights missing or inoperable 

Windshield Wipers (Section 4.3)

1. No windshield wipers and spray jets 

Windshield (Section 4.4)

1. Shattered or missing windshield 

Tires, Inner Tubes and Belts (Section 4.5)

1. Tires: walls cut or damaged, structural material exposed, not designed for 

highway use, tire tread separation, rubbing against adjacent surfaces, exposed radial belts, tires separating from wheels 

Wheels and Rims (Section 4.6)

1. Bent, broken or cracked wheel rims 

Frames, Rails or Truck Chassis; Semi-Trailer/Trailer Frame (Sections 4.7 and 4.8)

1. Cracked, loose, bent or broken frame rails, including those permitting movement of the chassis, and twists, bends and weaknesses due to cracks in the 

vehicle chassis 

Fuel System (Section 4.9)

1. Gas cap missing, filling pipe permits fuel spillage and fuel lines leak 

Vehicle Load Securing (Section 4.1)

1. Cracked, broken, stretched, twisted, worn, ruptured and knotted load securement chains, and cables and cut, burned or punctured synthetic belts 

2. Separation of load containment side boards or stakes, or the inadequate 

height of side walls which are unable to prevent load from falling 

Exhaust System (Section 4.11)

1. ‘‘Unsafe’’ mounting of, or broken or damaged parts of exhaust pipes for gases, 

smoke, and/or multiple collectors 

Steering System (Section 4.12)

1. Loose steering wheel or detached joints, missing U-bolts or securing bolts for 

steering column 

2. Steering gear box detached from its mounting on the chassis or a rupture 

in the gear box or its mounting brackets 

Suspension System (Section 4.13)

1. No springs on mechanical suspension 

2. Pneumatic suspension with cracked suspension frame or loose U-bolts. 

Pneumatic Brake System (Section 4.14)

1. Curled, obstructed or broken hoses or pipes 

2. Brake drums with cracks on their sides 

3. Detached or loosely mounted brake chambers 

4. More than 20 percent of the brake system’s ‘‘push rods’’ out of adjustment 

Hydraulic Brake System (Section 4.15)

1. Inoperative brake linings (non-moving) and/or oil contamination of brake 

drums 

89

2. Missing brake lining segments 

Electric Brake System (Section 4.16)

1. Missing, non-existent, ruptured or defective brake on vehicle wheel 

Cabin (Truck Cab) (Section 4.18)

1. Inoperative instruments and interior controls, including inoperative air pressure gauge for air brakes, emergency warning signal, emergency brake control, seatbelts, fire extinguishers 

2. No seats 

3. No ‘‘speed control device’’ (throttle) 

Although inapplicable to commercial trucks, the rules are also lax about the safety 

of passenger buses: 

Passenger Area in Buses (Section 4.19)

1. No emergency equipment, no emergency exit, inoperative emergency exit, 

holes in bus passenger area floor, seats not secured to floor, no seatbelts, inoperative interior lights

The translated text of the Mexican regulations is available on the Public Citizen 

Web site at www.citizen.org.

A more comprehensive report on the serious safety hazards of the NAFTA panel 

decision and the options open to the Bush administration is available on the Public 

Citizen Web site at www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/reports/truckstudy.htm

Mexico’s Trucks on Horizon Long-distance haulers are headed into U.S. once Bush 

opens borders 

Robert Collier, Chronicle Staff Writer 

Altar Desert, Mexico—Editor’s Note: This week, the Bush administration is 

required by NAFTA to announce that Mexican long-haul trucks will be allowed onto 

U.S. highways—where they have long been banned over concerns about safety—

rather than stopping at the border. The Chronicle sent a team to get the inside 

story before the trucks start to roll.

It was sometime way after midnight in the middle of nowhere, and a giddy 

Manuel Marquez was at the wheel of 20 tons of hurtling, U.S.-bound merchandise. 

The lights of oncoming trucks flared into a blur as they whooshed past on the narrow, two-lane highway, mere inches from the left mirror of his truck. Also gone in 

a blur were Marquez’s past 2 days, a nearly Olympic ordeal of driving with barely 

a few hours of sleep. 

‘‘Ayy, Mexico!’’ Marquez exclaimed as he slammed on the brakes around a hilly 

curve, steering around another truck that had stopped in the middle of the lane, 

its hood up and its driver nonchalantly smoking a cigarette. ‘‘We have so much talent to share with the Americans—and so much craziness.’’

Several hours ahead in the desert darkness was the border, the end of Marquez’s 

1,800-mile run. At Tijuana, he would deliver his cargo, wait for another load, then 

head back south. 

But soon, Marquez and other Mexican truckers will be able to cross the border 

instead of turning around. Their feats of long-distance stamina—and, critics fear, 

endangerment of public safety—are coming to a California freeway near you. 

Later this week, the Bush administration is expected to announce that it will 

open America’s highways to Mexican long-haul trucks, thus ending a long fight by 

U.S. truckers and highway safety advocates to keep them out. 

Under limitations imposed by the United States since 1982, Mexican vehicles are 

allowed passage only within a narrow border commercial zone, where they must 

transfer their cargo to U.S.-based long-haul trucks and drivers. 

The lifting of the ban—ordered last month by an arbitration panel of the North 

American Free Trade Agreement—has been at the center of one of the most highdecibel issues in the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship. 

Will the end of the ban endanger American motorists by bringing thousands of 

potentially unsafe Mexican trucks to U.S. roads? Or will it reduce the costs of crossborder trade and end U.S. protectionism with no increase in accidents? 

Two weeks ago, as the controversy grew, Marquez’s employer, Transportes 

Castores, allowed a Chronicle reporter and photographer to join him on a typical 

run from Mexico City to the border. 

90

The 3-day, 1,800-mile journey offered a window into a part of Mexico that few 

Americans ever see—the life of Mexican truckers, a resourceful, long-suffering breed 

who, from all indications, do not deserve their pariah status north of the border. 

But critics of the border opening would also find proof of their concerns about 

safety: —American inspectors at the border are badly undermanned and will be hardpressed to inspect more than a fraction of the incoming Mexican trucks. 

California—which has a much more rigorous truck inspection program than Arizona, New Mexico or Texas, the other border states—gave full inspections to only 

2 percent of the 920,000 short-haul trucks allowed to enter from Mexico last year. 

Critics say the four states will be overwhelmed by the influx of Mexican long-haul 

trucks, which are expected to nearly double the current volume of truck traffic at 

the border. —Most long-distance Mexican trucks are relatively modern, but maintenance is 

erratic. 

Marquez’s truck, for example, was a sleek, 6-month-old, Mexican-made Kenworth, 

equal to most trucks north of the border. But his windshield was cracked—a safety 

violation that would earn him a ticket in the United States but had been ignored 

by his company since it occurred 2 months ago. 

A recent report by the U.S. Transportation Department said 35 percent of Mexican trucks that entered the United States last year were ordered off the road by 

inspectors for safety violations such as faulty brakes and lights. —Mexico’s domestic truck-safety regulation is extremely lax. Mexico has no functioning truck weigh stations, and Marquez said federal police appear to have abandoned a program of random highway inspections that was inaugurated with much 

fanfare last fall. —Almost all Mexican long-haul drivers are forced to work dangerously long hours. 

Marquez was a skillful driver, with lightning reflexes honed by road conditions 

that would make U.S. highways seem like cruise-control paradise. But he was often 

steering through a thick fog of exhaustion. 

In Mexico, no logbooks—required in the United States to keep track of hours and 

itinerary—are kept. Marquez slept a total of only seven hours during his 3-day trip. ‘‘We’re just like American truckers, I’m sure,’’ Marquez said with a grin. ‘‘We’re neither saints nor devils. But we’re good drivers, that’s for sure, or we’d all be 

dead.’’ Although no reliable statistics exist for the Bay Area’s trade with Mexico, it is 

estimated that the region’s exports and imports with Mexico total $6 billion annually. About 90 percent of that amount moves by truck, in tens of thousands of round 

trips to and from the border. 

Under the decades-old border restrictions, long-haul trucks from either side must 

transfer their loads to short-haul ‘‘drayage’’ truckers, who cross the border and 

transfer the cargo again to long-haul domestic trucks. The complicated arrangement 

is costly and time-consuming, making imported goods more expensive for U.S. consumers. 

Industry analysts say that after the ban is lifted, most of the two nations’ trade 

will be done by Mexican drivers, who come much cheaper than American truckers 

because they earn only about one-third the salary and typically drive about 20 hours 

per day. 

Although Mexican truckers would have to obey the U.S. legal limit of 10 hours 

consecutive driving when in the United States, safety experts worry that northbound drivers will be so sleep-deprived by the time they cross the border that the 

American limit will be meaningless. Mexican drivers would not, however, be bound 

by U.S. labor laws, such as the minimum wage. 

‘‘Are you going to be able to stay awake?’’ Marcos Munoz, vice president of 

Transportes Castores jokingly asked a Chronicle reporter before the trip. ‘‘Do you 

want some pingas?’’

The word is slang for uppers, the stimulant pills that are commonly used by Mexican truckers. Marquez, however, needed only a few cups of coffee to stay awake 

through three straight 21-hour days at the wheel. 

Talking with his passengers, chatting on the CB radio with friends, and listening 

to tapes of 1950s and 1960s ranchera and bolero music, he showed few outward 

signs of fatigue. 

But the 46-year-old Marquez, who has been a trucker for 25 years, admitted that 

the burden occasionally is too much. 

‘‘Don’t kid yourself,’’ he said late the third night. ‘‘Sometimes, you get so tired, 

so worn, your head just falls.’’

U.S. highway safety groups predict an increase in accidents after the border is 

opened. 

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‘‘Even now, there aren’t enough safety inspectors available for all crossing points,’’

said David Golden, a top official of the National Association of Independent Insurers, the main insurance-industry lobby. 

‘‘So we need to make sure that when you’re going down Interstate 5 with an 

80,000-pound Mexican truck in your rearview mirror and you have to jam on your 

brakes, that truck doesn’t come through your window.’’

Golden said the Bush administration should delay the opening to Mexican trucks 

until border facilities are upgraded. 

California highway safety advocates concur, saying the California Highway Patrol—which carries out the state’s truck inspections—needs to be given more inspectors and larger facilities to check incoming trucks’ brakes, lights and other safety 

functions. 

Marquez’s trip started at his company’s freight yard in Tlalnepantla, an industrial 

suburb of Mexico City. There, his truck was loaded with a typical variety of cargo—

electronic components and handicrafts bound for Los Angeles, and chemicals, printing equipment and industrial parts for Tijuana. 

At the compound’s gateway was a shrine with statues of the Virgin Mary and 

Jesus. As he drove past, Marquez crossed himself, then crossed himself again before 

the small Virgin on his dashboard. 

‘‘Just in case, you know,’’ he said. ‘‘The devil is always on the loose on these 

roads.’’

In fact, Mexican truckers have to brave a wide variety of dangers. 

As he drove through the high plateaus of central Mexico, Marquez pointed out 

where he was hijacked a year ago—held up at gunpoint by robbers who pulled 

alongside him in another truck. His trailer full of canned tuna—easy to fence, he 

said—was stolen, along with all his personal belongings. 

What’s worse, some thieves wear uniforms. 

On this trip, the truck had to pass 14 roadblocks, at which police and army soldiers searched the cargo for narcotics. Each time, Marquez stood on tiptoes to watch 

over their shoulders. He said, ‘‘You have to have quick eyes, or they’ll take things 

out of the packages.’’

Twice, police inspectors asked for bribes—‘‘something for the coffee,’’ they said. 

Each time, he refused and got away with it. 

‘‘You’re good luck for me,’’ he told a Chronicle reporter. ‘‘They ask for money but 

then see an American and back off. Normally, I have to pay a lot.’’

Although the Mexican government has pushed hard to end the border restrictions, 

the Mexican trucking industry is far from united behind that position. Large trucking companies such as Transportes Castores back the border opening, while small 

and medium-size ones oppose it. 

‘‘We’re ready for the United States, and we’ll be driving to Los Angeles and San 

Francisco,’’ said Munoz, the company’s vice president. 

‘‘Our trucks are modern and can pass the U.S. inspections. Only about 10 companies here could meet the U.S. standards.’’

The border opening has been roundly opposed by CANACAR, the Mexican national trucking industry association, which says it will result in U.S. firms taking 

over Mexico’s trucking industry. 

‘‘The opening will allow giant U.S. truck firms to buy large Mexican firms and 

crush smaller ones,’’ said Miguel Quintanilla, CANACAR’s president. ‘‘We’re at a 

disadvantage, and those who benefit will be the multinationals.’’

Quintanilla said U.S. firms will lower their current costs by replacing their American drivers with Mexicans, yet will use the huge American advantages—superior 

warehouse and inventory-tracking technology, superior access to financing and huge 

economies of scale—to drive Mexican companies out of business. 

Already, some U.S. trucking giants such as M.S. Carriers, Yellow Corp. and Consolidated Freightways Corp. have invested heavily in Mexico. 

‘‘The opening of the border will bring about the consolidation of much of the trucking industry on both sides of the border,’’ said the leading U.S. academic expert on 

NAFTA trucking issues, James Giermanski, a professor at Belmont Abbey College 

in Raleigh, N.C. 

The largest U.S. firms will pair with large Mexican firms and will dominate U.S.-

Mexico traffic, he said. 

But Giermanski added that the increase in long-haul cross-border traffic will be 

slower than either critics or advocates expect, because of language difficulties, Mexico’s inadequate insurance coverage and Mexico’s time- consuming system of customs 

brokers. 

‘‘All the scare stories you’ve heard are just ridiculous,’’ he said. ‘‘The process will 

take a long time.’’

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In California, many truckers fear for their jobs. However, Teamsters union officials say they are trying to persuade their members that Marquez and his comrades 

are not the enemy. 

‘‘There will be a very vehement reaction by our members if the border is opened,’’

said Chuck Mack, president of Teamsters Joint Council 7, which has 55, 000 members in the Bay Area. 

‘‘But we’re trying to diminish the animosity that by focusing on the overall problem—how (the opening) will help multinational corporations to exploit drivers on 

both sides of the border.’’

Mexican drivers, however, are likely to welcome the multinationals’ increased efficiency, which will enable them to earn more by wasting less time waiting for loading 

and paperwork. 

For example, in Mexico City, Marquez had to wait more than 4 hours for stevedores to load his truck and for clerks to prepare the load’s documents—a task that 

would take perhaps an hour for most U.S. trucking firms. 

For drivers, time is money. Marquez’s firm pays drivers a percentage of gross 

freight charges, minus some expenses. His 3-day trip would net him about $300. His 

average monthly income is about $1,400—decent money in Mexico, but by no means 

middle class. 

Most Mexican truckers are represented by a union, but it is nearly always ineffectual—what Transportes Castores executives candidly described as a ‘‘company 

union.’’ A few days before this trip, Transportes Castores fired 20 drivers when they 

protested delays in reimbursement of fuel costs. 

But Marquez didn’t much like talking about his problems. He preferred to discuss 

his only child, a 22-year-old daughter who is in her first year of undergraduate medical school in Mexico City. 

Along with paternal pride was sadness. 

‘‘Don’t congratulate me,’’ he said. ‘‘My wife is the one who raised her. I’m gone 

most of the time. You have to have a very strong marriage, because this job is hell 

on a wife. 

‘‘The money is okay, and I really like being out on the open road, but the loneliness . . .’’ He left the thought unfinished, and turned up the volume on his cassette 

deck. 

It was playing Pedro Infante, the famous bolero balladeer, and Marquez began to 

sing. 

‘‘The moon of my nights has hidden itself. 

‘‘Oh little heavenly virgin, I am your son. 

‘‘Give me your consolation, 

‘‘Today, when I’m suffering out in the world.’’

Despite the melancholy tone, Marquez soon became jovial and energetic. He 

smiled widely and encouraged his passengers to sing along. Forgoing his normal 

caution, he accelerated aggressively on the curves. 

His voice rose, filling the cabin, drowning out the hiss of the pavement below and 

the rush of the wind that was blowing him inexorably toward the border. 

How NAFTA Ended the Ban On Mexico’s Trucks 

The North American Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect in January 

1994, stipulated that the longtime U.S. restrictions on Mexican trucks be lifted. 

Under NAFTA, by December 1995, Mexican trucks would be allowed to deliver 

loads all over the four U.S. border states—California, Arizona, New Mexico and 

Texas—and to pick up loads for their return trip to Mexico. U.S. trucking firms 

would get similar rights to travel in Mexico. And by January 2000, Mexican trucks 

would be allowed throughout the United States. 

However, bowing to pressure from the Teamsters union and the insurance industry, President Clinton blocked implementation of the NAFTA provisions. The Mexican government retaliated by imposing a similar ban on U.S. trucks. 

As a result, the longtime status quo continues: Trucks from either side must 

transfer their loads to short-haul ‘‘drayage’’ truckers, who cross the border and 

transfer the cargo again to long-haul domestic trucks. 

The complicated arrangement is time-consuming and expensive. Mexico estimates 

its losses at $2 billion annually; U.S. shippers say they have incurred similar costs. 

In 1998, Mexico filed a formal complaint under NAFTA, saying the U.S. ban violated the trade pact and was mere protectionism. The convoluted complaint process 

lasted nearly 6 years, until a three-person arbitration panel finally ruled Feb. 6 that 

the United States must lift its ban by March 8 or allow Mexico to levy punitive tariffs on U.S. exports. 

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Comparing Trucking Regulations 

The planned border opening to Mexican trucks will pose a big challenge to U. S. 

inspectors, who will check to be sure that trucks from Mexico abide by stricter U.S. 

truck-safety regulations. Here are some of the differences: 

Hours-of-service limits for drivers: 

In U.S.: Yes. Ten hours’ consecutive driving, up to 15 consecutive hours on duty, 

8 hours’ consecutive rest, maximum of 70 hours’ driving in 8-day period. 

In Mexico: No 

Driver’s age 

In U.S.: 21 is minimum for interstate trucking 

In Mexico: 18

Random drug test 

In U.S.: Yes, for all drivers 

In Mexico: No 

Automatic disqualification for certain medical conditions 

In U.S.: Yes 

In Mexico: No 

Logbooks 

In U.S.: Yes. Standardized logbooks with date graphs are required and part of inspection criteria. In Mexico: A new law requiring logbooks is not enforced, and virtually no truckers use them. 

Maximum weight limit (in pounds) 

In U.S.: 80,000

In Mexico: 135,000

Roadside Inspections 

In U.S.: Yes 

In Mexico: An inspection program began last year but has been discontinued. 

Out-of-service rules for safety deficiencies 

In U.S.: Yes 

In Mexico: Not currently. Program to be phased in over 2 years. 

Hazardous materials regulations 

In U.S.: A strict standards, training, licensure and inspection regime. 

In Mexico: Much laxer program with far fewer identified chemicals and substances, and fewer licensure requirements. 

Vehicle safety Standards 

In U.S.: Comprehensive standards for components such as antilock brakes, 

underride guards, night visibility of vehicle. 

In Mexico: Newly enacted standards for vehicle inspections are voluntary for the 

first year and less rigorous than U.S. rules. 

Sources: Public Citizen, California Department of Transportation and Chronicle 

research 

The Coming NAFTA Crash: 

THE DEADLY IMPACT OF A SECRET NAFTA TRIBUNAL’S DECISION TO OPEN U.S. 

HIGHWAYS TO UNSAFE MEXICAN TRUCKS

New Evidence Suggests that a NAFTA Ruling Allowing Mexican Trucks Access to U.S. Will Expose the Public to Significant Threats 

Introduction 

A legal ruling by a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunal will 

be released in February 2001. The NAFTA ruling—requiring the U.S. to permit access to U.S. highways by Mexican trucks—may not only put American motorists and 

communities at great risk, but could destroy NAFTA itself. Ironically, this NAFTA 

ruling—which could bring NAFTA’s threat to public health and safety directly into 

communities nationwide—comes as President George W. Bush calls for the expansion of NAFTA. Already his plan for the expansion of NAFTA to all the Americas 

faces a decidedly negative U.S. public opinion as a result of NAFTA. 

The NAFTA dispute America faces about open-border trucking is indicative of the 

split in the U.S. over corporate managed trade: on one side are corporate pressures 

to use ‘‘trade’’ deals to further a broad agenda of deregulation regardless of the environmental, health or safety consequences; and on the other, the public pressures to 

demand that international commercial agreements do not undermine important social and environmental goals.

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* Mexico’s initial complaint was that the U.S. did not open the U.S. border states in December 

1995 as agreed under NAFTA. However, the NAFTA tribunal did not issue a preliminary ruling 

until after the NAFTA transportation schedule also required the U.S. to open up the entire 

country to Mexican truck traffic. Public Citizen has been unable to determine whether during 

the course of the dispute Mexico amended its complaint to include the U.S. refusal to open its 

highways countrywide or not, despite repeated inquiries to the United States Trade Representative, the Mexican Embassy, the American Trucking Association, as well as consumer, highway 

safety and labor organizations concerned with the case. 

‘‘Just one unfortunate accident between an overweight, unsafe Mexican truck 

and a Texas school bus . . . could escalate into an international incident.’’—

Former Texas Attorney General Dan Morales, Los Angeles Times, 3/18/96.

Imminently in early February, 2001, a final ruling will be issued in a simmering 

trade dispute between the U.S. and Mexico that pits commercial trucking interests 

against the public interest of safe highways. A preliminary ruling in the case rejected U.S. arguments regarding the lack of safety of Mexican trucks and ordered 

the U.S. to permit access by Mexican trucks to U.S. highways. 

The North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect in 1994 with provisions allowing Mexican trucks increasing access to U.S. highways. These NAFTA 

provisions required the U.S. to open access to all U.S.-Mexico border states in 1995 

and to permit Mexican trucks to travel throughout the entire U.S. as of January 

1, 2000. Until these provisions are implemented, because of a pre-existing U.S.-Mexico agreement, Mexican trucks may operate in a border commercial zone ranging 

from 3 to 20 miles into the U.S. to drop off loads destined for U.S. interior states. 

There are no interior checkpoints to enforce the border zone, however, and Mexican 

trucks have been pulled over many times in the border states and beyond. 

Other provisions of NAFTA require the U.S., Mexico and Canada to negotiate unified standards for truck safety and commercial driver licensing. Proponents of open 

border trucking argued that this would allow Mexico to develop domestic standards 

at least as protective as those in the U.S. Yet the standardization process was not 

linked in NAFTA to the opening of the border and has not thus far led to the establishment of cross-border, uniform safety standards. In defending the administration’s decision to keep the border closed, the U.S. Department of Transportation 

(DOT) has repeatedly documented the significant safety risks Mexican trucks would 

pose to U.S. highways.

‘‘We are seeing some frightening violations: air brakes that aren’t responding; 

brake and tail lights that are not working or missing entirely. It’s scary stuff.’’—

Lawrence Weintrob, Department of Transportation Assistant Inspector General 

on condition of Mexican trucks, USA Today 1/11/99.

Moreover, the standards that do exist for commercial trucks in the U.S. are hardly a model for safety. Some critical standards, such as restrictions on the number 

of hours that truckers may drive, date from the 1930s. A consensus has been growing on Capitol Hill that this and other safety measures need to be updated soon in 

order to protect the public highway. If U.S. standards are upgraded the U.S. and 

Mexico would have to go back to the drawing table on many issues, so that Mexican 

trucks and driving rules would not lag behind the new U.S. standards. 

Because of all these concerns, while in office President Clinton maintained the 

limited access to the border commercial zones and did not allow any greater access 

to the four U.S. states bordering Mexico or the rest of the U.S. 

In 1998, Mexico challenged Clinton’s refusal to open the border before a NAFTA 

enforcement tribunal, demanding that the U.S. abide by its NAFTA commitments 

and open its highways.* On November 29, 2000, the NAFTA tribunal released its 

preliminary ruling on the case supporting Mexico’s claim: the U.S. must open its 

highways to Mexican trucks or pay an as-yet-unnamed penalty to Mexico for refusing to comply with the NAFTA ruling. A final ruling is due to be made by February 

5, 2001 and must be released to the public 15 days later. 

The final ruling was supposed to be released December 29, 2000 and released to 

the public by January 14, 2001, according to NAFTA’s pre-set tribunal time lines 

(final decision is supposed to be provided 30 days after the preliminary ruling and 

released to the public 15 days later). The delay of the ruling at least until February 

5, 2001 may suggest that the NAFTA tribunal sought to allow a transition in the 

U.S. government to be completed so that President Bush, whose election had only 

been certified days before the preliminary ruling, would be the decision maker. 

The preliminary ruling in the NAFTA truck case contained the legal sophistry 

which is becoming increasingly common in trade tribunal rulings as public oversight 

of this realm has increased. The panel ultimately ordered the U.S. to open its borVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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* Through interviews with state regulators, Public Citizen discerned that the state of Texas 

provides 45 commercial truck inspectors at the border, Arizona has 31 and California provides 

25. Public Citizen was not able to find out the current number of state inspectors in New Mexico, but there were none in 1998, according to a Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General Audit Report. 

der, but did so using crafty language: the panel ruled that the U.S. can maintain 

its own truck safety standards as long as it also complies with NAFTA’s provisions. 

In fact, there was never any question whether the U.S. could keep its domestic 

truck safety rules on the books. The issue was whether those safety standards could 

be enforced in the context of Mexican trucks. 

Owners of commercial fleets who wish to operate in the U.S. must apply for operating permits from the U.S. Department of Transportation. According to the NAFTA 

panel, the U.S. may require that Mexican trucking companies which apply to be 

able to cross the border will meet all U.S. safety and labor standards. While this 

sounds good in theory, in practice given the state of Mexican inspection and enforcement, the only way to monitor whether a company is upholding its obligations is 

to check every truck which crosses the border and maintain good records on the 

companies and trucks that fail inspection there or elsewhere in the U.S. Although 

our government has been working with Mexico to develop a common database to do 

just that since NAFTA was implemented, no system is currently in place, and we 

are years away from a workable monitoring process. 

Additionally, although the imminent NAFTA border opening deadline creates 

pressure on Mexico to develop a meaningful motor vehicle safety standard and oversight system little progress has occurred. Although some new Mexican laws are on 

the books, compliance is voluntary for the first year, and there is little evidence on 

the level of the Mexican government’s commitment to enforce the new rules. 

What the preliminary panel ruling actually required was that the U.S. must comply with NAFTA and open its borders—regardless of our state of readiness to enforce critical American health and safety standards. If the U.S. also seeks to try to 

enforce U.S. safety requirements, it must do so on a truck-by-truck basis. The U.S. 

inspects approximately 40 percent of domestic trucks with inspections being merely 

one element of its multifaceted truck safety regulatory system.1 And the safety 

standards in Mexico will not do much to assure American safety once the trucks 

cross the border. As described in this report, Mexico has only a fledgling truck safety system. Our experience thus far has demonstrated the risks. While fewer than 

1 percent of Mexican trucks now entering the U.S. are inspected, fully 35 percent 

of those trucks are forced out of service due to serious safety failures. 

To attempt to fully enforce U.S. truck safety standards in the context of Mexican 

trucks would require that every single Mexican truck be inspected on the border. 

When President Bush was governor of Texas, he signed a letter to the Clinton Administration criticizing the refusal to open the border.2 The new administration may 

argue that the U.S. can ensure safety by inspecting each Mexican truck. But the 

government and the U.S. trucking industry (which seeks to hire cheap Mexican 

drivers) know this is impossible. 

Currently, 2 million trucks are inspected in the U.S. annually. This includes the 

1 percent of 4 million (or approximately 35,000) Mexican trucks now crossing that 

are checked. DOT estimates that an additional 3 million Mexican trucks would cross 

yearly if the border were open. Thus, to inspect all entering Mexican trucks, U.S. 

inspections per year must rise from 2 million to 9 million trucks. Currently, there 

are about 101 state commercial truck inspectors and 60 federal inspectors at the 

border who are able to cover 1 percent of the current 4 million Mexican trucks.* 

Thus, to cover every Mexican truck if the border were opened with even a cursory 

inspection would require 32,000 inspectors. It is unlikely that the administration 

will guarantee this enormous resource allocation or the necessary funding for the 

construction of the huge new inspection facilities that would be needed to avoid 

week-long border backups. 

Yet, even if the U.S. had the additional resources to try to enforce U.S. safety 

standards on a truck-by-truck basis, the preliminary NAFTA truck ruling also included a cryptic reference to a NAFTA provision that could require the U.S. to treat 

U.S. and Mexican trucks identically for inspection purposes. In typical trade 

doublespeak, the preliminary ruling contains language suggesting that the U.S. 

could treat Mexican trucks differently for inspection purposes. However, at the same 

time, the ruling requires that the U.S. comply with NAFTA’s Technical Barriers to 

Trade Chapter, which explicitly forbids domestic and foreign players from being 

treated differently. 

‘‘We now have evidence that two-thirds of the trucks that come across the border are not safe; they don’t meet our standards. And I intend to see the rules 

96

are followed before I follow the rules on this.’’—President Clinton on delaying 

the NAFTA truck provisions, 10/99.

Amid the presidential election chaos, the crucial story of the NAFTA truck ruling 

received little media coverage outside the ‘‘trade press.’’ Yet, the upcoming decision 

has enormous policy and political implications. President Bush has two basic options:

• to reject the NAFTA tribunal’s orders to open the border and compensate Mexico for keeping the border closed until Mexican trucks can meet U.S. safety requirements; or

• to allow Mexican trucks to enter the U.S. and risk that inevitable future crashes will lead to additional loss of life and to a massive public backlash against 

NAFTA.

The high price to be paid under either response scenario—either financially, to 

maintain safety, or personally and politically, with increasing fatalities and injuries 

if the border is opened to unsafe trucks—demonstrates that NAFTA is a severely 

flawed agreement. 

President Clinton noted three major problems that were unsolved when he kept 

the border closed in 1995:

• major differences between U.S. and Mexican safety regulations;

• major differences in the application and enforcement of the safeguards; and

• the inability of states and federal regulators to effectively enforce U.S. standards on Mexican trucks.3

Those concerns are still valid—permitting greater access for Mexican trucks will 

endanger U.S. motorists, which is why U.S. consumer and highway safety groups 

urge President Bush to keep the border closed until the safety issues are addressed 

and to compensate Mexico as NAFTA’s rules require. 

President Bush’s response to this crisis will significantly impact American public 

opinion regarding trade and President Bush’s public image. Many people in the corporate business lobby that financed Bush’s campaign and inauguration are eager for 

him to open the border and allow underpaid Mexican drivers to transport the corporations’ cheap-labor Mexican-made goods to the U.S. for sale (long haul drivers 

in Mexico earn about 6¢ a mile compared to about 28¢ a mile for U.S. drivers).4 Most 

other Americans—especially in the border states of Texas, California, Arizona and 

New Mexico—are legitimately concerned that a flood of unsafe, basically unregulated freight trucks from Mexico would pose a significant threat to the quality of 

life and to highway safety. The safety threat is so significant that a California 

trucking industry association opposes opening the border, foreseeing a backlash 

against all trucking when the inevitable accident occurs. 

The current NAFTA truck crisis is one of the most dramatic examples of how 

‘‘trade agreements’’ such as NAFTA reach far beyond appropriate commercial issues 

and can threaten vital domestic health and safety standards, even when these 

standards are applied equally to domestic and foreign commerce. If U.S. federal 

highway safety officials conclude that Mexican trucks do not meet U.S. safety standards, why should that well-substantiated safety policy be challengeable before a 

NAFTA dispute resolution tribunal as a trade barrier? 

Indeed, raising Mexican truck safety standards would have an enormous benefit 

for the safety of Mexican motorists and communities. Currently, Mexico has a highway fatality rate more than three times that of the U.S. or Canada. With the opening of the border according to an arbitrary timeline that is set and enforced under 

the NAFTA agreement without any connection to compelling safety considerations, 

safety advances in Mexico and the U.S. will lose critical leverage for improving 

standards. 

In short, the panel’s decision will force the opening of the border to occur far too 

soon. The border should remain closed until there is a consensus that meaningful 

safety standards and oversight are in place. 

The continuing trend is that ‘‘trade’’ agreements will undermine safety, health 

and other domestic social policies. This ongoing diminishment of our hard-won 

health and safety safeguards fuels the backlash against NAFTA and the World 

Trade Organization (WTO). 

Background 

Among its 900 pages of rules and regulations, NAFTA includes provisions requiring standardization of NAFTA countries’ truck length, weight, safety and drivers’-

licensing standards.5 NAFTA also required that by 1995, Mexican trucks be perVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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mitted to drive throughout U.S.-Mexico border states and that by January 1, 2000, 

trucks from any NAFTA country could drive anywhere in all NAFTA countries.6 Absent these NAFTA border openings, Mexican trucks are permitted to travel in a border commercial zone up to 20 miles into the U.S. to unload and pick up freight to 

take back to Mexico.7

However, the two sets of truck-related NAFTA commitments were not linked. 

Thus, even though U.S. and Mexican standards were not harmonized, the U.S. still 

faces NAFTA rules which required it to allow access to U.S. highways by Mexican 

trucks. Yet, before the initial 1995 NAFTA-required opening of U.S. highways in the 

border states, the General Accounting Office found the same serious truck safety 

problems that were initially reported by border safety inspectors: of the few Mexican 

trucks that overwhelmed U.S. highway inspectors were able to examine, more than 

half had to be taken off the highway for serious safety violations.8 Indeed, fewer 

than 1 percent of Mexican trucks that cross the border are inspected by U.S. safety 

inspectors.9

Given the data on serious safety problems, the U.S. announced that the initial 

1995 border-state opening had to be delayed until Mexican truck safety was improved. Mid–1998, Mexico filed a formal challenge of that U.S. policy before a 

NAFTA dispute resolution tribunal.10 At the end of 1998, the U.S. DOT again reviewed the Mexican truck border inspection data to determine whether to recommend a border opening and concluded that the same serious failings existed.11

DOT thus maintained the status quo of only permitting the Mexican trucks in the 

limited commercial zone. It will be far from adequate to merely bulk up federal and 

state inspection resources at a few border checkpoints, because the most dangerous 

parts of the trucking fleet will inevitably be drawn to cross the border at the weakest inspection areas, where oversight is the most tenuous. 

The safety problems of the Mexican trucking industry are legion. The Mexican 

government provides little to no regulatory oversight to its trucking industry. Moreover, as documented in a 1996 Los Angeles Times expose ́, Mexican drivers work 

under notoriously poor conditions where extremely long hours and driver fatigue are 

often the requirements for keeping a job. Long-haul truck drivers in Mexico who 

bring freight to the shipping terminals at the U.S. border call their runs ‘‘working 

on the blade of the knife’’ because of the dangers of Mexican highways. This, in 

turn, contributes to excess preventable highway deaths in Mexico.12

Although Mexico does not keep track of highway fatalities by type of vehicle, 

Mexico has an overall highway fatality rate more than three times that of the 

U.S. or Canada.

NAFTA has concentrated these underpaid, overworked drivers in the border 

areas. There, the lucrative temptations of transporting narcotics, undocumented migrants, and contraband, like weapons and stolen cars, contribute to a border area 

that is more like the Wild West than the modern West. Indeed, Mexican trucks are 

posing an increasing threat to motorists in Texas border counties. The percentage 

of Texas border county truck fatalities and incapacitating injuries from trucks registered in Mexico nearly doubled between 1997 and 1998. 

When NAFTA passed 7 years ago, Mexico promised to improve its national truck 

safety standards to meet U.S. safety requirements covering inspection and enforcement. However, Mexican law does not require many fundamentals of highway safety 

policy that are elements of the U.S. motor carrier oversight program. For example: 13

• There are no hours-of-service restrictions for drivers;

• Although a new policy require use of logbooks will soon be required in Mexico, 

U.S. inspectors have yet to see even one in use at the border;

• Roadside inspections are now voluntary and will be ‘‘phased-in’’ over the next 

2 years, as will be vehicle out-of service standards, however, it is unclear if 

these programs are funded;

• Driver’s licensing requirements are brand-new and permit commercial drivers 

under the age of 21;

• There is no safety rating system;

• Truck weight limitations are significantly higher; and

• Hazardous materials rules are significantly more lax.

It is this comprehensive safety regulatory system in the U.S. which provides the 

measure of safety for American motorists. Trucking firms are required by law to implement and enforce safety programs established under federal guidelines for their 

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drivers and vehicles to help ensure safety. Roadside and spot inspections provide an 

added level of safety both by deterring trucking companies from shirking the rules 

and by actually pulling the most dangerous trucks off the highway. 

Without such a system in place, evidence to date that Mexican trucks are significantly less safe than U.S. trucks and thus pose greater risks to motorists is not surprising. The latest analysis of safety data from September 2000 shows that substantially more Mexican trucking firms pose significant threats to drivers than U.S. 

firms. Additionally, more than 5 years of border and highway inspections have 

shown that Mexican trucks have had to be pulled off the highway for serious safety 

violations at alarmingly high rates and much higher than U.S. truck rates. ‘‘There must be no trading of human lives for dollars in the zeal to facilitate truck commerce.’’—Robert Dibble, Senior VP for government relations National Association for Independent Insurers, National Underwriter, 1/18/99. 

Lastly, even without the additional traffic, a border-opening would cause a critical 

shortage of U.S. safety inspectors to perform the rapidly growing task of monitoring 

Mexican trucks for safety concerns at the U.S. border. Currently, more than 99 percent of Mexican trucks cross the border without inspections because of short staffing, despite the acknowledged problems with safety on Mexican trucks.14 The majority of these inspections are of the most cursory type allowed, the so-called ‘‘walk 

arounds.’’ In addition to missing important safety problems, such inspections are 

also missing shipments of narcotics and stolen goods, such as automobiles and 

weapons, crossing the border. Meanwhile, the deluge of trucks across the Mexican 

border has been growing rapidly—now over 4 million a year—even without the 

opening of U.S. highway border beyond commercial zones, and it is predicted to skyrocket—perhaps by 3 million annually—if more access is permitted.

‘‘You learn quickly, or you die young.’’—34-year veteran truck driver Vicente 

Sanchez on the highway safety dangers facing Mexican truck drivers, Los Angeles Times, 3/18/96.

Already, the increase in Mexican trucks within the limited border zone has had 

an adverse affect on safety in the U.S. The Texas border counties, within the commercial border zone, have seen a dramatic increase in highway fatalities and serious 

injuries from trucks with Mexican registrations. In one dramatic case in California, 

a Mexican truck was involved in a 10-car pileup that killed four California motorists 

north of San Diego—well north of the commercial zone. These fatal accidents are 

bound to increase if the border is opened and the number of trucks increases rapidly 

without Mexican safety systems in effect, given that U.S. inspectors are already 

overwhelmed. 

Highway safety groups felt it was imperative for the NAFTA tribunal hearing 

Mexico’s truck challenge to consider these dangerous realities. Thus, while the 

NAFTA tribunal was hearing the case, American safety experts asked to present 

evidence to the tribunal on the negative health and safety impacts of allowing unlimited access for Mexican trucks onto U.S. highways. In an ominous premonition 

of the NAFTA tribunal’s decision, the tribunal refused to take any oral or written 

testimony from highway safety experts regarding Mexican truck standards or truck 

safety compliance. 

On November 29, 2000, the preliminary report of the NAFTA truck panel was released. The panel ruled that the U.S. had violated NAFTA by prohibiting unsafe 

Mexican trucks from roaming freely (either within the U.S. border states or 

throughout the country, depending on whether Mexico amended its complaint). 

Under NAFTA dispute settlement rules, if the U.S. does not agree to open the border to Mexican trucks, it can offer to compensate Mexico with new trade benefits 

or cash payments. However, if Mexico refuses to negotiate terms of compensation, 

NAFTA permits Mexico to take compensation in the form of levying trade sanctions 

against the U.S. 

As noted above, the clever drafting of the panel opinion may force the U.S. into 

the position of choosing from only one of the above three options. However, assuming for the sake of argument that another option exists, it would be to open the border and then attempt to try to enforce U.S. safety standards truck-by-truck. Yet, 

even with granting additional truck access, the already swelling flood of trucks from 

Mexico since NAFTA’s inception is putting a strain on federal and state truck safety 

inspectors. 

Currently, there are about 2 million roadside inspections of large trucks throughout the U.S. This number includes Mexican truck border crossings. The U.S. Department of Transportation’s total budget for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, which is the federal agency responsible for such inspections, for fiscal year 

2001 is $269 million.15 In 1999, the most recent year for which data is available, 

4.1 million trucks crossed the Mexican border into the U.S., according to the U.S. 

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23 About half the states have grandfathered-in higher limits on the interstates and limits on 

state highways vary considerably.

Customs Service.16 Given the increase in Mexican truck traffic since NAFTA (about 

2.5 million crossed in 1993), border inspectors are only able to inspect fewer than 

1 percent of the Mexican trucks.17 With the borders wide open to Mexican truck 

traffic, Department of Transportation officials estimated at an October 1999 field 

hearing in Los Angeles that as many 7 million trucks could cross the U.S. border 

annually.18 For U.S. truck safety inspectors to ensure that each of these Mexican 

trucks was inspected at the border, U.S. truck inspections would have to jump from 

2 million annually to 9 million. More than 5,000 Americans die each year in large 

truck crashes, almost entirely involving U.S. trucks which are lighter and relatively 

safer than Mexican trucks. Allowing a deluge of heavier, relatively less safe large 

trucks onto U.S. highways is likely to increase highway deaths attributable to large 

trucks. 

I. Absence of Mexican Truck Safety Rules or Enforcement 

Large truck crashes already pose a considerable danger to U.S. motorists. In 1999, 

there were 5,362 fatalities in the U.S. caused by large truck crashes—up 20 percent 

from a low of 4,462 in 1992.19 This included 433 deaths in Texas, 363 in California, 

108 in Arizona, and 66 in New Mexico in 1999. In comparison, in the same year 

there were 691 fatalities in all aviation accidents—a sum which totals just 13 percent of the number of people killed in large truck accidents.20

These fatalities occur even though the U.S. regulatory system provides some safeguards against the most dangerous trucks—limiting hours of service, implementing 

and enforcing vehicle safety standards, limiting total vehicle weights, requiring licensing and training for drivers, and operating a regulatory system to remove the 

most dangerous vehicles and ensure safety systems are in effect in U.S. trucking 

firms. But even the U.S. truck safety regulatory program has been harshly criticized 

and is under pressure to be upgraded. For just one example, the current pressure 

from non-union U.S. carriers to have drivers work outside of the hours of service 

rules is recognized as a significant threat to U.S. motorists. 

Although Mexico does not keep track of highway fatalities by type of vehicle, Mexico has an overall highway fatality rate more than three times that of the U.S. or 

Canada. Mexico has a death rate of 7.5 fatalities for every 10,000 vehicles on the 

road compared with 2 per 10,000 vehicles for the U.S. and Canada in 1996, the most 

recent year comparable data are available. 21

Allowing Mexican trucks onto U.S. highways will exacerbate the current problem 

significantly. The Mexican truck safety standards that exist are significantly less 

stringent than U.S. standards. Little training has historically been required of drivers and Mexican’s licensing requirements are more lax. Below is a chart comparing 

U.S. and Mexican safety requirements:

Safety Consideration In U.S. In Mexico 

Hours-of Service Limits 

for drivers 

Yes. 10 hrs consecutive driving, 

up to 15 consecutive hours on 

duty, 8 hours consecutive 

rest, maximum of 70 hours 

driving in an 8-day period 

No

Driver’s Licensure 22

Time period: 2 to 6 years 10 years 

Age of driver: 21 years old min. for interstate 18 years old 

Skills test: 23 Yes—for all drivers New skills test for new drivers 

Medical card: Yes—federal requirement No—medical qualification on license 

Automatic disqualification for certain medical conditions: 

National monitoring system: Yes No 

Drug testing req’d for domestic and international drivers: 

Yes to detect violations Testing 

and documentation required 

Information system still in infancy DOT personnel indicate 

that some drivers are found 

w/o documentation.

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Safety Consideration In U.S. In Mexico 

Logbooks Yes, standardized logbooks with 

date graphs are required and 

part of inspection criteria 

While a new law is on the 

books, to date no Mexicanstyle logbooks have been seen 

by U.S. inspectors at the border; new rules do not standardize logbooks in U.S. format

Weight Limits 

(in pounds) 

80,000 is the federal Gross 

Vehicle Weight limit 

As high as 135,560 

Single Axle 20,000 14,300

Tandem Axle 34,000 42,990

Tridem Axle 34,000 49,604

Five Axle 80,000 97,000

Six Axle 80,000 106,900

Turnpike Double 80,000 135,560

Roadside Inspections Yes Not currently. New rule is to be 

phased in over 2 years, but 

the program is currently voluntary.

Out-of-Service Rules for 

Safety Deficiencies 

Yes Vehicle out of service rules will 

be phased in over 2 years, 

and are currently voluntary.

Hazardous Materials 

Regulations 

A strict standards, training, licensure and inspection regime 

Much laxer program with far 

fewer identified chemicals 

and substances, and fewer licensure requirements

Vehicle Safety Standards Comprehensive standards for 

components such as antilock 

brakes, underride guards, 

night visibility of vehicle 

Newly-enacted standards for vehicle inspections are voluntary for the first year and 

far from comprehensive

Safety Rating System Yes No 

Anecdotal evidence from news stories suggests that the long hours Mexican drivers are required to spend behind the wheel in order to keep their jobs significantly 

contribute to Mexico’s highway fatalities. Long-haul truck drivers in Mexico who 

bring freight to the shipping terminals at the U.S. border call their runs ‘‘working 

on the blade of the knife’’ because of the dangers of long hours in unsafe trucks.24

On an average 14 hour run from central Mexico to the border a driver might pass 

hundreds or thousands of white crosses at the side of the road signifying fatal crashes.25

Although the Mexican government committed to increase its truck safety standards and oversight in time for the NAFTA border openings, in practice few gains 

have been made. After NAFTA went into effect in 1994, the three NAFTA countries 

established a Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee (LTSS) to address the 

differences in the countries’ regulatory standards. However, to date this committee 

has accomplished little and certainly has not accomplished a leveling-up of Mexican 

highway safety standards. 

The latest LTSS draft report trumpets the committee’s success at establishing 

new technical subgroups and creating side-by-side charts of rules and standards between the NAFTA countries. The committee report notes that it ‘‘continues to work 

beyond the timeframes established’’ by NAFTA to address ‘‘reaching compatibility 

in some areas,’’ which has been a ‘‘difficult task.’’ 26 Until the standards and enforcement in Mexico are as protective as those in the U.S., it will remain a challenge 

for border authorities to be sure that Mexican trucks are in compliance with U.S. 

safety standards. 

Mexico currently does not have a mandatory inspection system for large 

trucks, nor does Mexican law provide authority to pull dangerous trucks 

off the highway. Mexico published new rules in July 2000 on truck inspection procedures and criteria to place trucks out-of-service.27 However, these rules are only 

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voluntary for the first year. Then they are to be ‘‘phased in’’ over 2 years according, 

to U.S. DOT officials.28 However, Mexico does not have a safety audit system in 

place or compliance review programs.29 In addition, there is no evidence of the level 

of funding or enforcement resources for even the newly-required measures.30

Mexico has failed to establish a border truck safety inspection program.

In 1995, Mexico stated to the U.S. its intention to start inspecting its trucks at the 

border and issuing inspection decals as part of Mexican preparation for NAFTA 

open-border trucking. However, it has not done so to date.31 With the pledge to initiate a truck inspection system, 285 Mexican personnel trained to be border truck 

inspectors since 1993. However, many of the officials and trained workers have left 

the program and there has been little enforcement activity to date.32

‘‘Let’s keep those Mexican trucks down south until we’re sure they won’t pose a 

major safety threat. I don’t want to become roadkill in the name of free trade.’’— Fort Worth Star Telegram editorial writer Jack Smith in 11/2/99 column, who was 

hit by a Mexican truck. 

While U.S. roadside inspections are an effective tool that increases motor 

vehicle safety, Mexico’s lack of roadside inspections is a serious deficiency 

in its regulatory apparatus. A 1998 study by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Motor Carrier Safety Analysis, Facts and Evaluation department (in the Office of Motor Carriers) found that highway inspections successfully avoided 347 

truck crashes. The report found that by both removing dangerous trucks from the 

highway and by providing deterrence to safety violations, truck inspection saved $47 

million dollars in crash-related costs, about $135,000 per crash. The study also 

found that a carrier’s out-of-service rate declined as the number of inspections increased. These findings indicate that the risks 33 to people and communities in Mexico and the U.S. posed by Mexican trucks could be mitigated by an effective, comprehensive inspection program by Mexican authorities. Absent these programs in 

Mexico, drivers and communities are left without any protection. In the U.S., given 

the structural and budgetary impossibility of inspecting every Mexican truck if the 

border were to be opened, the number of people newly exposed to additional harm 

could be huge. 

Mexican trucks are heavier than is permitted under American standards 

and thus pose greater safety dangers. According to the most recent National 

Truck Crash Profile, 83 percent of the fatal truck crashes in the U.S. involved 

trucks with gross vehicle weight over 26,000 pounds in 1998.34 The gross weight 

limit for U.S. trucks is 80,000 pounds on federal highways, although many states 

have grandfathered-in exceptions. Mexican truck limits are substantially higher. 

The most common Mexican truck, the six-axle semi-trailer, which comprises 37 percent of the Mexican carrier fleet, is permitted a gross weight of 106,900 pounds. The 

second most common Mexican truck, the five axle semi-trailer which makes up 35 

percent of the Mexican carrier fleet, has a gross weight limit of 97,000 pounds—

33 percent and 21 percent higher than the American standard respectively.35

Mexican trucks also damage U.S. highways and bridges even more severely than 

U.S. trucks because of their heavier weights on both single and tandem axles. In 

addition, most Mexican trucks are designed with ‘‘walking beam suspensions’’—

heavier duty suspensions for driving on the dirt roads that are still in widespread 

use in Mexico. This type of vehicle suspension transmits weight to the road in a 

much more damaging way. Damage to U.S. highways is both a financial and safety 

concern. There is already a huge backlog in the U.S. of highways and bridges in 

need of repair that is disproportionately subsidized by the gas taxes paid by passenger car drivers, because commercial carriers underpay their share. The damage 

would also create safety hazards and dangers when repairs are made. 

The Mexican hazardous materials control system is much more lax than 

the U.S. and presents a continuing danger to the public. Although Mexico has 

regulations on the transportation of hazardous materials, many substances which 

must be identified in the U.S. need not be marked with an official placard in Mexico. Unmarked materials would endanger highway safety personnel such as fire 

fighters and police officers, who would be unaware of the nature of the hazardous 

substance and its proper treatment. Because some hazardous materials are excluded 

from Mexico’s regulations, Mexican drivers are not given the special licensing training and certification which is required to transport those substances in the U.S.36

According to a recent study by the Teamsters, ‘‘[a]s many as 25 percent of trucks 

coming to the U.S. from Mexico contain toxic or hazardous materials . . . and only 

1 out of 14 of those trucks is properly marked to show the dangerous chemicals that 

are inside.’’ 37

Mexico has no limitation on hours-of-service for drivers, meaning exhausted drivers put themselves and others at risk. Currently, Mexico does not 

set any limits to the length of time drivers can spend behind the wheel. U.S. sets 

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* The Safety Status data examines all trucking companies licensed by the Department of 

Transportation. For U.S. firms, this includes all freight trucking firms. For Mexico, this includes 

all of the companies that are licensed to bring a truck into the commercial zones of the borderstates. These Mexican trucks are required to have DOT registration numbers. 

limits, known as ‘‘hours-of-service,’’ which are monitored by a driver’s log books. 

Mexico has recently published regulations requiring drivers to maintain logbooks, 

but U.S. border inspectors have yet to see a single logbook.38 Fatigue-related factors 

are one of the most significant causes of fatalities for U.S. large truck crashes. The 

National Transportation Safety Board found driver fatigue to be a factor in 30 percent of truck crashes.39 Truck companies in Mexico require unusually long hours for 

their drivers to maintain their jobs, leading to an increase in truck crashes due to 

fatigue. Even the best firms require as much as 16 hours a day behind the wheel 

and serious crashes on Mexican highways are common.40 Allowing truck drivers 

without hours-of-service limitations onto U.S. highways is likely to increase the 

number and percentage of fatal crashes.

‘‘The evidence is that Mexican trucks aren’t as safe as they should be.’’—Former 

Chairman of House Transportation Committee, Rep. Bud Schuster, USA Today, 10/

20/99.

Working conditions for Mexican truck drivers are poor. Mexican drivers 

are notoriously overworked by U.S. standards. It is not unusual for drivers to work 

7 days a week, making runs of about 1,400 miles from Mexico City to the U.S. border with only a few hours of sleep before the next haul. Some drivers report being 

required to drive 36 hours straight with only a 6 hour break before returning to the 

road. Drivers are paid poorly for this hard work, as little as $400 a month.41 The 

risks are high, Mexican truck drivers have almost all been involved in fatality-causing accidents, according to anecdotal reports (Mexico does not keep highway fatality 

data by type of vehicle).42

U.S. owners of Mexican carriers use NAFTA to skirt U.S. safety and labor 

standards. In 1998, 150 Mexico-based motor carriers with DOT identification numbers listed U.S. citizens as the majority owners. Two-thousand, two-hundred Mexican motor carriers were registered as having Mexican addresses in DOT’s operating 

database, but U.S. addresses in the identification number database.43 Increasingly, 

American firms are buying up Mexican trucking companies, gaining access to lower 

wage drivers, lower regulatory safety regulations and lower worker safety requirements. These owners can use these cheaper trucks and drivers to compete against 

the safer trucks and higher wage drivers in the U.S. Opening the border without 

either ensuring a working Mexican regulatory process for truck safety or having the 

resources to inspect every truck creates a perverse incentive to gain financially by 

racing to the bottom in safety. 

II. Recent Evidence Shows Mexican Motor Carriers are Substantially Less 

Safe than Carriers in the U.S. 

In 1999, development of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration as an 

independent truck and bus safety enforcement and monitoring executive agency 

within the U.S. Department of Transportation signified an increasing amount of 

U.S. public awareness to truck safety issues. 

Data collected and analyzed by the new agency under its ‘‘Safety Status’’ program 

on the relative safety of motor carriers (trucking and bus companies) provides increasingly detailed information about the safety and regulatory compliance of each 

trucking company and the trucks and buses that are operated by these carriers. The 

program is a new statistical safety database that provides a more comprehensive 

evaluation of the actual performance and safety of trucking firms from the U.S., 

Canada and Mexico than ever before available. The program included * data on safety programs, crashes, drivers’ safety records and vehicles. Using the Safety Status 

tracking data, Public Citizen examined the relative safety of the carrier fleet in 

Mexico and the carrier fleet in the U.S. and found that Mexican carriers are substantially less safe than U.S. motor carriers.44

Advocates of fully opening the border argue that the trucks now licensed to cross 

the U.S. border are Mexico’s oldest, worst-maintained trucks and that this is why 

the inspection data is so negative. The thrust of this argument is that companies 

are using older trucks, called ‘‘drayage’’ trucks, to make the short runs from 

Maquiladora plants located in Mexico near the border. However, many of the Mexican trucks crossing the border actually come from Mexico’s interior.45 In addition, 

opening the border would mean that the worst trucks would be permitted new access in addition to the hypothetically safe trucks presumed to exist in the interior—

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meaning a large number of extremely unsafe trucks would still have access to the 

U.S. 

Mexican motor carriers have much higher rates of deficient vehicle inspection indicators than U.S. carriers, regardless of years of operation experience. A Vehicle Inspection Indicator is determined by evaluating a trucking 

company’s performance over the previous 30 months at roadside inspections, taking 

particular consideration of a company’s out-of-service rates and the comprehensiveness of the inspection (whether it is a full inspection or the less stringent 

‘‘walkaround’’ variety).46 Comparisons of the ‘‘Safety Status’’ vehicle safety indicators in 2000 found that nearly 60 percent of Mexican carriers had deficient Vehicle 

Inspection Indicators, regardless of how long the carrier had been operating. By 

comparison, 32.8 percent new U.S. carriers had deficient Vehicle Inspection Indicators and 27.0 percent of experienced U.S. carriers had deficient Vehicle Inspection 

Indicators. While American carriers have improved performance after operating 2 

years, the majority of Mexican carriers continued to have vehicle inspection problems even after 2 years of operations.47 Because there are no roadside inspections 

in Mexico, the program analyzed the U.S. roadside and border inspection data of 

the Mexican trucks now licensed by the Department of Transportation to cross the 

U.S. border.

The Mexican carrier fleet now licensed to operate in the permitted 20-

mile U.S. border zone has three times more ‘‘at-risk’’ carriers than the U.S. 

carriers, according to an analysis of 2000 data provided by the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration. The latest comprehensive examination of 

safety records found that 2.3 percent of Mexican carrier companies licensed to operate in the U.S. were considered ‘‘at risk’’ compared to 0.77 percent of U.S. carriers—

a more than three-fold difference. ‘‘At risk’’ carriers are companies that rank in the 

worst 25 percent in at least two of the four safety measurements and have accident 

rates that are more than 200 percent of that of companies that are not rated ‘‘atrisk.’’ 48

Mexican truck carriers and Mexican trucks were more than three times 

as likely to have safety deficiencies than U.S. carriers in 2000. Mexican carriers are 3.5 times more likely to be identified with safety deficiencies than American carriers: 4.7 percent of Mexican carrier companies were identified to have some 

safety deficiencies, compared to 1.3 percent of U.S. carriers. The percentage of Mexican trucks with safety deficiencies was more than three times higher than U.S. 


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trucks—13.7 percent of Mexican trucks had safety deficiencies compared to 4.2 percent of U.S. trucks.49

Mexican trucks are twice as likely to be deficient in one safety category 

as U.S. trucks. 12.8 percent of Mexican carriers were found to be deficient in at 

least one safety category, compared to 5.6 percent of U.S. motor carriers. 

Mexican trucks are three times as likely as U.S. trucks to be deficient in 

the vehicle safety evaluation category as U.S. carriers. 10.5 percent of Mexican carriers were deficient in the ‘‘accident safety’’ category compared to 3.1 percent 

of U.S. carriers. The ‘‘accident safety’’ category evaluates a carrier on vehicle safety 

elements such as safety standards compliance review and roadside inspection data. 

III. Mexican Standards and Enforcement Must Improve Because Every 

Mexican Truck Cannot Realistically be Inspected by U.S. 

Proponents of opening the border argue that the U.S. should take care of its safety concerns by simply increasing border truck inspection resources—for instance, by 

inspecting every Mexican truck. Trucking industry representatives have made similar arguments while trying to spin the initial NAFTA ruling as somehow being a 

ruling in favor of U.S. safety policies. Yet the reality is that the skyrocketing number of Mexican trucks already crossing the border has greatly outpaced the number 

of inspectors to monitor these trucks and pull dangerous vehicles off the road. 

Even without allowing access by Mexican trucks beyond the narrow border commercial zones, the number of Mexican trucks crossing the border have risen dramatically since NAFTA went into effect—by more than 300 percent in Texas and 

by nearly 50 percent in California, the two states where the majority of the crossings are made.50 The number of Mexican trucking firms with Department of Transportation licenses to operate in the commercial zones is rising faster than the number of both U.S. and Canadian firms with DOT registrations to operate in the U.S.51

If the U.S. commercial zone limitations were lifted, the number of Mexican trucks 

crossing into the U.S. is estimated to increase substantially. In 1999, 4.1 million 

trucks crossed the border from Mexico and some federal officials have indicated that 

an additional 3 million Mexican trucks will cross the border if the commercial zone 

limitations were ended—nearly a 75 percent increase.52

At the same time, the numbers of federal and state inspectors are grossly inadequate to monitor the number of trucks that are already crossing the border. For 


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just one example, in 1998, the DOT’s Office of the Inspector General recommended 

that at least 120 federal safety inspectors be posted at the border to meet the critical need to remove dangerous trucks from the road, but by 2001 only 60 inspectors 

were funded. 

At many crossings, only one safety inspector is detailed to examine the literally 

thousands of trucks that cross the border each day. If the border were fully opened, 

the inspectors who now are unable to handle the current traffic load could face millions more trucks. Yet all of these trucks would be authorized to travel throughout 

the border-states or even the entire country. 

If estimates of the impact of opening of the border are realistic, seven million 

Mexican truck crossings per year would require inspection. Thus, to inspect all entering Mexican trucks, U.S. inspections per year must rise from 2 million to 9 million trucks. Currently, there are about 101 state commercial truck inspectors and 

60 federal inspectors at the border who are able to cover 1 percent of the current 

4 million Mexican trucks.53 Thus, to cover every Mexican truck if the border were 

opened with even a cursory inspection would require 32,000 inspectors. Given the 

fledgling nature of the domestic Mexican truck safety inspection system, every one 

of these trucks would need to be checked by U.S. inspectors and massive, new border inspections facilities would need to be constructed to avoid huge backups. Since 

this enormous new allocation of inspection funding and personnel training is entirely unrealistic, only Mexico’s establishment of a comprehensive, enforceable and 

well funded safety system can ensure improvements. But such a system is years 

away from being ready. 

Border truck inspections are currently unable to meet the rising demand 

by increasing truck crossings. The General Accounting Office reported in March 

2000 that despite efforts to increase collaboration of the federal and state inspectors 

at the border and some infrastructure investments, collective efforts have failed to 

keep up with the skyrocketing flood of trucks coming over the Mexican border even 

without further border opening.54 The 161 federal and state truck inspectors would 

each currently have to inspect more than 24,800 Mexican trucks to inspect all the 

Mexican trucks now crossing the border.

There is an appalling lack of border truck inspectors. The total number of 

U.S. federal truck inspectors in 2000 was 40, less than a third of the number reVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT

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quested by the 1998 Department of Transportation audit, and an additional 20 were 

scheduled to start in January 2001.55 This figure of 60 is still less than half the 

recommended 126 inspectors to have two inspectors for every border crossing and 

additional inspectors for high-volume border crossings. In 1997, 13 federal and 97 

state safety inspectors monitored the nearly 2000 mile U.S.-Mexico border when 3.5 

million Mexican trucks entered the U.S.56 At Pharr, Texas, two federal inspectors 

monitored five border crossings that received nearly 8 percent of the total Mexico 

truck traffic. New Mexico provided no state inspectors and the 37 Texas state inspectors only spent one-quarter of their time inspecting cross border trucks.57 Requests to double the number of federal inspectors to 27 by Federal Highway Administration Regional Directors responsible for the Mexican border regions was rejected 

by federal budget negotiators in January 1998.58 Similarly, the Texas Department 

of Public Safety’s request for 127 inspectors was rejected. Instead only five new 

state inspectors were authorized: three in 1998 and two in 1999.59

Truck Crossings from Mexico into Texas increased 324 percent since 

NAFTA. Three quarters of the Mexican truck freight traffic enters the U.S. through 

Texas. Between 1990 and 1993, the year before NAFTA was implemented, truck 

traffic from Mexico into Texas decreased 29.8 percent to 509,477 crossings.60 By 

1999, 2.29 million trucks entered Texas from Mexico.61 Based on the first 8 months 

of year 2000 traffic, Public Citizen projects that truck crossings from Mexico to 

Texas will have surged to 2,798,839 by the end of 2000—a 324 percent increase over 

the pre-NAFTA traffic. In comparison, rail car crossing to Texas increased 173 percent between 1990 and 1994, but grew at a more modest 158 percent rate between 

1994 and 2000.62

Fewer than 1 percent of Mexican trucks are inspected at the border. Despite slight improvements in the number and percentage of Mexican trucks that are 

inspected at the border, very few Mexican trucks undergo safety inspections. Especially given the unusually high out-of-service rates for the trucks that are inspected, 

the failure to inspect more than 99 percent of Mexican trucks crossing the border 

represents an almost-total failure to protect U.S. motorists and border communities. 

In 1999, 0.8 percent of the 4.1 million Mexican trucks that crossed the border were 

inspected.63 In 1998, 0.6 percent of the 3.9 million trucks that crossed the border 

were inspected.64 In comparison, approximately 40 percent of the U.S. truck fleet 

was inspected in 1998.65

Some border crossings have no inspectors for hours every day. A Department of Transportation audit found that at some border crossings there are no U.S. 

or state inspectors present on most weekdays.66 At other sites there were inspectors 

present during regular business hours, but no inspectors regularly assigned to 

evening or weekend hours.67 Thus, the drivers of trucks that may have inspection 

problems can plan to cross at un-staffed hours. The 3 full-time and 3 quarter-time 

truck safety inspectors at the busy Laredo, Texas border crossing could average 

about 34 inspections a day.68 However, on weekdays, an average of 4,800 Mexican 

trucks cross the border at Laredo making for an 0.7 percent inspection rate.69

The number of Mexican motor carrier firms registered with the U.S. has 

grown faster than either Canadian or U.S. registrations. Mexican companies 

with DOT licenses to operate within the commercial zone—and with the expectation 

that the border-states and the entire country will be open to Mexican haulers if the 

border is opened—have been growing more rapidly than the number of American 

or Canadian firms seeking DOT registrations. The number of active Mexican motor 

carrier companies registered with DOT grew by more than half between 1997 and 

1999—54.9 percent. Over the same period, the number of American carriers grew 

by 21.1 percent and Canadian carriers grew by 27.2 percent.70

Mexican truck traffic to California increased by nearly half between 1994 

and 1999. Since NAFTA’s passage, northbound truck crossings from Mexico to California increased 48 percent to 949,651 trucks.71 Top Mexican truck imports to California have grown three times as fast as top California truck exports to Mexico between 1997 and 2000. In the first quarter of 1997, California trucked $860 million 

worth of its top six goods to Mexico, and by the first quarter of 2000, the figure was 

$1.1 billion a 22 percent increase. In comparison, top Mexican truck exports to California grew 62 percent between the first quarter of 1997 and first quarter 2000, 

from $1.6 billion to $2.6 billion.72

Removing the limitations to operate only in the border state commercial 

zones will rapidly increase the number of Mexican trucks crossing the border. At a National Transportation Safety Board field hearing in Los Angeles in October of 1999, Department of Transportation officials predicted that an additional 

3 million Mexican trucks will cross the border every year with the Mexican border 

commercial zone limitations eliminated.73

107

* According to the Department of Transportation Inspectors General Office, fines for Mexican 

motor carriers in violation of operating regulations are too low to spur compliance with U.S. law. 

Texas and New Mexico send a warning letter for the first violation of operating outside commercial zones, and a $1,000 fine for the second violation with an additional $1,000 increase for each 

subsequent violation. In Arizona and California, the fines are $500 for operating outside the 

commercial zones. The Department of Transportation Inspector General criticized these small 

fines because companies consider them to be ‘‘a cost of doing business.’’ Higher fines and loss 

of operating authority are needed to effectively deter infractions. 

IV. Much Stricter Penalties and Enforcement Are Needed 

The DOT Inspector General’s office and safety advocacy groups have complained 

about lacking enforcement, low fines and failure to pull operating authority for repeated violations in the U.S. for domestic trucking corporations. These same practices of inadequate penalties currently the practice for operator violations. These inadequacies must be addressed for both domestic and Mexican trucks. 

Both for Mexican trucks now allowed in the border zone and in the future, there 

must be greater U.S. penalties for Mexican operators violating their DOT permits. 

DOT must have a policy of rescinding permits to operate in the U.S. for Mexican 

trucking companies that routinely violate safety standards. Now, DOT uses minimal 

monetary penalties for the trucks it finds to be out of compliance. Given that 99 

percent of trucks are not inspected and the fines for those which are caught violating safety standards are minimal, there is, in effect, no deterrence of potential 

violations. 

Along the same lines, major fines must be levied for Mexican motor carriers found 

operating outside permitted areas without U.S. authorization. Of the 202 Mexican 

motor carriers found operating outside the existing commercial zones in 1998, only 

3 enforcement actions were initiated. In 1999, only 2 actions * were initiated against 

carriers operating illegally outside the commercial zones, and none were taken 

against Mexican motor carriers operating outside the border states, despite being 

potentially thousands of miles from their permitted operating range.74 Federal law 

provides the authority to penalize Mexican drivers operating outside the border 

commercial zone, but it also allows discretion to hit violators with heftier fines than 

state law provides.75 Yet, these even this policy provides no minimum fines, only 

caps on how large a fine may be. Absent any punishment for violating the rules limiting Mexican drivers to the narrow commercial border zones, increasing numbers 

of trucks are likely to flaunt the law. This lack of sanctions creates incentives for 

dangerous conduct by companies who can profit by violating the law than improving 

the safety of their trucks. 

‘‘We simply cannot jeopardize highway safety by opening the border to increased 

truck traffic.’’—U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky in letter to Rep. Jim 

Kolbe in 1996 on why the border wasn’t opened in 1995. 

V. Case Studies of Mexican Trucks Causing Fatalities on U.S. Highways 

Already, the increase in Mexican trucks within the limited border zone has had 

an adverse affect on safety in the U.S. The Texas border counties, within the commercial border zone, have seen a dramatic increase in highway fatalities and serious 

injuries from trucks with Mexican registrations. In one dramatic case in California, 

a Mexican truck was involved in a 10-car pileup that killed four California motorists 

north of San Diego—well north of the commercial zone. These fatal crashes are 

bound to increase if the border is opened, and the number of trucks increases rapidly without meaningful Mexican safety systems in effect. 

Mexican trucks are a significant and growing portion of Texas border 

counties truck accidents and fatalities. Mexican trucks are posing an increasing 

threat to motorists in Texas border counties. According to data from the Texas Department of Safety, trucks registered in Mexico accounted for 9.7 percent of the fatal 

commercial vehicle accidents in 1998—nearly doubling from 5 percent in 1997. 

Trucks registered in Mexico accounted for 13.5 percent of the incapacitating injuries 

in commercial vehicle crashes in 1999, up from 7 percent in 1997, according to preliminary data from the Texas Department of Safety.76 If Texas’ experience of increasing fatalities from Mexican trucks along the border were extrapolated to the 

entire state using the latest fatalities data, an additional 39 people would have died 

in crashes with Mexican trucks in Texas. If it were expanded to the entire country, 

an additional 530 people would have died in crashes with Mexican trucks. 

Mexican truck caused deadly 10 car pile-up north of California’s commercial zone. A Mexican truck driver crashed into a construction slowdown at 60 miles 

an hour in March 1997, killing four adults and injuring 4 others, one critically.77

The driver fled the scene. The truck may have been overweight, but the towing company that removed it from the scene offloaded and sold some of its cargo of tomaVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
108

toes, so investigators will never know.78 The crash occurred under dry road conditions and clear visibility, and a civil suit against the trucking company alleged that 

the driver ignored brake lights from the traffic congestion.79

If Texas’ experience of increasing fatalities from Mexican trucks along the border 

were expanded to the entire state using the latest fatalities data, an additional 39 

people would have died in accidents with Mexican trucks in Texas. If it were expanded to the entire country, an additional 530 people would have died in crashes 

with Mexican trucks.

Mexican truck caused a chemical spill in Brownsville, Texas. In January 

2000, a short-haul Mexican truck headed south in the commercial zone was responsible for a chemical spill that killed millions of fish. The driver fled to Mexico before 

authorities discovered he was uninsured and the brakes on his truck were inoperable.80

VI. Border Community Conditions Declining at Truck Border Crossings 

Population growth near the U.S.-Mexico border has created a cauldron of declining social conditions. Long waits by trucks at the crossings fill Mexican border communities with unhealthy diesel exhaust. A surge in population has occurred on the 

Mexican side of the border without any of the requisite increases in infrastructure 

needs. Many Mexican border communities—called Colonias which are located near 

the export processing factories called Maquiladoras—lack even the most basic sanitation services or access to utilities like water or electricity. The border crossing 

areas attract smugglers and narcotics traffickers. The stranglehold the Mexican 

drug cartels have on border communities means the presence of additional crime, 

from money laundering to gun running. Competitive, violent gangs of drug traffickers make border communities especially vulnerable to high homicide rates and 

unsolved missing persons, cases known as ‘‘disappeareds.’’ Added to this are the environmental and social problems caused by thousands trucks lining up daily for 

multiple-hour waits for crossing.

The majority of narcotics entering the U.S. come through Mexico. Mexican 

drug cartels operating at the border are one of the main conduits for narcotics entering the U.S. U.S. officials estimate that 60 percent of the cocaine entering the U.S. 

in 1998 passed through Mexico. Mexico is also a major source of marijuana and heroin—nearly all the 6 metric tons of heroin produced in Mexico in 1998 was destined 

for the U.S.81 Total narcotics seizures at the Mexican border increased 78 percent 

between 1996 and 1999 to more than 1 million pounds—accounting for 77 percent 

of all seizures nationally.82

Border federal court districts are experiencing surging crime rates.

Criminal cases in Texas’ western district increased 182 percent since 1995 and grew 

in the southern district by 145 percent. The five federal court districts serving the 

U.S.-Mexico border region represent one-fourth of all federal court filings.83

Drug money is laundered through legitimate transportation companies.

The large volume of drug money generated by Mexican drug cartels is laundered 

through ordinary businesses to conceal the source of the profits. The cartels favor 

transportation companies, like the trucking industry, because they can both launder 

money and facilitate the smuggling of drugs, weapons and cash.84

Low wages for Mexican drivers encourage the transport of contraband.

Mexican truck drivers, who make as little as $400 a month, are often approached 

to transport drugs, money, weapons or undocumented migrants across the border. 

Low wages and the rising cost of living make these opportunities tempting for drivers trying to support their families. Indeed, Drug Enforcement Administration officials found that Mexican drug cartel leaders looked forward to the prospect of increasing the traffic of narcotics to the U.S. under NAFTA.85

Access to border crossings increases concentration of crime. Illegal smugglers of people, products and narcotics gather at border crossing communities for 

easy access to the traffic of people and trucks to transship their illegal goods. The 

drug cartels in Juarez across the border from El Paso have been linked to 500 murders in the 1990’s and another 200 people have simply disappeared. Ciudad Juarez 

has become a haven for smugglers of cars, guns and drugs and has one of the highest homicide rates in Mexico, including the brutal rapes and murders of 238 women 

over several years in the late 1990’s.86

Drug Enforcement Administration officials found that Mexican drug cartel leaders 

looked forward to the prospect of increasing the traffic of narcotics to the U.S. under 

NAFTA. 

Increasing truck traffic exposes border community to dangerous levels of 

air pollution. Border crossings from Mexico to the U.S. are in use 24 hours a day, 

7 days a week. During peak periods, the lines of idling trucks waiting to enter the 

109

U.S. can run several miles long, contributing to pollution and safety concerns.87 Diesel exhaust from Mexican truck traffic waiting to cross the border contributes to the 

high levels of air pollution on both sides of the border. Thirteen border cities exceeded or were expected to exceed ambient air quality standards in 1996—and traffic 

is the leading cause.88 The border communities show high levels of respiratory disease and high levels of lead in children.89

VII. Recommendations 

When should more access to U.S. roads be granted to Mexican trucks? The Mexican government must fulfill its promise to implement high safety standards and a 

regulatory framework necessary to enforce them. What is required is well known. 

A working regulatory system would need, at a minimum:

• considerable funding by the Mexican government to implement a Mexican truck 

safety program, including completion of the monitoring database for domestic 

and international trucking companies,

• safety standards for every truck and significant truck component—including 

tires, brakes, lighting, length, weight, etc.,

• enforcement of safety standards for motor carrier operators that establish fleetwide responsibility,

• creation and enforcement of hours-of-service limits on drivers,

• enforcement of logbook requirements for drivers,

• better training and effective levels of staffing of Mexican safety inspectors,

• regular spot and roadside inspections,

• establishment of the legal authority of Mexican inspectors to take dangerous 

trucks out-of-service; and

• imposition of strong penalties to deter violations.

Once a comprehensive Mexican truck safety system is in place, the U.S. would 

need to ensure that safety standards are being enforced by doing a statistically significant number of border safety checks. This would require an additional commitment of resources by Congress to increase inspection staffing and building border 

inspection facilities. 

Yet, even without any further border opening, U.S. resources devoted to border 

truck inspection are woefully inadequate. Significant improvements in border inspections need to be funded by the U.S. Congress simply to do a reasonable job inspecting the 4 million trucks that already enter the U.S. on an annual basis. 

In November 1999 the report of the DOT Inspector General stated that 

‘‘[a]dequate mechanisms are not in place to control access of Mexico-domiciled motor 

carriers into the U.S.’’ 90 The report described the monitoring systems that would 

be necessary on the American side of the border to assure safety. 

According to the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General’s report, U.S. 

controls and safeguards should, at a minimum, include:

• the use of automated data and state safety inspectors to monitor truck safety 

compliance;

• systems for verification of registration information;

• implementation of consistent enforcement policies for non-compliance;

• increased fines;

• and additional resources for the border program.

This is by no means an exhaustive list: any future opening of the border would 

require a major effort over several years to develop, implement and test these systems for their adequacy in protecting the American public. While both U.S. and 

Mexican governments have been taking some steps toward achieving these goals, 

their efforts to date fall far short of what would be required to protect the public 

health and safety. 

VIII. Conclusion 

The Mexican government has had 7 years to fulfill its commitments to enact and 

enforce a truck safety program that would ensure that the Mexican trucks seeking 

access to U.S. highways meet U.S. safety standards. Instead of fully complying with 

that requirement, the Mexican government has used NAFTA to attack U.S. truck 

safety enforcement. 

110

* Public Citizen does not believe a price can be put on a human life, thus the cost of having 

to pay NAFTA sanctions to keep a basic safety measure should be viewed as yet more damage 

resulting from the flawed NAFTA. However, for those of the Chicago School ilk who would do 

a cost-benefit analysis of maintaining this safety measure: even a mere 1,000 additional crashes 

from the 7 million cross-border trucks would cost more than $100 million, according to Department of Transportation calculations on truck crash costs, a figure which is more costly than 

even a high trade sanction would be.

Depending on how the conflict is resolved, this case could create a concrete 

NAFTA threat—deadly trucks—in every U.S. community with dire implications for 

already negative U.S. public opinion about NAFTA and additional dire implications 

for public safety. 

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of this NAFTA-based attack on highway 

safety is the fact that the data regarding public safety is so compelling. Instead 

of permitting additional access to Mexican trucks, the Bush Administration should 

focus on the scandal of the millions of dangerous Mexican trucks now rolling into 

the U.S. uninspected.

Since NAFTA, the number of Mexican trucks crossing the border has skyrocketed 

to 4 million per year. Because there is now no meaningful domestic Mexican truck 

safety program, overwhelmed U.S. border inspectors are all that stands between 

people living and driving in the 20-mile border zone in which Mexican trucks are 

permitted. 

Although U.S. officials are only able to inspect less than 1 percent of the Mexican 

trucks currently crossing the border, safety inspectors have routinely found—and 

continue to find —that the severe safety problems that result in a truck being put 

‘‘out-of-service’’ for Mexican trucks exceeds the out-of-service rates for U.S. trucks. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Transportation estimates that opening the 

border would add another 3 million trucks crossing into the U.S. bringing the annual total to 7 million. It is not feasible from a financial or infrastructure perspective for the U.S. to inspect every single Mexican truck that crosses the border. And, 

if the NAFTA tribunal ruling were implemented, it would no longer be a 20-mile 

strip of the border-states, but the entire country which would be exposed to the new 

threat. 

The U.S. must ensure domestic highway safety for motorists and communities. 

Given the current absence of any meaningful Mexican truck safety program, the 

high safety failure rates of Mexican trucks, and the impossibility of even inspecting 

all the Mexican trucks that would cross an open border, the only option to ensure 

safety is to continue to limit access to the narrow commercial zones and to significantly increase inspection to intercept more of the dangerous trucks already traveling in the border zone. 

In terms of NAFTA, this means that the Bush Administration must resolve the 

current case by agreeing to pay the NAFTA sanctions and continue to limit access 

until there is a meaningful Mexican truck safety system. Otherwise, the public will 

learn, painfully and first-hand, the dangers that an anti-democratic and anti-safety 

decision by a secret international trade tribunal can bring to its front door.* 

111

ENDNOTES 1 ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Nov. 4, 1999. 

12 ‘‘Mexican Truckers Face U.S. Obstacle Course,’’ USA Today, Feb. 5, 2001. 3 NAFTA Border Opening Remarks, Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena, 

Dec. 18, 1995; White House Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, Dec. 18, 1995. 4 ‘‘ ‘Working on the Blade of A Knife,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1996. 5 NAFTA, Annex 913.5.a–1(2)(a) 6 NAFTA, Annex I, Schedule of the United States. 

7 U.S. Mexico Border: Issues and Challenges Confronting the United States and 

Mexico, GAO, Jul. 1999. 8 ‘‘Commercial Trucking: Safety and Infrastructure Issues Under the North American Free Trade Agreement,’’ General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED–96–61, Feb. 

1996. 9 ‘‘FY 1999 Windows of Opportunity for Drug Smuggling (Southwest Border),’’ U.S. 

Customs Service, Nov. 4, 1999; ‘‘NAFTA Offers Freedom of the Road: U.S. May 

Have to Open its Borders to Neighbor’s Trucks, Regardless of Safety Concerns,’’ Financial Times, Nov. 28, 2000. 10 ‘‘Mexico Pursues the NAFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism Regarding the 

Opening of Cross-Border,’’ Embassy of Mexico press release, Jul. 24, 1998. 11 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 12 ‘‘ ‘Working on the Blade of a Knife,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1996. 13 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 14 ‘‘FY 1999 Windows of Opportunity for Drug Smuggling (Southwest Border),’’ U.S. Customs Service, Nov. 4, 1999; ‘‘NAFTA Offers Freedom of the Road: U.S. May 

Have to Open its Borders to Neighbor’s Trucks, Regardless of Safety Concerns,’’ Financial Times, Nov. 28, 2000. 15Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Fiscal Year 

2001, Conference Report, House Appropriation Committee Summary Table. 16 ‘‘FY 1999 Windows of Opportunity for Drug Smuggling (Southwest Border),’’ U.S. Customs Service, Nov. 4, 1999. 17 ‘‘FY 1999 Windows of Opportunity for Drug Smuggling (Southwest Border),’’ U.S. Customs Service, Nov. 4, 1999; ‘‘NAFTA Offers Freedom of the Road: U.S. May 

Have to Open its Borders to Neighbor’s Trucks, Regardless of Safety Concerns,’’ Financial Times, Nov. 28, 2000; ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial 

Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General 

Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 18 ‘‘Foreign Trucking a Safety Concern; Inspectors Unprepared, a Federal Official 

Says,’’ Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, Oct. 21, 1999; ‘‘Delay Urged in Loosening Truck 

Limits; Safety Concerns Have Some Officials Worried About Allowing Foreign Vehicles Free Movement in the U.S.,’’ Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, Oct. 23, 1999. 19 ‘‘Fatalities in Crashes Involving Large Trucks by State 1990–1999,’’ Analysis 

Division, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Sep. 11, 2000. 20 ‘‘Administrator’s Fact Book,’’ Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. DOT, October 2000. 21 ‘‘Mexico’s Traffic Death Rate Surpasses NAFTA Neighbors,’’ Journal of Com- merce, Jan. 6, 2000. 22 A final rule issued by the Office of Motor Carriers on July 16, 1992, see 57 FR 

31454 et seq., declared that a Memorandum of Understanding had been signed by 

the U.S. and Mexican governments recognizing the ‘‘equivalence’’ of the U.S. Commercial Driver’s License and the Mexican Licencia Federal de Conductor. Notwithstanding a declaration of functional equivalence between the licenses, however, real 

difference between the two countries’ programs exist. Some of those differences are 

noted in the chart. 23 Current U.S. regulations also require ‘‘English proficiency’’ for drivers in interstate commerce. 24 ‘‘ ‘Working on the Blade of a Knife,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1996. 25 ‘‘ ‘Working on the Blade of a Knife,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1996. 26 ‘‘Meeting of the NAFTA Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee, San 

Juan del Rio, Oct. 23–27, 2000,’’ draft report. 27 ‘‘Meeting of the NAFTA Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee, San 

Juan del Rio, Oct. 23–27, 2000,’’ draft report; briefing by the Transportation Consultative Group, Nov. 28, 2000. 28 ‘‘Meeting of the NAFTA Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee, San 

Juan del Rio, Oct. 23–27, 2000,’’ draft report; briefing by the Transportation Consultative Group, Nov. 28, 2000. 

112

29 ‘‘Background to New Entrant Safety Fitness Assurance Process,’’ John A. Volpe 

Transportation Systems Center for Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 

Mar. 2000. 30 ‘‘Meeting of the NAFTA Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee, San 

Juan del Rio, Oct. 23–27, 2000,’’ draft report; briefing by the Transportation Consultative Group, Nov. 28, 2000. 31 ‘‘Background to New Entrant Safety Fitness Assurance Process,’’ John A. Volpe 

Transportation Systems Center for Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 

Mar. 2000. 32 ‘‘Background to New Entrant Safety Fitness Assurance Process,’’ John A. Volpe 

Transportation Systems Center for Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 

Mar. 2000. 33 ‘‘Roadside Inspection: Effectiveness and Assessment,’’ Motor Carrier Safety 

Analysis, Facts and Evaluation Newsletter, vol. 3 no ii, Jan. 1998. 34 ‘‘Large Truck Crash Profile: The 1998 National Picture,’’ Analysis Division Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Jan. 2000. 35 ‘‘Comparative Truck Size and Weight Study: Volume III Scenario Analysis,’’

U.S. Dept. Of Transportation, Aug. 2000. 36Memorandum by Jerry Donaldson, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 

June 20, 2000. 37See NAFTA and Trucking, http://www.teamster.org/naftaltrucklsafety.html. 38 ‘‘Meeting of the NAFTA Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee, San 

Juan del Rio, Oct. 23–27, 2000,’’ draft report; briefing by the Transportation Consultative Group, Nov. 28, 2000. 39 ‘‘Staying Alive on Texas Roads; Increase Oversight of Big Rigs,’’ Austin American Statesman, Jan. 22, 1999. 40 ‘‘ ‘Working on the Blade of a Knife,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1996. 41 ‘‘The NAFTA Trucker,’’ The Teamster, Nov., 1999; ‘‘ ‘Working on the Blade of a 

Knife,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1996. 42 ‘‘The NAFTA Trucker,’’ The Teamster, Nov., 1999; ‘‘ ‘Working on the Blade of a 

Knife,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1996. 43 ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Nov. 4, 1999. 44SafeStat Analysis Report, Sep. 23, 2000 for Mexican carriers and U.S. carriers; 

SafeStat Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System, version 8.1, prepared 

for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration by John A. Volpe National 

Transportation Systems Center, Mar. 25, 2000. The comprehensive, layered data approach of examining Federal Motor Carrier compliance reviews, inspection status, 

safety measures, event data (like accident reports) and carrier descriptive data provides ratings for four specific safety areas (accident, driver, vehicle and safety programs) and identifies which specific carriers are in the worst quartile in at least two 

of these categories to discern relative safety. Carriers found to be deficient in at 

least two safety categories were deemed ‘‘at risk;’’ At risk carriers were found to be 

more than twice as likely to be involved in accidents as carriers that had no identified safety deficiencies. Public Citizen examined the aggregated data from the Safety Status Measurement System from September 23, 2000 for carriers based in Mexico and the U.S. and found significantly worse relative safety records for Mexican 

carriers. 45 ‘‘ ‘Working on the Blade of a Knife,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times, Mar. 18, 1996; ‘‘MexicoDomiciled Motor Carriers,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Nov. 4, 1999. 46SafeStat Analysis Report, Sep. 23, 2000 for Mexican carriers and U.S. carriers; 

SafeStat Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System, version 8.1, prepared 

for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration by John A. Volpe National 

Transportation Systems Center, Mar. 25, 2000. 47 ‘‘Background to New Entrant Safety Fitness Assurance Process,’’ John A. Volpe 

Transportation Systems Center for Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 

Mar. 2000. 48SafeStat Analysis Report, Sep. 23, 2000 for Mexican carriers and U.S. carriers; 

SafeStat Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System, version 8.1, prepared 

for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration by John A. Volpe National 

Transportation Systems Center, Mar. 25, 2000. 49SafeStat Analysis Report, Sep. 23, 2000 for Mexican carriers and U.S. carriers; 

SafeStat Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System, version 8.1, prepared 

for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration by John A. Volpe National 

Transportation Systems Center, Mar. 25, 2000. 

113

50Texas Center for Border Economic and Enterprise Development data, updated 

May 10, 2000, available on the internet at www.tamiu/edu/cob/bti/trucks.; projection 

calculated by Public Citizen. 51 ‘‘Background to New Entrant Safety Fitness Assurance Process,’’ John A. Volpe 

Transportation Systems Center for Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 

Mar. 2000. 52 ‘‘Foreign Trucking a Safety Concern; Inspectors Unprepared, a Federal Official 

Says,’’ Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, Oct. 21, 1999; ‘‘Delay Urged in Loosening Truck 

Limits; Safety Concerns Have Some Officials Worried About Allowing Foreign Vehicles Free Movement in the U.S.,’’ Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, Oct. 23, 1999. 53Through interviews with state regulators, Public Citizen discerned that the 

state of Texas provides 45 commercial truck inspectors at the border, Arizona has 

31 and California provides 25. Public Citizen was not able to find out the current 

number of state inspectors in New Mexico, but there were none in 1998 according 

to ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 54 ‘‘U.S.-Mexico Border: Better Planning, Coordination Needed to Handle Growing 

Commercial Traffic,’’ General Accounting Office, March 2000. 55 ‘‘Top Ten Management Issues,’’ Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General Report No. PT–2001–017, Jan. 18, 2001. 56 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 57 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 58 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 59 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 60Texas Center for Border Economic and Enterprise Development data, updated 

May 10, 2000, available on the internet at www.tamiu/edu/cob/bti/trucks. 61Texas Center for Border Economic and Enterprise Development data, updated 

May 10, 2000, available on the internet at www.tamiu/edu/cob/bti/trucks. 62Truck Crossing into Texas from Mexico, 1990–1999; Truck Crossing into Texas 

from Mexico, 2000 YTD; Rail Car Crossing into Texas from Mexico, 1990–1999, all 

from Texas Center for Border Economic and Enterprise Development, May 10, 200 

and Oct. 23, 2000; projection based on first 8 months of 2000 truck entries extrapolated to entire year. 63 ‘‘FY 1999 Windows of Opportunity for Drug Smuggling (Southwest Border),’’ U.S. Customs Service, Nov. 4, 1999; ‘‘NAFTA Offers Freedom of the Road: U.S. May 

Have to Open its Borders to Neighbor’s Trucks, Regardless of Safety Concerns,’’ Financial Times, Nov. 28, 2000. 64Opening Statement of Jim Hall, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, Third NTSB Hearing on Truck and Bus Safety: The Highway Transportation Aspects of NAFTA, Oct. 20–22, 1999, Los Angeles, CA. 65 ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Nov. 4, 1999. 66 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 67 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 68 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 69 ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Dec. 28, 1998. 70 ‘‘Background to New Entrant Safety Fitness Assurance Process,’’ John A. Volpe 

Transportation Systems Center for Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 

Mar. 2000. 71 California and Baja California Border Indicators, San Diego State University, 

California Center for Border and Regional Economic Studies, based on U.S. customs 

data 1994–1999. 72 California and Baja California Border Indicators, San Diego State University, 

California Center for Border and Regional Economic Studies, based on Bureau of 

Transportation Statistics. 73 ‘‘Delay Urged in Loosening Truck Limits,’’Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Oct. 23, 

1999. 74 ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Nov. 4, 1999. 75 H.R. Res. 3419, 105th Cong. § 219 (1999). 

114

76Texas Department of Public Safety data, 1997, 1998, 1999, preliminary. 77 ‘‘Big Rig Driver Released From Jail; Police Have Not Charged the Man Arrested 

After a Chain-Reaction Accident that Killed Four,’’ Orange County Register, Mar. 29, 

1997. 78 ‘‘Tow Firm’s Contract Suspended; It Gave Away a Big Rig’s Tomatoes After a 

Crash,’’ Orange County Register, Jul. 16, 1997. 79 ‘‘Survivors of Crash Victims File Lawsuit,’’ orange County Register, Jul. 12, 

1997. 80 ‘‘Officials Spar on Letting Mexican Trucks Beyond Border,’’ San Antonio Express-News, Mar. 19, 2000. 81 ‘‘U.S.-Mexico Border: Issues and Challenges Confronting the U.S. and Mexico,’’ General Accounting Office, Jul. 1999. 82Fiscal year 1999 Windows of Opportunity for Drug Smuggling (Southwest Border), U.S. Customs Service, Nov. 14, 1999. 83 ‘‘DAs Quit Checkpoint Cases: Soaring Border Drug Arrests Add Much to Local 

Workloads,’’ Associated Press, May 11, 2000. 84 ‘‘U.S.-Mexico Border: Issues and Challenges Confronting the U.S. and Mexico,’’ General Accounting Office, Jul. 1999. 85 ‘‘The NAFTA Trucker,’’ The Teamster, Nov., 1999. 86 ‘‘Young Women Follow Journeys of Hope to Factories—and Then, to Violence; 

Bright Lights, Dark City,’’ Washington Post, Jun. 25, 2000; ‘‘1 Killing but Many Victims; Ex-DEA Agent Phil Jordan Sees Drug Lords’ Hand in his Brothers Slaying 

and Related Misfortunes,’’ Los Angeles Times, Jul. 8, 2000. 87 U.S.-Mexico Border: Better Planning, Coordination Needed to Handle Growing 

Commercial Traffic, GAO, Mar. 2000. 88 ‘‘U.S.-Mexico Border: Issues and Challenges Confronting the U.S. and Mexico,’’ General Accounting Office, Jul. 1999. 89 ‘‘U.S.-Mexico Border: Issues and Challenges Confronting the U.S. and Mexico,’’ General Accounting Office, Jul. 1999. 90 ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers,’’ Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report, Nov. 4, 1999. 

PUBLIC CITIZEN

July 6, 2001

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Dockets Management Facility 

Room PL–401

400 Seventh Street, SW. 

Washington, DC. 

Re: 

1. Docket FMCSA–98–3297; 66 Fed. Reg. 22327 (May 3, 2001) 

Revision of Regulations and Application Form for Mexican-Domiciled Motor 

Carriers to Operate in U.S. Municipalities and Commercial Zones on the U.S.-

Mexico Border

2. Docket FMCSA–98–3298; 66 Fed. Reg. 22371 (May 3, 2001) 

Application by Certain Mexican Motor Carriers to Operate Beyond U.S. Municipalities and Commercial Zones on the U.S.-Mexico Border

3. Docket FMCSA–98–3299; 66 Fed. Reg. 22415 (May 3, 2001)

Safety Monitoring System and Compliance Initiative for Mexican Motor Carriers Operating in the United States

Public Citizen appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) proposed new and revised applications and 

safety monitoring procedures for opening the border to Mexican-domiciled trucks 

under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We believe that the 

proposed rules fail to acknowledge the inadequacy of the existing enforcement structure and will not protect the public from unsafe trucks crossing into the United 

States. 

If the border opens by the January 1, 2002 deadline announced by President 

Bush, under these proposed rules, unsafe trucks will inevitably escape detection and 

travel freely throughout the United States, endangering motorists and risking a 

trade-related debacle. For these reasons, the issue has already triggered widespread 

and deep opposition. A group of ten senators who support NAFTA sent a letter to 

President Bush expressing reservations about the inadequate inspection force at the 

border and the proposed 18-month period in which carriers may operate without a 

115

safety review.1 A majority of House members have also indicated their concern 

about the safety of Mexican cross-border traffic in a recent vote denying funding for 

the processing of applications on behalf of Mexican carriers.2

Business interests argue that allowing long-haul trips from the interior of Mexico 

into the United States would be more efficient than the present system, but some 

Mexican truckers find that the present system of long-haul to short-haul transitions 

at the border is relatively quick and that the physical transfer of truck loads takes 

less time than it takes for customs officials to process cross-border paperwork.3 Congestion at the border will increase, not decrease, as more businesses take advantage 

of Mexico’s network of cheaper trucking and warehouse labor to ship cargo to the 

interior United States. 

Little has changed since the Clinton Administration, prompted by safety concerns, 

refused to open the border in 1995. Mexico has not yet put in place a regulatory 

system comparable to those in the U.S. and Canada, as it is required to do under 

NAFTA. The out-of-service rate for Mexican-domiciled trucks crossing the border is 

still significantly higher than the out-of-service rate for trucks in the U.S. and Canada. The border is still woefully short on federal inspectors and resources to ensure 

that unsafe trucks are not admitted. 

The United States must limit access to Mexican-domiciled trucks until it can implement an effective system to ensure that these trucks comply with U.S. regulations. The proposed rules are inadequate to meet that objective in a number of respects. The agency evidently plans to grant operating authority based only on a 

paper application, without verifying the information submitted by applicants. To 

evaluate the safety fitness of Mexican carriers, the agency intends to rely heavily 

on an unpopulated database that currently lacks the basic information necessary to 

process applications or to perform a safety review. The agency permits itself an 18-

month window before completing a safety review of a Mexican carrier after it has 

been granted a certificate of registration, but 18 months is far too long to wait to 

verify a company’s regulatory compliance and safety record. 

The integrity of the application and review process is critical because information 

long available on the safety record of the Mexican trucking fleet shows that great 

improvement would be needed to meet U.S. safety standards. Border inspection facilities lack the resources and new inspectors necessary to pick up the slack created 

by weak enforcement of regulations on both sides of the border and inspect all Mexican trucks. As our comments show, once a truck gets beyond the border, it is not 

likely to face inspection or verification of operating authority by either state or federal officials. 

The NAFTA arbitral panel ruling directing the U.S. to open the border expressly 

provided permission in its ruling for U.S. authorities to establish inspection and licensing requirements that are not ‘‘like’’ those already in place for U.S. carriers, so 

long as their expectations are the result of legitimate safety concerns.5 Thus, the 

U.S. could establish a program which requires Mexican trucks to meet more stringent standards than is the case under current U.S. law. Such an accommodation is 

highly unusual in a trade ruling, and is an open invitation for the U.S. to act responsibly to fulfill its safety obligations to the American public. 

Despite such considerations by the panel, FMCSA has proposed rules which 

achieve the opposite of what is permitted under the ruling. The agency’s proposals 

actually allow greater latitude in several key areas for Mexican-domiciled carriers 

and drivers than currently apply to U.S. and Canadian companies and drivers under 

U.S. law. In fact, the agency’s proposed 18-month safety review process imposes far 

fewer and generally less serious consequences for safety violations than applies in 

its absence, thus creating a safe harbor for Mexican-domiciled entrants to the market and a competitive disadvantage for U.S. interests. 

NAFTA failed to link the development of a commercial carrier safety infrastructure in Mexico with the time-line for opening the U.S.-Mexico border to commercial 

trucks. The FMCSA is clearly struggling, in these rules, between the ‘‘rock’’ of the 

NAFTA-globalization juggernaut and ‘‘hard place’’ of its assigned mission to assure 

the safety of commercial carriers in the U.S. The proposed rules, however, answer 

to trade at the expense of safety. Because the agency puts trade first, and because 

agency decision makers are all too aware of the practical impediments to reasonable 

enforcement, the proposed rules demonstrate far less concern with technical feasibility than is usual in the agency’s history. 

The rules appear—although surely the FMCSA is not—to be almost entirely uninformed about the real risks that these dangerous proposals pose to the U.S. public, 

and to the image of ‘‘free’’ trade here at home. We are acting far too quickly, with 

far too little attention to the actual and potential costs, and at the risk of causing 

hazardous material spills, horrific truck crashes and other unnecessary suffering 

and death on U.S. highways. We urge the agency to reconsider its rules in light of 

116

the real risks to American motorists and its safety mission, and to formulate its future proposals with full awareness of the practical consequences and importance of 

its actions. 

I. The push to open the border to Mexican trucks without assurance of 

their safety is the result of a fatal flaw in the North American Free 

Trade Agreement. 

The NAFTA agreement required the United States to open its border to Mexican 

trucks in phases beginning in 1995. The time-line laid down in the agreement was 

not linked in any way to Mexico’s promise, also in the agreement, to improve its 

domestic level of safety for commercial carriers and to build up its oversight and 

safety inspection resources to levels commensurate with the U.S. and Canada. 

Without acting whatsoever on its domestic obligations, almost 3 years ago the 

Mexican government brought a dispute before a NAFTA arbitral panel to open the 

southern U.S. border to cross-border commercial traffic. Last summer, the Mexican 

government, following work with trucking industry representatives, finally issued a 

fledgling set of basic rules for commercial carrier safety. The rules are voluntary for 

the first year and are phased in over 2 years. Public Citizen’s analysis of the rules 

(see ‘‘Recent Mexican Trucking Rules Do Not Solve Serious Safety Hazards,’’ attached) shows the rules are deficient in many areas, and do not compare favorably 

to protections provided by U.S. standards and rules. 

Regardless of the lack of progress on safety standards in Mexico, the NAFTA 

panel ruled that the U.S. should open the border or face trade sanctions, thus demonstrating the untenability of the agreement’s structure. Once the U.S. actually 

opens the border, it of course will have no leverage with Mexico to encourage it to 

continue or improve this regulation process. 

Moreover, the massive funding for the necessary inspection and border resources 

amounts to an in-kind subsidy of federal dollars to cross-border companies that will 

grease the wheels of trade and further erode border communities and infrastructure. 

In this case, public tax dollars must be spent to facilitate a trade agreement, which 

will in turn enable the flow of commercial traffic across the border and enhance of 

the profitability of private trucking companies. Because the agreement itself allows 

no operating room to control expenditures at the border, and because the border’s opening was not linked to a safety time-line, NAFTA is a gun to the head of both 

FMCSA and the U.S. budget for federal border inspections. 

II. Mexico’s fledgling commercial carrier regulatory system has little substance. 

A. Mexico’s new regulations are weak and not yet actively enforced. 

The Mexican government finally began to honor its obligations under NAFTA last 

summer with the passage of new, albeit weak, regulations for commercial carriers. 

The inspection standards adopted under the new laws have been voluntary since 

their enactment a year ago, and have not been in place long enough to generate 

data. Planned to be ‘‘phased in’’ over the next 2 years, they become compulsory this 

summer, but there is as yet little evidence of enforcement or new funding for roadside inspections or database development. According to the translated text of the 

Mexican statute, the standards were drafted by a panel that included a number of 

industry representatives.6

The new Mexican inspection standards are far less stringent than U.S. standards, 

and have been written so as to work against a thorough inspection. While the inspections called for in the law include more than 143 actions to test components of 

the truck, inspectors must complete each inspection within an impossibly short 

time: 20 minutes maximum for a hazardous materials vehicle and 30 minutes maximum for a general cargo vehicle.7 Although the Mexican inspection standards are 

purported to be ‘‘based’’ on Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) out-of-service criteria, CVSA does not set limits on the time necessary to make an inspection. 

The standard CVSA Level I inspection takes an estimated 45 to 60 minutes to complete, and the discovery of a serious violation may trigger a longer, more thorough 

inspection that can take hours. The Mexican standard also provides for inspection 

facilities to be run by non-governmental third parties, which are likely to generate 

fees that will trigger conflicts of interest.8 There is no reason to believe that the 

inspection process will be untouched by the corruption which, according to news reports, is a constant challenge for the government and people of Mexico.9

The new Mexican inspection regulations allow unsafe vehicles to slip through the 

cracks. New vehicles are completely exempted from inspections for 2 years after the 

date of manufacture.10 Vehicles with multiple borderline infractions are not sanctioned because the inspection criteria are not cumulative. While the law allows for 

fines, it does not specify their amount, indicating that they may be so small that 

117

carriers can treat such fines as a cost of doing business. A number of safety defects 

that merely incur a fine and a request that the problem be fixed within 20 days 

in Mexico would be sufficient cause to remove a truck from the road in the U.S. 

These defects include improperly stored hazardous materials, missing fuses, worn 

or exposed wires, a lack of windshield wipers, a shattered windshield, damaged 

tires, broken wheel rims, leaky fuel lines, worn or cracked load securement chains, 

loose steering wheels, cracked brake drums and inoperative brake linings.11

B. The new Mexican regulatory system is not supported by a regulatory infrastructure. 

There is little evidence of funding or administrative structure for enforcing these 

laws. The wildly optimistic report released last fall by the Land Transportation 

Standards Subcommittee (LTSS), a group established under NAFTA to serve as a 

liaison among the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States in establishing a shared safety program, fails to emphasize the following serious problems 

documented in the report:

• Training for the road inspection program in Mexico fell apart.12

• Mexico has higher weight restrictions than the U.S., and no operational weigh 

stations.13

• Although Mexico has had a drug and alcohol testing requirement stemming 

from a 1998 Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S., Mexico has no laboratories that are U.S.- certified for drug testing.14

• The Mexican safety regulations are to be enforced only by Mexican federal officers, and only on Mexican federal highways, which represent 10 percent of all 

the highways in Mexico.

• There is no evidence to indicate the level of access that Mexican authorities on 

the highway have to the safety database they are developing or how regularly 

they are adding to it. Currently, the lack of information in the database renders 

it functionally inoperational.

• Mexico has required hours of service logbooks for hazardous materials drivers 

since 1993 and for all other commercial vehicle drivers since March 29, 2000,15

but U.S. border officials have yet to see a Mexican logbook.16

C. Mexico still has no hours of service rules. 

Unlike safety regulation in the U.S. and Canada, Mexican laws do not include 

hours of service rules. Mexican carriers often require their workers to drive for 

much longer periods per day than the U.S. statutory hours of service limit.17 In fact, 

the new Mexican regulations leave carriers to design logbooks for hours of service 

‘‘according to its needs.’’ 18

D. Assuring the safety fitness of trucks must be a priority in Mexico before they reach 

the border. 

A functioning road inspection system in Mexico will be crucial for assuring the 

fitness of Mexican trucks before they reach the border. The Mexican trucking fleet 

is older and receives more out-of-service orders than the U.S. fleet when trucks are 

inspected at the border.19 A recent report indicates that it would take some years 

and billions of dollars to bring the Mexican trucking fleet up to the quality of the 

U.S. fleet.20

III. Admission processes at the border will not filter out unsafe trucks. 

A. The proposed application process for Mexican-domiciled trucks will not ensure 

compliance. 

The proposed rules do not provide for verification of the information submitted in 

the paper application. 

The application procedures for Mexican-domiciled carriers that are included in the 

proposed rules do not provide for verification of the claims and submitted information. They rely heavily on self-reporting and do not outline or mention any process 

by which the truth of this information will be ascertained. In fact, some of the application information requested by FMCSA may prove to be unverifiable. 

Under the proposals, registration is granted primarily on the basis of information 

supplied by the applicant on the application and on the applicant’s reassurance that 

it has knowledge of, and will comply with, relevant U.S. safety regulations.21 All 

the applicant must do to demonstrate knowledge of applicable regulations is check 

‘‘yes.’’ Interestingly, there is no box to check ‘‘no.’’

118

The carrier also need only describe its ‘‘plan’’ for complying with drug testing and 

other programs, rather than submit proof that drug tests have been taken and results have been acceptable. Any inaccurate information supplied in an application 

likely will not be caught before a certificate of registration is issued. 

The Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General investigated and 

reported on the failure of FMCSA and its predecessor to verify information supplied by Mexican-domiciled carriers. 

The Department of Transportation has never implemented a verification process 

for Mexican registration information, and as a result, much of the information that 

the DOT currently has in its databases regarding Mexican-domiciled carriers is outdated or unverified. A November 1999 Office of the Inspector General audit report 

found that ‘‘there was too much reliance on the information contained in the application [of Mexican-domiciled motor carriers] without verification.’’ 22 The Inspector 

General found that there were no processes in place to confirm the claims.23

Furthermore, the report pointed out that the application process did not require 

that documents to be submitted with the application be certified copies.24 The proposed rules present the same serious problems, but the negative effects of granting 

operating authority on the basis of inaccurate information will extend beyond the 

commercial zone to the entire United States, where such operating authority is 

granted. 

The information requested may be distorted through error or fraud. 

Much of the information provided by applicants may not be verifiable under current practices. The applicant is asked to report whether it is ‘‘affiliated’’ with a carrier that has been disqualified from operating in the United States, but it does not 

define ‘‘affiliated’’ and it is unclear whether FMCSA has the ability to track any of 

this information. 

Indeed, the instructions of the proposed applications imply that applicants’ business information cannot be compared or cross-checked. The application forms instruct applicants to enter the name of the carrier exactly the same way each time 

a name is required, or the department will list two slightly different names as two 

different companies. The instruction suggests that the DOT has no way to crosscheck the owners, addresses, and other information of a company to ensure that a 

company is not counted twice. A simple typographical error in the name of a carrier 

for an entry of inspection or crash data into the database, then, could fail to match 

negative safety data with that carrier. In addition, carrier with a poor safety record 

could re-register under a new name to get a second ‘‘chance’’ in the DOT database. 

Information on drivers’ safety records may not be available. 

While important safety information involves individual drivers’ safety records, it 

is not clear that this information has been compiled in Mexico and would be included in the database. This omission presents another example of the problem in 

monitoring the Mexican trucking industry as opposed to the U.S. trucking industry. 

Information vital to determining the safety of drivers and carriers will inevitably 

be more accurate and more complete regarding U.S. drivers. As a result, danger 

signs that would be detected regarding U.S. carriers will not be detected in Mexican 

carriers, compromising the level of safety we have sought to achieve through regulation, and burdening only U.S. carriers while leaving Mexican carriers unaffected. 

B. The database to be used in the safety review contains little data and will be completely inadequate in evaluating the safety of Mexican carriers. 

Authorities have added little or no data to the database. 

A significant problem with the proposed rules is their dependence on a joint database to be maintained between the U.S. and Mexico. Under the agency’s proposal, 

registration is conditional upon a satisfactory safety review, including an evaluation 

of the ‘‘safety fitness’’ of the carrier as reflected in its inclusion in the Motor Carrier 

Management Information System (MCMIS) database. According to Department of 

Transportation officials at the Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee briefing last November, the database has been set up for Mexican carriers, but it is not 

yet ‘‘populated’’ with information.25 Therefore, the database is likely to provide little 

or no data on a particular carrier. 

While the Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee (LTSS) declares that 

Mexican carriers are being added to the database,26 simple inclusion in the database is not nearly sufficient. Inspection data and crash data are necessary for any 

evaluation of the safety record of a carrier, and no evidence is available that Mexican authorities are entering this data. According to oral statements of a member 

119

of Congress at a recent press conference, very little has been added about Mexican 

carriers on the Mexican side. 

Safety information from Mexico is not comparable to U.S. data. 

Even if data is entered into the database, the information gathered from Mexican 

reports, such as an out-of-service rate, is not likely to reflect the safety of the carrier 

by U.S. standards. The Mexican standards are weaker and the inspection standards 

remain voluntary until later this summer. Once the border is opened, the U.S. will 

retain little leverage with Mexico, and the FMCSA will have no way to improve any 

shortcomings that affect data or the lack of data on the Mexican side. 

Difficulties that the U.S. has encountered in implementing MCMIS will likely pose 

problems for Mexico as well. 

The MCMIS database, used to evaluate carrier and driver safety in the U.S. has 

presented a number of difficulties during use. It is foreseeable that Mexico will encounter similar problems. Discrepancies and deficiencies in the ways that different 

state enforcement agencies have entered or coded data in the database have affected 

the accuracy of the Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) scores of carriers.27 SafeStat scores are important in evaluating the safety fitness of carriers and 

detecting ‘‘at risk’’ carriers. Delays also present problems, because SafeStat weighs 

accidents that occurred within the last 6 months three times more than accidents 

that occurred in the last 18 months or longer.28 In fact, a significant proportion of 

the crashes reported in 1997 were reported after the period in which they would 

have been weighed the most heavily.29 U.S. law enforcement has been working on 

reducing the delay of information added to the database, but Mexico would likely 

experience similar problems with delays. 

If Mexican authorities do not enter complete information, the data will be extremely inadequate. The Inspector General’s office found in an audit of MCMIS that 

less than 40 percent of the crashes entered into MCMIS for the U.S. in 1997 identified the carriers involved.30 The same IG report also found that MCMIS contains 

no information on cause or fault in its crash data; 31 if this information is not supplied on the Mexican side, the FMCSA will have no way to recover it. 

A new law will penalize U.S. commercial drivers for poor personal driving records 

but will likely not be practically applicable to Mexican drivers, reducing the effectiveness of the law and allowing Mexican drivers a competitive advantage over 

their American and Canadian counterparts. 

A rule recently proposed by FMCSA would disqualify the commercial drivers licenses of drivers who are convicted of violations like drunk driving, leaving the 

scene of an accident, violating railroad-highway grade crossing signs, excessive 

speeding, and reckless driving, regardless of whether the offense was committed 

while driving a personal vehicle or a commercial vehicle.32 However, the MCMIS 

database will not carry information regarding Mexican drivers’ private driving 

records, making it impossible for FMCSA to enforce this law with respect to Mexican drivers. To enforce this law with respect to U.S. drivers but not Mexican drivers 

would be unfair to U.S. commercial drivers, creating a competitive disadvantage far 

beyond the foreseen consequences of NAFTA. 

C. The proposed safety monitoring program is too weak to deter non-compliance. It 

also provides an 18-month safe harbor for Mexican-domiciled carriers. 

Administrative difficulties will greatly hamper enforcement.

The proposed safety monitoring program is not likely to motivate carriers to comply with all regulations before the 18-month period expires. If the FMCSA is overwhelmed with applications, unable to conduct the number of safety reviews in a 

timely manner, or unable to keep track of suspended carriers, a carrier may operate 

indefinitely under hazardous conditions. Registration is so infrequently checked that 

finding a truck operating with suspended or revoked registration will be like finding 

a needle in a haystack. The consequences for carriers operating on a revoked or suspended license are neither certain nor serious. 

The rules create an 18-month safe harbor for Mexican carriers and drivers. 

In contrast to the NAFTA panel’s ruling that Mexican-domiciled carriers could be 

subject to special provisions, the penalties for Mexican-domiciled carriers under the 

safety monitoring program are weaker than those that currently apply to U.S.-domiciled carriers. 

Proposed section 385.23 provides a list of violations that are likely to result in 

an expedited safety review or deficiency letter. These violations include serious infractions such as using drivers lacking proper qualifications,33 operating vehicles 

that have been placed out of service without correcting the fault, involvement in acVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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cidents leading to a hazardous materials incident, using drivers testing positive for 

drugs and alcohol, and operating a vehicle that is not insured.34 For any one of 

these serious violations, a carrier would receive a safety review—a review to which 

it would have to submit anyway—or a deficiency letter instructing the carrier to notify FMCSA in writing that the problem has been corrected. 

The consequences of violations such as these for U.S. carriers are considerably 

more severe, including civil and criminal fines or even jail time.35 Allowing Mexican 

carriers to receive weak penalties for serious violations fails to communicate the seriousness of these violations to carriers and will not prepare them to comply with 

these regulations at the end of the safety oversight program. 

A number of serious violations were omitted from the proposed program, compromising safety and placing U.S. carriers at a market disadvantage. 

The FMCSA has also omitted some serious violations from the list of violations 

that would trigger an expedited safety review or deficiency letter. Under its proposal, an accident resulting in a hazardous materials incident prompts the expedited 

safety review or deficiency letter process, but an accident resulting in death does 

not. Furthermore, a violation of the hours of service limit is not on the list of violations that would result in an expedited safety review or deficiency letter. The hours 

of service limit is of particular concern because Mexican carriers often require their 

workers to drive for much longer periods per day than the U.S. statutory hours of 

service limit, and Mexican laws do not include hours of service rules.36 The FMCSA 

should add these infractions to the list, and publish its plan for enforcing hours of 

service limits for drivers crossing the border who are not subject to any time controls while in Mexico. 

Enforcement of penalties for carriers in the safety oversight program is weak and uncertain. 

The safety oversight provision has no teeth. The rule does not specify a time limit 

for the carrier to address the problem and respond to the deficiency letter. During 

that interval, the carrier would be operating in spite of documented safety concerns. 

A deficiency letter, or FMCSA’s intention to conduct a safety review sooner, does 

nothing to keep an unfit carrier off the road and does not communicate to the carrier the severity of the violation. Is an uninsured carrier allowed to operate while 

the safety review or deficiency letter process is going on? The agency must clarify 

its plan for ensuring that non-compliant carriers do not continue operating under 

hazardous conditions. 

If a carrier fails to respond to the agency’s deficiency letter, that carrier’s registration may be suspended until corrective action is taken. If a carrier fails the safety 

review, the carrier’s registration will be suspended until it takes corrective action. 

If the carrier does not take corrective action, or if the carrier operates in violation 

of a suspension order, the carrier’s registration may be revoked following notice and 

an opportunity for a proceeding. 

However, this rule does not specify a time limit for the carrier to respond to the 

deficiency letter before a suspension is issued. It is also unclear how soon after a 

violation an expedited safety review would take place. Without time limits, an unsafe carrier could operate indefinitely before any limitations are placed on it. The 

rule does not specify how long a carrier can be suspended without taking corrective 

action before its registration is revoked. The agency must clarify this rule and set 

definite time restrictions to ensure that non-compliant carriers do not slip through 

the cracks. 

No system is in place at the border to enforce the suspension or revocation of operating authority. 

The agency’s suspension or revocation of a license will not change a carrier’s ability to send trucks across the border. A November 1999 IG report found that, while 

suspension and revocation notices were sent to carriers, the carriers nevertheless 

were able to retain their certificates in their vehicles and continue operating across 

the border.37 No information is available to inspectors to verify that a certificate of 

registration is valid, or to verify that a driver has a certificate of registration if he 

or she is not able to present it upon request. 

D. Trucks crossing the border are not likely to be inspected because border facilities 

lack the resources and inspectors to step up inspections. 

The vast majority of cross-border trucks are not inspected at the border. 

About 1 percent of all trucks crossing the border are inspected.38 The overwhelming majority of these inspections are cursory ‘‘walk-around’’ inspections. 

Trucks that are not inspected at the border will not likely be checked for a certifiVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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cate of registration. Even if a truck is inspected, there is no information available 

to an inspector to verify that a certificate of registration is valid, or to verify that 

a driver has a certificate of registration if he or she is not able to present it upon 

request. 

Border officials do not routinely check the registration of cross-border trucks. 

Only federal inspectors and California state inspectors routinely check certificates 

of registration at the border. U.S. Customs officials and other state inspectors do 

not routinely check certificates of registration.39 Many border crossings do not have 

full-time federal inspectors or federal inspectors present during all hours of operation. If a truck is not inspected by a federal inspector, it is much less likely to have 

its certificate of registration checked. 

A substantial inspection presence may deter non-compliance. 

Unsafe and non-compliant trucks that attempt to cross the border are not likely 

to be detected. There is a direct correlation between the lack of inspectors or fulltime inspectors at a border crossing and the out of service rate of trucks that use 

that crossing.40

Border facilities still lack resources to inspect an adequate proportion of trucks crossing the border. 

Currently, border crossings do not have the resources to inspect every truck at 

the border. In the absence of a comprehensive Mexican regulatory system, the border crossings present the only opportunity for the U.S. to filter out non-compliant, 

unregistered, uninsured, or unsafe trucks before they can travel U.S. highways. 

Border crossings need many more federal inspectors. 

The number of federal inspectors at the border is less than half the 139 inspectors 

the IG called for in 1998.41 While 60 inspector positions have been authorized and 

funded, only 50 inspectors had been hired as of March 27, 2001.42 The estimate of 

139 inspectors was based on 1998 numbers for truck crossings. The volume of 

NAFTA traffic has increased since 1998, however, and that estimate did not include 

the inspectors needed for the 18-month proposed safety reviews.43

The proposed safety oversight program will strain the inspection forces at the border. 

The proposed rule creates the need for additional inspectors to perform the safety 

reviews of carriers either at a point within the U.S. or at the place of business of 

carriers in Mexico.44 The FMCSA is still short of the federal inspectors it needs to 

conduct truck inspections at the border, however, and the proposed rules do not include estimates as to how many additional inspectors are needed for the on-site 

safety reviews. The proposed rules do not estimate the amount of time each safety 

review would take, or the size of the workload attributed to a single inspector. 

Workloads would be exacerbated by the time and cost of traveling to places of business within Mexico. The greater the time and cost of each inspection, the longer carriers will operate without a thorough safety review. 

Inspection facilities are sorely inadequate. 

While plans have been made, no new border inspection facilities have been built 

since 1998.45 A recent study has documented that border crossings lack Internet 

connections, inspection space, and space to park out-of-service vehicles. In a May 

2001 IG report, investigators visited the 27 border crossings and found: at 20 crossings, FMCSA inspectors did not have dedicated phone lines to access databases, 

such as those for validating a CDL; at 19 crossings, FMCSA inspectors had space 

to inspect only 1 or 2 trucks at a time; and at 14 crossings, FMCSA inspectors had 

only 1 or 2 spaces to park vehicles placed out of service. Also, the out-of-service 

space was shared with the inspection space at the majority of these crossings.46 The 

FMCSA must address these serious shortcomings before the volume of cross-border 

traffic increases under the proposed rules. 

E. Insurance and proof-of-insurance requirements are dangerously inadequate to protect other drivers on public highways. 

The applicant need not submit proof of insurance with the application. Carriers 

operating in the border commercial zones need only carry proof of insurance with 

them when they cross the border. It is unclear whether U.S. Customs officials, state 

or federal inspectors will routinely check for proof of insurance. Carriers operating 

beyond the border zones must submit insurance forms only after notice of their applications appear in the federal register. This process does not do anything to guarantee that registration will not be granted to an uninsured carrier. 

While a Mexican carrier may have a general level of insurance, Mexican carriers 

sometimes transport a combination of freight and passengers, or freight and hazVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
122

ardous materials. These different shipping practices carry different required insurance levels, and a carrier may only meet the lower insurance level, thus creating 

a hazard for other drivers. 

F. New problems will arise after completion of the 18-month safety oversight program. 

Once the safety oversight program is completed, and a carrier’s registration becomes permanent, the oversight of Mexican carriers is considerably reduced. Serious 

violations, such as using unqualified drivers or drivers testing positive for drugs or 

alcohol, operating vehicles that have been placed out of service without correcting 

the violation, and involvement in accidents involving hazardous materials will not 

prompt a safety review. It is unclear whether, or for what infraction, a Mexicandomiciled carrier’s registration could be suspended or revoked after the safety oversight program is complete. The agency must clarify what circumstances would lead 

to the suspension or revocation after the 18 month period has expired. 

Lawfully imposed U.S. penalties may trigger conflicts. 

When Mexican drivers and carriers encounter the full force of U.S. regulations, 

conflicts will result. Assuming that the normal statutory penalties would begin to 

apply once the registration is permanent, drivers and carriers would be subject to 

the same civil and criminal penalties to which U.S. drivers and truckers are subject. 

However, when the Nogales border inspectors began inspecting trucks crossing 

the border and fining Mexican drivers when the trucks failed to comply with safety 

regulations, a group of Mexican truckers protested, blocking the border crossing at 

Nogales for 8 hours.47 The drivers, who receive twenty to thirty dollars per border 

crossing, had been fined up to $1,400 each because their vehicles did not comply 

with safety regulations. The workers protested that they should not be fined for the 

condition of their vehicles, but U.S. law requires that truck drivers be responsible 

for inspecting their vehicles before they begin operations, and provides for the 

issuance of fines to both drivers and carriers when trucks are placed out of service. 

U.S. penalties will be particularly hard on Mexican drivers, who are typically compensated at lower rates than drivers in the U.S. This incident illustrates a conflict 

that could become more pronounced as far more Mexican drivers encounter the enforcement of U.S. safety regulations. 

IV. Non-border states are completely unprepared for the influx of Mexican 

trucks. 

Trucks that are not inspected at the border are unlikely to be checked at any 

point beyond the border for certificates of registration. A November 1999 Office of 

the Inspector General report noted that, in FY 1998, 202 Mexican-domiciled motor 

carriers were found operating outside of their authority beyond the commercial 

zones in the border states, and 52 motor carriers were found operating outside of 

their authority in 20 non-border states.48 The trucks, which were supposed to travel 

only within commercial zones at the border, were found in North and South Dakota, 

Washington state, New York, New Jersey, and Florida.49 These trucks were detected only because they had been selected for roadside inspections. 

Much of the data that the safety oversight program and safety review will depend 

on is the safety data gathered and entered into the database from roadside inspections in the U.S. However, the likelihood that a truck will be selected for a roadside 

inspection in the U.S. is small. Trucks are usually selected for roadside inspections 

on the basis of visual clues that they may not comply with safety standards or if 

their carrier has been selected for closer monitoring on the basis of its SafeStat 

score. The SafeStat scoring system is not generally accurate for small carriers because they do not generate enough data, and most Mexican carriers are small carriers. 

If a truck operating without authority or outside of its authority does not appear 

to have physical defects, it is unlikely to be stopped at all. Inspectors in non-border 

states are much less likely to check certificates of registration, because the non-border states lack state laws banning Mexican-domiciled trucks from operating without 

registration or operating outside of their authority.50 Roadside inspectors cannot 

place a Mexican-domiciled vehicle out of service simply because it is operating without registration or operating outside of its authority.51

An inspector may issue an out-of-service order for other violations meeting the 

necessary criteria or issue a fine for operating outside of authority, but while the 

fine limits for operating outside of authority have been raised, the actual assessed 

fines have remained the same, in the range of $500–$1000, an amount that a carrier 

could view as a cost of doing business.52 There are few safeguards to monitor Mexican trucks operating beyond the border in the interior U.S. 

123

V. The proposed rules present significant hidden economic costs for the 

U.S., utilizing government funds to subsidize the private sector. 

The opening of the border under this proposed rulemaking will be costly to the 

United States economy in that it increases the probability of costly accidents and 

places all the expense of insuring Mexican compliance on U.S. border and road inspection resources. 

Mexican drivers and commercial carriers can, under the proposed rules, procure 

a marketplace advantage under the 18-month safety monitoring program. While 

they are in this program, they need not follow hours of service laws, and penalties 

for drivers and carriers for violating other laws are only as costly as correcting the 

violation. U.S. carriers in the same circumstances face fines, disqualification, or 

even time in jail. 

According to Department of Transportation calculations on the costs of truck 

crashes, just an additional 1,000 truck crashes resulting from this proposal would 

cost over $100 million, in addition to the intangible costs of injury and death. Even 

if the administration increases inspectors and their facilities at the border in an effort to avert disaster, the measure would amount to the U.S. performing the enforcement function of the laws that Mexico put on the books and is obligated to enforce 

under NAFTA. 

VI. Conclusion 

While the administration purports to require Mexican-domiciled carriers to adhere 

to the same safety standards as American carriers, the application process in the 

proposed rules indicates that its lofty goals are only accomplished on paper. Numerous failings in the current registration process for Mexican-domiciled carriers that 

were found and reported by the DOT Inspector General have not been addressed 

or even acknowledged in the proposed rules. 

The DOT is willing to do on paper what it is not willing to do in practice. Requiring only that carriers promise to know and follow regulations and failing to verify 

the information supplied by the carrier will place the public at risk. Under the proposed rules, FMCSA would evaluate carriers’ fitness for registration on paper before 

granting them authority, not conducting an actual on-site safety fitness review until 

after operating authority has been granted and the carriers have begun cross-border 

operations. 

The effectiveness of the entire truck safety oversight program depends on the deterrent effect of suspension or revocation of certificates of registration, but certificates of registration are rarely checked and cannot be verified at the border. While 

FMCSA can suspend or revoke the registration on paper, it has no enforcement system in place to prevent carriers with suspended or revoked registration from operating across the border in practice. With the opening of the border, the impact of 

these failings will significantly increase. 

The evaluation of the safety records of Mexican-domiciled carriers will depend in 

large part on the completeness and reliability of information supplied to the safety 

database on the Mexican side. We have no evidence to indicate that data is being 

entered promptly, completely, or accurately on the Mexican side, and no way to insure that its database programs are or will be implemented or funded in the future. 

The DOT relies on the MCMIS to analyze safety information and raise red flags for 

dangerous carriers in the U.S. If the database is not administered as conscientiously 

on the Mexican side, these same safeguards will be rendered ineffective for Mexicandomiciled carriers. 

Opening the border under the proposed rules will seriously compromise the safety 

of the public on U.S. highways. The lax enforcement of U.S. regulations will give 

Mexican-domiciled carriers a competitive advantage over U.S.-domiciled carriers. If 

FMCSA does not address and correct the systemic problems outlined in a number 

of reports by the Office of the Inspector General, it need only wait until the inevitable crash occurs. Public safety must not suffer under NAFTA, and indeed the 

NAFTA dispute panel gives the U.S. full authority to firmly enforce U.S. law for 

any truck traveling in the U.S. 

VII. Recommendations 

The proposed rules must be rejected in favor of a plan that provides for extensive 

verification of safely fitness and an enforcement infrastructure to ensure that Mexican-domiciled trucks meet U.S. safety regulations and to deter noncompliance. Such 

a plan should:

• As a precondition for granting operating authority, provide an application process in which statements made by carriers on paper applications are verified and 

unannounced, on-site safety inspections of the carriers occur;

124

• As a precondition for granting operating authority, establish a proficiency test 

for all foreign carriers through which their knowledge of U.S. operating standards may be verified;

• As a precondition for granting operating authority, set minimum amounts of inspection, crash and other performance and enforcement data that must be in 

the database for a applicant carrier, i.e., enough to allow a SafeStat score to 

be calculated;

• Clarify the consequences, time-line, and oversight resources needed to monitor 

suspended and revoked registrations and carrier responses to deficiency letters;

• Strengthen inspection forces at the border. This should include inspection facilities with adequate space to conduct inspections and place vehicles out of service, drive-through weigh-in-motion systems, and dedicated phone lines for access 

to databases. This should also include a substantial increase in the number of 

federal inspectors at the border—enough to ensure that a significant proportion 

of trucks are inspected at the border;

• Increase coordination with state inspectors to facilitate the enforcement of certificates of registration and operating authority, and to ensure that border 

crossings are staffed with adequate numbers of inspectors at all hours of operation. 

ENDNOTES 1Letter to the President from Senators Kerry, Baucus, Bingaman, Harkin, 

Daschle, Wyden, Kennedy, Bayh, Lieberman, and Durbin, June 11, 2001. 2 A recent Wall Street Journal article reported: ‘‘. . . 82 Republicans joined 201 

Democrats and two independents in voting to halt the safety permits. House leaders 

said one reason for the big margin was that lawmakers wanted to send a message 

to Mr. Bush to toughen regulations governing Mexican trucks.’’ Helene Cooper,‘‘Bush Wants to Reverse House Attempt to Keep Mexican Trucks Off U.S. 

Roads,’’ Wall Street Journal, 6/28/2001. 3The Associated Press interviewed Mexican truck drivers who oppose the opening 

of the border to long-haul trucks: ‘‘Gomez said that unhitching a trailer from a 

Mexican truck and hooking it to a U.S. one at the border usually occurs as the drivers wait for officials to process their border-crossing papers. 

‘‘ ‘We’re always much faster’ than the officials, he said.’’ Associated Press, ‘‘Mexico 

Might Strike Against the United States,’’ 6/27/2001. 4The number of inspectors is not likely to increase this year. On June 27, 2001, 

the Washington Post reported that the money earmarked for the hiring of an additional 80 inspectors was ‘‘struck from the spending bill on technical grounds yesterday.’’ Juliet Eilperin, ‘‘House Acts to Block Mexican Trucks,’’ Washington Post, 6/27/

2001. 5 Recommendations of the arbitral panel state:

‘‘300. The panel notes that compliance by the United States with its NAFTA obligations would not necessarily require providing favorable consideration to all or to 

any specific number of applications from Mexican-owned trucking firms, when it is 

evident that a particular applicant or applicants may be unable to comply with U.S. 

trucking regulations when operating in the United States. Nor does it require that 

all Mexican-domiciled firms currently providing trucking services in the United 

States be allowed to continue to do so, if and when they fail to comply with U.S. 

safety regulations. The United States may not be required to treat applications from 

Mexican trucking firms in exactly the same manner as applications from U.S. or Canadian firms, as long as they are reviewed on a case by case basis. U.S. authorities 

are responsible for the safe operation of trucks within U.S. territory, whether ownership is U.S., Canadian or Mexican. 

‘‘301. Similarly, it may not be unreasonable for a NAFTA Party to conclude that 

to ensure compliance with its own local standards by service providers from another 

NAFTA country, it may be necessary to implement different procedures with respect 

to such service providers. Thus, to the extent that the inspection and licensing requirements for Mexican trucks and drivers wishing to operate in the United States 

may not be ‘‘like’’ those in place in the United States, different methods of ensuring 

compliance with the U.S. regulatory regime may be justifiable. However, if in order 

to satisfy its own legitimate safety concerns the United States decides, exceptionally, to impose requirements on Mexican carriers that differ from those imposed on 

U.S. or Canadian carriers, then any such decision must (a) be made in good faith 

with respect to a legitimate safety concern and (b) implement differing requirements 

that fully conform with all relevant NAFTA provisions.’’

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North American Free Trade Agreement Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to 

Chapter Twenty: In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Secretariat File 

No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01, Final Report of the Panel, Feb 6, 2001, 81–82. 6Translation of ‘‘Official Mexican standard NOM–068–SCT–2–2000, Ground 

Transportation—Federal motor transport service for passengers, tourism, hauling 

and private transportation—Mechanical and safety conditions for operating trucks 

on national roads and bridges,’’ Diario Oficial, July 4, 2000. The preface lists over 

twenty companies and industry alliances. 7 ‘‘Official Mexican Standard MON–068–SCT–2–2000,’’ section 5.2.1.2. 8 ‘‘Official Mexican standard NOM–068–SCT–2–2000,’’ section 5.2.2.1. 9See Robert Collier, ‘‘Mexico’s Trucks on Horizon: Long-distance haulers are headed into U.S. once Bush opens borders,’’ San Francisco Chronicle 3/4/2001 (describing 

a ride-along with a Mexican long-haul trucker; police asked the trucker for bribes 

twice on the 3-day trip). See also ‘‘In Mexico, Graft Infects Every Aspect of Society,’’

Chicago Tribune, 4/15/2001 (describing traffic stops in which motorists pay bribes to 

transit policemen to avoid the long process of being issued a formal ticket, and discussing what the Mexican government is doing to try to stop the graft). 10 ‘‘Official Mexican Standard MON–068–SCT–2–2000,’’ section 5.2.2.2. 11See attachment A: ‘‘Recent Mexican Trucking Rules Do Not Solve Serious Safety Hazards.’’ 12 ‘‘Marquez said federal police appear to have abandoned a program of random 

highway inspections that was inaugurated with much fanfare last fall.’’ Robert Collier, ‘‘Mexico’s Trucks on Horizon: Long-distance haulers are headed into U.S. once 

Bush opens borders,’’ San Francisco Chronicle, 3/4/2001. See also statements made 

at Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee briefing, 11/28/2001. 13 Robert Collier, ‘‘Mexico’s Trucks on Horizon: Long-distance haulers are headed 

into U.S. once Bush opens borders,’’ San Francisco Chronicle, 3/4/2001. 14Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General report MH–2001–

059, ‘‘Interim Report on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade 

Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions,’’ May 8, 2001, at 17. 15 Ibid. 16Statements of Tom Kosloski, 11/28/2000. 17 Robert Collier, ‘‘Mexico’s Trucks on Horizon: Long-distance haulers are headed 

into U.S. once Bush opens borders,’’ San Francisco Chronicle, 3/4/2001. 18 ‘‘The logbook of driver’s hours of service is designed by the company, according 

to its needs.’’ Translation of ‘‘Official Mexican Standard MON–068–SCT–2–2000,’’

Appendix ‘‘A’’, Annex 1. 19 ‘‘FMCSA reports that in FY 2000, 36 percent of the Mexican trucks that were 

inspected were placed out of service. This contrasts with a 24 percent out-of-service 

rate for U.S. trucks nationwide in FY 2000.’’ Department of Transportation Office 

of the Inspector General report MH–2001–059, ‘‘Interim Report on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions,’’ May 8, 2001, at 7. 20 ‘‘Many of Mexico’s 375,000 freight trucks have been in service for 15 to 20 

years, compared with an average of 5 years in the United States. Industry leaders 

say it would cost billions of dollars over the next decade to bring the Mexican fleet 

to U.S. standards, though many defend the safety of their vehicles.’’ ‘‘Mexico Might 

Strike Against the United States,’’ Associated Press, 6/27/2001. 21 Registration for operating within the border zone is granted upon consideration 

of both the application information and the carrier’s inclusion in Mexican databases. 

Registration for operating beyond the border zone is conditional upon the satisfactory completion of a safety review to be conducted within 18 months after the grant 

of registration, including an evaluation of the carrier’s safety record as reflected in 

information from the MCMIS database. 22Office of the Inspector General Audit Report TR–2000–013: ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled 

Motor Carriers.’’ Nov 4, 1999, at 9. 23 Ibid. When the IG attempted to verify certain information about Mexican carriers in DOT records, it found that it could not confirm ownership or even the mailing addresses of some carriers. 24 Ibid. 25Statements of Tom Kosloski, 11/28/2000. 26Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General report MH–2001–

059, ‘‘Interim Report on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade 

Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions,’’ May 8, 2001, at 18. 27Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General report TR–1999–

091, ‘‘Motor Carrier Safety Program,’’ April 26, 1999, 19–24. 28 Id. at 25. 

126

29 ‘‘During FY 1997, 31 percent of the crashes were uploaded more than 180 days 

after the crash date.’’ Id. at 25. 30 Id. at 21. 31 Id. at 25–26. 32 66 Fed. Reg. 22499; ‘‘The FMCSA estimates that nearly 500 CMV-related crashes would be avoided annually as a result of these disqualifications.’’ Department of 

Transportation press release, FMCSA 9–01, May 4, 2001. 33Section 385.23(a)(1): ‘‘Using drivers not possessing, or operating without, a valid 

Licencia Federal de Conductor (LFC) or Commercial Driver’s License (CDL). A nonvalid LFC or CDL includes one that is falsified, revoked, expired, or without a Hazardous Materials endorsement, when required.’’ 66 Fed. Reg. 22415 (May 3, 2001) 

at 22419. 34Section 385.23(a)(6): ‘‘Operating within the United States a motor vehicle that 

is not insured as required by 49 CFR part 387.’’ 35Penalties for U.S. drivers and carriers are more severe: ‘‘The Federal penalty to a driver who violates the CDL requirements is a civil penalty of up to $2,500 or, 

in aggravated cases, criminal penalties of up to $5,000 in fines and/or up to 90 days 

in prison. An employer is also subject to a penalty of up to $10,000, if he or she 

knowingly uses a driver to operate a CMV without a valid CDL.’’ FMCSA website: 

<<http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safetyprogs/cdl.htm>>

The corresponding regulation for insurance of U.S. carriers, 49 CFR 387.17 states: ‘‘Any person (except an employee who acts without knowledge) who knowingly violates the rules of this subpart shall be liable to the United States for civil penalty 

of no more than $10,000 for each violation, and if any such violation is a continuing 

one, each day of violation will constitute a separate offense. The amount of any such 

penalty shall be assessed by the FHWA’s Associate Administrator for the Office of 

Motor Carriers, by written notice. In determining the amount of such penalty, the 

Associate Administrator, or his/her authorized delegate shall take into account the 

nature, circumstances, extent, the gravity of the violation committed and, with respect to the person found to have committed such violation, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to 

do business, and such other matters as justice may require.’’ 36 ‘‘Almost all Mexican long-haul drivers are forced to work dangerously long 

hours.’’ Also, ‘‘Industry analysts say that after the ban is lifted, most of the two nations’ trade will be done by Mexican drivers, who come much cheaper than American truckers because they earn only about one-third the salary and typically drive 

about 20 hours per day.’’ Robert Collier, ‘‘Mexico’s Trucks on Horizon: Long-distance 

haulers are headed into U.S. once Bush opens borders,’’ San Francisco Chronicle 3/

4/2001. 37Office of the Inspector General Audit Report TR–2000–013: ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled 

Motor Carriers.’’ Nov 4, 1999, at 9. 38Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General audit report TR–

2000–013, ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers,’’ Nov 9, 2000, at 10. 39 ‘‘State inspectors in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas did not routinely review 

the certificates of registration because State laws are not compatible with Federal 

requirements regarding operating authority. According to State officials in these 

three border States, legislation has not been initiated to provide for enforcement 

against a motor carrier for operating without a certificate of registration or for operating beyond the authority granted. Consequently, unless the truck happens to be 

selected for a safety inspection by a Federal inspector at the border, the certificate 

of registration will probably not be reviewed.’’ Id. at 16. 40 ‘‘A direct correlation exists between the condition of Mexican commercial trucks 

entering the United States and the level of inspection resources at the border. California has an inspection presence during all operating hours at its two major crossings and inspects each commercial truck that does not have a valid inspection sticker (Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance sticker valid for 3 months). The condition 

of the Mexican commercial trucks entering at the Mexico-California border is much 

better than those entering through all other border States.’’ Id. at 7. 41 ‘‘FMCSA increased the authorized number of inspectors at the southern border 

from 13 in FY 1998 to 60 in FY 2001 and requested 80 additional enforcement personnel in its FY 2002 budget request. . . . Deploying the additional 80 enforcement 

personnel at the border would bring the total number of authorized Federal inspectors there to 140, and be responsive to the recommendation in our 1998 report. If 

these 80 enforcement personnel are not deployed onsite at the border in the near 

term, sufficient inspectors will not be in place at all border crossings during all 

hours of commercial vehicle operations except for California’s two major crossings 

at Calexico and Otay Mesa.’’ (emphasis in original). Department of Transportation 

Office of the Inspector General report MH–2001–059, ‘‘Interim Report on Status of 

127

Implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking 

Provisions,’’ May 8, 2001, at 3. 

Funding for the additional 80 federal inspectors has been struck from the Transportation Spending bill, see note 2. 42 ‘‘As of March 27, 2001, FMCSA filled 10 of the 20 FY 2001 inspector positions, 

resulting in a total of 50 Federal inspectors assigned to the southern border.’’ Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General report MH–2001–059, 

‘‘Interim Report on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions,’’ May 8, 2001, at 9. 43 ‘‘Our 1998 estimate of 126 additional Federal inspectors for the U.S.-Mexico 

border is conservative because it was an estimate for the near term, and did not:

• include the amount of time an inspector would be away from work for training 

and approved absences,

• allow for expanded hours for commercial port operations,

• account for continued commercial traffic growth,

• include providing inspectors to perform only visual inspections of trucks or electronic verification of Commercial Driver’s Licenses (the capability to electronically verify Mexican Commercial Driver’s Licenses is now available to Federal 

inspectors at the U.S.-Mexico border), and

• include inspectors to perform visual inspections of passenger buses and safety 

inspections for commercial bus drivers. Four port cities accounted for 80 percent 

of about 269,000 passenger bus crossings at the U.S.-Mexico border in FY 2000 

(Otay Mesa and San Ysidro, California; and Hidalgo and Laredo, Texas).’’

Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General report MH–2001–

059, ‘‘Interim Report on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade 

Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions,’’ May 8, 2001, at 11. 44 ‘‘In addition to performing safety inspections, an FMCSA official said that the 

resources will be used to perform safety audits of motor carriers as proposed in the 

Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 and also to review applications requesting authority to operate in the United States. The FMCSA official further stated that, ‘as the Agency assesses the volume of applications for operating authority 

and begins to conduct safety reviews of Mexican carriers, flexibility will be required 

to deploy enforcement personnel to perform critical safety oversight tasks,’ ’’ Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General report MH–2001–059, ‘‘Interim Report on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions,’’ May 8, 2001, at 10. 45Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General report MH–2001–

059, ‘‘Interim Report on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade 

Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions,’’ May 8, 2001, at 12. 46 Id. at 14. 47 ‘‘Truck driver threatening to block port again over fines,’’ Associated Press, 4/

11/2001. See also ‘‘U.S. Strangling ‘Cruzadores,’ Truckers say,’’ Hernan Rozemberg, 

The Arizona Republic, 4/22/2001. 48Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General Audit Report TR–

2000–013, ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers,’’ Nov 4, 1999, at iii. 49 Id. at iii. 50 ‘‘After foreign motor carriers go past the border in California, state inspectors 

review certificates of registration during roadside inspections throughout the state. 

We found no evidence to indicate that any other states review certificates of registration during roadside inspections. Consequently, unless the truck happens to be 

selected for a safety inspection by a Federal . . . inspector at the border, the certificate of registration will probably not be reviewed.’’ Office of the Inspector General 

Audit Report TR–2000–013: ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers.’’ Nov 4, 1999, at 10. 51Office of the Inspector General Audit Report TR–2000–013: ‘‘Mexico-Domiciled 

Motor Carriers.’’ Nov 4, 1999, at 11–12. 52 ‘‘The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 providesincreased fines for 

foreign motor carriers operating without authority. The increased fines are not more 

than $10,000 for an intentional operating authority violation and not more than 

$25,000 for a pattern of intentional operating authority violations. FMCSA’s assessed fines have remained constant since 1998, averaging $500 to $1000 for operating authority violations.’’ Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector 

General report MH–2001–059, ‘‘Interim Report on Status of Implementing the 

North American Free Trade Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking Provisions,’’ May 8, 

2001, at 16.

128

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Pantuso. 

STATEMENT OF PETER J. PANTUSO, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

AMERICAN BUS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. PANTUSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the Committee. My name is Peter Pantuso, I am president and CEO of the 

American Bus Association and we appreciate the opportunity to 

testify before your Committee today. 

ABA is the trade organization of the intercity bus industry in the 

United States and Canada. Our members carry people, the most 

precious and important cargo. We do not carry melons, we do not 

carry freight. Our members represent nearly two-thirds of all motor 

coaches on the road today. In the United States, they transport 

more than 774 million passengers annually. That is 200 million 

more than the airlines and it is more than double the number of 

passengers Amtrak and commuter rail together move. We serve 

4,000 communities across the United States and we log more than 

2.6 billion miles annually. 

Intercity buses are the safest mode of commercial passenger 

transportation. ABA does support the timely, safe, and reciprocal 

provisions of NAFTA. For buses, NAFTA currently provides 

changes in access by lifting cross border restrictions on charter and 

tour buses, a provision that has already been implemented, and 

must yet implement reciprocal lifting of restrictions on regular 

route carriers. 

We are very concerned by gaps in recent DOT safety proposals, 

and of primary concern is a loophole of enforcement and oversight 

for United States domestic subsidiaries of Mexican carriers. I led 

an ABA delegation to Mexico City last month to learn more about 

the Mexican bus industry and about NAFTA, and I must say that 

we were very impressed with what we saw. The Mexican people 

have realized that bus service is an affordable and a common sense 

method of transportation. Buses connect the most rural towns with 

Mexico City, or with even the smallest villages in Mexico. Future 

partnerships make sense between United States carriers and Mexican bus companies, whereby their relative strengths and their market advantage can be combined to form strategic alliances and 

allow for growth in expanded service. 

However, there are important differences between the United 

States and Mexican motorcoach industry. Ninety-two percent of 

intercity trips are by bus in Mexico, with three billion passenger 

trips taken annually. That is versus the 774 million passenger trips 

in the United States. Small fleets are very common among United 

States bus operators, compared to very large fleets in Mexico. And 

perhaps the most significant differences are in vehicle safety standards. 

Cross border service in the United States works well along our 

northern border with Canada because Canada has adopted very 

similar, almost identical safety regulations for buses. But the rules 

between United States and Mexico are not identical. On our trip, 

ABA also visited Veteran’s Bridge, one of four border crossing 

points in Brownsville, Texas. Over 350 buses cross that bridge 

every single week. Customs and INS inspects all of the buses daily 

for contraband and for passenger documentation. DOT inspects 

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trucks daily at that border crossing point, but inspects buses only 

1 day every month. This greatly concerns us and it must change. 

Authorities must be always mindful always that buses carry passengers, and not freight. We are not saying that buses in Mexico 

are inherently unsafe. In fact, Mexican buses are made by Dina, 

Volvo and Mercedes. These are companies which also manufacture 

buses for the U.S. market. But the buses they manufacture for the 

U.S. market are built to U.S. Federal Motor Vehical Safety Standards. In Mexico, these standards do not apply. 

Frequent border inspections will ensure the consistent application of U.S. standards. We urge DOT to create a specific plan to 

ensure motorcoach and passenger safety prior to finalizing their 

proposal. That plan should address some specific issues, including 

the creation of an effective mechanism for preventing entry by 

Mexican manufactured buses that do not comply with United 

States safety standards. It should include enforcement of rules relating to Mexican drivers providing passenger service in the United 

States and finally, it should include a clarification that the proposed rules apply both to motorcoaches and to commercial passenger vans engaged in intercity service. 

Market equity with Mexican bus operations is also very important to our industry. Mexico will grant cross border authority for 

United States carriers to serve only one point in Mexico. It will not 

allow United States bus carriers to own or operate bus terminals 

in Mexico. And, it will not authorize those carriers to provide package service in Mexico. DOT proposals contain no such limitations 

on Mexican bus companies, and these differences could cripple the 

United States bus industry. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we would like to say that NAFTA, 

we believe, can be implemented fairly and safely and in a way that 

provides opportunities for bus operators, and the customers we 

serve throughout North America. However, we do urge Congress 

and this Administration to work together with the Mexican Government to ensure that the highest level of safety exists for the 

traveling public. With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Committee today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pantuso follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER J. PANTUSO, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

AMERICAN BUS ASSOCIATION

Introduction 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is Peter 

J. Pantuso and I am President and CEO of the American Bus Association. Thank 

you for the opportunity to testify on the impact of the North American Free Trade 

Agreement on motorcoach transportation. 

ABA is the trade organization of the intercity bus industry with more than 3,400 

member motorcoach operator, tour and travel organizations and suppliers to the industry in the United States and Canada. We are currently celebrating our 75th year 

of service to the industry. Buses in the United States transport over 774 million 

passengers annually—over 200 million more than airlines and more than double 

Amtrak and commuter rail. We serve more than 4,000 communities and log more 

than 2.6 billion miles annually. 

We are the safest mode of commercial passenger transportation with the lowest 

fatality rate per 100 million passenger miles traveled. According to the National 

Safety Council’s Injury Facts reporting on a period from 1995—1997, U.S. motorcoach travel averaged .01 passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger miles compared to .04 passenger fatalities for both rail and air travel for the same period and 

130

the same number of passenger miles. The industry strongly believes that even a single fatality is one too many and we continue to look for ways to further improve 

safety. Motorcoach operators and manufacturers themselves accomplished this safety record in large part through their own efforts to promote the highest standards 

of safe design and operation and vigilant compliance to stringent safety regulation. 

NAFTA and Motorcoach Operations 

I am here today to make you aware of motorcoach issues related to the implementation of motor carrier provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or 

NAFTA. Although most commentary focuses on trucks, the fact is that there are 

unique and important bus issues that must be addressed. 

ABA supports timely, safe and reciprocal implementation of NAFTA. However, we 

are concerned that the NAFTA implementation rules recentlyproposed by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration of the Department of Transportation do 

not ensure reciprocity or safety in bus operations. Those proposals could open up 

U.S. markets to Mexican bus companies without limitation, notwithstanding the 

Mexican government’s stated intent to limit U.S. bus companies’ ability to own and 

operate Mexican terminals; to provide crossborder service to multiple points in Mexico and to carry incidental package express. Bus service is not viable with these limitations. 

We are equally concerned by the gaps in the safety proposals. Unlike trucks, 

NAFTA authorizes Mexican motorcoach companies to set up U.S. subsidiaries to 

provide domestic U.S. bus service. DOT recognized that special procedures must be 

in place to ensure the safety of Mexican bus and truck operations, but without explanation, declined to apply those procedures to subsidiaries of Mexican motorcoach 

companies providing domestic U.S. service. Furthermore, there is little indication of 

a DOT program to ensure the safety of Mexican buses and bus operations. Indeed, 

existing border scrutiny of motorcoaches is sadly lacking. 

The NAFTA surface transportation provisions are designed to eliminate restrictions in all three NAFTA countries that limit access for and investment in transportation companies. For buses, changes in access refer to lifting of crossborder restrictions on charter and tour buses, a provision that has already been implemented, and 

a reciprocal lifting of restrictions on regular route carriers which has yet to be implemented. In terms of new investment opportunities under NAFTA, the U.S. is to 

allow 100 percent investment in bus companies owned by Mexicans while Mexico 

is to allow 51 percent U.S. ownership of Mexican companies this year and 100 percent in January, 2004. Again, it is important to emphasize that unlike Mexicanowned U.S. trucking companies, which are limited to carrying international cargo, 

Mexican-owned U.S. bus companies will be allowed to provide both domestic and 

international service in the U.S. 

The Mexican Bus Industry 

An ABA delegation of members and staff visited Mexico last month in order to 

gain a better understanding of the opportunities and challenges facing our members 

under NAFTA. I must say, frankly, that we were impressed with what we saw. Perhaps most extraordinary was the information provided by the Mexican Bus Association, CANAPAT, that passengers in Mexico took more than 3 billion bus trips last 

year alone. Over 92 percent of the Mexican population rides the bus for intercity 

trips at least once per year. A number of companies operate more than 4,000 

motorcoaches. This is no small business in Mexico. 

We were impressed with the facilities we visited in Mexico City. Mexican bus companies operate out of centralized bus terminals that compare favorably to many airports in the U.S. with comfortable waiting areas, well-established gates, electronic 

ticketing, pre-boarding security procedures, shopping, and friendly, convenient and 

abundant service. Again, this is a significant industry. Clearly people in Mexico 

have realized that bus service is an affordable and common-sense alternative when 

road congestion and environmental concerns are at issue. Bus service connects the 

most rural towns with Mexico City and other metropolitan areas and with other villages. 

Several things were made clear to us during that trip. Mexico represents a large 

market of people that rely heavily on bus service. Mexican bus companies pay lower 

wages to their workers than U.S. bus companies but have considerably less access 

to capital than their neighbors to the north. Partnerships make sense between U.S. 

and Mexican bus companies given these conditions as a backdrop and some of these 

partnerships are already in place. 

However, I must emphasize that we also learned that there are important differences between the U.S. motorcoach industry and the Mexican motorcoach industry. First, the magnitude of the difference in size of both the industry as a whole 

131

and the individual companies within the industry—3 billion passenger trips by bus 

annually in Mexico versus 774 million in the U.S.; small fleets in the U.S. compared 

to large fleets in Mexico. And, perhaps most significantly, differences in vehicle safety standards and the way in which industry is regulated. For all these reasons, we 

must be able to rely on strong enforcement in the United States to ensure safe highways and to ensure a level playing field for U.S. operators. 

We will work with the Mexican bus association in the months ahead to insure 

that they better understand the rules they must abide by in the U.S. in order to 

operate safely on our roads. We expect to learn from them, as well, regarding the 

rules of the road in Mexico. The reason that crossborder bus service works well 

along our northern border with Canada is because, to a large extent, Canada has 

adopted almost identical regulations for drivers, vehicles, hours of service and various other safety provisions. 

The rules between the U.S. and Mexico, however, are not identical. So, for now, 

while we are in Mexico, we will operate under their rules and when they are in the 

U.S., they will be expected to operate under U.S. rules. Eventually, given the proper 

authority and necessary resources, the NAFTA Land Transport Standards Subcommittee (a NAFTA working group including government regulators from all three 

NAFTA countries), working with groups like ABA and the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, should be able to bring those rules into closer alignment to the benefit 

of us all. But in the meantime, it is of utmost importance that enforcement officials 

are vigilant in their efforts to ensure that all motorcoach companies operating on 

U.S. roads comply with U.S. highway safety rules. 

Enforcement of Motorcoach Safety 

Following our visit to Mexico City, our group traveled to the U.S.-Mexico border 

to see the Veteran’s Bridge (one of four border crossing bridges in Brownsville) to 

meet with U.S. Customs officials. Over 350 buses cross that border point every week 

over the Veterans Bridge. Customs inspects all of those buses for drugs or other 

forms of contraband and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reviews 

passenger documentation. However, we were told that although the U.S. Department of Transportation inspectors inspects trucks daily, they only inspect buses one 

day per month. That means that, on that one bridge alone, more than 1,300 of the 

over 1,400 buses crossing monthly go uninspected by DOT. This concerns us greatly. 

It seems that somewhere during the highly-charged debate on NAFTA and trucking, the authorities forgot that buses carry passengers—not freight—across the border. It seems to us that we have a much greater stake in fair and effective enforcement than has been reflected in the dialog to date. The current practices need to 

change to assure passenger safety and the safety of the traveling public on the 

roads. 

We are not suggesting that Mexican buses are unsafe, they are made by Dina, 

Volvo and Mercedes—all of whom supply the U.S. market. We are only suggesting 

that frequent inspections will assure compliance with U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standards (FMVSS) and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation (FMCSR) 

requirements and keep safety the number one priority. 

ABA has several specific concerns relating to the safety regulatory framework recently proposed by DOT relating to full implementation of NAFTA crossborder access rules. The proposals fail to take into account that, unlike for trucks, the 

NAFTA bus provisions allow for domestic operations by Mexican-owned bus operations 

In the recent rulemaking proposal, DOT proposes to establish a system of special 

application procedures and oversight for Mexican companies providing crossborder 

services. But they specifically exempt from those procedures and that oversight 

Mexican passenger carriers that establish U.S. subsidiaries to provide domestic 

service in the U.S. This creates a giant loophole—Mexican companies operating in 

crossborder service are subject to the special application procedures and oversight 

while Mexican companies operating domestically are not. 

We urge DOT to modify its proposal to apply its proposed special safety procedures for crossborder carriers to Mexican owned, U.S.-based companies applying to 

provide domestic U.S. bus service. 

We also urge DOT to create a specific plan to ensure the safety of Mexican passenger motor carriers prior to finalizing their proposed rules and include the details 

of that plan in its decision promulgating the final rules. 

The plan should address specific issues such as:

• Creation of an effective mechanism for preventing Mexican-manufactured buses 

that do no comply with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards or the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations from entering the United States.

132

• Enforcement of rules relating to Mexican drivers providing passenger service in 

the U.S. The law requires that only U.S. citizens or resident aliens can provide 

domestic passenger service in the U.S. We believe that Mexican officials incorrectly interpret NAFTA as overturning this U.S. immigration law. DOT should 

work with INS to develop mechanisms to effectively enforce the immigration 

laws.

• DOT should also make clear that the proposed rules apply to both buses and 

commercial passenger vans carrying nine or more people in intercity service, including the driver. The department is expected to publish a final rule soon related to these ‘‘camioneta’’ operations that would increase these operators’ safety compliance responsibilities—this should not fall through the cracks as the 

Department plans for the border opening. 

Reciprocity with Mexican Bus Companies 

We also have a number of concerns in relation to market equity with Mexican bus 

operators. NAFTA requires that the implementation of the crossborder transportation provisions be executed in a reciprocal manner with both countries providing 

the same treatment to citizens of the other country. However, there are several 

ways in which Mexico appears to be taking positions contrary to that mandate. 

Mexico has taken the position that it will grant cross-border service authority for 

U.S. carriers to serve only one point in Mexico; it will not allow U.S. carriers to own 

or operate bus terminals in Mexico; and it will not authorize those carriers to provide incidental package express service as part of its crossborder trips. DOT’s proposals contain no such limitations. Mexican companies would be free to serve multiple U.S. points; could own and operate bus terminals wherever they like; and 

would be able to carry incidental package express on any of their schedules. 

If DOT implements its crossborder service proposals without ensuring reciprocal 

treatment of U.S. companies in Mexico, it could devastate the U.S. bus industry, 

which is much smaller than the Mexican bus industry. We urge DOT to engage in 

discussions with its counterpart in Mexico to determine what the terms and conditions of crossborder authority should be. Whatever terms and conditions are mutually agreed upon during those discussions should be implemented in the final rules. 

Conclusion 

We believe that NAFTA can be implemented fairly, safely and in a way that provides opportunities for bus operators and the customers we serve throughout North 

America. However, in order for this opportunity to be recognized, we are urging 

Congress and the Administration to work together with the Mexican government to 

ensure that the requests we have made which, we believe, will ensure the highest 

level of safety for the traveling public, are implemented with all due haste. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. We thank you, sir. Mr. Acklie. 

STATEMENT OF DUANE W. ACKLIE, CHAIRMAN,

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS 

Mr. ACKLIE. Mr. Chairman, Committee members, my name is 

Duane Acklie. I am Chairman of the American Trucking Associations or ATA, the national trade association of the trucking industry. Through our affiliated trucking associations, we have over 

30,000 motor carrier members throughout the United States. I am 

also Chairman of Crete Carrier Corporation, a rather small trucking company based in Lincoln, Nebraska but serving customers in 

Canada, Mexico and the United States. 

ATA supports the North American Free Trade Agreement, because it means increasing business for trucking companies and 

more jobs. According to the numbers of the United States Department of Commerce since NAFTA was implemented, trade between 

the United States and Mexico has more than tripled from 81 billion 

in 1993 to 246 billion in 2000. When measured by value, trucks 

move over 80 percent of the U.S.–Mexico trade and move 70 percent of the U.S.–Canada trade. In 1994, when NAFTA was impleVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
133

mented, there were about two and a half million truck crossings in 

the United States–Mexico border. In the year 2000, nearly five million truck crossings took place at the southern border. 

With that background, let me say that ATA has a stakeholder 

position based upon the growing volumes between United States 

and Mexico. ATA members have worked hard to improve safety on 

our highways, which can be seen in the reduced rates of truck accidents each year over the past 3 years. As truckers, we cannot afford to have our record blemished by unsafe trucks from either the 

United States, Canada, or Mexico. 

ATA supports the proposed process in which applications from 

Mexican carriers to get United States operating authority will be 

reviewed under the proposed Federal motor carrier safety rules on 

a case-to-case basis. 

The information being requested from the Mexican carrier goes 

beyond what is required from the new United States and Canadian 

carriers seeking United States operating authority. Let me also 

point out that when we started cross border with Canada, that 

they had no safety database, which they do today. They had no 

safety rating system, which they do today. And they had no alcohol 

and drug testing. In Canada, they still do not have, and it is prohibited, as I understand, by their constitution, a random testing on 

drugs and alcohol. But they must comply with all rules and regulations that we have in the United States. 

So what we are looking at here today implementing is not all 

that different than what was implemented in Canada. In order to 

get a better understanding of why NAFTA is good for trucking, it 

is important to look at a snapshot of trucking at the border today. 

Today cross border freight is handed off on the United States side 

of the border at one of the 27 truck border crossings, but predominantly in the commercial zones of California and Texas. 

Through interlying partnership, freight is handled on the United 

States side by the United States carrier and on the Mexican side 

by the Mexican carrier with a middleman or a cartage hauler in 

between, ferrying loads back and forth across the border to warehouses or freight yards to pick up and subsequent final delivery. 

Now, my own opinion is that there is so much congestion at the 

moment and, at the border, that the reason we are seeing the older 

trucks from Mexico doing a cartage is simply because there is really very little utilization because a lot of it is tied up. I don’t think 

the long haul Mexican carrier at the moment or the United States 

carrier is that interested in having their trucks tied up the border. 

That is why they—older trucks—are being used. I think there will 

be a different standard and different kind of truck once NAFTA is 

truly implemented. 

In other words, one shipment from the United States and Mexico 

today generally requires three drivers, the United States carrier, 

the border carrier, or the, as I would call, the cartage carrier and 

the long haul or Mexican carrier. It takes three different pieces of 

equipment to move. Opening the border will allow a free interchange between the responsible United States carrier and the responsible Mexican carrier or allow the United States carrier to go 

into Mexico and the Mexican carrier to go into the United States 

134

Our company, for example, being a smaller company, will continue interchange at the border with a very limited number of carriers we now use. We use responsible Mexican carriers. We have 

not had a problem in hijacking. We have not had a problem in theft 

or damage. All of our trailers go into Mexico, but our tractors stop 

at the border. 

NAFTA’s trucking provisions require all foreign carriers in the 

United States to abide by all United States standards. What’s that 

mean? We had some talk here today about there wasn’t going to 

be any laws. To be able to come into the United States, a Mexican 

carrier is going to have a week’s logs when they arrive there or 

they do not get in. They are going to have to have a week’s logs. 

We are going to have to do everything to check them in the very 

same manner as we check U.S. carriers. 

NAFTA’s trucking provisions require all foreign carriers operating in the United States to abide by U.S. standards and regulations, including the ability to speak and read the English language. 

ATA supports that position 100 percent. We believe in safety. We 

believe that the Mexican carriers should have to do the very same 

thing as all U.S. carriers. 

In the opinion of ATA and its members, we believe that California has demonstrated the strong enforcement and proper inspection at the border works. The fact is that every trucking company 

and every driver entering the United States will be required to 

meet each and every safety requirement after undergoing a comprehensive review through the proposed Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration application process to comply with United 

States safety standards. 

One of the things I have not heard here today is any discussion 

about insurance. Before a Mexican carrier or United States carrier 

can get liability and cargo insurance, the insurance company goes 

out and does a thorough inspection, when we have renewals each 

year. They come in. They look at our hiring procedures. They check 

our hiring records. They check our out-of-service rate. They do everything to decide whether or not they are going to insure. I will 

say to you that each Mexican carrier will have to obtain that insurance, and they will have a further safety check by the United 

States insurance carrier that is issuing the insurance. 

Such a review would include capturing information regarding 

hiring and training practices, maintenance practices and overall 

safety management. Thus the Mexican trucking companies will undergo not only a thorough application by the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration but also a far more thorough review by potential insurance carriers. 

As a practical matter now, I believe it is going to be a number 

of years before we see any substantial number of Mexican trucks 

operating on the United States highways. The larger carriers will 

use a driver to take that tractor and trailer to the Mexican border 

and the Mexican trucker will take the same tractor and trailer and 

proceed on to the destination. In other words, they will interchange 

drivers rather than equipment at the border. 

With carriers, like our company, that are smaller, we will merely 

exchange the trailer at the border with the responsible carrier and 

135

1Source: International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce 

eliminate that cartage company that runs that old dilapidated 

piece of equipment. 

In conclusion, ATA strongly believes that motor carriers operating in the United States, no matter what nationality, must abide 

by United States safety standards. However, ATA is concerned that 

the discussion of our Mexican counterparts are based more on an 

incomplete understanding of motor safety and prejudice toward the 

Mexican carriers instead of being based on hard facts that relate 

to safety. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you members of the 

Committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Acklie follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DUANE W. ACKLIE, CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS

The American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA), with offices located at 2200 Mill 

Road, Alexandria, Virginia 22314–4677, is the national trade association of the 

trucking industry. Through our affiliated trucking associations, and their over 

30,000 motor carrier members, affiliated conferences, and other organizations, ATA 

represents every type and class of motor carrier in the country. 

ATA has long viewed free trade as an important tool in improving our country’s economic growth. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 

implemented, trade between the United States and Mexico has more than tripled 

from $81 billion in 1993 to $246 billion in 2000.1

The trucking industry plays a critical role in the success of NAFTA. Trucks transport over 80 percent of the value of U.S.-Mexico trade, and over 70 percent for U.S.-

Canada trade. Trucking companies have benefited from the growing trade volumes 

among the NAFTA partners, considering that higher trade flows have resulted in 

more business for motor carriers in all three nations. Implementing NAFTA’s trucking provisions will allow motor carriers to better meet the transportation demands 

of our growing trade flows, doing so in an efficient, effective, and safe manner. 

NAFTA and Trucking. The trucking industry has long supported NAFTA. 

Therefore, ATA firmly opposed the delay by the U.S. Government in implementing 

the essential cross-border trucking provisions of NAFTA. The delay has arbitrarily 

denied Canada, Mexico and the United States the full benefits of this important 

trade agreement, negatively impacting U.S. shippers and carriers engaged in 

NAFTA trade. 

Under NAFTA, beginning on December 18, 1995, U.S. and Mexican carriers were 

to have been allowed to pick up and deliver international freight into each other’s states contiguous to the U.S.-Mexico border. By January 1, 2000, access would expand to all states on either side of the border. NAFTA’s trucking provisions would 

enhance the competitiveness of U.S. goods in the Mexican market by providing U.S. 

exporters and importers an efficient cross-border trucking operation. 

When then Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña announced that the 

implementation of NAFTA’s motor carrier provisions were being postponed, he cited 

safety and security concerns regarding Mexican trucks operating in the United 

States as the reason for the delay. However, it is important to remember that 

NAFTA’s trucking provisions require all foreign carriers operating in the United 

States to abide by U.S. standards and regulations, so only Mexican carriers who applied and then met U.S. standards would be given U.S. operating authority. ATA 

fully supports rigorous enforcement of all U.S. standards for all carriers operating 

in this country, U.S. and foreign. The current freeze on NAFTA, however, imposes 

a presumption of guilt based upon national origin: no matter how safe the Mexican 

trucking company, it cannot get permission to leave the border zone. 

The trucking provisions of NAFTA also allowed U.S. and Canadian carriers to improve their ability to invest in the Mexican market. Starting on December 18, 1995, 

U.S. and Canadian investors have been permitted to invest in up to 49 percent ownership of Mexican trucking companies or terminals providing exclusively international freight services. On January 1, 2001, the investment ceiling increased to 

51 percent, and, on January 1, 2004, the rights expand to 100 percent. In the 

United States, starting on December 18, 1995, Mexican investors were to be allowed 

to invest up to 100 percent in a U.S. trucking company providing international 

freight services. This commitment had also remained unfulfilled until President 

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2 International Association of Chiefs of Police; Estimates of Commercial Motor Vehicles Using 

the Southwest Border Crossings, Economic Data Resources, Bethesda, Md, September 20, 2000, 

appendix A 

Bush lifted the moratorium on investment by Mexican nationals on June 6 of this 

year. 

Because the NAFTA trucking provisions have been delayed, trucking companies 

that have invested in equipment to provide a first rate freight service throughout 

North America, are left to operate in an outmoded and ineffective freight transfer 

system at the U.S.-Mexico border. A shipment traveling from the United States to 

Mexico, or vice-versa, requires no less than three drivers and three tractors to perform a single international freight movement. Through interline partnerships, 

freight is handled on the U.S. side by a U.S. carrier and on the Mexican side by 

a Mexican carrier, with a ‘‘drayage’’ hauler in the middle. The drayage truck ferries 

loads back and forth across the border to warehouses or freight yards for pickup or 

subsequent final delivery. 

Congestion is compounded because trailers come back empty after delivering their 

freight across the border and because drayage ‘‘bobtails’’ (tractors without trailers) 

deliver a trailer only one-way across the border and return solo. In addition to requiring two long-haul carriers, one on either side of the border, and a drayage carrier to haul the shipment across the border, the process includes freight forwarders, 

customs brokers, as well as the official processing handled by government inspectors 

and enforcement officials. This process results in extra trucks on the road, congestion, delays and ‘‘over handling’’ of shipments that invariably leads to increased 

costs, and lost and damaged freight. 

Furthermore, the existing border infrastructure and human resources are seriously overburdened by the increased congestion generated by the growth in trade 

flows and the present outmoded cross-border trucking scheme. If, as anticipated, 

trade flows between Mexico and the United States continue to grow, the border facilities and personnel will only be further strained. To illustrate, according to a 

study by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), from 1994 to 1999, 

northbound truck crossings increased from 2.7 million to over 4.5 million. It is important to remind this Committee that these numbers reflect truck crossings and 

not the actual number of trucks crossing. According to the IACP, about 80,000 

trucks accounted for the 4.5 million truck crossings.2

Drayage vs. Long-haul. The trucks presently crossing the border into the 

United States are drayage trucks. It is these drayage trucks that are being inspected when crossing the border into the United States and that have a high out 

of service rate as detailed in the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General’s report (IG report) published in December 1998. (Report # TR–1999–034) 

However, the very same situation that occurs with drayage operations on the 

U.S.-Mexico occurs, regrettably, each day at intermodal terminals in the United 

States. For example, in Kansas City, Missouri, in the heart of America, drayage 

trucks perform transfer movements at the second busiest intermodal rail facility in 

the nation. According to the Kansas City Police Department, the out of service rate 

in Kansas City for drayage trucks is 45 -50 percent, about the same as drayage operations at the port of entry in Laredo, Texas. 

Drayage operations use older equipment because they are simply performing short 

transfers of freight from one side of the border to the other side, or from one end 

of the intermodal facility to the other end. Motor carriers, either on the U.S.-Mexico 

border, or in Kansas City, Missouri, do not invest $100,000.00 in equipment to perform short drayage operations. They simply cannot afford to do so. Motor carriers 

that buy new and expensive equipment do so for long-haul movements. Therefore, 

the trucks crossing the border today are not the same Mexican trucks that would 

operate in the United States once NAFTA’s trucking provisions are implemented. 

The IG report states that of the Mexican trucks crossing the border, an inordinate 

percentage of them, 44 percent, are put out of service, compared to 25 percent for 

the U.S. and 17 percent for Canada. It is critical to note that these are not random 

inspections, but targeted inspections by trained inspectors who know what they are 

looking for. The report recognizes that this population of drayage trucks may not 

be ‘‘statistically representative of the universe of Mexican trucks that are non-compliant.’’ Furthermore, the study also raises that ‘‘once the border is open to longhaul traffic, the number and percentage of safety compliant Mexican trucks will dramatically increase because long haul trucks will be different from, and in better condition, than the shorter haul trucks’’ used for drayage in the commercial zones. 

137

3 Interim Rerport on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Cross 

Border Trucking Provisions, U.S. DOT Inspector General Report # MH–2001–059, May 8, 2001, 

pg. 7

It is important to note, however, that in a subsequent study of U.S.-Mexico crossborder trucking operations, the IG reported that the out of service rate for Mexican 

trucks entering the U.S. dropped from 44 percent in 1998 to 36 percent in 2000.3

In addition, the IG report stated that there is a strong correlation between the 

quality level of inspection procedures and facilities, and the out-of-service rate of 

Mexican trucks crossing the border into the U.S. In California, the out of service 

rate of Mexican trucks is 28 percent (nearly the same as the U.S. rate), compared 

to Texas at 50 percent. These out of service rates also changed in the 2001 IG report, with California down to 26 percent and Texas at 40 percent. According to both 

IG reports, the more rigorous inspection procedures in California encourage Mexican 

truckers to make sure their equipment is up to U.S. standards. The reports also 

stated that there is a need for increased funding to hire additional inspectors and 

to build adequate border inspection facilities. ATA agrees with this assessment, and 

therefore believes it is critical that the resources requested by the President for FY 

2002 to hire more inspectors and to build inspection facilities be fully funded. 

The IG report concluded that too few trucks ‘‘are being inspected at the U.S.-Mexico border, and that too few inspected trucks comply with U.S. standards.’’ Considering that the present trucks are the pre-NAFTA drayage trucks, this is no surprise. 

Once NAFTA’s trucking provisions are implemented, safety and congestion will be 

improved at the border by reducing the dependency on drayage operators to transfer 

trailers across the border, and therefore reducing the number of empty trailers and 

bobtail tractors operating at the border. 

Motor Carrier Safety Encompasses More Than Equipment Condition. ATA 

believes it is important for the Committee and the public to recognize that motor 

carrier safety is a much broader issue than just the condition of the truck that is 

being operated on the highway. In fact, a more important component of truck safety 

is the licensing and qualification of the driver operating the truck. This statement 

is supported by the fact that general vehicle crash causation studies consistently indicate that approximately 90 percent of vehicle crashes are caused by actions or 

mistakes on the part of the driver. This is true whether the issue is passenger car 

crashes, or truck-involved crashes. Conversely, only a very small percentage of vehicle crashes are caused by defects in the vehicle being operated. Given these facts, 

it is curious why so much attention in the Mexican truck safety debate has been 

placed on the out-of-service rates of Mexican trucks. 

In ATA’s view, the overall safety of the Mexican trucking industry has been inappropriately labeled as less than satisfactory based primarily on the condition of 

Mexican drayage trucks operating in the U.S. commercial zones. This is unfortunate, and it seems unwise from a motor carrier safety and a general highway safety 

perspective, to put so much emphasis on the equipment and pay so little attention 

to what systems are in place regarding the driver. 

The Committee should be aware that the Mexican federal government has had an 

effective commercial driver licensing program in place for years. In fact, in 1991 the 

standards and procedures for issuing a Mexican Licencia de Federal were recognized 

by the U.S. Department of Transportation as equivalent to their own Commercial 

Driver’s License (CDL) standards and procedures. The reciprocity agreement recognizing this fact was signed by both countries in 1991, despite the fact that the CDL 

program in the U.S. was not fully operational until a year later. 

Additionally in 1991, the U.S. Department of Transportation recognized the Mexican government’s medical requirements for truck drivers as equivalent to those in 

place in the U.S. A reciprocity agreement is in place between both countries on this 

important driver-related issue as well. The Mexican government has also had in 

place since 1993 hours of service and logbook regulations for truck drivers hauling 

hazardous materials. These requirements were recently extended to all Mexican 

truck drivers. 

It is true that the Mexican regulatory regime is not identical to that which is in 

place in the U.S. However, the same statement can be made for the regulatory system in place in Canada. The fact is that every truck and truck driver from Mexico 

that will operate in the U.S. must abide by all U.S. safety requirements when operating in this country. The U.S. Department of Transportation should be allowed to 

assess during the application process a Mexican trucking company’s ability to meet 

the standards, and those carriers and drivers that can pass the test, should be allowed to operate in the U.S. 

Language requirements. NAFTA’s Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee (LTSS) has determined that there are minimal differences among the 

138

three NAFTA member countries, which do not affect the safety of cross-border 

trucking services. 

Foreign drivers, be they from Mexico, French-speaking Quebec, Poland or Russia, 

are required to have sufficient ability to understand road signs and to have basic 

proficiency levels to communicate in English when driving in the U.S. The Code of 

Federal Regulations, CFR 49, Section 391.11 (b)(2) states that a person is qualified 

to drive a commercial vehicle if he/she ‘‘can read and speak the English language 

sufficiently to converse with the general public, to understand highway traffic signs 

and signals in the English language, to respond to official inquiries, and to make 

entries on reports and records.’’ It is important to note that the ability to fluently speak the language of the host 

country in which a truck driver is operating does not represent an essential safety 

concern. Proof of this is the European Union where truck drivers from member 

countries operate freely throughout the region. 

Labor requirements. Mexican drivers entering the U.S. for the purpose of delivering and picking up international cargo are considered as temporary business visitors, and therefore not subject to U.S. domestic labor laws. This definition is included in the NAFTA text in Chapter XVI, Annex 1603, Section A, Business Visitors, 1, which states: ‘‘Transportation operators transporting goods or passengers to 

the territory of a Party from the territory of another Party, or loading and transporting goods or passengers from a territory of a Party, with no unloading in that 

territory, to the territory of another Party.’’ Since a Mexican driver receives compensation in Mexico, and has an employment 

relationship with a Mexican-based company, the driver is covered by Mexico’s labor 

laws, not U.S. labor laws. These are the same requirements that cover Canadian 

drivers driving in the United States. 

Recent developments. ATA strongly supported the final finding released on 

February 6, 2001 by the NAFTA Arbitration Panel. The panel ruled that the U.S. 

had not met its commitments as established under NAFTA, and therefore should 

begin processing the applications of Mexican carriers. The arbitration panel also 

ruled that:

‘‘The United States may not be required to treat applications from Mexican 

trucking firms in exactly the same manner as applications from U.S. or Canadian firms, as long as they are reviewed on a case by case basis. (Emphasis added) U.S. authorities are responsible for the safe operation of trucks within 

U.S. territory, whether ownership is U.S., Canadian or Mexican . . . Thus, to 

the extent that the inspection and licensing requirements for Mexican trucks and 

drivers wishing to operate in the United States may not be ‘‘like’’ those in place 

in the United States, different methods of ensuring compliance with the U.S. regulatory regime may be justifiable. However, if in order to satisfy its own legitimate safety concerns the United States decides, exceptionally, to impose requirements on Mexican carriers that differ from those imposed on U.S. or Canadian 

carriers, then any such decision must (a) be made in good faith with respect to a legitimate safety concern and (b) implement differing requirements that fully conform with all relevant NAFTA provisions.’’

(Emphasis added)

Following the guidance of the Arbitration Panel, on May 3, 2001, FMCSA published three notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register. These 

proposed rules relate to the process by which Mexican motor carriers will have to 

complete to obtain U.S. operating authority. The three proposed rules are as follow:

• Revision of regulations and a new application form to be filled by Mexican 

motor carriers that intend to operate in U.S. commercial zones contiguous to the 

U.S.-Mexico border (Form OP–2);

• A new application form for Mexican motor carriers that intend to operate in 

U.S. territory beyond the commercial zones (Form OP–1(MX); and,

• A new safety audit review mandated by the 1999 Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act (MCSIA), which would be required of all new motor carriers recently 

granted operating authority by the U.S. Department of Transportation within 

an eighteen month period.

In its comments to FMCSA in relation to the proposed rules, ATA recognized the 

Arbitration Panel’s objective stated above granting the U.S. government the ability 

to request information from Mexican motor carriers above and beyond what is requested from new U.S. or Canadian carriers. Although the proposed rules do raise 

questions about violating the ‘‘national treatment’’ and ‘‘most favored nation’’

clauses established under NAFTA, ATA expects FMCSA’s final rules to still require 

139

Mexican carriers to provide far more information on their ability to meet U.S. safety 

standards than carriers from the United States or Canada. Any concerns over safety 

of these carriers from Mexico and their trucks and drivers can and will be addressed 

in the rules for implementing the NAFTA agreement. The bottom line is that every 

trucking company, every truck and every driver entering the United States will be 

required to meet each and every U.S. safety requirement only after undergoing a comprehensive review through the proposed FMCSA applications, of their ability to meet 

those standards.

Conclusion. ATA continues to encourage the United States and Mexico to agree 

on comprehensive safety standards through the work of the LTSS, establish and test 

effective enforcement programs, and staff border facilities with full time inspectors 

as they move forward in implementing NAFTA’s trucking provisions. In 1999, ATA 

worked aggressively to include language in the legislation that created the FMCSA 

requiring that all trucks entering the U.S. from Mexico under NAFTA must meet 

U.S. truck safety standards. 

ATA strongly believes that motor carriers operating in the United States, no matter what their nationality, must abide by U.S. safety standards. However, ATA is 

concerned that attacks on our Mexican counterparts are more based on an incomplete understanding of motor carrier safety and prejudice towards Mexican carriers, 

instead of being based on hard facts related to safety. 

The U.S. trucking industry, shippers and the American consumers that we serve 

have already seen considerable benefits from NAFTA, i.e. job creation, opening of 

new markets for U.S. goods and services, business expansion opportunities, reduction in tariffs, and increased production efficiencies. Although NAFTA has proven 

beneficial to U.S. industries and consumers, the U.S. Government’s decision to delay 

cross-border trucking service has unduly penalized not only the transportation industry, but also U.S. exporters and importers alike. 

Implementation of NAFTA’s trucking provisions will eliminate a cumbersome, outdated and costly system of moving freight across the border, and replace it with an 

efficient, transparent and safe cross-border trucking process. It is essential that public officials remember that implementing NAFTA’s trucking provisions will also 

allow for U.S. carriers to increase to further improve their ability to provide crossborder freight services between the U.S. and Mexico. Once the border is opened, our 

countries can begin to recognize the full benefits of NAFTA and increased trade between the United States and Mexico. Then, we can focus our efforts on the many 

business and practical issues that will arise from the cross-border integration process, which can only be tackled with the goodwill of committed trading partners.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The statement is made 

that the trade has increased three times, but we have unfortunately had to look at what really has tripled, and not the trade of 

products, but the trade of jobs. My little state has lost 43,200 textile jobs. The textile industry and the berry industry has lost over 

400,000 since NAFTA, and right to the point with respect to going 

down there, the statement made by Ms. Claybrook relative to an 

actual onsite audit rather than a paper audit, Mr. Hoffa, I hope 

your Teamsters do not move to Mexico. I can see——

Mr. HOFFA. I don’t think they will do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. I can see Hollings Manufacturing or General Motors putting a subsidiary down there, one of their trucking lines 

and if they organize them, you got to look not just at the fact that 

they do have a union, but the composition of the union itself. In 

Tijuana a few years ago, I went down to look at the situation there 

and it so happened that the previous, they had a heavy rain, mud 

and everything. Came up around San Diego with the settlement, 

I guess it was 100,000 in a hard, crusted, no roads, no real development. 

They just—housing was 5 garage doors put together, for example. 

Well, with that heavy rain, everything just washed out and people 

trying to get their belongings together, they missed 3 days of work 

and under the labor rules in Mexico, they were docked an additional one so they lost 4 days. And in February, they had someone 

140

have his eye knocked out and they did not like that, the particular 

workers and then of course, the first week in May, their very favorite supervisor, she was expecting. 

She went to the front office midday and said I have got to go 

home to work. She says no, no. You are being required and you got 

to continue to work. And as a result, she miscarried, so the workers 

in that particular plant said we are going up to California and we 

are going to organize, and they went up to Los Angeles, and you 

know what they found out? They had a union. 

When that plant had moved from Santa Angelo down to Mexico, 

they filled out the papers between the lawyers. Down at the plant, 

they had never seen a steward or anybody from the union or whatever it was. They just swapped the paper and swapped the money, 

but that there was a compliance of having a paper union. And 

under the law in Mexico, if you try to organize a union, whereby 

you have a union, you file—and it was the mayor of Tijuana that 

invited Senator Hollings to come in and listen to these 12 workers 

who had been fired. 

Now, I wrote an article about NAFTA for the foreign policy edition, and they gave me $500. I sent it to the little lady who showed 

me around, I said go down there and organize. I am trying to organize in Mexico because it is really, we got to look closely at these 

things. I can tell from the testimony, and this is one of the best 

hearings that we have ever had, it has come out that we are in 

trouble, namely the United States, not Mexico. 

I think the fact that you have met with President Fox, Mr. Hoffa, 

and you have both gotten along and understand each other and can 

talk candidly and everything else gets past all of the politics about 

the NAFTA and the diplomacy and about enforcing the agreement. 

Specifically, let me just ask one question, Captain Vaughn. You 

went into details about all the things that had to be checked. 

Knowing from your experience all of those things that have to be 

complied with and everything else like that, do you think we are 

on course to really getting that done by January 1st? 

Captain VAUGHN. To do the CVSA plan, I believe there is an opportunity. If we do case studies rather than compliance reviews, 

what we are offering is to use state inspectors as part of a team 

that will also include a Federal representative and Mexican representative. That team will go in and we can look at each of the 

carriers that are applying for authority. Under that——

The CHAIRMAN. Have they put too much of the responsibility on 

the state? 

Captain VAUGHN. It does fall back on the state but as the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, our focus is on the safety of the nation’s highways. And if we can get the support of our individual 

states, we are willing to do that, to go down and assure that those 

companies are, and should be accredited to operate in the United 

States. I believe we can do so. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me yield to our distinguished chairman of 

the Transportation Subcommittee because he had to be earlier at 

another hearing. Senator Breaux. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Could I just ask a question about what he just 

said? He said do case studies and look at each carrier. Is he referVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
141

ring to occasional case studies or is he referring to looking at in 

fact every carrier with a full case study? 

Captain VAUGHN. What we would look at is each—currently we 

have been advised there are approximately 200 carriers in Mexico 

that are going to apply for authority to operate in the United 

States. If questions go to those 200 carriers, do the initial, so that 

they can have the authority to operate, it would be a conditional 

authority to operate, then it would fall back upon the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration to follow up and do the subsequent compliance reviews. That that is the direction this Committee, or rulemaking takes us. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. So you are talking about doing an on-site type 

of audit or just advising the company? 

Captain VAUGHN. No. On-site in Mexico at the carrier’s place of 

business. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. But not a full compliance review. 

Captain VAUGHN. Not a full compliance review. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Breaux. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BREAUX,

U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA 

Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did not mean to 

jump in front of our colleagues. I was chairing the aging hearing 

this morning and we had a great hearing. I think this is a subject 

matter that the Committee should act on, I mean, not just be subject to an appropriations amendment, but this is real policy, and 

I think that Surface Transportation Subcommittee with the chairmen’s cooperation really needs to move into codifying these new 

rules, whatever we decide is an appropriate standard. They ought 

to be part of the law and not just subject to an appropriation rider. 

Having said that, I think that Senator Murray and her team 

worked on putting together this proposal. She has really done a 

very credible job and helpful job in setting out some standards that 

I think make some sense. If we had $103 million more in the appropriations bill for border safety activity, that is more than the 

administration was requesting by about $15 million. 

That is a significant amount of money to be used that is not 

there today to improve the ability to conduct inspections and to assure safety which we all think is appropriate. I am impressed with 

two particular aspects of the Murray amendment, and I think it 

goes a long way. 

Number one is that they would be prohibited from opening up 

the border until the Department of Transportation is able to certify 

that there is an adequate capacity to conduct a significant number 

of meaningful inspections. It is one thing to have an inspection program, but if you do not have enough people to conduct it, it is not 

worth the paper that it is written on. So the $103 million hopefully 

will be able to show that this in fact has adequate people to do the 

job with inspecting vehicles that come across. They cannot come 

across openly until that is certified. 

The second thing I think is a good feature of it is the question 

of insurance. I think Mr. Acklie or someone spoke to that question. 

If the Murray amendment, as I understand it, says that they have 

to provide proof of valid insurance with an insurance company that 

142

is licensed and based in the United States. I mean, there is no insurance company worth its salt that is going to insure vehicles that 

are not safe. It is an economic loss to them. 

My colleague, Senator Boxer mentioned to me that they only buy 

insurance for 1 day. Well the insurance should cover the time that 

they are in the United States. If it is 1 day or 1 week, it should 

be within that period. You cannot provide insurance for a whole 

year if you are only going to be here for 7 days, it should cover the 

time that you are here, and I think that is going to be a real enforcement mechanism in addition to the government. I don’t think 

any insurance company is going to risk insuring a vehicle that does 

not meet standards which is an incredible potential liability they 

would have if in fact an accident occurred and resulted from the 

negligence of the carrier. 

So my simple question is with the Murray amendment, does anyone think that that is something we should not do? Either for the 

sake of it being too stringent or for the point that it is not stringent 

enough? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. We support the Murray amendment. 

Mr. HOFFA. Teamsters do, too. 

Mr. ACKLIE. I think Secretary Mineta said that it needed some 

fine tuning. With that, it just seems that it should be supported. 

Senator BREAUX. The bus thing. We had some terrible bus tragedies in Louisiana, and I think the industry has moved toward correcting some of those problems. Not so much with the national carriers, but a lot of the private, smaller carriers were having drivers 

that should have been in jail instead of driving a bus. 

Mr. PANTUSO. You are right, Senator. There is still a great deal 

to do. Much of this responsibility for change falls to FMCSA. 

Senator BREAUX. I think we are moving in the right direction. 

Senator DORGAN. Thank you. I thank the panel for their testimony. I guess I am missing something here. We have got people 

who say yes, the Federal Government can get this done by January 

1st. I mean, am I missing, have you all worked with Federal agencies? Have you all worked with Federal agencies? Has anybody 

here had any experience in working with Federal agencies. This is 

a huge job. A huge job. 

I am willing to bet you it is not going to get done in the next 

5 years, let alone the next 5 months but we have got this fiction 

going on here. There is an old saying never buy something from 

someone who is out of breath. There is kind of a breathless quality 

about this notion that you can put something together by January 

1st, assure the safety of the American people with the trucking industry that is allowed into this country that has such radically different standards. 

With respect to Mr. Acklie’s statements, I understand the point 

that they have logbook requirements, do not carry logbooks, they 

do not use logbooks. They have no hours of service requirements 

generally that are at all respected. All one has to do is look at the 

facts. We have radically different systems that we have to fuse together. It is going to take a good, long while. 

I want to ask Mr. Hoffa and Ms. Claybrook a question. I think 

the testimony demonstrates that we are not anywhere near ready 

to do this. And I think by far the best approach is to take the 

143

House amendment, the Sabo language which shuts this down for 

a year and fuse it to the Murray language which then establishes 

a process. 

I guess I would ask Mr. Hoffa, you indicated support for the 

House language. Would you indicate support for an amendment 

that adds the House language to the Senate bill? 

Mr. HOFFA. Yes, I will. I think it is good. It is strong. I think 

we have to have verification. It is like one of those nuclear tests. 

We have to verify what we are doing here. The problem is they talk 

about all these things. I heard the Secretary’s testimony this morning. I am amazed that he could think he could hire 80 people, that 

he could train 80 people, and that he could acquire the land, build 

the facilities in 6 months. 

I mean, that is just so incredible that it is not going to happen, 

and we all know that. And I just think that we are dealing with 

something that is very important, to put a deadline on something 

so vital as American highway safety. It is a great mistake and I 

just do not understand why the administration is in such a rush. 

I think it is better to do it the other way. Let us deny it and make 

them get the job done. 

They have had 7 years to do this, and they have not done anything, and Mexico hasn’t done it. Mexico knows that this deadline 

is coming up. They have not done the proper things with regard to 

making sure that their trucks are ready, making sure their drivers 

are trained, changing the way they operate to make sure they have 

a database, they have logbooks, they have driver training, they did 

CDLs, drug testing. Canada does it. We do not have any problem 

with Canada. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hoffa, did you discuss that with President 

Fox? 

Mr. HOFFA. We talked briefly. I said we have problems with the 

trucks, we have problems with the training of the drivers and he 

indicated that he knows that and I think that is one of the reasons 

why you do not see Canada enforcing any billion-dollar fine on us 

with regard to these things. I think it should be negotiated and 

this administration I think should be negotiating with the Mexican 

Government to set up something that is reasonable, that has a 

timeline where we can verify what they are doing, that we can get 

our act together with regard to 80 inspectors. 80 inspectors is such 

a small amount. 

I do not see anybody talking about drugs, I do not hear anybody 

talking about law enforcement problems of the drugs that are pouring across. NAFTA was the greatest thing for the drug dealers that 

ever happened, and now that we are implementing this, they are 

going to be, if you are inspecting 1 percent of the trucks and somebody was a drug dealer, I mean they would know, they will give 

up 1 percent if the chances of getting caught are almost impossible. 

I think that there is a lot of work to be done. I think the more 

pressure we put on the administration, we put on the Mexican 

Government to get something that is reasonable like Canada where 

they have compliance, where they have facilities where they inspect these trucks, where we have all the things we talked about, 

then we have got something we can bring back and we can all 

agree on and make sure that we have safe highways here. 

144

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Hoffa, let me be clear on my question. My 

question was about the Sabo amendment as added by the House. 

The Sabo amendment is an amendment that simply prohibits the 

use of funds for issuing those licenses in the coming year. That effectively shuts us down for a year. My question was would you support that? 

Mr. HOFFA. We support that. 

Senator DORGAN. Let me ask another question if I might. The Inspector General showed us a map of where Mexican trucks are now 

moving. North Dakota is one of those states. My assumption is we 

know very little about what’s going on here. Frankly, we are not 

really keeping track of what’s coming across our border. 

We inspect a relatively small percentage of trucks. We are finding serious safety violations in a rather large percentage but we 

are missing most of them that are coming across. While they are 

restricted to a 20-mile limit, the map shown by the Inspector General suggests that they are moving in many states across the country and in many cases moving well beyond the 20-mile limit in the 

border states. Ms. Claybrook, do you agree with that? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I do, Mr. Chairman. The reason that I support 

authorization legislation or legislation out of this Committee in addition to legislation out of the Appropriations Committee is because 

I think that this is going to take more than a year to accomplish. 

That is, to have in place sufficient facilities for inspection, sufficient inspectors to do the job, and onsite audits of the companies 

that want to come across the border. This takes a lot of time. 

I think that the appropriations bill merged between the House 

bill and the Senate Appropriations Committee bill is a very effective first step, but I think that this Committee, as Senator Breaux 

suggested, needs to act as well. When you look at the likelihood of 

any truck today getting caught if it goes beyond the 20-mile area, 

it is virtually nil, virtually nil. 

Senator DORGAN. I support that. I, in fact, mentioned it to Senator Breaux that I would support efforts of his and the chairman 

of the full Committee. I think it is necessary for us to proceed as 

an authorizing Committee. 

Let me make one final comment, Mr. Emmett, to you. I hope you 

will not do in the future what you did today on this issue where 

you describe racial profiling. The fact is I support the shutdown of 

Canadian wheat coming into this country until they can begin to 

comply with NAFTA with respect to wheat shipments. No one 

would suggest that is racial profiling on my part with respect to 

Canada, and I don’t believe a serious discussion about truck safety 

dealing with the question of Mexico ought to be related to that either and your testimony—I was profoundly disappointed. 

I think it ill-serves your cause to do that. That is not the motivation of those of us involved in a serious discussion about truck safety. 

Mr. EMMETT. Senator Dorgan, I appreciate your comment. I 

would ask you to consider that this is more than government to 

government. Consider if you were the owner of a Mexican trucking 

company, and you voluntarily came to the United States and said 

‘‘I will comply with anything you want me to comply with. I am 

based in Monterey. I have a customer in Kansas City and I will go 

145

back and forth.’’ Yet, they hear for year after year after year that 

the only reason they are not able to be admitted is because they 

are Mexican. And, there have been questionable things raised 

throughout this debate. 

One of the other witnesses commented on the fact that Mexican 

trucks have a different weight limit. So do Canadian trucks. But 

she has not raised that issue with regard to the Canadians. She 

only raises it with regard to the Mexicans. I will be the first—having worked with you, Senator Dorgan, and almost everybody on 

this panel, to say that was not in any way aimed at the Senate. 

In fact, our testimony today is totally supportive of the direction 

the Senate is going, particularly Senator Breaux. We think that, 

absolutely, the appropriate jurisdiction needs to be exercised here, 

but the blanket comments that were coming out not even by the 

members of the House, but by some of the witnesses, and the 

things that went on were, and are, unacceptable. Of course part of 

my feeling stems from the fact that I am from Texas and I have 

had a long working relationship with Mexicans. 

I am hearing more and more from people who do business there 

that that is the way it is being taken. And that is the reason I 

raised it, and that is why I said it is akin to it, without any personal comment. So, I do not know what you would tell the owner 

of that Mexican trucking firm who is willing to fully comply when 

the only reason he cannot come in is because he is Mexican. 

Senator DORGAN. I just ask you to be very careful when you 

move into those areas on page 3 of your testimony, it is not a discussion about some unnamed witnesses at some other venue. I 

just—look, this is a very serious issue for this country. It is very 

serious. And I want our roads, I want expanded trade opportunities. 

While I did not support NAFTA, I did not support it for good reasons. The fact is NAFTA has taken a very small surplus with the 

country of Mexico and turned it into a very, very large deficit and 

it has been a colossal failure with respect to Canada and Mexico. 

But I still believe that proper trade agreements properly negotiated 

can be beneficial to expand opportunities for all, but this issue of 

safety is a very important and compelling issue, needs to be discussed seriously, and we need to find a method by which we can 

transition under this trade agreement to a circumstance where we 

have international trucking firms with all of the safeguards moving 

on America’s highways. 

But I do not want, whether in North Dakota or South Carolina, 

some family looking into the rearview mirror with an 18 wheel 

80,000 pound truck that came across the border because it wasn’t 

inspected. That is not racial profiling. Read the San Francisco 

Chronicle and lots of other reports that I have read about a guy 

that traveled 3 days in Mexico with a long haul trucker and the 

guy slept 7 hours in 3 days, had no logbook. Read it and ask, is 

that someone you want to drive next to on an American interstate? 

I don’t think so. Let us make sure when we do this, we do it right. 

There isn’t any way we will be ready in January to do this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Let me just add to that. In my state, the Latinos 

in my state, just as everyone else, want safe roads and want to be 

146

able to take their kids to a soccer game and know they are not 

going to be hit by a truck that doesn’t pass inspection. I want to 

say, Mr. Chairman, this hearing came not a minute too soon, given 

what we are facing. 

Before Senator Dorgan may leave, I just want to express to him 

how much I support his approach if he chooses to go down that 

path. I think we ought to—of melding the two approaches, the 

Murray approach, along with the House approach because I believe 

strongly that this January 1st date was, as Mr. Hoffa implied, sort 

of plucked out as I will do this by January 1. And it doesn’t have 

any connection to reality. 

I know Mr. Mineta very well. And I have not, how do I put this, 

I don’t feel comfortable with the amount of preparation that he exhibited here for this challenge. Nor do I feel comfortable, nor do I 

feel comfortable that the Inspector General knows exactly what he 

is going to do. I think after thinking about what came out of this 

hearing, Mr. Chairman, I do believe both Mr. Mineta and the Inspector General will look at this, will pay more attention to this, 

will try to get ready, but January 1st is just not real. 

And I just want to say to my friends on all sides of this issue, 

and I think my colleagues will agree, one tragedy or two tragedies 

on the road, that is what it will take to shut down the border. We 

do not want that to happen. But I have been around politics a long 

time. And I see what happens when there is such a tragedy. So we 

want to avert it, and my friend, Senator Breaux, is right. We need 

to take action in this Committee and I will support him and my 

chairman in coming up with a good bill to do that. 

But it is well and good to say that everyone needs to have insurance. Yes, of course, Mr. Acklie, and insurance is, I agree with my 

colleague from Louisiana, a very good hedge. That is why I always 

say on nuclear power, which is another issue, when the insurance 

companies are ready to insure—nuclear power plants, talk to me 

about it because it’s a check on safety and if a company does go 

in and insure a carrier, it makes me feel a lot better. 

But remember our problem is the inspections. In California, 

where we are doing, we have put so much money and it has come 

out of this hearing. We are only getting 2 percent of the trucks, 

only 2 percent of the trucks. And out of that 2 percent, about how 

many, 26 percent are failing inspection. So think about the other 

98 percent we are not getting. So even if we make tough laws on 

insurance, but they do not have it, it is too late, once an accident 

occurs. 

I want to put into the record the fact that I am very concerned, 

Mr. Chairman, and I need you to help me look into this, about the 

answer that was given to a question that I asked about the penalties that would be waged on Mexican drivers compared to American drivers if the law is broken. Because I got an answer that says 

it is identical all the way. I have the ruling here. And I have 

searched this rule. And Mr. Chairman, it says a Mexican motor 

carrier committing any of the following violations identified 

through roadside inspections or by any other means may be subjected to an expedited safety review or issued a deficiency letter 

identifying the violations, including, and then it goes into driver 

147

violations. I can’t find anything in here that talks about the drivers. 

Now, I am very concerned about the answer that I got, so I 

would ask you, Mr. Chairman, if you would join with me in writing 

a letter to the Transportation Secretary asking him to please point 

out chapter and verse where is it written that there is in fact a 

level playing field with United States drivers because I do not see 

it. Would you do that? 

The CHAIRMAN. I would definitely join with you on that. We are 

going to leave this record open for questions by other members of 

all the witnesses here. 

Senator BOXER. Good. Because I want them to show me where 

this equality is in this rule. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Senator Boxer, I can answer that question very 

quickly. And that is that for the 18-month period or whatever period it is going to be, the Mexican companies would be given a deficiency letter. A similar violation by a United States carrier would 

be, would involve a penalty. So in fact the Mexican companies 

would have a lesser penalty, that is a deficiency letter, than a 

United States carrier, who could be penalized. 

Senator BOXER. Good. I would like to see whether Mr. Mineta 

agrees with that. I have a question for Mr. Hoffa, and that is all 

I have is one question here. 

Truck drivers employed by companies domiciled in Mexico that 

enter and operate both within and outside the current commercial 

zones are not subject to United States minimum wage laws and we 

know that is the case. The DOT proposed rules would require the 

Mexican carrier to certify that it will comply with United States 

labor laws. The instructions, however, state that registration will 

not be withheld if the applicant refuses to certify such compliance. 

So they do not have to certify compliance with our, with our labor 

laws. 

Why do you think the United States provided this out for these 

NAFTA carriers, and second, do you think the Labor Department 

could enforce wage and hour standards on Mexican drivers? 

Mr. HOFFA. Starting with your last question, I have discussed 

this with the Secretary of Labor and they have no mechanism to 

do this. Driver comes across and drives a thousand miles from the 

heart of Mexico to the border, comes across the border, operates for 

2 or 3 days back and forth. Who is going to make sure that during 

that period of time, he is paid the minimum wage? There is no 

mechanism to do that. It would be incredibly complicated to pick 

up Social Security. I have—they have not even thought about how 

they would even do that. 

Senator BOXER. What do they get paid at this time in Mexico? 

Mr. HOFFA. I have no idea. Somebody said they were paid at a 

rate—what was that rate, $7 a day. And could you imagine, and 

you think one of these companies is going to say okay, we are going 

to monitor the number of hours, we are going to give them at least 

minimum wage. It is not going to happen. 

I have raised this issue with Secretary Mineta and I have raised 

it with the Secretary of Labor which would fall under her jurisdiction. They have not even thought about it. They said they are going 

to look into it. Thousands and thousands of drivers coming across, 

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how would they go about that? There is no computer to pick up 

how long they are here. How long would you monitor when they 

go back and who is going to compute it and where do you send the 

bill? It is not going to happen. It is impractical. 

And no one is thinking about some of these issues. Like I said, 

I thought that the presentation today was that they have not 

thought through the thing. They are just trying very quickly to 

throw something together. This is a big issue about, they have to 

comply with these—with the American labor laws and they are not 

going to. Just like those trucks that we found up in North Dakota, 

you think those people were being paid the minimum wage? They 

are not. Everybody knows that. We shouldn’t kid ourselves about 

it. 

This is a major problem and until somebody comes up with a 

mechanism where we are going to have some kind of a computer 

base or give them an identification number and we are going to 

monitor it with regard to when trucks come through, do they go 

through, there is some kind of a pass, like a speed pass, they monitor the truck, it has a number. Driver has a number. They monitor 

the number of hours they were here and it goes back the same way 

and there is a computer printout as to the hours he spent in the 

United States, then it can be done. But it is a tremendous program 

to set that up. That is what has to be done to make sure we get 

compliance. 

Right now the administration isn’t even thinking about that so 

we are going to have literally thousands of people operating here 

being paid $7 a day for driving a truck who knows how many 

hours. 

Senator BOXER. This is a rule that says a lot of words, but it is 

not backed up. It says we require a Mexican carrier to certify it 

will comply with United States labor laws but as Mr. Hoffa has 

stated and I think frankly he has been extremely reasonable. I am 

not so sure I could be quite as contained. 

I compliment you on this because I know you fight hard for working people to have a decent life, and the fact of the matter is it is 

a sham. Because they say we require the Mexican carriers who are 

certified as complying with United States labor laws—my friend 

whispers to me what about health insurance and all the other 

things that we think are important? 

The bottom line is how can it be done, No. 1, and if it can be 

done, can it be done by January 1? No. So there is a loophole in 

this deal that says well, you don’t have to certify. You have to do 

it, but we do not require that you certify. So this is a sham deal. 

It is not right. And I hope—and that is why I was so happy when 

you agreed to do this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I want to applaud 

you and thank you. This is on our plate today, tomorrow, next day. 

We have got to confer and hopefully do something that will enable 

us to face this challenge, to do the right thing for people on both 

sides of the border. That is what I want to do, and I thank you very 

much, the whole panel. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BREAUX. Mr. Chairman, a comment with regard to the 

point that my colleague, Senator Dorgan made, and others have 

made, including Senator Boxer, about not being able to have this 

in place by January. That is probably correct. But as I read the 

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Murray amendment, almost every paragraph says that they are not 

going to open the border until the DOT Inspector certifies that 

there is a policy they ensure compliance, until the Inspector General certifies that information infrastructure is in place, until the 

DOT Inspector has certified there is adequate capacity to do inspections, until the proof of license is made available, until DOT has 

equipped all of the border crossings with the weigh in motion systems, and until the DOT Inspector certifies it as an accessible database. 

So I think the premise of the Murray amendment is that this 

really has to be done and until it is done and until it is certified 

that it is done and in place, we will not open the border. So they 

do not make this deadline by January. The border is not automatically opened under the Murray amendment. She says it cannot be 

opened until this is completed. If that is done in January, fine. But 

if it is not until January of next year, that is when the border 

would be opened. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is worded that way, Senator, but we didn’t 

want to go in a confrontational arbitrary way with some thought 

of the Sabo amendment, this ipso facto here in July we are going 

to cut out any chance for another year and a half because we know 

government. If they get another year and a half, then it won’t happen for another year and a half. And we did not want a veto. 

If we had it in that fashion, the President will say well you just 

cutoff your funds and you are against the policy and he may thereby veto. But the language and it is Shelby, too. It is Murray-Shelby, bipartisan. I think we could override. 

Senator BREAUX. Under the Murray language, as I understand it, 

the time could be even longer if this would happen, than the 

House-passed language, which is a 1-year delay. If this takes more 

than 1 year, then it will be more than 1 year, so I think that is 

a good policy. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Could I make one comment on the labor issue? 

For 15 years, safety groups have been trying to get an electronic 

box in trucks so they could enforce the hours of service rules and 

if you had an electronic box in the trucks, both in the United 

States, as well as in trucks coming into this country, you would be 

able to at least do a better job, albeit maybe not a perfect job, of 

enforcing those minimum wage requirements and you would also 

be able to enforce the hours of service rules. 

And we have not been able to get the United States Department 

of Transportation through thick and thin to propose this and to 

issue it. They finally did propose it about a year and a half ago. 

The likelihood that they will ever issue a rule is small. I would 

urge, in your consideration of this legislation, that you consider requiring that because I don’t think it is ever going to happen any 

other way. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Let me thank you on behalf of the 

Committee, each of the six. You all have made a very valuable contribution, and the record will stay open subject to questions and 

the Committee will be in recess subject to the call of the chair. 

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

(151)

Appendix

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. DONOHUE,

PRESIDENT AND CEO, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 

American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico to submit this statement to this panel 

today. I am Thomas J. Donohue, President and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. I appreciate this opportunity to comment on behalf of the Chamber on the 

spectacular success of the U.S.-Mexico trade partnership and the costs imposed by 

our nation’s failure to implement the cross-border trucking provisions of the North 

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 

Free trade has played a key role in our nation’s economic growth and development 

since it was founded, and the NAFTA played an important role in the accelerated 

income gains our nation enjoyed in the 1990s. Since the NAFTA came into force in 

1994, trade between the United States and Mexico has tripled from $81 billion in 

1993 to $246 billion in 2000. And the trucking industry is critical to this trade partnership since trucks transport over 80 percent of the value of our trade with Mexico. 

However, beginning in 1995, the Clinton Administration refused to abide by 

America’s commitment under the NAFTA to open the U.S.-Mexico border to crossborder trucking. The difficulties that stem from this barrier to trade should not be 

underestimated. Current rules maintain a cumbersome, environmentally damaging, 

and costly system that represents a brake on further growth in trade. The time has 

come for our countries to open our borders to a modern cargo transportation system 

that will allow our economic partnership to reach the next level of success. 

The Story So Far 

The NAFTA gave U.S. and Mexican carriers the right to pick up and deliver international freight into the neighboring country’s border states beginning in December 

1995. This market access was scheduled to expand to the entire territory of the 

United States and Mexico by January 2000. 

The NAFTA also included measures to permit U.S. and Mexican carriers to invest 

across the Rio Grande. Starting in December 1995, U.S. and Canadian investors 

were supposed to be allowed to invest in Mexican trucking companies or terminals 

providing exclusively international freight services up to a 49 percent ownership 

cap. The NAFTA laid out a schedule to raise this cap to 51 percent in 2001 and 

100 percent in 2004. 

By the same token, Mexican carriers were to be allowed to invest and fully own 

U.S. trucking companies for the purpose of transporting international cargo within 

the United States beginning in 1995. This provision was finally implemented on 

June 5, 2001, when President George W. Bush issued a memorandum instructing 

the U.S. Department of Transportation to begin accepting and processing applications by Mexican nationals for the purpose of establishing U.S. trucking companies. 

In a long anticipated ruling, a NAFTA dispute settlement panel in February 2001 

determined that the United States had violated its obligations on cross-border trucking, and analysts calculate that the United States will be slapped with retaliatory 

duties totaling between $1 billion and $2 billion for every year Washington refuses 

to allow cross-border trucking. More recently, the U.S. House of Representatives 

moved to bar funding for agencies charged by President Bush with processing applications by Mexican carriers to operate outside U.S. commercial zones; it also significantly reduced needed funding for truck inspections and border facilities. 

This dispute is flaring up at a difficult time. With over 700,000 manufacturing 

jobs lost in the past 12 months, the sanctions mentioned above would hit the U.S. 

economy at a moment when it is already weak. Mexico’s recently launched free 

trade agreement with the European Union means that Mexican importers have a 

wide range of choices when they seek suppliers, and this dispute could drive many 

Mexican firms to look for partners in countries other than the United States. After 

all, Mexico has free trade agreements with 32 nations, and if retaliatory duties drive 

up the price of U.S. goods, Mexican consumers have plenty of options. 

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Cross-Border Trucking 

Experts agree that the dispute over cross-border trucking threatens our relationship with our second largest trading partner. However, it is bizarre to hear apparently reasonable people try to defend the trucking system that currently exists on 

the U.S.-Mexico border. 

Cross-border trucking today was described in a recent coalition letter signed by 

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and nine other business organizations as ‘‘archaic 

and convoluted. . . . Currently, a shipment traveling from the United States to 

Mexico, or vice versa, requires no less than three drivers and three tractors to perform a single international freight movement. Through interline partnerships, a 

U.S. motor carrier handles freight on the U.S. side, and a Mexican carrier handles 

the freight on the Mexican side, with a ‘middleman’ or drayage hauler in the middle. 

The drayage driver ferries loads back and forth across the border to warehouses or 

freight yards for pickup or subsequent final delivery within the designated border 

commercial zone.’’

The upshot is congestion, air pollution, and higher prices for both consumers and 

business. The fraught logistics of the existing system often compel trucks to return 

home with empty trailers or with no trailer at all. Our border infrastructure is seriously overburdened, and the entire system is quickly becoming a real brake on further growth in trade. 

These problems are particularly severe for U.S. companies that operate ‘‘just-intime’’ manufacturing facilities in Mexico. These operations were established with a 

clear expectation that transportation services would be able to deliver inputs from 

the United States or elsewhere to facilities in Mexico according to schedule. Our mutually beneficial trading relationship with Mexico will plainly suffer—with costly effects for U.S. business—if we fail to ensure the expeditious delivery of materials to 

these manufacturing facilities by modernizing the cumbersome transportation system upon which our trade with Mexico depends. 

Safety: A Vital Issue 

Safety is plainly one of the most important issues at play in this dispute. It 

should come as no surprise that ensuring the safety of all trucks on American roads 

was a top priority of the U.S. trade officials who negotiated the NAFTA. The Congress approved the NAFTA because it was broadly satisfied with the fruits of their 

labors. 

And why shouldn’t we be? Under the NAFTA, every truck entering the United 

States is required to meet each and every U.S. safety requirement. In fact, Mexican 

motor carriers applying for U.S. permits will be required to provide far more detailed information regarding their ability to meet U.S. safety requirements than 

their American or Canadian counterparts. Any lingering concerns over the safety of 

these carriers from Mexico and their trucks and drivers can surely be addressed in 

the proposed rules for implementing the NAFTA. 

While safety is an overriding concern, we can certainly address this issue while 

keeping our international obligations and expanding upon our mutually beneficial 

trading relationship with Mexico. Failure to try would send a troubling message 

about the difference in our treatment of Canada and Mexico, our two closest neighbors and largest trading partners. 

Finally, it is imperative that Congress make available the required funds to ensure that safety enforcement inspections of trucks on the U.S.-Mexico border are 

carried out with all due seriousness. The U.S. Chamber strongly supports providing 

necessary funding to hire additional safety inspectors to be stationed at the border 

and to build and maintain adequate border inspection facilities. 

Conclusion 

Because the NAFTA has already eliminated most tariffs and other barriers to 

trade with Mexico, improving our transportation infrastructure is the best thing we 

can do to keep this partnership on track. Implementing the NAFTA’s trucking provisions offers the opportunity to fix the cumbersome, environmentally damaging, and 

costly transportation system upon which our trade with Mexico depends. With 

added and improved resources, inspection capabilities at the U.S.-Mexico border 

should ensure that trucks will be able to operate on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico 

border with safety and efficiency. 

In the final analysis, this issue revolves around whether the United States will 

keep its word. We should be mindful that the United States made a commitment 

under the NAFTA to work with Mexico to modernize our cross-border transportation 

system. I urge the Congress to implement the NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provisions and show the world that America keeps its commitments. 

153

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN G. PIKRALLIDAS, VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AAA 

AAA submits the following statement for the record to convey our views on the 

safety implications of opening the U.S. border to commercial trucks from Mexico. 

As the largest association in America dedicated to the safety of the traveling public, AAA is acutely aware of the need to ensure the safest possible operation of commercial motor vehicles. AAA members consistently rate driving with large trucks as 

one of their greatest fears. Opening the border and adding trucks from Mexico to 

the mix of vehicles traveling the nation’s roads will only intensify motorists’ con- cerns. While NAFTA requires that the border be open to ensure the smooth flow of traffic between both countries, the treaty also requires that trucks from Mexico meet 

all U.S. safety standards. To achieve that goal, the Administration and Congress 

must work together to ensure that all safety measures are in place and the processes and systems to monitor and enforce commercial traffic from Mexico are fully 

functioning. 

In formal comments filed in response to the Department of Transportation’s proposed rulemaking on NAFTA implementation, AAA expressed concern that the safety oversight plan unveiled by FMCSA falls short of providing motorists with necessary assurances to permit the opening of the border as the agency proposes. Motorists cannot accept a proposal that could allow carriers from Mexico to traverse 

U.S. roadways for up to 18 months before undergoing a safety audit. More intensive 

discussions and work must occur with representatives of both governments, enforcement authorities, and industry officials before the border is ready to be safely 

opened. 

What do we know about the carriers, vehicles and drivers from Mexico who will 

make application to cross the border? 

The answer is: very little. Until recently there have been few safety regulations 

placed on industry in Mexico, and the infrastructure to capture data is in an infant 

stage. In addition, we do not know the extent to which companies from Mexico will 

apply to cross the border or the types of operations and vehicles that will make such 

crossings. Vehicles and drivers currently traveling from Mexico to U.S. commercial 

zones are not necessarily indicative of the type of operations that may engage in 

long haul travel to the U.S. once the border is open. 

Safety Audits Should Occur Before Trucks Cross The Border 

AAA supports the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance’s recommendation that the 

safety inspection process should begin before trucks cross the border, with carrier 

audits being done even earlier. U.S. enforcement officials should be permitted to inspect truck company base operations in Mexico, a practice that is already followed 

with Canadian companies. These visits should include the evaluation of company 

safety management practices, knowledge of and compliance with U.S. regulations, 

vehicle inspections, and education of drivers, dispatchers, mechanics and management. 

Because U.S. enforcement authorities have had many years of experience with 

Canada, the database and knowledge of the Canadian trucking industry has developed over time. There is uniformity and reciprocity between Canada and the U.S. 

on enforcement standards and procedures. A similar relationship with Mexico is 

evolving, which is the goal of NAFTA. 

Under current CVSA practice, when a truck operating in the U.S. undergoes and 

passes an inspection, a 3-month sticker is issued. Many (but not all) truck inspectors honor this sticker during its 3-month period of validity and do not re-inspect 

the vehicle. As a minimum, trucks from Mexico that wish to enter the U.S. should 

be required to display a valid CVSA inspection sticker. If a truck does not have one, 

it should undergo the most rigorous CVSA (or equivalent) inspection immediately 

upon crossing the border. If it fails inspection, it should be either repaired on the 

spot and reinspected, or prevented from crossing the border until defects have been 

repaired. 

AAA is confident that Mexican authorities expect no less of their companies and 

drivers than to adhere to practices already followed by U.S. and Canadian companies. Many firms operating in Mexico maintain high safety standards for their 

trucks and drivers. AAA’s concern is that the highest safety standards be applied 

to all trucks and drivers operating in the U.S. regardless of where they are domiciled. 

Licensing Issues 

AAA is also concerned that drivers from Mexico may not be licensed to U.S. standards, and in some cases testing procedures may fall woefully short. The databases 

154

of both countries need to be synchronized so that enforcement authorities for both 

countries can easily check driver records. AAA has encouraged FMCSA to work 

closely with representatives of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) and CVSA to ensure that proper licensing procedures are in place 

and enforceable. 

Insurance Concerns Must Be Addressed 

Issues of insurance must also be addressed and steps taken to ensure that every 

vehicle in every fleet is adequately insured if it is operated in the U.S. Drivers must 

be required to carry an insurance document that is unique to their particular vehicle. Uninsured vehicles and drivers pose a threat to the economic well being of other 

road users and drive up the cost of insurance for everyone. 

Weight Issues 

AAA is very concerned about the safety and infrastructure impacts of increasing 

the size and weight of trucks. Effective enforcement of current weight limitations 

is essential, and AAA has vigorously opposed efforts in Congress that would seek 

to increase the weight of trucks beyond currently allowed levels. Opening the border 

to trucks from Mexico may result in pressure to raise sizes and weights to Mexican 

(and/or Canadian) limits. AAA believes trucks should be weighed at the border before entering the U.S. to ensure that U.S. weight limits are enforced. 

Sufficient Resources Necessary To Monitor The Border 

Much work remains to be done at major border crossings before we can be confident that the U.S. is prepared to handle the increased flow of commercial traffic 

across the border. The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General report 

found a direct correlation between the conditions of trucks from Mexico entering the 

U.S. and the level of enforcement resources at the border. There are 27 southern 

border crossings, and AAA believes that every crossing point must have the resources and facilities in place to fully monitor and enforce U.S. safety regulations. 

It should also be noted that issues resulting from opening the border are not solely confined to those residents of border states. More trucks from Mexico will place 

new responsibilities on enforcement authorities across the country. That will require 

additional resources. 

Conclusion 

To conclude, AAA believes the border should be opened to commercial vehicles 

from Mexico only when officials on both sides of the border are confident that all 

safety measures are in place. It is clear we are not ready today, and we are disappointed that these issues have not already been addressed in the intervening 

years since the adoption of NAFTA. It will take a concerted joint effort by officials 

from both countries to make it possible, but the safety of the motoring public on 

both sides of the border must be the primary concern. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. GIERMANSKI, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR,

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES, BELMONT ABBEY COLLEGE

Mexican Motor Carrier Access to the United States 

The Mexican motor carrier safety issue from the very beginning was suspect. For 

those of us who are involved in or study the trucking industry, the decision to deny 

Mexican truckers access to the United States was a deal between the White House 

and the Teamsters. As a result of the release of the 82-page NAFTA dispute-panel 

unanimous decision, we know the deal constituted a United States breach of its obligations under NAFTA. Alleged safety issues were contrived and false. Continued 

distortions of the Mexican threat by the Teamsters, and by some in Congress, do 

a disservice to the public. Therefore, it is time for some reasonable assessments of 

the reality of Mexican access and its potential impact on the U. S. trucking industry 

and the general public. My assessment will treat the magnitude of Mexican access 

to the U.S. motor-carrier market, the labor issues connected to it, the likelihood of 

successful market penetration by Mexican carriers, the genuineness of the safety 

issue, the likely impact on costs to U.S. shippers, and U.S. DOT’s role in allowing 

an unnecessary loophole in operating authority requirements. 

The Magnitude of a Mexican Presence 

According to the U.S. Bureau of Census figures, there are 733,900 Class 7 and 

8 motor carriers operating in the United States. Class 7 and Class 8 include the 

heavy over-the-road motor carrier. That number does not include another 63,000 

that failed to return a report, suggesting a total of 796,900 U.S. motor carriers. Of 

155

the carriers reporting, 538,700 are truck load (TL) and 195,200 are less than truck 

load (LTL). The number of requests for operating authority by Mexican motor carriers as of July 20, 1999, totaled 184 applications. Based on statements of 

CANACAR, the Mexican Trucking Association, denying an interest on the part of 

Mexican carriers to operate in the United States, and based on these numbers, we 

would see that the Mexicans would account for .0002 percent of the trucking industry. If one were to look only at the TL sector, the target market carved out by the 

Mexicans in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations, 

Mexican applications for operating authority amount to only .0003 percent of the 

U.S. truck-load carriers. Mexican presence in the TL market will hardly be noticeable. 

Finally, the assumption that if Mexican truckers are allowed in, there will be 

more trucks than ever on U.S. highways is unsupportable. Since Mexican truckers 

are permitted to carry only international cargo (cargo with an origin or destination 

outside the territory of the nation in which the cargo is carried), truck volumes will 

not increase unless trade increases dramatically. There is also a limit on the availability of equipment (tractors and trailers) no matter how much trade might increase. Any carriage by Mexicans simply offsets what would have been carried by 

U.S. truckers. Given the minuscule number of Mexican operating authority applications (even assuming they were all approved), and assuming that all these carriers 

would somehow carry additional trade, the Mexican truckers would still not be noticed. 

The actual impact of Mexican operations is likely to be small and positive: small 

because of sheer numbers, and positive because their presence could enhance service 

to domestic shippers. The potential displacement of U.S. drivers ordinarily carrying 

international cargo by Mexican entrants into the international cargo market would 

allow U.S. drivers to carry domestic cargo often delayed because of the shortage of 

U.S. truck drivers. In short, Mexican carriage of some international cargo frees up 

more U.S. drivers to improve domestic carriage, a clear benefit for the U.S. shipper 

and consignee. 

The Labor Issue 

Labor options under NAFTA severely limit the ability of Mexicans to capitalize 

on low wages paid to Mexican drivers operating in the United States. Only Chapter 

12 (Cross-Border Services), and Chapter 16 (Temporary Entry for Business Persons) 

address and define the extent of labor activity afforded to Mexican drivers operating 

in the United States. There are only two options for Mexican motor carriers. The 

Mexican carrier with operating authority in the United States may use a Mexican 

driver living in Mexico on a temporary cross-border basis with limited time allowed 

in the United States. The Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) allows 

these temporary workers up to one-year maximum and 6-months minimum in the 

United States. While some will claim that this is a threat to U.S. truck driver jobs, 

a closer examination suggests otherwise. A Mexican driver who lives and begins his 

work day in Mexico but subsequently enters the United States with cargo is subject 

to unique tax issues in some ways brought about by the time constraints contained 

in the INS regulations. Because of his cross-border status, the Mexican driver legally maintains his residence and principal place of employment in Mexico. Therefore, the Mexican driver is not provided the special U.S. tax treatment given to 

Mexicans who live in Mexico, or Canadians who live in Canada but enter to the 

United States for their normal work day. What this means is that a Mexican driver 

operating on a cross-border basis is obligated to pay Federal income tax to the 

United States, not just on earnings generated in the United States, but on all foreign earnings, including those generated in Mexico. 

Additionally, since under NAFTA and INS rules, the primary source of remuneration must be in Mexico in pesos, the Mexican motor-carrier firm must either augment the drivers’ earnings or provide expense allowances to pay for the increased 

costs of doing business in the United States. These expenses include the costs of 

fuel, food, lodging, and incidentals in the United States. 

Restrictions on Mexican drivers such as primary source of remuneration; international character of work; and prohibition against entering the U.S. local labor 

market or shopping for international cargo or carrying U.S. domestic goods severely 

limit opportunities and increase costs to the Mexican trucking company. In short, 

the cross-border Mexican carrier has few advantages except perhaps for operations 

solely restricted to nearby U.S. border states where there is, according to one scientific study, a TL market suited for Mexican motor carriers. 

Option two under Chapter 16 of NAFTA relates to professionals only. The chapter 

and 8 CFR 214 of INS regulations are so specific that they contain an all-inclusive 

list of what professional NAFTA covers. Truck drivers are NOT included. Of course, 

156

a Mexican motor carrier who establishes a firm in the United States could openly 

recruit Mexican drivers who qualify for H–1B Non-Immigrant status and use them 

up to 3 years providing the Mexican-owned U.S. carrier could prove a driver shortage. In this scenario, the Mexican driver is an employee of a U.S. firm which is legally obligated to provide all the requirements that are given to U.S. drivers. These 

drivers working for a Mexican carrier established in the United States under 

NAFTA are still restricted to carrying only international cargo. However, once admitted to the U.S. as an H–1B, the Mexican driver could be recruited and hired 

away by a U.S.-owned and controlled motor carrier and be used to carry domestic 

cargo within the time period allowed under the H–1B Non-Immigrant classification. 

Therefore, the Mexican carrier operating a firm in the United States must pay a 

competitive wage. 

The implementation of NAFTA with respect to Mexican truck drivers operating 

in the United States seriously restricts driver use, protects the U.S. local labor market, and suggests labor costs to the Mexican firm operating in the United States 

that are equal to, or nearly equal to those of the U.S. motor carrier. Thus, it appears 

at this time that there may not be a significant labor advantage for Mexican motor 

carriers operating in the United States under NAFTA. 

Competitive Constraints 

It is difficult to support the concept that Mexican motor carriers which will operate in the United States will successfully compete with U.S. carriers. First, Mexican 

carriers are limited to carrying international cargo. Second, they have to establish 

a system which provides cargo for their return trip, not an easy task. Third, given 

the likelihood of equipment and cargo imbalances, Mexican carriers will have to pool 

equipment in the United States at either terminals or lots and hire the personnel 

(U.S. jobs) necessary to operate and maintain their facilities in the United States. 

Fourth, they need sales offices, an adequate customer base, and a sophisticated information system to allow them a competitive advantage and interface with intermediaries, Customs, and customers at a level greater than or equal to that of their 

U.S. competitor. Fifth, Mexican carriers must meet all the federal and state requirements that every U.S. carrier must meet. Unlike their drayage counterparts on the 

border, Mexican long haulers must pay U.S. highway use tax. Mexican carriers operating in the United States must demonstrate financial responsibility, show proof 

of insurance or bond, or be self-insured. The insurance issue is a quite serious one 

for Mexican carriers. Their premiums to carry insurance sufficient to meet federal 

minimal liability standards will be exceptionally high because of the lack of actuary 

tables on Mexican motor carriers. Additionally, there is likely to be built into those 

high premiums, revenue to cover unfulfilled judgments should a Mexican carrier 

lose litigation in the United States. If not, the U.S. insurance industry by ‘‘spreading 

the risk’’ among all its customers would have to increase the costs of insurance to 

their U.S. motor carrier clients. 

Mexican carriers must also meet all U.S. motor carrier safety regulations and conform to all U.S. motor carrier obligations. Finally, they must break into or penetrate 

the strong U.S. market sufficiently to survive, let alone to realize a profit. 

The Safety Issue 

At this time, enough has been disclosed and written to dispel the myth of inferior 

Mexican motor carrier safety. While there are many sources of evidence which demonstrate that the Mexican long-haul motor carrier is every bit as safe as U.S. and 

Canadian long haul carriers, three factual reports should be enough to demonstrate 

that safety is NOT an issue. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) asked 

its Inspector General (IG) to investigate truck safety at the southern U.S.-Mexico 

border, presumably to support Clinton’s decision not to admit Mexican carriers into 

the United States. In the DOT IG’s 1998 report, it was expressly stated by the Inspector General that views differ on whether the data used to support the claim of 

unsafe Mexican trucks are statistically representative of the universe of Mexican 

trucks. The report did make it clear that given there were no Mexican long haul 

carriers to inspect, the inspection was made of Mexican drayage or transfer trucks 

used to ferry goods from one side of the border to the other—the worst of motor carrier equipment. What followed, however, was the use of these data to compare U.S. 

and Canadian long haul trucking to Mexican drayage trucking. This was a blatant 

distortion of fact. And if the reader read it carefully, he or she would see that the 

Inspector General acknowledged the distorted and dishonest comparison. Publicly 

reported results of examinations of both Mexican and U.S. drayage trucks by federal 

and state officials over many years demonstrated that, in fact, ‘‘out of service’’ rates 

for Mexican and U.S. drayage were essentially the same. 

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One year later in November 1999, DOT’s Inspector General released another report, again presumably to support the Administration’s contention that unsafe Mexican trucks were operating illegally in the United States through inventive lease 

agreements with U.S. carriers. In this report, the IG cited numerous interceptions 

of Mexican-long haul carriers found operating in the United States. What the IG 

did not highlight from that report was Exhibit D. An analysis of Exhibit D showed 

that of all the Mexican-long haul carriers inspected in the United States, only about 

15 percent were put ‘‘out of service.’’ For the first time, the U.S. had empirical evidence on Mexican long-haulers. However, what that evidence showed was that in 

comparison to the ‘‘out of service’’ rates of U.S. carriers (26%) and Canadian carriers 

(17%), the Mexican long-hauler was ALMOST TWICE as safe as the U.S. long-hauler. Finally, the most obvious evidence came by way of the NAFTA Dispute Panel’s ruling. The panel’s determinations included the following finding. Although the 

United States, through a loophole in the law, is allowing the operation of 150 Mexican-domiciled, U.S.-owned carriers; 5 Mexican-domiciled, Mexican-owned carriers; 

and 1 Mexican-domiciled, Mexican-owned (Mexican-Canada transit, only) carrier in 

or through the United States, the United States could not provide the Dispute Panel 

one piece of evidence of a specific safety problem with these Mexican carriers. 

Costs to the Shipper and/or Consignee 

Since December 18, 1995, the United States has breached its obligations under 

NAFTA. This breach has denied the opportunity for revenue to qualified Mexican 

long haulers and has helped to perpetuate an archaic and costly procedure along 

the southern border. That procedure is known as drayage or transfer carriage. The 

practice of drayage is not only expensive but also risky for carriers and shippers 

alike. The average dollar cost of drayage ranges between $75 to $125 per crossing. 

There have been millions and millions of crossings since December 1995. In 1999 

in Laredo, Texas, alone, a total of 2,793,166 trucks crossed Laredo bridges over 12 

months. If all these trucks were lined up bumper-to-bumper, they would form a line 

34,386 miles long and would stretch from Laredo to the Canadian border 20.7 times. 

Assuming 60 percent were carrying cargo for which there was a drayage charge of 

$100 dollars, that cost alone would amount to $167,589,960 of cost which would be 

unnecessary if opening the border for trucks had led to the opening of the border 

for cargo. It is difficult, if not impossible, to calculate the loss of time and money 

caused by maintaining an outdated transportation practice which is an essential 

condition for an outdated Mexican Customs Broker practice. 

Nonfeasance and the U.S. Department of Transportation 

When the ICC Termination Act went into effect in January 1996, USDOT was 

given clear guidance in publishing rules. These rules were to insure that the distinction between common carrier and contract carrier was eliminated (Sections 14101 

and 14706). The effect of eliminating this distinction would result in, among other 

changes, the removal of a loophole which would allow Mexican motor carriers to file 

for operating authority as contract carriers and therefore not be required to carry 

cargo insurance (49 CFR 387.303 (c)). 

In summary, the impact of Mexican trucking in the United States will be insignificant and likely limited by choice to the U.S. border states, providing a service 

to U.S. long-haulers. National treatment of Mexican carriers will benefit not only 

the U.S. trucking industry in the United States, it will benefit the U.S. trucking industry in Mexico. Opening the border is merely the first step in reducing costs for 

U.S. shippers, and providing faster service to them. The politics tied to this issue 

is not only distorting the truth, it also is jeopardizing the economy of the United 

States even further should Mexico be forced to retaliate justly to defend its rights 

as an equal party to the North American Free Trade Agreement. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, VICE PRESIDENT,

ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY

My name is Jacqueline Gillan and I am Vice President of Advocates for Highway 

and Auto Safety (Advocates), a coalition of consumer, health, safety, law enforcement and insurance companies and organizations working together to advance highway and auto safety laws, regulations, and policies. 

While Advocates’ individual board members hold different views on NAFTA, we 

hold a common view on safety. I am pleased to offer testimony today on several necessary and basic safeguards that must be in place before opening our southern border to unrestricted access by commercial carrier traffic on U.S. streets and roads. 

The proposed rules by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), 

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an agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), for the admittance of 

carriers from Mexico are totally inadequate and further actions are required in 

order to assure the safety of American motorists. My testimony will focus on deficiencies in the proposed rules and recommendations for further action. These recommendations do not conflict with meeting our treaty obligations, but instead will 

improve motor carrier safety as well as prevent unnecessary highway deaths and 

injuries. 

Advocates has a long history of working with this Committee on a broad range 

of highway safety issues and legislation to improve highway safety, including motor 

carrier safety. Motor vehicles crashes are the leading cause of death and injury for 

Americans between the ages of 5 and 27 and result annually in more than 41,000 

deaths and 3.5 million injuries. 

In 1999, almost 5,300 people died in crashes involving large trucks, according to 

the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, and more than 60,000 were injured (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 1999.) When big 

trucks and small passenger vehicles collide, 98 percent of the people who die are 

occupants of the small vehicles. In fact, 23 percent—almost one in four—of all passenger vehicle fatalities in 1999 that occurred in multiple-vehicle crashes were the 

result of collisions involving big trucks with small vehicles. 

Large trucks, year after year, are dramatically over-represented in crash figures 

and disproportionately contribute to highway deaths, injuries, and property damage 

losses. A special study just completed for the FMCSA only a few months ago finally 

quantified the enormous losses we suffer as a nation each year because of truck 

crashes. The agency concluded that large truck crashes cost the U.S. over $24 billion 

every year from loss of life, use of medical and emergency services, property damage, and reduced productivity. 

In recognition of the enormous personal and financial toll of deaths and injuries 

related to truck crashes, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transporation Committee advanced legislation in the 106th Congress to address the severity of the 

large truck crash problem. The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (the 

1999 Act), created a new agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation, 

FMCSA, and gave the agency a clear mission and specific mandates intended to 

stem the tide of human losses attributed to truck crashes. 

The FMCSA was created by Congress with the express mission:

to reduce the number and severity of large-truck involved crashes through more 

commercial motor vehicle and operation inspections and motor carrier compliance reviews, stronger enforcement measures against violators, expedited completion of rulemaking proceedings, scientifically sound research, and effective 

driver’s license testing, recordkeeping and sanctions.

Motor carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Section 4.

Furthermore, both the previous and the current Secretary of Transportation have 

endorsed a goal to reduce truck crash fatalities by as much as 50 percent by the 

end of 2009. 

Unfortunately, little progress has been made towards meeting this goal or fulfilling important mandates contained in the 1999 Act. Since 1996, deaths from big 

truck crashes have been holding at above 5,000 per year. Also, many of the congressionally-mandated responsibilities given to the agency have been met with insufficient actions while statutory deadlines have been delayed or completely ignored by 

FMCSA. The lack of preparedness by the FMCSA for opening the NAFTA borders 

is, in many cases, related to the agency’s apparent indifference to several of these 

statutory mandates. 

Adequately preparing for opening the southern border is especially important in 

light of the numerous studies by the Inspector General of the U.S. DOT, the General 

Accounting Office (GAO), and public interest groups, as well as media stories that 

have documented serious, life-threatening and pervasive deficiencies at the border 

crossings. These include insufficient federal and state enforcement personnel to staff 

the borders; too few inspections and too many trucks put out of service; no permanent inspection facilities at any border crossing outside of California; unreliable and 

unavailable data on the safety of motor carrier companies and drivers; and the absence of a basic system of motor carrier safety oversight in Mexico. 

The Decision of the NAFTA Arbitral Panel Permits the United States to 

Apply Different Standards to Uphold Safety 

While the NAFTA arbitration panel found the United States in violation of its 

treaty obligations, it also found that the United States may have different admission 

procedures for Mexican carriers to ensure that these carriers comply with U.S. regulations. The NAFTA arbitration panel indicated it was acceptable for the United 

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States to individually assess each application submitted by a carrier from Mexico 

to operate in the interior United States and refuse to issue operating authority if 

a particular carrier will not be in compliance with U.S. safety regulations. Paragraphs 300 and 301 of the ruling clearly allow the U.S. to apply, if found necessary, 

different, more stringent safety standards to ensure that the U.S. interest in upholding the safety and welfare of its citizens is fulfilled in awarding operating authority 

to Mexican motor carriers. Moreover, the ruling explicitly states that the U.S. does 

not have to provide favorable operating authority consideration to all or even any 

specific number of applications from Mexico. Mexican motor carriers which fail to 

meet reasonable, case-by-case examination of their safety condition may be barred 

from operating in the U.S. This panel ruling is a baseline legal interpretation of the 

rights and responsibilities of the U.S. in controlling cross-border motor carrier safety. 

It is clear why the NAFTA arbitration panel reached this decision to openly interpret NAFTA to allow the U.S. to uphold the safety of its citizens by applying more 

strenuous safety requirements to Mexican motor carriers applying for U.S. operating 

authority. The panel had been provided with information gathered by the U.S. government showing the continuing poor record of Mexican motor carriers operating in 

our country and the almost total lack of a safety oversight system put in place by 

the Mexican federal government to generate reliable information about the safety 

records of Mexican truck and bus companies. In back-to-back filings with the 

NAFTA Secretariat on June 8 and 9, 2000, our government documented the lack 

of a government-administered safety regime in Mexico. It emphasized that roadside 

inspections of trucks coming into the U.S. from Mexico were completely unequal to 

the task of identifying which carriers were dangerous. In fact, our country’s statements for the record stressed that even a company using new trucks in U.S. operations, which are more likely to pass roadside inspections, nevertheless did not ensure that it would operate safely once it had free operating privileges. Instead, the 

U.S. government stated that only on-site inspections of the company’s operations at 

their places of business, with direct evaluation of their crash experience and other 

carrier operating information, could provide the basis for judging the safety of any 

Mexican trucking firm. Most importantly, the U.S. asserted in its June 9, 2000, filing that:

No review of a Mexican motor carrier based solely on an unverifiable application 

for operating authority can give the United States a sufficient level of confidence regarding the safety of that carrier’s vehicles, no matter how detailed 

an application is required. Secretariat File No. USA–MEX–98–2008–01, June 9, 

2000 (emphasis supplied).

FMCSA Is Following a Course of Action That Degrades Safety and Ignores 

Procedures Permitted by the NAFTA Arbitral Panel 

Only a year after the U.S. made this statement in its filing, the FMCSA, charged 

with protecting the safety of the American people through policies and regulations 

designed to enhance motor carrier safety to the highest degree, as directed by Congress in Section 101 of the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, ignored 

our own government’s position on the unacceptability of paper applications for ensuring public safety and for making awards of operating authority. 

The FMCSA has proposed a dangerously flawed plan for granting new operating 

authority exclusively for motor carriers from Mexico. The plan asks only for 

uncorroborated responses from applicant companies that they understand and will 

comply with the entire range of driver, vehicle, insurance, hazardous material, and 

other legal and safety requirements for freight and passenger transportation in the 

U.S. The agency intends to accept applications that are checked ‘‘yes’’ in the appropriate places as the sole basis for awards of operating authority to Mexican truck 

and bus companies. In fact, there are more than five pages of questions in the Safety Certifications section of the application for both interstate and border zone motor 

carriers regarding an applicant’s knowledge of, and intention to follow U.S. regulations. However, there is only an option to answer ‘‘yes’’ on the application. Regarding questions concerning safety practices, driver qualifications, hours of service, 

drug and alcohol testing, vehicle condition and hazardous materials training and operation procedures, there is no option to even respond ‘‘no.’’

Safety Compliance Reviews of Carriers from Mexico Will Be Conducted 

after FMCSA Grants Operating Authority 

No initial safety compliance review will be conducted to determine whether these 

trucking and bus firms from Mexico actually understand and can comply with U.S. 

safety requirements before they operate on our streets and roads. During 18 months 

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or more of U.S. operations, the FMCSA proposes to conduct safety compliance reviews. However, these safety audits will often not be conducted at the motor carrier’s place of business and the agency will still rely almost entirely on a review of 

the records which the FMCSA will ask Mexican companies to bring to locations 

within the U.S. Advocates strongly opposes this approach and supports a meaningful audit system that relies on an on-site evaluation and inspection of the carrier 

at its place of business. 

FMCSA officials have stated that the purpose of the 18-month interval is to allow 

the agency to compile inspection and truck crash information on carriers during its 

operation in the United States. Using the American motoring public as a safety experiment with inexperienced foreign carriers would never be tolerated in any other 

mode of surface and air transportation or in any medical testing protocol. Yet, the 

FMCSA plans to go forward with this dangerous proposal. 

This is not a system of safety assurance. This proposed approach to the safety 

management of thousands of Mexican trucks and buses is instead an award of an 

18-month safe harbor for potentially dangerous vehicles and drivers. Permitting 

many thousands of new entrants into the U.S. is not a zero-sum safety proposition. 

These trucks and buses will increase their annual travel in the U.S. by more than 

an order of magnitude over the current annual mileage accrued by trucks and buses 

operating only in our southern border zone. This means that the exposure of the 

American people to crashes with trucks and buses from Mexico will dramatically increase. 

Comparisons Between Mexico and Canada Regarding Commercial Carrier 

Safety Oversight Are Misleading 

Critics have argued that differential treatment has been accorded Canada for 

cross-border commercial transportation while disfavoring Mexican freight and passenger motor carrier services in U.S. interstate commerce. Mexico, to date, has operated under the terms of restricted motor carrier access rights because there is no 

functioning safety regime in Mexico implemented and enforced by the government. 

Canadian motor carrier safety standards are very similar to those in the U.S. unlike Mexico. For example, Canada and the U.S. recognize the same set of commercial vehicle safety inspection criteria which are applied on each side of the northern 

border. Moreover, safety compliance reviews using essentially the same standards 

for vehicle and driver safety are conducted by the other country in the host country 

at the place of business of the Canadian or U.S. domiciled carrier. Last, both countries have automated, reciprocal access to each other’s databases of motor carrier 

registrations, roadside inspections results, safety ratings of motor carriers, driver license files, and violations/convictions records. 

Currently, there are no databases comprising these areas of safety oversight in 

Mexico which could be used by U.S. safety auditors and inspectors to review the 

safety compliance records of motor carriers from Mexico. The effectiveness of the Canadian system of motor carrier oversight and regulation is demonstrated in the 

lower out-of-service rate for their trucks compared to the out-of-service rate for U.S. 

trucks. 

Advocates’ Recommendations 

FMCSA must conduct an on-site safety review of carriers from Mexico seeking interstate operating authority in the United States. 

Prior to granting operating authority to any Mexican carrier, the FMCSA must 

conduct an on-site safety compliance review. A safety compliance review should be 

conducted at the carrier’s place of business with independent federal verification of 

driver license validity, equipment safety, inspection and repair facilities, safety 

management controls, and interviews with on-site company officials, in addition to 

other elements of a comprehensive safety compliance effort. A careful case-by-case 

review of motor carrier companies from Mexico as provided by the February 2001 

NAFTA arbitration panel will help to ensure that only the safest companies and 

drivers will be permitted to share the road with American motorists. 

Advocates is not alone in calling for these up-front safety audits of Mexican motor 

carrier safety capabilities. Major national groups and even trucking organizations 

have called for initial, case-by-case safety compliance reviews of new entrant applicants or have opposed reliance on nothing more than a simple, unverifiable paper 

application for gaining operating authority. In addition to Advocates, these include 

the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the Commercial Vehicle 

Safety Alliance (CVSA), the Transportation Lawyers Association, the Transportation 

Consumer Protection Council, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the California Highway Patrol (CHP), the American Bus Association, the Amalgamated 

Transit Union, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, the AFL-CIO, 

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AAA, Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways, the Arizona Department of Public 

Safety, Public Citizen, and the American Insurance Association. All of these organizations agree with our own U.S. government’s position taken in June 2000 that an 

unverified paper application cannot ensure the safety of the American people on 

their highways and streets. And hundreds of ordinary rank-and-file citizens have 

written to the U.S. Department of Transportation decrying the proposal of the 

FMCSA to allow cross-border trucking and passenger transportation operations 

without substantive safety compliance reviews. Without these initial safety compliance reviews conducted on-site in Mexico at a company’s place of business, we are 

needlessly endangering the lives of both U.S. citizens on their own roads as well 

the lives of the drivers who will operate Mexican trucks and buses. 

Strengthen Border Inspection Facilities. 

Most states, including the border states, are completely unprepared to address the 

increased traffic that will result from opening the border. Texas, which has the most 

border crossings and the highest traffic volume of carriers from Mexico, does not 

have permanent inspection facilities at any crossing point. The Texas Legislature 

recently passed a resolution asking Congress to recognize the tremendous impact of 

opening the border to unrestricted travel by Mexican carriers and requested funding 

to pay for the additional infrastructure costs at the border and on its roads. 

Of the current 27 recognized border crossing points, only two (2) have full inspection (Level One Inspection) facilities, both in California. All 27 border crossing 

points should have the facilities available for performing Level One inspections on 

a substantial percentage of Mexican-domiciled carriers seeking entry into the U.S. 

for either commercial zone or nationwide operation. Only a full inspection which intensively evaluates truck equipment and driver safety rather than only Level Two 

(simple ‘‘walk-around’’ or ‘‘eyeball’’ inspections) or only Level Three (only driver 

qualifications evaluations) can both detect serious safety deficiencies and create a 

deterrent effect for other Mexican-domiciled carriers who attempt to evade U.S. 

safety, insurance, licensing, and operating authority requirements. No Mexico-domiciled motor carriers should be granted access to the U.S. when the border is fully 

open unless all U.S. border crossings have Level One inspection facilities in place. 

Require Weight Scales at All U.S. Border Crossings to Confirm that Each MexicoDomiciled Truck or Bus Conforms to Federal Weight Limits Pursuant to 23 

U.S.C. § 127. 

Mexico-domiciled trucks and buses are permitted to operate in Mexico at both axle 

and gross weights which are far higher, and with axle spacings which are more lenient, than permitted in the U.S. under federal law and regulation governing commercial vehicle travel on the Interstate system. Since ample research, including research sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration, has shown that heavier, 

overweight trucks have more crashes and crashes of greater severity, increased 

weight certification at the border of Mexico-domiciled trucks and buses can prevent 

crashes once motor carriers from Mexico operate throughout the U.S. It would be 

preferable if money appropriated and spent for installing weigh scales at all border 

crossing points would be Weigh-In-Motion (WIM) systems so that Mexico-domiciled 

truck and bus weight verification would be automatic and performed for each vehicle entering the U.S. 

Direct the U.S. DOT Secretary to Implement Section 210(b) of the Motor Carrier 

Safety Improvement Act of 1999 by Issuing a Final Regulation After Notice-andComment Rulemaking that Establishes a Proficiency Test of All New Foreign 

and Domestic Motor Carriers Applying for U.S. Operating Authority. 

Currently, Section 210(b) directs the Secretary to conduct rulemaking to establish 

minimum requirements for new entrant applicant motor carriers, but it only suggests that the Secretary may consider adopting a proficiency test for new carriers 

to test their knowledge of U.S. federal safety standards. A safety proficiency test for 

all new foreign and domestic motor carriers applying for U.S. operating authority 

could supplant the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s proposed reliance 

on uncorroborated certifying statements by new entrants that they are knowledgeable about and will conform to U.S. motor carrier safety law and regulation. Successful passage of a safety knowledge proficiency examination coupled with a preliminary safety audit could be the cornerstones 

of a federal program of safety evaluation to ensure that new motor carriers have 

safe equipment, use legally licensed drivers, implement acceptable blood and alcohol 

testing programs, provide adequate safety oversight and regulatory compliance 

mechanisms, and employ only managers and drivers who are knowledgeable about 

U.S. motor carrier safety standards. 

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Direct the U.S. DOT Secretary to Implement Section 211 of the Motor Carrier Safety 

Improvement Act of 1999 by Providing for the Training and Certification of Sufficient Private Contractors for Conducting Safety Audits On the Mexico-U.S. Border. 

Even the addition of another 80 inspectors to southern border inspection points 

may not be sufficient to augment the number of border crossing safety inspections 

and of motor carrier safety audits performed at the business locations of Mexicodomiciled carriers in order to ensure detection of dangerous trucks and buses. A sufficient number of inspections and timely safety audits is necessary to create a substantial deterrent effect for carriers who are tempted to evade U.S. safety and other 

motor carrier laws and regulations. Amplifying the number of federal and state inspectors with private, third-party contractors will strengthen the overall U.S. motor 

carrier inspection and safety auditing program at the southern U.S. border. Currently, Section 211 directs the Secretary to complete rulemaking to improve training 

and provide for certification of safety auditors. The section also provides that some 

of these auditors can be private contractors. Adequate controls can be placed on the 

supplementary use of private contractors to avoid possible problems of fraud and 

abuse, such as allowing only federal inspectors to award an actual safety rating. 

Before the southern borders are opened, the Administration needs to certify that 

safety is not compromised. These recommendations cover the very basic safeguards 

that every American on our roads and highways deserves, and indeed, demands. 

That concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to answer any questions for the 

Committee. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JIM JOHNSTON, PRESIDENT,

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 

Summary 

On behalf of 66,000 independent small business truckers who are members of the 

Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (‘‘OOIDA’’ or ‘‘Association’’), I am 

pleased to submit this testimony regarding the operation of Mexican commercial vehicles within the United States. 

OOIDA would like to first emphasize that the proposal at issue under the North 

American Free Trade Agreement (‘‘NAFTA’’) is not simply the opening of the border 

to Mexican trucks. At issue is the opening of all interstate highways and local roads 

throughout the United States to Mexican trucks. Only from this perspective do you 

begin to understand the great impact that Mexican trucks will have on our country. 

OOIDA believes that no matter how strong our border enforcement is, the majority 

of problems our country will face with Mexican trucks will occur within the interior 

of the states. 

It is well known that Mexican carriers and truckers are not required to meet, and 

frequently fail to meet, U.S. motor carrier safety standards. In response to these 

safety concerns, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has proposed that 

Mexican carriers undergo a ‘‘safety review’’ in the first 18 months of their operation 

in the United States. Some in Congress have suggested that this review must occur 

before a Mexican carrier begins its U.S. operation. Although useful and important, 

this exercise in paperwork would have little practical effect on the safety of Mexican 

trucks operating in the United States. 

The Senate Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee has recommended a 

much more stringent pre-qualification of Mexican carriers and drivers, a stronger 

enforcement presence at the border, better tools for enforcement personnel, and consequences for Mexican carrier violation of U.S. laws. These are very positive and 

necessary actions, but we recommend that more needs to be done. 

There are NAFTA trade rules that implicate Customs and Immigration issues 

which are just as important as the safety issues. Specific restrictions in the NAFTA 

agreement proscribe the activities and movements of Mexican trucks and drivers in 

the United States. Enforcement of these provisions will require the efforts of the 

Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service in coordination 

with state enforcement officials. No such effort has been proposed or contemplated. 

Another overlooked issue is the revenue from fuel taxes, heavy truck excise taxes, 

and highway user fees that the states and the federal government will lose. These 

are important revenue sources that go to build and maintain our highways and 

bridges. When Mexican trucks come into the United States fueled up with cheap 

Mexican diesel, they avoid paying those taxes and replace American trucker who 

used to pay those taxes. There is no plan in place to address this consequence of 

NAFTA. 

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If these issues are not addressed, OOIDA members believe that we will see thousands of unsafe Mexican trucks operating virtually uninhibited on our highways. 

These trucks will not only endanger the safety of our highways but also create an 

issue of fairness to U.S. truckers who pay their fair share of taxes and comply with 

higher safety standards. 

The following is a more detailed discussion of these issues. 

U.S. Enforcement Efforts at the Border are Inadequate. 

The DOT Office of the Inspector General recently published a report that detailed 

the inadequacy of our border enforcement efforts. [See Interim Report on Status of 

Implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Cross-Border Trucking 

Provisions. Report Number: MH–2001–059, May 8, 2001]. It reported that during 

the fiscal year 1997, commercial trucks made 3.5 million crossings into the United 

States at the southern border. Federal and state inspectors performed inspections 

on less than 0.5 percent of those trucks. Furthermore, 44 percent of the trucks inspected were removed from service because of serious safety violations. These statistics demonstrate both our weak enforcement presence on the border and the poor 

physical condition of Mexican trucks. 

Currently, the only permanent inspection facilities at the U.S.-Mexico border are 

the state run facilities in California. Of the other 25 border crossings, the Inspector 

General’s report observed that few have a dedicated telephone line to access transportation databases. Furthermore, a majority of border facilities lacked the physical 

space in which to inspect or place out of service more than two vehicles at a time. 

The DOT has proposed hiring 40 new inspectors and 40 new safety investigators. 

This would bring the number up to 140 total, the level that the Inspector General 

recommended were needed for Mexican truck traffic in 1998. More substantial inspection facilities and many more inspection personnel need to be in place before 

our highways are opened to more Mexican trucks. 

U.S. Enforcement Efforts Within the United States is Nonexistent 

The individual states are on the front line of truck safety enforcement. Once a 

Mexican truck crosses the border, each state, not the federal government, will have 

the responsibility of inspecting Mexican trucks and verifying their compliance with 

U.S. regulations. In this role, it is the state enforcement personnel who must know 

whether a Mexican truck and driver is operating safely and within the bounds authorized by NAFTA. 

OOIDA is aware of no effort by any state, except perhaps California, to adequately take on the enforcement of the laws and regulations raised by Mexican 

trucks. California’s effort is limited to the inspection of the vehicle. OOIDA is aware 

of no effort by any federal government agency to educate the states on these issues 

or to give them the authority to enforce these laws and regulations. Such efforts 

must be a part of any thorough plan to allow more Mexican trucks onto our highways. 

Mexican Trucks Rarely Comply With U.S. Safety Law 

There is no true equivalent of the U.S. Commercial Driver License (‘‘CDL’’) system 

in place in Mexico. 

While both U.S. and Mexican government officials claim Mexico’s commercial driver licensing requirements are equivalent to the U.S. rules, statistics from border 

checks indicate that significant problems exist. Lack of a valid license is the top reason for placing Mexican drivers out-of-service (‘‘OOS’’) according to the Office of the 

U.S. Trade Representative. A recent spot check by the Texas Department of Public 

Safety found 9 of 12 drivers lacked valid licenses. Even if the license is valid and 

legally obtained, little or no data exists in Mexico that can accurately confirm that 

information. Nor can U.S. inspectors identify the details of a driver’s violation history or accident record. They may not even be able to tell whether the license presented belongs to the driver carrying it. 

There is no viable truck safety inspection program in Mexico. 

There are few if any trained Mexican commercial motor vehicle inspectors that 

measure up to the U.S. standards. While the Mexican government insists it enforces 

very strict commercial vehicle and driver standards, Mexican truckers report that 

the main condition to compliance is the financial persuasion of enforcement officials. 

Although Mexico joined the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (‘‘CVSA’’) and has 

agreed to adopt CVSA training, inspection and enforcement practices, the CVSA has 

failed, despite repeated attempts, to obtain inspection data from the Mexican government. There is no proof that Mexico is inspecting any vehicles or drivers. Unless 

Mexico quickly makes significant strides to ensure the safety of Mexican motor carVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
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rier equipment and drivers, the entire burden of safety compliance will fall squarely 

on U.S. enforcement efforts. 

There is no drug and alcohol testing program comparable to that of the U.S. program in Mexico 

U.S. drivers are extensively tested for use of controlled substances and alcohol. 

Although Mexico claims to have a program in place, the Association believes they 

have no means or will to enforce the rules. In fact, it is reported that Mexican drivers frequently use drugs in order to drive longer hours. Amazingly, sometimes the 

use of these drugs is encouraged by their trucking employer. 

It would be inherently inequitable to allow Mexican drivers to operate in the U.S. 

without being subject to the same stringent standards required of U.S. drivers. To 

permit a certain class of drivers to be largely and effectively ‘‘exempt’’ from these 

regulations would be a manifest injustice and place U.S. truck drivers at a distinct 

economic disadvantage and all drivers at a safety risk. 

Mexico has no driver hours-of-service regulation. 

There is no way to begin to verify how many hours a Mexican driver has operated 

in any given day or week. It has been reported that Mexican drivers commonly operate 16 to 20 hours a day or more. Regardless of whether Mexican drivers adhere 

to the U.S. standard while operating in the U.S., there is no way of knowing how 

long the driver had been driving prior to entering our country. 

Mexico Has No Viable Vehicle Size and Weight Enforcement 

Mexico has no effective weight enforcement for its vehicles. There are no fixed 

weigh station facilities in Mexico, and none on the U.S. side at the border. OOIDA 

fears that an influx of overweight Mexican trucks will cause a significant degradation in U.S. highway safety and the infrastructure. 

Mexican truckers who know or learn their way around state scales could conceivably travel throughout the United States and back into Mexico without ever being 

weighed. Fixed weigh stations at border crossings must be established in the United 

States to assure that Mexican trucks meet federal weight restrictions. FMCSA did 

not consider the additional costs of these facilities in their budget proposal. Millions 

of dollars in additional funds will be required to erect these weigh station facilities. 

Mexican Trucks Avoid State and Federal Fuel Taxes and Highway User 

Fees 

Mexican carriers have in the past installed additional fuel tanks to carry extra 

high sulfur fuel purchased at a much lower cost in Mexico. These vehicles can travel 

hundreds and even thousands of miles during each trip on U.S. highways without 

ever buying fuel in the U.S. In doing so, these Mexican trucks avoid paying any 

state and federal fuel taxes. Furthermore, they take the place of U.S. trucks and 

drivers that currently do pay those taxes and every other tax levied on us as citizens, including state and federal income and payroll taxes. 

The principal way that highways and bridges are financed in the U.S. is through 

taxes assessed on the trucking industry. Fees and taxes on highway use are primarily collected through registration fees and through taxes on fuel consumed under 

the International Registration Plan (‘‘IRP’’) and the International Fuel Tax Agreement (‘‘IFTA’’), respectively. Since Mexico does not participate in either plan, the 

fees and taxes cannot be collected under the agreements, and U.S. truck owners 

bear the entire cost of highway repair and new highway construction. 

Mexican Trucks Already Violate NAFTA Rules 

Once a Mexican truck passes through the border, the United States has no plan 

to ensure that they only perform the limited operations allowed by NAFTA. Under 

NAFTA, a Mexican truck can only deliver a cross-border shipment to a destination 

in the United States, pick up another shipment for return to Mexico, or drive 

through the United States on the way to Canada. We have no system in place to 

ensure they adhere to these restrictions. 

When a Mexican truck driver begins to violate NAFTA by hauling between two 

points within the United States, he or she has begun to perform domestic work 

within the U.S. and must have proper documentation (such as a green card) to do 

so. When a Mexican truck begins to haul between two points within the United 

States, ‘‘technically’’ that truck has been imported into the U.S. and all applicable 

duties and tariffs must be paid on it. 

The INS and Customs Service are unprepared to supervise Mexican truck compliance with these rules. As the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation has reported, Mexican trucks, ostensibly allowed into the country for shipVerDate Apr 24 2002 14:13 Feb 27, 2004 Jkt 089350 PO 00000 Frm 00168 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\89350.TXT SCOM1 PsN: CAROLT
165

ments to the commercial border zones, are already flaunting this NAFTA rule by 

operating throughout the United States. 

Aside from the initial contact when a truck enters the United States at the border, U.S. Customs and INS personnel rarely, if ever, come in contact with a foreignbased motor carrier’s vehicles and drivers. Most state motor carrier enforcement 

personnel, those who regularly encounter commercial vehicles in the interior of the 

country, are trained only to enforce federal and state vehicle and driver safety regulations. Few consider the origin and destination of a load, and how the movement 

may relate to the motor carrier’s country of domicile. Furthermore, state enforcement agencies appear unwilling at this point to take on the task of enforcing cabotage restrictions. Even if state CMV enforcement agencies received the necessary 

funding, and inspectors were properly trained and had the requisite authority, there 

is simply not enough staff to catch more than a token number of violators. 

There Will Be No Reciprocal Benefit From Mexico To the United States 

Under NAFTA each country has promised the others to give equal access to its 

markets. Practically speaking, however, Mexico is not prepared to give American 

trucking companies the same kind of safe and secure highways as their trucks will 

find in the United States. The reputation of the crime rate in Mexico and of Mexican 

law enforcement inspires few U.S. truckers to risk their own safety and security by 

trucking south of the border. We have attached an article that describes the routine 

danger of truck shipments being hijacked in Mexico. 

In terms of trucking, the benefits of opening the border all flow toward Mexico. 

Mexican truckers gain access to new markets and customers on the safest and most 

open highway system in the world. In return, the U.S. truckers are invited to travel 

more dangerous highways while the U.S. government gets the burden of performing 

safety enforcement for both countries. 

Conclusion 

Allowing Mexican trucks into the United States at this time is not in the best interest of the American public or U.S. drivers and small business truckers. Truck 

safety and highway conditions will suffer greatly. Mexican motor carrier and driver 

safety regulations are either inadequate or non-existent. Allowing the border to open 

without correcting these inadequacies will result in a substantial decline in truck 

safety. 

Border enforcement capabilities will need to be strengthened prior to allowing 

Mexican trucks into the U.S. Unless adequate personnel are deployed at border 

zones and additional funding is committed to provide permanent border weight and 

inspection facilities, there will be no way to ensure that Mexican carriers comply 

with United States laws and regulations. The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee has recommended some strong, realistic rules to address these safety issues. 

It is OOIDA’s belief that few Mexican carriers are educated in the numerous federal and state laws they will encounter. While many of these regulations and laws 

are within the control of the FMCSA, implementation of the entry provisions of 

NAFTA will require a cooperative effort among members of the FMCSA, INS, U.S. 

Customs Service and state enforcement officials. Coordination between the federal 

and state governments will also be necessary to recover the fuel taxes and user fees 

not paid by Mexican trucks. 

Allowing Mexican trucks into the U.S. should not compromise the safety of our 

highways. Until measures are put in place to ensure that Mexican trucks and drivers entering the U.S. are in compliance with NAFTA trade rules and all United 

States transportation laws and regulations, OOIDA remains adamant that the 

United States-Mexico border remain closed. Thank you for the opportunity to 

present these comments. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES LA SALA, INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT,

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL–CIO 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

On behalf of the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), which represents over 

175,000 members maintaining and operating bus, light rail, ferry, intercity bus, 

school bus and paratransit vehicles in the United States and Canada, including over 

5,000 Greyhound employees operating from 88 cities throughout the United States, 

I am pleased to submit this testimony on whether Mexican-domiciled motor carriers 

should be allowed to operate throughout the United States. In addition, I thank you 

for holding a hearing on this crucial safety and fairness issue. 

Initially, I take this opportunity to affirm our longstanding commitment to the 

safety and security of U.S. bus passengers and operators, as well as the rest of the 

166

traveling public. As such, we welcome the opportunity to work with this Committee, 

Congress and the Administration, toward a safe, effective and fair implementation 

of the cross-border passenger motor carrier provisions of the North American Free 

Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At this time, however, the ATU is firmly opposed to the 

proposed opening of the U.S.-Mexico border to cross-border passenger motor carrier 

operations. 

As you know, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out the FY 2002 

Transportation Appropriations bill (S. 1178) last week, including in the bill several 

provisions drafted by Senator Patty Murray, Chair of the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee, to address the issue of motor carrier safety with respect to 

Mexican cross-border truck and bus operations. These provisions are similar to 

those included in House Resolution 152. In addition to these pending bills, the 

House Transportation Appropriations bill (H.R. 2299) that passed the House of Representatives a few weeks ago includes language barring the U.S. from granting operating authority to any Mexican motor carriers. The ATU supports all of these bills 

which address many of the ATU’s safety concerns. However, the ATU does have several concerns, specific to the intercity bus industry, that may require separate legislative action. These concerns are discussed below. 

Specifically, it is the position of the ATU that:

(1) Mexican buses should not be authorized to operate in the U.S. absent reciprocal treatment of U.S. buses by Mexico; 

(2) Mexican buses must be certified as safe before the first day they are authorized to operate in the U.S.; 

(3) The U.S. border crossing must be adequately equipped and staffed and inspectors must be fully trained before operating authority can be granted to 

any Mexican bus operation; and 

(4) U.S. subsidiaries of Mexican companies must be subject to the same standards and reviews as their Mexican parent company.

Mexican Buses Should Not be Authorized to Operate in the U.S. Absent Reciprocal Treatment of U.S. Buses by Mexico 

As you know, on February 6, 2001, a NAFTA dispute resolution panel ruled that 

the U.S. violated its NAFTA obligations by not implementing the NAFTA cross-border trucking provisions. As a result, the Administration has moved forward with a 

plan, as evidenced by the implementation rules recently proposed by the Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), to fully open the border to both

Mexican trucks and buses by January 2002. 

It is important to note that the NAFTA panel decision concerned only the implementation of NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provisions and no similar ruling has 

been issued with respect to the cross-border passenger motor carrier provisions. As 

such, there is no need to hastily open the border to Mexican buses without first ensuring not only their safe and legal operation, but also a level playing field for U.S. 

competition. 

In fact, granting operating authority to Mexican-owned buses at this time is premature under the terms of NAFTA, which provides that, upon opening the border, 

Mexico is obligated to provide the ‘‘same treatment’’ to U.S. bus firms as the U.S. 

provides to Mexican firms. However, the Mexican and U.S. governments have taken 

different positions on several important operational issues that would result in vastly different treatment of the foreign bus operations in each country, involving access 

to bus terminals and the ability to provide service to multiple points within each 

country. 

Specifically, the Mexican government has taken the position that it would only 

authorize U.S. bus companies to provide cross-border service to one point in Mexico. 

In contrast, the position of the U.S. government, made evident by the FMCSA’s proposed implementation rules, is to authorize Mexican operators to provide cross-border service to multiple points in the U.S. Additionally, while the U.S. has not proposed to place any restrictions on the ability of Mexican companies to own or operate bus terminals in the U.S., Mexico’s position has been to strictly prohibit foreign 

ownership or operation of Mexican bus terminals.

The different treatment accorded foreign bus companies by the two countries 

would result in unfair competition and would be a violation of the ‘‘same treatment’’

requirement imposed by NAFTA. As such, the U.S. should not open the border to 

Mexican buses until Mexico has agreed to provide reciprocal authority to U.S. owned 

or controlled passenger motor carriers operating in Mexico. 

H.R. 2299 addresses this issue by simply prohibiting the opening of the border. 

Likewise, H. Res. 152 addresses the issue by requiring that a reciprocity agreement 

be reached by Mexico and the United States before operating authority can be 

167

granted to Mexican bus operations. S. 1178, however, does not address this important issue of reciprocity.

Mexican Buses Must be Certified as Safe Before the First Day They Operate 

in the U.S. 

The Administration is proposing to authorize Mexican passenger motor carriers 

to operate in the U.S. for up to 18 months before receiving a safety review. Further, 

under the FMCSA’s proposed rules, those carriers who do not receive a review within the 18 month time frame, will be allowed to operate in the U.S. for an indefinite 

period until a safety review is conducted. At the same time, the FMCSA recognizes 

that ‘‘Mexican carriers have, for the most part, little or no experience operating 

under regulations comparable to the [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations 

(FMCSRs)]’’ (66 FR 22372). 

The results of an audit conducted by the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) 

Inspector General (IG), released in May of this year, back up the FMCSA’s observation. Specifically, the report stated that the percentage of Mexican trucks found to 

have safety deficiencies is 50 percent higher than that of U.S. trucks. (Report No. 

MH–2000–059, May 8, 2001). Like Mexican trucks, Mexican buses fail to comply 

with U.S. safety requirements for critical safety items such as brakes, fuel systems, 

windows and emergency exits. Currently, there is only one Mexican-manufactured 

bus model that is known to meet the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 

(FMVSS) and the FMCSRs. 

Mexican buses must be safe on the first day they are authorized to operate in the 

U.S. Given the evidence from the IG audit and the observation of the FMCSA that 

these carriers do not and are not prepared to conform their operations to U.S. standards, we cannot allow these buses to operate on our roads and highways for 18 

months, or possibly longer, without first determining that they meet our drug and 

alcohol testing, driver, equipment, hours of service, fatigue and other safety standards. Failure to do so will seriously threaten the safety of U.S. bus passengers and 

others traveling our nation’s roads. All three bills, H.R. 2299, H. Res. 152 and S. 

1178, adequately address these safety concerns. 

The U.S. Border Crossing Must be Adequately Equipped and Staffed and 

Inspectors Must be Fully Trained Before Operating Authority Can be 

Granted to Any Mexican Bus Operation 

As the above-referenced IG study has shown, the U.S. is ill-prepared to handle 

the inspection and enforcement needs that will result from the increase in Mexican 

motor carrier traffic entering the U.S. when the border is fully opened. According 

to the IG, there are only two permanent inspection facilities on the U.S.-Mexico border, both of which are state facilities in California. Of the 25 remaining border 

crossings, 20 do not have dedicated telephone phone lines to access safety databases, 

such as those for validating a commercial driver’s license. Further, almost all of 

these inspection facilities lack adequate space to inspect vehicles and/or place dangerous vehicles out of service. In addition, there are not currently enough inspectors 

to adequately staff border operations. 

Despite these obvious deficiencies at our border, the Administration has not proposed a safety enforcement and compliance program that will ensure the safe operation of Mexican carriers authorized to provide cross-border services into the U.S. 

Such a program must be in place and must be adequately funded before operating 

authority is granted to any Mexican bus or truck operation. 

In addition to being able to stop unsafe vehicles from crossing the border, the U.S. 

must be prepared to ensure that the drivers of Mexican-owned passenger motor carriers are legally allowed to operate the authorized service. While the Administration 

has proposed to allow Mexican drivers possessing a valid Licencia Federal de Conductor (LFC) to operate cross-border bus service into the U.S., it is well established 

law that passenger motor carriers must use U.S. citizens or resident aliens to provide domestic point-to-point passenger service in the U.S., even if that service is 

part of an international operation. The U.S. must takes steps to ensure that Mexican carriers are not only aware of this restriction, but that they are also in compliance with this important immigration law. To accomplish this, FMCSA must work 

with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to develop mechanisms that 

effectively enforce this law, which protects the safety of U.S. travelers and U.S. 

worker jobs. Such an enforcement system must be in place, and publicized, before 

any operating authority, domestic or cross-border, is granted to Mexican-owned carriers. 

Again, H.R. 2299 addresses this issue by completely prohibiting the granting of 

operating authority to Mexican buses and trucks and both H. Res. 152 and S. 1178 

would ensure that the U.S. border crossing is adequately equipped and staffed and 

168

1 A complete list of TTD affiliates is attached. 

that inspectors are fully trained before operating authority is granted to any Mexican bus or truck operation. 

U.S. Subsidiaries of Mexican Companies Must be Subject to the Same Standards 

and Reviews as Their Mexican Parent Company 

In its proposed rule makings, FMCSA has specifically exempted from the special 

application procedures and oversight, U.S. subsidiaries of Mexican companies that 

provide domestic point-to-point service in the U.S. These are the carriers that will 

have the most impact on U.S. travelers since they will be providing both domestic 

and cross-border service to those passengers. As such, their operations should, at 

a very minimum, be subject to the same level of scrutiny and review, with respect 

to safety concerns, as their parent company and other cross-border carriers. 

In fact, equal application of these rules to Mexican-owned subsidiaries in the U.S. 

is necessitated by the recent Memorandum from President Bush to the Secretary 

of Transportation lifting the moratorium on Mexican owned and controlled companies providing domestic bus service in the U.S. In his letter, President Bush stated 

that all such entities ‘‘will be subject to the same Federal and State regulations and 

procedures that apply to all other U.S. carriers.’’ Unless these Mexican-owned subsidiaries are subject to the same application and review procedures proposed for 

other Mexican carriers, there will be no way to ensure that these Mexican bus companies, carrying U.S. passengers, are conforming their operations to U.S. standards. 

Further, this exemption would result in a loophole through which Mexican passenger motor carriers could bypass entirely safety fitness evaluations by setting up 

a U.S. subsidiary that can combine its U.S. domestic bus authority with its Mexican 

parent’s domestic and cross-border Mexican authority to provide an integrated domestic and cross-border service. Again, given the observations of the FMCSA that 

Mexican operators are unfamiliar with U.S. safety regulations, and therefore must 

be subject to special safety scrutiny, we cannot allow these Mexican-owned U.S. subsidiaries to operate without the thorough safety evaluation that the FMCSA says 

is needed. None of the pending bills, H.R. 2299, H. Res. 152 or S. 1178 address this 

issue. 

Conclusion 

In closing, I again emphasize the unyielding commitment of the ATU to the safety 

and well-being of the traveling public. It is for that reason, as well as those discussed above, that the ATU is opposed to the proposed opening of the U.S.-Mexico 

border to Mexican-owned bus operations until such time as our government can ensure to the American people that buses traveling into the U.S. from Mexico, as well 

as Mexican-owned buses operating throughout the U.S., comply with all safety, 

health and labor requirements as mandated under U.S. laws and regulations, and 

until the U.S. and Mexico have come to an agreement with respect to ensuring that 

the two countries provide the ‘‘same treatment’’ to foreign bus companies operating 

in each country. 

Again, we express our thanks to the Committee for the opportunity to testify on 

this matter and we look forward to working closely with this Committee, Congress 

and the Administration to ensure a safe and fair implementation of the NAFTA 

cross-border passenger motor carrier provisions. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD WYTKIND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

TRANSPORTATION TRADES DEPARTMENT, AFL–CIO 

My name is Edward Wytkind. I am the Executive Director of the Transportation 

Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD). On behalf of the TTD and our 33 affiliated 

unions,1 I want to thank you Chairman Hollings for holding this hearing and for 

giving transportation labor an opportunity to share our views on the current proposals to allow Mexican commercial trucks and buses to operate in the U.S. 

TTD affiliates represent hundreds of thousands of truck and bus drivers employed 

in all areas of our nation’s transportation system. As such, our collective interest 

in this issue and in promoting transportation safety is substantial. Let me state up 

front our continuing opposition to opening up the U.S.-Mexico border to 

unencumbered cross-border traffic. We remain concerned that the U.S. government 

cannot ensure that Mexico-domiciled motor carriers will comply with all safety and 

health requirements as mandated under U.S. laws and regulations. We urge that 

the border remain closed until Mexico fully brings its safety regime to an acceptable 

169

2 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a). 

standard and the U.S. substantially improves its border inspection capabilities and 

infrastructure. 

With that said, I think it is important that we review how we got to this point 

under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) process. NAFTA went 

into effect in 1994 with provisions allowing Mexico-domiciled motor carriers increasing access to U.S. highways. These NAFTA provisions required the U.S. to open access to all U.S.-Mexico border states in December 1995 and to permit Mexico-domiciled motor carriers to travel throughout the entire United States as of January 

1,200. Until these provisions are implemented Mexico-domiciled carriers may operate in a border commercial zone ranging from 3 to 20 miles into the U.S. to drop 

off loads destined for U.S. interior states. 

In 1995, due to a number of unresolved safety concerns, President Clinton maintained limited access to the border commercial zones and did not allow any greater 

access to the rest of the U.S. In 1998, Mexico challenged the President’s decision 

before a NAFTA tribunal, demanding that the U.S. abide by its NAFTA commitments and open its highways. On February 6, 2001, the final NAFTA panel report 

ruled that the safety of Mexico-domiciled trucks was a legitimate concern and provided that the U.S. could, consistent with NAFTA, promulgate stricter requirements 

for registration of Mexico-domiciled carriers than are used for the registration of 

U.S. carriers. It also held that the U.S. was required to start processing foreign 

motor carrier applications on a case-by-case basis. Although this particular case only 

concerned the trucking provisions of NAFTA, it is expected that the DOT will conclude bilateral bus passenger carrier negotiations at the same time as the trucking 

negotiations. 

The United States is under no legal obligation to implement the findings of the 

NAFTA panel. Under U.S. law, to the extent NAFTA conflicts with any U.S. law 

dealing with health, environment and worker safety, U.S. laws prevails.2 Even 

under the terms of NAFTA, the U.S. is entitled to disregard the panel’s rec- ommendation. Under NAFTA dispute settlement provisions, if the U.S. does not 

agree to open the border to Mexican motor carriers, it can offer to compensate Mexico with new trade benefits and cash payments. However, if Mexico refuses to negotiate terms of compensation, NAFTA permits Mexico to take compensation in the 

form of levying reciprocal trade sanctions against the U.S. Despite the fact that the 

U.S. is not required to open the southern border to unsafe motor carrier traffic, the 

Bush Administration seems poised to open the border by the end of the year. 

This apparent decision by the Bush Administration goes against the enormous 

body of evidence that far too many safety hazards remain unresolved and that the 

U.S. is ill-prepared to handle the massive influx of foreign traffic that would result 

from the opening of the border. In the late 1990s, studies by the Department of 

Transportation’s Inspector General (‘‘IG’’) and the General Accounting Office 

(‘‘GAO’’) established that Mexican transportation companies were ill-prepared to 

comply with all U.S. laws and regulations. These same studies have also exposed 

the fact that our government is not prepared to carry out its enforcement and inspection responsibilities at the border and on American highways. These facts were 

recently reconfirmed by a new IG report that found that while some improvements 

have been made since the IG last investigated the safety of Mexico-domiciled motor 

carriers in 1998, Mexico-domiciled motor carriers are still not as safe as U.S. carriers, and U.S. border inspection facilities are still inadequate to investigate the 

safety of Mexico-domiciled motor carriers as they cross the border. 

Mr. Chairman, these are troubling facts in light of Mexico’s commitment to harmonize its safety standards to the level of the United States and Canada. In 1994, 

the three NAFTA countries established a Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee (‘‘LTSS’’) to address the different rules and standards between the 

NAFTA countries. At the time, transportation labor was concerned that the LTSS 

had the potential of lowering U.S. highway and other transportation safety standards. Our goal has been the adoption of a common set of standards that raises each 

trading partner’s existing transportation safety standards to the highest common 

denominator found in any of three countries. In doing so, strong safety standards 

guarantee the fair trade necessary to protect and promote the well-being of citizens 

in each of the signatory countries. 

However, to date this committee has not completed its work and certainly has not 

accomplished a leveling-up of the Mexican highway standards. Mexico has no hoursof-service restrictions, roadside inspections are now voluntary, driver’s licensing requirements are brand-new and permit commercial drivers under age 21, has no accurate database to track safety violations of its carriers and drivers, and has new 

and untested logbook requirements. Without needed improvements in Mexican 

170

standards and the necessary resources to enforce these upgraded standards, any 

opening of our southern border is grossly premature, and is doomed to sacrifice safety and labor standards. 

Against the backdrop of all these developments, an overwhelming majority of the 

U.S. House of Representatives and a majority of the U.S. Senate has continued to 

endorse comprehensive safety standards before opening the U.S.- Mexico border to 

commercial motor vehicles. In 1999, 258 members of the House of Representatives, 

led by Reps. James Oberstar (D-MN) and Jack Quinn (R-NY), joined together to 

urge President Clinton to maintain the cross-border restrictions until both countries 

agree on comprehensive safety standards, establish and successfully test effective 

enforcement programs, and staff border facilities with full-time inspectors. In the 

same year, 48 U.S. Senators, led by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Ben 

Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), sent the same clear message to the President. 

More recently, the Congress has again gone on record supporting comprehensive 

safety standards before allowing Mexico-domiciled motor carriers to the enter the 

United States. On June 26, 2001, the House of Representatives, by an overwhelmingly vote of 285 to143, adopted an amendment to the Department of Transportation 

Appropriations bill (H.R. 2299) prohibiting any funds from being used to process applications by Mexico-domiciled motor carriers for conditional or permanent authority 

to operate beyond the commercial border zone. During debate on the House floor, 

the amendment’s primary sponsor, Rep. Martin Sabo (D-MN), made clear that it 

was unacceptable to permit 18 months to elapse between the time that a Mexicodomiciled carrier is granted U.S. operating authority and the completion of a thorough Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) safety review of the applicants. He further asserted that the proposed FMCSA paper review is not sufficient, and that FMCSA officials should be able to conduct a more thorough review, 

including audits of Mexico-domiciled carriers’ home offices, prior to granting even 

conditional operating authority. TTD strongly agrees with Representative Sabo’s 

measure, and we believe that the debate on this amendment clearly demonstrated 

again that a substantial majority in the House of Representatives remains committed to the highest safety standards at our border. 

On the Senate side, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out the FY 

2002 Transportation Appropriations bill (S. 1178) last week, including in the bill 

several provisions drafted by Senator Patty Murray, Chair of the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee, and ranking member Senator Richard Shelby, to address the issue of motor carrier safety with respect to Mexican cross-border truck 

and bus operations. TTD supports the Murray-Shelby measures which address most 

of our safety concerns. 

At this point, I would like to address some of our safety concerns with the cross 

border policy of this Administration. It is this Committee’s responsibility to address 

safety on our nations roads and highways. Anything that might have a negative impact on safety ought to be addressed in an immediate and responsive way by the 

Congress and the Department of Transportation. The admittance of Mexico-domiciled motor carriers will change the landscape of our highways and we need to be 

prepared to integrate them into our system safely and without sacrificing the safety 

of the traveling public. 

In May of this year, the FMCSA published three notices of proposed rulemaking 

and requests for comments concerning procedures for the registration and safety 

monitoring of Mexico-domiciled carriers. Two of the rulemakings propose new forms 

for Mexico-domiciled motor carriers applying for operating authority in the commercial border zones and nationwide. The third rulemaking addresses the establishment 

of a safety oversight program. Without going into all the specifics of these 

rulemakings, suffice it to say these rulemaking are inconsistent with our long held 

views that Mexico-domiciled motor carriers should have to meet the same comprehensive safety standards that U.S. carriers must meet and should demonstrate 

compliance before being granted operating authority. 

Two years ago this committee held hearings on motor carrier safety and how to 

improve it. Those hearings led this committee to create the FMCSA to protect the 

safety of U.S. highways. At the time, TTD affiliates strongly supported strengthening the legislative and regulatory framework supporting the Department of 

Transportation’s (DOT) safety programs which, prior to the FMCSA’s creation, drew 

criticism from the Congress regarding its effectiveness. Today, the newly created 

FMCSA is still under pressure to increase resources to support a proper level of 

safety oversight and inspection and bring greater focus to issues such as the safety 

hazards posed by Mexico-domiciled motor carriers entering our southern borders. 

171

3 49 U.S.C. § 13902

Under statutory requirements,3 the agency is required to register only those 

motor carriers that can demonstrate that they are fit, willing, and able to comply 

with U.S. safety and financial responsibility requirements. Furthermore, the 

FMCSA is required to consider all available evidence and make a determination 

that the carrier is fit prior to issuing registration to operate in the United States. 

With these standards in mind, we believe the FMCSA does not have an adequate 

implementation plan in place to ensure that all Mexico-domiciled carriers meet 

these legal requirements. 

Moreover, the proposed safety monitoring rulemaking is supposed to enhance 

safety oversight but provides no indication as to how this is going to be accomplished and with what resources. Needless to say, without specific procedures outlined or any credible plan for a substantial increase of enforcement personnel along 

the border, these proposed new rules will fail to raise the bar on safety. It is also 

not clear when these rules would be implemented and whether they could be accomplished in the short time frame established by the Bush Administration for liberalizing cross-border truck and bus operations between the U.S. and Mexico. 

We also believe that the safety inspection process should occur even before motor 

carriers cross the border, with carrier audits being done even earlier. U.S. enforcement officials should be permitted to inspect truck and bus companies base operations in Mexico. These visits should include the evaluation of company safety management practices, knowledge of and compliance with U.S. regulations, vehicle inspections, and education of drivers, dispatchers, mechanics and management. These 

procedures would not be without precedent. The Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) safety authorities routinely inspect foreign airlines in the United States and 

abroad, to ensure these carriers are complying with safety regulations. 

Another deficient area in the proposed rules is the failure to deal effectively with 

bus issues. As detailed in the testimony of Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) 

President Jim LaSala, the proposed rules fail to establish any plan or meaningful 

mechanism for monitoring the unique safety issues that exist for Mexico-domiciled 

passenger motor carrier operations. Mexican buses and passenger vans have safety 

problems similar to those of Mexican trucks. Very few are inspected and those that 

are have a much higher out-of-service rate compared to U.S. vehicles. Because buses 

and vans carry people, the Department of Transportation has always held these passenger motor carriers to the highest safety standards. We believe the same must 

be true for Mexican-owned bus and van operations. There are a variety of unique 

and important passenger carrier issues that must be addressed including the threat 

to U.S. passengers from Mexican-owned or controlled passenger motor carrier companies operating buses domestically in the U.S., developing a clear system that ensures that all Mexican-manufactured buses entering the U.S. comply with relevant 

safety standards, and the increasing use of unsafe camioneta vans on our highways. 

These real unresolved safety concerns in the Administration’s plans to the open 

the border are only compounded by an inadequate inspection force at the border 

that is completely unprepared for the influx of newly admitted carriers. Currently, 

less than one percent of the 4.5 million motor carriers that enter the U.S. at our 

southern borders are inspected. Additionally, the number of federal inspectors at the 

border is less than half of the number that was estimated to be necessary in 1998, 

and that number did not include the investigators that will be necessary for the 

agency to conduct its 18-month safety reviews. Also, only 2 of 27 border crossings 

have permanent inspection facilities, both of which are state facilities in California 

which is nationally recognized as already having a good inspection program. We believe that this situation along the border is inexcusable and gives a very clear indication that in no way will our government be prepared to open the border by the 

first of next year. Our position is that we must increase inspection resources to ensure every motor carrier entering the United States is inspected. 

Conclusion 

Based on all the evidence that exists, it is clear that the U.S. is not prepared to 

step up to the myriad inspection and enforcement duties associated with permitting 

uninspected Mexican commercial traffic on our highways. The current bilateral process being employed by the U.S. and Mexico for the purpose of harmonizing standards and regulations is failing to produce satisfactory solutions to the many serious 

unresolved safety hazards along the border. Additionally, our government cannot 

ensure that Mexico-domiciled carriers will comply with all safety and health regulations, nor has it developed a safety enforcement implementation plan for safely 

opening the border. For these reasons, we believe it would be irresponsible for our 

government to expose U.S. highway users, including truck and bus drivers, to the 

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safety threats posed by giving Mexico-domiciled carriers uninhibited access onto 

U.S. highways. We urge you to insist that the Administration reconsider its proposal 

to open the U.S.-Mexico border and work with TTD and our affiliated unions including the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Amalgamated Transit Union to 

keep our border closed to unsafe motor carrier operations. 

Thank you again for giving us an opportunity to share our views on this important matter. 

Attachment 1

TTD AFFILIATES 

The following labor organizations are members of and represented by the TTD:

Air Line Pilots Association 

Amalgamated Transit Union 

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 

American Federation of Teachers 

Association of Flight Attendants 

American Train Dispatchers Department 

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 

Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes 

Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen 

Communications Workers of America 

Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union 

International Association of Fire Fighters 

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 

International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers 

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters 

International Longshoremen’s Association 

International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union 

International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, ILA 

International Union of Operating Engineers 

Marine Engineers Beneficial Association 

National Air Traffic Controllers Association 

National Association of Letter Carriers 

National Federation of Public and Private Employees 

Office and Professional Employees International Union 

Professional Airways Systems Specialists 

Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union 

Service Employees International Union 

Sheet Metal Workers International Association 

Transportation 

Communications International Union 

Transport Workers Union of America 

United Mine Workers of America 

United Steelworkers of America

Æ