1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___ ____ ____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: May

23, 201 6 4 N O. 33, 064 5 STA TE OF NE W MEX ICO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v
. 8 LAWRENC E BR

AN CH, 9 D ef

en dant- Appe llant. 10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF SA N JU AN CO UN TY 11 Wi lli am C . Bi rd sal l, D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 Maris V eidem anis, A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 14 Santa Fe , N M 15 for Appellee 16 Bennett J. Ba

uer, Chief P ublic Defe nder 17 Mary Bar ket, A ssistant Appellate D efender 18 Santa Fe , N M 19 fo r Appe llant1 OPIN ION

2 VA NZ I, Jud ge. 3 { 1} T he re is no que sti on tha t D ef en dant L awre nc e Bra nc h shot a nd i nj ur ed

his 4 ad ult son , Jos huaBr an ch , w itha. 44 c al ibe r re vol ve r. D ef en dant c onf

es se d to the 5 shoo tin g and w as c harg ed w itha ggr av at ed

ba tte ry w itha de ad ly

w ea pon an d 6 ne gli ge nt u se of

ade ad ly w ea pon. H e w as a lso c harg ed w itha ggr av at ed

a ssa ult w ith 7 a deadly

we apon for allegedly assaulting his w ife, Patricia Branch, on the theory that 8 De fendant’ s conduct caused Patricia to re asonablybelieve that he wa s about to batter 9 he r as w el l. T he ke y iss ue at tr ia l w as w he the r the shoo tin g, w hic h w as the ba sis f or 10 al l t hr ee ch arg es , was i n s el f de fen se . 11 { 2} The j ury u l t i m at el y co n v i ct ed De fe n d an to n al l co u n t s . P en al t i es fo r a g g ravated 12 ba tte ry

an d a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult w er e ea chinc re as ed

by one y ear pur suant t o th e 13 statutory

firearm enhancem ent. N MSA1978 , § 31-18-16(A) ( 19 93 )
. T he d i st r i c t c ourt 14 t h e n a d

ju dg edth e ag gr av at edass au lt co nv ic ti on to be a “ se rio us vi ol en t o ffen se ,” 15 w hic h li m its D ef

en dant’ s e lig ibi lity

f or goo d ti m e cr ed it fo r tim e serve d inastate 16 pr is on . See NMS A 1978, § 33-2-34(A) (1) (2006, am ended 201 5). 17 { 3} On appeal, De fendant argues that (1) insufficient ev i d en ce and instructional 18 er ro r re qui re r ev er sa l of

the a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult c onvi ct ion , ( 2) m

ult ipl e puni shm en ts 19 vio la te D ef

en dant’ s r igh t t o be f

re e fr om double j eo pardy , ( 3) disco ve ry a nd2

1 ev ide nti ar

y r uli ngs unde rm ine d D efend an t’ s a bil ity to pr es en t a

de fe nse a nd t o 2 co nf ro nt the S ta te ’ s e vid en ce w ithr es pe ct to al l charg es , a nd ( 4) the se ri ous vio le nt 3 o ff en s e d es i g n at i o n t o t h e a g g ravatedas s au l tco n v i ct i o n l ac k s n ec es s ar y fi n d i n g s . We 4 af fi rm in part , r ev er se in part , a nd r em an d f or th e di str ic t c ourt t o do cu m en t i ts 5 fi ndi ngs re la te d to the se ri ous vio le nt o ff en se de sig na tio n. 6 BACKGRO UND 7 { 4} By

a ll ac co unt s, Jos huaa nd D efend an t sp en t the m or nin g of May 7, 201 2, 8 ar gui ng i n th e fr ont

y ar d, a s th ey

of te n did, abou t ho wbe st t o c ar e fo r the pr ope rty 9 the y oc cu pie d inse parate tr ai le rs . Jos hua , w ho w as a co lle ge stu de nt i n th e spr ing of 10 2012 , le ft

in the m idd le of the ar gum en t to t ak e ane xa m . T he a rg um en t r es um ed upo n 11 his re tur

n and end ed w he n De fe ndant fi re d a si ngl e shot , str iki ng J oshu a in the thi gh. 12 Jos hu a’s inj ur ie s r es ult ed in fi ve sur ge ri es a nd o ngoi ng i ssu es w ithc ir cu la tio n and 13 lim b function. He wa s on crutches when he testified for the State at trial a y ear later. 14 { 5} The sp eci fic cir cu m st an ces su rro un di ng t h e s ho ot in g wer e co nt es te d b el ow. 15 T he S ta te ’ s w itn es se s te sti fi ed that D efend an t wa s vi sib ly ups et —“ ag gr av at ed , 16 ag itate d” —tha t m or

nin g. Whe n Jo shua

f ini she d hi s ex am an d re tur ne d to his pare nts ’ 17 tra il er, Defe nd an t, wi th “ ha tre d i n h is vo ic e,” t ol d hi m to “ ge t . . . o ff th e p ro pe rty.” 18 T he tw o th ensho uted back a nd f orth b ef or e Jos huaa tte m

pte d to le av e. Jos huaa nd 19 Pat ric ia walk ed to ward th e co nc ret e sl ab th at su rro un de d th e st ep s to th e po rch . He3

1 ha d pl an s to m ee t hi s gi rl fr ie nd for lun ch , an d Pa tr ic ia , a tte m pti ng t o e as e the te nsi on, 2 tol d hi m to do tha t. Bu t as Jos huaa nd P atri ci a ta lke d ne ar the f ro nt s te ps, D ef

en dant 3 walk edpa st th em

in to th e h ou se . 4 { 6} At s om e p oi nt pri or , two gu ns —i nc lu di ng a .44 cal ib e r su pe r bl ack ha wk 5 (d es cr ibe d a s a“ hand c an non” by one witne ss) —w er e m ove d f ro m the ir usu al spo t 6 in a closet at the back of the trailer and stashed in D efendant’ s recliner, which fa ced 7 the tr ai le r’ s fr ont en tr an ce . D ef en dant ar m ed him se lf w ith the
. 44 w ith in s ec onds of 8 en te ri ng the tr ai le r an d th en w al ke d bac k to the fr ont doo r. S te ve n H ic km an , af am ily 9 fr ie nd w ho w as vis iti ng the Br an chhom e tha t day , te sti fi ed that D ef en dant “ w en t t o 10 the doo r an d th en[ sa id] ‘ ge t . . . out of he re ’ an d th enbang, j ust li ke that, that qu ic k, 11 the gun was fire d.” 12 { 7} Patr ic iate sti fi ed that she ha d her

hand o n Jo shua ’ s sh oul de r w he n he w as sho t. 13 T he tw o we re fa ci ng one an oth er w he n she l ooke d up a nd s awD ef en dant s tandi ng i n 14 the doorway with the .44. She hollered, “No!” And De fendant fired. She sawthe “ fire 15 com e out” of the gun, felt som ething h it her leg, and saw Joshua f al l
. Sh e testified 16 that she “ thou ght he was going to shoot all of us.” 17 { 8} While Josh ua lay bleeding on the pavem ent, De fendant cam e out of the tr ailer 18 an d p la ceda se t o f ke y s o n t he da sh o f a c a r th atwas p ark edun de r th e car po rt. He 19 the n lo oke d ov er

to Patr ic ia , tur

ne d, a nd wa lke d up the ro ad , sto ppi ng only to d isp ose4

1 of his poc ke t kn if

e in a f low er pot on the way ou t. Pat ri ci a did not se e D ef en dant 2 ag ai n t ha t d ay . 3 { 9} D ef

en dant’ s ve rs ionof

e ve nts dif

fe re d insom e re spe ct s. H e te st ifi ed that he 4 w as sittin g w ithP atri ci a on a sw ing in the y ard whe n Joshuar et ur ne d f ro m sc hool
. 5 De fend an t , who no lon ger w anted to argue, told Joshu a that he w ould leave. When 6 De fendant stood to do so , he saw that J o s h u a wa s furious. A s Def endant walked 7 tow ar d th e tr ai le r, he sawJos huaa nd P atric ia co m ing tow ar d hi m . H e en te re d th e 8 hous e an d sawJos huaout sid e, ne ar ing the por cha nd the n r ea ch ing fo r the ra il by the 9 door
. D ef

en dant w as fr igh te ne d be ca use he kne w tha t Jos huaw as a“ vio le nt k id” w ith 10 post traum atic stress disord er (P TS D) who had been in several f ights before, 11 inc lud ing af

igh t i n th e m ili tary . H e ar

m ed him se lf w iththe
. 44 and s hot

Jos hua , w ho 12 then released the ra il and fell t o t h e con crete . A dditi onal facts w ill be includ ed as 13 ne ed edin th e an al y si s t ha t fo ll ows . 14 DISC US SION 15 A. Instruc tional Error and Suf ficienc y of the Evidenc e 16 { 10} Assault consist s of “ any unlawful ac t, threat or m enacing conduct which causes 17 an oth er

pe rs on to re as ona

bly be lie ve that he is in d an ge r of r ec ei vin g an im

m ed ia te 18 ba tte ry [. ] ” N MS A 197 8, § 30- 3- 1( B) ( 1963 ). T he of fe nse is ag gr av at ed

w he n, a s in 19 this case, it is com

m itted with a deadly

we apon. N MSA 1 9 7 8, § 30-3-2(A ) (1963).5

1 De fendant argues that Section 30-3-1(B) required the State to prove som ething m ore 2 t h a n g e n e r a l c r i mi n a l i n t e n t , wh i c h wa s t h e i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n t o t h e ju ry. S p e c i f i c a l l y, 3 D ef en dant arg ue s th at

the S ta te ha d to pr ove “ spe ci fi c int en t t o frig ht en or put 4 som eo ne in fe ar

of a n im m ine nt batte ry [, ] ” or at the ve ry le as t, that on e ch ar ge d w ith 5 violatin g Section 30-3-1(B) did so r ecklessly
. Reading lim iting principles of this so rt 6 int o th e sta tut e w oul d th eo re tic al ly e nsur e som e ne xus be tw ee n a def en dant and

his 7 vi ct im , t here by

pr ev en tin g w ha t m igh t othe rw ise a m ount to a co nstru ct ionof

the 8 assault statute that crim i na l i z e s the i nf l i ction of em otion al distress for every by stander 9 that is reasonably

put in fear by

the com m issio n of a near

by crim e. 10 { 11} De fendant’ s argum ent is characte rized as a sufficiency

of the evidence 11 ch al le nge , a s a ch al lenge to the j ur y ins tr uc tio ns the m se lve s, a nd a s an a sse rt ionof 12 ine f f e c t i ve a ss i st a nc e o f

t r i a l c ouns e l i n f

a i l i ng t o r e qu e st

m or e d e m a nd i ng j ury 1 3 i n s t ru ct i o n s . “ Ou r r ev i ew fo r s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e e v i d en ce i s d ef er en t i al t o t h e ju r y’ s 14 fi ndi ngs. W e re vie wdir ec t and cir cu m stanti al ev ide nc e in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to 15 the gui lty

ve rd ic t, ind

ulg ing al l r ea sona

ble inf er en ce s and r es olv ing a ll co nf lic ts i n 16 the evidence i n favor of the ver dict.” Sta te v . W eb b , 201 3- N MC A -0 27, ¶

14, 296 P
. 3d 17 1247 (alteration, internal quotatio n m arks, and citations o m itted). W ith respect to j ury 18 ins tr uc tio ns, w e re vie w fo r re ve rs ibl e er ro r w he n an instr

uc tio n is pre se rv ed an d f

or 19 fu nd am en ta l er ro r whe n n ot . Sta te v . B en all y , 2001 -N MS C- 033, ¶ 12, 131 N
. M. 258 ,6

1 34 P
. 3d 1 134. Whe the r pr es er ve d or not , how ev er , D ef

en dant’ s c ont en tio n ul tim at el y 2 rai se s an is su e o f st atut ory in te rp ret at io n, fo r whi ch ou r rev ie w is de no vo . S t a t e v. 3 Tafoya , 2012 -N MS C- 030, ¶ 11, 285 P. 3d 60 4; se e als o State v . O sborne , 199 1- 4 N MS C- 032, ¶

40, 111 N
. M. 654 , 808 P. 2d 624 (“ [I ] t is the duty of the co urt, not the 5 defendant, to instruct the j ury on the essential elem ents of a cr im e. ”). 6 { 12} De fendant’ s view of Section 30-3-1(B) has som e m erit. At c omm on law, “ [a] 7 crim inal assault was an attem pt to comm it a batt er y. A tortious assaul t wa s an act 8 whi ch p ut anoth er in re asonable apprehension of im m ediate bodilyharm .” United 9 States v. D upree , 544 F. 2d 1050, 1051 (9th C ir. 1976 ) (per curiam ) (c itation o m itted). 10 T he la tt er ty

pe —r ea sona

ble appr eh en sio n a ssa

ult —ha s si nc e be enm ad e a cr im e in 11 m any j urisdictio ns, w hich have norm ally adopted sp ecific intent requirem ents rooted 12 in th e of

fen se ’s hi st ory

as a n i nt en ti on al to rt. Ca rte r v . Co m m onw ea lth , 594 S. E
. 2d 13 284, 287 -8 8 ( V a. Ct
. App. 200 4) ; se e, e . g. , R obi nson v. United States , 506 A
. 2d 5 72, 14 575 (D
. C. 198 6) ( “ A n in te nt t o f ri ght en is s uf

fi ci en t[
. ] ”) ; La m b v

. Sta te of M ary lan d , 15 613 A.2d 402, 413 (Md. Ct
. Sp ec . Ap p. 1992) (“ An assault of the intention al 16 fr igh te nin g vari ety

. . . r equir es aspe ci fic int en t t o pl ac e the vic tim in re as ona

ble 17 ap pr eh en sio n of an im m ine nt b atte ry . ”) ; Comm onwealth v. Spencer , 663 N
. E
. 2d 2 68, 18 271 (M as s. App. Ct
. 1996 ) (“ [P ] ro of of a n in te nt t o c au se f

ear is r equir ed
. ”) ; ac co rd 19 Mo de l Pe na l Co de § 2 11 .1(1 )(c) (20 15 ) (“ A per so n i s g u i l t y o f ass au lt if h e . . .7

1 atte m pts by phy sic al m en ac e to p ut anothe r in f ear of im m ine nt s er iou s bo dil y 2 inj ur y . ”)
. T his appare nt unif

orm ity in oth er j ur isd ic ti on s ha s pr om

pte d on e le ad ing 3 tr eatis e to c at eg or ic al ly de cl ar e tha t “ [t ] he re m

ust be a n a ct

ua l i nte nti on t o c au se 4 ap pr eh en si on , un le ss th ere e xi st s th e m or al ly w or se in te nt io n t o c au se bo di ly harm .” 5 2 Wayne R. LaFav e & Dav id C. Bau m , Subs tan tiv e Cr im ina l L aw § 16. 3( b) , at 569 6 (2 d e d. 2 00 3)
. 7 { 13} Bu t tha t i s no t the lawof N ewMe xic o. I n Sta te v . Cr uz , this Court held that 8 spe ci fi c int en t i s no t an e sse nti al e lem en t of a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult
. 197 4- N MC A -0 77, 9 ¶ 7, 86 N. M. 455, 525 P. 2d 38 2. A s a p rinciple of co nstruction , when a statute does 1 0 n o tr e f

e r t o i n t e n t , w h i c h i s t h e c a s e w i t h S e c t i o n 3 0
- 3
- 1 ( B ) , w e n o rma l l y p r e s u me 11 that the onlym ens rea involved is th at of consciou s wr ongd oing —com m onlyref erre d 12 t o a s “ ge ne r a l c r i m i na l i nt ent.” St ate v
. Ca m pos , 1996-NMS C-043, ¶ 56, 122 N. M. 13 148, 921 P
. 2d 1 266 (F ranc hin i, J. , dis se nti ng). We a ppl ie d th at pr es um pti on t o 14 ag gr av at ed

a ssa ult in Cr uz , a nd i n Sta te v. Cu tno se , 1974 -N MC A -1 30, ¶¶ 19- 20, 87 15 N.M. 30 7, 5 32 P.2d 89 6. Cf

. Sta te v. Mascar en as , 197 4- N MC A -1 00, ¶ ¶ 11- 12, 86 16 N
. M. 692 , 526 P
. 2d 1285 (“ [I ] nstru ct ion s in the lan gua ge of the statut e suf

fi ci en tly 17 instruct on the required intent.”)
. 18 { 14} In Sta te v . M anus , our S uprem e Court—apparently pers uaded by

that 19 re as oni ng— co nf

irm ed that ge ne ra l cr im ina l inte nt is all tha t is re qui re d to sup port a8

1 co nv ic ti on of a g g r a v a te d a ss au lt un de r Sec ti on 30 -3 -1 (B). Sta te v . M anus , 197 9- 2 NMSC -0 35 , ¶12 , 93 N.M. 95 , 59 7 P .2d 28 0, overruled on other gro unds by Sells v. 3 Sta te , 198 2- N MS C- 125, ¶ ¶ 9- 10, 98 N
. M. 786, 653 P. 2d 1 62. T he a rg um en ts m ad e 4 in M anus , w hic h w as al so a

by stande r- as sault

c as e, a re ne ar ly

ide nti ca l t o th ose 5 presented here. Apolice officer and a by stander we re f

illing out an accident report 6 whe n th e de fen da nt ap pr oa ch ed an d ki ll ed th e of fic er wi t h a s h o tg un . Id

. ¶ 3. T he 7 de fe ndant w as c harg ed w ithkil lin g th e of

fi ce r an d as sault ing the by stande r on the 8 theo ry th at the by stande r w as put in re as ona

ble f ear of r ec ei vin g an im

m ed ia te 9 ba tt ery. Id

. ¶ ¶ 1, 14. 10 { 15} T he de fe ndant arg ue d th at his c onvi ct ionf

or a ggr av at ed as sault

of the 11 by stande r co uld not stand be ca use “ the re w as no ev ide nc e of an y int en tio na l a ssa

ult 12 directed at [ her] .” Id

. ¶ 12. Our Suprem e Court re j ected that ar gum ent, holding that 13 “ [t ] he [ s] ta te w as not re qui re d to pr ove that [ the de fe ndant] int en de d to a ssa ult [ the 14 by stande r] , but

onl y that he did

a n un lawful ac t w hic h c au se d [ the by stande r] to 15 re as ona

bly be lie ve that sh e w as in dange r of r ec ei vin g an im

m ed ia te ba tte ry , that the 16 act w as done with a deadly we apon, and that it was done w ith general crim inal 17 intent.” Id

. ¶ 14; see State v. Morales , 2002 -N MC A -0 52, ¶ 36, 132 N
. M. 146, 45 P
. 3d 18 406 (“ T o c onvi ct [the d] ef en dant of ag gr av at ed as sault on a pea ce of fi ce r, the [ s] ta te 19 w as not

r equir ed to pro ve tha t [th e d] ef en dant inte nde d to inj ur e or ev en fr igh te n [ the9

1 of fic er].”), ov errul ed on othe r ground s by State v. T

ollardo , 201 2- N MS C- 008, ¶ 37 2 n. 6, 275 P. 3d 1 10; see also United States v. R ede-M endez , 680 F. 3d 552, 557 (6th Cir. 3 2012 ) (“ T he N ewMe xic o ve rs ionof a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult dif fe rs fro m th e ge ne ri c 4 version m ost sig nificantly in the m ens rea it attaches to the elem ent of bodilyinjury 5 or f ear of inj ur y . ”) ; United States v. Silva , 608 F. 3d 663, 675 (10th Cir. 2010 ) (H artz, 6 J. , dis se nti ng) ( “ [A ] pe rs on [ in N ewMe xic o] w ho i nte nti ona lly handl es aw ea

pon in 7 a m an ne r tha t i nduc es af ear of ba tte ry c anbe gu ilty

of a ssa ult e ve n if he m er el y 8 w an ts t o sh owof

f his de xte ri ty

in hand li ng th e we ap on, w ith out a ny int er es t i n 9 in du ci ng fear .”). 10 { 16} T he e xpansi ve appl ic at ionof a ssa ult in M anus c ontro ls our co nstru ct ionof 11 Se ct ion30- 3- 1( B)
. I n a cc or danc e w ith the langua ge of the statut e, the S ta te w as onl y 12 required to prove that Def endant “ did an unlawful act which caused [the by stander] 13 to reasonably

believe that she wa s in danger of rec eiving an imm ediate battery , that 14 the act w as done with a deadly we apon, and that it was done wi t h general cr im inal 15 intent.” M

anus , 1979 -NMSC-035, ¶ 14. T here is no nexus required between 16 D ef en dant and P atri ci a. L ia

bil ity und er the statut e is o nly

li m ite d by

the r equis ite 17 m ental state o f con scious wr ongd oing and by the requirem ent that the victim ’ s fear 18 m us t b e rea so na bl e. Se e id.10

1 { 17} E vid en ce w as pr es en te d th at D ef en dant’ s behavio r on the day of the sho oti ng 2 w a s g e n e r a l l y th r e a t e n i n g . He wa s “ a g g r a v a t e d , a g i t a t e d a t s o met h i n g ” o n t h a td a y; 3 he ha d “ ha tr ed in his voi ce . ” H e w as in the m ids t of a n on goi ng arg um en t w ithJos hua 4 tha t ha d take n a tur

n for the w or se . H e spe nt the m or nin g a ct ing e rr at ic al ly

—dr ivi ng 5 aro un d t he y ardon a ba ck ho e, th reat en in g t o “ pl ow J os hu a’s ho us e d own .” He 6 de m an de d th at

P atri ci a ch oose be tw ee n hi m a nd J oshu a, but she re fu se d to do s o. H is 7 de m ean orpri orto th e sh oo ti ng fri gh te ne d P at ric ia
. 8 { 18} A cc or din g to his ow n ver sio n of eve nts , D ef en dant asc en de d the por chste ps 9 an d saw Jos hua co m ing tow ar d the tr ai le r w ith Patr ic ia “ be hin d him
. ” St ev en an d 10 Patr ic iate sti fi ed

that D ef en dant ar m ed him se lf w ith in “ a co upl e of se co nds” a nd s hot 11 Josh ua while P at ricia w as standing right next to h im . P atricia te stified that she saw 12 th e m uz zl e fl as h, f

el t so m ethin g hi t he r le g, a nd “ tho ught he w as goi ng t o sh oot

a ll 13 of us .” W e v ie w th is tes ti m on y in th e li gh t m os t fa v o r ab le to th e St at e. Se e W eb b , 14 2013 -N MC A -0 27, ¶ 14 . Whi le Defen da nt ’s ver si on of e ve nt s d iff ers in so m e res pe cts, 15 it w as f

or the j ur y to w ei gh the c re dib ili ty of the w itn es se s an d r es olv e an y c onf lic ts 16 in t h e t e st im on y . Se e id. The j ury could conclud e that D efendant com m itted an 1 7 u n l aw fu l ac t (s h o o t i n g J o s h u a) , wh i ch ca u s ed Pa t ri ci a—wh o h ad wi t n es s ed t h e d ay’s 18 ev en ts and w as “ st an di ng rig ht n ex t t o” Jos huaw he n th e shoo tin g oc curr ed —t o 19 re as ona

bly be lie ve tha t she w as al so goi ng to be shot
. T he j urywas p ro perl y11

1 ins tr uc te d onge ne ra l c ri m ina l i nte nt. N oth ing m or e is r equired. Se e M anus , 197 9- 2 N MS C- 035, ¶

14. 3 { 19} D ef

en dant m ak es o ne a ddi tio na l ( an d r el at ed ) ar gum en t w ithr es pe ct to the 4 sufficiency

of the evi dence for the a ggravated assault convi ction. H e contends that 5 the e vid en ce f

ai le d to e sta

bli sh tha t he m ad e an y

thr eat or e xhi bit ed

a ny m en ac ing 6 co nduc t t ow ar d P atri ci a, w hic h he a rg ue s is r equir ed by the statut e. D ef

en dant 7 m isr ea ds S ec tio n 30 -3
- 1 ( B)
. A ssa ult c onsi sts of

“ an y unl aw fu l a ct , thr eat or

m en ac ing 8 co nduc t w hic h c au se s anothe r pe rs on to reason ab ly be lie ve that he is in d an ge r of 9 rece iving an im

m ediate battery [.] ” Id

. The com

m issio n of an “ unlawful act” is an 10 al te rn at ive m etho d of co mm itt ing the of fe nse that do es not

r el y on thr eate nin g or 11 m en aci ng co nd uc t. Se e H ale v . B asi n M

oto r C o. , 1990-NM SC-068 , ¶

9, 110 N. M. 12 314, 795 P
. 2d 1 006 (“ [T ] he w or d ‘ or ’ shou ld be giv en its nor m al dis j unc tiv e m eanin g 13 unl es s the co nte xt of a sta tut e de m an ds oth er w ise
. ”)
. It w as , in fa ct , the pr ong of the 14 sta tut e app lie d in M

anus , w he re the sta te w as not re qui re d to pr ove an y thr eat— or a ny 15 co nduc t a t a ll— dir ec te d to w ar d th e by stande r. 197 9- N MS C- 035, ¶ 14. T he re is 16 ab undant e vid en ce to supp ort a fi ndi ng tha t D ef en dant a ct ed

unl aw fu lly

w he n he sho t 17 Josh ua.12

1 B. Doub le Jeopardy 2 { 20} W e ne xt t

ur n to the vari ous doub le j eo pardy iss ue s that D ef en dant r ai se s. T he 3 co nst itu tio n pr ote ct s a ga ins t both s uc ce ssi ve pr ose cu tio ns and m ult ipl e puni shm en ts 4 fo r th e sa m e o ffen se . Sw aff ord v. Sta te , 1991 -N MS C- 043, ¶ 6, 112 N
. M. 3, 810 P
. 2d 5 1223
. T he re ar e tw o ty

pe s of m ult ipl e puni shm en t c as es : ( 1) uni t of pr ose cu tio n c as es , 6 in which an indiv idual is convicted of m ultip le violatio ns of the sam e cr im inal statute; 7 an d ( 2) double -d es cr ipt ionc as es , in w hic h a single ac t re sul ts in m ult ipl e co nvi ct ion s 8 un de r di ffer en t s ta tu te s. Id

. ¶ ¶ 8- 9. D efendant’ s arg um en ts, inv olv ing se parate 9 st atut es , rai se on ly dou bl e-d es cri pt io n c on cern s. 10 { 21} Ourco u r t s a p pl y a two -s te p i nq ui ry

to do ub le -d es cri pt io n c la im s. Id

. ¶ 25. 11 First, we analy ze the f actual question , “ whether the conduct underly ing the offenses 12 is un it ary, i.e. , whet he r th e sa m e co nd uc t v io la te s b ot h s t a t ut es [,]” andif s o, we 13 co nsi de r the le ga l qu es tio n, “ w he the r the [ L ] eg isl at ur e int en de d to cr eate se parate ly 14 puni shable offenses.” Id

. “ If it reasonably can be said that the conduct is u nitary , then 15 [w e] m

ust m ove to the se co nd p ar t of the inquir

y . Oth erwi se , if

the c ondu ct

is 16 separate and dis tinct, [the] inqui ry is at an end.” Id

. ¶ 28. 17 { 22} Be ca

use it is undi sput ed

that this c as e inv olv es uni tary c ondu ct ( the f ir ing of 18 a sin gle sho t) that r es ult ed in m ult ipl e co nvi ct ion s, our an al y sis w ill be lim ite d to the 19 que sti on o f le gis la tiv e int en t. “ D et er m ina tio ns o f le gis la tiv e in te nt , like double13

1 j eo pardy , pr es en t i ssu es of lawthat are r ev ie w ed

de nov o, w ith the ult im at e goa l of 2 suc h r ev ie w to be fa ci lit at ing a nd p ro m oti ng the [ L ] eg isl at ur e’ s a cc om

pli shm en t of 3 i t s pur po se .” S t a t e v. M

onto ya , 201 3- N MS C- 020, ¶

29, 306 P
. 3d 4 26 ( al te ratio ns, 4 internal quot at i o n m ar k s , a n dci t at i o n o m i t t ed ). Whe n , a s h er e, t h e s t at u t es t h emse l ves 5 do n ot e xpr es sly

pr ovi de f or m ult ipl e puni shm en ts, w e be ginby ap ply ing the r ule of 6 s t a tu t o ry c o n s t r

u c t i o n f r o m B l oc k

bu rg e r v . U

ni t e d State s , 2 84 U. S. 299 ( 1932 ), to 7 de te rm ine w he the r ea chpr ovi sio n r equir es pr oof of a fa ct that the oth er

doe s no t. 8 Sw aff ord , 1991-NMS C-043, ¶¶ 10, 30. I f not, on e o ff

en s e is logically

subsu m ed 9 within the other, and “puni shm ent cannot be had for both.” Id

. ¶ 30
. 10 { 23} In State v. G utierrez , our S uprem e Court m odified the B loc kb urge r an al y sis f or 11 doub le j eopardy

claim s invo lving statutes that are “ vague and uns pecific” or “ wr itten 12 w ithm an y

a lte rn at ive s. ” 2011 -N MS C- 024, ¶ ¶ 58- 59, 150 N
. M. 232, 258 P. 3d 1 024 13 (e m pha sis , int er

na l qu ota tio n m arks, a nd c itatio n om itt ed ). A cc or din gly , “ the 14 application o f Blockburger sh ou ld no t b e s o mec h a n i cal th atit is en ou gh fortwo 15 statutes to h ave differ ent elem ents.” State v. Swick, 2012 -N MS C- 018, ¶ 21, 279 P. 3d 16 747. T ha t i s, w e no l onge r ap ply a str ic t ele m en ts te st in the abstra ct ; r athe r, w e loo k 17 to the sta te ’ s tr ia l the or y to ide nti fy the spe ci fi c cr im ina l ca use of ac tio n fo r w hic h th e 18 de fe ndant w as c onvi ct ed , f ill ing in the c as e- spe ci fi c m eanin g of gene ri c te rm s in th e 19 st atut e whe n n eces sa ry . Gutierrez , 201 1- N MS C- 024, ¶ ¶ 58- 59. W e do s o14

1 “ i n d e p e n d e n to f

t h e p a rt i c u l a r

f a c t s o f t h e c a s e . . . b y

e x a m i n i n g t h e c h a r g ing 2 docum ents and the jury instruction s given in the case. ” Swick , 201 2- N MS C- 018, ¶ 21. 3 { 24} If the statutes survive Blockburger , w e ex am ine “ oth er ind ic ia of

le gis la tiv e 4 intent.” Sw aff

ord , 199 1- N MS C- 043, ¶ 31. W e loo k to “ the langua ge , his tor y , and 5 subject of the statutes, and we m ust identify the particular evil soug ht to be addressed 6 by each off ense.” Montoya , 2013 -N MS C- 020, ¶ 32 (i nte rn al quot at ion m ar ks and 7 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). “ St at ute s di re ct ed

tow ar d pr ot ect ing dif

fe re nt s oc ia l no rm s and 8 ac hie vin g di ff

er en t po lic ie s c anbe vie w ed a s se parate a nd am en ab le to m ult ipl e 9 puni shm ents.” Sw aff

ord , 199 1- N MS C- 043, ¶

32. 10 { 25} D ef

en dant arg ue s th at

his ri ght to be f re e fr om double j eo pardy

is vio la te d by 11 m ult ipl e puni shm en ts f

or ( 1) a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry a nd n eg lig en t us e of

af ir earm , ( 2) 12 ag gr avat ed

a ssa ult a nd a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry , a nd ( 3) the f

ir earm e nhanc em en ts t o 13 aggrav at ed assault and aggravated battery . T he State c oncedes at the outset that 14 De fendant’ s convictio n for negl igent use of a fir earm m ust be vacated, bec ause—as 1 5 ch ar g ed

— i ti s s ub s u m ed wi t h i n t h e a g g r a v a t e d b at t er y co n v i ct i o n . We a g re e. We 16 ad dr es s Def

en da nt ’s two rem ai ni ng arg um en ts in tu rn . 17 1. Aggravated A ssault and A ggrava ted Batter y 18 { 26} The c harge of aggr ava t ed assault with a deadly

we apon was appare ntly

pursued 19 unde r the “ unl aw fu l ac t” pr ong of Se ct ion30- 3- 1( B)
. T he te rm “ an y unl aw fu l a ct ” is15

1 a ge ne ri c one ; the re a re num er ous fo rm s of c ondu ct that c oul d f

ulf ill that r equir em en t. 2 Se e M asc are nas , 1974-NMC A- 100, ¶ 14 (“ ‘ Unlaw ful’ m ay m ean nothin g m ore than 3 ‘ not auth or iz ed

by law . ’ ” ). I n a

ppl y ing Blockburger , we i d en t i fythe State’ s actual 4 the or y of the c as e to s uppl y

the c as e- spe ci fi c m ean in g of ge ne ri c sta tut or y te rm s. 5 Gutierrez , 201 1- N MS C- 024, ¶ ¶ 58- 59. T he “ unl aw fu l a ct ” tha t w as c harg ed to the 6 j ur y w as tha t De fe ndant “ shot Jos hua Br an ch w hil e Pa tr ic ia Br an ch w as standi ng n ex t 7 t o h i m [. ]” 8 { 27} D ef

en dant’ s c onvi ct ion fo r ag gr av at ed ba tte ry , on the oth er hand, r equir ed

the 9 State to prove “ the unlawful touchin g or application o f forc e to the person of another 10 with intent to injure tha t p er s o n or an other
. ” N MS A 197 8, § 30 -3 -5 (A ) (1 969) 11 (e m pha sis a dde d)
. S ec tio n 30 -3 -5 (A ) al w ay s inc lud es a sta tut or y e le m en t ( int en t t o 12 injure another person) that is never an elem ent of ass au l t u n d er Section 30-3-1(B), 13 ev en as ch ar ge d in thi s ca se . T ha t is be ca use —a s w e ha ve dis cu sse d a t l en gthin thi s 14 O pin ion

—a ssa ult und er Sect io n 3 0- 3- 1( B) h as no sp eci fic in te nt req ui rem en t. Man us , 15 1979 -N MSC- 035, ¶ 14. S im ilarly , assault under Section 30-3-1(B) alway s includes 16 an elem ent (the victim ’ s reasonable belief that battery i s im m inent) that is never 17 req ui redto co m

m it a ba tt ery. See In re M

arlon C. , 200 3-NMC A- 005, ¶ 12, 133 N. M. 18 142, 61 P
. 3d 8 51 ( “ It i s th eo re tic al ly pos sib le to co m

ple te aba tte ry

on a pe rs on 19 w ith out

pr ior co nduc t causi ng the pe rs on to beli ev e the pe rs on is abou t to be ba tte re d,16

1 fo r ex am

ple , if the pe rs on i s stru ck

f ro m behin d. ”)
. T he re fo re , one of fe nse is not 2 su bsum ed

w ith in t he oth er , a nd Blockburger a l o n e d o e s n o tf

o r e c l o s e p u n i s hm en t 3 unde r both st at

ute s. 4 { 28} When two statutes surviv e Blockburger , w e loo k to “ the langua ge , his tor y , a nd 5 subject of the statutes, and we m ust identify the particular evil soug ht to be addressed 6 by each off ense.” Montoya , 2013 -N MS C- 020, ¶ 32 (i nte rn al quot at ion m ar ks and 7 ci tati on o m itt ed ). “ [T ] he soc ia l e vil s pr osc ri be d by dif fe re nt s ta tut es m

ust be 8 construed narrowly [. ] ” Sw aff ord , 1991-NMS C-04 3 , ¶ 32. “ The a ggravated battery 9 sta tut e pr ote ct s a ga ins t th e so ci al e vil that oc curs w he n on e pe rs on i nte nti ona lly 10 phy sically

attacks and injure s another.” State v. Carrasco , 199 7- NMSC -0 47, ¶ 33, 1 1 124 N
. M
. 6 4 , 9 4 6 P
. 2 d 1 0 7 5 ( i n t e rn a l qu o t a t i o n m a rk s a n d c i t a t i o n o m i tte d)
. T he 12 culpable act under Sec tion 3 0 -3 -1(B) , on the other hand, is one that causes 1 3 ap p r e h e n s i o n o r

f e a r . I n o t h e r

w o r d s , “[ t ]h e h a rm r e l a t e dt o a s s au l ti s me n t a l h a rm; 14 assaults pu t persons in fear. The harm relate d to battery

is phy sical h ar m ; batteries 15 actually

injure persons.” State v. Cowden , 199 6- N MC A -0 51, ¶ 12, 121 N
. M. 703 , 917 16 P. 2d 9 72. 17 { 29} In State v. R oper , w e held that doub le j eopardy principles are not offended 18 w he n ade fe ndant i s c onvi ct ed a nd s en te nc ed

f or tw o c ount s of as sault

f or poi nti ng 19 a gun at tw o pe rs ons at the sa m e tim e. 200 1- N MC A -0 93, ¶ 12, 131 N
. M. 189 , 34 P
. 3d17

1 133. T he a na ly sis in Roper is consist ent with the principle that our assault statu tes are 2 de sig ne d to pr ote ct dis tin ct vic tim s fr om m en ta l harm ca use d by a sin gle act. Id

. ; 3 Cowden , 199 6- N MC A -0 51, ¶ 12. A lth oughthi s is not

auni t of pr ose cu tio n c as e, the 4 s ame l o g i c ap p l i es h er e, wh er e o n e v i ct i m i s s h o tan dan o t h eras s au l t ed . De fe n d an t ’s 5 c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r o f f e n s e s i n v o l v i n g d i s t i n c t s o c i a l h a rms c au s e dt o mu l t i p l e v i c t i ms 6 d o n o tv i o l a t e t h e r i g h tt o b e f r e e f r o m d o ub l e je o p a r d y. 7 2. Fire arm Enh ancem ents 8 { 30} D e f

e n d a n tn e x t

a r g u e s t h a tf

i r e a rm e n h a n c e m e n t s t o h i s c o n v i c t i o n s f or 9 ag gr av a t e db a t t e ry

a n da g g r a v a t e da s s au l t , b o t h c o m m i t t e dw i t h ad e a d l y

w e ap on, 10 vio la te doub le j eo pard y be ca use use of af ir earm —the onl y

e sse nti al r equir em en t f

or 11 the inc re as ed

pe na lty —w as a lso ch ar ge d to the j ur y to pr ove the und er ly ing c ri m es . 12 The law i n t hi s ar ea i s n ot cle ar. 13 { 31} A se nte nc e sha ll be inc re as ed by one y ear whe n a

c ourt or j ur y m ak es a 14 s ep ar at e fi ndin g of fact that a firearm wa s used in th e com

m issio n of a noncapital 15 fe lon y . S ec tio n 31 -1 8- 16( A ). W e hav e pr ev iou sly he ld tha t the f

ir earm e nhanc em en t 16 can be co ns ti tu ti on al ly app li edto bo th ag gr avat ed ba tt ery wit h a de ad ly w eap on , Sta te 17 v. Gonzales , 19 81 -NMCA- 02 3, ¶ 6, 95 N.M. 63 6, 6 24 P.2d 10 33 , overruled on oth er 18 grou nds byB uzbe e v. D onne lly , 198 1- N MS C- 097, ¶ 46, 96 N
. M. 692 , 634 P
. 2d 1 244, 19 an d ag gr av at edass au lt wit h a de ad ly w eap on , Sta te v . Ch arl ton , 199 2- N MC A -1 24,18

1 ¶¶ 23, 26, 115 N
. M. 35, 846 P
. 2d 3 41. I n so m e ins tanc es , w e ha ve uph el d th e 2 en hanc em en t e ve n w he n th e j ur y ins tr uc tio n f or the under ly ing of

fe nse e xpr es sly 3 req ui redth e st at e to pro ve th atth e d ead ly w eap on us edwas, i n fa ct , a fir earm . See, 4 e. g. , State v. G onza les , 2010 W L 492 4986 , N o. 28, 467, m em . op. *11 ( N
. M. Ct
. App. 5 O ct . 26, 201 0) ( non- pr ec ed en tia l)
. T he S ta te c ite s th es e ca se s insup port of it s 6 ar gum en t. D ef

en dant c ount er s inhis r ep ly br ie f tha t Gonzales a nd Ch arl ton ( an d 7 oth er sim ilar ca se s) a re no l onge r good lawon this poi nt. 8 { 32} Gonzales rel ie d e nt ire ly o n S ta tev . G abal

don , 197 8- N MC A -1 01, 92 N
. M. 230 , 9 585 P. 2d 1 352. I n G abal don , w e uphel d af

ir earm e nhanc em en t a

ppl ie d to a 10 co nvi ct ionof

r obbe ry w ithade ad ly

w ea pon, w he re the de ad ly

w ea pon use d w as a 11 fi re ar m be ca use a rm ed

r obbe ry c oul d (i n the or

y ) be co m m itt ed by usi ng a kni fe , br as s 12 kn uc kl es , or a ny oth er d ead ly w eap on . Id

. ¶¶ 1, 28, 31. Si nc e the sta tut or y e le m en ts 13 fo r ar m ed r obbe ry did not a lw ay s r equir e pr oof

that a f ir earm w as use d, the re w as no 14 do ub le jeop ard y

vi ol at io n. Id

. ¶ 31
. Ch ar lto n sim ilarly resolved the Blockburger 15 portio n of

the double j eo pa rd ya na ly sis by loo kin g stri ct ly

to the e le m en ts o f the 16 st atut es . Ch arl ton , 199 2- N MC A -1 24, ¶ ¶ 22- 23. 17 { 33} Thus, ther e is a natural distinction in cases w here the e lem ents of the enhanced 18 of fen se sp eci fic al ly refer t o t he us e of a “ fir earm ” as op po se d t o a “ de ad ly w eap on .” 19 St at e v. V

are la , 1 9 9 9
- N M S C
- 0 4 5 , ¶ 4 1 , 1 2 8 N
. M
. 4 5 4 , 9 9 3 P
. 2 d1 2 8 0 ( v a ca tin g19

1 fi re ar m e nhanc em en ts a

ppl ie d to ac onvi ct ionf

or sho oti ng i nto a dwe lling and f or 2 fe lon y m ur de r pr ed ic at ed

on tha t of

fe nse be ca

use the use of

af ir earm is ane le m en t 3 of the c ri m es ); Sta te v . F

rank lin , 199 3- N MC A -1 35, ¶

15, 116 N
. M. 565 , 865 P
. 2d 4 1 2 0 9 ( d i s t i n g u i s h i n g Gab al don be ca use the de fe ndant i n F

rank lin w as spe ci fi ca lly 5 ch ar ge d w ithm an sla

ught er by ne gli ge nt u se of

af ir earm). A s w e re co gni ze d in 6 F rank lin , t he st ate is not

r equir ed to pr ove a ny

a ddi tio na l f

ac ts t o e nhanc e the 7 se nte nc e w he n us e of

af ir earm —a s op pose d to ade ad ly weapon—i s an e xpr es s 8 sta tut or

y e lem en t of

the e nhanc ed

of fe nse . 199 3- N MC A -1 35, ¶ ¶ 13- 15. I n th ose 9 instances, the fire arm

enhancem ent has alway s been subs um ed under Blockburger 10 (e ve n w he n a

ppl ie d to the statut es in the ab str ac t) , an d punish m en t ca nnot be ha d f or 11 bo th th e en ha nc em en t an d t he en ha nc edoff en se . F rank lin , 199 3- N MC A -1 35, ¶

¶ 13- 12 15. 13 { 34} T he ba sis fo r the dis tin ct ionbe tw ee n Ch arl ton a nd Gonzales , on the one hand, 14 an d V arela an d F

rank lin , o n t h e o t h er , i s n o l o n g ers o u n d . Ou r S up re m e C o u rt ’s 15 subs equent rej ection of a m echanical, strict elem ents test in cases invo lving statutes 16 tha t are “ va gue a nd unsp ec if ic ” or “ w ri tte n w ithm an y

a lte rn at ive s” nowr equir es our 17 co ur ts to ap p l y Bl o ckbu rger with re fere nce to the state’ s legal theory of the case. 18 Gutierrez , 201 1- N MS C-024, ¶ ¶ 58- 59 ( em

pha sis , int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks, a nd 19 ci ta ti on om it te d)
.20

1 { 35} A “ de a d l y w e ap o n ” i s a g e n e r i c t e rm . A s d e f i n e d i n t h e C r i m i n a l C o d e , it 2 “ m eans any

f ir earm , w he the r loa de d or unloa de d; or an y w ea pon w hic h is c ap ab le of 3 pr oduc ing de ath or

gr eat bo dil y

harm [. ] ” N MS A 197 8, § 30 -1 -1 2( B) ( 1963 ). T he 4 de fi nit ionthe n in clud es anon ex cl usi ve li st o f vari ous w ea pons , inc lud ing br as s 5 kn uc kl es , swi tc hb la de kn iv es , etc . Id

. A lth oughthe de ad ly

w ea pon re qui re d to 6 co m m it ag gr av at ed

ba tte ry a nd a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult c oul d have te ch nic al ly

be ena ny 7 of th es e weap on s, se e G abal don , 1978-NMC A- 101, ¶¶ 28, 31, there is no doubt that 8 the S ta te sou ght

to pr ove that the de ad ly w ea pon ac tua lly

use d inthi s c as e w as a 9 fir earm . 10 { 36} T o de te rm ine the S ta te ’ s the or y of the ca se , w e loo k to the c harg ing doc um en ts 11 an d ju ry

in st ru ct io ns . See Swick , 201 2- N MS C- 018, ¶ 21. Fo r ag gr av at ed ba tte ry w ith 12 a de ad ly

w ea pon, D ef en dant w as c harg ed

by c ri m ina l i nf

orm at ionw ith“ tou ch [i ng] 13 or appl y [i ng] f

or ce to Jos huaBr an ch , w ith a . 44 ca lib er re vol ve r handgun, ade ad ly 14 w ea pon. ” T o co nvi ct him of tha t of fe nse , the j ur

y w as ch ar ge d to f

ind that D ef en dant 15 “ tou ch ed or ap plied

f or ce to Jos huaBr an chby sho oti ng h im

w ithaf ir earm [. ] ” Fo r 16 ag gr av at ed

a ssa ult w ithade ad ly

w ea pon, D ef

en dant w as c ha rg ed

w ith 1 7 “ as s au l t [i n g ] . . . P at ri ci a B ra n ch wi t h a . 4 4 ca l i b erre v o l v er [, ] a d ea d l y we ap o n [. ]” 18 T he j ur

y ins tr uc tio n o n th at

c ount r equir ed af ind ing that D ef

en dant “ shot

Jos hua 19 Branch. ” In light of the theory of the case charged t o t h e ju ry, we can no longer21

1 ex am ine the e le m en ts o f the a ssa ult a nd b atte ry sta tut es in the abstra ct to upho ld the 2 fi re ar m e nhanc em en ts a s w e did

in Ch arl ton an d Gonzales
. See Swick, 2012-NMS C3 018, ¶ 21; Gutierrez , 201 1- N MS C- 024, ¶ ¶ 58- 59. 4 { 37} Our S uprem e Court’ s m ost recent pronoun cem ent on thi s issue was in an 5 un pu bl i sh edde ci si on . Sta te v . F erri , 201 5 W L 560 798, N o. 34, 229, de c. ¶ ¶ 66- 67 6 (N
. M. S up. Ct
. F eb
. 9, 201 5) (n on- pr ec ed en tia l)
. T he Co urt conc lud ed tha t, w he n us e 7 of a fi rearm

wa s specifically

instructed as an elem ent of the aggravated burglary 8 of fe nse , w hic h si m ilarl y

r ef er s to the ge ne ri c “ de ad ly

w ea pon” e le m en t, the inc lus ion 9 of a fi rear m

en ha nc em en t v io la te s d ou bl e jeop ard y . Id

. ¶ ¶ 1, 66- 67. The res ult

in 10 F erri , whi ch is pe rs ua si ve au th or it y , see Ru le 12- 405( A ) N MR A , is no t cons ist en t 11 w ith G abal

don ’s ab s t r a c ta n a l ys i s o f

t h e “ d e a d l y we ap o n ” e l e men t o f a rmed r o b b e ry, 12 uponw hic h Ch arl ton a nd Gonzales rel ie d. G abal don , 1978 -N MC A -1 01, ¶¶ 1, 29- 31. 13 { 38} Be ca

use the St at e, ac co rd ing to its ow n theo ry of the c as e, w as not

r equir ed to 14 prove a ny

a dd i t i on a l f

a c t s t o have D e f

e nd a nt ’ s se nt e nc e e nh a nc e d, t he f irearm 15 en hanc em en ts in this ca se vio la te doub le j eo pardy unde r the r ule state d in V

are la an d 16 F rank lin j ust a s th ey w oul d i f the statut es the m se lve s sa id “ fi re ar m ” ins te ad

of 17 “ de ad ly

w ea pon. ” T he e nhanc em en ts m ust be va cate d.22

1 C . D isc ove ry an d Ev id en ti ar y R ul in gs 2 { 39} D ef

en dant n ex t arg ue s that

dis co ve ry

a nd e vid en tiary

r uli ngs unde rm ine d hi s 3 ri ght t o p r e s e n t a d e f

e n s e a n d t o c o n f

r o n t t h e S t a t e ’ s e v i d e n c e . H e a r g u e s t h a t t he 4 dis tr i c t c o u rt e rr e d w h e n i t ( 1 ) f a i l e d t o o r d e r d i s c l o s u r e o f J o s h u a ’ s m i l i t arya nd 5 m ental health records, (2) excluded expert testim ony relate d to PTS D, and (3) fa iled 6 to p ro vid e a re m edy fo r the de str uc tio n of evi de nc e m at er ia l to the ca se . D ef en dant 7 as se rts th atth es e err or s, ei th er s ep arat el y or c om bi ne d, d ep riv edhi m

of a fai r tr ia l. 8 { 40} W e rev ie w th es e co nt en ti on s i n a m an ne r hi gh ly d efer en ti al to th e co ur t b el ow. 9 “ T he g r a n t i n g o f

d i s c o v e ry

i n ac r i m i n a l c a s e i s am a t t e r p e c u l i a r l y

w i t h i n the 10 dis cr et ionof

the tr ia l c ourt. A tr ia l j udge ’ s de nia l of ade fe ndant’ s di sc ove ry

r eque sts 11 will be re viewed ac cording to an abuse of discretion stand ard. ” Sta te v . B obbi n , 198 5- 12 NMC A- 089, ¶ 7, 103 N.M. 375, 707 P.2d 1185 (citation om itted). T he sam e standard 13 ap pl ie s in ev al ua ti ng a tri al co ur t’s de ci si on to ex cl ud e ev id en ce, Sta te v . Sti lls , 199 8- 14 N MS C- 009, ¶

44, 125 N
. M. 66, 957 P. 2d 51, an d in ev al ua tin g atr ia l c ourt’ s r uli ng 15 as to th e p ro pe r rem ed y forev id en ce t ha t h as be en lo st or d es tro y ed , State v. 16 Ch oui nard , 198 1- N MS C- 096, ¶ ¶ 25- 26, 96 N
. M. 658 , 634 P
. 2d 6 80. “ A n a buse of 17 dis cr et iona ri se s w he n th e evi de nti ar y ru lin g is cle ar ly co ntr ar y to logi c and the f

ac ts 18 and circum stances of the case. ” State v. D owney , 2008-NMS C-061, ¶ 24, 145 N. M. 19 232, 195 P.3d 124 4 (internal quotatio n m arks and citation om itted).19 D ef

en da nt als o s ub po en aedJo sh ua ’s col le ge acad emic r ec or ds. T hat su bpoe na 1 20 is no t i nv ol ve d i n t hi s ap pe al
. 23 1 1. Disclosure of Military and Men tal Health R ecords 2 { 41} De fendant issued a sub poena duces tecum directing Josh ua, who is a vete ran 3 of the Mari ne Co rp s, to pr ovi de ac opy of hi s m ili tary dis ch ar ge pa

pe rw ork. 4 D ef en dant a lso r eque ste d a co urt orde r au tho ri zi ng the r el ea se of Jos hua ’ s di sc harg e 5 reco rd s fr om

th e Nat io na l Arc hi ve s i n S t. Lo ui s, M is so ur i. See 5 U
. S. C. § 55 2a (b )( 11) 6 (2014) (perm itting the disclos ure of agency records “ pursuant to the order of a court 7 of c om pe te nt j ur isd ic tio n” ). I n r es pons e, the S ta te a sse rt ed th at Jos hua ’ s di sc harg e 8 re co rd s w er e ina dm iss ibl e an d c ont ai ne d se nsi tiv e pe rs ona l i de nti fy ing inf orm at ion 9 and protected m edical inform ation. T he State a lso asserted that Josh ua’ s prior service 10 as aMari ne c oul d no t po ssi bly pr ovi de aj ust if

ic at ionf or D ef en dant s hoot ing him

in 11 the le g. 12 { 42} At t h e h ea ri n g o n t h e is s u e, t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ap p ar en t l y v i ew ed D e f e n d an t ’s 13 vari ous dis co ve ry

r eque sts a s a“ fi shi ng e xpe dit ion
. ” T he c ourt as ke d D ef en dant t o 1 14 articulate his rea sons for see king Joshu a’ s m ilitary rec ords. D efendant asserted that 15 Jos huaha d be enpr ev iou sly inv olv ed in “ vi ol en ce aga ins t othe r m em be rs of the 16 m ili tary . ” D ef

en dant s pe ci fi ca lly

r ef er re d to af igh t i n th e m ili tary

that m ay ha ve 17 resulted in Jos hua’ s service being prem aturely term inated. H e ar gued that evid ence 18 of the f igh t c oul d be a dm iss ibl e to sh ow Jos hua ’ s pr ope nsi ty f or vio le nc e. H e al so24

1 ar gue d th at

Jos huaw as goi ng t o take the sta nd and tha t the dis ch ar ge pa pe rs w oul d 2 be use fu l to im

pe ac h hi m . A nd f

ina lly , D ef

en dant arg ue d th at

the m ili tary

r ec or ds 3 co ul d o pe n a n a ve nu e in to Jo sh ua ’s m en ta l h eal th hi st ory as i t re la te s t o P TSD. 4 { 43} T he dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly de te rm ine d tha t, in se lf

de fe nse c as es , e vid en ce of 5 spe ci fi c ins tanc es of a vic tim ’ s pr ior vio le nt co nduc t c an not be a dm itt ed

a s pr ope nsi ty 6 ev id en ce o f th e v ic ti m ’s vi ol en t d is po si ti on . Se e Stat e v. A rm en dari z , 2006-NMS C7 036, ¶ 17, 140 N. M. 182, 141 P. 3d 52 6 (“ [A] v i ct i m ’s violent chara cter is not an 8 e ss e nt i a l e l e m e nt

o f ad e f e nd a nt ’ s c l a i m

o f s e l f [ ] de f e ns e , b ut r a t he r c i r c um st a ntial 9 evidence t hat t e nd s t o sh ow t hat t he vi c t i m a c t e d i n c on f or m i t y w i t h hi s or

her 10 ch ar ac te r on a partic ular oc ca sio n. . . . [ O ] nly r ep uta tio n or

opi nio n e vid en ce sho uld 11 b e a d mitt edto sh ow t ha t t he vi ct im was t he fir st ag gr es so r.”), ov e rr ul e d on other 12 grou nds by Swick , 201 2- N MS C- 018, ¶ 31. T he dis tr ic t cour

t als o re co gni ze d that

the 13 di sc ha rg e pape rs wou ld no t be adm is si bl e to imp e a c h J os hu a. See Rule 11-608(B) 14 NMR A ( “ [E ]x t rin sic evidence is not adm issib le to prove specific instances of a 15 w itn es s’ s c ondu ct

in or de r to atta ck

or sup port the w itn es s’ s c hara ct er f or 16 truthfulness .” ). Beca use the requested records allegedly contained Jos hua ’s 17 “ sa cr osanc t” m ed ic al his tor y , a nd b ec au se D ef

en dant d id n ot j u s t i fy

the ne ed f or tho se 18 records at the hearing, the district c ourt quashed De fendant’ s subp oena and declined25

1 to issu e an or der authorizing produ ction of the docum ents from the National 2 Arch iv es . 3 { 44} Re co rd s are norm al lydis co ve ra ble if r ea sona bly c al cu la te d to le ad

to the 4 discovery

of adm issib le evidence. See Ru le 5- 503( C) N MR A
. Whil e re co rd s ne ed

not 5 be a dm iss ibl e to b e dis co ve ra ble , apr opon ent of d isc ove ry m ay sti ll be r equir ed

to 6 pr ov ide “ a re as ona

ble ba sis on whic h to be lie ve that i t i s li ke ly the r ec or ds c ont ai n 7 m aterial inform ation.” Sta te v . G arc ia , 201 3- N MCA-06 4, ¶ 28, 302 P
. 3d 1 11. 8 D ef en dan t a r g u e s o n ap p e a l t h a t t h e p r o p e r p r o c e du r e t o d e t e rm i n e m a t e r i a l i tyof 9 Josh ua’ s m ilitary

rec ords would have been for the district co u rt t o order in cam era 10 re vie wof

the doc um en ts. 11 { 45} W e agre e that in cam era reviewwould have been t h e b es t wa y to balance 12 Josh ua’ s privacy interests with D efendant’ s interests in ob taining rec ords that were 13 po te nt i a l l y rele va nt to hi s d efen se . Se e Sta te v . L una , 199 6- N MC A -0 71, ¶ 13, 122 14 N
. M. 143 , 921 P
. 2d 9 50 ( “ Inc am er a re vie w of co nf ide nti al inf

orm at ion re pr es en ts a 15 co m pr om ise be tw ee n th e intru siv e dis cl osur e of ir re le vant i nf

orm at ionon the one 16 hand and th e com

plete withholdi ng of poss ibly exculpatory

evidence on the other.”) ; 17 Sta te v. Gonzales , 199 6-NMC A- 026, ¶ 2 0, 12 1 N. M. 421 , 912 P. 2d 29 7 (stating th at 18 the pr ope r pr oc ed

ur e to de te rm ine w he the r the m at er ia l r eque ste d by the de fe ndant 19 is r el ev an t i s inc am er a re vie wby the dis tr ic t c ourt) ; Sta te v . P ohl , 197 6- N MC A -0 89,26

1 ¶ 5, 89 N
. M. 523 , 554 P
. 2d 9 84 ( hol din g th at the dis tr ic t cour t er re d innot c ondu ct ing 2 anin cam er a re vie w “ to de te rm ine w he the r the f ile s c ont ai ne d e vid en ce m at er ia l t o 3 th e d efen se ”). 4 { 46} Bu t the re is one pr obl em f or D ef en dant. U nli ke the de fe ndants in Lu na , 199 6- 5 NMCA-0 71 , ¶ 3, Gonzales , 1996 -N MC A -0 26, ¶ 20, a nd P ohl , 197 6- N MC A -0 89, ¶ 4, 6 D ef en dant n ev er

a ct ua lly r eque ste d inc am er a ins pe ct ion of any r ec or ds b ef

or e the 7 dis tr ic t c ourt— ev ena ft er the c ourt a ske d D ef en dant t o pr ovi de “ spe ci fi c 8 know le dge
. . . a s to w ha t t o lo ok fo r an d w he re , or on the oth er

hand to r eq uest a n 9 in camera review [. ] ” Fo r tha t re as on al one , thi s ca se be tte r re se m ble s State v. B aca , 10 in whic h w e sta te d, 11 A s in P ohl , w e cannot determ ine whether the supp ressed evidence w as 12 m at erial to [the d]e fendants’ claim of self[] defense, but, unlike P ohl , 13 [the d] efendants neither requested an in c am era hearing nor showed as 1 4 spe ci fi c a need as co ul d be ex pe ct ed under the 15 ci rc um stanc es . . . . Rathe r, our r ev ie wof the ar gum en t m ad e dur ing the 16 m otion he ar ing c onvi nc es us tha t [ the d] ef en dants w er e on a

f ish ing 17 ex pe dit ion
. [ T he d] ef en dants m ad e no s how ing that the ir r igh ts w oul d 18 be vi ol at edbu t fo r fu ll di sc lo su re o f th e m as te r fi le [.] 19 1993 -N MC A -0 51, ¶¶ 25- 26, 115 N
. M. 536, 854 P. 2d 363 (in te rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks 20 an d c it at io ns om it te d)
. 21 { 47} Th er e a re co m

p el l i n g ar g u m en t s o n ap p ea l t h at i n ca m er a re v i ew o f J o s h u a’s 22 m ili tary reco rd s co uld ha ve be enuse fu l t o lo cate m at er ia l i nf orm at ion , suc h a s th e 23 ide nti tie s of

c hara ct er w itn es se s w ho c oul d have te sti fi ed ab out Jos hua ’ s r ep uta tio n27

1 fo r vi ol en ce, see Ru le 11- 405( A ) N MR A , or co rr obor at ing w itn es se s w ho arg uably 2 c o u ld h av e te sti fi ed

und er Ru le 11- 404( B) N MR

A a nd State v. M

aples , 2 0 1 3
- NMCA3 052, ¶ 27, 300 P. 3d 749. Bu t w e cannot say that the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n 4 in r ej ec tin g th e ar gum en ts tha t w er e ac tua lly pr es en te d be low , w he re D ef en dant d id 5 no t se ek

in cam er a re vie wbut

sou ght f ull dis cl osur e of

a ll dis ch ar ge r ec or ds
. See 6 Baca , 199 3- N MC A -0 51, ¶ ¶ 25- 26; se e als o State v . O rti z , 200 9- N MC A -0 92, ¶

32, 7 14 6 N.M. 87 3, 215 P
. 3d 8 11 ( “ T o pr es er ve a n is sue f

or r ev ie won a

ppe al , it m ust 8 ap pe a r t h a tap p e l l a n tf

a i r l y i n v o k e dar

u l i n g o f t h e t r i a l c o u rto n t h e s a m e g r ound s 9 ar g u ed i n t h e ap p el l at e co u rt .” (i n t er n al qu o t at i o n m ar k s an d ci t at i o n o m i t t ed )) . We 10 af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt be ca

use it s r uli ng o n the ar gum en ts bef or e it w as not

“ cl earl y 11 contrary to log ic and the facts and circum stances of the case. ” Downey , 2008-NMS C12 061, ¶ 24 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 13 2. Testim ony Relate d to P TSD 14 { 48} D ef

en se c ouns el que sti one d Jo shua a t a pr el im inary

he ar ing about

adia gnos is 15 of P T SD r el at ed to pr ior m ili tary se rv ic e. T he St at e the n fi le d am oti on i n li m ine to 16 ex cl ude e vid en ce of Jos hua ’ s m en ta l hea lthhis tor y in the abse nc e of

e xpe rt te sti m ony 17 es ta bli shi ng the r el ev an ce of su ch ev ide nc e. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th at m oti on, 18 ordering that if

“ De fendant does not m ake, through expert testim ony , a prima faci [ e ] 19 showing th at evidence of [ Josh ua’ s] m ental health histo ry is rele v an t , t h en no such28

1 evidence m ay

be i ntroduced.” A little over a week b efore trial, De fendant identified 2 D r. A l e x a n d e r P a r e t , a p s y c h o l o g i s t , t o t e s t i f y ab o u t P T S D
. T h e S t a t e m o v edto 3 ex cl ude D r. P ar et ’ s te sti m ony on the gr ound

that he ha d no pr ior

c ont ac t w ithJos hua 4 an d w oul d have be en una ble to t es tif

y about howP T SD sy

m pto m s w er e spe ci fi ca lly 5 m an ife st edin Jo sh ua . 6 { 49} T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld a he ar ing on the iss ue on the day be fo re tr ia l. D ef

en dant 7 conceded that Dr
. Pare t had never m et or spok en with Josh ua and would onl y testify 8 ab out P T SD ge ne ra lly

be ca use adia gnos is o f PT SD goe s to the r ea sona ble ne ss o f 9 D ef en dant’ s a ssum

pti on tha t he w as in ap parent dange r w he n he sho t Jo shua
. T he 10 co urt po int ed

out that “ PT SD is a spe ctru m ” tha t m an if es ts its el f in d if

fe re nt p eo ple 11 in d if fe re nt w ay s and tha t w ith out ev er ha vin g e xa m ine d Jo shua , D r. P ar et c oul d no t 1 2 as s i s tt h e ju ry i n d et er m i n i n g wh et h erDe fe n d an t ’s al l eg ed co n ce rn s ab o u tJ o s h u a’s 13 PTSD were re as on ab le . The co ur t s up pr es se d t he pro po se d t es ti m on y . 14 { 50} “ The very e s s en ce of discretion is that th ere will be re asons for the district 15 co urt t o r

ule e ith er w ay on an issu e, an d whate ve r w ay the dis tr ic t c ourt r

ule s w ill not 16 be an abuse of discretion.” Sta te v . L ay ne , 2008 -N MC A -1 03, ¶ 7, 144 N
. M. 574 , 189 17 P. 3d 7 07. “ T he tr ia l j udge ’ s di sc re tio n is ne ce ssari ly br oa d f or he sit s inthe a re naof 18 litigatio n.” State v . T afoya , 198 0- N MS C- 099, ¶ 6, 94 N
. M. 762 , 617 P
. 2d 1 51 19 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). It is the trial judge that is best suit ed29

1 to answ er

the de te rm ina tiv e que sti on: “ O n this subj ec t c ana j ur y f ro m thi s pe rs on 2 rece ive appreciable help?” Id

. (in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io ns om it te d)
. 3 { 51} T he de fe ndant i n Tafoya w as pr ev en te d f ro m c al lin g ac hil d ps y ch ologis t t o 4 te st ify tha t ch il dr en ha d fa nt as iz edan al le ge d in st an ce of s ex ua l as sa ul t. Id

. ¶ 3. T he 5 psy ch olo gis t’ s te sti m ony “ w as to ha ve be en ba se d upon sta te m en ts and d ep osi tio ns 6 of the c hil dr en , a s w el l a s ta pe s of t he ir tria l t es tim ony . S he ha d ne ve r pe rs ona lly 7 observed the dem eanor of the children, nor questioned th em herself. ” Id

. O n a ppe al , 8 our S up r e m e C o u rt h e l d t h a t i t w a s n o t a n ab u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n f o r t h e t r i a l c o u rtto 9 “ determ ine that the probative value of the testim ony wa s sligh t, based upon the lack 10 of pe rs on al ob se rv at io n” by the ps y ch ol og is t. Id

. ¶ 7. 11 { 52} T he sit

ua tio n is no d if

fe re nt h er e. T he dis tri ct co urt i n th is c as e re as ona bly 12 dis co unt ed

the va lue of

D r. P ar et ’ s ge ne ra l t es tim ony about P T SD , w hic h wou ld h av e 13 m ad e no re fe re nc e to any obs er va tio n of Jos hua
. “ PT SD is sim

ply not am onol ith ic 14 disease with a uniform structure th at d oes not perm it of indiv idual variation.” B rune ll 15 v. W ildwood Crest P olice De

p’t , 822 A. 2d 576, 588-89 (N .J. 2003 ). Those diagnosed 16 wit h P TSD exh ib it a ran ge of r e act io ns rel at edto th ei r tr au m a. See The N ational 17 In st it ut e o f Men ta l Hea lt h: Po st -Trau m at ic Str es s Di so rd er, availabl e at 18 ht tp :/ /www.n imh.n ih .g o v / h e a l t h / t o p i c s /p o s t - t r a u mat i c-s tre ss -d is or de r-p ts d/ in de x.s 19 htm l ( la st a cc es se d Apr il 20, 201 6)
. D r. P ar et ’ s pr opos ed te sti m ony

w oul d no t have30

1 ac co unt ed

f or a ny i ndividu al vari at ionor m eanin gf

ull y a ssi ste d th e j ur

y in 2 de te rm in in g wh et he r Defen da nt ’s react io n t o t he m an if e s t a t i o n of P TSD in J

oshu a 3 wa s reasonab l e. “No er ror occurs w hen the judge excludes expert testim ony wher e 4 the probative value of that testim ony is sligh t.” State v. B lea , 198 4- N MS C- 055, ¶ 7, 5 1 0 1 N. M
. 3 2 3 , 6 8 1 P
. 2 d1 1 0 0
. Th e c a s e s c i t e db y De f e n d a n ta r e n o tt o t h e c o n t r a ry. 6 State v. A lberico , 199 3- N MS C- 047, ¶ 44, 116 N
. M. 156 , 861 P
. 2d 1 92 ( “ [T]h e 7 re le vant inq ui ryis on thi s su bje ct c a n aj u ry f

r o m thi s pe rso n r ec ei ve appr ec ia ble 8 he lp. ” (a lte ratio n, int er na l quota tio n m ar

ks, an d c itatio n om itt ed )) ; State v . M arqu ez , 9 2009 -N MS C- 055, ¶

25, 147 N
. M. 386 , 223 P
. 3d 9 31 ( de al ing w ithharm le ss e rr or in 10 an an al y si s t ha t h as be en ov erru le d) , ov errul ed byT ollardo , 201 2- N MS C- 008. 11 3. De struc tion of Evide nce 12 { 53} At som e poin t on the day of the shoo ting, De tective Danny Clugsten of the San 13 Juan C ount y Sheriff ’ s Of fice took phot ographs of the crim e scene t h at we re 14 ina dve rt en tly

los t. D ef en dant m ove d on the m or nin g of tri al to d ism iss a ll ch ar ge s or 15 to o the rw ise e xc lud e se ve ra l of the S ta te ’ s w itn es se s purs uant t o Scog gi ns v. Sta te , 16 1990 -N MS C- 103, ¶

¶ 8- 9, 111 N
. M. 122 , 802 P
. 2d 6 31. I n th e al te rn at ive , D ef en dant 17 re que ste d ala st- m inu te c ont inu an ce so that the St at e cou ld re vie w an d re spon d to the 18 au tho ri tie s c ite d i n th e m oti on t o di sm iss
. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e m oti on 19 be ca use it w as not tim el y

a nd b ec au se the re w er e m ult ipl e ey ew itn es se s a t the sc en e31

1 who could testify

about the relevant details. D efendant subs equently requested a j ury 2 instructio n that t h e lo st pho tographs “ m ay have suppo rted the conclusion that 3 Jo sh ua Bran ch was in a po si ti on fro m whi ch he co ul d cau se imm ed ia te ha rm to . . . 4 [D ] ef en dant” a nd that the j ur

y c oul d c onsi de r the los s of e vid en ce to be “ unf

av or ab le 5 to the [ S] ta te . ” T he c ourt gave de fe nse c ouns el carte bl an ch e to r ai se the iss ue in 6 cr oss -e xa m ina tio n of

pol ic e w itn es ses and in c los ing a rg um en ts b ut d en ie d th e 7 re que st f

or ali m iti ng i nstru ct ion
. 8 { 54} W e ap ply

athr ee -p ar

t t es t to dete rm ine w he the r de pr iva tio n of e vid en ce by

the 9 St at e co ns ti tu te s re ve rs ib le erro r. Ch oui nard , 198 1- N MS C- 096, ¶ 16. W e as k, f

ir st, 10 w he th er the S ta te br ea ch ed som e duty

or int en tio na lly

de pr ive d D ef

en dant o f 11 evidence; second, w hether the suppressed eviden ce w as m aterial; and third, w hether 12 pr ejud ic e res ul te d. Id

. Be ca use the re is no all eg at ion tha t the phot ogr ap hs we re los t 13 in bad faith, D efendant bore the burden of s howing m ateriality and prej udice before 14 an y sa nc ti on s wou ld ha ve be en ap pr op ria te . See State v. Pachec o , 200 8- N MC A -1 31, 15 ¶ 30, 145 N
. M. 40, 193 P. 3d 587. T he dis tr ic t co urt is in the be st posi tio n to e va lua te 16 th e im po rta nc e o f lo st ev id en ce. Id

. 17 { 55} D ef

en dant’ s m oti on w as fi le d at the la st m inu te an d w ith out an y good r ea son 18 for the late f

iling . T he defense team

had known for m onth s that the pho tographs were 19 los t. T he y

ne ve rthe le ss b ro ught

the iss ue to the c ourt’ s a tte nti on o n t he m or ni ng o f32

1 tr ia l b e c au s e , a f

t e r a d i s c u s s i o n t h e n i g h t b e f o r e , t h e y r e a l i z e d t h e y “ h a d adut yto 2 ge ne rate ar ec or d. ” T he y fa xe d the m oti on to oppo sin g co unse l at 7:0 0 p. m . that ni ght , 3 leaving the State littl e o pportun ity to respond. It was undi sputed th at the m otion wa s 4 un ti m el y

an d t ha t t he re was no go od ex cu se forth e la te fil in g. 5 { 56} Ina ny

e ve nt, D ef

en dant’ s arg um en t i s no t c onvi nc ing on the m er its
. Whil e 6 there is no doub t that the State breached a dutyto preserve evidence, the district court 7 co u l d re as onablyconclude that Defe ndant di d not sh ow m ateriality or prej udice. 8 D ef en dant a sse rt ed

a t the he ar ing that bl ood spa tte r in the pho tog ra phs m igh t sh ow 9 Jos hua ’ s loc at ion w he n he w as shot
. T ha t i s sp ec ula tiv e be ca use D ef en dant d id n ot 10 know what was in the photo graphs. “ The m ere poss ibilitythat an item of undisclo sed 11 inf orm at ionm igh t have he lpe d th e de fe nse , or m igh t have a ff

ec te d th e out co m e of

the 12 trial, does not establish ‘m ateriality ’ in the constit ution al sens e.” Sta te v . M art in , 13 1984 -N MS C- 077, ¶

37, 101 N
. M. 595, 686 P. 2d 937 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and 14 c i t at io n o m it te d) . It was , aft er al l, Defe nd an t’s b ur de n t o e st ab li sh m at eri al it y. 15 Pachec o , 200 8- N MC A-1 31 , ¶ 30. A nd tha t burd enm igh t have be enm et ha d th e 16 de fe nse te am

a ddr es se d th e iss ue w he n th e St at e br ough t it to the ir a tte nti on m onths 17 earl ie r. T he pho tos w er e ta ke n and l ost by an id en tif

ie d of fi ce r, D et ec tiv e Cl ugst on. 18 Ther e w ere likely

two o t h er witn esses, D eputy Todd Mangan, the f

irst officer

that 19 arrived on the scene, and Dete ctive Tim Ny ce, who stated in open court that he w as33

1 pr es en t w he n th e phot os w er e ta ke n, that coul d have te sti fi ed about the na tur e of

the 2 los t e vid en ce . But i nst ea d of int er vie w ing the m

pr ior to f

ili ng the m oti on, de fe nse 3 co unse l sp ec ula te d onthe m or nin g of tr ia l ab ou t th e con te nts of the pho tog ra

phs, 4 as kin g—b as ed

on the unkn ow n—f

or outri ght dis m iss al of al l charg es , ex cl usi on o f 5 se ve ra l of

the S ta te ’ s w itn es se s, or

ac ont inu an ce of

the tr ia l a ft er

the j ur y ha d a lr ea dy 6 be en em

pa ne le d. S

e e St a t e v . A r a gon , 1 99 7- N MC A -0 87, ¶ 22, 123 N
. M. 803 , 945 7 P. 2d 1 021 (“ [A ] s a gene ra l rul e, a m oti on for a co nti nuanc e fi le d a t the la st m inu te is 8 no t fa vo red .”). 9 { 57} E ve n a ssu m ing that the re w as dis ce rn ab le blo od s pa tte r in the phot ogr ap hs, it 1 0 i s u n l i k el y t h at s up p re s s i o n p re ju d i ce dDe fe n d an t . Th e S t at e’s t h eo ry ab o u tJ o s h u a’s 11 loc at ionw he n he w as sho t wa s not m eanin gf ull y dif fe re nt f ro m D ef en dant’ s ve rs ion 12 of e ve nts . Jos huate sti fi ed tha t he w as thr ee to fo ur f ee t f ro m the r ai lin g onthe ste ps 13 to the fr ont por ch
. Patr ic ia te sti fi ed to the sa m e ef fe ct . St ev en saw Jos hua ly ing on the 1 4 pa v e m e n ts i x t o e i g h tf e e tf r o m t h e t r a i l e r

a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g . A n dD e f en da nt 15 co nc ed ed

that Jo shua

did not f oll owhim

ont o th e por ch
. A ll ac co unt s pu t Jo shua in 16 the im

m ed ia te vic ini ty

of the r ai lin g surr ound ing the do or to the tr ai le r w he n th e 17 shoo ting o ccurre d. The r eal question was not where Josh ua wa s standin g, but whether 18 he w as advanc ing on D ef en dant. N o a ft er -the -f

ac t ph oto gr ap h of

blo od s pa tte r co uld 19 ha ve res ol ve d t ha t cr it ic al is su e. Se e Sta te v . D uarte , 200 7- N MC A -0 12, ¶ 11, 14034

1 N
. M
. 9 3 0 , 1 4 9 P
. 3 d 1 0 2 7 ( “[ R ]e v e r s a l i s n o t ma n d a t e d u n l e s s t h e e v i d e n c e i s i n s o me 2 way de te rm i n a t iv e o f gu il t.” ( in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) ). On 3 the se f ac ts, w e de fe r to the dis tr ic t cour t’ s sound dis cr et ionnot

to m an da te sanc tio ns 4 of an y ki nd
. 5 { 58} W e co nc lud e tha t the re w as no er ro r in any of the dis tr ic t cour t’ s disc ove ry

a nd 6 ev id en ti ary ru li ng s, an d t he refo re, t he re was no cu m ul at iv e erro r. Se e Stat e v. Salas , 7 20 10 -NMSC -0 28 , ¶ 40 , 14 8 N.M. 3 13 , 23 6 P .3d 32
. 8 D . A ggr avat ed A ssa ul t as a S er iou s V iol en t Of fe ns e 9 { 59} T his f

ina l i ssu e ar ise s, a s it

of te n do es , be ca

use the dis tr ic t c ourt us ed onl y 10 boi le rp la te langua ge in a se nte nc ing doc um en t t o de sig na te ase ri ous vio le nt o ff en se 11 under Section 33-2-34(L)( 4)(o) of the E arned Mer itorious De duction s Act ( EMD A)
. 12 The E MDAprovides th at prisone rs co n v i cted of serious violent o ffenses m ay ear n 13 only f our ( a s op po se d t o t hi rt y ) d a y s pe r m on t h of g oo d t i m e c r e di tf

or t i m e s e rved 14 in o ur state pr iso ns. S ec tio n 33 -2 -3 4( A )( 1) , ( 2)
. T he statut e div ide s se ri ous vio le nt 15 offenses into two categories: (1) an enum erate d list of crim es, such as second degree 16 m urder, t h at are serious viol ent offenses as a m atter of law; and (2) several 17 “ ad dit ion al of

fe nse s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt m ay

de te rm ine to be ser iou s vi ole nt 18 offenses due to the nature of the offe n s e an d t he resulting harm .” Sta te v . Sc urr y , 19 2007 -N MC A -0 64, ¶ 5, 141 N
. M. 591, 158 P. 3d 1034 (i nte rn al quot at ion m ar ks and35

1 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). A ggr av at ed a ssa ult is a dis cr et ion ar

y of fense unde r the se co nd 2 category . S ection 33-2-34(L)(4)( o). I n language m irro ri n g the statute, the district 3 co urt de sig na te d it to be ase ri ous vio le nt o ff en se “ due to the na tur e of

the of fe nse a nd 4 th e res ul ti ng ha rm .” 5 { 60} Whe n , a s h er e, a n o f f e n s e i s d i s cr et i o n ar y u n d ert h e s t at u t e, “ a c o u rt ’s 6 de sig na tio n of

ac rim e as a se ri ous vio le nt o ff en se a ff ec ts the le ngth of

ti m e the 7 de fe ndant s er

ve s ti m e in p ri son, ” an d th er ef or e “ it is i m

po rtant tha t the c ourt m ak e 8 spe ci fi c fi ndi ngs both to inf orm the de fe ndant be ing se nte nc ed of the f ac tua l ba sis on 9 w hic h hi s go od t im e cr ed it is b ei ng s ubst an tia lly r ed uc ed , a nd t o pe rm it m eanin gf ul 10 and ef

fe ct ive appellate reviewof the court’ s design ation.” Sta te v . L ore tto , 200 6- 11 N MC A -1 42, ¶ 12, 140 N
. M. 705 , 147 P
. 3d 1 138. E xpr es s f ind ing s m ust de m onstrate 12 tha t the c ri m e w as “ co m m itt ed in a phy sic al ly vio le nt m an ne r ei the r w ith an int en t t o 13 do serious h arm

or w ith recklessness in th e fa ce of knowledge that one’ s acts are 14 r e a so na

bl y l i ke l y t o r e su l ti n se r i ou s harm .” Id

. ¶ 11 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and 15 ci ta tio n om itt ed ). E ve n w he re sup port e xis ts i n th e re co rd f or the d is tri ct c ourt t o 16 m ak e suc h ade te rm ina tio n, it is up to the dis tr ic t cour t “ in the f ir st i nst an ce to m ak e 17 the required findings.” State v. M orales , 2002 -N MC A -0 16, ¶ 18, 131 N
. M. 530 , 39 18 P.3 d 7 47 , abro gated on other gro unds by State v. F rawley , 2007 -N MS C- 057, ¶ 36, 19 143 N
. M. 7, 172 P
. 3d 1 44.36

1 { 61} The S tate ar gues that “ [t] he evidence p resented at trial full y suppo rts the trial 2 co ur t’s fi nd in g t ha t t he ag gr av at edass au lt co nv ic ti on was a ser io us vi ol en t o ffen se .” 3 But the standard is no t whether there is sufficient evidence in the re cord to supp ort 4 the district court’ s unexpl ained conclusio n. The standard is a bright line that “ requires 5 the district c ourt to explain its conclusion s.” Sc urr y , 200 7- N MC A -0 64, ¶

6. W e ha ve 6 held in th is Opinion th at, under M anus , Def

endant m ay

technically

have been 7 convicted of aggravated assault without d i re cting any conduct toward Patr icia, 8 w ith out

a ct ing r ec kle ssl y , a nd w ith out harb or ing a ny

spe ci fi c int en t t o c au se 9 ap pr eh en si on or f

ear. See 197 9- NMSC -0 35, ¶ 14. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s f or 10 se nte nc ing on a ggr av at ed a ssa ult a re both im

portant and r equir ed. Mo rales , 200 2- 11 N MC A -0 16, ¶

¶ 16, 18. 12 { 62} T he S ta te ha s no t po int ed out a ny spe ci fi c fi ndi ngs in the r ec or d. T he j udgm en t 13 and sentence contains on ly the sam e run-of-the- m ill explanatio n—“ due to the nature 14 of the of fe nse an d the re sul tin g harm ”— tha t fr eque ntl y

c au se s us to re m an d c as es f or 15 ad di ti on al fact fin di ng . Se e, e . g. , Sta te v. I rv in , 2 0 1 5 WL 4 2 7 6 0 9 2 , N o . 3 2 , 6 4 3 , me m. 16 op. ¶ 37 (N
. M. Ct
. App. Jun e 23, 201 5) ( non- pr ec ed en tia l) ; Sta te v . Ku yk en dal l , 201 4 17 W L 578 2937 , N o. 32, 612, m em . op. ¶ 37 (N
. M. Ct
. App . S ep t. 23, 201 4) ( non18 pr ec ed en tia l) ; State v. Yban ez , 201 3 W L 452 7245 , N o. 31, 216, m em . op. ¶ ¶ 18- 19 19 (N
. M. Ct
. App. Mar. 27, 201 3) ( non- pr ec ed en tia l) ; Sta te v . F arr el l , 2 0 1 0 WL37

1 3997 938, No. 29,186, m em . op. *7 (N .M. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2010 ) (non-prece dential); 2 State v. Salles , 2009 W L 6677 933, No. 29,222, m em . op. *2-3 (N. M. C t. App. May 3 1, 2 00 9) (no n- pr eced en ti al ). 4 { 63} W e onc e ag ai n r em an d f or fi ndi ngs co nsi ste nt w iththe standard de sc ri be d in 5 Morales , 200 2- N MC A -0 16, ¶ ¶ 16, 18, a nd the c as es that have f oll ow ed it
. 6 CON CLU SION 7 { 64} D ef

en dant’s co nvi ct ion s f

or a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult a nd a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry , both 8 w ithade ad ly w ea

pon, a re a ff

irm ed
. T he f

ir earm e nhanc em en ts t o th ose c onvi ct ion s 9 ar e re ve rs ed

a nd v ac at ed
. D ef

en dant’ s c onvi ct io n for

ne gli ge nt u se of

ade ad ly 10 w ea pon is a lso r ev er se d and v ac at ed
. Fi na lly , w e re m an d th e se ri ous vio le nt o ff en se 11 designatio n related to D efendant’ s aggravated assault convictio n back to the dis trict 12 co urt f

or spe ci fi c fi ndi ngs to i de nti fy a nd e xpl ai n th e ev ide nc e supp ortin g th e 13 de si gn at io n. 14 { 65} IT IS S O ORDERE D.
15

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 16 LI N D A M . V A N Z I, Ju dg e38

1 WE CO NCUR:

2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 3 TI M OT HYL. GA R C IA , Ju dg e
4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 5 ST EP HE N G. F R EN C H, Ju dg e