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U.S. Air Service in World War i

Volume IV: Postwar Review

The Office of Air Force History has announced the publication oil Volume

IV te in serie,The U.S. Air Service in World War I

Titled Postwar eiw this documentary work consists of two major

sections: lessons learned in the conduct of the air war during World War i and

ureyof bombting carnage.

For material in "le;ssens a-nd " Dr. Maurer ";aurer, editor of t e fourvolurne series, drew upon the remarks submitted by commanders, pilots, observers,

and other officers of' Air Service Units in. response to Maj. Gen. M.as9on M. Fat-rick's

directive for information deemed important in planning the future Air Service.

These remarks are of considerable historical iLnterest ifor the information they

contain about the employment of air power at the front.

The bombing survey is a report on the effects of Allied bombing In W.-orld

War i. It is a long-forgotten document sumirarizing the results of a pnstwar

investigation conducted by the Air Intelligence Section of General Headquarters,

American Expeditioinary Forces.

All publications in this series are offered for s;ale by the Superintendent

of DocurnU , U.S. Gv.rnment Printing Office, , sh_.g ..... C. 20402.

i]

Released to date are: Volume I: T,, Firal Fe rt or the Cief of Air S '" ,

A TF, and A Tatical Historce (stock 008-070-00358; $0.'p5); Volume i: Earl

Conens of' Mil tarh Aviation (stock r008-070-00362-7; $8.25); and VoIu.e

IV: Postwar Peview (stock d087e0-00r00-3; $9.50). Volune III, The atte of

St. Mihiel, wll be available n ]ate 1979.

For ateial tamed" n "essos D. MarerMaurr, dito ofthe our
iiti -5. Air, -Porice in

Volumme IV#

Postwar Review_. The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center

Maxwell AFB Alabama

CompledandEdied by The Office of Air Force History Maurer/Maure/ HeadquartersUSAF

Washington_1979,

/F

Iv. o
F7 -I

Library of Congress Cataloging Main in Publication Data entry under title.

The U. S Air Service in World War 1.

tactical 

CONTENTS: 

history of 

v 

the 

1. 

Air 

Final 

Service, 

Report of the Chief of Air Service. AEF. A

avaiation-v. 3 The 

AEF -v. 2. Ear~y concepts of mniliiary Battle of St Mihiel.-v. 4. Postwar Review. Includes indlexes1. European War, 19

ted States. Army 

14-191 8Aerial operations, American. 2 UniMilitary-United States-History 

A.EF.. 1917-1920. Air Service. 3 Aeronautics.

8.606.U54 1. Maurer, Maurer 940.4'49'73 75-42296

j- -

1. V

For saeb-h uerne~eto Documri~

U oen etPrnIonfc I,.arigo.D. 00
United States Air Force

Historical Advisory

Committee

Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr. Lt. Gen. James R. Allen Dr. Henry F. Graft

Duke University Superintendent, USAF Columbia University

Academy

Dr. Forest C. Pogue

Dr. Robert F. Byrnes Director, Dwight D.

Indiana University Eisenhower Institute for

Historicdl Research

Lt. Gen. Albert P. Clark

US/1 F (rel.) Mr. Peter B. Hamilton

General Counsel, USAF

Lt. Gen. Raymond B. F1urlong

Commander, Air University

Office of Air Force

History

Maj. Gen. John W. Huston Dr. Stanley L. Falk Carl Berger

Chief Chief Historian Chief, Histories Division

Max Rosenberg Lawrence J. Paszek

Deputy Chief Historian Senior Editor

[J

& ? q i1 "

-i(c'A
vI

f-()r2c U()Cr2' )VI

'Following the Armistice in 1918. Maj. Gen. Mason I. Patrick.

Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary orces, directed

that a record be made of lessons learned during the war This

information, he believed, was needed for planning the Air Service of the future. The reports prepared by commanders, pilots.

observers, and other members of the various Air Service units in

response to General Patrick's directive are of considerable

historical interest for the information they contain about the

Air Service aid its employment at the front A select group of

the reports on lessons learned make up Part I of this volume of

World War I documents on U. S military aviation.

Part II is devoted to a report on the effects of Allied bombing

in World War I. This long-forgotten document, the result of a

post-war investigation by the Air Intelligence Section of General

Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, is the counterpart of the well-known United States Strategic Bombing Survey

of World War It

This volume is the lest in a series that the Office of Air Force

History is publishing on the U. S. Air Service in World War I

Mal, Gen John W. Huston

Chief

Office of Air Foice History
Pr ef (iceVi

On the morning of 11 November 1918, Air Service units at the

front stood by waiting for the tog to lift so they could take to the

air. The orders for the day called for offensive opera';ons to

destroy the German air service, protect friendly air and ground

forces, and harass enemy troops with machinegun firp and

bombs at every opportunity Thu purchasing, shipping, and

receiving of supplies and equipment, constructioi of new facilities, training of additional pilots and observers, and o;her husiness necessary to support plans for defeting the Germans

continued as if the war would be of indefinite rtfration. But alt of

this was suddenly changed at 1100 hou.s.

With the Armistice in effect, cambat Lnits res :. -3ining.

An air service was formed forJuty in Germany v. t' s a -vof

occupation. Work was quickly begur o termi,..t..,:,:*: ts.

stop construction, dispose of excess supplies arid ,acilc's

phase out training programs, and ret;rn personnel a o un-it. tu

the United States where most of the men would be dischargeu

and the units disbanded

In the same period, at the end of 19i8 and Curiny the first part

of 1919, the Air Service. American Exr' ditior;ary Forces (AEF)

was reviewing World War I to see what had been lea-ned that

might be of value to the postwar. peacetime Air Service. Documentary materials relating t: this review--reports of lessons

learned and a survey of the effects of bomt:ng-are presented

in this volume

As in previous volumes in this series, the general editorial

policy has Leen to hold the editin'] an(, annotation to a minimum. All ef the documents reproduced here nave been taken

from a microfilm copy of Edgar S. Gorroll, "History of the Air

Service, AEF," the original of which is in the Naticnai Archives in

Washington, D.C'

The editor wishes to express his appreciation to Lloyd H,

Corrett, Jr., Chief of the Albert F. Simpsor. Historical Research

Center. for his support and assistance; to Dorothy McCluskie,

Lois Wagner, Jane Motley, Carolyn Fulk, Kathy Nichols. and

Billie White for their excellent work in transcribing the documents and typing the manuscript: to John D. Ashmore and his

staff in the Cartographics Information Division of Ait University Library for maps and information about places rmentioned in

documents used in this book; and to the many other people who

contributed in various ways to the preparation of this volume

Special recognition goes to Mr Lawrer.ce J. Paszek, Senior

Editor in the Office of Air Force History. for his work in the

selection and placement of photos, preparation of art, and for

guiding the manuscript through the various stages of publ-ca-
Viii

tion. -Mr. Jim Watson, U.S. Government Printing Office, deserves

credit for the arrangement of typography and design in this volume. The photographs have been selected from collections in

the National Archives, USAF Museum, and the USAF photo depository of the Aerospace Audiovisual Se-;ice 'MNAC).
C~nmte uts i

Foreword......................................................... v

Preface......................................... ................. vii

Part 1: Lessons Learned............................................ 1

Introduction ...................................... 1

Reports ................................................ .......... 4

Part 11: U.S. Bombing Sur-vey........................................ 363

Iniroduction ....................... ......................... 363

Reports ......................................... 368

Statistical Summary........................................... 492

Narrative Summary ......................... ................. 495

Conclusion ....................................................... 504

Appendixes

A. Tables of Organization............................................ 507I

B. Unit Costs ..................................................... 533

Notes................................................... ........ 551

Glossary of Abbreviations .......................................... 563

Index .............................................. . 566

LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

G en. M ason M . Patrick .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 1

Col. Thomas DeW itt Milling . . . . . . . . . . I.. . . - . . . . .. 4

C urtiss JN-4 trainers .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 7

DHA 4 .. .............................. ... ....................... 11

C ol. Frank P. Lahm ..... .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Balloon ready for ascension _ .......... .. .. 19

Gen. Foulois talks with airmen at tihe front . . .. ....... .... . ... 23

M arshall Ferdinand Foch . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. 27

Mal. H.E. Hartney with 1 st Lt. A.L. Cunningham ... _. .. ..... 29

Insignia of the 1 85th Aero Squadron .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
x

Empty bomb rack on a Breguet ........................................... 33

Antiaircraft gun........................................................ 38

Maj. Maxwell Kirby.............. .............................. ...... 42

Capt. John W entworth .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Capt. Reed G. Landis . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . .. 51

" Trouble shooters-' . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 55

"A" Flight, 148th Aero Squadron ............. ... 56

Officers of the 147th Aero Squadron ... .....- ...... .. 60

Pilots on alert at Toul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 68

Capt. Jerry C. Vasconcells .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 71

Fokker Triplane .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . 73

German Drachen balloon . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . .. 75

C apt. Alfred A. G rant . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . I.. . . . . . . . . . .. 77

W recked airplane, dropped 500 ft .. . .. .. .. ... ... ... ... .. 79

Lt. Thomas G. Cassady .-- - - - .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. 80

C aproni biplane .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Breuget. ............................................................. 88

Intelligence office. 1 st Day Bombardment Group........... ................... 92

Service crew, DH-4 aircraft - - - - .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 95

Pilots and observers of the 24th Aero Squadron ..... ................... ..... 96

Interior of a wireless truck ............................................... 103

Lt. Col. John F. Curry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 105

A Lewis gun mounted on a DH-4 .............................. .... ... 118

Insignia of the 12th Aero Squadron ...................................... 121

Salmson .................................. .......................... 123 A

Capt. Arhthur J. Coyle and Lt- Arthur L. Easterbrook ............... 125

Pigeons boarding aircrat...................... ....................... 127

Signaling w& pistols .... ................................. 128

Insignia of the 91 st Aero Squadron........................................ 130

Lts. J. Dickinson Estes and H C. Boricon ........... ........ 131

German antiaircraft gun in action ..... . ........ .... . 137

Flight mechanics, Romorantin, France .................................... 139

Officers of the 90th Aero Squadron ....... ................................ 143

Class in artillery 'eglage at LeValdlahon ...... ........... .. 144

Mechanics servicing a French Nieuport . .................. 156

Aerial view of trenches . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. 159

A 75-mm field artillery gun in action .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 161
xi

Laying out panel m arkers ................................................... 163

Insignia of the 104th Aero Squadron .......................................... 168

Aircraft of the 1st Aero Squadron ...................... 172

Airdrop to the "Lost Batalion" (Art by Merv Corning) ........................... 175

U.S. Infantry troops advancing over "no-man's land- ............. .. .......... 179

U.S. 155-m m artillery guns at Varennes ..................................... 182

Insignia of the 90th Aero Squadron ............ . . .. ...... .... . .. . 184

Lts. Linn D. Merrill and Edward C. Black, Jr.. 166th Aero Squadron ............... 187

U.S. troops in action at Belleau W oods ......... .... ........................ 188

340- m m railway gun in action .............. ... ........................ 191

A rocking nacelle used as a dummy fuselage for training aerial gunners .... .... 194

Germans fire at an American observation balloon .............................. 197

B u rn in g b a llo o n . . .... ....................... ....................... 2 0 1

Maj. John H. Jouett ........................................ 203

10th B alloon C o. truck convoy ...................................... ........ 204

Transporting a balloon to a new position ...................... . ... 205

A w inch for a captive balloon ....... ....... . . . ....................... 207

Balloon inflation .......................... ........................ 208

Bedding dow n a balloon ...................... ............. . ........ 211

C aptive balloon caught in trees ................................. ............ 213

Lt. Prentiss M. Terry .................... .... .. .. ..... 214

Allied balloons carried propaganda leaflets behind German lines ................ 221

M eteo rological balloon ..................................................... 227

A wagon train of supplies and ammunition ................................... 231

1st Lt Edward M. Urband mans a Lewis Gun ............ ... .... 232

Gen. M itchell w ith M aj. Joralem on ...................... .. ... ........ 241

Airplane hauled for repairs, 1st Air Depot .................................... 242

F use la ge rep air .......................... .......... .. ...... ...... .... 24 3

Transporting a rotary engine ................................ ... .... .... 246

E ng in e re p a ir ................................................ .. .... 2 4 7

Aircraft overhaul, 1st Air Depot .................. ............. ......... 249

W in g re pa ir ......................... .......... . .. .. .. ....... 2 50

Receiving messages from airp;ane by radio .................................. 253

Generator for type "Y" set mounted on the fuselage of a DH-4 ................. 255

Class in operating the wireless z' LeValdahon, An elementary buzzer class in

code instruction ................................ 259

A corner of the American radio set room at the 2d AIC ....................... .260

The radio department at the radio tower, 2d AIC, Tours .................. . . 261

I
xii

A signal corps radio set ... . . .. . . . . . . . . ... 265

A radio set instatied in a DH-4 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .266

Trucks and water tanks, Romorantin, France .................. 271

Water tanks used to supply airplanes . .. . ...... . . .... . . . 272

Gas and oil refueling station, Issoudlun ... .. .......... 274

Repair depot for rotary motors. Wing room in the Aero Supply Depot. AIC, Issoudlun.

Airplane salvage, Romorantin ... .... . ...... .... 275

Salvage pile at the 1 st Air Depot ..... ...... . . ... 276

Huron sisters theatrical group with LI. Arthur J. Coyle, Mat Ralph Royce. and

Mal. Lewis H. Brereton ............... ... .. ... 281

Ophthalmological room of a medical research laboratory .. ... ... 285-2136

Testing visual fields with a Hall Perimeter ... I........ 287

Testing near point of accommodation ............... 289

Testfng stereoscopic visio............. ............. 291

Capt. Fred Place and the staff of the Photographic School,

2d AIC. ...... .......... . . .. . . . . . .. . ......... ..... 297

Capt. Ernest Jor~s . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .... 298

FUselage supplies . . . .I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

Capt. Frederick W . Zinn . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311

Aviation Field #3, Issoudlun ... . . .. ... .. . . . . . . . ... 312

Pinup girls ...... . ... . ... ........ .. . . ... . .. 315

Col W alter C. Kilner .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 319

Wing repair shop, Issoudlun .. . . ... .. . . ... I.. 329

Horse-drawn supply vehicle. 1st Air Depot ......... .. ...... 331

Lt Col. W~dlter G. Kiner wvatches s!udent aviator take oft .......... 339

Preflight inspection, tssoudlun .. ... . . .I. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 341

Capt. W.M. Conantl, Maj. L.H Byarn. 1st LI. R.H. Merkle, and

Capt. H.L. Wingate . . .... 344

Photo room, 91 st Aero Squadron .......... 349 1.German observation post .......... ... .354

Machine shop, Issoudun . ...... .. . 357

LI. Cot. William C. Sherman, Col. Thomas D. Milling, and

Lt Col John Paegelow ........... 359

Damage caused by a 230 Jb British bomb . . 363

Insignia. four AEF bombing squadrons of World War I ............. 365

Breguets, 96th Aeno Squadron . . . ... ......... 370

Preparations for bombing rflssiori to Uornma,,y-Baroncourt. 12 June 1918 .... 372
11

I

xiii

Aerial photos showing the bombing of Montmedy ............................... 377

Damage caused by 1,600-lb. British bcmb ...... ............................ 390

The Uckange factory .................................... ............... .. 395

D am age in Hayange ............................ ......................... 397

C ity ruins in "1hionville ..................................................... 400

Thionville railroad station ............. ............................... 407

Damage to railway station near Luxembourg .................................. 412

Foundry at Dudelange ..................................................... 415

A eriai view of Trier ......................................... ............... 4 19

Houses hit in aerial bombardment of Trier .................................... 422

Damaged gas storage tank, Trier Gas Works ................................. 428

D am age at Volklingen ..................... ............................... 44 1

Solvay Chemical Factory, Sarratbe. following air raid,

22 A ugust 19 18 ................... ..................................... 450

Stumm Brothers factory, following air raid, 17 July 1918 ....................... 453

Effects of a 112-lb, British bomb on buildings .................................. 458

R esults of a raid, Coblenz ............................. .. .................. 477

Bom b dam age, Cologne ............................. ..................... 484

Houses of Buhl village destroyed by aerial bombardment ....................... 490

Issoudun (Art by J. Andre Smith) ....... ..................... 550

Maj. Harry M. Brown, Commanding Officer, 96th Aero Sqaudron ................ 560

The S .S . A driatic ............................................... .. .. 562

LIST OF TABLES, MAPS, AND CHARTS

U .S . Bom bing Survey ...................................................... 366

S ketch of Bouzonvilie ......................... ................. .......... 447

M ap Sketch of Frankfurt .................................................. 473

Statistical Sum m ary of Raids ............................................... 492

Tables of Organization

Army Air Sorvices ...................................................... . 508

C orps A ir Services .................................. ................. 510

Observation Group, Air Service ............................................. 512

Observation Squadron, Air Service ........... ....................... .514

Balloon W ing, Air Service ..................... ... ........................ 516
xiv

Balloon Group, Air Service

Balon omanAir Service.......................................... 517

Balloon Company, Air Service ...... ............ 518

Army Observation Wing, Air Service ................................ . 519 Army Observation Group, Air Service ....... ...... ............ 520

Monoplace Pursuit Wing, Air Service ... 520 Monoplace Pursuit Group, Air Service ............... 522 MVonopiace Pursuit Squadron, Air Service52 Day Bombardment Squadron, Air Service ................. ............... 528

Day Bombardment Group, Air Service .............................. 5

Air Park, Air Service .............. ........ 530

Photo Section, Air Service .......... ........ . .. .. .. ... .......................... ............... 531 ..... 5 3 2 Summary of Tables of Unit Costs II Estimated 

Day Bombardment 

Costs-establishment and maintenances of squadrons (1 year) 533 Squadron 535.......

, Airplanes Spare Parts and Motors .. ...53ii~ ................................... i ii ; i i i i i i i ii i i i i i i i 535 S 6

Sp....... ealpaathig ................... 536

il e Coth n .............................................. Transportation Equipment .......... 537 ............................. 538 Oxygen Apparatus .. . . . . . . . . . .538 Airplane Instruments 

Ordnance Equipment ...................... .............. .............. 5 39 ..................

Armament ........ Airplane Gasoline......... ................. ................. 542

Radio Equipment................. .. ............... ..... 54 Barracks, Buildings and Hangars Am m unition and Bombs .. ........................................ 544 545 Lubricating Oil and Grease for Motor Transportation and Equipment ............ 545 Gasoline for Motor Transportation ............................... 546

G-,.a Castor s M a Oil............................. s k s .... . . .. ......... .. 5 4 6

G Special as a Clothing s................... ................. ......... for Motorcyclists, Chauffeurs, Truck Drivers 547

and Mechanics.........

Subsistence of Enlisted Men .............

Family Allotments ......................... 547

Pay of Officers and Enhisled Men .... 548

Flying Fields, Roads, Railroads, Water Supply and Electric System 549 I-. .. ... 4 IZ

!.___
The U.S. Afrp Serwoice in

WcnOIZ WarH

V Voclme IV

Postwar Review

f.
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Panrt 1:

Less or s Le(1r.r--

Introduction

When the fighting was over, Maj. Gen. Masoih M. Patrick,

Chief of Air Service. American Expeditionary Forces, wanted to

find out what lessons had been learned, what knowledge had

been gained by Air Service personnel during World War I He

directed that such information be sent to Col. Edgar S. Gorrell.

Assistant Chief of Staff. who was compiling the history of the

Air Service, AEF, and preparing a "Final Report" for Patrick to

give to General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, AEF.,

No one was to go home, Patrick said, until he had "furnished in

writing to Colonel Gorrell any information of value which he

possesslesl and which he has acquired while in the American

Air Service.

'

Setting an example, Gorrell put on paper his own experience Ger,.Parick

in an ear;ier assignment as Chief of the Strategical Section. and

told what he had learned from his efforts to initiate a program of

strategical bombardment. Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois.

Assistant Chief of Air Service at Tours, Col. Thomas DeWitt

Milling, Chief of Air 3ervice of First Army, and Col. Frank P.

Lahm. Chief of Air Service of Second Army, followed suit. The

Chief of Air Service of Third Army, Brig. Gen. William Mitchell,

contributed some valuable documents retating to his early work

on plans and programs of the Air Service, A.E.F4

As Patrick's orders filtered down through the various levels of

organization. commanders of corps air services, groups, and

squadrons, staff officers, flight leaders, pilots, observers, supply

officers, engineers, armament officers, radio men, photographers, surgeons, and other U.S. Army officers assigned or

attached to Air Service units began writing reports. Some of the

reports, like the one written by a young intelligence officer, a

Yale graduate who would return to his alma mater to become

Lampson Professor of Latin. were well-written documents.

carefully and thoughtfully prepared. Others obviously were

dashed off hurriedly to be rid of a distasteful and seemingly

nonsensical task as quickly and easily as possible Someone at

the Second Artillery Aerial Observation School at Souge. found

still an easier way of meeting the requirement-a form letter for

use by officers at the school

L _ _ _ _ 

_
2 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Date-__ 1918

From

To Col. Gorrell, Office Chief of Air Service

Subject: Information.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in telegram Z 727

TG, from Chief Training Section, Headquarters Air Service,

Tours, the following certificate is submitted

2. I certify that I have acquired, while in the Air Service, no

information of value.

(Signed)

When Such certificates had been completed and signed by 10

first and second lieutenants, they were collected by the

commander, another first lieutenant who sent them off to

Colonel Gorrell, "in accordance with instructions. 6 There were

other officers, however, who had learned a great deal and had

information worth recording but who apparently did not submit

reports. There are no reports, for example, from Capt. Eddie

Rickenbacker and some other well-known fliers who survived

the war, but in some instances, as in the case of Maj. Char!es J.

Biddle. the men had left for the United States before General

-.,rick's order was received.

Receiving the reports, Colonel Gorrell made them part of the

"History of the Air Service, AEF." Most of them were bound

together in Volume 15 of Series A, but others are scattered

through various volumes of the history Apparently no one ever

attempted to organize and analyze the reports to see just what

had been learned that might be of use m the future The reports

evidently have not been much used for research. Scholars who

Vhave examined them have been disappointed. As one of them I said, "The volumes entitled 'Lessons Learned' belie the promise

of the title; . they are unsystematic, not comprehensive, and

inconr.lusive."' Nevertheless, these reports. written by men who

had first-hand knowledge of the matters about which they

wrote, are valuable as primary source materials for World War I.

They supply information and ofttimes present viewpoints not

found in other source documents of the Air Service, AEF.

Taken together, the reports contain a considerable amouint 01

interesting and significant data on a variety of subjects-the

care and feeding of pilots (they should eat more prunes), what it

was like to be airsi ;k in the back seat of a DH-4 (clean your goggles with the sleeve of your teddy bear), or. for example, how to

fly through an artillery barrage (by a pilot who did it regularly

and lived to write down what he had learned). There are reports

I, _ _ __ _ __ 

_
V]

Lessons 3

Learned

on how to avoid being shot down by anti-aircraft shells, machine gun fire from the ground, or red-nosed Fokkers the best

way (or ways-the men did not always agree) to carry out an

infantry contact or artillery adjustment or patrol or reconnaissance mission; how to survive the forced landings that were a

normal, expected part of flying in those days; why aviators were

such an undisciplined lot. how uncooperative infantrymen were and how little they appreciated the help given them by the aviators; how hazardous a trailing antenna Could be in formation flying; why some Air Service activities should be placed in charge

of civilian experts, or why those activities had to be directed by

military men; what was wrong-or right-with the promotion

system, commissioning programs, or gunnery training, how this

effort or that was "ruined" by the Armistice (a lament sung all

through the ranks, from Maj. Ger. Mason M. Patrick and Brig.

Gen. William Mitchell on down); and what wonderful things would have been accomplished "if the war had lasted six

months longer."

All these and many other things-the poor construction of radiator caps, tail Skids that wore out, propellers broken because

the wheels on the planes lacked mudguards, etc..-affecting the

employment of aviation in World War I are brought Out in the reports which follow.
- - - - .~ :-.

- - --- ---

4 US Air ervice

in World Wir I Vol IV

2I

Reports

Col. of Thomas Air Service, DeWitt First Milling Army eChief 

The remarks and observations that Col- Thomas DeWitt Mill-

: iing submitted in response to Genera'Patrick's instructions reffeited broad and varied experience in U SW military aviation. A

pioneer aviator who had learned to fly at College Park in 1911,

Milling had set some of the early flying records in the United

States and had been involved in many of the early experiments

with aircraft in the U.S. Army. He had been one of the original members of the 1st Aero Squadron and had flown with the

squadron in Mexico. Having been in charge of flight training in

-Col. Millng. the Signal Corps, he Subsequently had served as chief of training for the Air Service, AEF Later he had command. d the lst

Pursuit Wing and had served as Chief of Star of the

Pursuit Wing and had served as Chief of Staff of the Air Service of the First Army before succeeding Mitchell as Chief of Air Ser-

-Cvice, First Army Thus, Milling was well qualified to comment on

such things as the stae of the pre-war Ar Service. problems of

training the pilots and producing the airplanes required for the

war f Europe. confcts that arose between the military and civilians and between the Air Service in Washington and the Anir

Service of the AEF, and among otherf th e development

of combat tactics in the Air Service, AEF.

- CAt the timgn al e sdeclared war Germany sn few people in

the United States knew anything about the Air Servce or had

uany real knowledge abo airplanes, types that should be

employed or the use that could be made of them, either from a

commercial standpoin or from the standpoint of war. This

condition of affairs placed the Air Serllce at the b.innng or, a

very unstable fooling. sDuring the trouble with Mexico. immediately preceding our

declaration of war on Germany, the Urped States possessed

very few airplanes. These consstaed of a few school machines in

use in the training school and a few in service nn Mexico At hs

time the newspapers, based on wformaon supped both by

cihans and by Army Officers. mad an attack on the Signal

Corps agains the machines then being used in Mexico. While

certain charges may have been true, no remedy ead offered and

d i a r e S p

veyfwarlns heecniido ewshoIahnsi
Lessons 

5

Learned

therefore the "muck-raking" that took place did more harm than

good. At the time, these machineb were the best obtainable in

the United States; it was impossible to purchase machines from

abroad; it was therefore a question of making the best use of

the equipment at hand.

When war was declared on Germany programs were drawn

shwing wnat the United States could do towards building and

putting on the battle front of Europe an Air Service superior in

numbers and efficiency to that of the Allies combined. This

program was undoubtedly based on the idea that has always

seemed to exist in the United States, namely, that money can do

anything It was evidently supposed that if a sufficient

appropriation was secured from Congress, that no difficulty

would be encountered in building the necessary tquipment and

in training pilots. This at the time was an impossibility to those

who appreciated the true situation.

The work of drawing up the plans and organization for the Air

Service at the beginning of the war, with the exception of two or

three officers who knew something about aviation conditions, was

turned over entirely to a board o' men who had been successful

in civilian life, such as manufactuiers, particularly that of

automobiles. This in itself, in my opinion, was a mistake. It is

believed that the services of men who have been successful in

the organization and handling of large business establishments in

civil life can be well utilized in connection with Army work, but as

a rule they should be subordinate to trained officers of the

Army, as conditions enter that can only be met and handled by

men who have gained knowledge and experience by actual

military service.

A publicity campaign was immediately begun and the people

were fed on rash promises, not only as to the number of planes

that could be put on the front, but also the wonderful things

they would do towards winnin3 the war. While this may have

been necessary from a political standpoint in order to obtain the

appropriations asked of Congress, nevertheless it was apparent

that it would do more harm than good in the end.

The programs drawn up for both the training of pilots and the

building of planes were entirely too optimistic. The manufacturers

7 of planes of course had to bid high on a production basis if they

expected to receive the oeders. Considering the matter in the

light of our experience obtained in buying planes in the United

States during the previous four or five years, it was apparent

that these programs could not be met. The maximum figures for

the building, establishing and putting in service of the schools

wer. employed with a corresponding maximum output in the

minimum of time. This, without considering carefully, the output
6 U.S Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

from our schools during the previous years.

If at the time the Air Service program was taken up, it bad

been decided to develop the service on what might be

considered two separate programs, it is believed that many

difficulties would have been eliminated. The first program could

have provided for the immediate needs of all mobile troops by

copying standard makes of planes and motors pending su.:h time

as the larger program calling for thousands of pilots and planes

with new equipment could be developed It is also believed that

too much consideration has always been given to ine views and

opinions of foreign officers, rather than placing full dependence

on those of our officers who, knowing our own peculiar

condihons, were, from their experience !n oviation, better finted to

determine al questions affecting our service.

It is not believed that sufficent consideration was gien to the

planes that had been developed in the United States. In addition

to those selected for training purposes, there were two or three

types susceptible of development, which, in my opnion, wold

have piovwed satisfactory for use on the front

The organization as finally built up in the United States and

that in Europe lacked coordination. If success was to be

obtained it was essential that the closest co-operation and c(

I." ordination should exist between the Air Service in Europe and in

the United States, bearing in mind always that the Air Service in

the United States existed purely for the purpose of supplying the

American Army in Europe with all the necessary personnel and

material. This seemed to have been lost sight of. The Air Service

in Europe, due to the new conditions it had to face and being

directly in contact with conditions actually existing on the front,

developed a view-point which no one in the United States could

possibly acquire unless he had had the same experience in

Europe and especially on the fro ' The opinion of those in

Europe should have been accep• .- ' question Such was

not always the case

The program as outlin e proruction of pilots in the

United States was based L 

. me number of schools to be estabhshed, either two or four squadron stations. This was

figured on the maximum capacity of the school and a sufficient I length of time was not allowed for the construction and

preparation of the school before it was supposed to produce its

maximum number of pilots. The fields should have been located

in those sections affording the best climatic conditions. Instead of

establishing a large number of small schools, it is believed to be a better policy to establish a small number of large ones with a

sufficient number of outlying fields to complete the full course of

any particular phase of training The greatest care should have

StI
Lessons 7

Leameu

been exercsed in the selection of commanding officers for

schools, as only in such cases can the best results be obtained,

where morale is such a high factor and where the temperament

of ti, individual must be thorouqhly studied and understood. It

is not believed that this was thoroughly appreciated.

The type of machine selected for primary training, namely the

Curtiss J.N.4, is believed to be good for the purpose. It is

understood that a sufficient number of high powered machines.

either single or tu, Dlace, could not be obtained. It is believed,

however, that a mistake was made in holding back pupils in the

States who had from 100 to 150 hours flying, even though it had

been on Curtiss J.N.4 machines, awaiting such time as faster

machines were available- The man who is thoroughly tramed to

fly and has had a large amount ot practice, even on machines of

this type, will require but little additional training on faster types

to. equip him for work over the front. The principal reason for

employing three or four different types in training a pilot is to

cut the time as short as possib!e consistent with the results. If a

sufficient amount of time can be devoted on a slower type

machine, all results can be obtained except the finishing touches.

In spite of the information received from the States that fully

trained personnel would arrive ready for the front in a short

time, it was determined to maintain the schools in Europe with

-

A 

t

A- . - . -L
8 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

the idea in view of using them for revision and selection of pupils

arriving from the States By this method a pupil who arrived for

any particular phase of work such as pursuit, bombardment or

otherwise, would be sent to the school in question and after

being examined, wouL!d remain there for the length of time

necessary to determine that he was competent before being sent

to the front. This period would probably have varied from one to

three weeks. This unfortunately never had a fair test, as men

were sent over in all stages of training.

The method of training followed in our schools in France was

based on the French system. This method was based on 

a

system of individual training, the result of which may be seen in

the "French Ace," rather than teamwork and formation flying

We n,?ver fully appreciated the necessity for training in formation

work until after the Battle of St. Mihiel. Steps were then taken

by the Training Department of the Air Service to change the

course of irstrucion in order to institute this new method.

In order to dev,-lop pilots of espree arid to instill in them the

desire to be cc(,stantly "on the job," regardless of conditions, it

was essential that they receive proper treatment in the schools;

in other words 'morale," one of the biggest factors of success in

the Air Service, had to be maintained. Due to the congestion of

cadet: sent over from the States foi training, there was much

dissatisfaction. In many cases cadets who were sent to Europe.

because of their high standing on graduation from ground

schools, were still privates when men who had attended school

with them began to arrive as first lieutenants The mixing of

cadets and officers, who had been at the same ground schools

together, was very detrimental. In other cases, due probably to

the shortage of enlisted personnel, they were required to do

police work and other odd jobs Under the conditions this may

have been necessary; however it is believed that it would be

better policy to establish a definite status for these men which

coufd be clearly defined and followed.

The bombardment school at Clermont.Ferrand was inspected

by the undersigned in ',c early part of last Spring. The school at

that time was in very ')oor shape, discipline lax and morale poor.

It is believed that the resulting poor morale in the bombardment

units at the beginning of the Argonne offensive was due in 

a

large measure to the conditions existing at this school.

Due to the shortage of our Air Service during the battles of

St. Mihiel and the Argonne and the fact that we viere unable to

obtain a sufficient number of squadrons from the French to take

care of the sector alloted us, it was necessary to take squadrons

of enlisted personne! direct!y into the army area and organize

them as fighting units while the battle was in progress. It is

k • 

k
Lessons 

9

Learned

believed that it is only due to the high character of our

personnel that this was possible and that the resulting fine

service was obtained from the units so organized.

Some trouble has been encountered in maintaining harmony

between the flying and non-flying personnel. This is due

principally to the fact that the flying personnel as a whole looks

upon the average healthy man who holds a non-flying position as

one who has either obtained it through political influence or who

desires to escape danger. It is believed that the best way to

eradicate this situation is to place all flying officers who through

wounds, nervousness or other causes lose their usefulness as

pilots over the front, but who are still capable of performing non

flying duty, in these positions

So far as flying personnel is concerned, pilots, as a rule,

should be between 19 and 24 yeas of age; observers 23 to 30.

Also it is not thought necessary that an observer should he

forced to undergo Ie same physical examination as a pilot, nor

that exactly the same physical qualifications should be required

of him

At the beginning of the battle of Chateau Thierry. the tactics

amployed by our Air Service were in general what we had

learned from the French and British. It soon became apparent

that their method of employing the pursuit in large massed

patrols was not the most effective. It was therefore decided that

while the large numerical strength of patrols should be

maintained, instead of employing the patrol in one massed

formation as was commonly the case, the formation sh:ruid be

made up of small groups in echelon properly articulated and

within supporting distance In this way only one small group

could be thrown into confusion if attacked and the remaining

groups would be in a positron to counter attack. This method

proved very effective, as is shown by the fact that it was

immediately adopted by the Germans The lessons learned in this

battle in the employment of pursuit and Corps Observation

proved of great value to us later. During this battle the only

American units employed were pursuit and corps observation, all

-under the general command of the French. It was not until the

-: " beginning of the battle of St. Mihiel that our Air Service began

to function under American command throughout.

Our Air Service for this battle consisted of about 45%

American and 55%. French but all under the command of an

American Chief of Air Service. The lessons learned at Chateau

Thierry were taken advantage of with excellent results Our

pursuit was equipped with bomb racks to carry light bombs for

use against concentrations of enemy ground troops, convoys,

etc. One group was held in reserve for this purpose and to meet

iI

. , ,, , 1 1 I I I I I I 1
10 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

any sudden concentration of enemy aircraft. In the withdiawal of

the Germans from the salient the wiseness of this move was

shown, ?s an opportunity was afforded on the afternoon of the

12th to attack heavy congestions of traffic and troops vith

bombs and machine guns. Thereafter the general policy was to

always retain one group in reserve. However, such a group was

not idle during the day. If its services were not needed to meet

concentrations of enemy aircraft or if no special concentrations

of enemy troops or convoys could be discovered, it was sent out

at various times during the day as concentrated patrols to sweep

the front.

The First American Pursuit Group was given an entirely new

phase oi work which had never before been tried, namely, what we migjht call "low flying". Thi5 was done in order to attack the

Corps Air Service of the enemy, to prevent his battle-plarnes

from operating successfully and for the purpose of attacking and V destroying balloons. Up to this time the tendency in pursuit had

been to work at higher and higher altitudes By instituting th,

method of low flying in the offensive we were able to combai

successfully the German battle-planes, which up to this time had I been able to work uohindered and n addition to place a full

barrier of pursuit on the front.

The day bombardment was employ-d as the French and

British had always used it, practically without protection, to

attack important hostile P C.'s and points of strategic vaiue from

ten to twenty kilometers behind the lines. This method of

employment is highly unsatisfactory and is attendant with what

might be considered heavy iosses. It is believed that the

Germans, realizing this, never seriously employed or attempted

to organize day bombardment units. As will be explained later, in

the Argonne-Meuse offensive, however, the method which we

employed in using the day bombardment together with the

pursuit not only did away with excessive losses but also

increased our efficiency.

After the Battle of St. Mihiel the transfer of the units to the

new fields for the Argonne.Meuse offensive was completed in

ample time for the attack on September 26th without the pursuit

ever ceasing Its work, bu, with great difficulty on account of the

lack of transportation. It might be pointed out in this connection

that if the Air Service is ever to be successful in the field,

especially in the system of open warfare which had been ,eached

during the last months of the war, they must be equipped vth 

a full allowance of transportation in order that they may be

absolutely' mobile. It was only by using our transportation lwenty

four hours a day that the move was completed, bitt the

transportation was left in su( h sh.:pe that a similar movement
Lessons 11

Learned

would have been impossible. It has been demonstiated without

question ihat if mobility of Air Service units is to be realized, it

is essential that the Air Service have and control its own motor

transport service.

At the beginning of the Argonne-Meuse offensive our general

tactics of employment were retained. After our attack which

began on September 26th was checked, the air fighting continued

to be very severe. For a period of about ten days, or until

about October 12th, we encountered difficulty on account of the

losses in the day bombardment. This was having an effect on

their morale. It was therefore decided to employ them only in

connection with the pursuit. On October 12th, therefore, one

pursuit group was sent as protection for the day bombardment;

this protection being afforded by seling a definite hour for a

rendezvous over the target to be bombed, the pursuit being in

place in groups above and below the level at whichthe bombers

were operating. The presence of day bombardment always draws

out the opposing pursuit, and as a consequence our pursuit was

afforded an opportunity to attack their opponents as soon as

they appeared in view. This method proved highly successful

with practically no loss to the bombardment. It was then decided

to continue the development of this method by employing pursuit

in greater numbers and loading them with light bombs at the

same time. During the succeeding days the morning raid by day

bombardmert was made in conjunction with one pursuit group.

For the afternoon raid a time was selected so that the bombers

would be across the lines during the last hour of daylight. In this

way all pursuit could be concentrated with the bombing and a

force of from 140 to 180 machines employed in a single raid.

These raids proved -. successful that during the last days of the

battle approximately 75%, of the total planes brought down during

the day occurred as a result of these raids. After escorting the

bombers back to the lines, the pursuit would disperse and would

straft the front line troop., machine gunning any concentrations

of the enemy that could be discovered and clear the front of DH-4.

opposing machines.

j.7 WIN

down-=
12 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

In connection with the day bombardment, it might be

mentioned that another reason which existed for their low

morale was due to the fact that the type of machine with which

three of the squadrons were equipped, the D.H.4, carried gas

tanks which were unprotected against fire. It seems that it would

have been a simple matter to have foreseen the necessity of

supplying protected tanks. Successful experiments with such

tanks had been made in the United States before the

undersigned :eft there, which was in August 1917. There are

numerous cases where these machines were set on fire, not

only when being attached by enemy machines, but also when

being struck by enemy anti-aircraft. French machines with

protected tanks were retuining to our lines intact with

numberless holes in their ga,. !anks, one specific ,..se of which 

I

know having fourteen.

During the month of October an additional pursuit squadron

was brough. to the front and equipped with Sopwith Camels for

the purpose of being used for night work. This squadron was

put into shape very quickly and did very good work on night

patrois. However, the Germans were riot employing their large

bombers over the front at this time and only one opportunity

was given for them to engage in combat with an enerry plane.

Unfortunately this took place without the aid ot searchlights and

no results were obtained. However, a sufficient amount of

experience was obtained from this squadron to show that it is as

practicable as day pursuit and if proper liaison is maintained with

- the anti aircraft service, that the employment of night bombers

without protection will he a difficult matter in the future. At the

time the armistice was signed provision was being made to equip

this night pursuit squadron with bomb racks for the use of lIght

bombs against the front line trenches. Such bombs would cause

L little, it any, real damage against the enemy but from experience

with our own troops, it would have a great effect on their

morale. The night pursuit can be very well employed in

connection with nisht squadrons, whether of the night

reconnaissance or night bombing type.

Numerous cases occurred where both German pilots and

German observers saved themselves from being killed by leaping

with parachutes from their plane when it caught on fire. From

examination made of several men who descerded in this manner.

it was found that their machines hid not been designed nor

constructed in the factories to carry parachutes hut that they

were carried in different ways; in some cases they were used as

seat cushions, in other cases they were carried strapped to the

hack. However no case is known where any observer or pilot
Lessons 13

Leaned

" jumped and his parachute failed to open. It is believed that it

would be a simple matter to arrange for receptacles for the

installation of parachutes in al machines when they are

manufactured.

It is not believed that the so-called two-p;ace fighter has yet

demonstrated the fact that it can be considered to exist Unless

it is intended to use such a machine in connection with

observation or bombardment, its use is not recommended. if it

is intended to be Lsed in connection with observation or

bombardment ii is not seen where it would be sufficiently

superior to the types of machines now used for that

purpose to warrant the use of material and personnel for this

purpose alone. In the natural course of events one-place fighters V should continue to improve in performance as rapidly as a twoI

place fighter and will therefore retiin its advantage from the

standpoint of speed arl maneuverability Also in any two-place

machine the fighting is done by the man in the rear seat and not

by the man who operates the bow-guns. In such case the pilot

maneuvers the machine so as to put his gunner in position

where he can fire in the most effective manner. When placed in

this position he is usually going away from the enemy. He

therefore immediately places himself on the defensive and the

offensive spirit is lost. It is believed that this offensive spirit is

essential and can only be obtained where the pilot is constantly

going forward and toward his adversary. Undoubtedly the twoplace fighter was designed with the idea in view of individual

combat, which had been the rule up to the last few months of

the war. It is believed that the best two place machine would be

able to defeat the ordinary single-seater machie. However, it

must be remembered that the one-place fighters are only used in

grourp, and that it i- against the rule of our service for a man to

leave his formation for the sole purpose of indulging in individual

combat The so-called making of "aces" is not countenanced in

our service and undoubtedly this is the main reason why we

have been so successful in making a record with our pursuit that

has been equalleo by no other service in the worid
14 U.S. Air Service 

I

in World War I

Vol IV

Air Service Commander. First Army

In addition to a statement of lessons learned, Milling was

asked to make recommendations for changes in the Tables of

Organization (see appendix A). The following recommendations were provided to the Chief of Air Service, AEF on 1 1 January 1919 by Maj. A. L. Walsh, Chief of Staff, acting for, and in the

absence of, the Army Air Service Commander, Colonel Milling.

While the recommendations pertain mainly to specific authorizations, the commentary contains some signficant remarks

(extracted below) about the organization and employment of

aviation.

It must be remembered that each war is fought in a different

manner from the previous one; therefore organization and

equipment in this war is not necessarily that which will be used

in the next war. This was not an open and mobile war but a

stationary war and the organization and equipment is more or less based on that idea.

The Operations Department must be considered as one of the

most important in all Headquarters units... Headquarters officers j

should be men who have had experience and they should have a

constant knowledge of the situation by actually flying themselves.

There should also be schools established to train Air Service

Staff officers in all branches of the Air Service and also in the

work ol the lice ard work of the balloons.

In the employment of bombardment and pursuit together it

was found that better results were obtained when both were

under one head. But with trained staffs, there should be no

difficulty in cooperating pursuit and bombardrnnt, and in such

an event this would not be necessary. There should be one

pLirsuit group in the army assigned to low flying work against

battle plares arid balloons. This group should have night flyng

equipment as the work is such thai it requires "taking off" or

"landing in the dark." There should also be two night pursuit

squadrons. These six squadrons are included in the 24 for the

army

If the personnel and commanders of the Observation Group

and Balloon Group together with G 3 cf the Corps are

thoroughly trained in the employment of Air Service, the position
Lessons 15

Learned

of Corps Air Service Commander could be done away with, as the airplanes and balloons could be co-ordinated by G.3.

However, there should always be a thoroughly trained Air

Seivice Officer with sufficient rank for his opinion to carry

weight as a member of G-3 of the Corps.

A Divisional Air Service is not recommended.

1. Due to constant changing of divisicns in attack it will

require an excess of Divisional Air Service

2. It is uneconomical in both personnel and materiel.

3. The necessary cohesion and control will be lost in the

Corps Air Se, vice.

This table [of organization for Headquarters, G.H.Q. Air Service

Reserve] should be that necessary for a Headquarters, Group of

Armies or an advanced General Headquarters. These

headquarters should control the large bases and feed s.:pphes

and personnel to the small bases (depots) of each army. The

personnel arid equipment should be that necessary to operate in

this manner.

There should also be a reserve independent force, under the

command of the Group of Armies, capable of being placed at

the most vital points to assist the Army Air Service This should

be large and contain picked units. It should be made up mostly of pursuit and bombardment units.

Col. Frank P. Lahm

Chief of Air Service, Second Army

Col. Frank P. Lahm. who was 10 years older than Milling. had

entered aviation by way of ballooning. in which his father was

interested. The younger l.ahm had learned to fly a balloon in

France and had won the first James Gordon Bennett International Balloon Race, in 1906. The following year he had been assigned to the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps, and two

years later he had become the first member of the U.S. Army to Col IAim

I
16 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

go up in an airplane and the second to make a solo flight. Sent

to Fort McKinley in a cavalry assignment, he had started military

aviation in the Philippines. Later he had been secretary of the

Signal Corps' Aviator School at San Diego and commander of

the Balloon School at Omaha. Sent to France in September

1917, he had been placed in charge of balloon activities in the

AEF. Later he had served as a balloon representative at GHQ,

AEF. chief of the advance section of the balloon service, and on

the staff of G-3. Headquarters, First Army, before being made

Chief of Air Service. Second Army. in October 1918. Lahm's report on lessons learned was in two parts, the first being concerned with the Air Service in gereral and hoavier-than-airavia0ion in particular (below), the second pertaining to balloons (see

below, Document 72).

Historical. Like the entire Army, we had the problem of rapidly

organizing, training, equipping and putting on the front, a large

Air Service.

We suffered first from lack of a reasonable nucleus with which

to start, then from lack of coordination between efforts in the

U.S. and those in the A.E.F. This was early recognized and

liaison officers were exchanged, but they frequently did not have

full knowledge of the conditions on which they were to report,

moreover in the case of officers returning to the US., I

know that conditions changed rapidly, and information taken

back by them, was frequently superannuated by the time it was

delivered.

The Air Service in the U.S. worked along certain ,nes. but we

did not know in France, just what these lines were. For instance,

trained personnel was supposed to come from the U.S. and at a

time when irained personnel was lacking in France. we knew

that there was supposed to be some 16,000 aviators in the

service, but sufficient were not obtainable to maintain a d,-,

squadrons on the front. The U S. had failed to foresee the jai.,

overhead required in producing rapidly a large trained personnel

consequently many of the earlier trained ones were held at

instruction centers starting right from the ground schools in the

U.S. and up to the final training schools in France, from which

aviators were sent into squadrons. Our permanent training cadre

maintained with the colors after the war, should be large enough

to suddenly take the largest influx of green mateiial that any

future war may call on us to train and put on the front. We

know now what machinery is required for this purpose. We

should never again find the "neck of the bottle" to be, for

instance, aerial gunnery. With our past experienL:e, no one
Lessons 17

Learned

K feature of training should be overlooked, but a symmetrically

developed system should be maintained in time of peace, that

will produce completely trained aviators with facilities for passing

them from one phase of their training to the next without delay.

We should be self dependent and never have to depend on

foreign services to assist in our training, utilizing them simply for

broadening our knowledge and view point. From my personal

knowledge I know that the training given our pilots and

observers in French units, airplane as well as balloon, was of

material value to them in their later work in our own squadrons

on the front. It is not sufficient to have trained officers of the

French and British Air Services attached to our training section

at home, we should continue to maintain at all times, a

personnel under instructions in foreign schools, as has been done

in our cavalry service for many years past. American officers

who had the advantage of the course of instruction at the

French Cavalry School of Application at Saumur,0 were of

material assistance in developing our own Cavalry Service. The

* Air Service should follow this principle and keep up the date in

all the developments of foreign aviation, French, British as well

as German.

Coordination is a subject on which we have learned many

lessons. I believe a well organized coordination section, operating

a year ago would have assisted materially in the development of

the Air Service in Europe. At first we were ahead on pilots and

observers, sending the trained men to French and British

squadrons while waiting for planes to equip the squadrons we

did have. This existed trom perhaps February till July, when we

found we had a sufficient supply of planes, but pilots and

particularly observers, were lacking, and before this, the shortage

of service squadrons had made itself felt. A coordination section

would have foreseen some of this difficulty. However, neither a

coordination section nor any other amount of foresight will ever he able to overcome the difficulties which resulted from our

being dependent on our Allies for supplying us with ships and

with training our personnel. It is evident that we must be in a

position to supply all our own needs, and our future plans

should be based on this plan. It is probably entirely unnecessary

to state that money and men in unlimited quantities will not

mobilize an Air Service in time of war. We had both, but took

just a year to put our first squadron on the front, from the time war was declared.

A fixed policy was another one of our difficulties. At one time

early in 1918, three different organizations for a balloon company

were in effect. Companies were arriving from the U.S. composed

- A
18 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

if six officers and ninety-one men, the organization which hd

b'en approved in the U.S. the previous spring. As a result of

investigations carried on in France, a balkoon company

organization of nine officers and two hundred men had been

apprcved at G.H Q A.E F., sent to the U S and approved by

the Wa- Department About this time a new organization was

propose land adopted in the A. E F cutting down the number of

officers bf, one and the number of enlisted men by thirty. No

one of the L-iree organizations was perfect, but the continuation

of any one o' them at least for a reasonable length of time

would have rsulted in less confusion and greater efficiency 

I

think we shoukd take this lesson to heart and avoid a repetition

ot it in the future. Another example, has been the First Air

Depot. This has at vanous times been destined as a main supply

depot, an advanced depot and a park While its functions were being discussed and -hanged. squadrons came to the front and

the depot was unprep.ired to handle to work at hand. I suggest

that first a well thought -ui system of supply be adopted to

meet any kind of vaiar,,. we may be calf'd upon to conduct, 

A

and that conservatism be exercised in all changes of organization

and supply, once reasonable systems have been adopted

Swapping horses in the middle of the stream is known to be

bad policy.

Tactically I believe our Air Service has been as sound as that

of the British. French or German. Tactics have been in a stage

of development right up to the end and probably would have

continued to change rapidly and radically as equipment changed 

i

and the war progressed. In less than a year we passed from the 

A

exploits of individual 'aces" to the well though! out operations of

teams. Team work must be the basis of future tactical

development as illustrated by the French Aenal Division.

Formation flying must be given a place of great importance.

starting with the patrol of a flight arid working up to groups of

squadrons operating together in bombardment and pursuit. It has

been recognized for some time that proper training in the line

can only be accomplished by concentrating divisions or lorger

units. I believe the same is true of the Air Service. Isolated

squadrons will not amve at the desired efficiency Bombing and

pursuit must be concentratecl. and the different kinds of aviation

must train together, not wait until the outbreak of war to

deveiop team work Bombers and pursuit must know each other

and train in the same vicinity The same applies to pursuit and

observation Moreover it is absolutely essential that corps

observation squadrons should traii with the line in time of

peace Consequently. taking into account climatic conditions. 

I

believe the Air Service should be concentrated in large units in

I. 

.

,,~a I 

-
Lessons 19

Learned

Balloon ready for ascension

the vicinity of the training centers fa)r troops, there to come in

contact with the line and let the d fferent services become

mutually acquainted.

Perhaps our weakest point has been in the lack of

understanding between the Air Service (observation in particular)

and the line. Great progress in overcoming this difficufty has

been made in the last three months, first by detading observers

to the line units down as far as battalions where they lived and

talked aviation, explained the capabilities and limitations of the

Air Service, learned the line officers view point, second by

bringing the line to the Air Service and demonstrating its

operations. Corps Schools have proven of particular value in this

work, details of one hundred men and six to a dozen officers

being taken frum a divisiun unto the corps ubservatiun airdroie

for a five day's course of instruction and training, covering the

equipment. methods and usual procedure, and practical exercises

with panels, pyrotechnics and radio, ... Every opportunity should

be taken to participate in the problems and maneuvers of the

line troops To accomplish the above results, the Air Service in

time of peace must be located near the training centers for line

troops.

Mobilizing and putting a large Air Service en the front in a

minimum length of time was our problem the past two years.

"he greatest one feature of this problem was supply, and this

will probably always be the case. In our eagerness to get the
20 US. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

first squadrons to the line, we sent them there with equipment

that could not be rated as first class and that was insufficient in

quantity. I refer to the Spad type XI, A.R Two, Sopwith and

Nieuport planes in particular. It is a fact, however, that putting

squadrons on the front with these planes resulted in expediting

the delivery of additional equipment, and what was far more

important, it gave our aviators the opportunity to demonshate

their efficiency, as a fesult of which the quality of equipment

furnished by the French improved materially.

Spad types VII and XIII for the pursuit and Salmsons for the

observation took the places of the earlier equipment. While it

would have been desirable to wait for these better ships before

sending squadrons to the front, I believe the plan adopted was of

greater benefit to the Air Service in the end.

Supply. The original supply system for units in the field, drawn

up in the summer of 1917, is believed to be sound not only for

the peculiar fixed warfare we have grown accustomed to, but for

any future form of warfare. We shall always require depots,

t probably backed up by receiving and regulating stations, with

parks out in front of the depots. These parks should be fairly

mobile and capable of moving with their supplies as troops

move. The park squadrons with the groups are of particular

value, especially in the pursuit groups, and in case of mobile

warfare for which we must be prepared, they would prove

particularly valuable. In the observation group the park squadron

is less important, due partly to the greater reliability of the

Liberty motor and partly to the fact that the observatii.n group

has been more fixed. This should not be taken as the normal

case however.

The D. H. 4 has proven a very successful observation plane. It

has the power, speed, carrying capacity and ceiling. The

adoption of the D H.9 will obviate the difficulty due to the

separation of the pilot and observer as in the D.H.4, and will

also give the added improvement of having the tank where it will Inot be a menace to the pilot in case of a crash Covered 9-s

tanks are absolutely essential. The morale of the observation and

bombing flyers was noticeably lowered due to the danger from

fire which they knew was always present with the uncovered

tanks. The Selden pump in place of the pressure feed is another

improvement that will react favorable on the morale of D.H. 4

flyers.'- Mud guardb should be provided on all planes sent to the

front With the arrival of the rainy season and consequent

muddy fields, many propellers have been broken in taking off.

and f.ying has had to be suspended in many cases until mud

guards could be made and put on the planes.

Low flying, high speed, protected two seater fighting planes

.... . . . . ... , , , ,
Lessons 21

Learned

would have proven of great value in the Second Army- A

machine of this type should be developed at once, capable of

shooting up troops on the ground ad of carrying out low

reconnaissance missions. The moral effect of these planes on

front line troops is out of all proportion to the material effect.

Our own troops were greatly harassed by enemy planes flying

over them, though as a matter of fact the casualties were neg!iqible. On the other hand, the mere presence of our own

planes flyinq at a low altitude over the front lines produces a

feeling of confidence in the line troops that calinot be

overest;mated.

During the last five days before November 11th, Second Army Headquarters was particularly anxious to verify the suspected

wididiawdl of the enemv from our front. I his was the Air

Service's one most important mission at that time. It could be

accomplished only by low flying reconnaissance and for

unprotected planes this is a mission that can only be

accomplished by the most daring flyers, the ones we could least

afford to lose. A squadron of fast, protected two-seaters would

have proven invaluable on this front.

-4A

Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois

Assistant Chief of Air Service, AEF

On 29 January 1919, Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, Assistant Chief of Air Service at Tours, turned in a 140-page report,

typewritten, single-spaced, on legal-size paper, on "Air Service

lessons learned during the present war." After briefly reviewing

the status of U.S. military aviation at the time the United States

entered the war, Fouiois told of his work in the Aviation Section

of the Signal Corps in Washington in the period from April to

October 1917. During that time, first as a captain, then as a

major. and finally as a brigadier general, Foutois had played an

important role in the expansion of the Aviation Section into the

wartime Air Service.

The main part of Foulois' report, however, was devoted to his

accomplishments as Chief of Air Service, AEF from November

1917 until May 1918, when he was concerned mainly with organization, logistics, and training This section, some 110

pages, was made up largely of letters, memoranda, orders, re--

ports, cables, and other documents copied in their entirety and

strung together with brief passages supplied by Foulois
22 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

The next section of Foulois' report, (12 pages) covered the

period of his service as Chief of Air Service, First Army. The

most important thing during that time, and the one on which

Foulois concentrated, was his conflict with Billy Mitchell. Here

again a large part of the text was built up from documents, including those in which Foulois requested reassignment and recommended Mitchell for the post of Chief of Air Service. First Army.

A few pages then were used for the period, beginning in August 1918, when Foulois was Assistant Chief of Air Service, first

in the Zone of Advance and then at Tours

The report is much too long for inclusion in its entirety in this

volume. Furthermore. the way in which it was constructed from

copies of documents prevents the selection of a series of meaningful extracts. The lessons learned were reflected, however, in

the recommendations with which Foulois brought his report to 

a

close.

126. In closing this report on lessons learned, I submit the

following recommendations for future consideration.

126a Future Preparedness. Each and every paragraph of this

report shows the necessity for future military and industrial

preparedness.

The United States has developed an aeroplane and engine

industry during the period of our participation in the war, which

if effectively fostered and not allowed to die, will put the United

States in its proper place in the League of Nations, aid in the

event of future military emergency we will not be required to go

through the chaotic and unpleasant experiences which developed

in the United States in 1918, due primarily to the unprepared

state of the American aeroplane and engine industry.

The United States had developed a large aeronautical

personnel which at the close of hostilities was, in the aggregate.

the superior of all other aeronautical personnel in the world.

In other words, the United States is in a position today to

take and maintain the supremacy of the air, both militarily and

commercially, if prompt advantage is taken to maintain and keep

up the development of our present aeronautical resources.

Great Britain, during the entire period of the war, has

constantly looked forward to the supremacy of the air, both

militarily and commercially.

Recent news dispatches indicate that Germany is already

turning toward the development of an enormous air force.

The terrilic impetus given to the development of aeronutical

equipment, as a result ol this war, makes it an absolute certainty
I

ii3

ss)b

23

:

IIIIIII

L
24 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

that each and every Allied nation, and other first-class nations,

will foster and jurther develop the resources of aerial navigation.

It therefore behooves the United States to do likewise, if we

wsh to be prepared for any future military emergency, which,

judging from the trend of tactics at the close of the recent

hostilities, clearly pointed to a greater and more frequent use of

aircraft in offensive and defensive military operations.

127. Policy as to general staff administration, and control of air

service administration and operation. As a firm believer of the

principles and function of the General Staff, I believe in the

administration, control and operation of the Air Service by the

General Staft, as in the case of all other branches of the military

service.

I do not agree, however, wth the way in which General Staff

administration and control was exercised in the early stages of

the development of the Air Service. American Expeditionary | ': Forces.

During the first six months of the Air Service development,

the General Staff, A.E.F., did not possess a single General Staff

I officer with sufficient knowledge of aviation to act intelligently,

from his knowledge, on any vital problem concerning the

organization or equipment of any Air Service activity. This

condition of affairs was perfectly natural, in view of the

comparative newness of aviation and the limited number of

officers in the United States Army, at the date of our entrance

into the war, who had had the opportunity to come in actual

practical contact with aviation.

The future military efficiency of the Air Service will depend for

its development upon the intelligent guidance and administrative

control of the General Staff, as heretofore.

In order, however, to secure intelligent guidance and

administrative control, General Staff officers charged with the Air

Service affairs must have practical knowledge -)f the many

technical problems involved in the organization, development, and use of an efficient Air Service. That proctical knowledge con

only he gained in one way, and that is, hy actual service .i'h

air units.

The Air Service, as a result of the past eighteen months'

experie, - :, includes in its present Regular Army personnel 

a

number of officers who possess the qualifications of General

Stafl officers These officers should be utilized as far as possible

for General Staff duty and charged with the General Staff

sLIpervsirin and administration of Air Service afiairs.

II they are not so utilized, and officers with no practical

knowledge of Air Service work are charged with the General

Staff supervision and administration of Air Service affairs, such A
Lessons 25

Learned

ctircers, before they are allowed to actively dictate any Air

Seivice policy, should be required to serve in the Air Service for

a period of at least six months in order that they may be

practically acquainted with the Air Service problems of

organization, administration, and development of personnel and

materiel.

128. General Staff, American E.F., Policy Reference the

Creation of an Amer:can Independent Air Force. The question as

to thoe future organization of an efficient Air Service, for the

United States Army, is at this very, instant seriously involved

Tcntative bills have already been introduced in Congress,

which plan to create an Independent Air Force, similar to the

present Air organization of the British Government, and which

will combine the U.S. Army and Navy Air Forces, under 

a

separate cabinet officet, independent of the War and Navy

Departments.

Efforts have been made, and bills have been introduced in

Congress for the past four years, to create such a force.

Heretofore all such efforts have failed, due to the opposition of

the Navy Department, and of the General Staff of the Army. 

I

ani very reliably informed that the general sentiment of the War

Department, and the General Staff on duty in Washington was

about two months ago in favor of the creation of an independent

air force.

I am not informed as to the views on this subject, of the

General Staff, A.E F., but of this I am certain, that if the General

Staff, A.E.F., (which in my opinion represents the most up to

date Genera! Staff views of the United States Army today) is not

in favor of such a radical step, they should take immediate

action toward its prev,,ntion.

128a. The creation of an independent Air Force at this period of our military existence will operate, in my opinion, against the

the full future military efficiency of the United States Army. It

will operate to separate an indispensible military auxiliary arm

from control and military coordinated by the Generai Staff of

the Army. It will operate to trair up, in time of peace, 

a

separate organization distinct from Army control which in time of

war, must inevitably be brought back under military control, if

efficient and coordinated military action is to be obtained. It will

foster and keep alive the feeling which existed in the General

Staff, A.E.F. during the winter of 1917 and the Spring of 1918,

that the Air Service considered itself as an independent branch

of the military service, and did not desire coordination with the

rest of the Army.

It took from 6 to 8 months of constant effort on the part of,

Colonels Burtt, Whitehead, Van Horn,' myseli and other older
_ = 

3

26 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

ii

Regular officers to remove, once and for all from the minds of

the General Staff A.E.F. the impression that the administrative

heads of the Air Service were endeavoring to create a separate

service which would not be in full coordination and under full

control of the General Staff, A.E.F.

The steps which have already been taken in Washington, by

the introduction of proposed legislation to create a separate and

independent Air Force for the United States, should be made the V- subject of immediate study and action by the General Staff,

A.E.F. if they are to have under consideration the problems of

the future organization of the Air Service.

If the General Staff, A.E.F. is opposed to the policy of an

independent Air Force, its opinion should be voiced without

delay, and it must be voiced in the Halls of Congress, as the

question has already reached that point in the issue.

The General Stiff, A.E.F. should have iept:&entation, in

Washington at this very date, in order that a full presentation

and discussion of both sides of the question may be had.

Many of the flying officers of the Air Service, A.E.F., who are

enroute or have returned to the United States under orders from the

War Department, are strong advocates of a separate Air Service,

and unless prompt action is taken by the General Staff, A.E.F.

the question will be settled in favor of an independent air force,

without reference to the General Staff, AE.F.

128b. One of the strongest arguments that has been used in

the past, is the example of Englands' step in creating an independent Air Force, by combining their Army and Navy Air

Service under one head, the British Air Ministry. Under the acid

test of field service in war this creation of a separate and

independent A'r Force under the British Air Ministry has failed.

The Naval Wing of the British Royal Air Force has practically

carried on its operations independent of the Army Wing. In

addition to the strictly Army Wing, which operated under the

Commanderin-Chief of the British Armies in ihe Field, we have

witnessed during the past year, the creation and operation of

another Independent Royal Air Force, which operatwd directiv

under the orders of the British Air Ministry, without reference to

or control by the Supreme Military Command in the Field.

The question of the creation of this military force destined for

operation in active service in France, under the direct orders of

the British Air Ministry was considered for the first time, in the

early spring of 1918, when it was brought up for discussion

before the Aviation Committee of the Supreme War Council, of

which I was the American representative. I emphatically opposed

before the Committee of the Supreme War Council, the

creation of a military force for active service in France, which
Lessons 27 Z Learied

was destined to operate under the direct orders of a civilian

body, without reference to or control by the Supreme Military

Command in the Field.

As this Independent Royal Air Force, was contemplating its

operations in the same territorial area which had been designated

as the American Sector in France, I very p!ainly pointed out to

the Allied Representatives on the Supreme War Council, and

especially to the British Representatives, that the problems which 

t

this British Independent Air Force, operating in the American A le

Army area, would encounter, in connection with the use of

railroad lines, sites for depots, aerodromes, etc., would make it

absolutely necessary for such a force to be subject to some

Supreme Military Command, in addition to such control as might be exercised direct from the British Air Ministry.

128c Fortunately, for the operations of this Independent Air

Force, it was placed under the command of Major General Hugh Marhail r,.

Trenchard, an officer of the highest prctical knowiedge and

* experience, not only as regards Air Service operations, but

military operations in general, and an officer who was weil known

and liked by all American officers with whom he had associated.

In my opinion the success of the operations of this force, during 

A its period of service, was due entirely to the personality and

judgment of Genera! Trenchard, and not to the policy which 

-

created this force and placed it under the direct control and

orders of the British Air Ministry. In fact, it is my understanding

that shortly prior to the signing of the armistice on November

11, 1918, that, the policy of direct control of the Independent Air

Force by the British Air Ministry was done away with, and that

Major General Trenchard, reported for duty with his force to

Marshall Foch, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies

This practical failure of the British Royal Air Force to operate

efficiently in active service, as an independent force, directly

under the control of a civilian body, is in mu opinion a sufficient

argument against any such experiment in connection with the

creation and establishment of a similar American Air Force.

129. As a result of the lessons learned during our active

participation in this war, many other reconiniendat ions and

suggestions as to the future organization, training, equipment and

operation of the Air Service, U S. Army, could be presented in

this repert. Such recommendations however, all hinge in my

opinion, on the efficient solution of the three problems outlined

in the three preceding paragraphs of this report.

If these main problems outlined in paragraphs 126 127 and 128

(- this report, are satisfactorily solved, in my opinion the other

problems of organization, training, supply and operations will

solve themselves without much difficulty.
28 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

Maj. Harold E. Hartney

C.O., 1st Pursuit Group

Harold E. Hartney. a tough and cocky Canadian, had fought

with the Royal Flying Corps before being commissioned in the

U.S. Army. Assuming command of the 27th Aero Squadron at

Toronto, where the unit was in training, Major Harlrey had

taken the 27th to France in February 1918 and into combat as

part of the 1st Pursuit Group in June. When Maj. Bert M. Atkinson had moved up in August to command the 1st Pursuit Wing.

Hartney had succeeded him as commander of the 1st Pursuit

Group.

One of the units under Hartney's command was the 185th

Aero Squadron. which joined the 1st Pursuit Group on 7 October 1918. Commanded by 1st Lt. Seth Low, the 185th arrived at

Rambercourt with few pilots and no planes, but it soon received

additional personnel and Sopwith Camels. which were fitted

with 165-horsepower Monosoupape engines, The squadron

then learned that it was to be "a Night Chasse Squadron, the

first of its type in the American Army." The mission of the

squadron was "to establish a barrage over our line of search

lights against enemy night bombing machines."' The squadron's historian described some of the problems the 185th encountered in trying to carry out this assignment: 

!

Night Chasse work ir Aeronautics is only in its infancy,

and as we were a new type of squadron equipped with

planes that had almost gone out of use, except in training

fie!ds.c we were confronted with numerous difficulties

which greatly hamrnered our work. In the first place our

Pilots were not trained for night flying, many of them never

having been off the ground after dusk before Then too we

had to experiment with wing flares, parachute flares, and

instrument tights. The lights on the Airdrome had to be

developed. The searchlights and Anti-aircraft Batteries in

this vicinity apparently were not versed in the proper cooperation with night chasse machines, and they were able

to give us but very little assistance in our game of "hide and

seek" with the Huns. Also there were not enought searchlights and mortars for the guidance of our pilots, who frequen!ly [became] lost, ran out of gasoline, and then had to

make forced landings, invariably crashing their planes ....

kJ ~ r~. ~ ~ 'V~*~.
Lessons 29

L Learned

I.

= Ready or not, the 185th began operations on the night of

18/19 October. In the short time left before the Armistice, there

were many nights when the weather was too bad to permit flying. By 11 November. however, the 185th had flown on eight

nights with a total of 31 sorties on patrol or from alert. In addi-

- tion the squadron had sent two planes on night bombing missions, but neither pilot had found the target. The squadron

reported combat on only one night. 24/25 October. when one of

the pilots fired on enemy planes at five different times, apparently without scoring, and was fired on once, without receiving any

damage. In these operations, the 185th had one plane damaged

and three wrecked, and one pilot killed, in crashes and forced

landings.

Hartney, who had learned a lot about night flying by taking a

Camel up on patrol one night,d foresaw an important place for

t night pursuit in the military aviation of the future.

With the development of the Air Service, the prnhlem tof night

flying, and more particularly, night pursui hds to be faced and

solved. The First Pursuit Group has had one night put;uit

squadron attached to it and while they have been handicapped

by shortage of machines, spare parts, and pilots, considerable

Maj Hartney ileft), with his

- i Operations Officer, tst Li.

IA. L. Cunningham.

t

-

133
30 U.S. Air Service I

in World War I I

Vol. IV

experience has been gained which may prove of great value in

the development and which is outlined herewith.

At first sight it might appear the limitations of night pursuit are I

so great that a squadron of this kind would not justify its

existence, but on more careful study one finds that the

potentialities are great and the possibilities almost unlimited.

The main function of night pursuit at present is, of course, the

defensive patrols for the purpose of destroying night bombers. The British have already demonstrated that this is quite practical

and have indeed almost succeeded in bringing the day of the

twin engine night bomber to a close. One squadron of night

flying Camels brought down 25 enemy bombing machines in 3

months.

The 185th Aero Squadron As the Air Service develops, the night pursuit will be used in

conjunction with patrolling for the purpose of surveillance and appropriaty selected a bat reconnaissance All big movements of troops now take plact by .:

fir iits insignia to represent it night and in time chasse pilots will be sent out to predetermined

as the first "night chasse squadron." objectives for the purpose of dropping a flare at an important

crossroad to ascertain movements of troops or for the purpose of confirming a suspected withdrawal. At first, night

reconnaissance by chasse machines will probably be done in the

late evening or in the early morning but as time goes on and the

number of squadrons of this kind increase, this kind of work will

be done in all favorable weather at night. Concentrations will be

located and bombs will be carried, enabling the chasse machine

to descend and straff same from very low altitude with extremely

great accuracy. Balloon straffing at dawn and in the dusk of

evening as carried on by this Group will be almost entirely the

function of the night chasse machine and this practice may in

time blind the ernemy insofar as balloons are concerned as the

experience of the First Pursuit Group in the past offensive has

shown. Straffing enemy troops by machine gun fire will be a very

safe and effective work of the night pursuit and its possibilities

are limited only by the weather conditions.

There are many difficult problems in connection with night pursuit that have to be faced and attempts made to solve before

a squadron can hope to meet with any success. The pilots must

be specially trained in navigation by night although this can be

learned in a very short time by one of ordinary intelligence and

can be helped greatly by increasing the number of lighthouses,

mortar signals, and cooperation between the units of the Air

Services, day and night forces combined. Forced landings at

night discourage pilots more than any other feature of this work,

but with proper landing flares and emergency airdrome lighting

sets on all fields and cooperation ot searchlights in the defended

area, the dangers from this source can be reduced practically to
-A

Lessons 31

Learned

the same as day flying.

Pilots find that one of the greatest problems of night pursuit is

iocating the enemy. They claim it is impossible to see him even

with the aid of searchlights. l is difficult, but it is not impossible.

On moonlight nights, the enemy is visible at 500 to 600 yards,

even when he is not in the beam of the light, and on bright

starlight nights, he appears as a dark shadow at a distance of

200 yards. If he happens to be picked up by a beam of

searchlights, his planes show up for a very great distance and he

has been known to be held in a beam as much as 10 minutes

by American searchlight officers. Sometimes he can be seen in

the twilight of the searchlights and fights have taken place

without the beam picking him up or without the knowledge of

the operators uf the light.

As for the actual combat, it is safe to say that the enemy can

be engaged and brought down with slight danger of his

retaliation, provided he is first seen by the Pursuit machine.

One of the great problems of night flying is equipment. This

Group has found it very difficult and in fact almost impossible to

obtain supplies Day machines for some reasons unexplainable

seem to' obtain priority, but if night flying is to be attempted it

will be necessary to provide for the essentials. The squadron in

: this Group has the night machines but did not have the

necessary spares. It had to develorp all its field lighting,

landmarks and pyrotechnics itself and in many cases the

necessary supplies were unobtainable in that they did not exist.

Estimates will have to be made and large contracts for the

necessities must be let immediately on a big scale and under the

direction of an experienced man if the branch is to be developed

to its full efficiency. These necessities include Ameriran

searchlights, American machines, American airdrome lighting

planes P)i. lighthouses, mortars and signals.

For night flying as a whole in the operations of any army it is

absolutely essential that we have the proper cooperation and

liaison with the neighboring arms. The searchlights are operated

by the Engineers. It would be well to have a Liaison Officer on

the staff of the Chief of night flying who can advise and insure

the proper location of searchlights and the cooperation of their

personnel with the pilots. The same liaison applies to the anti

aircraft artillery. The Chief ,hould have a liaison officer frorm this

branch on his staff and the guns should be located and operated

on his advice and with his cooperation In addition, official

observation posts should be established in all units on the lines,

each in touch with a P.C., where there should be located a

wireless station, in order that the chief of all wireless stations in

the rear will be kept in constant touch with indications and

I-w *,--
J

32 U.S AirService

in World War I

Vol. IV

locations of enemy aerial activity, and likewise advised of its

cessation, so that concentrations and patrols may be determined

wth the greatest efficiency.

Defended areas have been one of the incidentals in the

experience of night pursuit and it is suggested that as the night

pursuit develops these be reduced to a minimum if not

dispensed with entirely Arrangements could be made whereby all

machines crossing the lines could be challenged by the forward

observation posts and the identity of the machine fixed at this

point.

It is quite essential to obtain the proper kind of a machine for

nght work. In the first place the engine must be reliable and

simple and, if possible, one that starts easily and instantly. The

Le Rhone, Clerget, Mono Soupape, BR, or any reliable rotary

seems best adapted for night chasse. The machine itself should

be light, maneuverable and with great flexibility of speed, o'ina

to the fact that aftcr overtaking a twin engine machine a pilot

mu~l reduce his speed to the same or less than that of the

bomber. It is essential that it climb and dive rapidly and at the

same time should land very slowly so that it can be safely

pancaked" into a very small area as is essential in night forced

landing. It is well to strengthen the center section struts so that

in case of a turnover, the pilot can be sure of getting out and it would be advisable to have a machine sensitive laterally rather

than foie and aft If a machne is too sensitive fore and aft, one

is apt to pique into the ground or stall or coming into the

airdrome when one's attention is diverted to landing lights,

instruments, oi ground lights. With regard to fuel it is well to

have as much gasoline as possible. Although a patrol should not

be for more than 1.-1; hours, pilots sometimes get lost returning

and have to fly around a long time before they get their

bearings.

Armament is an important feature, equip the machines with

two guns, one bailoon and one ordinary. Have illuminated sights

and ordinary ammunition, with the exception that ver, few

tracers should be used (I in 15). Bomb racks are essential, and

it would be -well tu have a rack that could be bodily taken off

with bombs and replaced on short notice, as normally this will

not be the duty of night machines.

The instrument board is an important feature. All instruments

should be lighted as well as luminous in themscves and there

should be two movable flashlights, the whole electrical equipment

being run off two separate storage batieries which, n themselves,

should be very accessible, yet substantially fixed A good speed

indicator and a S-aod altimeter are even more essential in night

flginq than in day, ard the compass, too, should be of the very

I
FiC.

Lessons 33

Learned IL

IL

Sbest. A machine should carry Holt flares, one under each wing

tip; navigation lights on the outer struts, and signaling light on

the bottom of the fuselage and least one Michelin parachute

flare. Normally, the Holt landing flares will not be used, out in

the case of forced landings they will be lighted, sufficiently high

above the ground to insure their being burned out by the time

the ground is reached. These should be examined very

- frequently and inder no circumstances should they be used later

than the date staimped thereon. There is no such a word as

economy in connection with the testing of flares They should

not be opened until they are actually going to be placed on the

I machine Michelin parachute flares only should be carried The

Grench parachute flare is a total failure and represerts false

, economy in the purchase The signal light beneath the fuselage

tmust ho nprated by a taper key and a permanent switch be

opned interchangeably at will and instantly

i Two kinds cf airdrome equipment should be recognized. fiist

that in voque on the fields of the squadrons operating, which

should be most reliable arid, if necessary, elaborate; and

secondly, the emergency landing set, which should be at hand on

these fields but in addition should be placed on every airdrome

- day and night in the area so that a pilot lost in a fog may with

safety call and land at any field The arrangements of the main

fields can be worked out as circumstances require, but it is

essential that a good generating unit be at hand and that the

as

Empty bL,rnb rack on a

Breguet

i •
34 U S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

bounds of the fie!d be clearly defined. For an emergency lighting

outfit would recommend these Aldis signal lights with a 15 volt

storage bat'ary placed on a trolley. These are quite inexpensive

and would on every field .ustify their existence many tunes over.

The Army area as a whole should be lit up with Mortars and

lighthouses and it would be well to place a 36 inch Sperry light

at the main airorome for purpose of defense as well as with the

object of directing machines home.

Certain rules will have to be inaugurated for landing on

Airdrome at night. These will be formulated not forgetting thpossibility of the enemy bombing and will consist of a signal for

reconnaissance and on the main fields the use of a dummy

airdrome as an adjunct. All pilots will be called upon to rnake_

circuits to the left and glide in parallel to the main line of lights

Each pilot must flash the proper code letter before landing. If e,

crash occupies the field, proper signals must be flashed to him

In this connection, !t will be essential to instruct one ran at

least on every field in the plac:ng of lights so that a ilot will never be required to come in over obstacles and so that hc will

be able to make a landing evi ) if he is unfamiliar with the

airdrome. At the present time, a great deal of ignorance exists

throughout the Air Service in this respect and few seem to

appreciate the first essentials

Probably the greatest difficulty to be encountered at first will

be the selection of pilots for this work It is absolutely imperative

thet night pilots master the science of flying, It is quite possible

to be a successful pilot in the daytime and yet know very little

about flying but he who hopes to succeed at night must be

capable ol flying any kind of a machine by the feel and in

addition must have mastered the peculiarities ot the par,cular

machine that he is to use. It is essental that he be keen about

his work and the responsibdiltv for this rests primarily with the

Squadro., Commander directly through the Flight Commander.

He must be imbued with a spirit of determination, first, to

develop this new branch of war aviation. He should be steady,

sober, keen, and industrious, and so fond of flying that he seizes

every opportunity to get up day and night.

In flying a pursuit mma.hine at night, a pilot who has mastered

his machine thoroughly should have no difficulty in flying at

night, whether chasse or bomber, but it is useless for him to

attempt the work until this :s the case. In all arm-es there have

been regrettabie accidents in this connection which have tended

in a long way to bring night flying into disfavor with the pDlots

and in most cases they could be traced to this source It is 

a

fact that an good day pilot will make a good night pilot

provided his vison is normal In addition to being good pilots trte
S Lessons 35

Learned

night flyer must have thorough knowledcw of the country, of the land -

marks, and must be skilled in the location of possible fields, airdromes,

forests, rivers bad grounds, etc., and when fie is first enlisted into the

service of the night squadron. he should spend 29 months masternng the

situation, never feeling satisfied until he knows the country thoroughly

-. He must be instructed in cloud flying but should be warned never to

S attempt it unless compelled to do so.. Ifovertaken by a mist or clouds he

should never let theground get out of sight. If necessary he should make

a forced landing rather than attempt to g]et home at night through the

mist. unless of course he is flying high and is sure of the weather.

After a pilot becomes competent, he should practice forced

i landings on his own airdrome on moonlight nights, and practice

combat fighting with two sealers with the cooperation of the

! searchlig]hts, and as an extra, aim Mt making forced !andirngs buv

mean,, of parachute f,,ares, using the engine if he discovers that

the field sough! is liable to cause him to !urn over.

The location of instruments and the methods of using them in

the dark should become+ a matter of second nature to him, so

that this mrll in no way chstract his attention from more

important things. Patrols will often be monotonous in that they

will ?.r short beat$ over important points. Enemy night "

' omuers are certain. to follow permanent landmarks, such as ,i

rivers or forests, This means that a pilot on patrol will have to

: patiently stay over this spot and await his opportunity and he

- will do well to have patience and not be distracted by

neighboring lights from his particular mission. Pilots should never

attempt to fly under 200 meters at night as the risk involved is

too great and on his first flights he should arrive over his

S airdrome at a height of at least 1,000 meters and take his time

S coming in Piots in all branches of the Air Service have to be

i umored to a certain extent but this is more so in the case of

S night pilots Day flying should be indulged in and should only be

+t permitted between certain definite hours of daylight. Otherwise,

pilots will never feei that they are off duty and in a short lime

will become tiled and disgusted with their work, and lose all

their keennessThe main duty in the operatnons of night pursuit at the present

S time is defensive patrols. The-,e are caiehully planned with the

+" object of intercepting hostile bombers at the point where they

0. are picked up by the searchlights. Patrols w,.l therefore be

S catried out slightly in the Year of line and more particularly over

permanent landmarks They should not last more than I-"? hours

- and vary in altitude from 2,000 -,) 4,000 meters, according to the

i situation it is inadvisable to send patrols tip until enemy artivity

has been reported by the advanced posts and it is quite possible

IN A

. .

iI

iT

iI
36 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

to determine with great accuracy when the enemy is operating

by observing his mortars, lighthouses, airdromes, etc. Balloons

may in time be utifized for this purpose as they would in all

probability render valuable assistance.

When a pilot is on patrol, he will have his attention called to

enemy aircraft by the firing of the Archie guns, by observation of

the exp~osion of bombs on the ground, and by the direction and

con-entration of searchlight beams. He should cut his motor

frequently arid glide as long as possible with a dead motor so

that the light operators and gunners cajn listen for the enemy

ships. In time it will be possible to institute a system of Trkets

and flares which will enable a pilot on patrol to follow the course

of an enemy bombei and it is within the range of possibility that

before long wireless telephones will come to the assistance of a

pilot on patrol and solve many of his d'fficulties.

When a pilot sights an enemy machine, his method of attack

simply will be to get under his tail, closing in to very close range

and opening up fire after throttling down, making use of the

element of 5urprise to the utmost, tor, if the enemy begins to

side slip and maneuver, he will probably get away. Should a pilot

be SO unfortunate as to be seen by the enemy machine before

he has effected a complete surprise, he should endeavor to keep his

eye on the enemy, observing his instrument board. his exhaust or

the explosive tracers from his mach-ne guns. After a short time,

the enemy will steady down and even attempt to dive for home.

when it will be quite safe for the pursuit machine to close in on

him again It .is easier on a clear night to see a machine above

silhouetted against the sky but should he dive and get below the

by obevn-i * otrlgtoss idoeec alos
Lessons 37

Learned

attacker it is quite possible to pick up his outline once more

against the lights on the ground, probably in time special

illuminating lights will be provided for this purpose.

In addition to defensive patrols, night pursuit will be utilized in

time. for reconnaissance and surveillance and special machines

will be dispatched to intersections and crossroads, railway

stations, rivers, etc., for the purpose of iocating and confirming

enemy movements. In some case, parachute flares will be used

and in time it may be possible to take photographs at night. The

samp machines will be able to carry Cooper bombs' and shutting

off their motors, glide down to a very low altitude and with great

precision and accuracy drop them, insuring good results.

Other duties, however, beside these will be required of night

pursuit squadrons. They will be able to attack balloons late in

the evening, in the air, and in theit nests after all the enemy

airplanes have landed, and come back in safely to their own lines

landing after dark. In the early dawn, the same work can be

accomplished and it is not without the range of possibility that

the present efficiency of balloons will in this way be reduced

many times over

Airdrome straffing in the late evening and in the early dawn

will in time become one of the chief functions of night pursuit

and may result in enemy airdromes being so far back that the

whole situation will be changed. I! is quite conceivable that

hangars will have to be underground and that mechanics will

have to live in dugouts. On fine nights, single machines will be

able to harass enemy airdromes many times over and before large

offensive operatons will be able to put many machines out of

action. Bfore and during an olfensive, enemy concentrations will

be straifed and machine gunned from low altitude. Indeed

possibilities are unlimited.

A great deal of the success of night pursuit will depend on the

location of the airdrome The ideal place v..II be in the center of

the line of searchlights. This will enable pilots to be on alert and

reduce the time of theit Patrols. Wth an androme in this

location, pilots will be ahle to go up and take short: flights,

making many sorties per night if necessary Many devices, such

as dummy airdromes, will be used to enable the location of this

advanced field to be kept secret and to prevent its being

bombed It is possiblo that the machines will not be brought up

until he night of an anticipated raid, the clual location o the

squadrons being well in the rear. It is very much better,

however, to have squadrons work from the field where its

headquarters, hangars, machine stop, etc , are located, as

advanced fields are never entirely satisfactory, and if at all

possible this should be insured The location of this field, near
- '.-.'~...--,._.-.---

38 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol, IV

r •the searchlights, keeps a possible landing ground within gliding

", " distance of the pilot at all times and greatly increases his

confidence and efficiency While it is important to have the airdrome located centrally,

the proper location of the iight., is perhaps more essential and

two methods seem to present themselves. First, the

concentration of searchights around important bombing

obiectives from the enemy standpoint of view, and, second, the

location of a continous line of lights a!ong the whole front There

are many points in favor of both and the ideal, of course, is the

adoption of both. Certainly it is best to have as many lights as

possible and in this the question of economy does not figure. It

is quite determined that the unit of lights should be three in

triangular formation, the sides of the triangle being roughly 3000 i

vard- All the lights should be under one P C and !f possble

this should be located on the airdrome and in direct touch with

the operations officer of the squadron. Another very important

feature about the location of the lights and one which will go a

long way to the success of the operations is that of possible

"forced-landing" fields. Every searchlight, if possible. should be

placed on a possible emergency landing field and instructions

given to the operators that upon a distance signal from the

planes all lights so located will concentrate on their emergency

field In locating these searchlights and instructing the cperators,

care should be taken that they should understand that a plane

lands best uphill and into the wind, not fcrgetting to point out

that it is next to impossible at nig.,t to land over obstacles.

Antiaircraft g]ur, Antiaircraft guns should be locat," so as to fire in zones and probably the best rule is to have ihen fire or.,/ towards enemy 4

territory and over the enemy lines In this way they wdll servq as

a signal for a pii.bt who may be in the air and at the same time A

there will be no chance of the pilot being hit Experience proves

thai enemy bombers prefer to penetrate an anti craft barrage

than searchlights when there are pursuit marl ines about. With

this in view tactical distribution of the juri5 can be made to suit

4

I

-,- & i-4W d. - ~--~~'~=.~ ~ ,
Lessons 39

Leamed

-6-

Lt. Col- Davenport Johnson

C.O., 2d Pursuit Group

"Johnnie" Johnson commanded the 2d Pursuit Group from its

organization on 29 June 1918 until aftei the Armistice. A graduate of the U.S Military Academy in 1912, he had served with the

1st Aero Squadron in Mexico before being sent to France early in 1917 for flying training in combat aircraft Afte-r serving as a

staff officer in the Air Service, AEF, Johnson had commanded

the 95th Aero Squadron in combat before assuming command

of the 2d Group.

I. It must be borne in mind that no two problems are identical

and that different problems will be encountered in other

campaigns. Such as mobility of organizations in open warfare.

This is the time when Aviation will be, if possible, of more va'ue,

keeping its relative position wilh the advancing or retreating

Armies, gaining information of the enemy and protecting our

troops frcm enemy aircraft.

2. In view of the fact that one experienced pilot at the front is

worth two pilots of same training but without experience at the

front, the effect of the different uses of Aviation on the individual

pilot must he considered, as morale, or will to do. is one of the

big assets of pursuit Aviatior.

3. The missions of pursuit Aviation are to protect our troops

and air forces from enemy attacks and observation, and to

attack and destroy enemy aircraft and harass enemy troops on

the ground These missions are accomplished by protection

patrols, barrage patrols and alerts. Upon rare occasions specia!

rEonnaissatices are made by ")ursuit Aviation

(a) Protection patrols are when a number of pursuit

iiichines accompany an obsrivation plane The methods insisted

upon by the observation has been for the pursuit patrol to stav

within 100 to 200 meters above the observation plane. This gives

a moral protection only as monoplace machines are offensive

fighters only and not defensive, and the pursuit has its hands

tied beceuse it must remain with the observation and the enemy

can gel po ition and attack at its pleasture. It ,kould be belter li

have small fast biplace Aviation for this kind of work, or

designate the time, place and allitude that the observation plane

is to work and have the pursuit to sweep the air clean of enemy

machines

(b) Barrage patrols consist of keeping on adequate number
L

I

40 U.S. Air Service ~in World War I

Vol. IV

I of machines constantly in the air patrolling the desired sector,

with the mission of destroying all enemy aircraft in the sector

thereby protecting cur troops and dircraft from observation and

molestation by the enemy. This it, easiest on the pilots as they

have certain set hours for this work and are tree the rest of the

time. However, as barrage patrols use up a great deal of

Aviation material and energy. these should be cut down to a

minimum with the work to be dione.

(c) Alerts are where all available planes not on other duty

are kept lined up and warmed up with the pilots at the hangars

so as to be able to leave the ground within 15 minutes notice for

special missions, such as reinforcements for the barraqe patrols,

attacks on enemy Sround troops with both machine guns and

bombs, clearng the air of enemy aircraft at certain places, at

certain times etc . or in other words these are the reserves to De

thrown in at a minute's notice

4 Army Air Service Comniandel. oi Wing Cim,-nander keeps

absolute liaison with the enemy and troop acti.ities by means of

advanced observation points. balloons, observation planes. etc

and sends out his alerts when enemy activities justify it. The

most dangerous from a physical standrint is the attacking of

troops on the ground with bombs and machine guns and this

should never be done unless a clearly defined target on the

ground is known beforehand. Alerts are the hardest wear on the

pilots as they, when not flying, are waiting at the hangars under

a great tension to go, which is infinitely harder than the actual

flying tseli But alerts have the great advantage of attacking the

enemy at unexpected times with overwhelming force, and

consequently do excessive damage materially and mrorally to both

the enemy aircrat and ground troops

5. As pursuit Aviation is essentially offensive, the ideal

employment is, for protection of special observation, to designate

a time, place and altitude that the observation plane will work,

and have pursuit planes thoroughly lice the air at that point.

for the protection of our troops and aircraft and destuction of

the eneniy aircraft and harassing of enemy troops on the gritindtLo keep a permanent barrage over the sector only large enough

to do this work, and to keep all remaining planes on the alert as

a reserve to be used at a moment's notice

-7-t-=
Lessons 41

Learned

t

v -- 7-

Maj. Milton F. Da 

s

C.O., 4th Pursuit Group

Davis, who had spent several months at the Third Aviat-on

Instruction Center at Issoudun as commander of a training field,

had succeeded Maj. Charles J. Biddle as commander of the 4th

Pursuit Group when Biddle had left on 29 November 1918 for

return to the United States.

1. In compliance with your Memotandum of December 13, 1918,

the following report is submitted

(a) Fram my experience in the Air Service previous to

assuming command oi a group, I think that our system oi giving

train:ng in the S.O.S. made the training of pilots unnecessarily

long and expensive. The training that the pilots received in the

S.O.S. often duplicated and overlapped thai which they received

in the U S. without putting them on service machines until they

actually were assigned to active squadrons at the Front. The

pilots thus were called upon to do war flying in types of

machines which they were absolutely unfamiliar with

(b) My recommendation is that pilots be thoroughly trained

at home through everythino, including gunnery and combat, on their service machine. Then when arriving overseas they go to 

a

dispatch center which is both for new squadrons and piots going

to the Front. At these dispatch centers, the pilots and machines

are assigned to squadrons, and thus both pilots and personnel

get acquainted with the machines they are to use at the Front,

and with each other. Thus the pilot's work in the S 0 S is

entire!y with the machine, guns and men he is to be with at the

Front. The pilots meant for replacement would not get al! of this,

but would see and become familiar with the most up-to-date

experiences and lessons from the Front.

(c) My experience as Group Commander has been entirely

since the cessation of hostilities, but emphasize the need of both

Pilots and Enlisted personnel becoming acquainted with their

machines, guns, and with each other before beginning war flying

2. The above applies principally to scout work, as practically

my entre experience has been in this kind of work.
42 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Maj. Maxwell Kirby

C.O., 5th Pursuit Group

Kirby. who had enlisted in the Army in 1904, had been commrssioned in the Cavalry in 1913 and detailed to the Aviation

Section of the Signal Corps in 1916. His prewar service had

included flying duty with the 1st Aero Squadron in Mexico.

Later, while attached to the 94th Aero Squadron in France, he

shot down a Fokker, the last enemy plane officially credited toa

pursuit pilot* of the U.S. Air Service in World War I. Major Kirby

assumed command of the 5th Pursuit Group on 1 December

1918, succeeding Capt. Dudley L. Hill, who had been in command since the group was formed two weeks earlier.

1. Herewith enclosed report covering functioning of the Fifth

Pursuit Group, Air Service, Second Army, since October 12, as

ordered

2. . . . it is believed that the important lessons drawn from

our experiences during the present war in regard to Air Service,

particularly pursuit, are as follow;: The proper functioning of

both Air Service, and Anti-Aircraft, should compose one branch

Maj Kirby,. of the ervice, and hence a comprehensive cooperation is

necesssary. the noticeable lack of liaison between these two arms, or

sections of one arm has been a very great retard to the progress

ol American arms. It was noticed hy the undersigned during a

short tour of work at the front that, in many instances, patrols

were sent out without a definite mission to perform. It is felt that

in a great many cases, if not the majority, there was very little, if

any cooperation between flights, or patrols sent out from

different units. It is believed that the pursuit was not sufficiently utilized as a protection fc,r Army Corps and bombing, and in the

majority of cases, definite methods were not laid down

3. The idea altogether too common that pursuit planes are

used only for individual combat and protective purposes is felt by

the writer to be in error Some of the greatest uses to which

monoplace machines can he put, as have been proven,

particularly by sorties on the Flanders front, are trench and

troup straffing by Chasse planes in numbers, concerted attacks

on emplacements .und reserves mmediatel, before and during a

general attaci , and in covering a retreat, in short, every use to

which Caval y has been put may be gven with advantage to

Chassep )aes.

II
[i Lessons 43

7 Learned L

[

4 The duty covered by the undersigned as Group

Commanding Officer has been principally with organization and

coordination.

Capt. John Wentworth

Assistant Operations Officer. 1st Pursuit Wing

Wentworth had been a flight commander in the 49th Aero

Squadron before moving up to wing headquarters to become 6"

assistant operations officer at the beginning of November 1916.

The work of a pursuit pilot in time of attack and when

engaged on duty over a quiet sector has been of somewhat

different character. On a quiet sector his individual ability has

had fuller play. He has flown iII small formations, or occasionally

alone. His importance in the formation was relatively greater as

its size diminished, and tendencies that required regulating in the

massed action of offcnsives were encouraged.

This is because the enemy have been in the habit of using

their pursuit for shock, massing it at offensives, so that in quiet

sectors few formations of 7 or 8 (very rarely over that number)

were encountered, these only occasionally, 4 or 5 monoplaces Capt. Wentworth

were often seen together, and frequent unprotected bi-places It

was most desirable to prevent these bi-places, employed in

reglage and high photographic work, from accomplishing their

missions. Therefore, a thin veneer of our pursuit covering the

sector at all altitudes and continuously, was preferable to strong

periodic formations, which, while they cleared the sector for the

moment, left gaps of time during which enemy machines could

operate. Large formations were not economy, as they were not

needed (Toul Secor, April May June), the talent of the individual came into more prominence

However, the fundamental upon which successful pursuit must

build -disipline --i as important in quiet zjectors as in time Of

olfensive. The necessity of discipline must be explained, it has

been found, to pilots, that every pilot, on whom it is naturally most difficult to maintain a chcrck while in combat, may realize

that from br)th the standpoa:t of attack and defense, efficiency

depends on each man absolutelty a definite function Thee

functions of coursp vary with the situation, but possible situations

may be grouped and classed.
44 U S. Air Service

in World War I 4" Vol. IV

Therefore, when a new pilot joins a squadron, he is impressed

with certain essentials arrived at through experience by his

predecessors. Their purpose is to minimize in so far as possibleA

the undesirable necessity of his solving situations as seem best

to him at the moment. They are based on the fact that similar

situations have been encountered before, the possibilities,

analyzed and the method of dealing with them incorporated in

I

the essentials.

°Th2 formation is the unit-all operations will be directed so as

!o maintain it as a unit. Therefore, when flying over the lines,

the primary point to keep in mind is that a pilot is an asset just

so long as he remains part of that unit. Any separation means

that the danger ,tA attack by enemy planes is tremendously

enhanced. It his motor lags, for example, so that he cannot keep

up, he should go home. He becomes a liability. The formation

wil! be hindered in its work by attempting to guard hin), ond to

carry on at the same time. If he is, as a straggler, attacked by

an enemy patrol that would hesitate to engage the unit his

foimation must go to his aid, giving combat under perhaps most

disadvantageous circumstances (Chateau-Thierry drive, July). He

jeopardizes the safety and efficiency of all. Such separation

applies equally to a pilot breaking from his formation to give

combat. Combat should invariably be entered into by the leader

of the formation. The reasons against a pilot breaking away are

self evident. He may attack a machine or formation that is

headed into our lines, and which his leader wishes to be allowed

to proceed as far as possible into our territory before attacking.

The leader, a man of more experience or better judgment, may

be maneuvering for better position. He may see another enemy

formation above, which makes immediate attack undesirable, or a

lone machine may pass close under the formation, going in the

opposite direction. The odds are apparently I to 1, to the pilot

who breaks off. The leader has seen that lone machine, however,

break out of a large formation above, diving from the side

underneath in the very hope of exciting someone to break away

and follow it. Result-the whole enemy formation with its

advantage of altitude mobs the machine that has broken away

before its own formation can give did (Chateau-Thierry drive,

August).

The foregoing episodes could not have occurred if the

formation had been in its unit form. There are some eventualities

that have happened directily as the outcome of lack of

understanding in the absolute nece. sitv for discipline.

Again, wh-en attadcked, to break out of the formation is often

fatal (St. Mihiel Sector, August). It requires the grealest sell

control when ,enemy planes are following, diving and firing on the

iI
I

-I

Lessons 45

E. Learned

rear men of a lower patrol, for those men to avoid turninq away

or maneuvering wildly However, it has been proven beyond 

A

question that the defense is to dive unde, their own formation

and to stay there. If the formation is properly echeloned, the

attack continuing, the next men, becoming the rear two, receive

the fire, and in turn will dive underneath. So long as the enemy

planes stay well above, it is impossib!e to counterattack

effectively. The leader of the formation attacked wil: turn into his

own lines, climb, perhaps dive, to shake off the pursuit, and

return with the advantage lessened; for in all pursuit work the

advantage of altitude is everything. The formation thus retains its

unity, differently massed for the moment, but still a mutually,

protective and aggressive unit.

Small formations of Germans, by way of notation, when

attacked from above, sometimes formed a circle, following each

other around, pFotQltin9 one another's tails, and gradually edging

back into their own lines. They thus become a difficult mark, but

were absolutely on the defensive for just so long as the attackers

wished to continue (Toul Sector, May, June). It is reported that in 2 cases, when attack of this character

was imminent, one or two machines dove back into the German

lines, climbed and returned to harass the allied formation from

above. It would seem that a maneuver of this character would

require too much time in execution to make it valuable as 

a

practice.

We are still dealing with the action of a single formation

unreinforced by a protective patrol t 'i '.hcr j,.tiide. or

a lower formation engaged in some definite mission requiring

cooperation. It will be observed that the foregoing has been in

character, defensive. Discipline has been emphasized in this

connection. It is as important when attacking and the function of

pursuit being to attack, it becomes all important.

The first pilots of the United States Army in this war were

trained under French instructors. They had at thei command

the experience of men who had been long at the front. There

was no word spoken that would lead to any otio-r conclusion

than that the action was individual in war flying. A protective

patrol was mentioned as remaining above in attack. The leader

opened the attack, but from there on, the individual acted as he

thought best. The American pilots instituted and initiated "gang

fighting " It may have been in the minds of the French, but no

hint of it as a practice was given, nor in any of the matter

circulated to the pilots by the French were any problems worked

out along these lines. Gang fighting by the test of trial has

proved the most efficient and only form adaptable to the

character of fighting pursuit has met with as the war progressed.
46 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

In the early days, aviation was in a way based on individuals

Time has brought new problems, as the size of the fighting air

forces increased, that are solved only by this method

Gang fighting is based on an attempt to figure out a system

whereby the enemy has no chance. It is efficiency, the exact

antithesis of the "sporting attitude." The pressure of time

4 tprevented it from acquiring the finesse that might have been

later commanded, but along its lines cumulative training will not

be wasted. An organization to be schooled in the unit action

necessitated by this mode of scientific air fighting, requires much

training It requires mock combats wherein the real conditions

are simulated, and the possibility of the unexpected reduced until

each man is a part of a mobile machine, thinks with one head as the actions of the enemy in combat convey that this, that, or

another set of maneuvers ic required.

Two examples will imnress the intcnt of this system. A simple case of a lone bi-place attacked by a formation of 5 or 6 monoplaces, which approaches from above or behind in V formation

The leader of the mono-place formation sees that the enemy

machine turns quickly into its own lines. He is observed. He

reaches a position three or four hundred meters behind, wiggles his wings (the prearranged signal for attack) and "cabarets"

(slowing up forward speed by pulling plane into steep climbing

angle with reduced motor). At once number 2 and 3 machine on

each side and directly behind him fan out and dive to a position

on each side of the bi-place, coming no closer to it than 350 or

400 yards. This is done in a moment, on account of the extra

speed gained while diving to the enemy's level. The leader still

holds back, not attempting to gain on the fleeing bi place. The

two or three remaining machines of his formation fly on, climbing as soon as possible to a position high over the bi-place They are protection, watching for enemy planes, that may seek to

interfere, and taking no active part in the combat. Meanwhile

there is a mono-place on each side of the bi-place, and the

leader still above and bEhind The two on the sides swing in and

away as the gunner of the bi-place fires on them (they can see

the smoke of his tracers) never coming nearer than 300 oi 400

yards: turning away when he fires their way, coming in when his engaged with the plane on the other side. The attention of the

gunner and pilot of the hi place is concentrated on these

machines, with possibly a share given to the protective planes

above and out of range. The leader now drops down, comes up

very close below, and shoots the bi-place down from 30 or 50

yards. Normally he has riot had a shot fired at him. The planes

on each side are well away, where the, run only the very

slightest chance cf being hit, and the planes abo-e are both an

LL_
Lessons 47

Leamed

annoyance to the bt-place and protection to their own.

The protective planes then drop down to the altitude of the

leader, the two on each side, close in, and the formation is again

complete (May 30, St. Mihiel-Toul Sector).

In contrast is an attack wherein 4 monoplaces attacked a biplace under parallel circumstances. The leader dove and

attempted to come up underneath, but was driven off as the biplace pilot switched his tail around, and the gunner got in a fair

shot. Two more machines dove together, from the side now,

trying to get behind as they came down. They watched each

other and the bi-place. One got behind for a moment, getting in

a short burst, but his speed carried him by The fourth waited 

a

moment and came down, but could not fire as the first machine

was getting back in position and came in line with the bi-place.

So it continued while the bi-place turned leisurely in quartier ?1

circles, losing altitude till it was too low and iar in its own lines

to make further pursuit reasonable (June, St. Mihiel-Toul sector).

The foregoing has been somewhat generalized. It is because

the writer believes that as soon as the strength that the enemy

had to offer against us in any sector, was determined, and the

situations that might occur reasoned out, with applications of the

gang fighting method, special problems ceased to exist. There

are definite rules, and as definite situations that may arise on

patrol work. They are limited if the patrol continues as a patrol.

It must not be split by faulty technique or drilling of the pilots.

Its effectiveness then as a patrol will depend on the sort and

amount of training in gang fighting that it has received If

attacked by superior numbers from above it must get back to its

own lines as already stated, or climb to an alt;tude from which it

can work. If attacking monoplaces below it, it must keep above

them, the leader and those on each side of him diving and firing

and zooming up to rejoin those that have acted as protection

and remained above. If attacking hi-places, there will rarely, if

ever, be more than one to deal with Two together split on

attack, make no attempt to defend each other.

The American oursuit pilots have had no experience with

groups of bi-places flying together, since the Germans employed

no day bnmbers in the sectors over which our Aviation worked.

The Germans solved this problem by following our bombers, firing at long ranqe or mobbing machines that might become

crippled and drag back from the formation They would also dive

far beneath, zoom, and hanging on the propeller get in a burst

from below. This required a fine judgement of speed by the

attackers and was apt to entail casualties as great as the results

obtained by it.

% I t
J

48 U.S Air Service 

A

in World War 

I

Vol IV

The possibilities that may then develop for a single patrol on

the line are:

I Attack on pursuit plane or a formation of pursuit planes

2 Attack on a single bi-place. (If a bi-place is protected by

enemy pursuit, the attack is on the formation of pursuit, working

always from the higher altitude downward).

3. To be attacked by pursuit planes from the same altitude

or from above. There is a sameness in the working out of these

possibilities that lends its df w,.ll to analysis and preparedness.

The necessity for tactical decision begins to assume more

definite shape for the patrol leader, when instead of being on

patrol with a single formation, he is carrying out orders in

conjunction with another formation or performing a special

mission. It is the patrol leader only who should have the thinking

part until contact with the enemy is gained. lefore this time the

pilnt' place is to follow. From tIle mument of signal tor attack

or when attacked, each pilot in the formation at once assumes

his part as cog in the prearranged scheme.

Cooperating with another formation which is leading or

protecting photographic machines, he must so maneuver as to

keep contact with the leading formation or machines and still

regulate his speed so that his formation can follow. He must

further place his formation in position to render the most

efficient aid to the lower formation or act as a buffer to incipient

attack on. 

. [)j the photographic plane

This is distinctly an article on ways and means. It is taken for

granted that the function of pursuit is known, that in time of

attack it is to clear the air for observation. that it has

oblective to prevent the enemy from getting within a prescribed

distance of our line with any form of airplane, and to destroy

whenever possible, working always on the gang fighting principle,

a principle of cooperation, throughout.

Cooperation then between patrols. An upper patrol will of

course go to the aid of a low-er if attack comes from an intermediate altitude. It must leave part of its number above,

part goinq down to harass the attacking enemy, the part above,

depending in size on the actual or likely presence of enemy

planes in the region, or on the size of the attacking enemy force

It must above ail things not lose contact, immediate contact, with

the number that have gone down The same procedure as in

attacking any enemy formation of mono-places will be followed,

diving on the highest machine of the enemy, zoominc ,. ,ward

their protections, and diving again urtil the enemy force is split

or turns off, never getting below enemy pursuit planes.

In this connecion, arid throughout all pursuit fighting, ability to

see in the air, is of paramount !mportance. To be dble to discern

L.'
Lessons 49

Learned

tw

airplanes far away means preparedness. The advantage to the man who

observes the other formation, who can spot friend or foe by the

silhouette and general look. is not to be taken unawares He can climb

for combat if below, he can maneuver for perfect position if above. The

surprise element becomes possible for him Therefore signals are

arranged: for while the patrol leader has the great opportunity to see

what is in the air, it sometimes happens that a pilot of the formation

may catch a speck-a distant plane-before the leader sees it.

Diving past the leader, pointing his plane toward the distant one,

and returning into formation is a common signal, better :han

wiggling the wings or shooting a Very pistol, as has been tried,

as it is more positive. h future, the unreless telephone will make

formations of Pursuit planes on the lines :nestimably more

efficient. The possibilities the telephone will introduce are without

limit for the de'elopment of gang fighting.

The Germans have cooperated between formations by sending

to the line a large "swarm" which on arrival at the center of the

sector to be patrolled will maneuver as follows: "Chains," or

small formations, will break off and at different altitudes patrol.

the mother formation remaining generally in the same locality.

Attacking or attacked these small formations will lead the

attackers or force the attacked machines toward the main

&FI

%_4

161w
50 US. Air Service

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I

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formation which in one case has wiped out an entire allied

formation .... The system is good but requires a large number

of pursuit to continue it as a policy throughout the dsy.

Our pursuit has cooperated most successfuly with the day

bombers. The Bombers leave their field, telephoning before they

start the hour at which they will be over the objective Our

pursuit, carrying small ten kilogram bombs reaches the objective

five or ten minutes before the bombers are due. They discharge

their bombs on the objective and await the bombers, clearing the

region of enemy pursuit. After the bombers have accomplished

their mission they are escorted back by the pursuit. These

missions were carried out on a large scale, a Group of Day

bombers and a Group of pursuit working together.

Lastly, the work of pursuit in attack has been to bomb and

straff with machine guns enemy troops and emplacements, and

to destroy or force down their balloons. The writer has had little

experience in the latter work, and iw not competent to deal with

the comparative efficiency of various methods of attack Bombing

from low altitude and straffing seems to be best accomplished by

crossing the line at a thousand meters, dropping the bombs from

500 to 600 meters, and then attacking with machine gun. It is

not desiidble or necessary to approach the ground nearer than

two hundred and fifty meters when machine gunning troops. The

work cart be carried out as well from that or a little higher

altitude, and the plane offers a more difficult target for the

ground fire. Immediately after the mission is performed, each

plane, for they, of necessity, split while seeking objectives for

their machine guns, will return by the most direct route across

the line, unless that route necessitates passing through a barrage

Special conditions decide this, but the object es to get out as

soon as the work is completed.

The foregoing has been framed as an argument for co!lective

and cooperative fighting. All examples have actually occurred in

the course of the work, the conclusions are based on the

collective evidence of eight months of work on the line. In future

training, with the aid of the wireless telephone, gang fighting can

be brought to a standard of efficiency that will make large

formations of pursuit invincible, and that will minimize our losses

During the last months of thi2 War, the trend of Pursuit

Aviation proved that it requires direct cooperation of all parts, as

is necessary in an infantry attack. Future training should be

directed with the idea foremost that, save for attack on balloons,

American pursuit aviation has no place for the individuals.
Lessons 51

Learned

-10-

Capt. Reed G. Landis

C.O., 25th Aero Squadron

Landis, who had won 10 or more victories while with the Royal

Flying Corps, had become commander of the 25th Squadron on

25 September 1918. The squadron, manned largely by officers

and men who had trained in England. spent the following month

trying to get ready for operations with SE-5's The planes and

pilots were slow in arriving, however, and the first tlight over the

lines was not made until 10 November, when Landis accompanied Major Biddle, the group commander, on "a hunting

expedition in front of Metz "' Borrowing three pilots, Landis led

an uneventful, four-plane patrol over the lines the following day.

First: All of my experience over the lines was secured prior to

t:-e timie I wcsb given command of this organization, and during

the time I was attached to the British Royal Air Force, both in Capt. Landis.

training and at the Fr,.nt.

I believe that the lack of well-trained, efficient personnel, well

learned and interested in the most up to date developments in

aviation throughout the world and, particularly, as developed by

the Allies and by the enemy, was the most serious obstacle the

United States Air Service had to contend with in its organization.

This lack of experienced direction reacted in a number of ways

in the formation of the Air Service for use over the lines. From

the material point of view, it caused considerab!e trouble when

the adoption and manufacture of various types of air-craft

became necessary. From the personnel point of view, it .eriously

handicapped operations at the Front because there was very i nearly a complete lack of appreciation of the sacrifices and

efforts made by the enlisted personnel and by student aviators,

the latter in particular, prior to the time of their commissioninq

and in fact, up to the time they actually arrived at their

Squadrons at the Front, were shown no consideration at all,

even after they were commissioned. Their treatment was such

that it took a tremendous amount of patriotism for them to keep

up their interest in their work I believe that if the men in

command of the training, both at home and overseas. had been

more experienced, they would have been able, with their natural

tact, to create a much better "esprit-de-corps" both among the

pilots and men than actual'. resulted.

I would strongly recommend that attaches be placed in all

foreign countries to keep in touch, ac much as possible, with

!I
Ri

iI52 U.S AirService

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developments in aviation, and that an expermental department

be maintained at home to develop airplanes and equipment, both

from their records and reports and from the suggest.ons and

designs of American inventor. and manufacturers. In this way,

we will not only keep in touch with the physical future of

aviation, but we will be enabled to create a considerable number

of experienced pilots and directors of producion for use in an

emergency. It seems very necessary to me, that this

experimental board conbine pilots, obst-rvers, designers, and

tacticians, in order to co-ordinate all the 

- )ssibilities of any one

design It appears to me, most important that the Government

should give all possible encoure-lement to civilian aviation,

particularly from the production viewpoint, and with a view to

developinq the general utility of aircraft. This , 

-asist greatly lo

securing personnel and equipment, ,hich might be readily turned

into the production of Government dir-craft in f:

emergency.

I would, most strongly, recommend that flyi ot made

the same for all ranks engaged in aviation. A .eutenant i 

flying over the lines from two to four hours a day is certainly

entitled to as much remuneration for his extra hazardous servi,:e

as is an officer of higher rank, who in the majority of cases flys

very little, and then without the hazard of enemy interference.

Second: Since taking command of this Squadron, the

Squadron engaged in only two patrols over the lins, prior to the

signing of the Armistice, and my recommendations for this period .1 must, necessarily, be governed by that fact.

I believe that a Monoplace Pursuit Squadron can dispense with

the services of its Operations Officer, its Engineering Officer, and

its Medical Officer without any decrease in efficiency. The

Commanding Officer can and should handle operations. with the

assistance of the Adjutant and Flight Commanders. The Supply

Officer should be abl. to take the work of the E.nineering

Officer, in addition to his other duties, if properly trained along

that line Tnese recommendations are made with the idea that

the Group Organization will be kept as at present In cases of

detached Squadrons, a Medicai Officer becomes necessary

It is not necessary, in my opinion, that three men should be

assigned to the care of a single-seater pursuit plane *rhe British

have operated efficiently with one rigger and one fitter caring for

each machine A careful estimate should he made of the number

of nonspecialists needed for regular fatigue dutcs and a sufficient

excess allowed to take care of emer.ency work. Table of

Organization should he so compiled that it would be unnecessary

to put members of Souadrns on detached service at Group and

other Headquarters to enable them to take care of their work.

LI
Lessons 53

Learned

It is my belief that co ordination between the training of line

troops and the Air Service would result in a much better

understanding between the various branches of service,

particularly inasmuch as the difficulties under which each branch

operates are concerned Infantrymen should b. given a general

understanding of the difficulties of aviation, as applied to

cooperation between aircraft and troops on the ground as well

as in connection with the engagement of enemy aircraft. Pilots

and obscrvers, on the other hand, should understand fully that

their primary duty is to assist the Infantry through as many

methods as it is possible to devebp, and that any possible

personal risk is well worthwhile, if it will assist the troops or, the

ground.

It is vitally necessary that a sufficient pursuit organization be

created and maintained in time of peace to furnish experienced

personnel, sufficient in time of war, to train and direct pursuit

organizations on a scale large enough to clear the sky for

reconnaissance, artillery observation and contact patrol machines.

If aircraft was important in this war it will be much more so in

the future emergencies which may arise, and I strongly

recommend that the United States be so equipped with

personnel and machines as to be able to efficiently defend itself

and its ground troops from the ruinous methods of attack which

will undoubtedly result from further developments in aviation

Capt. Charles M. ,Jones

CO., 28th Aero Squadron

Jones had commanded the 28th during the squadron's operations at the front with the 3d Pursuit Group, from 2 September

1918 until the Armistice.

In order to attain the highest point of efficieiic, dnd maximum

amount of work from the personnel of an aero squadron, military

regulations and tactics etc. should be reduced to a minimum, at

the same time enforcing a strict and rigid discipline.

Unlike most military organizations, the nature of the work is

such as to call for considerable individual duties and very

irregular hours. For that rea-son the amount of work allotted to

each mechanic varies greatly due to the amount of flying, the

condition of his plane, and the time of year, accordingly great

!I
Wg

54 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

tact should be used in the handling of men in order to obtain

their full efficiency without driving them excessively Reveille

should be held each morning for all concerned with the

exception of those mechanics who were on duty earlier at the

hangers, and a formation with roll call of all mechanics sometime

during the day affords a good opportunity of familiarizing them

with any rules or suggestions as to their work Particular

attention should be paid that good food and quarters be available

for the men, and if possible, short periods of games, such as

baseball, football etc., this being their only form of hard exercise.

As regards to the Flight Commanders and the Pilots, as much

freedom which will not interfere with their work should be given

them. Pilots cannot work at high speed more than a limited

space of time, this depending upon the disposition of the pilot,

and the more recreation he can enboy, the longer will he be able

to take interest in his work and do it efficiently When ever possible short leaves of three or four ddy, should be granted, to

give the pilots a change of surroundings and cure or prevent

slaleness

Flight Commanders should be given as much authority as

possible and rrade to realize that their flights are miniature

squadrons of wh:ch they are in command, and for which they

are responsible. Whenever available an experienced pilot should

be put in charge of flying with authority to handle all matters

pertaining actually to it.

In regards to the assignment of the men to jobs in a pursuit

squadron the following system has bc*_n most successful altho

there are, others probably equally as good. Each plane is taken

care of by a crew ol two men. a rigger and a fitter, assisting

each other, the rigger has an opportunity to learn engine work

and vice versa. Each flight is in charge of a flight sergeant,

according to lab!e of organization, and the three flights are under

the joint command of two or more master electricians Attached

to each flight are two or three so called "trouble shooters."

whose duty is to locate engine trouble, and to explain such to

the plane's creu By this system much unnecessary work, due to

unskilled mechwnic, is avoided, and many unnecessary changes

done away with These "trouble shooters" must accordingly be

thoroughly experienced mer., and should be picked from the best

material of the squadron They should not be expected to do

much work, as ther time is well occupied in locating troubles,

and nspecting new rotors

A difficulty which has often a, sen in an alero squadron, on active duty, is that of waking the mechanics, col'ks, pilots, etc.

in anple time for a patrol at say 4 a m The most certain

method is to appoint a man, whose duty is to stay
Lessons 55

Learned

up at night, and upon receiving the orders of the following day,

act accordingly The most successful manner seems to be in

awaking first the cooks, then the mechanics and lastly the pilots.

The mechanics should begin getting out the planes at leas! fifty

minutes boore patrol time. in order to start warming up the

engines, and allow time for an , adjustinert or tcouble which

might turn up at the last moment. Pilots should arrive at the

hangers 30 minutes before patrol time, and their machires ready

to take off five minutes in advance of the scheduled time

The "trouble shooters" pu?

the paeces togehcr to keep

the panes flying

-Si--*

-. 4
55 U S. Air Service

in World War I

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L

Summing it up briefly. every mrechanic should be encourdged

to take e personal intercst in his work, and made to realize that

he, in his way, is helping the squadion just as much as any pilot

In this regards the pilots should be given to understand that

F steady devoted attention to duty is equally if not more valuable

to the organization than reckless tho successful work,

unnecessarily endangering the lives of others.

"A" Ftight of the 148tth Aero

Squadron -all scored victors,

credits fl in -~ LiD5

LAwrence T V ;-y. LouisW

Rob,. FPlo E Kindley,

VL alter B Knos. drnd Jesse

0 Creech.- C .. --. : --
[/Li

Lessons 57

S Learned

-12-

1st Lt. Field E. Kindley

C.O., 141st Aero Squadron

Field Kindley, for whom Kindley Field in Bermuda ,s named,

had trained in Great Britain and had served at the front with a

British squadron. Later, he had been assigned to the U.S. 148th

Aero Squadron, which was attached to the British for service.

Kindley, who had become a flight leader in the 148th, did not

assume command of the 141st until sometime after the Armistice.

1. 1 shall give criticisms, as frank as possible upon our Air

Service program, from building of aircraft to actual combat.

2 Manufacture.

(a) The greatest failure in our entire air program is that of

manufacturing, and because of this failure many of the following

criticisms are possible. However I shall make the criticisms

regardless of the actual causes.

(b) The probable cause for the production failure is that

manufacturers in the States were selfish and tried at first to

~perfect their own type of machine while later no one seemed to

know just what type they wanted and finally through ignorance

of those in charge they chose the wrong or I might say an

older type.

(c) It seemed they were partial to the two seater, and

neglected the scout. This was probably due to the tact that they

could appreciate the work of a two seater observation nachine,

but could not appreciate the work of a scout. They could not

understand that a scout was very necessary in order for a two

seater to work.

3. Training

(a) We were very successful in training pilots for the R.M A.

tests but we were very short of schools capable of training a war

pilot, and the results are we had thousands of pilots but very few of which were fit for the front.

(b) In many cases the morallel of the flying student was

very poor, due not only to continual hounding but also to the

fact that many instructors discouraged a pilot that was about to

go solo. Upon his first solo the pilot did not fear so much the

chance of killing himself as he did that of crashing the machine

for which he would be punished and in many cases actually

taken from the Air Service.

(c) In the case of a crash many are punished by taking

'+ .. I I +i ....... 1 +I +1 '1 +3 - + I I+ +1 I+1+ =r ] r + I 1 1
58 U.S Air Service

in World War I -

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I

\,. them off of flying for a week or two. This to my mind is a very

bad mistake, for I honest!y believe that the sooner a pilot gets

back into the air after a crash the better it is for him. I have

had actual experience aiong this line.

(d) In many training camps an officer under instruction is made to feel like a third class private and not like an officer in

the United States Army. Many think that this has no effect upon

results, but I am sure that a satisfied and comfortable pilot will

make a better air man.

(e) One of the greatest faults of our advance training is that

our :nstructors were not experienced war pilots and did not know the "game." Many set rules they gave for fighting were incorrect A good war pilot is of great value at the advance xl

training school than he would be at the front.

4. Discipline

(a) The Air Service is entirely different from any branch of

the army and the same should be considered in the required 

1

discipline. Of course the men can and should be disciplined as

an infantry company but the pilots must have a different kind of

discipline and a good name for it is "loyalty." Loyalty can be

instilled into them by a good commanding officer. What I mean

by loyalty is that the pilot will do what ever work he is ordered

fo do against the enemy when there is a possible chance of • oing it and will at all times attack and destroy the enemy not

b,-ause he fears his commanding officer but because of respect

for him Loyalty will also demand team work among the pilots in

combat.

(b) The best place ol disciplining an officer or instilling

loyalty is the mess where the pilots collect, where friendship and

respect for one another is formed. Understand me I do not

mean to say a pilot should be allowed to call his commanding

officer by his first name or such as that but I do mean to say

the iron infantry hand should not be used.

5. Aerial Tactics.

(a) It seems that we had no system at the front, that is to

say we did not keep a consistent patrol on the lines, to work at

different heights, nor did the pursuit squadron know just how to

cooperate with the observation and bombing machines to the

best advantage. They seemed to go to the lines blind folded

and butted into the enemy and fought the best they could In

my mind a pursuit squadron can do wonderful work by keeping

the lines clear of the enemy even though they may aot destroy

so many machines They did not seem to know just how to

gei the best results with the least possible losses. They did not

use the system of trapping the enemy and out-maneuvering him
4

Lessons 59

N,-

(b) Of course lack of machines no doubt is a case for a

certain amount of this but it would be better not to send out

any machines than to send one or two at a time as was often

the case for this caused many losses without resu!ts equal to !he

value of the losses. In March of this year on a front that I am

well acquainted with, the one-flight patrol was sufficient to patrol

and keep the enemy off of the lines, but in September and

October a squadron patrol of three flights became necessary.

This as we all know was due to the enemy introducing the

Fokker Biplane in such large numbers, but I understand that we

sent out the same strength patrol so to speak in September and

October as we did in March. To defeat ihe enemy we must

meet his improvement b,, improving ourselves.

(c) Often officers ir, the capacity of flight commanders were

intrusted with other offcers' lives when he himself was not

experienced on the frcnt This was a waste of man power.

6. Care and Treatment of Pilots at the Front

(a) Of couie b,.use we were so short of good men at the

front they were kep, there for very long periods. but every effort

should be made tr, cgve a pilot the necessary rest in the form of

leave or other duties such as instructing or lecturing at the

trainina schoos Many pilots broke down in health and others

were s:lot down because their efficiency had gone down.

(b) There is no better tonic for a soldier than that of

promotion on the grounds he had done good work. This tonic

was very scarce 7. The Enemy's Criticism.

(a) I have heard that a German Air Service Intelligence

officer even went so far as to criticise our Air Service by telling

an American pilot who was a prisoner of war and before a

German Officer that "the Americans have the best possible

chance of having the best possible Air Service in that they have

the matenal and manhood, but they are making their mistake in

sticking to the French machines and French system of rraining

and fighting "

(b) My experience as a squadron commander does not

justify me in givng my ideas and of lessons learned in this war

L, _ _ ____ . ._ ___... _ _ _ _
60 US. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

-13--

Capt. James A. Meissner

C.O., 147th Aero Squadron

Meissner had been a flight commander in the 94th Aero

Squadron and had four credited victories when he was selected

to replace Maj. G. H. Bonnell as commander of the 147th Squadron in July 1918.

Probably the most important requirement of an officer

commanding an Aero Squadron on active service, is to know

and understand each and every one of his pilots. It is very easy

for a man, flying on active service, to become discouraged or

disgusted with the way things seem to be going and it is

especially important that the squadron commander notice

immediately any signs of such a condition, and to do all in his

Officers of the 1471hAero power to prevent it. Pilots should always be contented and

Squadron (I to r standing). feeling in the best of condition in order that they may do good

Ma). Harold E Hanney (CO. work, and it is well in the power of the C.O. to make things

st Pursuit Gp.). Capt. James A interesting and confortable for them. Meissner(CO 147th). and Ist It also is very important that the squadron commander be sitting) Lls StuartiT Purcell, experienced in the kind of work his pilots are doing, that he is ThomasJ.,ig U methy, and competent to give valuable advice concerning this work, that he

Horace A. Andrews knows as much and more about the work than his pilots, that

he is interested in everything each pilot does no matter how

many times he has heard of or seen the same thing. But for a

C.O. not to be thorouqhly familiar with the work his squadron is

doing, not to have donp some of the work himself, and still to

try to force his ideas on his pilots, is most discouraging.

To have his pilots as much like a large contented family as

possible, to have them interested in their work, and satisfied with

the way things are going, should be the aim of every squa Iron

commander A good mess and various amusements for "dud"

days go a long way to help in this respect.

But in watching the pilots carefully, the C.O. should never

neglect the enlisted personnel of the squadron. It is they who

keep the machines serviceable and if they are discontented, their

work will be poorer than if they were happy and interested. To

see that his men get good quarters and good food should be

one of the foremost duties of the CO. If the squadron is

modeled somewhat after the British organization, each pilot

having his own rigger and fitter, it greatly facilitates the work of

keeping the men interested in their work and that is the main

r

=. • A
tiMir

Lessons 61

j Learned

?i

object. If the squadron is divided into three flights, flight

sergeants are responsible for their work, it would be easier for

the C 0. in that, the flight sergeants ivill be responsible for the

condition of the men under him and he can watch them closely.

In this way each man takes a personal interest in the plane he is

looking after and nth the cooperation of his pilot he will keep

the plane in good shape. Keeping the men interested in their

work and making them feel that they are directly instrumental in

helpng their pilots in their work, cannot be too greatly

emphasized. Discontent among the enlisted men is a condition to

be very carefully avoided.

Keeping the men and officers in good physical condition is

another important point to be considered by the C.O On days

when the weather prevents flying, the men usually have plenty of

work to do on the machines, but sometimes their machines are

in good condition and the men are inclined to do nothing rather

than find something to occupy them and give them some

exercise. When not flying the pilots are inclined to sit around

and do nothing, rather than find some form of distraction to take

them away from the usual routine of work around the squadron.

But primarily the pilots should be made to oversee any work

being done on their plane and to be sure that it is in 

a

serviceable condition.

To understand each man under him and make the work as

interesting as possible, a contented and happy squadron will do

the best work and to obtain this end the CO. must see to it

that men in charge of the different departments are competent

and interested in their work.

• -4--

147th Aero Squadron

Successful aerial attacks like all other military offensive

maneuvers, depends to a large extent on position And surptise.

Other things being equal, the aviator that can surprise his

opponent or accelerate his speed by diving from a higher altitude

will win the battle. The best possible position to have is to be in

* line between your adversary and the sun and to b-e at least 

a

couple of hundred meters higher. An attack on equal numbers

from such an opportunity should bring a victory every time.

When a hostile formation is seen below, the leader should

start to swing his formation into the sun to get the better

advantagc of its blinding light. When he dives the whole

ii ' i "
62 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

formation should go down with him at the same time

endeavoring to hold the positions in the forma!:,)n. It hat; been

found that the Bosche often leave one or tw'. men above their

formations ready to dive at an attacking formation when it is

mixed up in the melee of the fight. To counter this one of the

trailing members of the friendly formation should remain up out

of the fight in order to combat any that tried to enter in a

surprise attack. Many men have been lost by diving too far

through the enemy formation for if not outnumbered several

machines will follow on down and with little danger to themselves

ride the tail of the man that has gone down too far Normally,

an attack made of diving, shooting, and zooming up to dive

again should split up any opposing aeroplanes.

Tightening a formation when the leadei gives the Hun signal is

absolutely necessary particularly if all its members fail to see the

Huns. The Bosches seldom attack an enemy formation even if

they have a preponderance of members if it is flying a tight

formation. It as about the best protection that a small group of

machines can assume. After the formation has ,-losed together

the leader will maneuver in order to bring the opposing machines

into better view out of the sun. At the same time the formation climbs in an effort to counter the superior altitude of the enemy.

To attack from below is dangerous unless the attackers have

superior numbers but if attacked the Bosche will lose a lot ol

their advantage if the enemy formation is climbing towards them,

often the speed of the diving machines cairying them through

the other formation.

-15--

95th Aero Squadron

Aerial combat presents so many unexpected and novel

situations in practice that any attempt to reduce it to a system

of rules seems at first glance to. be practically impossible, but at

the same time there are numerous general suggestions which can

be made subject to the changes which must be instantly devised

to suit each new development.

It is no exaggeration to say that three-fourths of the battle lies

in seeing your opponent or opponents first and if possible,

making a surprise attack. Under these conditions, everything is

in the favor of the attacking man and his adversary, if he ever

gets into a position to fight at all, is at a tremendous

disadvantage. When getting into position for any attack, and

especially when a pilot thinks he is catching his adversary

unaware, the greatest care must be taken to search minutely for

other enemy planes above or nearby. Often an apparently
A

Lessons 63

Learned

helpless plane is simply acting as a bait for others lying in wait in

some advantageous position. Make sure you see and understand

every detail of the situation and then attack wilh a!l possible

speed.

In any fight in which more than one enemy plane is

encountered, make a sharp rapid attack on the highest man 

i

possible and break off the instant he tries to lead you down to

lower altitude, even though he appears to be an easy victim The

great temptation is to concentrate one's whole attention on the

machine you are attacking, whereas at least half your faculties

should be devoted to what is going on around you Lnok behind

you at least once every 10 seconds. As a general rule. it is

advisable to always try to remain above your opponents, bu! if

attacked by surprise or forced ;nto a difficult position by superior

numbers, a vertical dive with flill motor, especially in a Spad, will

often prove to be the surest and safest method of escape, but it

should be saved as a last resource.

In attacking a bi-place machine, one should endeavor to

maneuver into the blind spot under his tail where the obierver's

gun is useless. If this position can be attained, he will be an easy

victim, but in practice it will be found extremely difficult to do,

particularly if you are up against an experienced pilot. If more

than one pilot is attacking a single bi place, one man can easily

draw the observer's fire without great risk, while the others close

in to the .,rual attack If forced to dive on a bi-place alone, try

to swing from one side of the enemy machine to the other so as

to force the machine-gunner to move his guns continually.

For a good shot, the attack from a three-quarter front and

slightly above is an excellent position but can be held for only 

a

few seconds and, hence, is practiczlly useless for an

inexperiwnced pilot. Similarl9, a crack shot may do great damage

to any enemy plane and even bring it down from a distance of

300 to 400 yards, but the average pilot will find that most of his

work will be accomplished from 200 yards up to as close as 10

yards; and on account of the danger of jams, it is inadvisable to

shoot from further than 200 yards When once you fire, keep

shooting as long as your tracers gc reasonably near or until

forced to pull away. ,. -_

-16- 

.

95th Aero Squadron

Formation flying for pursuit planes was a development of the

last 2 vears of aerial warfare when the steadily increasing numbe:

of machines in the air made it exceedingly dangerous for any but
-A

64 US. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

the most experienced pilots to fly alone.

In ail formation work, it is absolutely essential to have a leader

who has had sufficient time to be able to see enemy machines in

the air, and one upon whose ludgment the other members of the

patrol can rely Given this it should be understood that no pilot

should leave his patrol, unless unable to keep up, and the

strictest discipline while in the air must be maintained

In getting together at the start, the leader should designate a

comparatively small point, such as a village or even a single

building, as rendezvous and should circle immediately over that

point until all his men have arrived It will be frjund exceedingly

difficult for one leader to try to assemble more than five planes

under his immediate command.

Pursuit formations may be roughly divided into two classes:

large iormations of 10 or more machines whose mission is to

protect observation or bombing planes or, in some cases, to

form a barrage against hostile planes; and the small formation

three or possibly five planes whose duty it is to seek out and

destroy enemy machines. The former type of formation has

numerous obvious disadvantages owing to its cumbersome size

and the difficulties of co ,pration. It is essential that each five

machines in a patrol of 10 or 15, for example, should have a

separate leader, cooperating with and directly responsible to the

patrol leader, but at the same time keeping a sharp eye on the

men under his imnediate control. It is of the utmost importance

for the two rear men to fly close to their formation, as otherwise

they are practically helpless if attacked from above. If, due to a

bad motor or for any other reason, a pilot is unable to keep in

close touch with his patrol he should return to his own lines at

once. Either of the rear men on a formation, if attacked from

above, should immediately dive into his patrol where an enemy machine cannot follow. To turn in and endeavor to combat

under such conditions is fatal, as it breaks up the formation and

totally destroys its efficiency as a protective unit.

For pursuit work, the most interesting and cficient unit is the

small patrol of three or five in V-shape formation which by

reason of its extreme maneuverability and compactness can act

almost as one man. Such a patrol if composed of experienced

pilots and with a clever leader will be practically immune from

attack and will be effective against much larger formations of

enemy machines Isolated bi-p~ace machines of the enemy which

would flee before a large formation of pursuit planes may be

Lreadily surprised and are an easy victim for the small patrol.

When attacking, at least one man should remain detached from

and above his companions, keeping a watchful eye on the [ proceedings, and ready to lend instant assistance to any of his

I I
Lessons 65

Learned

1 men who get into difficulties.

"Skilled Pilot," 27th Aero Squadron

Aerial Tactics and Combat

Scout machines being single seaters fly over the lines in .,-Or.

formation. These formations vary in strength from three to

seven. It is good practice during offensive operations to fly

several formations over a sector at the same time having them constantly in touch with a designated squadron as pivot squadron. Before starting on patrol every member of the

formation should know the plan and what to do in case of

emergency. It often happens during a fight that the formation is

split up and a rendezvous should be arranged before starting out so as the formation can get together again.

A formation patrolling the line must keep in close contact; in

other wcrds it is of prime importance that each member of the

formation ...[holdi the position designated to him. The

formation usually is in V shape as shown below. #2 man 50

meters above the leader, #3 man 50 meters above #2, #4 man 50

meters above 13, etc.

#] (Leader)

93 #2

#5 #4

#7 #

f#2 should be 50 meters behind and to the right of the leader;

44 man 50 meters behind and to the right of #2 man, etc. A

straggler in a formation is easy meat for the "Hun." He is

always on the lookout for a chance to pick off the end man. It

is also a fact that a good formation will scare away a Hun

formation of much larger strength Several cases of formations

which have penetrated far into enemy terrt ,ry and have not

been attacked is one proof of this A man out of formation is

liai.'i, to spoil the effectiveness of the whole unit. A straggler not

only puts himself in danger but reduces the strength of the

formation.

The Attack

The leader starts the attack. In favorable circumstances he will

have altitude over the enemy and "Il dive on the enemy

•5
,1=1

66 U.S Air Serwce

in World War I

Vol. IV

formaton or single machine as the case may he Numbers two

and tk--- go down to the attack with the leader The other

memL i -f the formation stay up to protect from attack above.

We always try to keep a!titude on the enemy during the entire

fight Also keep the enemy on the inside while our machines

dive, shoot and pull off to come back again for another shot It

must alfaus be remembered that we are working as a unit and

not individually. Do not go down and play around with any

individual The idea is to have planes diving arid shooting all the Itime. If you go down and stay with the enemy at his level you

-,;]I lose your advantage and lay yourself open to attack by

ianother member of the enemy formation The easiest man to

bring down is the man who is so much concentrated on a single

adversary that he e~ther forgets or neglects to watch his tail. The

machines which have stayed above to protect will be brought ii (town into the tight by the leader as they are needed but they

should use their head and if they see our formation outnumbered

and hard pressed go to it.

II The Leader

The leader has absolute command of the whole formation. He

is responsible for leading his men on patrol, making decisions as

to when to attack. preventing the formation from being surprised

and having his patrol perform their mission

Many cases could be cited in which leaders have been called

on to make decisions. It is often times a question of snap

judgerrent. bu as a rule he has a plan of action formulated as

the siluahon develops He should be a man of experience who, sees evervthing that is in the sky While on patrol over the lines

a good leader -s continually scheming and planning to meet

siiuations which may arise at aiy ti e He considers every

machine in the sky as an eneriv until he is close enough to t I

the type A leader whose. formatiun is surpr'sed is a failure.

Likewise if hP engaqed in a combat under unfavorable conditions

wihou sufficient reasii. he is not 3 success Fie must know

,very part ol hs set' tU. BfuorL going into the air he should take

note of the vind vplocily and direction so as not to be blown

info enemy terrlciry during a fight

it i, the leader's duty to take advantage of nai.tral t.,ndlions

hici are iavoramlt for sur'irise This includes clouds, mist and

Sur

A f., iniii ,:i h,,uld one tomiiallv S'ing and turning and no

neire.oijr (f the form-it,n should b. flivng straight at any time In

ordc.r to k (,p the menberi. .,f his formalinrn on the move and in

poIljoi The leedui should fly at .,, low a s ped as "ossble and

and turn Loirnually. Look alive, see everything aid jump at
Lessons 67

Learnel

every opportunity to attack.

The Indiuidual'

The individual preparation for work over he lines starts on the

ground at the hangar It is taken for granted when a man is sent

to the frunt that he can handle his machin,,

Your machine must be in the best of condition, as must be

your guns. Live with you- machine, get to know your mechanics

and let themn know that you are taking an interest in thing- It is

(up] to you to have that machine and its guns in the best of

conditions.

Upon your arrival at the~ front get inl touch with the older flen

and get their advice on hovi things are done. Keep your ears

and eyes open and obey instructions, be k-een to learn. Take

things easy at first and finally you will be a good pursuit pilot. 1i

you think you know it ail and refuse advice anid do riot do ab

told you by flight commander arid the older men in the squadron

you wil; most likely develop into a first class "Daisy Pusher

In combat your advantage lies in pressing the ;)-tack. Wait

until you can see the mani's head and then spra him with both

guns. If you do this you will get 'him. If you per~isf in shooting at

long range you will waste all of your ammunition, accomplish

nothing, and find yourself out of luck when the timne comes for

you to save your own skin Keepafter the eiiemry. Do nut give

him a chance to fix his guns or to do anyth:'ig else However,

remember attack from the Front and "Watch You! Tail

Recommendotions

The trairing schools have not sent men to the front prepared

for their work. They have not becn ta'ight to fly formation. They

expect signals from the leader as to when, to turn This should

he instinctive. They nave not been taught how to keep i-i

for-mat~on. rThe combat instruction given then' .. been base )r the

wrong idea They have been led it- i..' that their combat

principles irnv '-ed individual currhrt , Ictpally vwhereas indi'rdu

combatm is a *yrare uccurance.

Thp main r'ouhle kwith thc training appoeir5 to b,, that the

inatroc turs are niot tmen of esnerin(eC di tfiv ft,)il 'oci nan (,ai

teach a puruit pilot' wh o has nor t be throuqht tfi- mill I likinstruiidtr shoiu ld he a niro whc i hfei i i e frori Iasa hoi in

ini ic r of .3 pur~u it c,idri n miid has ber it! coin fats tini

prrefuratily a nier, 'slitvfa hberi ai flight leader 1 t Ilk leim

fad it! expern::;i( of tear iiii pdkits f'uri thet tr,jini ig4 , it 

A

'If11C 1irain re FCOinreidat0%uUIii houl lief i ,ii di i iff of

itisructors be, fornied who kiiow the qatie burr, v.ery angqle aiid
68 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

U S Air Service pilots on alert

at Toul

at the same time are able to impart their knowled.qe to others.

This it is believed would fit men for their work at the front in a

pursuit squadron. They at least would not arrive at squadrons

with wrong ideas and the belief is that they would have the

qeneral principles of pursuit work included in their general

knowledge.

~-18-

"Skilled Pilot," 27th Aero Squadron

The importance of teamwork in chasse flying can hardly

be emphasized and is perhaps the hardest thing a new piiot.

fresh from training school has to realize. This is without

doubt due to the fact that training formations are usually

flown in a simple, straight course, never done al the front;

and because his final or combat training consists only of

endeavoring to out maneuver a single opponent.

Apart from a few individual stars, men of long experience,

who operate singly with success, practically all chasse or

scout work is done by groups of from three to ten or more

plines flying in formation, cooperation and explicit

obedience to the signals of the leader being the key note of

Success

Experience of this squadron has proven that a diamond or

wedge shape formotion, in which the planes arc, iered

outward and above the leader, to be the best lighting patrol for

A
-I

Lessons 69

Learned

the reason that while a compac! unit, enemy machines can

maneuver in any fashion and have an unobstructed view. Due to

the blind spots common to all planes, a zig-zag tortuous course

is always flown near the lines, to enable the pilot to have a free

vision in all directions, and also to render archie fire ineffective.

Groups of planes patrol the lines, to the end that all enemy

aircraft attempting to cross the lines be destroyed or driven

back; and by clearing the air of enemy fighting patrols it enables

our reconnaissance and reglage machines to operate free from .

interference. Perhaps the most disliked duty a -hasse patrol is

called on to leriorm is to protect reconnaissance or

photographic missions far into enemy territorv, where they are at

the mercy ol any large group of attacking fighting planes.

In troop straffing always done during a special drive or push,

scouts operating singly or in twos, diving on enemy trenches or

supply trains and zooming back into safet-,, and then repeat the

attack at another point. Low fog or clouds at such a time are a

great aid.

In any attack it is very esseoital that the patrol have the

advantage of greater altitude than the enemy. Existing weather

conditions of courre must be taken into consideration. Clouds

and bright sun afford excellent opportunities to surprise an

enemy group, if properly used; and likewise enable the enemy to

obtain the advantage if great care is not exercised in the use of

these natural advantages. Thick solid clouds for instance, can be

flown di;ectly under with perfect safety, which if there are holes

in them there is great danger of an enemy group circling above

such a hole and diving on the cnd men of a formation passing

beneath, with every prospect of success, and then zooming back

above the clouds unmolested.

To straggle or lag behind the formation is to court di-aster,

many a man being lost in this manner

A bright sun constitutes a great advantage if the patrol

maneuvers so as to have the sun at its back, thus being in what

is kr,own as the enemy's sun spot, it being almost impossible to

look d'rectly at the sun and see a machine until it comes within

shnotinf! range Great care must of courst: be taken that no

enemy group obtains a similar advantage by maneuvers, as a

surprise attack particularly from above, allows but small chance

for escape

In order that both l w and high flying enem' planes be

intercepted, patrols are at a rule flown at varying levels.

approximately 600. 2500 ar,d 5000 meters as in this manner the

tipper echelons const:tule 1prolection] to those below. Should the

lox oatrol attack and in turn he attecked by a se-ond enemy

group our upper echelon wu.ld have every opportunity of diving

L -,
70 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

in turn upon the enemy, with great advantages It is in this way

that so called dog-fights commence, friendly and enemy groups

diving on one another in layers. Here the necessity of vigilance

not only ahead, but to the rear, and particularly above, while

carrying on, or contemplating an attack.

In attacking an enemy formation equal or slightly greater in

numbers assuming that the leader has maneuvered so as to have

the advantage of altitude, a favonte method is to have the leader

and the right and left hand man dive on the enemy, followed by

the next two men at a distance great enough to have the first

three chandeilej up into position again, thus keeping the

formation intact, while a practically continuous fire is maintained

on the enemy, and the advantage of altitude is not lost Unless

one of those diving gets into difficulties below the end men of

the formetion do not go down, but remain above, affording

protection to those divinq From an attack of this kird the,"

rio escape, other than by diving away, manipulating control , so

as to cause *he ship to pursue irregular course. cominony

known as putting the nose down and walking the rudder, which

affords a very difficujl target.

Iri atacking a bi-place machine, containing an observer

operating machine guns on a movable turret. the most

satisfactory method has been found to be two or three men

diving simultaneously from both sides and to the rear. The

combined fire would usually disconcert the observer and render

ineffective his aim, which at best is difficult because of double

deflection. There can be no escape from such an attack if well

carried out.

A single scout attacking a hi-place can often, by taking

oo. antage of the blind angles or vision of such a ship, approach

it from below and slightly in front with a fair chance of success,

in as much as the traverse of the observer's guns is limited. An

individual combat between two single seaters often calls into play

considerable acrobation, that unless skillfully performed and well

timed often proves dangerous,

There is a very great danger of the adversary securing3 a great advantage in maneuk,els of this kind. this is particularly true of

the reversement and in fact any maneuver which has a dead

po.int is lost f'I,f spued A,,,erical A virage 15 wilhoat a doubt the

most valuable maneuver and by far the most difficult to perform

correctly, as in the majority of single combats considerable

circling is done betore either can get into shooting posiion Diue

to the guns on a sinjle seater shooting straight ahead only, the man who makes the smallest circl- or tig-e'=t virage gradually

gains so as to come on the tail of his opponent and so get in a

burst of shots. It is at such a tinie that a pilot must know and

=No
Lessons 71

Leamed

feel his ship as any tendency to stal or side-slip, with the

consequent loss of altitude, would be fatal. Too great a stress can not be laid on a pilot's knowledge of

his engine and ship, his facility to fly and shoot in any position,

and familiarity with terrain flown over. He must be able to see

and distinguish at great distances all enemy aircraft and to know

whether or not he can outclimb or outrun the types of enemy

planes common on his sector. Information of this later score is

of great assistance during an attack or in breaking off a combat

as it would be useless to try to to climb away from an opponent

were he in a ship of superior climbing ability. While every type

of combat plane has some particular advantage it usually has its

disadvantages- therefore knowledge thereof is essential. Much

depends on the leader of a formation and his signals should be

few and wcil understood by all members of the patrol, who must

follow his lead explicitly. Continuous flying together and

discussion of p!ans for attack are very recessary before diiy

patrol can become an efficient fighting unit; and the present

formation flying training might well be extended so as to

embrace the more advanced patrol flying so essential in work at

the front.

-19-

"Skilled Pilot," 27th Aero Squadron

When orders are received by this squadron to destroy enemy

observation bailoons, the very great military value of same, to

the enemy, necessitates that every possible precautior be taken

to prevynt failure in the fulfillmenl of this mission Only planes

with motors of the most established reliability should be

employed; first because of the self evident importance of the task

in hand, and secondly, because the rnision must be executed at

relatively low altitude, and well beyond the enemy's lines. The

motor and plane should be subjected to the most thorough

inspection. Capt. Jerry C Vasconcells

Even more essential is it that the machine guns to be used be neit to a 27th Aero

carefully tested on the range. There is no time in the attack on Squadron aircraft

a balloon to clear a )am, which, should it occur, would entirely

defeat the success (f the mission. The plane used should always

be equipped with one special balloon gun (Vickers 11 mrni usimg

incendiary ammunition only, for experience hi this squadron and

the British, has shown that unless the shots are exc2ptionly

well grouped, balloons will not burn when attackero with
72 1)} S. Air Service

L in World War I

~Vol. IV

ammunition of service calibre, even though incendiary -

! ammunition is used in a very large proportion. Also, and this is A3

~~of ve,-y great importance, p~lots should be strictly forbidden to _

attack balloons unless so equipped, for the very great chances of ~failure otherwise, make the risk, proportional to the chance of

success far too great.

Weather conditions permitong, the enemy endeavors to give4

very adequate protection to his balloons. In the Chateau-Thierry

drive, tri piane Fokkers were specially detailedl to this task,

whereas in the Argonne Meuse Drive, Bi-plane Fokkers were

nearly always to be found above and in the vicinity of the enemy

balloon lines. From the ground invariably his balloons are

protected by the so called "Flaming Onions," ' Ar,-hie Batteries,"

and by machine gun emplacements. It may be remembered that

the latter are by far more dangerous.

In clear weather, the enemy aerial protection is practically

certain, it is imperative to give adequate protection to the

"Balloon Straffer," and so to enable him to concentrate his entire

at ' ntion on his task. If the enemy, balloon is within 6 to 8

kiloreter's within his lines, an escort of six to ten planes to fly

above, circle during the attack, and accompany balloon straffer

beck to lines, %nll usually be sufficient;, if balloon is farther back.

this squadron has experienced best success with an escort of

two echelons of five to six planes each employing same tactics,

and flying one 500 to 1000 meters above the other In case of

clear weather, and god visibility, the chances are the balloon

will be high (600 to 1000 meters) and consequently enemy

protection from the ground is relatively less to be feared.

When clouds are solid at low altitude the Officer selected to

destroy the balloon may proceed on his mission alone, for then

he may fly just under the clouds and so be safe from aerial

attack above. In case of attack by superior nuambers he can

escape into the clouds and fly a compass course until within his

own lines. Also allnr Straffer may be dispatched alone before

dawn, so as to reach his objecti,.e at dawn; or before dusk, so

as to reach balloon at dlusk. In both named cases he is relatively

safe from aerial attack, due to fact the enemy aircraft will not

leave airdromes before dawr, for balloon protection, and will

leave in tinie to return by nightfall. Of Course the straffer leaving

beicore dawn must be z, most experienced pilot, very familiar with

! sector, and balloon locations must be definitely given, and the

same is applicable to balloon s,raffers before dus~k

L The methods o~f attack are of course individual problems. and

worked out differently by different pilots, but the following ~print -)les may be suggested Above all it is most necessary to

Sgrc shots well together to in:.ure combustion of balloon

: II
Lessons 73

Learned i

-d I ii

Fokker Triplane

Especially at dawn is this true, due to condensations of moisture

during night upon the envelope. If the balloon is well in

ascension do not pass over it after attack, through cone of fire

from machine gun emplacements upon ground, but chandel'el

away, ganing altitude as rapidly as possible. If the balloon is in

the nest, as is very likely at dawn or nightfall, it is advisable to

hug ground as closely as possible after attack, zig zagging and

taking all possible advantage of natural obstacles to enemy fire.

-20-

"Skilled Pilot," 27th Aero Squadron

Lieutenant Luke' with fourteen offit:ial balloon victories vas

perhaps the first to inaugurate the successful dusk and dawn

balloon straffing expeditions. While returning late one evening

from a patrol he ;,tacked and destroyed a hallon Apprecating

the added protection given him by the darkness he continued his

future expeditions along this plan. Nlator Hartney immediately

adopted the plan ot dawn and dusk balloon stratfing for the

entire First Pursuit Group as he immediately re(ognized the

advantages of this plan of attack. The results have been far

more satisfactory than was at first anticipated

The plan for the dawn balloon straffing was this -a pilot would

i- ---------
74 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

. be dispatched from the airdrome before dawn, taking off by 

a

systeri of lights arranged around the field, the pilot would time

his departure so as to arrive at the balloon location at dawn, as

the balloons are sent up at this time to begin the day's

observations. Often times the plot pursued a round-about route

-,to the balloon location after cro~ising into the enemy lines ir.

order to confuse ground observers as to his destination In case

. any hostile E.A. were ,ent up in pursuit of him such an indirect

route would naturally make him more difficult to locate. Arriving at the balloon the pilot immediately attacked the balloon, often

V-. while a balloon was still in its nest. Immediately, thereafter taking - .the quickest route for his own lines. The particular advantages of - -- dawn straffing consist of the protection afforded the pilot from

possible attack by hostile E.A_, since hostile machines are

practically never flying at such early dawn. Another advantage is

the opportunity of making a surprise attack on the balloon whilc

the enemy fire from A.A. and machine guns is inaccurate due to

the poor visibility. The chief advantage is the destruction of the

balloon at the beginning of the day as it is practically impossible

to replace the balloon for the day's observation.

Practically the same plan is followed in dusk straffing; the pilot

leaving just before dusk, arriving at the balloon at dusk attacking

it in its nest and at once returning to his aerodrome by the

quickest possible route. The pilot is enabled to land by light from the lighting system around the field. Rockets and flares are

fired continually to assist him in locating his airdrome. The

advantages of dusk straffing consist of the protection afforded

the pilot by the darkness allowing him to carry out his mission

unmolested by hostile E.A. and due to the poor visibility, A.A.

and machine gun fire is necessarily inaccurate. At this time of

the day the hostile E.A. usually have returned to their respective

airdromes leaving the air free for the carrying out of the mission.

The darkness ?_so assists the pilot to make a surprise attack,

the value of which can hardly be over estimated.

in successfully carrying out dawn and dusk balloon strafling

missions the pilot must study his map well before leaving,

carefully working oul his route, noting principal water-ways and

land-marks thai would be plainly discernable in the darkness and

having firmly fixed this in his mind, and also the exact location

of the balloon. An accurate compass with a radio light face is

absolutely necessary as after attacking a balloon the pilot quite

often is obliged to return to his lines flying just a few feel above

the tree tops; not being able to see the surrounding country he

is obliged to rely absolutely on his compass. The sun can often

be used to follow direction by, _,ut on the Western Front it is

often concealed for days at a time by thick mist and clouds

i

fr
Lessons 75

Learned

Another method of attacking balloons and which was found to

be very successful was to send out a large number of planes to

fom protection for the pilot or pilots designated to attack the

balloon. The planes would proceed to the balloon location in

formation and circle above and about the balloon, clearing the

air of hostile E A., while the pilo, or pilots formally designated

dove down and attacked the balloon. This form of attack was found very valuable where orders were received to proceed

without delay to destroy some certain balloon that was especially

active and troublesome, that was regulating hostile artillery fire,

etc. This attack can be carried out at any time of day and is

one of the chief points of advantage. The disadvantage of such

an attack consists of the danger of losses to our planes or the

failure of the 3ttack, due to the possibility of attacks by large

formations of hostile E.A. The anti-aircraft and machine gun fire German Dr arhen 'ballcn

i inecessarily mu,_h more accurate in broad daylight and where

the many planes form an excellent target

Oftentimes our pilots have taken advantage of the concealment

oltered by the clouds. In this form of attack the pilot or pilots

approach the balloon, remaining concealed by a cloud or clouds

until directly over the balloon, when the balloon would be

[ attacked by diving stiaight down on the bailoon, holding fire until

at close range, then opening fire with both guns until nearly on

the balloon when he would zoom away and return to our lines

as quickly as possible. In this form of attack two attacking pilots

and sometimes three achieved better success because the

balloon defense could not concentrate its fire on any one

attacking plane thus increasing our pilots' chances of setting the

balloon on fire and safely escaping. There are instances where

one pilot attacked the machine gunners on the ground, who

were defending the balloon while the other pilot or pilots

attacked the balloon itself The disadvantage of this plan of

attack is the danger of the attack by hostile E.A. in lerge

formations, who would have a distinct advantage over our pilots

since they would have altitude for attacking them and would

have the advantage of superior numbers

In the 27th Squadron there are many instances of a pilot

crossing the line with no protection and attacking and burning

one a.nd oftentimes several balloons. These expeditions have

been successful to a high degree due to the superiority of our

pilots over those of the enemy This form ol attack is by far the

most dangerous and runs less chance of succeeding Idue) ti the

possible interlerence by both hostile E A and hostile A.A. tire.

The armament for a plane attacking balloons. which has been

found the most successlul in this squadron, consists of 2 Vickers

guns, fixed and firing directly ahead shooting through the
76 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

propeller One gun was the common aerial Vickers 7mm. gun

firing service ammunition, every fifth cartridge being a tracer.

The other gun being the 11 mm. Vickers balloon gun firing all

incendiary ammunition. There are many instances of our pilots

attacking and firing good bursts into balloons at close range but

failing to burn the balloon due to lack of proper incendiary

ammunition, but since the introduction of the balloon gun no

such cases have been reported. The s ghts used hrive been the

ring and bead, ' Aldis.' and Reville sevilleA but they are hardly

necessary in attacking balloons due to the large size of

the target and the pilots usually regulated their fire by changing

the direction of the plane as their tracers indicated the necessity

of a change. t is vitally important that the guns be in good

working order and that the ammunition has been carefully

selected, as a jam at the critical moment may mean the failure of

your entire mission It is obvious that the pilot should be

thoroughly familiar with the operation of his gun.

Since in attacking a balloon a pilot is required to penetrate

several kilometers into enemy territory; the importance of having

his plane in absolutely perfect running order cannot be too highly

emphasized. If a pilot desires to fail in his mission and perhaps

allow the balloon he was to destroy continue invaluable

observation for the enemy, if he desires to spend the balance of

the war in a prison camp, let him fly a machine over enemy

territory that is not running properly and the chances are big

that he will never be able to carry out his mission or ever get back to his own lines A pilot should thoroughly understand his

machine and know that it is right. The Ameiican training schools

have made a grave error in sending pilots to the front, practically

100", of whom had never flown a Spad, taking the valuable time

of the older m~n as well as their own time in familiarizing

themselves with the Spad both in how to fly it and in the

handling of the motor to produce the best results Thr motors

furnished the squadron have as a majority been of a very poor

quality and combining this with the fact that many of the pilots

had to familiarize themselves with the Hispano-Suiza motor by

experience and by continued experiments, the efficiency of the

squadron has been impaired and many offers for volunteer

balloon straffing expeditions had to be refused, due to the

shortage of planes This shortage being produced by repairs - being constantly made on the engine.

In all the forms of balloon straffing the balloon "as attacked from above along the top surface from head to tail due to the hydrogen being :n the upper part of the bag. The surest method

of burning the balloon as carried on by our pilots was this:

Diving on the balloon tlVe pilot opened fire at about 100 yards

:

I
Lessons 77

Learned

S with the small gun firing the service ammunition concentrating the fire so as to produce a hole in the bag (this is easily done

I by following the directions of the tracers) allowing the hydrogen

to escape and unite with the oxygen of the air. When at perhaps

50 or 60 yards he would open fire with the balloon gun firing the

incendiaries, these taking greatest effect now since the HO had

united from the hole in the bag and the burning bullet passing

through this mixture easily ignited the bag.

After attacking a balloon and when the pilot is returning home

is when the enemy fire is the heaviest from the machine guns and "Flaming Onions" (large balls of phosphorous) fired with the

intent of setting the attacking plane on fire. The safety of the

pilot now depends on his ability to maneuver his plane rapidly

and in all directions to frustrate the hostile fire from the ground. Capt. Ared A. Grant,

Perhaps the most successful maneuver consists of "walking on Con;rmandin9 Officer,

the rudder" that is, skidding the machine first to left and then to 27th Aero Squadron.

right by pressure on the rudder. A Spad is very easy to skid

and when maneuvered in this manner makes a very difficult

target.

-21-

"Skilled Pilot," 27th Aero Squadron

There are several general classes of forced landings but they

all merge rather closely. Each and every one is an experience,

sometimes pleasant, sometimes exciting and rather dangerous,

but more often merely an incident in the every day life of a pilot.

The three classes of forced landings which constantly occur are:

(1) Those when from some trouble with the mutor or plane, it is

necessary to land within a limited lime but there is still leeway to

reach an airdrome or a good landing place. (2) Those where the

tiouble is very serious and it is necessary to land within a few

minutes at the most. (3) Those when the motor goes absolutely

dead and you must come down as best you can.

Experience alone will teach you to determine the seriousness

of the trouble and to distinguish between the first two classes.

Shouid your oil or water system break you must, if possible,

land at once in order to save the motor; but never chance

crashing the plane to save the motor. Fuel or ignition trouble is

liot dangerous to either you or your motor as long as the motor

'revs up" enough to keep the plane in the air and bring you

- home. One important rule at the front is always to bring the
78 U-S. Air Servce

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

plane back to the airdrome if possible, as a plane "out on pan"

means a serious tie up to the flight and squadron Headwork as

well as flying ability is extremely necessary to a successful pilot

at the front.

In the third case when the motor stops absolutely or slows

down to a point when it is useless, there is only one thing to

do, "pique" or dive steeply enough to keep flying speed and land

the best available place, into the wind if possible. Never

endanger your own life trying to save the plane.

This, so far, is a very general discussion and in order to

narrow it we will deal only with forced landings as they occur at

the front.

A pilot should know his motor from A to Z so that when

trouble occurs he can instantly decide what is wrong and how

serious it is. Before leaving the ground the temperature,

pressures and the "rev" should be right and the pilot should feel

confident that the riutur is in as perfect condition as circumstances will allow, I put it that way because many times it

is necessary to make a patrol with a motor which vibrates or

which, while it isn't quite right, still gets you where you have to

go and enables you to do the work required. Should serious

trouble occur while taking off there is one valuable rule, the

breaking of which has cost many a pilot his life and that is to

go straight ahead and land, no matter what you have to land on

or into. Here again experience will have to fell you how serious

the trouble is while circling around over or near the airdrome as

is the custom when forming for a patrol, you have an excellent

chance to try out and listen to your motor. It is far better to

detect trouble at the start than to have a forced landing in

Germany or the shell holes rnd trenches at the front, just

because you didn't notice a leak or hear a miss or discover that

when you opened up your throttle the motor choked badly.

When you start for the front with a patrol you should feel

confident that unless something develops everything is O.K. The

ideal condition of course is when you can forget your motor and

attend only to the thousand and one other things that you must

watch and think about while patrolling the lines; unfortunately

we have run across hut few such perfect motors.

During the Saint Mihiel drive we had very little serious trouble

from forced landings, due to the fact that we were flying high

and also because the country was not badly shot up. If you re

high and motor trouble develops there is little difficulty in at least

picking out a good landing field and getting down safely. In most

cases the pilots were able to limp back to the airdrome because

they could lose altitude safely.

Matters were decidely different when the Verdun Argonne
Lessons 79

L earned

I

Wrecked airplane. dropped t5(A)h after thc moro lailed

drive opened and they grew worse as the Huns were pushed

back. Never were we allowed to fly above 600 meters and the

country north, northwest, and west of Verdiun is a mass of shell

holes, barbed wired and trenches and forests. Thus a forced

lendina instead of being a joke more or less, became a very

serious matter so that when the motor coughed or cut out so

did your heart and when it stopped dead the bottom sort of

dropped out of something inside of you. Fortunately, although

many ships were crashed on these forced landings, very few of

the pilots were hurt.There seems to be but one way of landing

under the conditions met with between the Meuse and the

Argonne and that is to head for the best looking spot you can

reach and "pan cake" down. By pancaking is meant holding the

ship a few feet off the ground as long as possible and getting the

tail well down, thus when you have lost flying speed the plane

drops ar,C does not roll as far as it would after making anr

ordinary landing. Only luck will keep you from turning over, but

a pan cake landing helps. An i~iteresting book could be written

on the feelings, thoughts and sensations that come to different

pilots on such occasions.

If you are lucky enough to make a good landing there are

severa! things to be done and determined First: What is wrong

AI
80 U.S. Air Ser,ice in World War I

Voi IV

with the motor? Can it be fixed easily? What parts are needed

etc? Second: When the machine is fixed will it be possible to

"take-off' from the field you are in or any nearby field? Third:

Will the machine have to be wrecked or salvaged? If this is

necessary all instruments, sights, guns etc, should be removed

and taken back to camp. Fourth: The machine must be guarded

as the world is full of souvenir hunters and a disabled plane with

its insignia, cocards, number and miny removable parts is a

choice prize period. Five: Notify Headquarters where the plane

is, the extent of the damage and what in your judgment it is best to do.

If a pilot always knows approximately which way ihe wind is blowny

and what direction is towards enemy territory he has little to .

fear from a forced landing; if he doesn't know these two things

he is hardly a pilot. I

-22--

1st Lt. Thomas G. Cassady

Pilot, 28th Aero Squadron

Cassady had enlisted in the French air service in July 1917

and had served briefly at the front before Iransferring to the

U.S. Ai- Service in February 1918. Subsequcntly he had been

attached to a French squadron before being assigned to the

28th early in September 1918. He had credit for five victories

while on detached service with the French and four more with

the 28th Squadron. His report, which follows, was entitled

"Recommendations for Practical Flying with Military Tactics."

It seems to me that in all American squadrons which I have

Li Cassady. observed at the front, there is room for improvement in their

formation flying. First of all formation should be Effected more

rapidly. At almost every flight there is some pilot who can not

depart at the given hour because of some simple little trouble

which could have been arranged if he had tried his motor, say, a

half hour before departure Some pilots are naturally slower in

adjusting their helmets, g-lasses etc. than others and because of

al! the above reasons I suqgest that each pilot complete all his

preparations and be strapped in his machine at least ten minutes

before the given hour of departure. Any normal motor should be

started in five minutes and in the remaining five minutes be

waimed up and taxied to starting line.

hi a

!-
Lessons 81

Learned

A very satisfactory mode of assemblement employed in many

French squadrorns is as follows. Every motor is started before

leader taxies out to starting line allowing the ten minutes for

each machine. The leader after noting the number of motors

turning over immediately takes off and climbs rapidly to 200

meters where he reduces motor to line of flight speed and

straightens out continuing straight into wind. Each remaining pilot

starts to take off as soon as the wheels of his predecessor's

machine leave the ground and immediately climbs to fifty meters

above the leader on the side assigned and remaining machines

do likewise climbing to 50 meters above their predecessor. As

soon as the leader counts all the machines behind him at proper

altitudes and positions he performs a vertical turn and passes

back through the group, each succeeding pilot forming into exact

pUition by performing a vertical turn in an uutward position

from leader; that is if he is on the left he turns to left and on

the right he turns to right. This mode of assemblement entails

high efficiency and co-operation on parts of mechanics and pilots

and have not yet been able to make it succeed in the American

army, but if it can be accomplished by the French it can also be

done by Americans.

The following method is quite efficient: Have all machines

prepared as is stated in first paragraph and instruct all pilots to

turn in left hand circles, at a given altitude over a well defined

land-mark, ,uch as a village, lake or small forest. The leader

awaits until all available machines have taken off then climbs to

within fifty meters of the circling planes under which he passes

in the given direction such as from north to south or east to

west and by waving his wings in some distinctive manner attracts

the others immediate attention. At periphery of circling machines

he reverses and starts in opposite direction, repeating this

operation until everybody is in place. If he attempts to form by

going in right circles for example; the pilot on the left will find it

difficult to retain an approximate position and the pilots on the

right will have difficulty in keeping in the leader's rear and the

formation thereby retarded.

Unless the mission is urgent the leader should climb at

eighteen or nineteen hundred revolutions depending on the paich

of propeller so as to enable everybody to keep in proper

position, for all motors are not of equal power and some have 

a

tendency to over heat. On arriving at given altitude the leader

should turn his motor at seventeen hundred or seventeen-fifty

hundred revolutions depending on pitch or propeller. A great

many types of formations have been tried but I think the best

and simplest is the V formation With each pilot seventy five

meters above, seventy five meters behind and seventy five

I
- -71:- _ _--- -

82 U S Air Service

in World War lI Vol. IV

meters to the left or right, as the case may be of the man in

front of him A great obvious fault of our formation is the too

great distance between the planes.

To attack a large enemy patrol all planes must act in unison.

which they cannot if the formation is uneven. Furthermore the

pilot who flies a lo,"q distance from his companions is susceptible

to an attack without chance of immediate succor from the

patrol.

A good protective formation is for the olanes on the side next

to the lines, to fly twenty five meters below his comrade on the

opposite side of formation If attacked he dives into his own lines

and under his patrol which throws the attacking E.A. immediately

under the fire of the pilot opposite. The E.A. most often attacks

trom the side and this is really an effo,-ti , means of protective

flying.

The same formation of pilots should, as far as possible, always

fly t-gethpr, establish a3 code of signals, and discuss together the

mode of attack to be followed on different EA. formations, the

individual part that each is to play, modes of defense to be

followed in case of attack from all possible positions etc. This 1

shall not attempt to describe for it has been very amply done by

Cpt. Deullin of the French Air Service and translated by Maj.

Bidell (Biddle]' Every pilot should have this document and each

pursuit squadron have several copies in its possession.

Another %'ery practical practice is a voluntary patrol of three

pilots. It is the best method of breaking in the beginner. Two old

pilots taking out a new one can give him very valuable

encouragement in permitting him to take part in the attack of an

E.A. bi-plane several times. I find it distinctly bad to introduce a

pilot to actual combat with a large E A. patiol He is sureiy not

going to be at his best and in a moment when he is

bewilderingly watching the combat ome E.A. is quite apt to

surprise him. E.A. bi-planes have a habit of coming to the line at

certain hours to perform their work, usually when they think our pursuit patrols are not in the air. This hour is often at noon and

often just belore dusk. By telephoning to our balloon stations

one can always gain valuable information concerning activity of

E.A. bi-planes and by being on the alert, the voluntary patrol can

secure a combat with a biplane

I think it an excellent suggestion that each patrol that leaves

the ground should carry four light bombs and climb to its given

altitude cross the lines at once and drop them, not deep within

the enemy ines but distinctly on the enemy's side Of course

accurate information as to change in lines must be at hand. No

particular spot is to be an objective but any spot in region of

enemy infantry. As a rule infait~y ,arinot tell wheiher or not the
Lessons 83

Learned

;anes above are enemy or friendly and if each patrol would

drop its quota of bombs into the enemy trenches the enemy

infantry would come to mistrust any plane over-head, even its

own, and the moral effect would be tremendous.

-23-

1st Lt. Louis C. Simon, Jr. 

-

Pilot, 147th Aero Squadron 

-

Formation Flying. To begin with, Formation Flying is the key

to success of any squadron on the front; this applied to all kinds I

of squadrons: Chasse, Bombing (day), and ObservationFlying Formation with Chasse Machines differs in many ways

to othor types. To begin with, you my, be flying, say, a Nieupurt

where you can only fly at full speed and one machine may be

faster than the others, that pilot has to S more to keep in

place. The fact is every pilot has to S a certain amount in order

to keep his correct position. It also takes a lot of practice to

keep formation and at the same time be able at all times to look

around in the air for enemy airplanes and also on the ground to

try and observe for information which may be valuable for ostr

use. In being able to do all this, it not only takes practice and experience, but a patrol leader who sees everything and can use

his head at all times. If a patrol leader does not have these

qualifications, he cannot keep his patrol together, cannot

maneuver for best position of attack and most likely will be

atacked by enemy airplanes And suffer heavy losses Beforc going

on patrol, you must always have a deputy leader with equal

experience m case the leader drops out. From experience

enemy airplanes will not attack if you are in formation whether

you have an equal number of machines or not. Formations ;n

chasse machines does not mean flying wing to wing but about

200 yards above and 100 yards back of the pilot in front, this

distance giving you room enough to maneuver in case of being

attacked or attacking.

Method of Attack. First, patrol leader should maneuver to get

all his patrol in formation. (This should only be necessary when

you have a new pilot or a pilot with something wrong with his

motor ) Always maneuver to get the sun at your back if possible.

When attacking, always attack in formation, but all machines

must not go down into the fight. Always have at least two

machines above in case there are more enemy airplanes around,
84 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

to pre'vent them from diving on your tail, and you always find

that upon attacking or being attacked the enemy airplanes try to

climb above you and get on your tail. So by having two above,

you will not have to worry so much about your tail- The average

fight lasts from 2 to 5 minutes When you break off. get into

formation as quickly as possible and prepare for another attack

or move towards home, as the patrol leader deems fit. Always

have some point where you can rendezvous. (This is in case a

pilot loses his formation.) One of the strongest points that all

young pilots should have beaten into their heads (I use the word

beaten because it is just about what you have to do) is never

leave a formation or attack unless the patrol leader signals you

or leads the attack himself, I can't emphasize this point too

strongly because in my squadron 50 percent of our casualties

were caused by pilots either losing their heads or leaving a patrol

and going off alone. They may get away with it for a while, but

sooner or later they will be missing.

At the beginning I spoke of the Nieuport 28 machine, because

it has the rotary motor and is the hardest to fly formation with

because you can't regulate your speed, but those with stationary

motors, formation flying is easier because of not having to S so

much, but you always should do b certain amount in order to

know what is around. In closing I'll say, never take anything for

granted, trust no planes till you are positive what they are, and

by all means follow your leader in all cases whether you think he

is doing the right or wrong.

-24

Maj. George E. A. Reinburg

C.O. 2d Day Bombardment Group

The 2d Day Bombardment Group which was organized on 1

November 1918, was Reinburg's first Air Service command at

the front. Assigned to the Second Army, the group had two DH4 squadrons, the 100th and the 163d, ready for operations by 9

November, but bad weather prevented them from flying any

bombing missions before the Armistice. Reinburg's "Lessons

Learned from the War in Aviation" was submitted with the

group's history just before Christmas 1918.

A. Aeroplanes.

1. Types. The war has shown that there is no universal or
Lessons 85

F Lecrrneoil

multiple purpose plane, which can be used for pursuit, Capron. fip.aii

reconnaissance and bombing work Each particular work calls for

a different type of plane, specializing either in speed.

maneuverability, climbing ability. carrying capacity, or long

distance range. It; order to embody one of these characteristics

if' a [), nVI , otfiL'rs must h.' icrificd

2 Construction Certain planes, such as the Spad for

pursuit, Breguet for bombing, and Salnson for reconnaissance.

are the results of years of experience in designing planes and

combine the maximum factor for safety with best features of

plane performance. These plones have practtcally become

'1,!, n '_ir( dnr( th e firi il) in pr ' c) ''.,iit, t . i , rI ' iiW ;:1 ti miitr~r

inasmuch as a greater speed and a higher ceil:ng are desirable

for all of these planes.

Other planes, like the Handley Pagp and Caproni and others

of the night bombing type, are susceptible of considerable

development for long distanr. and weight-carrying purposes. Al;

of these multiple-motored planes may be altered to fit the speciai

purpose desired

3. Use of Aeroplanes in warfare. The principal and primary

uses of airplanes are for observation, destruction of property,

and attack upon ground troops, and the secondary of defensii.e uses are for pursuit and protect~ve purposes Observation and

bombing were both deeloped greatly during the present war, the
A

86 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vo! IV

former including both visual and photographic reconnaissance

Pursuit and "Strafing" units were wholly a development of the

present war, the former being used against enemy airplanes, and

the latter against ground troops.

4. Limitations of Aviation in Warfare. The principal limitation

of the aviator lies in his inability to conceal himself from the

ground troops hence the latter are always forewarned of his

presence. Another limitation (especially in observation and

bombing) lies in the difficulty of picking out the finer details of

the ground landscape from a height, and especialiy in cloudy or

hazy weather. For photographic work the weather of France is

very adverse, except for a couple of months in the summer.

B. Essential Requirements of a Successful Day Bombing Plane

1. Good visibility. Speed being but a minor consideration if a

plane can be flown well in a tight formation and inasmuch as no

bombing plane can hope to iun away from pursuit planes, its

defensive power lies in the strength of the formation. Good

visibility is necessary for this work. A good formation of bi-place

machines can fight off double the number of pursuit planes2. Carrying capacity. No Day Bombing plane that cannot

carry' five hundred pounds of bombs is worth calling a Bombing

plane. If less than this is carried the Pursuit and Observation

type of plane can as easily do the work.

3. A Wide Fuel Range. To bomb behind the range of

present day artillery and to reach strategic rail heads, not less

than four hours of fuel should be carried by each plane. If

tactical bombing is desired the same planes can do the work,

carrying less fuel and more bombs. By Tactical Bombing is

meant Battle Field Bombing.

4. Great Wing-Spread. Unless this is maintaired for bombing

planes difficulty is found in maintaining a tight formation at high

altitudes, for the plane must be stalled thru the air with its heavy

load of bombs.

5. Detachable or Protected Fuel Tanks Inasmuch as 

a

bombing formation does a great deal of defensive fighting and

has limited maneuvering ability this seems absolutely necessary It

has been found practical.

6. No Exposed Controls. They are very apt to be shot away

by the observer while attempting to shoot under his tail.

7. Armored Pilots Seat. Many occasions have shown this to

be responsible 'or the safe return of the plane

8. Universal Bomb Racks. Bomb racks should accommodate

any size of bombs for the same total aggregate weight. This is

very important as object bombs are practically worthless against

troops and shrapnel bombs are useless against railheads,
Lessons 87

Learned

factories, etc.

9. Both pilot and observer should be as cc-rdortable as

possible. Four hours of flying :.; kwarisome at the best and the

best work is not done by a Wiurnout -nan.

C. Why the De Haviland, Liberty Fo:r, is a Poori Airrlane for

Day Bombardment.

1. It is not fast at great altitudes w.......oad of bnk~

2 For a bombing plane it car-ries -o '. rinfeno.

quantity of bombs.

3. The fuel tank placed between the pii-t ndcsr..i

the target of ever pursmi p'lane that aittacks i:.

4. The iuef tank is unprotectced, work., 6yr pressure anc'

explodes when shot up.

5 When a kiad landunig is !ndo 0- 01C plane crashes thse

tank leaves its beduir. havi'ng nothin 

- to keep it thefe, arid

crushes the pilot agains! thiern'.

6. The pilot and observer a e too far apart. Tean- work is

rnecessary in a bomnbing plane arcd is imipossible in this, !ype.

Speaking tubes hrdp some but ate no! the remedy for this

situation.

7 The observer's cockpit is too ',) and the seat aiid belt

provided are useless for artive fig-trng Any observer tinds great

difficulty in swiriging Twit' Lewis guns in the blaist of a Liberty

8. The controls arp exr-osed and liable to be shot away by

even a carefu and conservi.tive observer.

9. The arrarngements for the throttle and switch are badly

placed. They shold be on ti-e same side, thus miking it

unnecessary for the pilot to chaiige hands or. the stick while

landing.

10. The engine bed is. weak

I1I Thu? toil ic wehk and must tie brdced Bracing is nevr 

s

reliable as substantial consti uctio in the making.

12. The king~ posts on the elevator are weak and no wires

(on the white ships) tun from the kingl post to the trailing edge of the elevztor.

13. The plane is blind hoth fromn the pilot's and observer's

standpoint.

14, The Liherty motor is too heavy and powerful for the De

H-aviland 4. Anyone who has flown one can tell thus by the

vibration of the machine under full power

15. The rubber correction on the gasoline tine running

parallel to the exhaust becomes heated and so works loose. This

causes a flood of gasoline over the exhaust and a resultant ptane

burned in the air. Have seen this happen on the ground.
88 U. S Air Service m World War I V'ol IV

16 The undercarriage is weak. ;n a crash there is a tendency

for the motor to leAte the plane, have witnessed at least one

death as a result of this.

17. The plane is not so constructed that a bombing sight can

be used thru the floor of the fuselage This applies to carrying

large camera as well. It is possible but not practical.

18. The giavity tank placed in the wings is not necessary and

is dangerous

19. The all-wood constructior of the fuselage and wings tends

to loosen more easily than a metal connection. The metal

construction is used by both the French and Germans and is

found practical

20. The bomb racks are not dependable, are capable of

carrying only large bombs If srnail bombs are used only a small

L

Breuget

number can he accommodated by the preaert bomb racks.

21. On the Liberty Motor the position of the spark plugs on

the inside of the cylinders makes it necessary to wait for the

engine to cool before changinq the plugs This means that a

piane starting on a raid and finding a plug missing cannot get

away on the raid, but if the plugs were dlifferently situated, the

plane could return to the field, change the plug and still catch

th formation This is very practici and often occurs

D Why the Fiench Breguet Bomber is a Successful Day

Bombing Plane

I It is last at high altitudes on account of the large wing

surface and w-l carry three times the load of the De Haviland to

a hi 3her altitude Have been to 600 meteis with 12 Michelin

90mam bombs

2. The Bieguet Squadrons can operate regularly at an
-4 - M

t --

U

S Lesso~ns 89

i- L Learnead

ordinary altitude of 10,000 feet with 600 pounds of bombs, an

armored seat for the pilot, twin Lewis guns, 6 drums of Iammunition and the regulation front gun and ammunition

K 3. The fuel system is divided into two tanks, the lower of

which can easily be dropped in case of fire, and the upper so

protected that it is very rarely set on fire. These tanks are in

front of the pilot and do not tend to crush him in case of a

crash.

4. Pilot and observer are close together so that conversation

is easily carried on.

5. The observer's cockpit is deep so that the aims are easily

swung and the observer requires no belt.

6. No controls are exposed. 7. The throttle arrangements are conveniently situated and

excelent fur the pilot. 8. The engine bed is strong. In our experience we have

never seen the engine leave its bed in a Breguet crash.

9. The metal fuselage is strong, so that the plane does not

get out of line easily. Have seen a longeron entirely shot away

and the plane return safely.

10. Both pilot and observer have good visibility enabling good

formation work and protection

11. The entire floor of the luselage can easily be opened thus

giving excellent visibility below and making practical an accurate

bomb sight.

12 The Michelin bomb racks are adjustable tc any size bomb

and stii! carry a full capacity load.

13. The struts cannot be shot apart by an explosive bullet.

14. From a standpoint of construction no stronger ship has

probably ever been subjected to hard active service and given

such good results.

15. We believe it possible to install a Liberty Motor in a

specially designed Breguet and as a result have a plane close to

the ideal bombing plane.

16. The present Rendull Breguet carries five hours fuel in

addition to its capacity of bombs.

17. At a high altitude it is just as easy to fly as a De

Haviland since no stalling is necessary to hold the altitude once

gained.

Note: These observations have all been substantiated by

experience and many more could be added.

F. Flying Personnel.

1. Choice of Fliers. Altho for the most part the fliers have

beei, proved as excellet material, a certain proportion have
A

90 U.S Air Service

it World War I

Vol IV

been somewhat below par From observation a large proportion

of these cases have been Hue to the individual indifference of the

fliers in cuestion rather than to any actual inferiority.

2 Manner of Choosing Pilots for the Front In some cases

the best fliers have been kept at the various schools instead of

being sent to the front, with the resu!t that when fliers were sent

out in squadrons operating at the front, some of those fliers

were apparently stigmatized as being inferior to the flying

instructors in the S O S This was especially true when

promotions were given to flying instructors in the S O.S

whereas at the front a flier must be given command of 

a

squadron before anV promotions were g:ven

F Operations.

1. Size of Formations It has been learned that no hard and

fast rules can be laid down for the size of formations. Each unit

must regulate i',,, riez of the iormation to the importance of the

mission and to the degree of resistance offered by enem,,

aircraft. This proved especially true in the Chateau-Thierry, St

Mihiel, and Argonne operations, where the enemy amassed 

a

large number of pursuit flights In a case where two formations

met, each one consisting of planes of equal fighting power, the

advantage of the larger formation over the other is in about the

same ratio as the square of their respective numbers Assuming

that in. the first round of fire that each side downs the same

number of opposing planes, the smaller formation has by this

ti.nic lo,t iblyyc prri' ,r!iun of p', ict t 1 h" i,.'rji O f d itmds,

a good chance of being wiped out altogether.

2. Area of Operations. The least loss is experienced to

aviation when the enemy is fooled as to the target chosen If he

can guess the probable area and time of aerial attack,

arrangements will doubtless be made for some counter attack,

but when operations cover a wider area and are constantly

shifted, his patrols must either be increased all along the line, or

he mus, wait for word of our planes ciossing the lines before

sending up fighting planes.

In the case of an ?rmy attck ,,her, it 1s n,,cea~8iS to feath

certain ob-ectives regardless of enemy opposition, much better

results have been gained and with a considerably smaller loss of

olanes and flying personnel when extra groups have been brot in

to equalize the odds of the Air Service of the army attacking

i. Results of Bombardment vs Expectations.

I. Expectations of Bombardment Aviation Due to

considerable newspaper talk it was popularly thol that bombing

aviators would bomb enemy trenches and distant objectives such

as Berlin, erc. These writers showed a lack of apprecaton of the

limitations of the planes available and of the military importance
- Ler 

9

Learned

I

of the obiectives thus popularly assigned

2. Aims of Bombardment. Speaking for a military standpoint

the 

works 

principal 

beyond 

aims 

reach 

of 

of 

bombardment 

art:llery tire, 

have 

to d:sperse 

been to 

enemy 

destroy 

air 

enemy 

forces,

I

and to undermine the morale of the enemy by such hostile

demonstrations

3. Actual Results of American Bombardment Aviation

Resulting from the bombing of principal enemy railroad centers.

the traffic at those stations was so tied up. that trains had to be

rerouted thru other channels, causing considerable inconvenience

and delay The morale of the railroad workers was considerably lowered, judging from testimony received after the Armistice As

a result of the bombing of enemy concentration several enemy

counter attacks were said to have been checked at the outset.

During enemy retreats the bombers caused considerable

confusion along the route Aside from these considerations the

materia; damage done by bombers during their raids was

considerable and has not even been calculated.

The indirect results affectinq the morale of the enem, and our own troops can scarcely Le estimated, but helped considerably towards a successful conclusion of hostilities

H. Relative Values of Different Objectives.

I While it was necessary at all times to maintain a certain

amount of secrecy concerning the operations of the

bombardment squadrons, yet a more ccmpiele summary of

intelligence concerning the damage done on the various raids

could have helped out wonderfully It was found out afterwatds

that some of the raids which were listed as unsuccessful were

successful in wiping out a part of a machine gun train;ng school

for German officers

2 Changing Objectives Enroute. In the case of a cloud

compietely obscuring the region of the obiectiv, it was

sometimes found necessary to bomb another objective or return

home The leading team then had to judqe from their limited

knowledge of the situation on the ground which course to follow

In the course of an army attact, it was impossible to tell within

five miles of the position of the front line and unless specific

obiectives were given out, the leading team would pick some

center sufficiently far from the actual front to be on the safe

side

I. Value of an Efficient Intelligence Section

I Group Intelligence Office Aside from furnishing the pilots

and observers suitable maps of !he sector arid maintaining up to

date wall maps the Group Intelligence Officer provides all

available data obtainable concerning the enemy air forces ind 

a

full series of maps indicating the principal road and railroad

I =,~ ~'-
!7 i i i i.' i -- - ' , : - - = - ., ..-= 

92 US Air Service

!n World War I

Vol. IV

Intelligence office of the 1st

Day Bombardment Group -

communications, aerodromes, anti-aircraft batteries, factories,

ammunition dumps, supply depots, narrow gauge railroads, forts,

reserve trenches, and photos of the principal landmarks of the

sector All available pamphlets and magazines relating to aviation

and secured. Drawings, sketches, and graphs of enemy planes,

group operations, etc., are drawn up. Everything of this nature

stimulated and encourages the fliers to better work. especially

when information of their own operations is brought to light.

Anything in the nature of a compelition keeps up the interest of

aviators, who might otherwise become weary and indifferent in

the work.

2. Special lectures and demonstrations for new pilots and

observers were held in favor by the Bombardment Groups.

These were not so much along the theoretical zs along practical

lines of aviation in active service New types of formations were

discussed and tried nut Different observers were tested from

time to time in regard to their bombdroppir, accuracy, sense of

direction, and knowledge of tI'e enemy sector. Numerous

discussions were held between the observers and the ordnance

officers and a number of the theories of the former were put in

practice. evolving such innovations as ring sights and straight

sights on the Twin Lewis guns, mud guards on the landing

wheels (permitting planes to take off on a muddy day without

having the propellers broken by mud), special locking device for

Twin Lewis guns, different arraigement of nstruments. Very

cartridges, and maps in the plane.
Lessons 93

Learned

* 3. Spirit of Competition. The various pilots and observers

were checked up when flying in new positions and changed

around until the formation was able to perform most efficiently.

The Intelligence Officer would suggest certain observers to fly where they could devote a large proportion of their time to

ground observation, and those better adapted to aerial gunnery would practice upon the enemy planes from time to time. The

leading teams were chosen in accordance with their value to the

squadron and not according to the ranks they held

4. Increasing Value of Group to the Army. The Intelligence

Officer by increasing the number and value of )bs,rvahons made

by his group would enhance the value of that group to the

Army; instead of accomplishing merely a series of bombing

missions, the group wnuld act also as an observation unit, its

ability in this line being limited only by the experience of

the observers, the area covered by the bom'ing unit, and the

freedom of the bombing unit from enemy att3ck.

5. Information desired by a bombing group. All infroiadtion

concerning its immediate ohjectives, enemy aircraft located in the

opposite sector, anti-aircraft locations, weather reports, changes in disposition of enemy forces at the front is necessary to a

bombing group. Desirable information includes; daMag2 done

by raids, changes in enemy transportation, new works, localities

of maximum activity.

-25-

Mai. George E. A. Reinburg

C.O., 2d Day Bombardment Group

I am submitting herewith such tentative changes in the

Air Service tables of organization (approved by G.H.Q., A.E F.,

Sept. 8, 1918), as I believe to be desirable for the efficient

functioning of a Day Bombardment Group

3. It is believed that the commanding officer of a Day

Bombardment Group should be a full Colonel and that a Day

Bombdrdment Grout) should coriespond in that respect to 

a

regimental command, as a tactical unit. It is not likely that a Day Bombardment Wing will ever be utilized within an army and that

the day bombardment group vll be the unit employed. The

tables of organization provide for 156 officers and 749 enlisted

strength (exclusive of Air Park personnel), in a day
94 U.S, Air Service

in World War I

Vo l IV

bombardment group command. This toger ..ath the large

property responsibility calls for a commaridin 3 officer, an active

flyer, of the rank of Colonel.

6 With reference to officer personnel, I am of the opinion that

the development of bombadment aviation in the army will

render advisable the discontinuance of commissioning as officers,

all pilots and observers. The British and French Air Services

have adopted the plan of using non-commissioned officers, but I

believe the most practical system for day bombardment in the

United States Air Service, would be to commission as officers,

flight leaders and leading observers arid to create the grade of

Pilot 1st Class, Pilot, Observer 1st Class, and Observer, with

commensurate pay for the several grades. The presence of so

many commissioned officers in a squadron, whose military

trdining has been subordinated to flying training, i , complicdting

and tends toward relaxation of military discipline. As this is a

matter affecting policy I am not incorporating this in the table of

proposed changes.

8. An increase should be made in the number of nonspecialists allowed for a squadron Experience has shown that

specialists can not at times be used for ordinar V fatigue and for

duties of a nature calling for unskilled labor. I have therefore

increased the number of Privates in the squadron ...

--26--

Capt. Charles L. Heater

C.O. 11th Aero Squadron

Healer, who had been placed on detached service with the

British, had served with No. 55 Squadron, a D.H.4 unit of the

Independent Force, Royal Air Force, from 1 July to 20 September 1918. With a recommendation from General Trenchard,

commander of the Independent Force, Heater had been transferred to the 11th Squadron following the loss of the squadron's commander, 1st Lt Thornton D Hooper, on a bombing mission on 18 September 1918.

Command. Squadron commanders should direct operations of

own squadron, based on orders from group. They should be
Lessons 95

Learned

intimately in touch with all officers of the squadron and should

have sufficient rank to carry weight. Should be experienced and

be able to explain experience to those in their command, but

also should go on raids occasionally with squadron, for morale,

experience and supervision.

Squadron Commanders should have more authority to direct

conduct of officers at all times.

Flight Commanders should hold r,.rik of Captain and should

lead raids. They should be directly in touch with officers and

men of their flight, should make recommendations regarding

matters of promotion, discipline, etc., in their flight and should

take care that all pilots and observers are properly instructed in

the duties, customs or tactics peculiar to that squadron.

Equipment. Changes in operating equipment have been

suggested; a more satisfactory bombing plane than the D.H 4

should be developed, but during such period as this deve!opment

;s taking place, it is essential that the machine in use should be

used to the best possible advantage. This has not been possible

in the operations undertaken in the past.

The machines arriving from aircraft depots were equipped with

only a few of the necessary instruments; motors and their

accessories were not finely adiusted, armament equipment was

not complete, nor in best possible condition; and riggng was

poorly adjusted. In some cases machines were delivered as being

serviceable, when they were totally unfit, there having been,

apparently, no thorough inspection of them at the advance

depot. In order to do away with a part of this, squadrons should

be permitted to make more repairs upon machines instead of

salvaging, since repairs require little more time than overhauling Crew services a DH-4

new machines from depots. engir from an oil supply

wagon at the 1st Air Depot.

i N
96 U.S An Service in Woild Wor I

Vol IV

The transportation question suggested iM revised Table of Organization No 27 would care for the needs of a squadron, but this quota has never neared fulfillment. [his lack hampered

operation to o great extent

Organization The organization has been ,.jell planned except

Armament that nut enough Department general uti!itv men are provided and the is not large enough for emergency opiation The Armament shou!d be at least 30 N CO 's and

MCIi.

t

I7 i

Pi!, ,s and o s)e rve*r, of thie 24tih A'ro Squadrorl (I to r ) Lis t -4Arenme

M Selteck Ronr 

Waliei 

0 Krr.redy. Raymond P f)ii!on. S:ctno., V W Peters. 0 Lokry. Norman W Halti. t"alrdo E rultic. Herrdr, , Search. Cap Harry I Wood, and (stirmgi [.I Sidney R Werimer
Lessons 97

Learned

-27-

Capt. Harry T. Wood

C.O., First Army Observation Group

Wood, an observer, had served at the front with the 24th

Aero Squadron and later would command the squadron in the

Army of Occupation. IL

I strongly recommend that Aero Squadrons be made units of

great mobility and independence. I mean, a complete unit in itself in every particular.

To elaborate, Aero Squadrons during the present war were

very immobile. When moving, they had to depend on Air Park

Squadrons, which were seldom equipped to handle the

movement, or to call for transportation from an Air Depot or Air Service Headquarters.

Air Park Squadrons should be abolished. In their place there

should simply be salvage squadrons, and Air Depot Squadrons to

handle rep)., ements.

The Servce Squadron should be made complete. The ideal

squadron would be one with sufficient transportation to move

bag and baggage at a moment's notice, and one which could

draw its own supplies.

There should be sufficient transportation at least to move one

flight. For instance, duing the last ten days of the war this

Group found itself suddenly one hundred kilometers behind the

line. It would have been a matter of days before we could have

moved the Group into the Zone of Advance and have been able

to operate. The same trouble was complained of by the

Commanding Officer of the First Pursuit Wing.

Some modification should be made in the present equipment.

While hangars can be moved, it is a lengthy affair. The only

solution is to design some sort of tentage which can be used in

emergencies for hangars. Then if the Squadron should be there

for a protracted period, the more unwield)y hangars used at

present could be brought up and established.

Tentage should be supplied the enlisted personnel for those

men who could not sleep in emergency hangars, and for

headquarters, the officers' mess, and the enlisted men's mess.

Tentage was supplied here for the E.&R., Ordnance, and Supply

tents.

' ' Ji

: , -,-...,== '.'b
98 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

In place of the presc'nt method of handling supplies through

the Air Park Squardon attached to the Group or through 

a

Group Supply Office, S,.rvice Squadrons should draw all their

supplies direct. In the Ai- Park system, it is seldom that these

units have in their stock ,he articles urgently needed, at least in

amount. In the Group Suprily Officer system, it is a case of an

officer who could be dispersed with It would be much better

and simpler for the Squadrcn Supply Officer to submit his

requiiition direct than the present roundabout system. At least

there could be no cry oi favoritism. In my own experience, I can

quote such a case. My crew 'iief requisitioned for a Wasmer

prop. The prop was obtained i.v the Group Supply Officer, but

instead of it being placed or my ship it was turned over to

another Squadron which always had the first call on new

material.

A service Squadron with these modifications would be of much

greater utility, and in fact the only Squadron which could he

efficient in a war of movement.

-28--

Maj. Joseph T. McNarney

Corps Air Service Commander, VI Corps

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy in 1915. McNarney

had received his Junior Miiitary Aviator badge at the Aviation

School at San Diego In April 1917. The following month he had

joined the 1st Aero Squadron at Columbus, New Mexico, and in

August 1917 he had sailed with the squadron to France. He had

flown at the front as a flight commander of the lat Squadron

before being assigned to the staff of IV Corps Observation

Group in the Toul Sector at the beginning of July 1918. Afterwards (as he indicated in the report which follows) he had commanded first the I Corps Observation Group and then the Air

Service of III Corps at Chateau-Thieriy, IV Corps Observation

Group in the Battle of St. Mihiel, and V Corps Observation

Group in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. He had taken command of the Air Service, VI Corps, Second Army on October

1918.

1. I have been the Commanding Officer of the 1st, 3rd, 4th,

5th and 6th Corps Observation Groups and in each case during

L! I._

I,. 

1
V.7

I

Lessons 99

Learned

their first large scale offensive action. I2. Liaison. Without constant and efficient liaison with the units

for which the Observation is working, nothing worth while can

be accomplished.

(a) Liaison with Corps and Division Staffs.

(1) Corps. Liaison with the Corps Staff is comparatively

simple, and in nearly every case has been very good, except that

there is a tendency to neglect the Corps Artillery Commander, the liaison with the artillery being all accomplished through

subordinate commanders. In many cases, especially with new

divisions, it has been very difficult to get fugitive target batteries

assignedand in many cases each battery commander will insist

on his own method of adjustment. I believe that in every case if

properly presented by the C.A.S.C. the Corps Artillery

U Commander will, if necessary, order the fugitive target batteries

assigned, and a uniform method for adjustment put in force

throughout the entire Corps. It is also very necessary that the

C.A.S.C. be in such close touch with Corps and Division Staffs,

and the general operations of the Divisions, Corps, and the Army, that when called upon to write an annex to Corps Field

" Orders, he can write one which will not only be in proper form,

but which will provide for the pioper use of the Air Service by

all branches. It the Corps finds it necessary to send your annex

back for revision two or three times a very bad impression is

made with a resulting loss of confidence in the Air Service. This

is a small but very important point.

(2) Division. It has been the general practice both of

C.A.S.C.'s and Group Commanders to leave the liaison with the

Divisions almost entirely to Squadron Officers. This is a great mistake. During active operations Staff Officers are usually

overworked and quick tempered from lack of sleep and a ist

Lieutenant will often not even be received and seldom listened

to, while a field officer, especially if he be a regular, will always

be given an opportunity to make suggestions and explanations.

Again very few of our Division Staff Officers had any

conception of the use of the Air Service and did not know what

we could do for them or what was impossible. During the

operations of the 1st Corps at Chateau Thierry neither the Air

Service or the line knew just what they could do. We had never

been in active operations, liaison was poor and until the last

week of the operation no attempt at liaison with divisions other

than an occasional visit of the Squadron Commanders was

made. Consequently very little work of any value was

accomplished, the Air Service executed a great number of

missions, with very severe losses, but due to the lack of proper

ground liaison, and communications the work had little value
100 U.S. Air Settce

in World War I

Vol. IV

other than educational.

In order to give the divisions the full benefit of the Air

Service it will nearly always be found necessary to suggest how

the Air Service should be used In case Field Orders are

prepared a sufficient iength of time before the impending

operations it is desirable that the C A.S.C. or Group

Commander after consultation with Division G-3 write the Air

Service annex to the Division F.O. using your Corps Annex as a

base, but going more into detail. This will be found to be a great help especially for the first time. For the St, Mihiel offensive I

wrote the annexes for both the 42nd and the 891h Divisions.

They were very. grateful as they said they had no idea as to

what the Air Service could do.

In connection with liaison with the division I wish to state,

that I believe that squadrons should be assigned permanently to

a single division. The personnel come to kiio,, each other and

trust each other, how each one works. After , division has been

pleased with the work of a squadron small diff. ulties and

misunderstandings are easily cleared, staffs are always ready to

listen, and the work steadily improves. This was very clearly

demonstrated to me before and after the St. Mihiel offensive.

Before the offensive the 1st Division had success with the C.42

French Squadron and was willing to cooperate with the 8th. The

42nd Division had had very poor work fiom a French Squadron,

and said they were still open to conviction but didn't think the

Air Service was any good. The 89th had had no experience

except in Sector warfare and didn't know. Afterwards the Ist

said when they moved they would request that the 8th go with

them, the 42nd said they considered the 90th as a pait of the

family, and the 89th had the Division insignia placed on the

planes of the 135th to show that they belonged to them. The

change in the way the Division received the Air Service officers

is significant. Before you waited for an audience, stood up whi!e

there, and never got an invitaiion to a meal. Afterwards you were immediately received, invited to sit down, pressed to stay

for a meai, and always asked to drop in an , time Difficulties in

liaison disappeared as if by magic, they were willing to try

anything you suggested. but unfortunately the divisions moved

and the Squadrons went to other divisions. In my opinion the

Service would be benefited if squadrons, as far as possible, were kept with the same divisions even though it necessitated the

squadron changing Corps often.

3. Education of Line Units Except in a few of the older

divisions, our line troops have no conception of the use of the

Air Service

(a) Staffs. As I have stated it is very necessary to suggest to
I

Lessons 101

Learned

Corps and Division Staffs how the Air Service can be used, and

in many, in fact nearly every case I have found it necessary to

order out over 50% of the missions without being asked to do so by the divisions, in order that the Air Service be used to its full

capacity,.

(b) Infantry. In many cases the infantry did not know how

to place panels, and in many cases used them for dish rags and

shoe cloths. Battalion P.C.'s very seldom communicated with the

planes, and very few knEw why they should show their panels

except that it was orders.

In this connection I wish to say that it is a great mistake to

ask for the panels promiscuously. A good observer will pick up advancing troops without calling for the line and advancing

troops will not show the panels. If possible never ask fur the line

inore than three timeb a day, olce ini the norning, the lait thing in the evening and one time in reserve. If asked for every hour

or six or seven times a day the infantry becomes indifferent, and

often will pay no attention at any time. This is a very important

point, and from my experience in every important offensive in

which the American troops have participated am fully convinced

that by not asking more than three times per day your infantry

liaisons will be 100% more successful.

(c) Artillery. Radio and panel operators need a great deal of

instruction for inzireasing speed, the length of time wasted has

caused many failures in artillery ad)ustment.

(d) General. All branches of the line need instruction in

maps and codes. In many cases units never heard of the key

and band code, Lists 1 and 2 (Liaison for all Arms), etc.

(e) All the above faults can be overcome in a great measure

Radir operator at the switch

A

• /
102 US Air Service

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Vol. IV

by Liaison Schools at the Airdrome... constant participation in

manouevers, and talking to Junior Officers.

4. Communications. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the

necessity for keeping up communications from the arrdrome to

Corps and Division headquarters. In every case after an advance

telephonic communications break dowr with the division and

often with the Corps and the only thing left is courier and radio.

Courier messages take often 24 hours for delivery, and then the

wireless is the last resort.

The operators furnished the Air Service are not sufficiently

trained and there are not enough of them. All messages are in

code and excellent operators are required to take them

correctly. In every group I have been it has been necessary to

comb the squadrons for operators, the results have been very

poor In several cases I have had important messages come in

and when decoded did not make sense, hy the time they had

been repeatcd the requests for work would often be from four to

six hours too late.

In every case Division Commanders, Air Service Liaison

Officers and Group Commanders have failed to make sufficient use of the Radio, and nearly always failed to take into account

that an average of two hours is necessary to get a message

through. Nct enough use has been made of advanced landing grounds. When communication is bad the surest and quickest

way is dropped messages. "This will always work from Groups to

Divisions, but necessitates an advanced field from Division to

Group.

When communications are poor and the Group has been left

behind the use of an advanced and a base field becomes

imperative. This phase of the move has been almost entirely

neglected by the American Air Service. A detailed account of

how relations between Corps, Division, advanced, and rear field

should be coordinated is too long to be gone into in this

statement. It will suffice to say that the Group Commander,

B.I.O. and photo section with a radio outfit should be pushed up

to within 10-15 K.M. from the front, and three individual hangars

erected. All except three ships and three teams remain at thle

base field during the night and come up only 30 minutes to an hour before scheduled missions. This is equally valuable in case

of advance or retreat, and in case of a retreat is the only way to

save much of your material.

The unequal distribution of codes, when changed, has caused the loss of an entire day's work in more than one case. Codes

have been changed and the Air Service received the new codes

1 24 hours in advance of line units, consequently the units could

not decipher messages or map references. This can be obviated

] = I-' I '1 I : I~ i .. II,
[WCfl5103

n !

2 !l2'l5rr:
104 U.S. Air Service

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by having codes not go into effect till a certain time well in

advance of the time the distribution is started.

5. Within the Group.

(a) In many cases not enough attention has been paid to

keeping up the observers room. During an advance it is very

difficult to get the information but if some one observer is

charged with it for each squadron, and if the information brought

in by each observer as well as that obtained from the Corps and

Division is posted, the maps can be kept up to date ...

(b) It has been a mistake to have the B 1.0 a ground

officer. The full information gathered by an observer can only be

drawn from hini by carefu! questioning, this has been the duty of

the B10. A flying observer has not a great deal of confidence in

a grrund officer, no matter how well he knows his duties and

al,,ays has a secret disrespect for a ground officer who tres to

question him. I have noticed this in many cases, especially during

very active operations, and have often taken over the cross

examination of the observer myself.

(c) Group Commanders. Group CuMitinders have been toc

prone to occupy themselves only with administration and

technical questions. It is a prime essential of a good Group

Commander that during active operations he spend his entire

time from daylight till dark in the observers room, and that he

occupy himself with tactical questions only. To question every

observer and keep himself informed at all times of every bit of

information that comes in. Only by this keeping in touch with

events will he be able to get the full efficiency from his Group

He must decide whether or not conditions warrant sending out

missions in very unfavorable weather, what infoirmation should be

checked, [and what) additional missions ordered. He must take

the initiative and not wait for requests from Corps and Division.

After two or three days of hard work with losses he will find the

morale of his ,Iiers lowered, he should then fly himself on the

daylight missions and he must compliment every observer and pilot

who does good work. He must personally see that pilots and

observers go to bed early and do not sit up all hours of the

night gambling Work will fall off 25% if pilots and observers do

not get proper rest.

6 lropped Messages. Enough attention is not paid to proper

instruction of observers in writing clear and concise messages.

Often very valuable information has been lost due to failure to

write messages properly. A good illustration follows

A Corps plane of command went out to locate if possible any

bridges over the Vesle which had not been destroyed. The

mission was accomplished and the following message dropped.

"Three god bridges over the Vesle." "rhe entire value of the

k : = ,,
Lessons 105

Learned

message was lost as he did not say where or what kind of

bridges, foot bridges or larger. They could have been any place on the Corps front of 16 kilometers Telephonic communication

was down and it was four hours before the prope, information

reached the Corps.

7. Within the Squadron. Only by specialization of teams on

certain kind of work can high efficiency be obtained. Squadrons

in which as far as possible the same pilot and observer work

together, and on one kind of work, such as Infantry, Artillery or

photographic, are always more efficient than squadrons in which

everything is run by roster. Observers should be capable of

doing any kind of aerial work, but should specialize on one

certain kind.

8. During the period covered while in command of the 6th

Corps Observation Group due to poor weather conditions and a quiet sector, very little hard work was accomplished No special

lessons can be drawn except the necessity for constant liaison

and the education of the Staffs, Infantry and Artillery in the use

of the Air Service.

9. It has been impossible in a statement of this kind to go into

detail on the faults or the means of correcting them A detailed

report with examples would necessitate a month or two of

uninterrupted labor.

-29-

Lt. CoL. John. F. Curry

Chief of Staff, Second Army Air Service

Curry, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy in 1908, had

been attached to the Aviation Section in August 1915 and grad- uated Irorn the Aviation School at San Diego in May 1916 After

eight months with the 1st Aero Squadron he had been sent to

Hawaai to organize the 6th Aero Squadron Returning to the

United States in mid-1917, he had held various training positions, including Chief of the Training Section in Washington

and Commanding Officer of Ellington Field, Texas, before being

sent to France in the summer of 1918

Curry had been at Tours. in the Training Section of the Air

Service. AEF. wnen selected to be Chief of Staff of the Air Service, Second Army. He had reported to Lahm on 23 October and

had been shot down o,'er the lines three days later. The DH-4. in Col Curry which Curry had been flying as observer, was hit by fire from the
'S ~ ai fl ~ m ~ * .- - --

106 U.S. Air Service

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ground and forced down in No Man's Land. Both Curry and

his pilot, 1st Lt. L. L. Smart of the 135th Aero Squadron, had

managed to make their way safely to the Allied trenches. On

another flight, on 3 November, Curry and his pilot, along with

pilot and observer of another OH-4 of the 168th Squadron. had

been credited with the destruction of a German balloon.

submit herewith the following suggestions, I pertaining

entirely to my experience in the Second Army.

Organizational ...

The Corps Air Seivice Commander and the Commander of

the Observation Group atached to the Corps should be one

and same person The Corps Air Service Commander, in order

to efficiently do his work must be in close relation with the

working of his Group, which he can only be by being in direct

conmand of that Group.

Wing Commander Army Observation Group should be

abolished. He exercises no useful function and is only an extra

link to slow up work. This is the opinion of all Observation

Group Commanding Officers with whom I have talked.

There is a constant tendency for the work done by the

Operations and Information Sections to overlap where there was no clearly defined line. Close liaison is needed between these

sections but !he work should be clearly differentiated. Operations

confining itself to strictly operations work, statistical, tactical.

planning, training, etc., while the information shou!d closely follow

the lines of G 2. All information covered by the Air Service and

its phrto missions, etc., the sending of these missions and

reporting of same should come directly under the Air Service

Information Section and not under G-2 as at present.

Reports. Strong tendency to place too much value on certain

reports which are necessarily routine The Operations report

would on an active day require the services of too many

members of, and would occupy too much time of the Operations

Section. it being featured to the exclusion of everythinG ,Ise

while in reality it is a routine report and should nver be alluyed

to interfere with constructive planning. The time of rendering the

Operations report should be from noon as in the rest of the

services and not from daylight to dusk as in the Air Ser,,ce.

Due to the time of the reports not coinciding there was always a possbility of error in reading the operations report of the Army

and the Operations report of the Air Service.

Liaison. The necessity of close iiaison between th1e Air Service

and ground troops and between different Air Service Units was

extremely evident The needs of liaison were met in the Second
Lessons 107

-V Learned

I

Army by the establishment of Corps Liaison Schools where

details from the different divisions of the Army were given 

a

short course of instruction in Aviation, its possibilities, limitations,

infantry liaison work, etc.. while Observers and Pilots from the

different Observation Squadrons were sent to the different

Brigades and Regiments for short periods of time, there to learn

what the ground troops had to do.

-30-

Capt. Stephen H. Noyes

C.O., Corps Observation Group, First Army'

Noyes had commanded the 12th Aero Squadron at the front

from 1 June until 24 October 1918, when he left to take commant. of V Corps Observation Group.

This report expresses the opinion of the undersigned on the

most important points of criticism regarding Corps Observation,

Air Service, under conditions that existed during the latter part

of the present war--i.e., troops in open warfare practically

untrained in the use of Air Service and artillery little accustomed

to adjustment by w >ne.

Army Corps, C.A.S.

The Chief of the Air Service of an Army Corps should be an

officer who knows the difficulties of certain types of missions; he

should be throughly in sympathy with the work of pilots and

observers by personal experience as such: he should have 

a

prestige that commands the respect of those that do the work

he assigns, otherwise the work will be done half-heartedly or not

at all, as the opportunity to find trouble with the weather or

motor are far too easily found; the pilot and observer ordered

r out should know that the order came from one who realized the

possibilities of being outnumbered by the enemy, the risk of

storms, the chances of motor failure, but who knew that the risk

was justified by the possibility of a successful mission. If the

CA.S. is the proper kind, the average pilot and observer will not

only do what they are told but endeavor to do more.

S With one or possibly two exceptions, the undersigned knows

r of no C.A.S. of a Corps who ever seriously flew over the lines.

Officers were promoted to these positions at first, when our Air

Service first started functioning, for their knowledge and previous

II
108 U.S Air Service

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training ir military orgari2ations (which of course was entirely

proper), but were kept there later on when other officers with

the actual experience in aerial warfare became available. The

truth in this connection is that there have been many officers of

the rank higher than any attainable by the original reserve

officers for whose opinion pilots and observers who did actual

flying soon learned to have no respect. The result was that the

squadron C 0 's were continually searching for excuses in the

weather for the failure to cairy out the daily program that would

have quickly washed out their squadrons without a commensurate

result. The continued failure of the Air Service to do the

impossible resulted in dissatisfaction of divisions with their

squadrons. Examples of orders emanating from the office of the

C.A.S., Army Corps:

1. "Reconnaissance planes continually over the lines the

hours of daylight" 116 hours) or say 20 sorties for 10 protected

missions of two planes each-this is about double the number of

Salmson airplanes that can be sent out day after day out of 

a squadron that wil! average 15 planes available.

2. "Infantry contact missions, dawn, noon, and evening." An

infantry contact mission is the most difficult and dangerous flight

made. The type of pilot and observer that can successfully find

the frontlines when the infantry is poorly trained is so

uncommon that a squadron would be !rt,.nt( to have one

quarter of its personnel available for this kind of duty; it takes 

a long time to train a new man; therefore, the squadron should be

called on for this kind of work at the time only when it is

imperative to know where the advanced elements are and only

when every other means of liaison with those lines, has failed.

To call for such missions by schedule from the day before is to

be ignorant of this fundamental principle and is a useless

sacrifice of officers; when called for, even when the troops are

not advancinq, as it has been is simply to invite the squadron

C.O. refusal under any pretext he happens to be able to think

[ofl at the time. This matter of excuses for failure to send out

missions has, in some cases, made the Air Service appear

ridiculous: bad weather and heavy fields are two which are most

used Iby] CO.'s who lack imagination; the former should be

used with care as the Boche may be flying, the latter is,

therefore, better although in truth the slight additional danger

(except to the propeller) in taking off on a muddy field is

negligible. The superior officer who gives direct orders to 

a

squadror, should be one who knows the difficulties of a mission,

who is familiar with the internal condition of the squadron, who

will give the order only when the chance for fulfillment is at least

fair and justified by conditions, and then who will listen to no
Lessons 109

Learned

excuses. However, as recommended further below. the C A S,

Army Corps, is neot thought Io be ever the proper source or

channel fcr, direct orders to Divisional or Corps Artillery

squadrons, and that orders should not emanate here except in

the slpecial case of command plane:s The functior; of the Corps

C.AS. should be advisory to the Corps C.G , and not

administrative. For example: One of the reasons why, the spirit of

an Aero ,Squadron was so high during the Chateau Thierry drive

was that orders for missions came to the squadron C 0. direct

from the D.i)vision, their needs were known, and the pilots and

observers made the correspo~nding efforts, the same squadron

r ~during the Argonne Meuse offensive was low in morale beciuse

all orders camp fro~m or through 1'hv C.A.S Corps By the time

the Division had called for a plane through the liaison at Division

-- - I ' I - - I -- . . . . ... . .I = 'I 1.. . . . .I . .!
110 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

Headquarters, and he had telephoned (by instructions) to the

C.A.S Corps, and the clerk or adjutant had relayed the message

to the Group, who in turn passed the order to the squadron,

the meaning of the onginal rriessage was usually garbled beyond

understanding. Officers consequently never know whether their

mission was important or even necessary.

The Group

In grouping squadrons, the individuality of the squadrons

should be emphasized and not the Group. There are occasions

when it is important that squadrons cooperate, but it is not one

of the essentials. Were it not that a Group operation officer,

responsible for the dissemination of knowledge of the units

adjacent to the one a squadron directly works with, is a help

(not an essential), the ideal condition for a Divisional squadron is

to be alone; here the esprit of a squadron is best fostered, its

initiative developed, and interest in its work advanced; if, in

addition a direct liaison with the C. of S. of the Division

(properly advised by the squadron liaison officer) is furnished, the

Divisional squadron stands under the best advantage for its

usefulness and development.

When squadrons are grouped, it is of course necessary to

have a Group Headquarters, to take care of camp work,

common to all units on the post; it can be of service in the

matter of supplies, transportation, and can promote cooperation

of squadrons in their work when the occasion arises, hut the

Group C.O. should suppress his authority as much as possible,

issuing as few orders as possible instead of as many as possible.

Orders to properly working squadrons for missions over the

lines should never emanate from a Group Headquarters, neither

should these Headquarters be a channel through which orders

come.

Source of Orders

The officer tc give orders to a Divisional squadron is the

Divisional C. of S. or his assistant. A means of direct

communication with the squadron C.O. is the great essential, sr'

that a clear understanding of the importance of the mission can

be gained and so no time will be lost in transmission; the C. of

S. should be told what the internal condition of the squadron is

at the time (reports are valueless) so that lie may realize that if

he ca*lls for a mission at one time, he may have to do without

an airplane later The C. of S. may lay the situation before the

squadron C.O. and, the latter being an expert in such matters,

may advise the C. of S. what he can do for him; if he knows

the needs of the troops for an airplane he will know whether or
Lessons 11

Learned

not to send a good observer or if a new untrained man will be

sufficient. With a direct means of liaison information is always at

hand concerning weather conditions near the front (through

liaison officer at Division Headquarters), the latest reports

concerning enemy aerial activity, but above all there will be

available to a pilot and observer which are going on an infantry

contact mission the latest information and the judgment of the

C. of S. as to where the fror.tline troops car, be expected

(without this, no infantry contact mission should leave the

ground-this kind of work wll comprise 90 percent of the

usefulness of a Divisional squadron in open warfare, it is [in] this

work that the bulk of the casualties occur and therefore it is

here that the greates, precautions against extra risk should be

taken).

Means Of Communication

Ground radio had proved a complete failure as far as a means

of communication to Divisional squadrons is concerned; even if it

worked quickly and perfectly, it would not be satisfactory as it

does not afford an opportunity for complete understanding, to

the squadron C.O. of the needs to the C. of S. of what he could

rely on getting. Telegraph and couriers as means of communication have

proved also a failure, and, for the same reason, would never be

satisfactory.

Telephones. If Aviation is to be used by Division in any way

efficiently, a direct telephone wire from Headquarters to the

Airdrome must be provided. If this is provided, the writer

believes the usefulness of an aero squadron would be doubled

with the same number of missions sent out. Every mission would

leave the field with a clear conception as to what was wanted
112 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

I 

.

and what to look for especially; on its return, the C. of S. could

talk directly with the observer, clarifying his dropped message, and questioning him on points not therein mentioned; pilots and

observers would thereby appreciate more fully the value of their

work with the obvious results. For example, a squadron C.O.

made it a practice whenever possible to send the observer

immediately on his return from a mission up to Divisional

Headquarters; it was found that G 2 or G. 3 always asked

questions, but the most important result was that the observer

learned to see the value of his work and what was important to

report and what irrelevant (the observer gets no training in this

important branch of observation at schools).

The Squadron

To command a squadron so that it functions with average

efficiency is a simple matter for an officer accustomed to

command men. To run a squadron efficiently, however, during

open warfare, demands, primarily a C.O. who takes an active

part in flying; in this way only can the C.O. expect the pilots

and observers to do their missions to the best of their ability. and in this way only will he himself be able to talk intelligently of

what is going on at the front to higher commanders. He can leave the details of operation to his operations officer, but the

C.O. with his broader knowledge of the conditions of .Isquadron will have to modify operations to the squadron

resources. If the C.O. does not (as he commonly cannot) ta Xhi, turn in routine flyin~g, he should hold himself prepared to.,

a mission when ? specially difficult one is called fur. A C.O. who

has earned the suspicion of dodging danger behind his rank

should be summarily relieved from his duties. No amount of

military discipline among the enlisted personnel which calls simply

for an obedience to orders will be sufficient in a squadron if

results are to be obtained. To develop a squadron whose

mechanics will work night after night on motors so that they will

be ready in the morning for a flight, and to do this to the absolute limit of their knowledge and ability can only be

accomplished by fostering their pride in their organizations. Close

order infantry drill does not go far enough in this direction. The

emphasizing always of the squadron as the unit (as opposed to

the Group, for example) the provision of letter paper with 

a

good squadron insignia, a squadron baseball and football team,

squadron guidon, and a special squadron chevron are among

some of the things that would help in this direction. Experience

shows that the factor that most commonly limits the resources

of a squadron as far as sending missions over the lines goes, is

the number of planes that will run without motor failure;

conscientious mechanics who can keep up their planes are the
Lessons 113

Learned

direct issue in this respect.

A C.O. who takes an intense interest in the work his

squadron is doing and can impart some of his enthusiasm to his

pilots and observers, raises the value of every mission in direct

proportion. A not unusual attitude in squadron C.O.'s has been

to hold on to pilots and observers whose ability and experience

justifies their appointments to command other newly formed

units. This prevents a normal, healthy promotion in responsibility

of all officers and soon reacts on the espiit of the squadron (to

say nothing of the harm to the Service as a whole). Recognition and reward should follow meritorious seiceabove all in the

case of squadrons in open warfare, where the officers and

enlisted personnel must be kept at top pitch. In this connection,

the undersigned, is of the opinion that decorations such as the

D S-C., are an incentive to greater effort on the part of pilots

and observers, and that if properly awarded are for the good of

the service; but that the way they have been given out has doneA

more harm than goodl. Too long a time has always elapse~d

between the action and the reward, and the recommendations

for decoration have not been kept sufficiently secret; too much

has depended on how the recommendation had been writter.

Another common mistake that squadron C.O.'s make is the

ordering out of as many planes as possible each day, in order to

make a good showing on their reports. It should be their attitude

to send out as ,few planes as possible, compatible with

achievements of the result; nothing but a reasonable chance of

success in their m'.ssiun justifies flying during open warfare. The

C.O. vnll find that with a month of open warfare expected ahead

and the usual call on Its services as made by an American

Division he should start with about the following: six experienced

teams (pilot and observer) who can conduct an infantry contact

S mission, two good photographic teams, four good teams

experienced especial!y in artillery adjustment. The rest can be

inexp.erienced teams, in training for one of the specialties, but

still useful only for protection. With the supply of replacements

as it was during the latter part of the present war, a squadron

S could keep up its, work day after day for a month or 5 weeks.

At the end of that time, the mechanics would creep into their

worh withi d ,onsequejA loss ot confidence of pilots in iiheir

motors, moreover the older observers and pilots would be

nervously exhausted-such men are easy marks for the Bocheand the work of the squadron as a whole rapidly deteriorates.

Liaison Officers

19norance of the use of airplane has marke,' the attitude of the

line troops toward the Air Service. To counterad_ this an
I

11

114 U.S Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV A

interchange of officers from the infantry and artillery units to the

airdrome and permanent liaison officers at Division and Brigade

Headquarters as well is pilots and observers (who need a day or

so rest) on visits to the front is necessary. This would not only

create a sympathy between the two branches of the

service . . , Ibut] is as much value to the squadron officers as

[to] the line uo.cer.

The Future cf Observation

Of all branches of Aviation, the field for development and

usefulness is widest in observation work. Two new types of

mission should be added to the duties of a Divisional squadron.

1. Early Morning Reconnaissance. A plane should leave the

airdrome before dawn in time so that it would reach the lines at

the critical moment when guns flashes from enemy emplacements

are still easily spotted and there is just sufficient light to

distinguish roads and the outline of woods so that the gun

position can be marked on the map. Furnishing many targets

coordinates for friendly artillery is better time spent than

attempting, later in the day, a few of the usual accurate [?J

adjustments Shooting volumes of shells with fair accuracy where

the volume will be shot anyway in open warfare, is better than

"y[ shooting at two or three targets, well, and all the rest of our

artillery shooting blind. Evening reconnaissance are for a like

.If 7',' ' reason important but the morning one always furnishes more

.' Z useful data. For this work special planes with special night

( ,: tj' landing lights and airdromes fitted in anticipation of such flights,

, / must be provided, otherwise the wastage in planes and personnel rL/4does not warrant the practice.

2. Planes Which Will Work in Conjunction With Frontline

\..l Troops on the Advance. With modern open warfare, means of

("1 i .,",liaison from Division or Corps Headquarters to frontline infantry

• Jis so when troops are advancing that, after the general order of

f 'battle is given, success depends entirely on the smaller units;

,,....-... helping the smaller units by detailed information of the enemy in

front of it is therefore of greater importance than simply keeping

Corps or Division Headquarters informed as to the position of its

advanced elements. A low flying plane communicating information

-as to enemy strong points, machinegun nests, consolidation for

counterattack, occupied trenches, and villages, LIc., directly to an

advancing battalion p.c. is the object of this type of mission. The

mission is one of great danger and therefore everything should

be done to minimize the risk-such as the use of armored

, - planes. Troops watched by such a plane, gain confidence and a

great impetus is given to the attack. It is possible that troops

might even be directed from the air, instead of simply supplying

r intelligence concerning the enemy.
Lessons 115

Learned

Organizations of the Air Service as affecting the supply of

pilots and observers has been one of the handicaps under which

observation has worked. The lack of recognition of the ability of

some (particularly observers) has been a gross injustice.

Example- The two best observation squadrons that have been in

the First Army have for operations officers, 2nd lieutenants who

have proved by their efficiency the propriety of their

appointments as such in spite of this handicap.

No matter how simple it was to get rid of unsuitable pilots and

observers, according to higher command, it has been found that

their relief from duty with a squadron was a matter of the

greatest difficulty-this has resulted in officers, who could not be

used over the lines, being recommended for positions in schools,

when names were called for by higher commanders.

-31-

Capt. Stephen H. Noyes

C.O., Corps Observation Group, First Army

Herewith a collection of notes and extracts from squadron

orders bearing on the subject of biplace fighting, gotten together

by the undersigned as a result of his experience and that of

others on the front during a period of 8 months activity.

1. It must be remembered that a bi-place observation machine

is always on a mission to bring back information and never to

provoke a fight.

2. The Boche is (either by nature, or because he is under

strict orders) a coward, he will seldom attack unless he thinks

he will surprise you. A patrol say six or seven Boche will

probably never carry cn attack against one good dou-'e-seater

(such as a Spad or Salmson) which is on the alert, to a finish.

Each machine more likely wiil simply fire a burst from long range

and turn away. Therefore, the cardinal principle of bi-place

defense is to be constantly watching the air

(a) Watch beneath your machine as well as above. Some of

the new Boche planes have unexpected climbing ability; and are

able to approach from below.

(b) Remain on the alert until safely home-it was by waiting

until an enemy plane was near its airdrome and the observer

entirely off his guard that one of our best chasse pilots got the

majority of his bi-place victims.

3. If approached by a Boche patrol, try out your guns

immediately. This shows him that you are alert and perhaps he
116 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

ORA
Lessons 117

Learned

will turn away far out of range to await a more favorable

opportunity, givin3 you added chance to fulfill your mission. If he

comes close in, fire bursts of two or three shots when he is still

at Ions range, increasing the number of shots in a burst as the

target approaches, always shoot on whatever plane in the patrol

is shooting at you at the time being and let nearer and better *- chances to down a plane go by; shooting at the Boche usuaily

makes him stop shooting at you.

4. Save ammunition; in the excitement of a fight you will fire

two or three times as often as you estimate.

5. A very common trick of the Boche is to distract your

* attention with a small patrol which he hopes you will keep

constantly watching, and have, by prearrangement, another single

plane (or patrol) attack you from the direction of the Sun.

Therefore, if you see Boche look for another Boche

6. The pilot and observer should be in perfect accord, and this

cannot be the case unless they practically always fly together.

From the point of view of aerial combat, the necessity of

teamwork, is most imperative; simple signals to suit their fancy

should be prearranged (such as tap on the pilots head to mean

"Boche").

7. When attacked by a single Boche (or patrol) seek the safety

of your own lines at low altitude; you are perfectly (?) safe at

500 meters near a balloon defense battery.

(a) If suddenly attacked over the lines the pilot must

immediately start down in an irregular spiral say banking about

25, and descending say 15. This will continue making yourself 

a

shifting, difficult, target and still be a stable platform for the

observer to shoot from while still making it hard for the Boche

to keep under your tail where the observer cannot shoot him.

(b) If suddenly attacked beyond your lines bank immediately

then maneuver down towards your own lines keeping the Boche

always where the observer can shoot.

(c) If the pilot can maneuver to keep the Boche (this applies

to single seater or patrols attacking) so that the observer need

never shoot except in the two rear quadrants of fire and have

r his guns point a little up it will be found that the observer can

shoot better and the pilot follow the position of attacking planes

better. In order to preserve the principle of making yourself 

a

difficult target, the pilot can swerve from one bank to the other

placing the attacking planes first in one quadrant and then in the

k other, making this turn when the observer is not shooting for the

time being; this shifting of turns is a delicate proposition

however, as while it is taking place the tail for a moment will

blind the target, and what's more the observer must change the

position of his guns or the turelle.

r
118 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

(d) Never pique straight down in a straight line, obviously

this is just what a Boche fighter would like.

(e) If you see a steady line of tracers coming near you,

remember that the quickest way to change your relative position

is a jerk on the stick-not too strong or you will disconcert the

observer.

8. Never fly just underneath the clouds, you wi: have no

warning of an attack; it is, of course, a very common trick for a fighting machine to lie in wait behind a cloud for an unsuspecting

two-seater whose attention is riveted on his mission.

9. Never dive on another machine even though you know he

is friendly, and for the same reason, never let another machine

(even with allied cocards) get very near you, unless positive he is

friendly-warn him away with a few close bursts-he may be

Boche.

10. A pilot should be always picking out very obvious

landmarks because it is very common for a fight to be carried

down too close to the ground, and when it is over, for the pilot

to have completely lost his sense of general direction.

11. It is veri common for the French AA batteries to warn a

A Lewis gun mounted on a

DH-4

K5 .
Lessons 119

Learned

friendly plane of the approach of a Boche by shooting two bursts

of shrapnel, which gives white clouds of smoke, in front of you.

12. In ordinary flight the observer's guns will be carried on

right side of fuselage pointing back and up. This should be

constant practice in a squadron.

13. Turelle elastics should be loosened at all times, when plane

is not in flight.

14. Lewis machine gun ammunition drums of 97 cartridges are

found to be the most practical.

-- 32-

Capt. John Gilbert Winant

C.O., 8th Aero Squadron

Winant, who had been a member of the New Hampshire

House of Representatives before the war and who later would

be governor of his state and U.S. ambassador to Great Britain,

had enlisted in the U.S. Army in Paris in 1917. Later he had been

commissioned and had flown at the front with the 1st Aero

Squadron before being transferred to the 8th Squadron in July 1918. Winant had commanded the 8th, which flew DH-4 Liberty

airplanes, during the Battle of St. Mihiel and in the MeuseArgonne Campaign.

1 .. . the few practical suggestions that are here submitted

might lessen some of the present difficulties and dangers

encountered in D-H 4 Observation Squadrons serving on the

front.'

2. The first D-H 4 aeroplanes sent to the front were provided

with one oil tank. This supply of oil was not suffizient. The

shortage was done away with by the use of a second tank of

equal size. All new machines coming to the front are so

equipped. It would be a simple matter to make this change, if

the oil tanks and brackets were supplied. These have not been

furnished this Squadron

3. Because of enemy planes, it is necessary to fly "close

formation" on photographic missions The upper plane in the

American D H 4 blinds the Pilot and prevents such formations.

By removing the Norris tank an opening can be made over the

Pilot's head which would give good visibility. If this is done it is

necessary to substitute for the Norris tank the British streamlined gravity tank, placed under the right or left upper wing,

pW
120 U.S. Air Servce

in World War I

Vol. IV

depending on the talk J?J of motor These tanks should be

furnished.

4. At present it is impossible to obtain the necessary number

of different sized carburetor jets to make a fine adjustment of

gas flow. This stops the use of the compensator and reduces the

maximum flying time at high altitudes, one hour or more.

Request that Squadrons at the front be supplied with these jets.

5. The only two planes of this Squadron shot thru the main

tank, both fell in flames. A large tank under pressure is

dangerous. Lieut -of Colombey-les-Belles gave me a British

Selsdon to use for experimental purposes. This pump has been

successfully installed in the main tank of one of our planes. It

d;splaces the old pressure system by a suction system (however

we have retained intact the pressuie system so that it can be

used as an emergency reserve, the shift from the one system to

the other is accomplished by simply turning a petcock.) If

Selsdon pumps could be provided for all D-H 4 planes on the

front, I believe the number of these planes brought down in

flames would be cut in two.

6. The most serious defect of the D H 4 as an Observation

aeroplane is the distance between the Pilot and the Observer.

This difficulty has in part been done away with by the

Interphone. The supply of these phones has been limited-many

planes have not got them. Successful cooperation between a

Pilot and an Observer in a D-H 4 without one is almost

impossible.

7. The pressure from the wind stream is very great in this

type of aeroplane. An improved windshield would enable the

Observer to do better work.

The British rudder with the 2 extra arms is an improvement

on the one used by us.

-33 -

1st Lt, Robert C. Paradise

C.O., 12th Aero Squadron

Paradise had joined the 12th Squadron on 25 June 1918 and

had succeeded Stephen Noyes as squadron commander on 25

October.

Suggestions and recommendations from Squadron Commander

1. That Squadron Commander be grade of major. A

commander of an Observation Squadron has 42 officers under

him and often these officers are his senior in rank. To command

-~ -- -. 4 
Lessons 121

~ Learned

j the respect necessary, (he Commander of an organization should

U- be senior offi.cer. It is recommended that provisions be carried

out that Chief Observer be a captain and that the three Flight

Commanders be captains, l

-, 2. Recommend that airplanes be furnished to keep

organization up to full strength. It is impossible for a fighting unit

to be efficient if it is below strength in men and airplanes. Under

Sthe order of six airplanes a month per squadron, the 12th Aero

Squadron found it impossible to keep up to full strength; much

of the tirne of the Engineering Officer was taken up in fighting to lnsig of the 12th Aero

get ships.

3. Better cooperation between Chasse and Observation Squadron.

Squadrons.

, 4. Better liaison between Infantry and Aviation. The 12th

Aero Squadron found its efficiency greatly cut down because of

the failure of the Infantry to cooperate with us. There w.as an

apparent lack of knowledge of what aviation could do and could

not do b-1 Infantry Officers.

-34.-

H 2d Lt. Eugene E. Stuck

1' Operations Officer, 12th Aero Squadron

(1) The Squadron Commander should be of the rank stipulated by

the table of organization, It has often occurred where an officer

commanding a squadron composed of 40 officers has the rank of

first lieutenant. ...(he has] in his squadron officers of higher rank. A Squadron Commander is necessarily coming in contact

in line of duty and operations with officers of much higher rank,

consequently he cannot command the same respect. The

Operations Officer should also be of the grade stipulated by the

table of organization. He is constantly associated with officers of

superior rank in line of duty and operation of the squadron

(2) The training of observers by a corps of instructors who

have seen service on the front under conditions that every

observer will see. Improperly and insufficiently trained observers

, ; coming to a squadron takes up much valuable time of the

personnel in training these men before they can be of much

value to a squadron and can accomplish a successful mission.

The facilities in a squadron is not sufficient to further the training

- of observers. 1* (3) There has been in the past lack of cooperation between

observation squadron and the infantry and artillery units. Tils

can be bettered by having training squadrons attached to

Divisions in their training area. Lack of knowledge of the infantry

It.~.~ rrjiitfd,j'_aA
122 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

in working with airplanes has been the cause of many

unsuccessful missions. Suggest that an aerial observer of some

experience be attached or assigned to the Division staff as a

permanent member of the staff, his duty to take charge of all

operations and liaison between a Division and the Air Service.

(4) Recommend that all pilots before being assigned to an

observation squadron be giver, a course in observation, thereby

eliminating much time in doing a mission over the front. In this

way, a pilot will know how to fly so that the observer can

accomplish his mission in less time and with better results.

-35-

Capt. Clearton H, Reynolds

C.O., 104th Aero Squadron

Reynolds had been the first pilot assigned to the 91st Aero

Squadron after the squadron's arrival in France late in 1917. lie

had served temporarily in January and February 1918 as commander of the 91st and later as its adjutant. When tne 91st Mad

begun operations at the front In June with Salmson 2 aircraft,

Reynolds had become leader of the squadron's first flight. Reassigned on 26 July, Reynolds had Luommanded the 104th in the

Battle of St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.

1. It is my belief from experience, that Infantry Contact work

as performed by an Observa'ion Squadron has not been as

efficient and successful as the needs of the service demands. The

chief difficulty seems to have been in getting line troops to

properly designate their front line when called upon. This may

have been due to faults in the present system, or to lack of

proper training and co-ordination between the line arid aviation

units. I would personally like to see the following experiment

tried. Believing that a good pilot desiring to become sornethaig more than a chauffeur for an Observer, can with proper training

do nearly as much observation on infantry contact work. Use an

aeroplane like the Salmson equipped with a high horsepowered

niotor of small horizontal surface, and place the pilot's cockpit

back of the wing to offer greater visibility, and armor the motor,

gas tank, and pilot's seat with a weight of armor equivalent to

the weight of the Observer, extra guns and ammunition done

away with This plane should fly very close to the ground The

pilot would indicate on a map in front ut him the position of the

.&A
Lessons 123

Learned r

,I

front line and points where he actually sees friendly or enemy

troops. Flying low, such troops could easily be seen. The

protection of the armor and the difficulty of hitting a swiftly

mov~ng object at low altitudes would give the pilot little to fear

from ground machine gun fire. A chase patrol 1000 meters

higher than this plane would prevent attacks of enemy avions

and would permit the Pilot-Observer to give his full attention to

activity on the ground. In my experience as a Pilot on Infantry

Contact work, I have been able to personally locate the front

line during the attack without aid of panels from the troops on

the ground by flying low and observing the action going on and

drawing mathine gun fire from the enemy. It is believed that

outside of heavily wooded areas, it is possible to locate in this

manner the front lines without the aid of panels or flares, thus

permitting the troops to give their entire attention to fighting.

2. An Observation Squadron with 18 Pilots and 18 Observers

is believed to be unnecessarily large for Division work. A r Squadron of the size as used in the French Army is Lblieved to

be more practicable and more easily trained organized and

efficiently operated. With a smaller Squadron, however, it would

be necessary to readily obtain trained pilots and observers for

replacemi'nts.

3. Observation work as carried out in the past is in constant

need of protection by pursuit planes. Co-ordination between

Pursuit and Observation squadrons in the past has been

unavoidably poor. The reas-ns for this are better known to

higher command. I personally believe that to each Observation

squadron there should be attached a small Pursuit Squadron,

possibly of fifteen planes with ten pilots.

..... .. ...... .
124 U.S. AirService

in World War I

Vol. IV

Capt. Clearton H. Reynolds C.O., 104th Aero Squadron

Recommendations:

1. That the present inefficiencies in Infantry Contact work, due

to inability of observers to get Infantry to respond to signals to

locate their lines ard to lack of coordination between the two

acms, can be improved by the use of single-seated planes, lightly

armored, in which the pilot could fly at a low altitude over the

lines with a protection plane above him, and locate friendly

troops without the aid of panels. For this, Capt. Reynolds

suggests a plane of the Salm~on type, uilh high-powered motor

of small horizontal surface, the pilot's cockpit to be placed back

of the wings for greater visibility.

2. That a squadron of 18 pilots and 18 observers is too large

for Division work and that greater efficiency could be secured by

conforming to the size of squadron used in the French Army.

3. That, in order to improve coordination between observing

machines and protection pursuit planes, a small pursuit squadron

of possibly 15 planes with 10 pilots be attached to each

observation squadron.

-. 37-

1st Aero Squadron

1. Contact Missions. It has been found good practice to

approach the lines at near the extreme altitude at which

necessary visibility is possible, which varies with atmospheric

conditions and the character of the terrain covered. On a day of

average fair visibility in fairly open country troops can be seen in

shell holes or behind natural protection at an altitude of 300 to

400 meters. Patrols and iuolated bodies of troops often f&il to

catch the eye al even lower altitude. Entering at as high an

altitude as possible, it is well to nose over a bit for added speed

and cover the front to be covered. coming out at a lower

altitude. Fiying a zig zag course helps to avoid machne gun fire

from the ground. It is very often necessary to fly in foggy

weather or in such poor visibility that it is necessary to fly as

low as 50 meters.

Signal rockets and pistols often fail to function but in no

circumstances should they be carelessly handled nor should

pistols be loaded beforehand. It is the practice of many

td-
Lessons 125

Learr-d

mI

SClapt Arth-U: J C"2OV

andJ 1,I[LI Arthur L.

.a sterhro',k prepvr' i,,r ,iciht I., o. i n , I i Arc,

Squddrn air( ratil

observers to throw away a Very pistol which fails to fire. This is

hardly necessary but great care must be exercis,d in unloading

immediately o'er the side oi the Juselage

It is offer possible to help the infantry. Especially in very open

warfare, b; droppinq messages, telling of the presence or

absence of eremy in front, directly on oor front line troops or

patrols rather than on Headquarters panels

2. The adjustment of artiLery is about the only work which

can be stUdied with riuch Icet:flt away. Irom a(ttial ,orcdit nrs of

(ombat Personal haison belween the observer and the battery

officers s ot greater benefit to the osbserver than to the battcry

3. Ph tography requires somrne pratice, but is in the main a

matter of getting i n exactly the right position and then cool
126 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

headed operation of the camera. It is probably more dangerous

work than other missions and the operating plane should be

heavily protected preferably by Both observation and chasse

planes. Practice in flying thuse formations would be useful and

methods of irregular flying to avoid anti-aircraft fire while still

keeping some sort of formation.

4. Miscellaneous. A protecting or alternate plane prepared to

take over the mission should always, when possible, be

employed. The observer of this protection plane should make

note of what he can, but it must be impressed on him that his

real object is to protect. But in foggy weather protection planes

should return. Observers sent up to protect must remember that

they may do more harm than good when fog makes danger of

collision.

Map boards are a matter of individual taste and ingenuity.

We have found that the dropping of newspapers and cigarettes

was greatly appreciated by the Infantry and would like to see

this sort of service made general, rather than an exception.

-38-

90th Aero Squadron

1. Air Service Telephone Net. Past experience shows that the

Air Service, like the Infantry and Artillery, should have its own

telephone net connecting all groups and squadrons, chasse,

observation, and bombardment, with the office of the Chief of

Air Service and leading forward from him to the division P.C.'s

where a repiesentative of the Flying Corps should be on duty.

At present, all communication from the front goes over already

congested Infantry and rrtillery netG and is thereby rendered

very difficult za best and more often almost impossible

2. Air Service Liaison Officers. During the last few months of

hostilities, squadrons working with divisions have assigned

observers to act as liaison officers with the division commanders,

whose duties have been to keep the squadron informed on the

situation at all times and to give as many suqgestions and as

much help as possible to the unit commander with whom their

squadron was working. This is a practice which should be made

permanent and which, with the direct communication spoken of

in the preceding paragraph, will add appreciably to the results

obtained.

3. Exercises With Infantry. More exercises in which planes and

infantry can work together will tend to remedy several existing

conditions
Ai

Lessos 12

Learne

A

4

A

Ob~erers 90t Aer i th 

Lessons, 1 J 127~e 

types ~ ~ ~ ~ ndwl ~ of plhne nthd ~ which ~ O~rr Arerinobvet 

Upor. ~ ~ ~ ~ reefe ~ ~ ase cccaior piingurvaiuonapigs

Commanding ~ bebogt2oraie ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ orin wither the dsiiitt

and th ~ ~ ~ ~ ilno ~ al ~ o ~ orepc ~ ~ Orhs Frar'.cc.ri 14 tulran 

Theion tops carribecome Lidc ndith and reiohtre thosie .

types( for plheist htime tg abfone hem andslly no ide

wrcit artr enmru p~aeilasing1:(k ry plne, as t has be n they la 

Comanrien ofters Hannbei 1 nro eh to )srer e e os ibiite

asnd iaton active irp dlyn and will frnt crl fosoepenact-

(Msons o bie cwrihted (Jut nde rtondtior behic h e rish

4AcTcsto Natews then ol Enee , Cabtle toenersth

hlae nevear he tHee t clnoneres boe eing, t

Old pilots atid o~bservers spend a great de,): of ltie vatchinq

planes in) Flight and thereby come ivent ualy to know frietidls
.I

128 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol, IV

from enemy planes by their shapes, while the new men who

have never had even that opportunity are often caught unaware,

waiting to identify another plane by its markings,

5. Instructors Men of Experience. As far as possible, it is to

be recommended that instructors in Schools of Observation be

men who have been at the front and seen the conditions as they

actually exist. New observers are continually joining squadrons

absolutely ignorant of the most important points a flier has to

know, where flying over country patrolled by hostile scouts and

protected by hostile A.A. batteries.

6. Testing Pilots and Observers. In observation squadrons

working in active sectors, pilots and observers should be teamed

up and only fly together. The pilot should have his own machine

and fly no other, except of course under exceptional conditions.

The reasons are obvious. First, when combats are frequent,

teamwork between pilot and observer is very essential, If two

mep who have never flown together ar'e engaged in combat,

neither knows what the other will do or wants to do, while two

men who have continually worked together know each other,

trust each other, know their machine, and usually study their

missions and maps in common so that usually their work and

the work of the whole squadron will be of much greater value

than that of a squadron in which pilots and observers are

continually going out together for the first time.

7. Signal Equipment. The grade of Very pistol signals and Very

pistols has been very poor for many months past. Misfires,

delayed discharges, and failures of the rocket to explode after

leaving the pistol have added greatly to the difficulties of the

observer. In several cases, faulty pistols and hang-fires have

resulted in almost fatal fires in the planes. If possible, improved

pistols and ammunition should be provided even if special

material has to be used for airplane work.

____ p -39--

91st Aero Squadron

.4 It is natural that months of flying over the lines should teach

ft,' -valuable lessons and in studying the papers submitted by pilots

and observers on what they have gained by their experiences it

is interesting to note their unanimity on the importance of three

• points: Watchfulness, knowledge of one's sector, and

cooperation. There are other things of importance, too, as what

' ' , " & .follkws will show, but these three must be the basis of all good

g ihpwork.

Signalinqj with pisiols
%]

essens 129

Learned

There is an old saying that eternal vigilance is the price of

peace. In air work it is the price of life. One's safety and one's

usefulness alike demand absolutely that pilot and ob-erver should

both be everlastingly on the lo-kout for enemy planes. Half the

planes brought down, one pilot ventures to suggest, are brought

down in surpnsc attacks, and this is probably true. It is essential

that pilot and observer practice "picking up" -. id reporting to

each other any planes that appear, aiways remembering to keep

an especially sharp watch under the ta of the machine and in

the direction of the sun; for that, above all on hazy days, is the

enemy's best friend. He will use it if he possibly can. It is to be

remembered that all planes are enemy planes until one has been

able, by their appearance or their cocardes, to distinguish them

as friendly; and any plane that dives on one out of the sun, even

though it be an allied plane, as happened once in this squadron,

must be considered an enemy plane and so treated

If the pilot and observer are to do satisfactory work, perfect

familiarity with one's sector and its main features is vital-not

simply the knowledge gained by constant flying over it, but by

continuous study of maps, intelligence reports, and photographs,

made real and vivid on each trip by comparison in one's mind

with the sector itself. Each member of a team should keep in

' touch with what the other knows, or learns from day to day,

and especially before going out on a mission the two should talk

over the important points to be observed on the trip. The pilots,

except under unusual conditions such as severe anti-craft fire,

can always give a moderate amount of attention to the ground,

and just as four eyes are better than two, so should all

information, no matter how trivial it may seem, that has been

gained on the tnp be [given] to the observer on returning, to be

included in his report.

The third essential, cooperation, is the lesson which will

perhaps be the most valuable to us, in our life back in the

States, of all that we have gained from this work. It is the lesson

of our coilege athletics, and we can now understand better why

the authorities were so interested on that score when we applied

for enlistment in the Air Service. It is the Keystone of al!

effective work. Cooperation between pilot and mechanics,

between pilot and observer, and the ordnance officer and his

men, cooperation between the different members of the individual

flights, and most important of all, between each pilot and

observer working together. These are the qualities that produce

a smoothly working whole, and get results.

Other lessons, such as the necessity of dressing warmly, for

even in midsummer it is sometimes bitter cold at 5000 meters;

and as the preparations to be made in the machine before
130 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

91st Aero Squadron inoignia.

starting on a mission can be learned on the job and need not be

repeated here. It may be of interest, however, to mention a few

scattered hints, each itself the fruits of experience. Such is the

need for close flying in formation-not seventy-five or a hundred

meters apart, but twenty-five or closer, if need be. A lagging

machine is a liability, and is easily brought down in a fight, being

beyond the protection of the leading machines; and for this

reason the observer in the leading plane must keep his pilot

informed at all times of the position of the other planes in the

formation. Such is the necessity on the observers part of

constant readiness for combat-not to be confused with

watchfulness. It is told how one observer lost his life because he

forgot to put the magazines on his machine guns, and when

attacked had no chance to; another was killed because he forgot

to cock his guns, and when surprised lust thk- few valuable

seconds he had in which to defend himself. So easily do details

forgotten become matters of life and death.

This summary would b, incomplete without a mention of thaL

constant companion on alrriost all missions, whose sharp short

cough, with its accompanying puff of black smoke, has been 

a

greeting from the Bosche at all altitudes and in all weathers, and

has silvered many a hair before its time-the Archies. Not alone

for the devilish accuracy and persistence of the Bosche gunners,

for the damage they have done out planes and the brave men whose lives they have taken from us, have we disliked and

dreaded them; but because they have brought, time after time,

swarms of enemy chasse planes to the attack, and thus added to

our worries. "When the Archies stop, the Bosches appear," one

flyer writes, and it is safe to say that seldom except out of

respe.:t for the approach of their own planes have the Bosche

gunners failed to shower us, literally, with their attentions

throughout the whole course of the mission.

The importance of bringing back the desired information,

regardless of temptations to attack an enemy formation which

chance may have put in a position favorable to us, or to "strafe"

trenches, deserves mention; and through all the papers of which

this is a summary runs the realization that no chances are too

great, no dangers too formidable when instructions have been

received that "the information wanted must be obtained " Had that

knowledge not been evident, the missions performed at ail

altitudes, even at 100 meters, in the face of enemy formations

superior in numbers, in all weathers-going up in rainstcms,

landing after dark, on strange fields sometimes, ir machines not

intended lot night flying-would show how deeply the men felt

this to be a principle in their work.

Such are the lessons learned in observation work-a wotk that

has, it i, safe to say, made over all the men engaged in it; has

L'
S- - - t- -I

I

Lessons 1311

Learned

- taught them the priceless value of team play, has shown them

in their friends depths of cheerfulness, forgetfulness of self, and

bravery, whose greatness they had never appreciated, and has

left them an affection for these friends so strong that it will be

always a part of their lives.

-40--

2d Lt. Sidney V. W. Peters

Flight Commander, 24th Aero Squadron

A

Peters had joined the 24th on 8 September 1918 and had .

served with the squadron during the Battle of St. Mihiel and the

Meuse-Argonne Campaign. The 24th Squadron had flown

Salmson 2A2's at the front, but after the first of October it also

had one DH-4 with Liberty engine.

The Liberty motor in itself has proven to be all that its

builders predicted. Excellent reliability with a continual flow of

power equal to any emergency. In fact, its power in full cannot

be used with its pursuit plane and it has an excess of 250 rpm

over the strength of the wing surface.

With a few minor changes which have been made by field

mechanics under working conditions at the front, the motor has

given a very creditable account of itself. These changes were

mostly in the ignition system. When trouble with the motor has

been encountered, its cause has generally been the unfamiliarity

of the mechanics working on it.

Lis J. Dickinson Estes and

H. C Boricon, the first pilots of the U S. Liberty plane in

France. Taken at the

A S Production Center # 1

Romorantin, 8 June 1918

==-t~~ -
132 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

From the plane's first appearance on the front, it has been

looked upon unfavorably from the pilot's viewpoint. Its greatest 

A

criticism has been the lack of features of safety. The wing

construction and fuselage is admittedly weak, and pilots

undergoing instruction are warned against steep dives and

vertical virages. It has not been advisable to put the ship into

loops or subject it to any strain that is not absolutely necessary.

It is not difficult to imagine the frame of mind of the pilot over

the lines in a ship he has little faith in the construction of.

Probably the most objectionable feature is the gas tank and its

construction. There is not and has not been any covering or

safety on the tank. The French practice has been to use

asbestos and rubber so that when a bullet enters the tank in

combat, the hole is automatically sealed and no fire results. 

A

bullet hole in the Liberty gas tank, in most cases, has resulted in a fire and the death of the pilot and observer. With a gas tank

unprotected, the pilot cannot possibly have the proper mental attitude, nor can an ubserver properly do his work. 'rhey also

face the probability of fire ir, a crash in a Liberty without 

a

protected tank that would be greatly reduced it the tank were

properly covered as is the case in the Salmson or S.P.A.D

There have been numerous examples of Liberties falling in

flames from the hits of "Archies" in the recent bombing raids,

and in many instances the fatal result has been attributed

directly to either the flimsy construction or the unprotected gas

tank of the Liberty plane.

--4-

2d Lt. David S. Kennedy

Deputy Flight Commander

24th Aero Squadron

Criticism, adverse or favorable, of the Aviation Instruction

Schools, must be concerned chiefly with the personnel and

organization rather than with the course of instruction offered.

The latter seemed in most instances adequate and as complete

as the newness of aviation in the United States permitted

One exception to this is that many flying students graduated

from schools in the States have been deficient in familiarity with

stunts. Appaiently this was due to fear on the part of authorities

of adverse public opinion if the number of casualties from this

cause showed a marked increase. As a result many flyers were

graduated and actually sent to the front to fight without ever
Lessons 133

Learned

having been in a tailspin, a loop or other air maneuvers. While

these are actuaIly little used in fighting and especially in

reconnaissance or bombardment work, nevertheless a certain

knowledge of them greatly increases the confidence of the pilot

in himself and his machine and might in many instances furnish

the reserve of morale necessary to ttrn a defeat in the Air into

a victory.

In many of the schools in the States stunting is forbidden. 

I

myself repeatedly asked for instruction in stunts at various posts

but my request was never granted. My only familiarity with them

is due accordingly to my practicing alone, out of sight of the

field, without instructions and without the sanction of the

aut,-orities in charge. I do not regret this disregard of regulations

and believe that my assuming of the responsibility in doing this

resulted in better service in my work at the front. It should not

be necessary for a flying student to undertake this essential part

of his training uinder such circumstanccs.

Another criticism of the training schools, and particularly of

the ground schools, is that undue insistence was often placed

upon subjects not essential to success as a flyer and that in

consequence the United States Army lost many good men. As

an instance, at the ground school at Cornell University, many

promising men were discharged because of failure to pass the

examination in radio telegraphy. Many of these went to Canada, enlisted in the Royal Flying Corps and subsequently became

efficient aviators in the British service. Some of them became

well known aces.

My twelve months experience as a flyer have convinced me that sufficient attention is not given to the physical condition of

the Aviation Student. I myself have not received a physical

examination since first enlisted in the service nearly eighteen

months ago, though in that time I have been flying constantly,

and at altitudes as high as 19,000 feet.

It is my belief that many of the accidents in training are dLe

to lack of proper physical attention. The senses of a student

almost exhausted or under undue fatigue do not react as rapidly

as under normal conditions. The eye is apt to misjudge the

distance from the ground, or the feel of the machine under the

control of the student is likely to be blunted. This is shown in

the fact that many students are killed by slipping off on a wing

in a turn near ground, especially when the motor has cut out or lost power from any cause. Skill in the co-ordination of the muscles is absolutely essential

in the making of a flyer. Mv observation hat; been that men who

have this ability have made good flyers, whether this facu!ty has

been shown in athletics, or in some other accomplishment as

I
134 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

piano playing, juggling or the like. I have noticed the officials in

charge of flying fields try for weeks to make an aviator out of a

man whose whole difficulty lay in inability to co-ordinate his

actions quickly. Accidents to planes and in some instances

deaths of the men would have been prevented if this inherent

disqualification had been recognized.

Boards examining candidates for aviation attempted to obviate

this difficulty by selecting men who had shown an iptitude for

athletics. This care was not followed up in ground school and

/ flying school by proper training in this direction, with efforts to

eliminate the unfit.

/.// Keen eyesight in aviation cannot be too stron3ly insisted upon.

The flyer at the front who can pick up enemy planes a few

seconds before he himself is seen has a great advantage in

/[ determining wheher to accept or refuse combat, as his judgment I may dictate. Otherwise this advantage passes to the enemy.

P \

A I

-42-

It '2d Lt. David S. Kennedy

Flight Commander

24th Aero Squadron

Maps. The Air Service is now using maps constructed for the

infantry and artillery. Maps made especially for the use of

aviators would greatly simplify many of the difficulties now

encountered in visual and photographic reconnaissance.

Especial attention should be qiven to the landscape a, it

appears from the air. Among a multitude of small villages and

roads it is difficult loi an aviator to find his position on the niap

On the contrary there are always many distinctive landmarks

which immediately catch the eye from the air but which car. iot

be found readily on the maps now in use.

Water is always distinctive -lakes, rivers, and canals should be

more strongly marked, with particular attention to form and

direction.

I
Lessons 135

Learned

A

Peculiarly shaped woods are readily seen.

Unusual angles and bends in roads are picked up readily.

Hills und valleys are not readily distinguished from an altitude,

but frequently hills have tops of unusual earth covering or

exposed stone, while valleys often contain marshes or ponds which stand out from the neutral coloring of surrounding ground.

Railroads are hard to see above 15,000 feet and do not afford

landmarks as good as commonly supposed.

The roofs of buildings are good landmarks.

Visibility. Good visibility for the pilot simpiilies visual and

photographic work, especially when it is necessary for the pilot

to fly over a prescribed course.

When it is impossible for the pilot to be seated ahead of the

wings, it is desirable for him to be placed just behind and with

the upper [wing] slighily above the level of his eyes.

A small shutter door in the bottom of the fuselage is

necessary and visibility would be improved by an arrangement of

two mirrors giving a view to the side and beneath each wing.

Controls. It is desirable to have the plane sensitive on the

controls when this can be obtained without sacrificing more

essential features. The rudder should be particularly easy to

permit the tail to be switched aside quickly to uncover an enemy

plane of greater speed which may be approaching for an attack.

Quick response to the ailerons may be obtained by eliminating

the dihedral angle. A skillful pilot does not need this feature of

inherent stability so long as his controls are not destroyed, which

infrequently occurs. The plane should respond easily to the

elevator.

Speed. A difference in speed of ten miles per hour often

means the successful return of an observation team with

information, as against its des'ruction. A speed range of fifty to

one hundred and forty miles per hour would permit the motor to

be throttled to slow speed for the purposes of observation and to

[high speed to] draw away from enemy planes in case of attack.

In a machine of greater speed than enemy planes, observation

far into hosti! _ teiritory could be carried out at lower altitudes

with- impunity. Under present conditions it is necessary for long

distance reconnaissance to be accomplished at high altitudes to

take advantage of the extra wingspread of observation planes.

Wings constructed with a variable camber would be of

enormous importance, allowing slower landing speed and slower

speed over an objective, while at the same time permitting

greater speed in case of attack.

Machines for long distance reconnaissance should be strongly

built so that it would be poasible to return home even with

bullets in vital parts It fiequently happens that observation

""a
136 U S. Air Servce

in World War I

Vol. IV

planes are attacked by superior numbers of the enemy and are

considerably shot up before escaping.

Armament. Protection of the gas tank and of vital engine

parts is of great importance and should take precedence over

protection of pilot and observer when both are not possible

Troining. Pilots of reconnaissance planes should be thoroughly

trained in close formation flying and in 'S-ing" in'formation. The

latter is the only maneuver required in observation work and is

necessary to escape from anti-aircraft fire. Attacks from enemy

planes often follow an "Archie" barrage and it is essential that

the fo,ration should not be scattered.

Piiots should be familiar with stunts and should know how to

recover from a tail spin.

-43--

1st Lt. Allen T. Bird, Jr.

Flight Commander. 50th Aero Squadron

.... .. ......... .. ... ... 

................. .. .....

.. * °

The flight commanders of a squadron should keep in close

touch with the work in their respective flights both of the pilots and observers as well as the mechanics, also to know each day

the condition of every machine in the flight and to watch the

motors closely.

Finally, whenever necessary to make suggestions or criticrims

to both pilots and observers (observers, more particularly on

their requirements of pilots in working) regarding their methods.

It is needless to say that under the prevailing table of squadron

organization usually such suggestions or criticisms were not

received in the spirit they were given and little heed paid.

In the work of an observati::)1 pilot caution and good judgment

should be the primary requisites. As the successful

accomplishment of each mission is due to a great extent upon

the flying ability of the pilot he should at all times maneuver his

machine so that the observer can carry on his work most

effectively. Before going on a mission it is absolutely essential that pilot

and observer talk over the work to be accomplished and lay their plans of cooperation accordingly.

Coniact Patrol: To successfully accomplish such a mission

there are several vital factors and situations to be considered,

Kupon which the method to be employed depends. The area to

be covered: wooded, broken and open country each require

IF

__L

--I
Lessons 137

Leamed

[?

A German antiaircraft gun in action. T]he photo had been taken by the

gunner's German comrade, who was later captured.

- different tactics in .flying. In a wooded area such as the Argonne

Forest low flying was absolutely necessary in order to identify

panels, flares or our infantry; and at times it was difficult flying

at less than one hundred feet to accomplish such contact

throughout the area. But low flying is extremely hazardous for

two reasons: First, surprise by enemy aircraft. Both pilot and

observer are apt to become engrossed upon their task and

attracted by the panorama passing underneath, which situation

would glive the enemny aircraft the opportunity they are so eager

to take advantage of: Surprise Attack. Second, machine -un fire

from the ground- In working over this area on Contact Patrols

those two factors were continually borne in mind, and the

missions were flown accordingly. On reaching the scenie of

Operations I would fly into the enemy country at an altitude of

between 3000 and 4000 feet until anti-aircraft fire was drawn,

turning and flying at a right angle to MY Previous ,.ourse I would

get an approximate idea of the enemy AA line. Then would fly

- back and be.gin searching for our troops ai a lowy altitude

"= working toward the AA line, and when the approximate location

of our troops had been determined I would give the observer the

signal and would drop to the altitude that was necessary for

positive identification of the advanced lin. of infantry. Then flying

at the low altitude I would run the motor 1.50 to 200 revolutioris

fatter than at higher altitude, depending upon speed to carry me

by any enemy fire.

V ___ _ ___ ___ ___ ____ _ _ ___ ___ ___ ____ __ ___ ___ __ ___ 1= _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _

F ...... . . ... ... ... .. ' "' . .. . ..
138 U.S. Air Service

in World War !

Vol. IV

By locating the enemy AA and probable troop positions and

searching for troops at the altitude mentioned the possibility of a

surprise attack from enemy aircraft was overcome and the

danger of any extensive ground fire practically nil.

On the low flying work over the area there was only the

danger of machine gun fire from the ground and before

attempting it would make sure there were no enemy aircraft

about.

From the beginning of our operations I have been of the

opinion that with an airplane such as the Liberty motored DH 4,

with its speed and abundance of power the chance of being hit

by machine gun fire from the ground were very small if the

advantage of speed and power was taken, and so I depended

upon speed alone to successfully conclude the work, reserving however an abundance of power to he used should any

unexpected difficulty be encountered.

In broken country such as that in the area north of the Grand

Pre-St. Juvin Line, it is to be expected that the enemy will take

advantage of all high ground to mount machine guns for use

against airLraft- In working over an area of that description it

was necessary to keep this fact in mind and fly the mission

accordingly. Flying at various altitudes and a very irregular

course with good speed, flying directly over the heiGhts in order

to mak'i the gauge of deflection more difficult.

In open country, the danger from machine gun fire increases

as the gunners have ample opportunity to gauge deflection and

to throw up an intensive fire so that speed and incessant

changing of both course and elevation is vitally necessary. Reconnaissance: On working on such a mission the

observations of the pilot are equally important as those of the

observer and the pilot can const,ntly bring things to the

observer's attention that otherwise would escape his notice.

Enemy aircraft among those things. On several occasions while

flying over villages in enemy areas I have rioted, beyond the

possibility of a doubt, that they were occupied b troops. After

accomplishing the mission and while talking over incidents of the

trip it developed that my observer had not seen any signs of

troop occupation. The practice of pilot and observer comparing

their impressions of the observation immediately after each

mission is of great importance and should be done on every

occasion.

I
Lessons 139

Learned

Flight mechanics use a Ford tractor to puli a Liberty plane off the field for maintenance at ,he Air Service

Production Center U2, Roriorantin. France

-- 44-

1st Lt. F. M. McCook

Flight Commander, 50th Aero Squadron

The efficiency of the enlisted personnel of any flight depends

chiefly upon the ability of the flight-sergeant, whose main

prerequisite must be leadership, combined with a sound

mechanical mind. A good flight-sergeant need not necessarily be

a Master Electrician, it being a grave mistake to place an M.E. in

charge, per se, for regardless of knowledge if his leadership

qualities are poor, he will never get the best out of his men.

Considerable leeway should be permitted the flight-sergeant

especially as regards matters of discipline. Men desiring passes,

leaves etc., should first submit them for his approval. They

should know also that promotions will be made only with his

recommendations. As regards to promotions, they should be welt

merited and few. Nothinq disturbs the harmony of a flight more

than ar, undeserved promotion, and the greater the premium

placed on rank, the harder it will be worked for and appreciated.

The consistent worker is a good man to place in charge of a

ship while the good engine, magneto, etc., man should be

encouraged to specialize. The flying officers should have

immediate authcrity over their crews, their attitude being fnendly

but firm, c?.re being taken lest it approach the familiar. The men

should be taken up as passengers as often as occasion permits

and it is recommended that after every rigging lob, the N.C.O. in

charge be ordered to accompany the pilot on the first trip. The

;i I
140 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

flight commander's authority over the officers in his flight should

extend only to flying, ground and flight rules-matters of

discipline, program, etc., should be dealt directly by the squadron

Commanding Officer and Operations Officer.

Observations-Actiue Service. The greatest value of the

aviation reconnaissance service in the battle of the Argonne laid

(in] its ability to locate and report the position of the front line.

Very low flying was done with extremely few casualties. As to

modus operandi, the writer employed two methods depending

on the positions or progress of the forward elements. Should the

front line be more or less stable, the advance being slow and its

location somewhat definitely known before leaving the airdrome

the approach was made at an altitude of from 800 to 1000 feet

in a series of wide circles the general progress being toward the

line. On the farthest ooint of each circle the observer would fte

his pistol and the maneuver was ccntinued until the ccll was

recognized and answered by the Infantry. The flying consisted of

dives and climbing turns.

The value of the above maneuver fies chiefly in the fact that

this does not permit the pilot to over-fly and become out of

touch with his troops; it also eliminates much machine-gun and

rifle fire, as in most cases the machine and its purpose has been

recognized from its preceding circles, the panels and flares are

already laid out and can be picked up out of range of the hostile

anti-aircraft barrage. Another decided advantage is that it affords

the pilct an opportunity of keeping a constant lookout from all

sides and above.

Should the advance be great and no definite information as to

the whereabouts of the line, the flying should be done at about

200fe.Troops should be looked for near or along the roads,

railroad tracks and hill sides, it is advisable not to continue in

any direction where there is no activity-the last soon will

generally be your most advanced patrol. Flares or panels in arn

advance of this kind can not be expected as the infantry will

generally throw them away to lighten their load Never fly over

the same place twice and regard clumps of trees and edges of

forests with the greatest respect. Hostile Aircraft. Extreme care should be taken in approaching the line, carefully note the aerial activity and the planes working

in adjacent sectors. A large number of friendly balloons at a fair

ele,ation is a good sign of a peaceful sky, although this should

not be depended upon. Always regard with suspicion the plane

or planes that seem to have nothing to do or who appear

unaware of your presence. The sun and clouds are your greatest

-,friends and greatest enemies Beware of an attack from their

i ,l
Lessons 141

Jr Learned

4

c direction and in case of trouble you will find them your greatest

refuge.

The first dive is always the most to be feared-a good

maneuver is to wait until he is just within range and then go up

r in a sharp climbing turn. The enemy plan of attack on two

seaters is to take them by surprise. A short burst of tracers by

the observer will often forestall combat. After an attack or low flying venture, great care should be

j" taken in the handling of a machine until it is safely landed on the

drome. A ground inspection of a plane after a "job" often causes

cold perspiration. As a last remark, it has been the writer's

observation that those with the greatest "wind-up," whether in

training or in service, ore the first to go.

-45--:

1st Lt. Merrit 0. White

Flight Commander, 90th Aero Squadron

Training of pilots for observation work has been very much

under-{ated and therefore neglected. So much so that at chasse

schools we were threatened with observation work if we fali

down in chasse.

Our experience has taught us the importance of thoroughly

k trained and skillful pilots for observatinn work if they are to be

successful in working with the observer. Only two pilots of the

90th Aero Squadron had ever received any training in

observation work, and this would have proved a distinct setback

if they had been obliged to start hard work immediately upon

their arrival at the front. Fortunately, all of them had completed

• the entire course for chasse pilots, including gunnery, and for the

first two months or. the front were able to do easy work on the

lines and get plenty of practice with the Infantry in the rear. This

gave them the much-needed experience so that by the St. Mihiel V drive, they had become expert observation pilots. The work

done and the losses sustained from this time to the end of the

war bear this out. Our loss over the lines during this time was

one man who had practically no previous experience.

All observation pilots should go through the regular course of

training, including acrobating, then through a course in

E observation work, actual practice with the Infantry of course 6 being the most valuable.

Infantry contact work, one of the most important, hazardous,

S and interesting, requires most expert piloting and perfect
142 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

cooperation with the observer to be successful.

First, the pilot should study his maps carefully, the situation

thoroughly, and get from his observer a perfect understanding of

where he is to fly, where to go through the barrage and at what

altitude, so that no further instructions will be necessary from his

observer during the execution of the work.

Too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the importance of

the facts. While making a contact, the pilot has three important

things to watch out for mainly-attacks from enemy chasse, antiaircraft fire, and maneuvering of his plane over the right

territory. He must never for an instant fly in a straight line,

neither must he circle over one place constantly. Constant

swings and unexpected turns keep gunners on the ground

guessing and seems to work out successfully.

The pilot must be 90 percent of the eye of the team against

enemy, chasse planes for the observer is busy with his work, and

a live pilot enables him to do just so much more.

In case of attack, he should immediately maneuver in 

a

position for his observer to do the shooting, as his two guns are

more than 100 percent more formidable than his own.

We believe the experience of the 90th Aero Squadron has

proven conclusively that a thoroughly trained observation pilot and one who is interested it, his work is the only type who can constantly and thoroughly do the work assigned to them.

-46--

1st Lt. George S. Clark

Flight Commander, 104th Aero Squadron

1. The best and most successful work will come from the

Observation Squadron in which there is the greatest cooperation

between the entire personnel of the squadron and especiaily

between the pilots and the observer.

2. In the first place, pilots for this work should have 

a

minimum of 100 hours of flying experience including at least 25

hours of aerial gunnery (actual tme in the air), with fixed gun

both photographic and shooting at targets. After his gunnery

course he should go to a school where he can get some idea of

the kind of work going on at the front, preferably an observer's

school. In this work he would find that he could work with some

observeis a great deal better than with others. In this manner

the teams could be formed and if serit through the rest of their

training together, they would be able to enter their duties at the

L 

.
Lessons 143

Learned

L=

IiP€

tem.

I Inanr Cotc wor. I; if two pn a s o gt

It H 1 l

ifrton esirmedathelyu Obsrr in the lre ane canl do this I work kin ta t er hatstrher r outction ahmn wilth

hav tn beir wactchn to lwanes otofte et It bestor

the po tofy!nvscrossin the fie trosu t ,but riot to er flo r srtrail i lore, nr (roe athe a-lo defn litu, utr keep rgin ig,

iraio adsireg Atesllern two-, the plane an wok o te

adva kwntg tha one as the Obsroterctrust spoe qite a wlt

time t b cing he shots --he shul to fy timot betwt battr

ah re. n or n a cein g upon thend

4.. tler-te Ina jsigA t o.~e c n w rk t t

5 In work at least thre. planes sent ;hould: i

L('

J' 1mI: +nu:l:+ " [,r[ t,,t; l,., )r,~.'+ +,,q l.r,, ] -,"A~'I .:,: t..
144 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

kVol. IV

out, the leader carrying the camera. The successful outcome of

these missions depend upon how the pilots can hold their

formation, the closer the formation, the less danger there is of

attack. If attacked by large numbers the best practice is for the

plane on the side where they attack to dive down under the

loader, thus allowing all Observers' guns to come into n!ay. The

pilots should get in as much time as possible :n close formation

flying.

-47-

1st Lt. James S. Roberts

Flight Commander, 104th Aero Squadron

It is recommended that:

1. Training of Pilots. Pilots receive 30 hours of preliminary

training of flying alone, followed immediately by 20 hours of aerial

gunnery. Gunnery to consist not so much in the ground work,

but all aerial practice to be emphasized- Single and formation

combat work with camera guns to be chief feature of work.

Pilots to be sent to the front with from 50 to 100 hours flying.

VThose who have been used as instructors and having more than

Class in artillery regtage at r LeValdalon

1=
.. _,, = ,- ,,, 

. , -- m. 

- -, ._, _ ---. ---

I

Lessons 145

Leamed

5-

150 hour-, flying to their credit to be kept as instructors

whenever practical. Pilots who have 300 hours to their credit

before going to the front are not good material for work over

the lines.

Pilots be trained on as many different planes as possible.

2. Operations in Field, General. All missions be under strict supervision of Operations Officer and chief pilot or Flight

Commander, between whom the greatest coordination is imperative.

Pilots work vvith the same observer at all times. 

I

Infantry Missions. Infantry missions be flown by single plane

whose altitude over the lines should never exceed 300 meters. A

straight course while over the lines is always to bc avoided and

a very crooked couise of short turns, skids, and sharp changes of altitude be at all times employed when over the lines. In case

Infantry plane is attacked by enemy chasse, it should at once

dive to lowest altitude possible towards our lines, returning to its

work when en;2my chasse has left the flight.

Artillery RegJage and Surveillance. Be flown by a single plane

behind fnendly chasse patrols at an altitude from 600 to 1500

meters. Care be taken to avoid going directly over battery in

which reglage is being done except when absolutely necessary. 

- Surveillance missions be sent out just before dawn and just at

sunset, as this type of mission can work far more effectively at

these times. In case of attack by hostile chasse, a tight spiral

with side slip be used to get down close to the ground as the

machine is behind its own lines and is best protected by ground

fire at low altitudes.

Photoqraphy Mission. Be flown by three planes, one plane

taking pictures, other two planes acting as protection. Mission to

oe flown in a tight three point formation with the protection

planes flying about 50 meters above and just behind the

photography plane. That in cases where mission is to go more

than 10 miles over lines, chasse protection be always given and

in other cases chasse protection be furnished whenever possible.

In case of attack, that under nc circumstance is furmation to be

broken, but if force of attacking chasse is in great numbers, an

effort should be made to finish pictures and get behind our lines

losing altitude in doing so, In case it is important to finish the

pictures, the formation should get behind its own lines losing

altitude and then return to finish the picturcs. This type of

mission be flown above 3500 meters.

That :aison be kept with the nearest chasse group at all times.

That chasse groups at all times be nearer the lines than

observation groups. That up-to-date chasse patrol schedules be furnished observation group.
146 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol IV

-48-

1st Lt. Dogan M. Arthur

Pilot, 12th Aero Squadron

1. Before leaving the aerodrome study your map carefully.

Make sure of the lines as last reported, the next objective, and

as near as possible where the Infantry front line will be at the

time you should reach the lines. When near the lines orient

yourself carefully before going over. Pick out a prominent

landmark. A high hill, a large town, highway, stream, lake or

wood. Note the position of this landmark as it appears when you

are headed towards the enemy lines, flying parallel or away from

the enemy lines. Note the position of the sun. If it is at your

back as you go in, then you will have to face it to come out; if

it is on your left on right going in then it will be on the opposite side when you start out. This is very important, for you quickly

lose sense of direction when you start looking for our infantry, enemy planes and panels, and if attacked by superior number of

enemy airplanes or motor fails, then you must find the direction

of friendly territory without losing even one second. No matter

what is occupying your attention, always keep in mind just which

way you have to turn to head towards friendly territory, one

second's delay may prove fatal.

After you have oriented yourself then start in at one end of

your sector and fly to the other end. Never cut in deep or fly

into enemy territory far. It is not necessary. Fly back and forth

along sector, gradually working in. Fly level if possible, that is do

not bank up any more thaii is necessary. To bank up exposes 

a

larger surface for enemy ground machine guns and rifles to hit.

Do not race motor but run normal, and keep nose of plane

down a little, thus getting a large amount of speed without

straining your motor. When it is a case of life or death, then is

the time you need all your motor, and w-ill have some reserve

speed. When near or over our front lines you are constantly

under fire from enemy machine guns and rifles from the ground,

so keep plenty of speed, skid the plane from side to side by

using rudder. When you have to turn at the end of sector, do 

a

half vrille turn; all this tends to make you a very difficult target

for the enemy gunners. Help the observer all you can by watching !he ground for our

troops, hut do not neglect your watch in the air for enemy

airz'raft. The observer usually jets the pilot know when he is

going to call for panels from our infantry. Then keep him in best

position to observe panels. This is the time to keep a very sharp
Lessons 147

Learned

5-=

watch for enemy chasse for if there are any near they will be

attracted by the rockets, and will attack them if they are near

enough, for they know that when rockets are fired, the observer

is busy watching the ground and his watch fo- enemy aircraft is

therefore impossible. Try to locate the front lines first; then

veriy it by calling for panels with a rocket, thus keeping from

making infantry as well as yourself conspicuous.

Friendly troops can usually be distinguished easily from about

200 meters by the color of their uniform, but weather conditions

and heavily wooded territory at times makes it necc,sary to fly

as low as 50 metres. When flying as Inw as this, always try to keep

back of our lines as far as possible to avoid enemy fire from the

ground, but at the same time keeping near erough front lines for the

observer to see panels plainly

When oi contact patrols the enemy archies cause very little

trouble as you are so low and behind our lines they have to fire

laterally and their aim is usually poor. If they come near just

change direction about 45 degrees and altitude without banking

up any. But should they come too near or get you bracketed

then side slip out of them and resume work at some other point

along sector.

Pilot and observer should have utmost confidence ;n each

other. Try to team up with an observer that you know is

reliable, that is that you don't mind doing as he tells you to. For

instance, if he should try to tell you to fly over a certain place

within the enemy lines at a very low altitude, and even though

you knew it was extremely dangerous, and thought it wasn't

necessary, you wouldn't hesitate a second but would do as he

asked, for you have full confidence in him; knew that he knew

what he wanted, and it was necessary to do as he asks in

order that he may secure the desired information. Just

remember that he knows what he is doing. Knows the danger

and is taking the risk as you, even more, for if he is killed you can get the plane and yourself back, but if you are killed then

the planes goes down, and therefore he is taking a double risk.

Never depend on your observer to keep your direction, that is

the pilot's businers. The observer's time is fully occupied in

watching the ground and for enemy aircraft, and is not expected

to keep the direction, so it is up to you, as the pilot, to do this,

for nine times out of ten the observer is so busy that it would

be impossible for him to know whether the plane was flying

rnorth, south. east or west In order to fuliy carr-, out his

missions he had to have full confidence in the pilot and he

knows he will keep himself oriented.

It is not advisable for the pilot of an observation plane to

strafe enemy troops, transports, etc. His gun is fixed and lie
-T 

-

148 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

would have to dive his machine to strafe and as an observation

plane is large it cannot be controlled as easily as a chasse plane.

Let the observer do the strafing when there is any strafing to be

done, as he has two guns mounted or a movable tourelle, and

can strafe while plane is on a straight line of flight.

Try to remember direction of wind at all times, for if your

motor fails you haven't rnough altitude to look around to find

the direction of the wind, and to land with the wind on a shell

torn field, in -. woods or among wire is far more dangerous than

if you landed dgainst the wind and had it to help check your

ground spced.

The Boche seldom attack a bi-olane machine unless they have

it outnumbered three or four t.. , r They usually wait until they think the pilot or observer i .,ave their attention on

t something else other than t ,,; heir favorite mode of attack

is from the rear with the sun i. thpir back. One or 'wo of the - enemy aircraft usually try to get beneath the plane they are

attacking, thus making it impossible for either pilot or observer

to return their fire. The only thing for the pilot to do in this case

A' is to dive down and fly so close to the ground that it is

impossible for the enemy aircraft to stay beneath you and

maneuver. When diving down, kick the rudder from side to side,

skidding the ship and making it more difficult for the enemy

aircraft to score hits. Another advantage in getting low is that it Fgives the friendly infantry an excellent chance to help you out

with machine guns and rifles. When attacked and outrumbered

always make for the rear of our lines as I have found the enemy

aircraft will not follow you very far back of your lines at low

altitude. In a fight always give the observer a chance to shout,

he has the advantage over your fixed guns, with his movable

guns and wind vane sights. It is best for the pilot not to attack

under ordinary circumstances unless he can surprise the enemy

aircraft or has other advantages.

The foregoing is drawn from my personal experience as an

observation pilot on contact patrol missions and I escaped from

attacks by enemy aircraft several times when I was outnumbered

from six to eighteen machines.

- A
71

FYI

Lessons 149 -1

Learned

--49-

1st Lt. Robert L. Davidson, Jr.

Pilot, 12th Aero Squadron

Every pilot has his own peculiarities in flying the different

missions over the front, but at the bottom of all observation

flying there are certain basic principles, which, if followed, will

make the work less hazardous. These principles are:

1. To remember that you are sent out to accomplish a

rmission and not to seek rombat until that mission has been

accomplished. When outnumbered to withdraw and attempt to

elude the enemy so as to be able to finish the mission later.

2. When flying over the lines to constantly maneuver the

plane in order to dodge the line of fire, either of machine guns

or anti-aircraft depending upon the altitude. Gentle side slips and

flat skids prove very deceptive to marksman on the ground.

3. To never go deeper into enemy territory than successful

completion of mission requires. Certain missions can be done

without crossing the lines.

4. When anti-aircraft becomes too dangerous, withdraw and

come back at a different altitude, causing battery to find new

range.

What to do when attacked depends on many things; type of

plane, number of enemy, altitude, clouds, etc. If the eneny is

seen in time and the altitude is low it is best to fly towards our

lines, and aftei crossing, hug as close to the ground as possible.

The enemy will soon give up the pursuit. Many high altitude

observation planes can outclinb, outmaneuver and outfly the

chasse planes above 4,000 metres. One observation plane, if

skillfully handled can make a warm combat for two chasse

planes. If the observation plane is surprised and hopelessly

outnumbered, a combination of skid and gentle side slips make 

a

very difficult target. If the plane dives too steeply in attempting

to escape, the attacking planes can get under the tail and riddle

it. A tail spin is very impractical as a means of escape as it can

closely be followed. A steep bank should never be used in

combat. In combat with more than one plane, the shooting

position of the observer should be considered as of utmost

importance.

On infantry liaison work the altitude depends on the visibilily.

500 metres is advisable if the work can be done at that height.

While flying, the machine should be kept constantly side dlipping

and skidding to avoid the machine gun and rifle barrage.

An artillery reglage is the easiest to fly, hostile aircraft being

L}
150 U.S Air Seruice

in World War I

Vol. IV

the main worry. The plane needs to be within a ran le of the

anti-aircraft only a small portion of the time. This is usually flown

in circles between battery and target.

Photographic work necessitates the ship being flown in a

straight course. Generally the anti-aircraft vill permit a straight

course being flown into enemy teritorv. Then the oilot may

dodge coming out Often a ccmplete round trip may be made in

a straight line. If the anti-aircraft becomes too "dan9roni the

course may be broken Then go away for awhile and let the

battery lose its range. Come back and continue work where it

was left off.

-50-

19t Lt. Kenneth M. Holden

Pilot, 12th Aero Squadron

1. Infantry liaison protection Circumstances sometimes

necessitate two planes to successfuly accomplish a single mission,

one plane to do the work and the second to act as protection.

In this protection work you are largely responsible for the

success of the mission, for you must not only fight off enemy

aircraft but be in a position to carry on the mission itself should

the other plane fail. The pilot must have his map marked with

the probable location of the lines, must keep himself loci'ted at

all times, so that he can be able to glide into friendly territory

in case of engine trouble, and must always be in the best

position to defend the mission plane. When the mission plane

starts working over the lines, for example, at one hundred

metres, it is best for you to stay several hundred metres above

him and not attempt to remain diiectly on his tail, or in case of

attack you are then able to warn the mission plane by diving on

h;m and then climbing back in a defensive position in the

shortest possible time. In this work it is necessary to be wide

awake at all times for you are not only on the constant watch

for enemy aircraft but at the same time are being constcintly

fired on by machine guns on the ground. The best possible way

to ovoid these is by skidding, for where a machine is fly ng in

this menner it is a very difficult target to hit Never fly in a

straight line and skid most of the turns for when a plane makes

an ordinary bank into its turns, it becomes an excellent target

and an easy one. Always stay with the machine which you are

protecting no matter where he may go and if the mission plane

should become lost, which you will know by the fact that in this

L

F.;

" = i,"I i:iI .. : | I " " :I I : 1']"I-: i'T ("*F='[:'|F " ~ T '...I'
Lessons 151

Learned

work, you are never far in enemy territory, dive down in front of

him or attract his attention in some way or other and then head

him back to our lines when you again take your position of

protection.

Protect the machine that is doing the work at all costs and if

you find that you are not able to ward off the attack by yourself,

close in nearby the leading plane and let him help you.

The success of the mission depends upon you. Do your work

so that the leading plane can accomplish its duties in the least

possible time and with the best results. Be wide awake and fully

aware of the fact that something else is at stake outside of your

own personal safety. Do not encourage a fight but rather seek to

avoid it, for the reports of the enemy j?) infantry planes are

more important than the destruction of enemy aircraft. Remain

constantly on the alert until your return to your own aerodrome

and thereby you have done all in your power to accomplish 

a

successful mission.

2. Protection for ortillpry missions. In protection for thib

work your mac-iine must be equipped with wireless reels, maps

with target locations, and in fact with all the necessities of 

a

mission plane. Before leaving the ground arrange a set of signals

with the pilot of the leading plane so that in case of attack you

can easily attract his attention. When in the air take your

position above and to his rear and then look out for trouble.

The thought must always be uppermost in your mind that the

observer in the missiun plane is watching his target and the

bursting of shells and consequently is depending almost entirely

upon you for his protection. In this work you are most always

flying at an altitude of several thousand metres and in

consequence the only troul:,e you will come in contact with, is

anti-aircraft and enemy planes. The best possible way of avoiding the former is by continually changing your line of flight as in this

way you become a very poor target while in the case of attack

you must at all costs, protect the leading plane. Remember that

the pilot in th, machine that is doing the work must keep his

ship in the best possible position to afford his observer a clear

view of the target and even though his action may at certain

times seem a trifle peculiar that is no affair of yours. In case of

attack remember that your observer has guns as well as yourself

and therefore keep your ship in a po3ition so that he can use

his guns to the best advantage as he is able to do more efficient

shooting than you, Watch the blind angles of your machine and

it possible never let an enemy plane take advantage of them.

Alwais remember that the enemy plane knows the location of

your blind angles as well as you know theirs, and therefore you

ii . ' -1
:152 U.S. Air Service

~in World War I

~Vol. IV

T must keep constantly shifting the p"osition of your machine. In a

fight never let the enemy separate you from the plane which you

are protecting for if they succeed in this, your mission as aA

protection machine has been a failure. Above all watch the sun ~for it is the best possible hiding place. The enemy will get

t directly between you and the sun if possible and if successful in

this, is able to dive directly at you and it is almost impossible for

~you to see him. No matter how difficult always keep thz leading

, plane, the sun, and yourself at an angle and never in a straight

~line. Be sure not to fly below and directly behind the leading

plane as his wireless wire is out for perhaps a distance of sixty

or more metres and you are liable to run into the samre. Always

be in a position to carry on the mission should the first plane go

down, for in observation a mission must be accomplished no

matter what the cost may be.

3. Protection !or photographic missions The first thing a pilot

must realize before leaving the ground is that he is in for d fight

~with the odds against him and consequently must have a thorough

understanding with the other pilots in the formation as to mode of

~defense when attacked. A photographic mission is something

~which must be accomplished at all costs and in view of this fact,

i one must be prepared for JI emergencies. The leading plane is

:: the one which generally does the work and as it is necessary for

him to fly in a perfectly straight line he is consequently exposed

; to direct anti-aircraft fire as well as being an excellent target for

i enemy aircraft. Therefore, as nothing can be done to protect the

E mission plane from archies or anti-aircraft fire, the protection

- planes must devote their entire attention to enemy aircraft. It is

a common trick of the enemy to fly over your formation at a

safe altitude with a single plane, hoping that someone will dive at

-" him. If he is successful in this and you should leave your

i formation, you are immediately jumped upon by the formation

~above and you are lost. In falling into this trap you not only lose

~yourself but weaken your formation and if this should be

~repeated, the formation would soon be broken up. Another

~favorite trick of the enemy is to fly over ycu and attempt to

attract your attention while at the same time another formation

attacks from below. This is used to break up your formation and

unless all pianes in your group are working together and carrying

on a cross fire which will keep the enemy off from your tail, it is

generally successful. Therefore, you must always remember that

even though your own chances of living seem to be awfuity

small, you cannot under any consideration leave the formation,

above all keep your head and never for a single instant let

~anything detract your attention from the protection of the leading

~plane. A few bullet holes in your plane will do no harm while on
Lessons 153

Learned

the othe, hand a single bullet might hit the camera and cause

the mission to be a failue. Do what is asked and expected of you. Keep your eyes open wide at all times and remember

that the success of the mission depends upon you and your

ability.

-51-

1st Lt. Robert M. Anderson

Pilot, 50th Aero Squadron

To make a reconnaissance or a contact patrol, it is necessary

to gel to the lines which are in contact with the enemy. In order

to get to the lines, it is the duty of the pilot to get his observer

there, the result being that the motor must be in perfect

condition before leaving the ground. It is better not to go on a

mission than to go on with a missing motor as the chances are

that the plane will have to land between the airdrome and the

front. In case the plane should come down, it would probably be

hours before the pilot could get word to the squadron that the

trip had been a failure. The motto should be remembered by the

pilot that while 5 minutes are wasted, six lives might be lost.

With the motor turning up properly, it is then time to leave

the ground. The wireless is checked up while flying over the

airdrome. Protection planes falling in ,n the flanks as the

checking out is carried on, providing the latter is furnished. To

get to the place where the mission is to be carried out, it is best

to follow a certain route, observing the terrain on the right and

the left of the course to faciliiate the time which will come when

lost in the clouds or fog.

Beginning the contact patrol the observer will direct his pilot

to the spot where he wishes to fire his rockets, or where he

thinks the line is located. He will then fire a six star rocket

which is the signal for the infantry to show up the line. If the

first rocket does not bring results, he will direct the pilot to fly

farther toward the enemy's positions. He will then fire another

rocket with the same number of stars. As soon as seen from the

ground, the infantry will put out panels of white cloth. These

series of panels are the front lines. The observer then records

the Nine on his map.; and the mission is complete.

The visibility is the chief factor in flying infantry liaison. If the

clouds are low, it is sometimes necessary to fly the patrol at a

hundred feet, but, when the visibility is excellent, the mission can

be carried out between 2000 a-d 3000 feet. The higher the panel

LI
154 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

can be seen, the easier it is to get the coordinates in their

proper places. There is one disadvantage in flying contact patrol

at high altitudes. It is more a menace than a disadvantage and is

known among fliers as "archy." This form of artillery is very

accurate, making it necessary for the pilot to change his course

frequently but not with the same regularity. If the course is

followed, say a thousand yards in one direction a( 45* to the

right, then 450 to the left the anti-aircraft gunners will make the

correction to meet you before the turn is made. A gentle sideslip deceives those on the ground, and if carried on it will be

only a short time until the shrapnel will be burstip.g at your old

altitude instead of your lower level The six star rocket having

been fired, the infantry will place panels of white strips on the ground showing up their front line. As soon as the observer

records this line on his map, he then fires a twu ,tdr rocket

O: which indicates that the line has been understood. The panels

are then quickly taken in, for if allowed too long on the ground,

hostile artillery fire will be the result.

While the mission is being carried out, it is absolutely

necessary to watch the skies for hostile planes. Increased

vigilance is necessary after the mission has been completed as an

enemy plane might slip down, making the trip a failure, as 

a

plane shot down with information is as good as no plane sent

out at all. It is the enemy's method of attack to get in the sun,

where he hardly can be seen. He will not attack unless he has

the advantage; altitude and a supenor number of comrades is his

advantage. If he does not surprise his opponent, he is easily

driven away with a few bursts from the rear guns. If he gets

under your tail, it is best to spiral with about 1100 revolutions of

your motor. It is then impossible for him to continue in so good position. But the spiral of this kind it should not be tight, but

loose enough to allow the observer to shoot. When tracer bullets

come his way, he will leave without hesitation. The plane returns after

dropping its messages at previously designated points.

A reconnaissance trip should be carried out in a similar

fashion although altitude is then advantageous. The observer

records movements back of the enemy's front lines, such as

convoys, trains, ammunition dumps, and any information of

value. If te hostile parties are retreating, it is good policy to

dive down upon them with machine guns open. It will delay his

retreat, making it possible for our infantry patrols to capture

prisoners and material.

If a target presents itself of great value, the observer will send

back by wireless the coordinates of same and request artillery

fire. He will then adjust the fire to destroy the target. Fires and

I7

- ii-
Lessons 155

Learned

large explosions are recorded and sent down in his written

report which is dropped similarly to the infantry contact patrol

report.

All things of importance recorded, the plane returns to the

> airdrome to await a later mission.

-52-

1st Lt. Floyd M. Pickrell

Pilot, 50th Aero Squadron

That the plane should be [in] perfect working condition in

order to carry out a successful mission is obvious. Therefore, it

is the duty of the pilot to study his plane and motor very

carefully. He should inspect thoroughly before and after each

flight. He should discuss with the crew chief the running of the

motor with each flight, be present when repairing is being done

and know as far as possible the cause for a bad motor. Each

motor has a personality, so to speak, and the pilot must know

his motor in order to handle it successfully, for it can be death

when it goes bad in the air. A bad motor shakes the morale fof)

both the pilot and the observer, for the observer with experience

can detect a missing or sputtering motor as quick as can the

pilot. His mind is then taken off his work, because he does not

know exactly what the pilot can, or will do, and since his life

depends on such, he has cause for worry. I have found the Liberty Motor to be a wonderful piece of

machinery, but it is light and powerful, and consequently delicate.

Therefore its usage should be according to directions. Particularly

do I mention the fact that it should not be run at high speed on

the ground unti! the temperature is 700 centigrade. Before attempting flight everything should be inspected to see

that it is in perfect working order, particular attention being paid

to the guns and the 'C.C.' gear.- The pilot must know the sector

as well as does the observer and it should be necessary for

them to agree on the altitude and the course to be pursued. If

the mission is Infantry Contact the altitude should be from three

to six hundred meters, depending of course on the weather and

the kind of terrain. One can sweep down and pick out uniforms

in an open country, but it cannot be done in a forest like the

Argonne. When art Army is advancing rapidly in the open, as in

our advance toward Sedan, it is necessay to pick out fiiendly

patrols in order to locate the lines.
156 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

I -4

Mechanics Nieup~ort. servicing a French " " . j

In flying along the line get in the sun and come with the wind

if possible. Come with the wind preferably because speed is your

best defense against anti-aircraft batteries and machine gun fire

from the ground, and you are bothered more by them by flying

Infantry Contact than by enemy planes.

Division Reconnaissance Missions should be flown at an altitude of from eight to fifteen hundred meters, depending of

course on the visibility. It should not be flown higher than that as objects on the ground cannot be distinguished [even] when

the visibility is perfect. One should not play around over his

sector, but dart over and take a look and then come back over

your own line. Repeat this until the sector has been covered

thoroughly.

The best way to get away from enemy machines is to do an

easy spiral with the motor turning about 1200 (revolutions per

minute] or to do a gradual climbing turn. The former is best if

you are close to your own line and the latter if you are far over

enemy territory In each case the attacking planes have to get

inside the circle to shoot at you and if he does the observer has

an unobstructed line of fire. These turns should be first to the

right and then to the lefl in the general direction of your own

line. That attacking planes will try to get in between you and

your lines. It is needless to mention that this must not be

allowed. Also, do not allow the enemy to svrprise you.
Lessons 157

Learned

-53-

2d Lt. G.T. Lindstrom

Observer, 90th Aero Squadron

All the photographic missions on which I wa. sent were in the

St. Mihiel sector, and were done during the preparation peniod

before the attack and also during operations. These missions

were for the benefit of the division with which the squad-on

operated, and were taken at an altitude ranging from 2000 to

2500 meters, and from the enemy front line to a distance of

about 15 kilometers to the rear. I was also sent on several

missions before and during the attack to take oblique

photographs of the enemy front line position at an altitude of

about 350 meters.

On some of the missions (when taking vertical views) I had

two biplace planes from our own squadron for protection, and

on several missions, the various pursuit squadrons operating in

the same sector furnished the protection planes.

* The equipment during these operations consisted of the 52 cm

camera, without the automatic magazine, so a great deal of the

observer's attention during the time he was actually over the

course to be photographed was occupied in manipulating the

camera.

During these missions (the verticai) I was chiefly concerned

about four points, the course of the plane, enemy pursuit planes, anti-aircraft fire, and the whereabouts of the protection planes.

Owing to the method I pursued in minimizing the danger from

anti-aircraft fire a great deal of attention had to be confined to

the course of the plane in order that the wind did not affect its

course so as to blow us away from our objective, as the pilot

had great difficuty due to his position in following the course

true and allowing a proper amount for "drift". No especial

- difficulty was encountered in regard to following the course.

It was found that so much attention was required in

- manipulating the camera and watching the course of the plane, I. that it was comparatively easy for an enemy patrol of pursuit

planes to come within striking distance before the observer was

aware of their approach. With an automatic camera [which] was

later used in the Argonne-Meuse operations, this danger was

greatly minimized, as the observer's attention was not required

so much inside the fuselage in operating the magazine. The

greatest advantage a pursuit plane can have in attracting a

biplace observation plane is to surprise the observation plane.

The protection planes may see the enemy patrol and yet not be

*1
158 U S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

able to communicate to the photograohic plane except by

machine gun fire close to it, unless the observer who is taking

the photographs is ever on the alert. The photographic plane

may also bring the whole mission to grief by continuing on a

course which soon will place them in the midst of an

overwhelming enemy pursuit patrol. One such instance occurred

duong the St. Mihiei operations. The photographic observer's

attention was occupied in manipulating the camera magazine and

did not see an approaching enemy patrol which outnumbered the

photographic plane with its protection. Machine gun fire from

one of the protecting planes, very close to the photographic

plane, very quickly attracted the observer's attention to the

impending danger and the quick maneuvering of the

photographic plane with its protection planes, saved the mission

from probable disaster. If all photographic planes were equipped

with the automatic camera, this danger would be greatly

mininiized. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the caution

to all pilots and observers to be ever on the alert for enemy

pursuit planes.

In regard to anti-aircraft fire, which an observer is bound to

encounter on every photographic mission over the enemy's lines,

I have found what I believe to be the best course to pursue in

order to minimize the danger of a hit. In planning my missions I

followed the course here given. Before leaving the ground plan

the flight so that the course to be followed in flying over the

Kobjective is at a sharp angle to the approach at the beginning of

the course, and if the mission is several kilometers behind the

lines, it is advisable to fly at an altitude of 110 io 150 meters

higher than the required altitude. In this way w.,ile 'ie A.A.

battery is figuring its data and getting the correct altitude the

plane has time to fly some distance before the bursts come

dangerously close and by the time the beginning of objective is

reached the battery is firing with data which is entirely off as

soon as the plane makes a quick turn and loses its extra altitude

and is flying over the objective. Before the A.A. battery has had

time to observe the change, in both direction and altitude,

changed its data, arid placed the bursts dangerously close, the

end of the objective has been reached and no longer is it

necessary to fly in a straight line.

The greatest danger from A.A. fire is while flying in a straight

line without changing altitude. A gentle sideslip to a lower

altitude has been found to be a very effective means of getting

out of dangerous fire. We experienced a great deal of difficulty in our attempts to

take oblique photographs. Our first attempt was to suspend the

I

I 't1I ~ ] I]IiT - ,-- .. . ... ..
I

Lessons 159

Ar:aI vie", o! trn hey

camera on the inside ot the fuselage but this proved to be very

unsatistactory. inasmuch as the oil from the motor could not be

properly guarded against causing the lens to become dirty and

fogging the plates- With this method of suspension 9reat difficulty

was experienced in Securing a sufficiently small angle with the

horizontal. The photos did iot gvP the prnper perspertive After

several attempts at petting a suspension to fit the machne gun

turelle so the photos would he taken over the side where the

observer could see what lie was photogiaphing, and cIlso he

could secure a proper angle for the perspective

Ihis later arrangement qace exceient results after a yoke had

been made which absorbed ail vihrations fronm the plane

However, besides being very ha;cardous tfo fly at very low

altitudes over the enemy lies with thi suspenson instead of the

macrine ouns it was also very difficult to manipi;;ate due to the

II

i,
160 U.S. Air Service in World War I Vol. IV

blast of the propeller coming full or, to the camera, making it

extremely difficult to swing the camera towards the side. In

changing magazines difficulty was also encountered with the

shutter in the camera. Nevertheless several successful missions

were accomplished with this camera.

Some of these missions were sent out with protection planes as the photographic plane was practically undefended, and some

were sent out without protection. Due to the extremely low

altitude, protection waq hardly necessary as no enemy plar'es

were encountered at that altitude. The anti-aircraft fire was also

rather inaccurate at such low altitudes and without protection, the photographic plane drew less fire than it would have had

protection ships gone out with it.

-54-

2d Lt. A.W. Parr

Observer, 90tn Aero Squadron

To properly discuss the question of cooperation of aviation

with artillery -',m rust divide it into two pars: work in a quiet sector with tie warfare of a stationary nature, and condition of

the war of movement.

With well trained artiilery personnel and good communication

artillery reglage is highly successful in a quiet sector, or any

sector where the lines are not changing rapidly. But it should be

remembered that aviation should only be resorted to in directing artillery fire when terrestial and balloon observation fail, on

account of obvious reasons-i.e. greater expense, uncertainty of

communication, intermittency of observation on account of

enemy planes, and the very fact that the plane moves thru the

air so fast. In genera!, the methods as laid down in the

regulations are adhered to in firing. Of course the standard

panels and letter and number signals are used and they are

ample for most conditions. It is imp2rative that the reglage be

personally arranged preferably by the observer who is to run it,

as that is sometimes impossible the observer on liaison with the

division may arrange the details. After a number of regiages with

the same battery this is not so necessary as both parties become

accustomed to working with the other.

The average battery -ommander prefers to follow the book hut

is generally willing to modify some of the methods. For example

the B.C. may prefer to do amelioration by piece which from his

standpoint is better than amelioration by salvo whereas the

IL. -
Lessons 161

Learned

I--ti

.Aw A 75-rm field artillery gun

observer may prefer to do it by salvo on account of the

intermittencV of observation. He generally is willing to let the

observer choose the method.

It is rare to run a reglage clear thru for effect. An observer

can economi2e time by firing two batteries at once, altho this

practice too is rare.

In the war of movement reglage plays a different roll than in

stationary warfare. It takes the form, during an attack, of fugitive

target work in which batteries specialiy assigned to the work are

brought to bear on chance targets, which the observer might

see, such as a convoy on a road, a column of troops, an antitank battery, any battery in action, machine guns, etc. Generally

you have one 155 battery and one or two batteries of 75's. It is

best to call on the 155's for counter battery work as they are

more effective. Also it is easier to observe for them so it is to

the observer's advantage to use them. It is necessary to

remember the field of fire and range of your batteries. I once

tried to get a fugitive target battery to fire on a very fine target

without tesult. When I landed and measured the distance

accurately on my map, I found it to be just a kilometer out of

range. The B T. line looked very short at 1200 meters in the air

but in reality it was too much for the 75's and I had no 155's at

my disposal.

Fugitive target work in time of battle is generally pretty

offhand work. You give them one correction and then go to

• I__
162 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

some fire. No one wants to make a complete adjustment to 

a

target when you have to get in the barrage all the time as you

frequently do on account of low clouds. Also you want to keep

your eve out for other targets, to fire on. It has beer our °': experience that reglage during an attack is not very satisfactory altho it should ",e attempted in many circumstances. The

batteries are on the move, and their rec*iving stations are often

in bad working order; at least they don't get our signals altho we test out our wireless at the squadron. In any case knowing the

location of your batteries you can drop them a message giving

the coordinates of enemy targets and they can fire if need be

without further assistance from you. But in every case

communicate by wireless if possible.

While each observer may have different ideas about flying 

a

reglage, here are some suggestions which have proven useful

Call your battery on the way over and while getting your battery

ready, cr.b the enemy's lines to reconnoiter the target after that

you can keep on our side of the lines, unless you have to fly

very low and the visibi!',-, is bad In making yo ,r circles or eights

don't fly exactly the same course twice in succession, thereby

making impossible for anti-aircraft to lay on you by knowing just

when you are due to reach a certain spot. It iS necessary to zigzag more or less to dodge archies but unless you turn sharply

your wireless will be received While sending, keep a close watch

in the sky; also just before your shots are due to faii look

around for planes.

-55--.

2a Lt. William Bolt

Observer, 50th Aero Squadron

Too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the importance of

the liaison between the ground and the air. Good ground liaison

between the various units engaged during a battle is very

essential but there are certain pieces of information that can be

more quickly found out and sent to the proper authorities by the

aercplane:'. ihe aeroplane, equipped as it is with uireless, flares,

V.P. rockets and dropped messages not only affords a rapid

means O communication, but many times the nly means bV which certain information can be taken fror i one unit to

another

The location of our adv-inced troops, enemy troops, batteries,

machiue gun nests, convoys, counter attacks and train
Lessons 163

Learned

Laying out panel ma'kers.

movements can be quickly sent to those in command. Ground

liaison is essential and likewise liaison by means of the aeroplane

is essential. To get the best results close liaison between the

ground must be maintained. This is very true when working with

the Infantry. Infantry Contact Patrol work will under the most

favorable conditions present unexpected difficiilties. In oder that

Infantry Contract Patrol work be successful it is necessary that

the Infantry know the meaning of their priels, flares and rockets

and also the insignia of our planes. The infan:ry should not oniy

know the meaning of the various signals used, hut when and

how to use them. The observer on his part must know hi,

sector thoroughly- He must know his map so well that he can

at any time while in the air tell exactly where he is without

looking at his map. This is very necessary in Infantry Contact

work, because the oltserver is under ideal situations kept very

busy.

Th2 clouds, poor visibility, the nature of the terrain, enemy

anti aircraft, machine guns and enemy planes preveny the

observer from devoting his entire time to looking at !he groind

He must be c,nstantly on the alert and as his time is linit( . i!

is necessary that the most information possible Ie gathered in

the least poisible time If when the observer ,v Jic of the V.B

cartridges calls for the line J, itry do not bhow their panels

and flares, Infantry Contact s v.. york, cannot be succe iful.

Expei "ce has pioven that mr,,y times the panels and flires are

not dsdiayed and if they are not it is practically impossible to

say exactly where the advanced troops are. If the panels and

flares are shown the work is much more accurate and easier. In

,ase no flares or panels are shown, there is only one thing to

do; descend to an altitude from which men on the groun,- can

be s.?en

Thi! v'iy to do an Infantry Contact can:,ot be laid down

definite: by a set oi rules The way to Jo an Infantry Contact

depends upon the conditions at the time. The visibility, enemy
..- ,- -. ..--- -.-. -... -

164 U.S. Air Service

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Vol. IV

planes and the terrain make the method of flying different on

each occasion. The pilot and the observer must understand each

other and work together at all times

Reconnaissance work differs greatly from Infantry Contact. Here

too, the observer must always be on the lookout for enemy planes.

In reconnaissance one flies several kilometers into the enemy

territory hence it is more probable that he will be attacked by

l.istle aircraft. The observer must not allow the enemy to

surpise him. He must remember at all times that he is sent out

to get certain inforrnation and it is his duty to get that

information and return with it. Under no circumstances to return

without doing all within his power to fulfill his mission.

-56-

1st Lt. Howard C. French

Observer, 50th Aero Squadron

Safety over the enemy lines for Observation Planes depends

mainly on the watchfulness of the observer. If enemy planes are

seen soon enough on nearly ali occasions the observation plane

can get away, even if the enemy has large numbers. A good

observer should see enemy planes in time to have his guns

trained on them long before they are in range

If on observation for a Divison, where the distance to be

covered is only a short distance behind the enemy lines, the

enemy is encountered in larger numbers than yourself, the

Observation Plane should return to its own lines. You can then

enter your sector from a different place. If chased out again

continue to return and you will gradually cover your sector and

get the information to the rear without engaging in a fight.

On entering the enemy territory immediately start to side slip,

change direction, etc., even if the anti-aircraft guns are not firing

at you. They wilt allow a plane flying a straight course to gel

within good range before firing. In this case the first shots they

fire are the most accurate.

If attacked by a small number of the enemy, it is best for the

observer to begin firing at long range The enemy will know that

you have seen them and are on your guard. Knowing this they

will hesitate to close in However. if the enemy is in large

numbers he will attack anyway and it is best to wait until he is

within 300 yards beore firing so as to have ful, magazines at an

effective range.

t
. - Lessons 165

F Learned

If two or more biplace planes are attacked while flying

together, by closing in very close to one another and protecting

each other's dead angles they can hold off a large number of the

enemy.

Reconnaissance. When flying short distance reconnaissance,

possible stay directly

lines at an altitude of about 4000 feet and still cover your sector

four or five kilometers to the enemy's rear. To do this, while

looking at the ground you must not cover too much territory at a glance. Watch particular spots and gradually covei the sector

; this way.

This is also a good position to spot enemy batteries in action.

The flash of a gun can be seen as far back as eight or ten

kilometers. It is possible to !ocate batteries from this position

which would not [be located] if they saw a plane overhead.

On a day with poor visbilit,/, after ascertaining that the air is

clear of enemy aircraft, it is a good plan to cross the lines at an altitude of about 3000 feet and when four or fiyc kios behind them to come down to 1000 feet or lower. In this way the

machine guns or the front line can be avoided. !n the back

areas, rnch.ne guns are not found so thick and it is possible to

get valuable information at this low altitude. Infantry Contact Patrol. While flying Infantry Contact Patrol

I have noticed that the infantry seem to think that all planes are

enemy and on several occasions have fired on their own planes.

This I believe is due to some extent that the Infantiy does not

know the American insignia. While acting as a ground liaison

officer with the Infantry, I encountered infantrymen who were still

looking for the star in our insignia.' This was as late as

October, 1918. They said they got the idea from looking at

pictures in Amercan magazines showing the old insignia. Not

recognizing our plaives causes tie infantry to be slow about

showing panels and flares.

In calling for the infantry line it is better to fire the rockets

ahead of them rathei than directly overhead. They are niore

likely to see the rockets.

Six-star rockets, which are the ones most frequently used, are

-very often faulty and do not show the full number of stars. 

I

btlieve it would be better to use a rocket with a smalkr number L- of stars, in calling for Infantry line, as they are more accurate

and burn knqner.

During very open wafare, as during the last phase of the

advance on Sedan, it was possible to locate the extent of our

advance by the formation our Infantry wer, moving in along the

roads This could be done from a nigh altitude of 3000 feet

Often, knowing the approximate location, the observer could
166 U.S. Air Service

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Vol. IV

descend to a very low altitude to get more accurate information

without the danger of being over the enemy lines at a low

altitude for any geat length of time.

When flying low over woods occupied by enemy troops, a

plane appears to be a better target at an altitude of 1000 feet

than at 100 to 200 feet. When real low it is a fleeting target for

the men among the trees. Tracer bullets from the ground are

the most accu.ate. They also give away the location of the gun

firing them. A few shots by the observer in their direction

usually causes them to stop firing or stop using tracers.

-57--

1st Lt. James E. Sain

Observer, 50th Aero Squadron

Infantry contact cannot be governed by any certain set of

rules but each time changes in order tc get results. The

difficulties to overcome are rarely ever the same, but by knowing

the experience of a few, the others become easier. For instance,

if the observer knows approximately where the line is, then he can come down very low and find it eveit though no flares or

panels are shown and if he doesn't know except that it is within

five kilometers, then he must start and work up slowly finng

rockets continually. The terrain must be known perfectly by the

obrerver or many things of importance will be passed up before

they can be definitely located. The kind of terrain also makes a

great difference in the observer's ability to carry out a successful

infantry contact, woods and mountains being the greatest

drawback.

There are always several things to do almost at once, firing

rockets, locating things on the maps, watching the sky for enemy

planes and directing the pilot, and there should be a perfect

understanding between the pilot and observer. There are several

things to prevent an observer from doing a successfu! Infantry

Contact, the main three being: Poor visibility, fire from the

ground and enemy planes. The first is overcome only by low

flying. If visibility is good to escape fire from ground fly around

five hundred meters and change direclion constantly, and to get

away from enemy planes, never allow him he advantage 3nd you

are reasonably safe The !nfantry Contact report is very

important, therefore much care should be taken to get it

absolutely correct.

Ii
Lessons 167

~ Learned

Reconnaissance is very different from Infantry Contact and yet

it is very much similar. The object is to see in both, but different methods are used to see it. In reconnaissance, everything you

U see should be behind the enemy's lines. Fly so as to cover as

much ground as possible at one time, yet see it well, and that

means no one altitude can be used. Spend the time looking

where things naturally would be; in woods, valleys, along side of

roads, etc. When an object is seen circle round it until sure

what it is, if necessary to even distinguish uniforms. If fired at

from ground at this altitude, return the fire and the enemy seeks

shelter. The main difficulties in reconnaissance are anti-aircraft

guns and enemy planes. The first is overcome by changing

altitude and direction. Enemy planes should never be allowed the

advantage of getting between you and your own lines or

surprising you.

One of the greatest aids to observers is having experienced

men as instructors. They have been given the wrong impression

about many things before going to the front and that is

especially so with Infantry Contact and reconnaissance and many

important things were left out. Not enough time was spent in

map reading and cross country trips to be followed by maps

alone.

-58--

"st Lt. John W. S. Gilchrist

Observer, 104th Aero Squadron

1. Infantry: So far as I observed the most successful infantry

missions were those in which the observer did not call for the

line with rockets, but by very low flying found the advancfd

{ elements of infantry on the ground -generally in patrols and not

in the oldtime line-and reported where those troops were.

Occasionally the infantry answered rockets but not often. In my

opinion the reason for this was that observers were sent out far

too often with the order "Find the line." The infantry qot tired of

seeing the signals from the aeroplane. So long as the infantry is

t advancing it is not hard to find detachments of tnem, but when

the infantrymen are halted and dig '-lemrelves in and their

position [is] fairly well known, they do not want to expose I themselves to enemy observation. At such times, nu aeroplanes

should worry the infantry with ro:kets In my opinion the Air

Service should have a fe-. signals tot use with the ground and

use them sparingly

I

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II

168 U.S. Air Service

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2. Instruction of Infantry: A great many infantry officers who

criticize the Air Service preface their remarks by, "Well, I don't

know anything about the Air Service, but-." Not only junior Icriticisms that show they do not understand the nature, function,

and limitations of the Air Service. Some system of lecture, as

many rides in aeroplanes as is practical, and visits to Squadrons

where they can see photographs and reports, and talk to the

pilots and observers, would bring about a better understanding. 3. Instruction of Air Service. Air Service officers who could

go to the front on visits zn the infantry would probably learn a

great deal that would help 'hen in their work.

4 Artillery and Air Servi:e: In my opinion the Artillery

Insignia of the 104th Aero expected too muc of the 'Air Service without haying a very

Squadron clear idea of how to work with the Air Service. An Observer

who had been an Artilleryman, could by visiting batteries and

being present when shoots occur, clear up many

misunderstandings. ,5. Morale: So far as I observed, the pilots and ooiservers in

my squadron were anxious for this Squadron to have a good

name and wanted to do their wor in as good a manner as

possible. But they resented in being sent out on missions when

weather conditions precluded a possibility of success-for

instance, photographic missions that were sent out on cloudy

days or late in the afternoon. They sometimes felt that they were

being sent up on missions which were of no particular use and

did not believe that the mere fact of "flying at the front" was

worth while unless they could dccomplish something. A frequent

cause of complaints was the system of alerts. In only oie case I

can call to mind was the mission of such a character that it had

to be executed instantly. The other missions assigned to pilots

and observers on alert were generally those which could be

performed at any time within a three or four hour limit.

-59--

1st Lt. John W. S. Gilchrist

Observer, 104th Aero Squadron

Recommends: That a systematic plan of education in the

possibilities, urns, and limitations of the Air Service should be

given to all Infantry and Artillery officers to overcome the hostile

attitude now 'elt for the A.S. by those branches Also that Air

Service officers visit the Infantry and Artilery with which they

are to work in order to clear up risunderstandings concerning

the duties of each branch.
Lessons 169

Learned

-60-

1st Lt. John H. Caufield

Observer. 104th Aero Squadron

1. 1 think artillery reglages were very unsatisfactory during

my presence at the front (Sept. 25th-Nov. 11th, 1918). but that

the chief cause was the artillery's ignorance of ai-plane work.

As much training as possible by actual firing to familiarize

artillerymen with aerial methods and its limitations, is the only

remedy that I see for such a condition. I think the panel and

radio system now in use is a good one.

2. 1 believe that Infantry Liaison was fairly effective during the

period mentioned, but that it would have been much better had

the infantrymen been impressed with the advantage of signalling

to planes by panels, flares and rockets. Both officers and men

were very ignorant as to what they were supposed to do to

uphold their end of the liaison. Some officers did not know

even what a six-star rocket meant, and were completely in the

dark regarding the finer points, such as the use of battalion or

other P.C. panels, ground.signal rockets, etc.

3. One of the chif causes of other branches neglecting their

end of the aerial work, I believe, was their attitude toward the

air service- Artillerymen, infantrymen, doctors, and in fact every

branch of the service engaged at the front, take an untriendly

attitude toward the air service, not toward men in the air

service personally, but toward the service generally. They have

wholesale collections of stories as to airplane inefficiency and

even cite some cases cf alleged cowardice. All of such stories

can be traced directly to ignorance of aerial work, and to

exaggerated ideas regarding the number of American planes at

the front, and the work they were expected to accomplish.

They base their notions on newspaper stories and want results

to match. If some real facts were published, even ncw,

regarding the number of planes that took part in the American

offensive and the casualties, accomplishments, etc., of these

pianes, I think it would do a great deal to raise the Air Service

in the opinion of other branches. When they change their

attitude towa-d the Air Service, and become more friendly and

tolerant, they would probably show more interest in their end of

the work, to the benefit of all concerned.

kL _______
170 U.S. Air Service

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Vol. IV

-61-

1st Lt. Fay W. Williams

Observer, 104th Aero Squadron

Infavtry Contact: The work of an infantry plane is best

divided ,nto two phases, times of attack and quiet times.

At times of attack, a plane over the line at all times is imperative, and if the regimental and battalion headquarters had 

"

displayed their panels, this plane would be of great assistance. 

I

About all we could do was to report a group of men

progressing here and there as the infantry can't stop and 

I

display their panels. The failure of liaison between the infantry and the air has been due to !ack of training.

In quiet times the front line should not be called for except at daybreak and late in the afternoon unless other orders are

received from Dkision Headquarters. The front lines should not 4'

be called tor until the end of the mission. Quite a good deal of

time is lost due to not flying in our own sector. Each pilot and

observer should have his sector limits fixed in his mind and not

go outside of them. Identification rockets must be shot when

the plane is in front of our own line in order to get results.

Artillery Reglage: Our main trouble has been the lack of

liaison. It is absolutely necessary for a successful reglage that

the pilot and observer should see personally the commander of

the battery and find out his method of fire and limits of range and deflection. Quite a few times locations of targets were

dropped on the nearest battery and it was usually out of the

area covered by the battery and by the time Headquarters

were notified and a battery designated our gas supply became

exhausted. A plane sent up every afternoon just before dusk

can locate enemy batteries and this is of the utmost

importance. This was done but seldom and we did not

accomplih what we should have in this.

Counter Attack Plane: This plane should not start over until

after two or three hours of the beginning of the attack. Results

obtained in the first hours were unsuccessful and I believe 

a

counter attack plane should cover a corps sector instead of 

a

division front as the latter is too small for successful counter

attacks to 

...[fornj.

General Impressions: rhe main reason for the failure has

been due to the ignorance of the capabilities of an aeroplane

by the Infantry and Artillery So much has beer promised by the

newspapers that actual statements should be given in order to

change the hostile attitude taken by the infantry and artillery.
Lessons 171

Learned

-62-

2d Lt. Fred E. D'Arnour

Operations Officer, 1st Aero Squadron

I. The chief criticism which I consider can be made as regards

the use of aerial observation is the crying need of ground units

for training in working with the Air Service. One does not realize

how totally ignorant our troops are as regards aerial work until

ane works as ground liaison officer with a division now at the

front. This ignorance is not limited to the troops themselves, the

command is equally unfamiliar with the advantage and limitations

of aerial cooperation. It is important enough when our own

troops shot down an American aeroplane as has happened

several times in this squadron, but it is even more unfortunate

when Division Commanders refuse to give us their cooperation,

and the entire work of a squadron is in vain. A case in point is

when the C.AS. [?] of the 80th Division refused to arrange

practice exercises [with) us, another where the Commander of

the Artillery Brigade of the 35th Division hesitated to assign 

a

battery for fugitive target work, sayi.ig "we gave him his own

men for targets" and another where the same division had been in

the lines for 4 days without any of [he P.C.'s except the division

having their panel.

These faults can only be remedied by a course of training, not

only of men, but officers as well. It need not be a long course

for infantry, merely to make the men familiar with the American

cocarde and to teach them to display their panels when called

for. This would require only four or fve practice exercises.

In artillery the course should be more thorough and repeated

frequently. It is [not) necessary that any actual firing be done,

since, the main difficulty has been in lack of liaison between

airplane and battery commanders and not any fault of the men

at the guns. For this reason, only panel exercises are necessary,

a shoot b'!ing actually run through, corrections sent and all the

workings of an actual regiage gone through, except that no guns

are fired

I believe that the above criticisms have been repeated over

3nd over again so often indeed that they seem to lack force. But

experience has proven beyond question that no matter how

efficient the personnel of a squadron may be, no matter what

improvement is made in type of machines, the Air Service must

have cooperation from the ground forces in order that the

results obtained will iustify its future maintenance

II. Several times while this squadron was operating a, the front

L
172 U.S. Air Serrice

in World War I

Vol. IV

A wrecked aircrafi of the Ist

Aero Squadon, foloinq an

observation mission on 6

July 1918 ]

it was called upon to make practices with divisions in training

behind the lines. This extra work was always called for at times

when (he resources of the squadron were strained to the utmost

keeping up operations over the front and at tirn.s when it was

far below its required quota of pilots, observers and planes. It is

easy to see that the squadron could not carry on its regular work wi:h the same degree of efficiency, when called upon for

this practice work in addition. Had the training above mentioned

been done previously, it would not have been necessary to call

on an already overburdened squadron for work which should

have been done in the S.O.S.

Ill. There is an over-3rganizat ion in the Air Service which

causes considerable confusion. The squadron is a complete unit

in itself and I see no necessity for a g9roup organization. The

Chief of the Air Service of the corps could just as well be group commander and send his orders to squadrons direct, rather than

relay them through the group causing a duplication of work all

through. Every Squadron has its own operations, its own supply,

its own transportation, and I fail to see any reason for the

existence of the group. ~~IV. The Squadron Commanders should be the final authority J

as to whether or not weather conditions will justify a mission

being sent. He should not be forced to send out a mission

against his own judgment by a higher authority unfamiliar with

the conditions.

V, ! believe better results would be obtained, more work

acccmpished and the good spirits and morale raised by giving more recognition in the way of promotions and decorations to

the flying personnel, especially observers. An observer is much

more familiar with the work of an observation squadron than a
-__ _ _ _ _ __-_ __-_ -,

Lessons 173

~ Learned

pilot is, yet I know of only two cases where observers are in"

command of squadrons. Only one observer in this squadron has

been promoted while five pilots have been thus honored. In no

case is the table of organization carried out, it seems

unnecessary to prepare such a table unless its requirements are

fulfilled.

VI. Red Tape. I leave this problem for someone wearing stars

to solve.

-63-

1st Lt. Howard T. Fleeson

Observer, 12th Aero Squadron

It is only when pilot and observer have an intimate knowledge

of the terrain over which the attack covers that infantry liaison

can be accurately carried out. The pilot and observer must at all

times keep their sense of direction. This is done by means of the

sun and by the outstanding features on the ground. The

observer's study should be contours, as well as the roads, woods

and rivers which are the necessary points of study in every kind

of aerial observation. Both pilot and observer must know the

exact location of the present line, the objectives of the attack,

the hour of attack and the hour that the objectives should be

reached.

It is best to reach the lines at least 20 minutes before the

advanced positions of the infantry are to be taken, this allows

time for a study of the situation on the ground and in the air. If

the air seems free of enemy aircraft, fly up and down the old

lines once or twice, if you meet with hostile machine gun fire

from the ground, it is obvious that the advance has been held

up. Perhaps it is only local, that is, at one end of the sector you

meet with machine gun fire and at the other end you do not. Fly

further in the next time except at the points where you know

the enemy are. If you meet with no fire from the ground still,

cut in farther at certain points you will no doubt see friendly

troops, if they are the most advanced units they will sometimes

wave their panels before you call for them. In this way you get

an idea where to expect the panels or flares as you have an

approximate idea as to the location of the lines. Before shooting

your six star iocket, take a survey of the sky for hostile aircraft

as it is the most favorable moment of attack for the enemy, as

the observer will be busy watching the ground and the pilot the

course he is flying. It is here that a study of contours is so

ii! --... ~ --
174 U.S. Air Se"wce

in World War I

Vol. IV

valuable to the observer; it permits quick and accurate locations

of the panels or flares displayed by the infantry.

If troops are going forward, they vll not always display panels.

If you meet with this situation, continue to follow the advance

until it is held up. At this point, Battalion Commanders by

means of battalion panels may call for , lengthening of the

barrage, hand grenades or ammunition, or state that our artillery fire is falling short or that our troops are unable to advance

farther. The aeroplane here becomes of great value in

transmitting this information to Division Headquarters. it is

sometimes possible to aid the infantry by machine, gun fire from

the air on the strong points of the enemy. This is greatly

appreciated by our own troops and extremely discouraging to

the enemy. However, the work of straffing should not be done

until Division Headquarters has all the information that it is

possible for you to give them.

The least number of six star rockets it is necessary to fire, to

secure the result sought for. the better. Infantrymen complain

that the shooting of rockets from the air gives information to the

enemy artillery for their adjustment on our front line positions.

The writer believe5 that there may be some truth in the

statement. In doing Infantry liaison when our troops were on the

heights west of Chateau-Thierry, I shot about four rockets, after

getting the line we flew up and down, seeking to aid the infantry

in any way possible. It was not long before the enemy began a violent bombardment of these advanced positions. Whether this

was a prearranged barrage on our positions or incited by our

shooting the rockels, I do not know.

Oftimes the infantry has not been trained in the use of panels; in such a situaticn, you will have to fly low enough to distinguish

uniforms. When the visibility is good, this is possihe from a

height of 200 meters, but you will often have to go low as 50

meters to be sure of your identification. Uniess panels are shown

you cannot be sure that the troops seei are the most advanced;

so in writing your report, it is best to say "Friendly troops seen

at" and "Infantry showed panels at."

The enemy seeks to prevent aerial observatioi, by two methods;

first, antiaircraft and machine gun fire, and, secondly, aircraft of their

own. The former is the least effective of the two

but is dangerous for the inexperienced. Antiaircraft is avoided by

constantly changing altitude and direction, machine gun fire by

skidding and increased speed. Enemy aircraft will seldom if ever

attack a biplace machine unless it has superior numbers. When

attacked, it is best to withdraw and make a running fight toward

your own lines The attacking planes will come under your tail

and in a vertical dive on you from a higher altitude. The pilot

; _ .__ .:. ... ... . . .. .. .
Lessons 175

Learned

will kick his rudder to throw off their aim and when he does this

you are able to get a good shot at the one underneath. For the

one above about all you can do is to pray that he is a poor

shot. Don't get excited and aim on the nearest first. Shoot in

short burst of five or six shots. On the approach of hostile

aircraft, the observer should fire a short burst at long range so

as to inform the pilot of their proximity; the pilot iikewise must

notify the observer of all planes which he deems hostile.

-64--

2d Lt. W. J. Rogers

Observer, 50th Aero Squadron

Rogers was !he man who "found" the "Lost Battalion. During

an advance by the 77th Division on 2 October 1918, six companies of the 308th Infantry and two companies of the 306th

Machine Gun Battalion had penetratsd the enemy line and had

Fbeen surrounded by enemy forces. The 77th had tried for several days to break through and reestablish contact but without

success. The battalion had displayed its panels, but the 50th

Aero Squadron, which was working with the 77th Division, had

been unable to spot the panels or other signs of the battalion at

the place accurately reported by the battalion commander in

messages sent by pigeon. F:)od, ammunition, and other supplies dropped by the 50th Squadron had landed just out of reach

of the Americans, who were hanging on to their position in a

wooded ravine. On the morning of 7 October the 77th and other

American and French units made another effort to reach the

battalion. Flying with 1st Lt. Robert M. Anderson (see Document

51, above), Rogers spotted a panel that morning about 200

yards east of where the airmen had been looking for the battalion, Rogers immediately reported the coordinates by message to the 77th Division. The ground attack was successful,

contact with the battalion being reestablished later the same

day.

Inr doing an Infantry Contact Patrol, I first fly along the sector

over our own artillery to get an idea of the battle. Observe

where the barrages are falling, friendly and enemy, and get an

idea rf the enemy aeria! activity. ! judge the approximate location

of our lines. Then fly in on our side of the sector, lire a rocket

and come out, say 500 meters. Then go in on the other side and

I
176 U S Air Skervice

U~~ W'2 I.'jd VWacr I

Vol IV,

A r x Imrpla~c -Ra r, i c 5)1 , I

MI
I=

.. Lessons 177

Learned

fire another rocket. By this time the line is being shown where 

I

fired the first rocket. I get up close enough to see the panels

and flares and fly across the sector, putting the line on my map

as I go. Then I'm through. 

A

! did most of this work at 500 meters altitude. When weather

conditions are such as one must fly lower than this altitude, it is well nigh impossible to do the mission. In open country an observer can fly along a road, or a small wood, and locate

troops on the ground orienting himself by villages, but in a forest

like the Argonne, when there is a fog or mist, when you lose

sight of the villages on either side, it is like being on the sea.

You must fly by compass. You cannot locate what you see on

your map with any accuracy. The results obtained, therefore, do

not compensate for the risk incurred. A machine gun or a rifle

bullet from the ground, and the resultant forced landing destroys

a machine and kills pilot and observer. The records of this

squadron furnish the unrebutted evidence of this fact.

The manner in which panels are laid by the infantry so as to

take advantage of the sun and contours is of the utmoa;t

importance. When the writer located the famous Lost Battalion

in the Argonne Forest, they had put their panels on the side of

a hill, in, and facing the sun. I could not mistake them.

When panels are put in shell holes, they should be put on the

side and facing the sun. If put in the bottom they look like

water. Panels cannot be seen from the air very easily if the sun

i.n shining and they are in the shade.

An infantry observer should not strafe, except under favorable

conditions. He is the best trained man in the Air Service, and he

accomplishes but little at this for the risk he is taking. He is too

valuable for such work. However, there are times when he can

take the enemy unaware and inflict many casualties

When the Americans made their memorable breakthrough

from Grand Pre to Sedan, the writer was observing the

disorderly retreat of the Germans on one occasion On a road

through a small forest there was much artillery being rushed to

the rear. The pilot, Lt. Anderson and I fired about 800 rounds

on the road before the Germans could realize what was

happening By the time they had crawled into shell holes and

other hiding places with rifles and niachine guns, we were gone.

It would have been suicide to have returned The French

civilians in a nearby town informed us later that we killed 60

horses and as many men The good results were due tn the

t rriient aerial gunnery ot the pilot iii the first instance and the

fact that we enfiladed the road. We had a very few aerial

combats in our work. I think the DH4 with the Liberty motor

must have been divined by the Germans as a two seater fighter.
I

178 US An Servce

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1

They came around in Fokkers many times in superior numbers.

looked us over, and went away. Sometimes they would fire a few

shots.

One Fokker went around into the sun one day and came at

Lt. Anderson and I three times We !eft the sector three times

but each time returned and finished the mission without a combat. My experience was that they w.ouldn't attack the Libertv

without a distinct advantage

In conclusion I might remark that aerial observation is neither

a bed of roses nor the path to glory that the man on the ground

sometimes imagines it to be. The wind behind a Liberty is

terrific, and it taxes the strength of the strongest to fight it 3

hours If the ship is rolled and tossed about very much, either

by bumps or purposely to avoid shell and shrapnel, the

occupants sometimes get sick. Very similar to sea sickness, you

lose your lunch arid the wind places it in a neat layer on youi

goggles. The wind has blown your hankerchief from your pocket.

You wipe it off on your teddy' sleeve. You start to write your

messages and of your three pencils you have one left. You break

the point on it and your knife is in your pocket under your

teddy bear.

You read in the air report the next day that our chasse men

shot down 30 planes, and that the efforts of reconnaissance

planes to drop provisions to a lost battalion were of no avail, all

falling to the Germans.

But I like it I'm sorry we had war, but since we did, I'm glad

I was an aerial observer.

-65-

2d Lt. James E. McCurdy

Observer, 50th Aero Squadron

Too much importance cannot be given to close liaison between

the infantry and the aeroplane. While the infantry are advancing

and obstacles are being overcome, even in the best terrain, it is

impossible for quick and precise information to be obtaiited by

the ground liai,-on agents. No matter hw tki0,-oiqhly traied the intantry and Artillery

may be, there are sure to be times when the shells from our

own guns will fall upon the advancing troops and unless

information on this is quickly gotten to the artillery units

supporting, the attack is held up and many lives lost, at a time

when every life lost and every second of delay diminishes the

chances of success
= I

L.u'-solrs 179

l. .-. pa i Id

1I

In order to have close liaison betw,,een the infantry and the

aeroplane it is absolutely necessary That the infantry re'y on the

aeroplane for commurucatinq with the ,..mmander.G ;n the rear,

,rnd it is of even greatez importance that all sign'als from the

aeroplane be properly int~rprete~d and prornptly. answvered

Nothing is more discouraging to an aerial obsorere th-nn

conrsistent dplav+ or) the part of the unit 'w.ith whi~h he is w+orking

in answerino sign'als

Through neqhqgence on the part of the officers, infantry units

hr-,e been kn,..'.*n t , qr, into, action witho~ut havinq been

Cquipped wi'th h.nson materials (p,;ot;.. flare,, Mr.) and without

inslr,j(t,c~ii ir) th,, use oi these njaterital5 This is 9ro.,s

(arelessnr.ss, anc! the officers guilty of this ark, t..ikin

unnrecessary ( hanceh' w1ill) liv -'s of their Men. W ,hen, an aeroplane

caiis for the hne, those men 5, iowm9g paniels and flares shn, utd

make sure they art!, the advaniced units at that poirnt, as shouvinq

O mr)rce than one st.i uo' pd,e - ii, deplr ikfo¢; 10.+ c,,i,,ln. ornu

Fb co;n."uslon in t ttWe nmeon,; dsaste:

Wh-_n iroop5' are in th . "(v.ods, the showing cif p~anels is

useless as it is ;mnpf)ss5l[,!e fo:r th , w rial Mbserve, io) see then).

but! fiarws show up [p!a~riy as a smudge of bl-ue smoke In case th lj2 rtri, Tr.S arIe flares an ordinary smoke smudge 7ithoiji 

aolad recom o ii w o mnrneh

a4r0A Colnes be Cpoely tr 1 pr htd No tlwo oherers ,iii

roe ui hp e r ont he pai t o th infantry icers, 1ion, hoit is a
180 US Air Service

in World War 

I

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fact that little can bo accomplished at a greater altitude than 300

meters. For my part I have always found 100 to 200 meters to

be the best altitude for good work. At this altitude the danger

from enemy machines is diminished by half, for a plane is not

likely to attack and if he does attack, he can only attack from

above; also the anti-aircraft guns cannot be used on a machine

at this altitude, while machine-gun fire from the ground is no

worse at this altitude than at 300 metersThe last point I will mention is a proper understanding

between pilot and observer. An observer, in order to be

successful in infantry liaison, must feel the utmost confidence in

his pilot; also the pilot must feel that the observer is perfectly

competent to carry out his mission and at the same time guard

the machine from attack from the air.

When I say an observer must feel the greatest confidence in

his pilot I mean that he must feel that his pilot is not only a

very brave and willing flyer, but that he is a very skillful one. 

I

remember on one occasion while flying on a photographic

mission with two other machines, we were subjected to heavy

fire from machine guns on the giound and anti-aircraft. It did not

seem possible for the machines to escape without injury, but 

I

felt no fear for the safety oi my own machine for I had

confidence in my pilot though at the same time I felt the liveliest

fear for the safety of the other machines.

f

-66--

2d LI. Adolph 0. Devre

Liaison Officer, 50th Aero Squadron

The duties of a squadron liaison officer may be compared

ia ,uraby wit tliose ut a waiiii dc~e~p 3 , of a labur ,rwon in

civil life; both act as the buffer between their respective

organizations and those for whom they work, and both are

constantly on duty to see that the interests of their constituents

are carefully safeguarded, and to clear up any misunderstanding

which may arise between them and their employees. The liaison

officer is the medium by which the aero squadron and the line

forces with which it is working, come to a complete

understanding of the work at hand and thri him any. difference

may be adjusted.

aI
Lessons 181

Learned

The aero squadron liaison officer" must be thoroughly familiar

with the duties of the aerial observer, and he must be well

impressed with the limitations as well as the possibilities of aerial

observation. He must, therefore, have had actual experience in

flying over the lines. and accordingly he is selected fromn the

squadron roll of observers, temporarily detached froin the

squadron and sent to the Headquarters of the division with

which his squadron has been assigned to work.

On arriving at this post, the new liaison officer at once seeks

to make himself known to the officers of the divisional staff. This

is done on his own initiative or under the guidance of one of the officers. The _staff Chief of Staff will explain what he expects of

~the aero squadron, and criticize what they have done for his

.. division in the past. From the Operations Officer and Intelligence

Officer can be found the means of obtaining that latest

information as to the situation on the sector. The Operations

Officer will also, on request, furnish a copy of the field orders

and the plan of liaison for whatever movement the division may

be interested in at that time. The Chief Signal Officer has charge

of all lines of communication, and the liaison officer should at

once find out from him the best way to communicate with the

squadron, the system used in receiving the radio and dropped

messages from the airplane and the codes in use From the Staff

Officers of the Artillery Brigade the distribution of all artillery

units can be determined arnd what units rely on aerial

observation for their fire control.

The daily work of the liaison officer varies to a certain extent.

He must at all tirnes be sure that the proper divisional panel is

being displayed, and in such a position that the observer can

readily see it. He will rmake sure that the panel mren understand

their work and that they are in direct communication with the

radio receiving set. He must keep in close touch with the

operations and intelligence offices, any abrupt change in the

position of the front line, or change in an artillery location must

be sent to the squadron at once. All reports on aerial activity

must be investigated thoroughly , especially those involving the

work of his own squadron.

It i.F also important that the liaison officer visit the artillery

battalion and infantry brigade posts of command to see that the

airplane is giving good service and is receiving proper co.

operation from the ground. The infantry must at all times be

equipped with panels and flares, and instructed in the proper use

of each. 'With the artillery the exact met:-.o,' of fire must be

agreed upon, and also the number and positions of the batteries

designated for fugitive tar qet work.

The whereabouts of the liaison officer must always be known
rI WUIC ,'1 I .II

LI

U8 S ;n-n AiqSunnic

in World W<lI

Vol iV

II

at divi ion headquarters In case a special mission is required.

the operations officer will notify the haison officer of the nature

of the m;ss:on and the hour of the execution he I:alson officer

wdll promptly transmt this request by telephone or radio to h!s

squadron operations officer who \&ill start the airplane on its

n;sslion

In addition to the above routine, the liaison officer must assume the roll of missionary, for there seems to be a

widespread !ack of knowledqe in the !ne forces as to what an observation squadron can do and what it cannot do Many ftntry officers think that our planes fail in their missions

because they do not patrol up and down the front line

cOnirtLaly to prevent the enemy fron strafing our trenches, 5et

they also insist that we keep a lookou! on the enemy's hark

areas Daily, innumerable questl)rns shout the Air Serice_ are

asked of the liaison officer, and he can readily dispel some ct the erroneous ideas which seem to prevail at the presrt? tme
Lessons 183

L-earned

4-

-67-

2d Lt. Walter L. Francis 

.

Observer, 90h Aero Squadlron AN

There are but few flying men who will not igsee to the

stateiment (hat iifaiatiy lascii u! ii~ldi!iy ';viitrci. oz, it

probably better known in the American Service, it .: once the

most valuable, most dangerous, and ios)t difficult type -f ?:f

plane work. 01 course it is only carried on in periods, or' attackI

when our troops are advancing and when lines of communication from the front to the P.C's are very often useless.

Theory says that the Infantry contact plane will fly from- 800 to

1000 meters and that when called upon to do so by prearranged

signals the infantry will show their paneks or flares oil tne ground,

the observer will plot the lEne of panels thus foi med and will

drop a map with the line marked out upon it. Practice, however,

is widely different. First of a the infantry is tar' busy fighting,

and at 800 to 1000 meters your signals would many times be

unnoticed. Then again a battlefield is covered with debrs,

papers, and various things which look like panels from that

altitude. So you find first of all that you must fly lower Still for some reason you can only see a panel here and a flare there,

and you see also some figures nomvng on the ground but you

cannot make out whether they are friend or enemy. Again yota

decide to go down a few hundred meters. Now you are flying at

a hundred syters or less, well within the trajectory of the 

t

artillery, aiid also within range of enemy machine guns, but you can make out your en and the enemy also. Your s n rockets

also fall nearly to the ground rnd are seen by tre men. Now the

proposition comes down to locating the advanced edements of

your own troops, which in the method of attack now used

against enemy machine guns, will never form a continuous line,

hut will merely be groups of men pread out, and advancing

slowly to encircle and put out of action the points of resistance

which are bothering him

One case is known where an Infantry Liaison mission was

carried out with a thick layer of fog at fifty meters. The team

doing the work flew to the point where the troops should be,

dropped through a layer of cloud and proceeded at that very low

altitude to locate their advanced units with good results.

There is always the enemy scout plane to he kept in mind

The observer cannot hang over the side and search the ground

as he does in training, but must continuay he on the alert

against monoplace attack. A French observer of three and a half
184 U S An Service

it i W oiId Wae I

Vol IV

years experience once told me, "The secret of successful

observation is to never be surprised. Watch the ground one

second and the air nine." His idea was that if you see your

opponent as soon as he sees you or sooner, you can at least

choose your own position for receiving his attack. Any flier

knows that the biplace attacked by a scout cannot attack and

expect to survive many such combats.

Many times when rapid advance is being made the team

performing the missions does not know exactly where their

troops are expected to be. Some observers have quite

successfully used the following plan: They flew well back into the

sector, unti! they saw; large groups of our troops in close order

advancng on a road, then they turned about and following the

road back until the units grew smaller and finally disappeared.

they then began to look for the advanced elements, and

gradually picked them up and established the line. This again

means flying at low altitudes where friendly troops can he

recognized by sight. Another squadron at Chateau-Therry flew

forward until they encountered enemy marhine gun fire and then

knew ihat they were over enemy troops and began to search

out their lines, a little further back.

Another practice which has been found very satisfactory as

well as almost necessary is to fly down the approximate front

line firing as many as five or six signals calling for the line. This

gives the entire line a warning to show their position, while firing

only once at one end of the sector might very orlen be

unnoticed in other parts of the line resulting of course in a

failure of the troops to show any panels.

Successful infantry contact rmssions depend upon the observer

and pilot seeing the line. If il canro be given at the time by

panels it is up to the aviator to go down and see the men

themselves Many times after several days in line continually

fighting, the troops have lost their panels, and their flares are all

gone, so that the infantry cannot he too harshly criticized lot not

always respcnding to the airplane call. Hence the necessity of

the observer seeing from a low altitude.

lnsiqnia ol the 90th Aero SquAdron
Lessons 185

Learned

-- --

1st Lt. Pressley B. Shuss

Observer, 90th Aero Squadron

During the four months on the quiet Toul Sector, Lt.

Livingston! as Pilot and mysself as observpr accomplished a

number of exercises with different infantry units in order to train

the infantry in working with the planes and to get the needed

experience ourselves.

On the morning of Sept. 12, 1918, we were assigned our first

real Inf. Contact mission in combat. We left the flying field in

sufficient time in advance of the scheduled time to test the

wireless and to fly to the designated P.C.'s to locate message

dropping grounds.

The first difficulty which presented itself was getting through

our own barrage. This was accomplished by observing the

flashes of the guns, choosing a point to enter where the least

number of flashes were observed and flying through the line of

rising prolectiles in the direction of fire at an altitude of 300

meters. Then later choosing a point where the least number of

projectiles appeared to be falling we flew through the failing

ba rrage at an altitude of 600 mveters.

Flying in elongated circles, and figure eights, over our troops

we worked forward more each circle, first obstrving that vehicles

were not visible in advance of certain points, then massed troops

were not visible in advance of other points, further advanced I

saw friendly troops in an open formation after descending to

200m as visibility was very poor with some rain. Advancing

further I observed more troops, but as the barrage was still

about one kilomneter in advance we continued north to the line

of bursts of the barrage and worked back searching each part of

the sector for our troops After seeing the most advanced ones

visible I fired several rockets which means "where is the front

line" and also where are the P.C.'s of the units.

The only answer was given by one Battalion P C. showing its

position. Aft~er firing several more of the same rockets without

answer from the front line we circled over the [one?] point after

the other descending until we had located the most advanced

troops and the rear guard of the enemy troops, and the Tear

guard where th"' were visible.

I found that ai an altitude less than 150 meters it is necessary

to circle over lone] poin't and search it thoroughly before

proceeding to another as the speed oi the plane would only

permit a short 21ar,ce at one point while flying straight, also that
186 U S Air Ser.,ice

in World War I

Vol. IV

I

men on the ground are very difficult to see if they are in shell 

I

holes or immo.'able

While observing the advance of the troops I sent by wireless

code the line of the barrage and location of the front lines and 

4

while flying back to the rear I wrote out the dropping messages

and marked on the drop maps the location of troops, barrage

fire (in enemy territory) and any thing observed which would be

uf 1liileil to the command. I dropped one cop, of these at

Division PC. and one at Corps P.C. 4

After landing I immediately reported to the Intelligence Officer,

gave him what information I had, then made a detailed report of

the mission.

All subsequent missions were accomplished in the same

manner, but many difficulties presented themselves which had to

be overcome. The most important difficulty is the presence of

enemy planes. During all missions I had to watch the air for

enemy planes and have rarcly failed to see some every mission

They endeavor to surprise us which we counteract by keeping

a very careful watch and by always standing up with the

machine guns ready to mount.

I wish to warn all concerned of the importance of this as 

I

was surprised by four enemy pianes diving dowkn through the

clouds when I was sitting down. By the time I had risen and

turned my guns on them they were out of range, having turned

away which showed us that we were saved by the fact that they

were more su-prised to see us than we were to see them.

Had they known that we were there we should have been

easy victims as they passed us within 30 meters

At that time I was wearing a fur lined coat reaching to my

knees, when I arose to get my guns in action the wind blew the

skirt of the coat up between my hands and the guns which

added to my delay and prevented any chance of my getting 

a

good shot at them

I have never worn anything but a union suit since that

experience

As a biplace plane has movable twin machine guns in the rear

it is most effective in an aerial combat while appearing to be

running away; therefnre fit) should only fight when the enemy is

aggressive.

When attacked during a mission we have always led the

enemy planes over our territory and when they turned back we

would return and finish the mission or repeat the tactics until

they go home, as we carry more gasoline and can stay longer in

the air.

'I he second important difficulty is bad wedtfer cundiliun 

. Rair

decreases the chances of the infai.try an.wering the signals. To
Lessons 187

Learned

overcome that we must fly low enough to see the man I had to

fly as low as 30 meters on the afternoon of Sept. 12, 1918, as

the rain was very heavy and large drops. On that instance the

pilot reduced the speed of the engine until we could just fly levei

to decrease the chance of the propeller be:ng broken by the

heavy drops of rain. In fact it was split anyhow but we were able

to finish the mission unaware of that.

Fog or ground mist not unly prevents seeinq men or panels

except when directly ovet them at low altitude but makes it

exceedingly difficult to keep your location and direction and

nearly impossible to locate them accurately on the map when we

do see them.

To overcome this we fly low over a road or river we know

near as possible to our sector then pick out one land mark

ahead and keep it in sight until we see another Inasmuch as our

speed is so great that requires selecting landmarks very quickly

in a fog as one may see only a few hundred yards ahead. That

Twin machine guns on a "bip'ace plane" of tihe 166th Aero Squadron Lis Linn D 1"Grandpa") Mernil and

Edward C ("Red") Black, Jr. (at the guns) nian the aircraft

I!

I!

i ,

r=
188 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

is not possible if the pilots and observers do not know the

sector very well; therefore it is very important to study all marks

of the sector very thoroughly. I have on several occasions accomplished an infantry contact

mission during bad visibility that would have been impossible had

I not spent hours studying large scale maps of the sector.

I refer particularly ;o territory in the way of enemy lines where

one does not have occasion to fly over at low altitude previous

to the mission assigned as the advance of our troops bring new territory in our field of work in one day.

The difficulty of locating the front line. The infantry does not

like to show thpir pnoitmnns (first) because the,' ha.'e a great fear of all planes (,used by enemy planes shooting at them with

machine quis. dropping bombs, and regulating artillery fire on them, (second) because they are not able to distinguish enemy

planes frorr allied planes due to the lack of instruction, (third)

Pad weather conditions make aerial observation exceedinglv difficult The photo shows U S. troops in action

at Belleau Woods

.A.

.MV
Lessons 189

Learned

because of rumors to the effect that the enemy use planes with

the allied identification marks for the above purpose. I do not

believe !hat is true.

I made a visit to the troops while they were in the front line

and thus was enabled to find their reason for the existing

conditions above mentioned.

The troops do not realize the importance of the command

knowing their exact position and location and progress in combat

and how quickly the plane can get the information to the

command after obtaining it.

This difficulty is overcome on our part as much as possible on the mission by repeatedly asking for the line and staying over

them as long as possible and in the event that they ull not

show panels or flares we go down until we can see them unless

they are in agreen forest, in that case it is impossible.

It can be readily seen that if we see troops in an open space

and a forest in advance we cannot tell the command that the

troops that we saw are the first line unless they show panels

indicating it, as we have no manner of krowing if there are more

troops in the uoods unless we receive an answer by the Bengal

flares from the woods.

This also meant that we must fly forward until we see the

enemy troops in order to be sure that no more of our troop~s are in advance of the last observed. Doing this decreases very

much our chances of getting the information to the command as the enemy troops shoot at the planes with tifles and machine

guns at a very effective range.

We have conducted school at the Aero Squadron which is

attended by about 200 officers and non commissioned officers of

the infantry of one Division at one time for the purpose of

instructing them in distinguishing planes, methods of showing the

lines, sending messages to the plane, and the importance of

liaison between the infantry and the contact planes

The Squadron has sent observers to visit the Infantry Division,

Brigade, Regiment, Battalion P.C 's and into the front line to find

out what the infantry thinks of our work, what we can do for

them and to instruct them in what our work is, how we do it

and enable them to identify allied planes. This better

understanding wil lessen their fear of planes and prevent our

troops from firing at allied planes and machine guns which has

occurred very frequeiitly.
190 US Air SeNice

in World War I

Vo! IV

-69-

1st Lt. Flynn L. A, Andrew

Observer, 104th Aero Squadron

I Too much time is lost in the execution of an Infantry

Contact Mission which defect can be remedied only by the

thorough training of infantrymen designated to work with the

aeroplane; and immediate answer to signals from the aeroplane is

imperative

2. The method of firing rockets from the aeroplane as a

request for information is not sufficient to insure a reasonable

successful mission, for two reasons to wit: (1) A six star rocket

requesting our line is very often fired when the ship is behind

the front line whicl means that the infantry whose whole

attention ib, directed to their front, fails to see the signal, the line

is not shown and the time is lost. (2) An observer failing to get

the line at this first signal must again signal, distracting his

attention from the ground where it should be constantly in order

that he may always be oriented. This defect can be cured by

some continuous signal that will show the infantry at all times

just what the ship is requesting. Two methods could be used (I)

If the ship was sent out to get the line, one, two or even more

streamers attached to the ship, meaning a definite thing and

showing the infantry at all times that this ship requested the line,

(2) Mechanical devices such as small antennas which could be

instantly rolled in or out, attached to each a small streamer or more compact signal, one meaning one thing, two another, etc.

In this way no time would be lost, while over the lines, the

infantrymen could have the signal constantly 5efore them. The

whole time of the Observer could be given to them.

-70--

2d Lt. H. L. Borden

Observer, 90th Aero Squadron

During the latter part of the Meuse-Argonne operations the

First American Army was greatly handicapped by the absence of

cavalry with which it could harass the retreating enemy and

accurately learn the disposition of the enemy rear guard To

remedy the defect the idea was conceived that the observation

squadrons at the front could to a large degree, do the work

which in former wars was intrusted to the cavalry

-. -. --- nI---. a z
A

A

A

Lessons11 =

Learned

t___ A

So fdr as this writer knows this was first suggested by Major

Littauer,I Chief of the Air Service of the Third Corps of the First

American Army. About the tirst of November he instructedl the

observation squadronis in the Third Observation Group, to

cooperate with the InfantrV by locating c-,ur advanitng frontl lines

kilometers carefully locating the enemies first line of rear guards

and their supports. rhis in formation was to be embodied in a

brief message marked "urgent - hand to the nearest oificer' and

dropped to the troops in our front lines In addition to securing

thus information the observers and pilots were to haiass the

enemy by machine quit fire

Owing to the sho rt duration of hostilities after this plan was

pLt intij operation, it never receivPed a thorough !ert. however, a

few cavalry reconnaiss~ances were carried out with great suiccess

In view of the short period of experimentation aod the

cfmamymiy Lo:idtroms in the torrain., the air strength of eniemy .3;r
I

192 U S Air Serice

in World War I

Vol. IV

I

craft and ant:-airciaft defenses (which always confront the

observer during an advance) no hard and fast rules can be laid

down for the successful carrying out of a cavalry reconnaissance;

however, it can be definitely stated that the purpose of the

cavalry reconnaissance is to first find our front lines in a certain

sector, and then to scour the air so carefully that practically

every meter in the enemy's lines will have been seen to a depth

of from four to six kilometer;, so far as possible locating the

hostile first line of defense machine gun nests, etc., with their

supports in the rear- Then this information should be written

down and dropped to our front line troops

Now to accomplish such a mission it is evident that certain

general rules must be observed. The first thing to be considered

is the way to accurately locate the enemy's forces (it is not

necessary here to speak of methods of finding our front lines for

every observer trained in Infantry contact work understands

that). The location of the enemy is much more difficult

Generally the hostile troops have retreated to previously

determined positions where they are well protected and

concealed. Also, being well trained troops, when they first see 

a

hostile plane (if they are at all exposed to view) will take all

the cover available, or if there is none will be prone and

motionless. Hence they are extremeiy difficult to see

Therefore it is necessary that the observer on a cavalry

reconnaissance should fly at such an altitude that he can pick up

such difficult objects. For the individual observer the altitude will

depend upon weather conditions, the keenness of his eye sight,

concealment offered by the nature of the terrain to troops on

the ground, etc.. Under conditions of such poor visiblity as

prevailed during the Meuse Argonne operations the writer found

that an altitude of 100 meters was the most satisfactory in his

individual case.

In addition to the greater facilities for locating troops afforded

by flying at a low altitude is the fact that a plane is safer from

M.G. bullets at an altitude under 200 meters than one from 200

to 600. This is due tu the rapidity with which the plane passes

out of range and the rapidity ol changing angle of sight

When the enemy troops are seen, if the conditions are

favorable, it is a good idea to strafe them with machine guns. This not only demoralizes the hostile rear guards but (if your

advance guard is not too hotly engaged) they will see the

direction ol your tracers and this will point out the position of

the enemy. Furthermore, when a plane begins to shoot all the

M.G. nests in the vicinity if not already firing will open up. By

thus drawing the enemy's fire the observers can locate by sound

and by sight (if tracers are used) the machine gun nests which if
Lessons 193

Learned

not discovered would take a heavy toll of our infantry.

It is not advisable to go into further detai!s in regard to the

carrying out of a Cavalry Reconnaissance. Only experienced

observers should ever be sent on such a mission. A trained

observer bearing in mind the purpose ot the missions (as have

been outlined) must work out the details as to altitude of flight,

etc., himself. In regard to manner of flying, one thing only should

be insisted on; as in every case when flying over hostile territor,

the pilot should never fly straight ahead. He should throw off the

many machine guns for whom he is sure to be animated target.

It is evident from the few experiments successfully made that

the Observation Squadrons have a new and valuable field of

work in the making o! cavalry reconnaissance; during an

advance. Tho the planes cannot harass the enemy as thoroughly,

as the cavalry, they can cover the territory much more quiLkly

and more carefully. The experienced pilot and observer can

cover the front of a division-l dctor in from one to two hours,

drawing the fire from all hostile positions and locating the strong

points of defense, this in most cases can be done rapidly and

without loss of life. On the other hand the progress of the

cavalry is slower and always costly in lives of the troops. It will

remain for future opportunities to demonstrate beyond a doubt

the valuable service that an Observation Squadron can

accomplish thru a "cavalry reconnaissance."

-71-

2d Lt. William Nickel

Aerial Gunner, 99th Aero Squadron

Having been from April 20th., 1918 to Sept. 15th., 1918, Chief

Instructor in Armament in the School for Observer Gunnery at

Casaux, and having been asked to report in brief, from this

experience in connection with my experience at the front with

the 99th Squadron, the following is submitted:

A waste of time is the result of the method of machine gun

instruction, in an effort to systematize the assembling and

dissembling of machine guns. Because of the different characters

of different persons. it is impossible to achieve uniformity.

Instruction for some is thereby retarded and they must begin

their studies anew when they reach the front.

The French system comprises a complete course in the

rudiments of gunnery, and the need of constant practice, careful

6m
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194

In World ASrIWar 

Vol IV

calibration of ammunition, anid proper regulation in sights, and the knowledge thus attained, afterwards renders the student independent of the armiament department of his squadron. The lives of both men in a plane are frequently dependent upon the proper action of the observer's gun-s. It, therefore, behooves the observer to know his gunis initimatelv, precisely and to have 5uch knowledge of stoppages, or other trouble, as to enable himr to remedy such trouble in the least possible time. Academic instruction is not sufficient, the learner should have ample practice, demonstration of the mniifold causes of failure of action

.A rocking nrale used as a dun~niy tuseisge for trning aerial gunners

41I
Lessons 195

Learned

and the quickest means of correcting them. Brief lectures giving

the fundamental theory of the actions and operations of machine

guns will suffice much better than long, intensive discussions

which tire the minds of the listeners and cause a loss of interest,

The time thus saved, could be spent with great value, allowing the student to do by actual operation, what he must eventually

do in any case, i.e., construct his own personal method for

achieving results, whether it be in assembling and demounting his

gun, or in the cleacing of stoppages. Timely suggestions by the

instructors, are, of course, of material benefit.

The machine gun instruction centers of our service, uniformly base their course on this systematic method, and on the use of

a single gur, whereas in actual practice at the front, the twin

gun is universally used. This discrepancy between instruction and

practice should not occur, because it is manifest that with twin

guns instead of single guns, new difficulties arise.

The practice of removing the magazine to clear simple -A

stoppages, with either the single or twin guns, is unnecessary

and is also cumbersome and slow. The French who are experts at clearing such stoppages, do not remove the magazine in

actual work at the front, nor does their course of instruction

include such an operation. In my estimation the French method

is quicker and safer for both pilot and observer than is the

English and so-called American method, which includes removing the magazine for ali stoppages.

A combat seldom lasts over 30 seconds, and the average

combat lasts about 10 seconds, the average distance being about

200 meters. Every move that the observer makes can easily be

seen by his opponent. If the observer begins to demount his

gun, the enemy closes in to a closer range, thus making his

shooting more accurate. The observers who joined our squadron, who had taken their aerial gunnery training under our own

method, invariably learned from the students of the French this

easier, quicker method of clearing jams and stoppages. I found that the French sight was the most preferable. Our

Government having adopted the so-called Norman Ring,, an

English sight; the Reilie Soult was impossible to get from our

Ordnance Department.b In many cases the observers had their

mechanics to make the Reille Soult sights, some borrowed them

from the Frcnch, and in some cases where they could not be

procured or made, the observer used no sights at all, judging his

shooting by his knowledge of deflection.

The student has never been taught any method of defense

against machine gun fire from the ground. As about 75% of the

casualties of our squadron were from this source (a not unusual

percentage I am told), it is quite apparent that a gunnery school
196 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

instructor should be absolutely familiar with combat conditions,

and where possible, experienced in such work

At Cazaux we mounted a shot gun on a tourelle and had the

students to fire at clay pigeons. This method enabled the student

to attain quickness in judging deflection, ease in handling the

tourel!e, or "feel" as it is called; and lastly and most important of

all, he learned to shoot quickly from a tourelle.

Map reading for aerial gunners has always seemed to be a

minor subject, whereas it should be a most important one. Ofttimes he finds it is his duty, not only to orient himself but

actually steer the flight course. Forewarned is fore-armed, and

the aerial gunner who is never sure of his location is rarely in a

position to be fore-warned.

I

-72-

Col. Frank P. Lahm

Chief of Air Service, Second Army

Balloon Service. On my arrival in Paris the last of September

1917, I found no Balloon Service organization. This work was

being handled in the Technical Section, Paris, with Major East,-

'- Air Service in direct charge. There was no one in France at that

,- ,time who had been in the Balloon Service or was technically

A- conversant Ath the subject. Foresight on the part of those in

-o2".9=; " charge had led to orders being placed with the French for eight

complete company equipments, for 50 additional equipments of

balloon baskets, cables and basket equipment. It was fortunate

that these orders had been placed as the first companies to

arrive from the U. S. did not have their equipment with them.

At the same time orders had been placed in Italy for Fiat trucks

and cars, which, though slow in arriving, made possible the

operation of the first units A cable had been sent to the U. S.

asking for eight balloon companies at once. They did not arrive

until late in December. In the meantime, artillery brigades had

arrived from the U S. and were in training at the various

artillery training centers, unfortunately without balloons to work

with them, with one very notable exception, that is, the Artillery

Camp at Le Valdahon. The 84th French Balloon Company had

been sent there in August and a great deal of credit is due its

commanding officer and chief observer for their excellent work in

teaching our artillery the use of balloon observation, in training

artillery officers as billoon observers, and later ir. training some

24 of our own balloon officers who were sent over here to

L .,
Lessons 197

Learned

receive their balloon training. Had the other artillery training

centers had balloons at their disposal a much better

understanding would have been arrived at between the Artillery

and the Balloon Service. Those artillery brigades that had

balloons availab!e during their training period show the results

most plainly, as did those who trained where there were no

balloons. In the latter cases it required a long and difficult course

of education at the front which could have heen conducted

much more easily before arriving there. In all future service, we

must guarantee the presence of both balloons and observation

planes at all artillery training centers.

On the recommendation of the French it had been decided

that our balloon school should be located near the French

Balloon School at Vadenay north of Chalons. I represented the

Air Service at a conference there in October, with officials of the

Headquarters of the French Balloon Service, the French Balloon

School and the French Mission. It was agreed that our school

Germans tire a! an Arnencan observation balloon

_40 .

- :. ~ jt Z4

W71-~:~ r'

4W
198 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

would have six French officers and 10 French non-commissioned

officers as instructors, who were to work with our own

instructors. With the assistance of the Construction Department

plans were drawn up in the Paris office which organized

immediately after my arrival, providing for training the officers

and most of the enlisted specialists of balloon companies coming

from the U.S. Construction was started in November, one

balloon company arrived in Chalons about December 23 and was

utilized in construction work This was completed about the end

of March when the German offensive made it advisable to

evacuate both the French and American Schools.

Had it not been for French balloon equipment, French

assistance in our early instruction and the benefit we derived from

their previous balloon experience, our own Balloon Service would

have been greatly handicapped and we would not now record

the success which I feel it has had in France, practically from

the beginning. The time came, however, about the end of March,

when it was advisable for us to separate our own activities from

those of the French and rely more upon ourselves so I believe it

was wisely decided that our School should be moved to Scuge

where it could operate under o-jr own control, still however,

assisted by the advice and cooperation furnished by the French

through their representatives at the School.

The French offered to train 100 Balloon Officers and a cable to that

effect was sent to Washington about October 1917. Fifty-four extra

officers with no balloon training were sent to France and put

Iinto French balloon companies at the front, afterward receiving

t artillery instruction at Le Valdahon, additional balloon instruction

in the 84th French Company at Le Valdahon and some of them

finally graduating from our Balloon School at Souge. This was 

a

I, war expedient that I trust we will not have to repeat, and will

serve us a lesson to prove that our own facilities must be

sufficient to meet our needs without calling on a foreign nation

to train our officers in bulk. They were given valuable training by

the French, were fortunate to receive instruction :n companies

operating on the front, but the training varies in different

companies, was unnecessarily long in others. A very few of

these officers were not of the desired standard as raw material

and wasted their own time as well as that of the French. The

latter should not be called upon to sift out our new officers,

eliminating the unfit and reclassifying the others. That is our own

duty. I believe the records show that not over 30 per cent of

these 54 extra officers proved to be good observers.

On being relieved in Paris by Colonel Chandler about

November 20th, I went to Headquarters Air Service at
Lessons 199

Learned

Chaumont, organized the Balloon Section in that office,

remaining until the removal of the Air Service Headquarters to

Tours, after which I was in charge of tie Advance Section of the

Balloon Service including the supervision of training of the extra

officers in French Companies at the front and of our own

balloon companies at the Artillery firing ce-nters at Le Valdahon

and Haussimont.

The history of the Amencan Balloon Servce in France may be

considered as the most successful part of our Air Service 4

activities. The first Air Servce Unit to go to the front was the

Second Balloon Company which relieved a French Balloon

Company near Royaumeix, the end of February 1918. The

companies that came from the United States were as a rule

made up of excellent material, well trained and well disciplined,

and their services were uniformly efficient when put to the test

in action against the enemy. The Balloon Service's great difficulty

was in persuading the General Staff that their services weie

required in France and at the front, and in securing priority of

shipment of both personnel and material.

With none of the Heavier than Air's offensive opportunities,

our observers have shown the greatest fortitude, energy, efficiency and devotion to duty. Full advantage has never been

taken of the Balloon Service, that necessary liaison between the

Heavier and Lighter than Air Services has never been properly

established and we still have much to learn before the Army will

reap the full benefit to be derived from this very valuable

auxiliary.

.I.

t
200 U S. Air Service

in World War 1

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-73-

Col. Charlos DeF. Chandler

Chief, Balloon Section

Air Service, AEF

Commissioned in the Signal Corps in 1898. Chandler had

become interested in balloons and had been placed in command when the Aeronautical Division was established in 1907.

He had qualified as a balloon pilot in 1907, dirigible pilot in 1909,

airplane pilot in 1911, and military aviator in 1912. He had been

in charge of the Signal Corps' aviation schools at College

Park and Augusta, had cormanded the 1st Aero Squadron at

Texas City in 1913, and. ,morg other things, had established

the Army's balloon plant and Ister the balloon school at Fort

Omaha. He had been placed i.- charge of lighter-than-air experi- r" ments and engineering in Washington in April 1917 and had

gone to Europe with Foulois in November. replacing Lahm as

head of the Balloon Section, AEF.

The following paragraphs summarize the lessons learned during

the present war which pertain to the Balloon Section:

As a result of our experience the present complement of one

balloon company per Division should be considered only as an

allowance and all companies serving with Army Corps should be

classed as Corps Air Service When a Division joins the Corps

one balloon company should be assigned to it, normally

remaining under the tactical control of the Division commander

during the entire period that the Division pertains to the same

Corps. There is no objection to the transfer of a Divisional

balloon from one Corps to another with its Division, whenever

prospective military operations make the transfer expedient.

The control of a balloon Group commander over Divisional

balloon companies in his Corps s',ould be considered technical

and not tactical; the supervision relating principally to personnel

replacements, supply of maintenance equipment; provision for

hydrogen and the consolidation of information reports required

by Corps Headquarters.

Army Artillery should in all cases arrange with the nearest

Corps balloon to adjust fire instead of having special balloons

attached to Army Headquarters exclusively for Army Artillery.

An army reserve of 10 to 15 balloons should be availab!e in each

army for special assignments, particularly the reliel of companies

in Corps Groups alter long periods of arduous service: The
L~cirrwd2011

Ilk<

K~rn c; 1-loor
202 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol, IV

Army Reserve companies should never be considered es available

only for Army Artillery.

Balloon Wing Headquarters of an Army should be utilized to

exercise the technical supervision over all balloons in one Army.

Instead of the small administrative units now provided by

Organization Tables for each Balloon Group Headquarters and

Balloon Wing Headquarters, there should be allowed one Balloon

Park for each Army: this Park to have the same personnel

allowance as balloon companies and utilized to provide

detachments not only for each Group and Wing Headquarters

but for tube dumps, balloon mobile parks and all other balloon

detached service of an Army.

~~~~~~..... _ -- , . : .... . -. ................ ! .... I- ......... .. .. ..

The change from balloon squadron organization to separate

companies, each serially numbered ano conmbuied in Groups

according to thieir assignment to Army Corps proved to be

entirely satisfactory and should be continued.

The procurement of balloon observers by assignment only

F from Artillery which was effective from January to August 1918

was not satisfactory. it resulted in much waste c~f time and effort

in cases where Artillery officers were detaileo as balloon

observers against their inclinations for air servcei

It was found that the course of instruction at the Balloon

School covering a period of three weeks and including only the

most essential subjects could not be pursued satisfactorily by

officers having no previous balloon experience. In time of peace,

to coiser the entire subject thoroly, a course of one year should

he provided to insure complete instruction for officers having no previous ballooning experience.

Park .. . ........

aloac sbloncmaie n tlzdt rvd
Lessons 203

Learned

-74-

Maj. John H. Jouetts

Wing Commander, Army Balloons

Second Army

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Jouett had been

commissioned in the Coast Artillery in 1914 and detailed to the

Aviation Section of the Signal Corps in 1917. Going overseas

with Foulois's party in November 1917, Jouett had served as

Chandler's assistant in the Balloon Section and had been com- mander of balloons in IV Corps before becoming Balloon

Officer of the Second Army in October 1918.

There are two well defined periods of balloon activity, which

are: in a stationar-,' sector and in an offcnsivc.

The balloons of the American Expeditionary Forces in

stationary sectors performed very creditably in their work with

artillery, in their work of general sUrveillance, and to a certain

extent, in theii work with infantry. There lacked, however, to a

great degree an understanding and perfect liaison with the Maj. Jouettaeroplane service. In the Group which the undersigned commanded in the Toul sector about the only liaison that was

made ,with aeroplane units was a series of conferences between

pursuit pilots and balloon observers for the purpose of discussing

the best way to attack balloons, the best ways for balloons to

evade attack, and the efficacy of various types of protective fire

from the ground. No other l. ison was ever attempted, and, to

the best knowledge of the undersigned. in no group was there

any liaison with the aeroplane service worthy of notice.

This is all wrong. It is a well understood fact that balloons

shoula undertake to regulate for artillery on all targets which can

be seen from the balloIon. In other words, the aeroplane should

not touch those targets but should be used for other things. On

the other hand there are many targets which the balloon cannot

use, due to defilade and othor causes, an? ,,hich should be

regulated upon by aeroplane. In quiet se. ,here should be

nightly meetings and discussions between the Corps Air Service Commanders and Corps Balloon Group Commanders for the

purpose of assigning various duties and functions to both

aeroplanes and bal;oon.. By these meetings, and these meetings

only, can the maximum amount of work be done and each

portion of the work done by the unit which should do it. This is by far the greatest lesson which was learned from the functioning

of balioons in a stationary sector.

I3
204 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol- IV

During an offensive. In offensives, balloon groups were composed of companies which had received training only to

work as separate units and there had been practically rio effort

made to have the balloons of a group work together. This was,

of course, unavoidable because there had been no offensive on any great scale on the Allied side and there was no precedent

from which to work and it is, therefore, evident that these

lessons had to be learned. The French. from time to time, had

courses at their balloon school for their group commanders, and

in the opinion of the undersigned, this course should in future be

given to American Group Commanders. Thee are many, many

points which came up which had to be settled immediately,

without ever having received previous thought, points which

should have already been worked out.

During days of preparation for an offensive, the Group Commanders should have nightly conferences with the Company

Commanders in order that the work of the Company Commanders may be checked, that ail necessary work is being

done, and that no unnecessary work is being done, and to better

insure the proper understanding of present and future conduct of

operations within the group. During this same period the Group Commander shoild form a balloon telephone central with direct

lines running to each of his companies in order to have

uninterrupted communication.

10th Balloon Co truck convoy with winches, moving from one position to another.

I

tli J ..
Lessons 205 

A

I Learned

rA

/A

When an offensive has commenced and any gains have been

realized, balloon companies immediately drop out of control of

the Group Commander in so far as communication is concerned.

If the advance is but a short one of 5 to 10 kilometers, liaison

can be kept up, but when the advance is greater than this, or,

when there is an advance every day-although it may be a small

one-communication with the rear canrot be kept up by balloon

companies, if they desire to keep up the more important work of

remaining in touch with combat units with which they are

working. After various attempts to keep in touch with balloor.

companies during an advance, both by telephone and by 

=

wireless, the undersigned was forced to adopt a plan which 

- worked very satisfactorily and which could be followed at any X-V

time in the future with good results. An Army Corps Staff

always maintains a forward observation point to which a trunk

line is run. Along this trunk line there are usually test boxes.

The Group Commander should form an advance P.C. at a test

box which is as near as possible to the center of his balloon

companies. Permission should be received from the Corps Signal 

4

Officer to cut in at this test box. The Group Commander should Lktake station at that point when his duties permit and he should

have an officer there when he is absent. Balloon companies 

-

should not be forced to run lines to this point, but should be 

r

required to have half-hourly courier service between the

companies arid the forward P.C. It was found by the undersigned

that at no time was any company more distant than 3/ to 

4

kilometers from his forward P.C., so that there was no great --.

hardship in having a set of runners carry pencil memoranda of

operations completed during the preceding half-hour.

Group Commanders should so conduct the administration of

their groups that they are at all times free to go from company

to company. They should not be tied down anywhere to any one

point. The Group Commander's place during a battle is with his

companies, and he should proceed from company to company

giving advice and helping out in every way within his power. By Transporting a balloon to 

a

the selection of a good adjutant for his Balloon Group

Headquarters this can very readily be done. It has often been new.posilon

found, due to congested traffic, that Group Commanders have

not been in their offices for stretches of from 24 to 36 hours.

There should be no necessity for their being there.

As the Tables of Organization now stand, since the addition of

a certain number of cargo trailers, a balloon company has just

enough transportation to be entirely mobile. A balloon company

must be entirely mobile or it looses one of its greatest assets in

an advance, that is, to be a good forward observation post in 

a

minimum of time. - -. 

-- _ _ 

_ , 
206 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

-75-

Capt. Alvin C. Reis

C.O., Balloon Group, V Corps

The assignment of balloons to Army Artillery as such should

be abolished. It is recommended that all balloons under the

jurisdiction of the Army be assigned directly to corps.

The necessity for providing a channel through which reports

can be transmitted promptly requires that the reports come

through an office which is in more intimate touch, than Army

Headquarters can be, with balloons on the line. Information

obtained must be acted upon at once. Delay of an hour, in the 

effort to secure connection through main controls, renders the

information worthless. All balloons should be connected by direct 

- line to the balloon central of the sector, so that the value of the

balloon's observations may be immediately utilized.

The mission of all balloons in a sector is, fundamentally, the

same. The mision is two-fold: surveillance of the sector and

adjustment of fire.

There is no distinction in method and aptitude between an

observer's watching matters of interest to Army Artillery and an -4

observer's watching matters of interest to G-2 of the corps.

Ludicrous it is to assume that a balloon can look only for things

of importance to the Army, shutting its eyes to things of

importance to the corps. The balloon must see everything and

should report everything to one central balloon group office.

That office should be held responsible to determine whether the

information is of value to Army Artillery or to Artillery Corps, to

G-2 of the Army or G-2 of the Corps.

There is no distinction in process and function, between

adjusting fire for the 155's of Corps Artillery and adjusting fire

for the 270's of Army Artillery. There is no distinction between

objectives for Corps Artillery and spotting objec:ives for Army

Artillery. The work is identical.

The present designation of Army balloons, as such, creates

this double oaradox of permitting the Army balloon to be idle

when tne Army Artillery does not fire and, on the other hand, of

compelling the Army balloon to reach over into the sector of

other balloons where Army Artillery batteries may be situated,

attempting to regulate fire on an exaggerated Balloon-Target

Battery-Target angle.

The balloons in a corps area should be distributed territorially,

not tactically. The balloons should be identified with a sector, not

with a command. The balloon should see everything and do

LA
Lessons 207

Learmed

everything in its sector. The balloon should regulate every piece

of artillery, of whatever caliber, in the sector. The balloon should

observe everything in the sector, whether it be the relief of

enemy troops (a matter of interest to G-2 of the Corps) or

whether it be a 42.centimeter gun in action (a matter of interest

to the Army Artillery).

The function of every balloon in an operation should follow

this defined rule: It should see everything directly in front of it,

and no more. It should regulate for everything directly behind it,

and no more. Thus will efficiency and harmony be augmented.

-76-

Capt. 0. B. Anderson

C.O., 43d Balloon Company

Equipment: Recommend that companies operating against an

enemy be issued light transportation called for in the tables of

organizationConditions in this Company required liaisons and

reconnaissance to be made on foot. Demands made on this

Company were in the light of full equipment-therefore,

unreasonable orders were received, about sending reports,

couriers, etc.

A winch detail for a

captive balloon.

I

II
208 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

Command: Recommend that a Balloon Company, when once

assigned to a Division, be left with it throughout the operation of the

Division.

The practice of assigning a balloon to a new Division just

b,'fore an attack does not permit the greatest efficiency through

liaison

The practice of taking away a balloon from a Division just at

the time it can be used effectively is not considered to the best

advantage.

The practice of assigning balloons geographically should be

discouraged. A balloon operating with a tactical unit cannot

operate geographically. Its movements should be governed

completely by the tactical movements of the unit to which it

should be permanently assigned.

Upon taking the field, a balioon company should be detached

from control of the Air Service for tactical employment and

turned over to the combat unit.

Lr

IF
Lessons 209 -A

Learned

Determining the conditions for the operation of the balloon

should be left to the company commander, who should be held

responsible for the technical part in the employment of a balloon,

in all other respects the balloon should be under the orders and

be supplied by the combat unit.

It should be as much a part of a division of infantry as is the

artillery brigade headquarters.

-77-

Capt. 0. B. Anderson

C.O., 43d Balloon Company

Recommendations on Equipment: That a special study be

made concerning transportation issued to balloon companies

Heavy trucks with low axles are not suitable for mud and bad

roads.

A company should be equipped with a light tractor with

caterpillar tread. This is to replace tender which is useless.

Compartment in tractor for tools would replace tender in every

respect and would really facilitate mobility in mud, open fields, or

any kind of roads.

Experience proves that a light tractor has enough speed when

a balloon forms a part of a large unit which moves slowly.

Motorcycles for liaison work, alone, are not enough. Two

saddle horses are indispensable.

There is 10 times the necessity for a horse in a balloon

company than in a battery of arfillery, for artillery reasons alone.

A chart room truck should be issued.

Trailers are dead weight.

The transportation of a balloon company should not be built

for speed, but to insure steady progress in any weather or on

any road.

Command: The organization known as "Balloon Group" is

believed to be useless, during field operations.

The work of the balloon is so varied and it is concerned

with so many different features that to do justice to the units in

line the balloon should be assigned to them and left to woik out

its own mission.

To accomplish the best results, it is believed that this can

be done by placing the balloon under the orders of the combat

un;t or artillery brigade.

&
- ~,*in.. - - - --- ,.,_

210 U.S Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

-78-

Lt. Col. Warwick Greene

Chief, Executive Section

Air Service, AEF

Greene, a graduate of the Harvard Law School, had been Director of the Bureau of Public Works in the Philippine Islands and later

Director of the War Relief Commission of the Rockefeller Foundalion before being commissioned in the U.S. Army in 1917 After

serving on the Air Service staff in Paris, he had become Chiefof the

Progress Division when the Coordination Section (later Coordinalion Staff) was established in June 1918. Greene had succeeded

L. Col. H. A. Toulmin, Jr., as section chief when the Coordination

Staff was reorganized as the Executive Section at the beginn'ng of

November 1918.

The creation of the Coordination Section by General Patrick was an effort to tie together and relate the diverse and scatlered activilies of the Air Service. AEF. Supply and technical matters were

being handled by an office, headed by an Assistant Chief of Air

Service, in Paris. Personnel administration, training, information,

balloons, photography, and some other things were supervised

from Headquarters, Services of Supply, at Tours. In the Zone of

Advance an Assistant Chief of Air Service was in charge of developing airdromes, depots, and parks. Al of these activities had to be

coordinated, not only within the Air Service, AEF. but aiso with

plans and programs o General Headquarters. AEF, at Chaumont,

and with the requirements of aero squadrons and balloon companies in service at the front. Finding that coordination previously had

been weak and faulty, Patrick tried to correct this situation by

creating a special coordinating unit soon after he became Chief of

Air Service, AEF. Greene, as the result of his experience on the

Coordination Staff, thought there was a better solution to the problem.

1. In accordance with your instructions to prepare a

statement giving my personal opinions and recommendations

based upon my experience with the Coordination Staff and its

successo the Executive Section, the following is submitted:

Coordination Staff

1. The principal duty of the Coordination Staff was as its

name implies to coordinate the activities of the Air Service,

A.E.F To this end it was empowered:

41. 0
Lessons 211

Learned

a. To iiquire into all activities of the Air Service.

b To prepare plans, programs, etc. for the Air Service.

c. To make the necessary estimates for carrying approved

plans and programs into execution.

d. To follow up the progress of the Air Service in executing its

approved plans and programs

2. In addition the Coordination Staff had property accountability

and the mobilization of squadrons.

3. While the Coordination Staff, under its energetic Chief, Lt.

Col. H. A. Toulmin, Jr., did notable work in assisting to

reorganize the Air Se-vice and to bring it to a much higher level

of efficiency, yet in my opinion the same duties would have

been better performed by a regular staff organization, under a

chief of staff reporting directly to the Chief of Air Service. This

staff would have been divided into the customary G-1, G-2, etc.,

and all of the duties of the Coordination Staff except

mobilization and property accountability merged in a more

comprehensive organization.

4. Besides being a clean cut, compact and efficient military

organization, this would have had the inestimable advantage of

making the organization of the Air Service uniform with the rest

r of the Army As this staff system had already been worked out

Bedding dowr. a balloon.

j?

I-
212 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

and was in operation on a large scale in the A.EF. (and similar

staff organization in the other Allied armies) the Air Service

would have wasted nio time in drawing up plans, preparing

schemes of organization, working out the details of duties, etc.

On the contrary, it couid have availed itself of a ready-made plan

of organization, in actual operation, a practical success, and so

well known that a mere reference to a section number carried

full information to other army staff officers of the exact

jurisdiction embraced by the section. All of the duties actually

performed by the Coordination Staff could have been performed

under such a staff organization-and in my opinion performed

with less effort and greater effectiveness.

5. To sum up, the important duties of the Coordination Staff

could have been carried out to bettei advantage by the regular staff organization in use by the American and Allied Armies

Executive Section

1. On or about November 1, 1918, the Executive Section

succeeded to the functions and duties of the Coordination Staff,

except inspection. I do not know why the name Executive

Section was selected.

2. This Section had hardly gotten under way when the

Armistice fundamentally changed all conditions in the A.E.F. This

historical and statistical work of the Section was, at the

suggestion of the undersigned, transferred out of the Section.

This work was then placed in a Historical Section under the

charge of an Assistant Chief of Air Service.

3. Mobilization work being finished, the force which had been

engaged in this work was, upon the recommendation of the

undersigned, transferred out of the Section in order to work

elsewher,a on demobilization.

4. The preparation of plans, estimates, programs, and the

follhw-up work on the progress of the Air Service automatically

ceased.

5. There remained in the Executive Section property

accountability and the valuation of the assets of the Air Service.

a duty which had been added to the Executive Section after its

formation.

6. With reference to inspection: the undersigned while a

member of the Coordination Staff recommended that an

Inspection Department be organized for the entire Air Service, to

be divided into three branches, namely,

Military-Discipline; morale; administration; smartness; flying,

gunnery and combat efficiency; condition of stations, parks,

messes, sanitation, etc.
Lessons 213

Learned

Captive balloons somnetimes were caught in trees

Mechanical-Condition of engines, motor vehicles,

machinery, etc.; shop efficiency, etc.

Property and Equipment-Care and condition of equipment;

efficiency of supply methods; condition of depots; keeping of

property records, etc.

7. This matter was taken under advisement by higher

authority. In the meantime, all property inspection which had

been carried on by the Accountability Division . . . came to an

end. About five weeks later (some time early in December) it

was finally determined, in view of the Armistice and of the rapid

demobilization of the Air Service, not to have military and

mechanical inspection as an organized branch or department of

the Air Service The Executive Section however was directed to

resume property inspection through the Accountability Division.

8 Since that time the Accountability Division has carried

on as systematic a property inspection of the Air Service as

conditions have permitted. This inspection has revealed a wide

range of efficiency. At a few stations conditions were excellent,

in many fair, in some indifferent, or poor, and in a few

deplorable. Generally speaking, motor transport is particularly

badly cared for and this branch of the Air Service lacks

discipline, good morale, and pride in the condition of the

vehicles. Unfortunately this condition has been prevalent through

the motor transport of the A.E.F. which for many reasons has

not reached the standards of the British and other armies At

the same time the undersigned has seen some motor transport

with the 3rd Army and with certain divisions of the A.E.F. in

hi,
214 U S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

better condition than the best in the Air Service

9. Thus military and aviation mechanical matters have been none of our concern, yet in the course of these inspections we

could not help noting that where equipment was well cared for

and property records were in good shape, military discipline and

mechanical efficiency were also high. Conversely, poor property

conditions were usually accompanied by slack discipline and low

mechanical efficiency.

10. 1 believe that an Inspection Department of the Air

Service, given the necessary authority and efficiently organized,

would have greatly increased the effectiveness of the Air Service.

Had such a department been organized in the early days of the

Air Service, the history of the latter would have been different. A

comprehensive system of inspection would have welded the Air

Service together, prevented duplication of effort, checked

slackness, permitted full use of our limited mat,-riel hy preventingi

waste and misuse, save[d] large sums of public money, ard

raised standards of efficiency throughout all branches of the Air

Service. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Air Service

functioned without such a department. Unquestionably it would

have been a better organization, both from a military and a

business point of view, if the Chief of Air Service had been

served by a competent Chief Inspector, with a live, trained and

aggressive force of inspectors under him Inspection should have

been organized on constructive as weli as on critical lines.

-79-

1st Lt. Alfred T. Bellinger

G-2, A-7, GHQ, AEF

The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2), GHQ,

AEF, was organized into divisions which carried letter designations. The Military Information Divicion, G-2-A, headed by

Col. Arthur L. Conger, had several subsections, with A-7 being responsible for Air Intelligence. A-7 had been organized

by Lt. Prentiss M Terry. who had been succeeded by Maj.

(later LI. Col.) Charles F. Thompson. One 7f the members

S of Thompson's staff was a young Yale graduate. 1st Lt. Al- kifred T Bellinger,* who wrote the following report on air inLt. Preniss M Terry telligence organization and activities.

if

-'i' :''I

, ' - i 1IIC" ... i
II

essons 215 t Learned

This war has been responsible foi the development to 

a hitherto unknown degree of the science of military intelligence. Whereas previous Generals have been content to learn of large

enemy movements with questionable accuracy from their spies,

and of a number of minor unrelated details from the occasional

capture of prisoners cr documents, it has become possible

through the careful exploitation of all sources of information for

Commanders in the present war to reconstruct the major part of

the enemy's organization and intentions with dependable

completeness This work is the special care of the Second

Section of the General Staff (G-2) in the American forces, which

directs and coordinates all the agencies of intelligence. None of

these is more important than air intelligence, though its

possibilities have been fully appreciated only within the last two

years However, before the United States entered the war, the

experience of the French and British had proved that the results

of air reconnaissance and the data to be gathered from air

photographs were of such importance that it was well worth

while to assign specially trained men to this work exclusively. In

recognition of this, but with a most imperfect understanding of it,

early tables of organization of Air Service made provision for an

Information Officer with each squadron in the field The idea in

mind was that these Officers should take care of military

intelligence proper and also collect and disseminate information

on enemy and allied aviation of interest to the Air Service only.

In October 1917, however, the problem having received more

specific consideration, an agreement was made between the

C.A.S. and the A C. of S. G-2 providing for the detailing of

Officers as representatives of the General Staff to serve with

Squadrons in the field. From this time it was recognized that the

matter was primarily a Staff affair and all the Intelligence Officers

so assigned, from whatever branch of the service they were

drawn, were, in point of fact, selected and trained by the staff,

under whose orders they acted In spite of this original

arrangement, nevertheless, the idea that the work of air

intelligence belonged properly to the Air Service persisted in

some quarters, to the detriment of cooperation and mutual

understanding The thesis of the supporters of this theory was

that it was necessary for an Intelligence Officer to have technical

knowledge of aviation for the proper performance of his duties

and that t was impossible to get good results from a system

which gave so prominent a place to an Officer attached to Air

Service units yet not responsible to the Air Service This view

was based on a consideration of the French system in which the

corresponding Officers, while in the closest contact with the 2me

Bureau, are in effect members of the French Air Service. To put

! ..
216 U.S. Air Service L-_ in World War I

Vol. !V

an end to the possibilities of contention on the subject in March

1918 Major D. M, Henry was sent by the Air Service and Major

C F. Thompson by the General Staff to study the methods of

the British whose air intelligence was conceded to be the best in

theory and organization. After a study of considerable detail,

covering a large number of units and headquarters, these

Officers presented reports without consultation in which,

however, they were in perfect agreement on the point that,

under existing conditions the work could be satisfactorily handled

only by the General Staff at G.H.Q. Accordingly a subsection on Air Intelligence (G-2, A-7) was formed which was to select all the

Branch Intelligence Officers. The reports made it evident also

that convenient as it might be for these Officers to have

theoretical and practical knowledge of aviation, such knowledge

was by no means essential, whereas it was of the first

importance for them to have an acquaintance with Intelligence in -

general such as could only be gained by an intimate association

with the Staff. It was then decided finally that all bombing and

reconnaissance units should be supplied with Branch Intelligence

Officers, responsib!e to the G-2 of the Army or Army Corps

under which their unit operated, through whom orders for 

I

reconnaissance were to be transmitted to the C.O. and

information gathered from reconnaissance disseminated to all

concerned. The most important feature of this arrangement was

that it made the work almost wholly a matter of the personal

relations of the Branch Intelligence Officer. It was very soon

shown that his efficacy was in no way alfected by the arm of the

service to which he belonged. If he was not able by force of

personality to make good his standing in the Squadron to which h, was attached, no possible official position could repair the

damage. And if he was able to give the person most concerned

(G-2 in ninety nine cases out of a hundred) prompt and accurate

information about the enemy, it mattered not at all who was

technically his commander. That the system was capab!P of excellent results is abundantly proven by such an example as that of the 91st Squadron (later the 1st Army Observation

Group) where a C.O. and a B.I.O. both possessed of ability,

energy. and a fine sense of values produced an organization which may be fai, '

, considered as good as any Army can shcw.

That the relation. )i the Air Service with G-2 were in general, only moderately successful is due to a number of causes. In the first place G.2 A-7, always an amorphous office, suffered badly

from the prevailing G.H.Q. disease of atrophy of the sense of

proportion In the se':ond place, through force of circumstances 

A

it was often impossible to secure officers for assignment to

Squadrons who had the requisite breadth and balance. It was 

j

I.]
- --?- =- ---

Lessons 217

- Learned

o-nly one of the numberless ways in which the A.E.F suffered

from the lack of experienced officers. In more cases than one

the vak:e of a reconnaissance Squadron was very materially

reduced because the B.I.O. was ignorant or tactless--

shortcomings of exactly equal seriousness to his position. In the

third place the latent jealousy of various Air Service

Headquarters to the whole system frequently hampered its

efficacy. It was one of the unfortunate bi-products of the plan

to make the Air Service a complete and self sufficient arm of the

fighting force that some who had had no experience of the war

from any other point of view were inclined to resent any

infringment of the sovereignty of the Air Service without due

consideration of the matter from the standpoint of the force as a

whole. In this case it was the failure to grasp the essential fact

that intelligence of any kind is conceriied wholly and solely with

"kil!ing Boches and preventing casualties" and that all questions

of credit and precedence are extraneous and impertinent. There

was further difficulty due to the reluctance of certain Air Service

Headquarters to look at reconnaissance as an ordinary part of

the day's work and not a matter of particular moment. Evidence

of such an unfortunate attitude is to be had, for example, in one

of the bulletins of the Air Service of the 2nd Army on aerial

observation the obvious tendency of which was to show, not

how important it was but how difficult it wasb-a publication as

useful as though the Chief of Artillery should issue a

memorandum on the unlikelyhood of hitting what you aim at. In

this case_ the lack of mutual understanding was due, it would

appear, less to the inability of the Staff to appreciate the special

work of the Air Service to grasp the general work of the Staff.

Nevertheless these drawbacks are all such as time would have

remedied and, while the consideration of them is uscful to show

the dangers to which the system is liable, it does not alter the

conviction, supported by the success of the British, that the

system itself is sound and, based as it is on individual ability, is

capable of indefinite expansion and adaptation.
U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

-- 80-

1st, Lt. Robert B. Rhoads

Operations Section

Second Army Air Service

The writer's experience during the past 8 months has been, to

a large extent, a very limited one in scope, so far as the

practical details of organization and supply are concerned.

Having been in the Operations Section continuously since the

first functioning of the Air Service with the First Army Corps on

May 1st, my experience has been almost entirely along tactical

ines.

To most of us who have been interested in the utmost

efficiency of the functioning of the Air Service, the relations of

G-2. General Staff, to the Air Service have been a question of

considerable discussion and criticism. The present arrangement

whereby missions for both photographic and visuai

reconnaissance are ordered by G-2 direct to each Group

Commander, through the respective Branch Intelligence Officers,

is subject in my opinion to criticism in several ways. In the first place, the missions which are given are often prepared by

officers totally unqualified to judge of the possibilities and

limitations of the Air Service, and often orders for wholly

impossible missions go to the Group Commanders without the

knowledge ef the Army Air Service Commander, who might have

been quite able, having seen the assignments, to so alter and

rearrange them that they could have come within the scope of

possibility. I know of instances where Groups were given missions of such

magnitude that weeks would have been involved in their

execution. With the danger of inexperienced Group

Commanders, often their missions were attempted only to be

abandoned without result after the greatest amount of lost effort.

Then, too, the system whereby G-2 assigns missions direct. robs

the Army Air Service Commander of the benefit and value to

the service, of his experience, whereas by a wise selection,

missions could undoubtedly be accomplished much more

efficiently ir every respect.

From an Army Operations Section point of view, it is my

opinion that entirely too much effort is expended in the issuan'e

of the daily operations report. The report is never more than

history of past events, and all effort spent in it is just so much
Lessons 219

Learned

effort lost in the greater game of studying the enemy's intentions

and in devoting the best efforts of the Operations Section to

constructive work. This question involves not only the lost effort

of Army Air Service headquarters, but that of every squadron

and group in the Army.

On account of the undue emphasis put on this question during

the St. Mihiel and Argonne offensives, great hardship was put on

the personnel of all squadrons, groups and headquarters, and the

mechanical equipment and loss of time to all concerned, through

apparently needless demands made upon all units in regard to

daily operations reports, certainly made its mark on the morale

of all concerned during the trying days of those two offensives.

In this same connection, the undue emphasis given to

operations reports, which resulted eventually in a great amount

of unhealthy and unproductive competition between groups in

order to make paper results, was responsible, as I personally

know, in several group commanders dispatching many missions,

which they knew beforehand would be unsuccessful, and which

were always costly in every respect, simply to increase the flying

hours operations and total 

report, 

number of missions as shown on the dai!y 

IThe whole question of reports-engineering, statistical,

operations-was one without any correlation whatsoever,

resulting in an enormous amount of useless duplication of

paperwork for all squadrons and groups. A thorough review of

this subject with a painstaking compilation of statistics has been

made by the Assistant Chief of Air Service, Z. of A., which

report, in my opinion, will bear the fullest examination and will

reveal some startling wastages in our report systems. One of the greatest difficulties experienced throughout the

whole history of the Air Service, was in my opinion, the lack of

liaison between the Air Service and the other arms. While totally

unfamiliar with the methods in vogue in training in the states, it

would seem that during the long period of training whi .h

our divisions underwent both here and in the states, liaison could

have been established so that infantrymen and artillerymen could

at least have known what an American cocarde looked

like when they arrived at the front the first time.

The questions of organization, assignment of squadrons to

divisions, etc., have been so often discussed that further mention

of those points seems totally out of place. However, so far as

the Army Air Service Operations Section is concerned, in my

opinion, the Observation Wing is an extra cog in the machine

which delayed rather than expedited the fulfillment of orders.

The Wing Commander had no taciical prerogatives and at best

could be no more than a technical adviser. The additional

A
220 U.S. Air Service

II

in World War I

paperwork demanded by Observation Wing Commanders

brought an undue hardship on all Observation units under them,

and Commander often duplicated work done for the Army Air Service by all units.

A

Capt. Heber Blankenhorn

Chiof, Propaganda Section. G-2, GHQ, AEF

Heber Blankenhorn, who had been assistant editor of the New

York Sun before the war, was given the task in February 1918 of

forming a psychologica! warfare unit in the Military Intelligence

Division of the War Department General Staff. Having developed a plan that had received the approval of Chief of Staff

Peyton March and Secretary of War Newton D. Bakei. Blankenhorn was sent to France to repcrt to Col. Dennis E. Nolan, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, GHQ, AEF. He took with him Capt.

Walter Lippmann, Lt Charles Merz, and some other newsmen

who had been commissioned at his request. An investigation of

Allied methods was started but c t short in August by orders to

begin propaganda operations at once. Operating from a room

on the floor above Pershing's office in Damremont Caserne at

Chaumont. Blankenhorn organized and directed the preparation and delivery of propaganda leaflets over German lines by

airplanes and balloons. Copy for the leaflets was prepared in

Blankenhorn's section and sent to Paris or Langres for printing.

The leaflets then were sent by truck to field units at Bar-le-Duc

and Toul for distribution to the aero squadrons and balloon

companies responsible for delivering them over the lines. Blankenhorn described the leaflet operations in the following report.'

No Air Service, No Propaganda

jf there had been no Air Service, or if the Air Service had

balked, there would have been no propaganda against the enemy

worth mentioning .... in any future war against a civilized

nation propaganda should be used extensively in the field and

preparation should be made early by the Air Service for such use ....

S. C,
Lessons

Learned 221

Alied balloons carried propaganda leaflets behind German hnes

Function of the Air Service Propaganda against the enemy, consisting in the main of leaflets, was under the direction of A.C. of S., G-2, G.H.Q, AE.F. The function of the Air Service was distribution of the leaflets, principally by airplane, a few by paper balloon. The Propaganda Section prepared and printed 5,164,750 copies o! 18 leaflets of which over 3,000,000 copies were dropped over the

enemy lines and concentration areas by the Air Service, AE.F. The campaign, modeled in method both of organization and of distribution on the practice of the British and French General

Staffs, was inaugurated suddenly in the end of August and reached its greatest intensity in the month immediately preceding the armistice. Its purpose was to contribute to thie general demoralization of entiemy morale and in specific sectors to break the fighting spirit of particular units and to bring about desertion, from particular units at critical times. The main

arguments . . . used in the leaflets were American milnary participation, rendering Germany's military defeat inevitable, and America's peace program, offering Germany the best way out of the war. In other words the propaganda leaflets spread the moral effect of the shells, bombs and bayoonets of the Americans and at the same time drove home to the Germans that the one way of mitigating their disaster was by seizing early the opportunity to
222 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

get peace on Wilson lines. More specifically, certain of the A EF.

leaflets spread in the German Army the knowledge that

Americans did take prisoners and treated them especially well,

particularly well as regards rations, and that German soldiers

who knew that the war was lost and who did not care to get

killed in the last battles of the war were being received in the

American lines.

American Aviators distributed these leaflets with tire!ess

devotion. It was a strange business for them. They could see on a photograph the effects of their air bombs, they could bring

back mapped reports of their observations of enemy activity and

in regulating artillery fire they had visible and immediate proof of

the worth of their endeavors and risks. But in dropping leaflets

out of the skies the fliers saw no visible results and had no firsthand knowledge of the effects of the whole campaign. "hese

effects accrued to the profit of the infantry and were studied and

recorded by the G-2 Staffs of Corps and Armies. Some of the

airmen must have thought it a thankless task. Some without

doubt thought it time wasted. It is therefore especially fitting and

necessary that these fliers should have some know!edge of the

estimate placed by the General Staff, AE.F., on the fruits of

tFeir labors.

Proof of the Pudding

Considerable proof already exists of the effectiveness of these

leaflets. No competent authority connected with the General

Staff would on the basis of the present evidence attempt to

imake sweeping claims concerning the destructiveness of the

leaflets but neither will any competent authority deny that when

the full evidence is in, it is possible that the judgment of

historians will declare that the results were rather sweeping. In

other words the evidence in hand, necessarily very incomplete,

indicates undoubted results and implies effects which may have

been much greater than can now be positively ascertained.

The evidence now in existence is of several kinds

1. Testimony, of Boche prisoners, who were extensively and

intensively questioned for propaganda purposes throughout

September and October.

2. Enemy orders concerning propaganda, captured by the

A.E.F. and by the British and French

3. Enemy proclamations against Allied propaganda, published

in their press.

4. Letters from Germans and interviews with German ex

officers obtained since the armistice.

Complete evidence of course cannot be obtained until the

German General Staff publish their memoirs and German Army
Lessons 223

Learned

Records are available to the historian. It is probable that

conclusive evidence can never be obtained because the effects of

propaganda were in the invisible minds of men and because

Boche who caved in as a result of propaganda more frequently

denied it than admitted it. Soldiers naturally prefer to assign as

their reason for surrender the overwhelminq barrage, deprivation

of supplies or being outnumbered. A good soldier prefers to say

that it was a very large shell which lowered his morale rather

than a little piece of paper. And yet it may have been the little

piece of paper which actually broke the cam2l's back and made

the German and his squad stay in their dugouts and give up

when the Americans came in sight.

Hastily summarizing the evidence in hand, the following

statements are borne out in the records:

1. Prisoners came over in increasing numbers with the

American leaflets concealed on their person, in some cases held

in their hands as passports; prisoner privates generally indicated

their belief in the statements of the leaflets and asserted that the

leaflets were no help in making them fight; prisoner officers generally denied that the leaflets had any effect but about 25

percent declared that the effects were bad and some insisted

that the leaflets were disastrous; prisoners frequently asserted

that the first news they got of important developments, such as

the armistice notes and Austria's withdrawal from the war, was

obtained from our leaflets and caused widespread depression;

prisoners more and more demanded as they marched back from

the lines those famous American rations advertised in the

leaflets; prisoners in October were, 90 percent, convinced that

the war was lost because of American participation, and v,are in

doubt only as to whether America and the Allies could win the

decisive victory which Germany certainly could not.

2. Captured enemy orders, which were corroborated by

prisoners' statements, showed that the German Command tried

to counteract the leaflets by paying the soldiers for turning them

in; showed also that men were to be punished for reading the

leaflets or having them in their possession; that measures were

taken to stop the men's practice of mailing them home; that

officers gave lectures to counteract the leaflets, that extensive

and exceptional steps were taken to bolster up morale in the

German Army and that the rain of American and Allied leaflets

was a main cause of wurry to the German High Command.

3 Proclamations and exhortations against the leaflets were published in increasing numbers in the enemy press in

September and October, including especially the famous

proclamation of Hindenburg himself directed solely against the

leaflets, denouncing them and warning aganst them and praising
224 US Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

the German soldiers for obeying orders and turning them in. The

figures which Hindenburg gave, 504,000 leaflets turned in in May,

June and July, were useful to the Propaganda Section because it

enabled us to calculate the percentage. The leaflets turned in

were just 4 percent of the total- Meanwhile the German press

decried soldiers' and civilians' belief in the leaflets, together with

the practice of passing these leaflets around in home circles and

in cafes.

4. Since the armistice letters from German officers have

blamed the leaflets as principal cause of the lowering of German

morale; letters from revolutionary leaders in Berlin have asserted

that the common soldiers of the army were relied on because of

the larqe number of revolutionary letters recently received from

the front; C,.rman military critics have publicly blamed 

a

considerable part of Germany's downfall on the leaflets. One

officer interviewed by Americans after the armistice, for example,

declared, "I can only talk as a soldier on the front, but there the

effects of propaganda were disastrous and especially so in the

last six months. Even the little Flugbloetter, after you read them

you imagined you read the truth, that our government was lying

to us. I remember one; after I read it, I felt like blowing my

brains out. I never let one of our men read them but it was

difficult, they were everywhere." This officer referred mainly to

British air propaganda but his testimony applies as well to

American leaflets which had this in common with the British,

they both were confined to statements of bald fact.

In general the present judgment of the Propaganda Section,

G.H.Q., is based on such recent testimony as the above

together with previous prisoner questioning reports, especially by its own questioners. The reports of Corps and Army questioning

contained many such statements as the following from the report of the 3rd Corps, October 12.13, obtained from officers of the

40th Infantry of the 28th Division; "The propaganda which your

aviators have dropped over our lines has given us no end of

trouble .... A very large number insisted on secreting them on

their persons and when home on leave make it a practice ol

reading and distributing them to relatives and friends .... In

fact civilians would write to men at the front begging ihem on

the score of this propaganda to seize the first opportunity to

desert." Even on the present evidence the judgment of the

Propaganda Section is that the leaflets' effects, while uneven,

were largely as was intended and that they contributed in

considerable measure to creating that unescapable atmosphere of

defeat with which the German Army was shot through at the

time of the armistice.

I. 

*
P

Lessons 225

t Learned

Credit to the Aviator

If the above judgment is correct and should be borne out

and even enlarged by the judgment of the historian, it should be

emphatically reported now that the principal credit for

the achievement shou;d go to the individual fliers ot the Air

Service, A.E.F., who undertook the risky bother of searching out

the German in his lair and virtually handing him the destructive

arguments. The ist Army Higher Command of the Air Service

did not make any noticeable great effort in the matter but

individual fliers, and a great many Flight and Squadron

Commanders, gave the business their unremitting thought and

determination and action. The history of the success of

propaganda is virtually the history of aviators and squadron

captains, who were button-holed on Air Fields ail over the zone

of the American Armies by persistent propaganda officers and

who, rising to the occasion in the typical American rough and

ready fashion, loaded their buses up with the leaflets and while

observing or bombing or regulating artillery showered the leaflets

into the German airs. Especially these aviators cooperated with

the Branch Intelligence Officers attached to Air Squadrons.

Fliers' Daring

The Propaganda Officers in the course of their investigations

at the London War Office and at British G.H.Q. learned that the

Bitish Air Service had forbidden their fliers to carry propaganda

on the ground that it was an unwarranted risk. Two British

fliersb had been sentenced by the Germans to hard labor for

carrying propaganda and the German High Command had

proclaimed that they would shoot or hang any aviator caught

carrying propaganda. Therefore every British bus carried a little

card attesting that printed matter could not be carried in the

plane

In the begnning of October the Austrian Command issued a

new order threatening hanging for captured pilots who carried

propaganda. When this threat was brought to the attention of

one American Squadron (The Third Corps Observers at Souilly)

the Squadron Commander was asked what effect it had had. He

repied that as a result he had issued orders that the fliers

carryng propaganda should not fly lower than a couple hundred

meters. He added that American Aviators had flown as low as

50 meters over Monflaucon with the leaflts.

In short the American aviators, despite enemy threats and

AI!ied caution, seemed never to have hesitated and rather to

have risen to greater activity because of the greater risk. The

record of the American flier in this respect was communicated in
226 U.S. Air Service

ir, World War I

Vol. IV

the 

the middle 

result that 

of October 

the British 

to the 

Air 

British 

Service 

Propaganda 

was mo,ed 

Direction 

to revise 

with 

its

I

orders just before the Armistice.

The Jndiuidual Flier

The attitude of the Chief Command in the Air Service, First

Armyd in the end of September was natural and easily

explained. Handicapped by inadequate equipment, overtaxed by

the magnitude of effort expected of it, suffering heavy losses and

threatened with continual shortages, it was very natural that the

attitude should be taken and the statement frequently made,

"Propaganda has no place during operations. Come back in the

w:nter and we will do anything for you that you want." It is to

the credit of those holding this view that when argument was 

I

made exposing their fallacy, the attitude changed quickly to one

of cooperation. The principal argument, however, was the

willingness and eagerness of certain Corps Squadrons to carry

propaganda as already displayed in action. It was the

venturesomeness and inquisitive danng of the individual aviators

which saved the day. They studied the leaflets, argued over

them, planned out automatic releases for them and cluttered up

their buses with them on every sort of more strictly military

flight. One flier was busy inventing a propaganda air bomb to be

dropped from great heights in order to reach limited areas

accurately. In the British Army the rumor was current that fliers

had been prone to burn up the leaflets in the Hangars rather

than carry them. In the French Army fliers were paid special

little bonuses for every'little pack of the leaflets thrown

overboard. In the American Army it seems to be true that the

individual flier was sufficiently intrigued by the fun of the thing to

do the job and do it well. Riding the unseen and perilous areas

over the German lines the individual flier could slack on the job

without any possible check-up. He could have thrown the leaflets

over in bundles instead of loose, he could have dumped them

just anywhere, but it seems that he preferred to risk his life to

get those papers into the areas where they would do the most

good.

Technical Points

It was a new business to the flier. He had to work out the

technical points of how to stow the leaflets in his ship, how to

get them overboard loose and yet not tangled in the tail of his

machine, how to take advantage of air currents arid avoid

adverse winds so as to snow under specially designated areas.

The Propaganda Section, using British data, had worked out the
Lessons 227

Learned

.4 (tei.'T'iiInq sp1 !it

* direc!1i>; if wI d

"-ind dr ftage rates of paper and distriuted the tah~es to the air

fields. The very first fliers, iacking these tabies, made a slight

mistaike, with the result that half the leaflets they distributed fell

a good three or four miles back of the American lines. The

average leaflet takes live mintites to fall 1.000 feet. a bunch

therefore dlropped at 0,000ll feet in a twenty mile %wind will drift ten

miles On later flights the j,.iators seemed to have been generally

successful in covering specially dosignated German Divisions

The Bailoon Wing of the Air Service, which it was planned v.05 to have carried out the sending of propaganda by free

balloons durinq the winter, encountered gieater technical

difficult:es which also wiere worked out by the Propaganda

Section in conjunction with excper~ments carried out by the

Mecteoioilogical Service of the Signal Corps-
228 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

Very few free balloons carrying propaganda were sent off

before the armistice, and these entirely by the Independent

Truck Sending Stations of the Propaganda Section. A first set of

eight free balloons was sent off by Observation Balloon Number

6, as an experiment, on September 17, 1918, at Dommartin la

Montagne in the St. Mihiel Salient, undei the direction of the

Chief, Propaganda Section. The experiment was entirely

successful.

Organization

Based on experiments and experience the following scheme of

organization was worked out for the cooperation of the Air

Service with the Propaganda Section. G-2tD, G.H.Q.:

(a) By airplane. The Chiefa of the Air Service, First and

Second Armies, were made responsible for the distribution of

leaflets by airplane, over areas and at times designated by the

Propaganda Section; leaflets to be distributed, wherever

practicable, on all of the flights for other purposes and where

necessary, on special flights for propaganda purposes primarily.

Reports of distribution were to be made through the B.I.O.,

through the G-2s, to the Propaganda Section, G.H.Q. Indications

of areas and priority of distribution were to be made through

Propaganda Liaison Officers with the G-2s of each Army.

(b) By balloon. The Chiefs, Balloon Wings, First and Second

Armies were to be responsible for the distribution of leaflets by

free balloons, operated by the Observation Balloon Companies.

Free balloons and made-up balloon "releases" were to be

furnished the Propaganda Section, together with indications as

to time and areas of use.

(c) The Balloon Wing was also to supply hydrogen gas to

the Independent Mobile Sending Stations of the Propaganda

Section for free balloons.

The above organization was put into effect as regards (a)

about three weeks before the Armistice, as regards (b) it was

never in effect and as regards (c) it was in effect just before the

Armistice.

The Balloon Wing of the First Army, properly enough, took

the stand that gas could be furnished for free ba!loons only after

the needs of Observation Balloons were met, and more, were

safeguarded by reserves sufficient to cover all emergencies.

Emergencies consisted of Boche planes which came over and

burned up our big observation balloons. Every time a big balloon

was burned two hundred tubes of hydrogen gas vanished which

might otherwise have been used for propaganda. So many

balloons were burned that the balloon sending program never

really got under way. Only in the Second Army, where the

_ -
Lessons 229

Learned

shortage was not so great and where the Chiefs of the Air

Service and of the Balloon Wing were convinced believers in the

efficacy of propaganda, were steps taken to inaugurate the

program on a big scale but this effort like many others was

"ruined" by the Armistice.

The free balloons used were the standard British propaganda balloons, made of chemically treated paper with an oiled silk

neck, to which was attached a "release", consisting of a fuse and

hangers to which bunches of leaflets were attached. As the fuse

burned down the leaflets fell free and scattered at regular

intervals. The balloon was about nine feet long and required half

a tube of gas. Four pounds of Leaflets (about 600 sheets) were

easily carried on the "release." 

...

It was especially planned to make extensive use of free

balloons during the winter lull in order to reach the civilian

population of Germany. especially of the Rhineland. Experiments

carried on in the United States at the instance of the

Propaganda Section, G.H.Q., and of the Psychological Section,

MID., Washington, had partly succeeded ir, evolving a large balloon capable of carrying 10,000 leaflets to distances of from

300 to 500 miles. Meanwhile the Air Service, S.O.S., AE.F, had

enlarged its hydrogen gas producing program so as to provide

gas for a really extensive winter campaign.

The balloons actually sent off, aside from those mentioned,

were dispatched from the neighborhood of Verdun by the Mobile

Sending Stations of the Propaganda Section. It is noted that the

French Army made extensive use of balloons and the entire

huge distribution of the British Army throughout the summer and

autumn was accomplished by free balloons. There is no doubt

whatever that next to the airplane the free balloon is the best

medium of distribution

Conclusions

The airplane was the great weapon of propaganda in the

AEF., nine to twelve Aviation Fie!ds handling the leaflets,

averaging in distribution 5,000 to 10,000 leaflets a day and some

as high as 30,000 a day. The most effective effort was made by the 3rd Corps Observers at Souilly, the 4th Corps Observers at

Toul, the day bombers at Amanty (later at Maulan), the Army

Observers at Vavincourt and the various Corps Observers at

Rarecourt, Foucaucourt, Remicourt, Beauzee, and Rumont, later

St. Mihiel (the last two, French).

The miserable weather prevailing in October was the great

deterrent to greater distribution. It rained persistently and when

it did not rain, cloud levels were so low as to make flying

impossible. The Armistice caught the Air Fields with great - A! • ='
230 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. !V

quantities of leaflets on hand which would have been distributed

but for the weather and the extreme changes of the line in the

last fortnight of the war. It was never possible to tell the exact amount distributed by

each squadron because, in the haste of making wai, squadrons

failed to make formal written report of all their efforts. The main

credit goes to the unnamed aviator, the lone enthusiast in the

skies, who unperturbedly and intelligently rained the leaflets on

Fritz's haunts.

The use of the Air Service for propaganda purposes in an,

future war against a nation whose soldiers are capable of reaJing

should undoubtedly be a part of the recommendations of the War Plans Division of the General Staff

1st Lt. Evan T. Mathis

Armament Officer, I Corps Observation Group

1. In this organization the office of Group Armament Officer

was riot created unrtil August 29, 1918-- At this date three

squadrons, namely the 1st, 12th and 50th, comprised the Group.

The planes of the first two squadrons mentioned were Salmsons

and were equipped with one synchronized gun, the Vickers with

the mechanical synchronizer, while the planes of the 50th

Squadron were D.H. 4's and were equipped with two Marlins

with the C.C. synchronizing gear. The planes of all three

squadrons carried two Lewis guns on *he tourelle '

2. The duties of the Group Armament Officer were chiefly that

of Supply to the three squadrons. The Squadron Aimament

Officer would submit a list of material needed to the Group

Armam-'nl Officer and same would be obtained by the !alter with

Group transportation, when possible to obtain said

transportation. ,nd delivered directly to the squadron armory. no

s'cick of supplies was kepl by the group. The lack of sufficient

transportation has hindered the supply to a certain exten!, but

never did this lack affect operations as each squadron carried an

emergency supply.

3. As mentioned above, the work of the Group Armament

Officer in the case ol this group was mainly that of Supply. This

is due in a large measure to the fact that two of the squadrons

had been operating on the front for several months and the

personnel has been well trained in its duties. At very few times

_ - i

, , r- I I " r -I 1 I I i ..... [ I.
rLesson' 231

L Learned

Igi A ri nqnjU n

wa ihe- ou Armn . oeneaort _ _ _ _ _-)!_ _Upn 

io csv, e h ~ icu sin it -lr o tf r)i e t

koAvr h rimn fieso h otw udclaoaei th ouino n rul .Iih on ntem aso im rv m nfClim n

prowasito ih ac m lo aO er c Unne ohews

seived ltt :~ ivte n to.'qa' tOW C,0101 he '~vo

Hna t cr,. th0 ara me offics thei st tiii- colarte in3

the soluton ofny t rou wha ,oc i n irscn o fgthe m fa r tf .

hi SigiOts---li ' c esto o rgis tncr gs ;o s ha sonav 

rds hu rnandii ici'r that rfimicr Hi'is In ohfli 'ght or the n

bead in additioin to t A16s lhin'se'tpic sight
C]

232 U.S. Air SerAce in World War I

Vol. IV

Ist Lt. Edward M Urband

nians a Lewis Gun mounted

n a DH-4 of the 135th

Aero Squadron.

5. The Norman Wind Vane Sight with the nng back was

furnished as the Lewi; sight. It was usually mounted on the right

gun of the set. Sorne observers preferred the Reille.Soult sight

and same was obtained by the observer of the squadron

whenever possible. Some preferred the simple rifle sight, and

some cases the Norman sight was put on the right gun and the

rifle sight on the left. Such a combination is in my opinion an

excellent one. Tracers were used every third round and it will be

remembred that these in themselves serve as an excellent right

after the first few rounds fired at the enemy.

6. Synchronizers-The mechanical synchronizer was used on the Salmson planes for the Vickers. The ease of oiling this cam

box is an excellent feature. In two cases the cam gave

considerable trouble; in one case this was due to uneven wear

on the cam and in the other to improper grinding of the cam

surface. The latter mentioned case should never have passed the

inspector-the facts were that the gun fired and a firing angle of

35 degrees could be obtained but there was practically no over.

travel of the trigger motor plunger due to the fact that the cam

had insufficient throw The two cases were remedied with new

cam boxes which were obtained in less than three hours.

7. The C.C. synchronizer which is an oil gear was used to fire

the Marlins on the D.H. 4's. Somr, trouble was experienced with

it due to the difficulty of kceping the pipe line fee from air. Also

the soldered )oints at the generator would break to motor

vibration ft was practically impossible to obtain spare parts for

these gears and often !t was necessary to obtain a new one in

order to get some part needed.
Lessons 233

Learned

8. The first Salmsons which were supplied to the 1st and 12th

Squadrons were equipped with a Lewis gun on the upper plane.

This was abandoned due to the lack of need of it and to the

tremendous amount of resistance offered to flight.

* 9. Prior to the change to Salmsons in June the 1st and 12th

squadrons (the 50th Squadron at that time was outfitted) were

equipped with a French type Lewis Sun, cal. 303. These proved

highly satisfactory but spare parts were difficult to obtain and the

interchangeability of parts was satisfactory. However very few

breakages occurred. This was Dame Revise Lewis and it is

indeed an exceedingly fine piece of work with a strictly high

class finish.

10. The Salmsons came equipped with the modified ground

type Lewis made by the Savage Arm Co. This gun was modified

in France and as could easily be seen in many cases was very

much abused at this stage. These guns were sent out on the

planes without being tested after having been modified. Orders

were received by the squadrons to turn in all .303 guns and at

the same time a change of stations was effected requiring a

move of 150 mil,?s from the point where these guns were turned

in. This was the latter part of June. The first few days of July

saw some hard air fighting on the Chateau-Thierry front and

untold trouble was experienced with these modified Lewis guns.

This trouble was the most serious that could be brought about

and it was necessary to abandon the use of this gun and go

back to the use of the .303 French Lewis.

11. Then the American Air Type Lewis made also by the

Savage Arm Co., was supplied on all planes. After drilling the

gas port in the bairel to 4.5 mm and tho port in the gas

regulator cup to 6 mm. this gun proved fast and satisfactory. The drilling was done in the squadrons after the guns were sent

to the squadrons with the approval of the Inspection Department

for work over the lines.

12. The performance of the Vickers gun was at all times

satisfactory. Some trouble was experienced with the tirst

American made copperized link. The performance of the Marlin

was also satisfactory; it proved to be a very fast shooting gun; at

the begnning of its use some trouble was experienced with

double feeds. This was entirely and positively eliminated by the

use of a small attachment which could be made in any machine

shop.

13 The Very pistols supplied gave very poor results on

ejection. It was practically always necessary to use another rou,,d

or a stick for this purpose. Several of the main springs required

refiling and retempering. The Very pistol ammunition was

absolutely unsatisfactory due to old age and improper storage

11L,
234 U.S 

in World 

Air Service 

War I

I

Vol- IV

before reaching the squadrons; all this ammunition was obtained

from the French government.

14. Some trouble was also experienced with the Frankford

Arsenal ammunition, F.A. 18, which was made specially for aerial 

I

machine guns. One lot F.A. 18 Ball, lot number 433, was put

into the ammunition boxes of the planes and considerable (?)

experienced. A 1000 round test was run on this lot and two

rounds were found to have no powder in them and several

misfires were obtained. This necessitated the discard of all the

ammunition in the planes and the reloading of some 12000

rounds per squadron for the synchronized guns alone.

15. Finally will state that the main trouble found with

equipment could have been detected by more thorough and rigid

inspection both a( th manufacturing points and at the stations

where the armament is installed on the planes.

16. Would recommend that when a field is picked to be used

for aviation purposes that the proper butts be constructed into

which the guns may be fired from the planes for testing.

-83-

2d Lt. F. H. Wessman

Armament Officer, 50th Aero Squadron

On August 1st, 1918, the work of the armament section of this

squadron takes is beginning.- Before this time the men had been

doing all kinds of fatigue work, and on calling them all together

it was determined that only three of the thirteen men assigned to

armament work had training fitting them for this work, while

several could act as helpers. So the first step was to call them

together, find out their previous occupation and experience and

then to instruct them on the work they were to do. At this time

we had no ships and plenty of time was avai!able for this work.

By the time the planes had begun to arrive the men had

begun to gain a little experience. A tent had been set up, a butt

was erected, and things moved along with occasional hitches due

mostly to inexperience. The follnwing program was carried out

for getting armament on planes in condition.

As the planes all arrived in a group, the best results were

obtained by handling each article of armament equipment at one

time, setting this out of the way and then taking another article.

For instance, the Marlin guns were dismounted from the planes.

One group of men disassembled the guns, cleaned off the

Ma
r

Lessons 235

Learned

cosmoline and the rust, of which there was a great deal at first

through and thoroughly tested by me, every gun being shot

several hundred times and perfect performance being required

before remounting on the planes. Having passed this test okay,

another group again dismounted and cleaned thoroughly. After

this they were put back on the planes.

It must be said that the Marlin guns performed excellently,

showing that at some point they had been run in very well, for

they performed better than they did in the states where I have

had some experience at a run in p!ant. Their condition, due to

exposure from weather conditions, at first was bad but these

improved.

Then the question of the Lewis guns came up. At first it

seemed that not a gun would shoot. In every case it was the same story, the piston would not come back, showing either too

much friction or not enough gas. The latter was finally decided

on as being the cause, and the problem cleared up when we

bored straight through the gas chamber nipple through the barrel

with a 4.5 mm drill. After this no trouble was experienced.

By the time the guns were fixed, a good line was obtained

upon the capabilitie3 U the men, and they were each assigned to

a certain number of ships, and they were made responsible for

all the armamnent on those ships. They were brought into the

Armory as occasion required.

The C.C. gears presented another problem, for very few

systems were in working order. Many pipe lines were broken, all

of them bent poorly, and leaked everywhere. A sergeant was

dispatched to the First Air Depot, and in the Armory there

picked up all the information he could on the gears and Marhn

guns. On his coming back he ripped out most of the systems,

straightened the pipes, packed the trigger motors, and gradually

got the guns in shape. The work on the gears being completed,

the guns were then shot through the props at the butt and the

sights were harmonized.

By the time the squadron was completely organized, the

armament was in condition for service. Much was learn,?d in the

first operation of the St Mihiel drive, and from this experience

the present state of organizatinn originated, which may be of

interest.

In the first place, the most important thing developed was ihe

absolute need to place responsibility and also to arouse the

man's interest in his work so that he would take pride in having

the armament on his plane in the best of condition. Those two

factors, the pride in his own plane and his responsibility for

Ai
236 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

them, tc a large extent governed the success attained. These

factors were brought about through the following organization.

There were 18 planes in the squadron besides a few extras.

Each three planes were assigned to one armorer. He was

responsible for the armament fixed on the planes, such as Marlin

guns and ammunition, sights, tourelle, etc. He was r ,sponsible

for keeping the gears filled with oil and taking the air out of the

system. Also for going to the Armory for the Lewis guns and

ammunition and putting them on the plane and taking them back

to the Armory. There his responsibility increased in regards to

the Lewis guns. One sergeant was in entire charge of all these

men, and all armament in the hangars, so to speak. One man was put in entire charge of the gears, to inspect them regularly and make any repairs which !he ships's armorers

could not. The latter would take out the floor boirds, etc., anH

prepare things for the C.C. gear man, who would in this way lose no time in getting around the ships.

Now we coie to the Armory. A sergeant was in charge of

everything therein. Under him there were six men, two corporal ,

and four privates. One corporal specialized in Lewis 9':ns,

making any necessary repairs and preparing ',, guns, and

shooting them before putting them on the planes. The other

corporal specialized in Marlin guns, Under them are three

helpers who clean Lewis guns and do the other necessary work

round the Armory. One man tends entirely to the ammunition

keeping individual pilot's and observer's ammunition straight,

taking care and filling magazines, calibrating and getting together

sets of Very pistol ammunition. There is one other man in the

Armory who keeps records straight, keeps up supplies, takes

down and posts the number of rounds fired, makes out reports,

etc. So much for the organization. Let us now take, for example,

a day in the Armory to show how the organization works.

The list of missions for the following day is obtained the night

before, and is posted on a bulletin board so that the armorers

may ascertain what work is in store for them. The armorers in

the Armory then prepare the Lewis guns for early morning flight.

In the early morning every bit of armament is thoroughly inspected b/ those concerned. Marlin guns are cleaned, gears

filled, air taken out, etc. In the Armory all the Lewis guns are

cleaned superficially.

It is time for a mission. Three-quarters of an hour before

hand, the Lewis guns are shot through and placed on a table,

the ammunition and flares beside them. The armorer from the

ship which is to go, comes in, gets the guns and ammunition

and places them on the ship He then tests the gears, wipes out

• i i . .... =. = , I: !. 
Lessons 237

Learned

the barrels of the Marlin guns. loads them, leaving them on

safety.

When the ships come back, he gets the report of the number of rounds fired and troubles, if there were any, carries back the

guns and ammunition, reports number of rounds fired to clerk

and ammunition man. He goes back to his ship, cleans the guns

and puts the armament in shape again. In the Armory the

Lewis guns are cleaned and the magazines refilled.

Now, as to suggestion for improvements which experience has

shown. In the first place, as a rule guns and gears, when they arrive on the ship, due to the weathering they receive or some

such cause, are usually in very bad condition. And are badly

rusted, often the barrels. For this reason it is our opinion that

guns and gears ought to be drawn by the squadron as needed,

rather than be received on the ship. This argument for drawing armament instead of receiving it is

not the only argument. The guns from a new plane must be

g ! -.

A ,K

i\L
238 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

taken off the plane, thoroughly cleaned and tested by shooting

anyway, so it would save this dismantling the guns if they were

drawn from a supply depot. Again, for example, you have several

crashed planes on your field, as we have had occasionally.

Orders are to leave the guns on the planes. A pilot has used

and liked these guns. These guns could be mounted on the new

ship coming in, without dismounting the pair from the new ship,

and thus having extras which have to be returned. In other

words you could cut down on the total number of guns

necessary.

Every plane coming to us had six magazines and many fiber

belts, and we had to return at least 175 of those Lewis

magazines. This would never have had to be done if we drew

oniy what was needed.

Now to another problem entirely, that of Signal Pisto!

Ammunition. This squadron had very little success with the

signal pistol ammunition which was available, and though such

precautions a7 were possible were used, several missions failed

because of the failure of the ammunition to fiie correctly at the

proper time. As this squadron did a maximum of Contact Patrol,

in which Signal Pistols are of great importance, the poor quality

of the ammunition was especially noticeable.

It appears that a more stable type should be developed with

an improved type of pistol. The pistols used would never eject.

The ejector was worthless. Besides every cartridge had to be

calibrated through the pistol it was to be used in, for the

cartridge and pistols were very irregular.

Also an improvement in the cartridge carrier should be made.

After two experiences in the squadron, a carrier was developed

which gave great saiisfactin. It was fastened to the outside of

the fuselage so that if struck and exploded by a bullet (which

actually happened in this .3quadron), it will burn outside and not

inside the ship.

A piece of aluminum sheeting [was) fastened to the outside of

the fuselage and to this aga;n was fastened another piece of

aluminum, shaped to fit half way around the cartridge, and

catching the rim so it could not fall. Across these were stretched

a piece of elastic rubber which held the cartridge and also

served to streamline the holder. An old inner tube served

admirably.

Another thing contended with throughout was the poor quality

of aircraft ammunition. 'rue, some lots were okay but many of

them had to be discarded after testing. Worst of all though were

the lots which were only found bad after they were mixed up in

- the ammunition boxes. Those gave all sorts of trouble. The deep

_ -

Lt
Lessons 239

r Learned

set primers found in the aircraft ammunition was especially

noticeable.

*It 's the opinion of this squadron that C.C. gears are not very

practical. There was practically no trouble due to shooting prop,

but the constant care required and undependability of the gear

makes [it) rather impractical. For instance, a gear will test out

on the ground alright, but taking the air it will not function. A

secondary pipe breaks in the air. The soldenng breaks loose

from a vibration. The principle and action of the gear is good,

but it is the unexpected trouble that cannot be found, which

makes it bad. A gear, depending for successful operation on a

tightness, where there is so much vibration is impractical.

---84 -

f2d Lt. Robert A. Kohless]

Ordnance Officer, 1st Aero Squadron

1. In moving from camp to camp, guns and magazines were

- damaged by lack of proper transportation facilities. This trouble

was overcome by the use of a four-wheel trailer with improvised

racks and fixtures.

2. The installing of machine guns (Lewis) in the tail of the

* fuselage to shoot underneath the tail of the aeroplane was found

to be unsuccessful owing to lack of room for maneuvering and

for the use of sights, and was discontinued.

3. Very pistols were found to be faulty in construction; main

spnngs were as a rule too weak and ejectors often failed to eject

exploded cartridges.

4 Some trouble was experienced with Signal flares. Many

flares when received were found to be mouldy and damp

,5. Defects in ammunition were noted as follows: low primers,

split cass, and insufficient powder charges.

6. Cams operating the synchronizer foi Vickers guns on new planes received by the Squadron were in many cases faulty. This

necessitated obtaining and installing new cams.

7. Considerable trouble was experienced with American-made

black enameled and coppered Vickers links. These links were

evidently badly made and held the cartridges too tightly.

4ALI

~.t-.,~. =s-.wt~ vk., - A--.)7~l = l
240 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. I

1st Lt. Melville C. Hall

Ordnance Officer, 12th Aero Squadron

Based on the experience of the past 5 months operations, the

armament work in connection with the Salmson Observation

plane may be divided into two parts: (1) pilots' machine guns

and (2) observers' machine guns.

Calibrating and supplying of ammunition for all machine guns

used on the plane should be made the duty of the Armament

Officer, the pilots and observers to inspect and recalibrate if they

think necessary. Much confusion resulted under the arrangement

of requiring each officer to calibrate the ammunition he used.

Operations: Frequently when the squadron moved to a new

field, operations would be started before the armory could be set

up. A special heavy truck should be assigned to move extra

guns and the other ordnance supplies to the new field without

delay.

Personnel: Trained armorer. (from 10 to 15) should be under

the direct charge of the armament officer, he to be empowered

to make such promotions as are desirable, subject to approval of

the Squadron Commander. The practice of loaning untrained

men from the squadron was the cause of much poor work and

inefficiency.

Material: Guns and ordnance supplies should be brought to

the squadron ready for use, after the usual cleaning and testing.

Overhauling and marking in of the guns was often done in the

early months on the front. Experimental work was carried on

when the guns were unfi to be sent into the air, but this extra

work could not be handled we]! along with the routine work

during the active operations. The First Air Depot gave us

excellent service in filling requisitions, but it could not be

expected that the armament received here in poor condition

could be put into firstclas.3 working order.

AA
Lessons 241

Learned

-86-

Maj. Ira B. Joralemon

Designs and Projects Division

Supply Section, Air Service, AEF

Joralemon. a mining engineer, had earned Mitchell's praise 'or the "wonderful work" he had done in preparing airdromes

and getting supplies for the Battle of St. Mihiel.,

1. The following are the general results of the experience in

preparing airdromes in the army areas.

2. For summer campaigns, it is most necessary that the Air

Service have its own supply of tents and tent hangars for rapid

moves. Since the advance, in case there is an advance, will Gen. Mitchell (left) with Maj

nearly always be through devastated country, there is no chance Juralemon.

to billet squadrons. Therefore, enough tents of the 5 x 8 meter, wall type, or some similar goad type, should be supplied to

house the officers and enlisted men and to furnish necessary

offices and shops. Some type of tent hangar should be devised

intermediate between the present individual tent hangar and the

Bessonrieau.b It should be stronger than the present tent hangar

which often collapses in severe wind storms. Probably a tent

hangar built to accommodate two or three planes of ordinary

size would be most satisfactory. 3. For more nearly permanent installations, the Air Service should have its own supply of light demountable barracks, and

all hangars of a more permanent type. These hangars night be

of the Bessonneau type although probably they would be more

effective if they werc about halt the size of a Bessonneau, or

they might be made in the German style of a light wooden

framework with board covering possibly. Some adaptation of the

Adrian Barrack, principle might be satisfactory. 4. Since during great activity, when construction material is

greatly needed, i, is practically impossible to get railway

transportation, the supplies of baracks and hangars should be

stored at some depot within trucking distance of the airdromes.

The construction squadrons should have sufficient motor trucks

to carry the hangar and barrack equipment for an airdrome in a

reasonable number of loads. Experience has shown that

approximately 12 heavy trucks and four light trucks are needed

during the times of great activity. Part of this equipment need

not be assigned directly to construction squadrons, since it is not

often that all the armes are active at the same time. The

transportation could be placed under the equipment officers 'jf
242 U.S Air Service

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the group of armies and by that office temporarily assigned

where necessary.

5. It is absolutely vital that all this construction material as well

as construction personnel be directly under the Air Service. If

the materia! and personnel are controlled by the engineers, at

the time when they are most needed, the engineers are

overworked by other branches of the Army and cannot give the

proper attention to the Air Service.

6. During the preparations for the St. Mihiel and Argonne offensives, the army engineers showed every disposition to

cooperate with the Air Service. In spite of this, the barracks

which they furnished for use during the St. Mihiel offensive,

arrived just in time for the Argonne-Meuse offensive, while the

barracks which were promised for the Argonne-Meuse offensive, came just before the armistice was declared.

7. For use at times of activity when the airdromes are always more or less tempurary, all buildings should be of very simple

demountable types and of as few types as possible. This will

make it possible for the construction squadrons to carry only a very few simple tools. On such airdromes there is no time

to install a water system and tank trailers must be used

exclusively. The only electric lights are those which can be

Airplane hauled for repairs to the machine repair shop at the 1st Air Depot.

I.£

L . .L . . . - a . '

I ". l
Lessons Leamed 243

supplied by the lighting trucks of the squadrons. 8. When an advanced airdrome is first constructed, nothing should be erected save barely the necessary tents or light demountablL barracks, to shelter the men and officers. Later on, it it seems likely that the airdrome will be occupied for a month or two officers mess halls should be erected, floored and finished as well as possible. Next, mess halls should be erected for the enlisted personnel. Finally, the officers barracks should be partitioned and floored as is desired by the squadrons. 9. During the first few weeks on an airdrome, squadrons can

operate with machine shop trucks entirely and can use parts of the hangars for storage space. Later on, if the airdrome continues to be occupied, a workshop should be erected for every squadron and a storehouse for the air park attached to the group. This will generally require an equivalent of nearly one

Bessonneau hangar for the park of a group. IC. All construction materal in the area of an army should be considered expendable material and should be absolutely under the control of the Air Service commander of that Army and of the group of Armies through the equipment officers. This will make it possible to teardown buildings from one airdrome and move them to another without the delay which is caused by getting authority from anyone further back.

Fuselage repair.
244 

U S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

Capt. Charles W. Babcock

Chief Aeronautical Engineer Third Aviation Instruction Center

. The most important lesson that has come to my attention diring 

Some of 

the present war is she improper diszribeition oi mechonics. the best mechanics 

kinds of work 

in 1,ur Air Servici. were used on all

close survey of 

except 

the mechanical 

on work that they were best fitted forA pers. nnel would show expert toolmakers 

military 

or other expert mechanics doing kitcher police, police and work of a similar nature. In many ct es mechanics were doing stenography or cle~icaj work wP:' stenographers 

might 

and clerks were striving in the shops ,- 'i their

nor one 

to 

week: 

become mechanics Mechanics are not m (1 -ne dey it takes years of practice expert mechanic. in order t( -me an

2. Guard Duty was another drawback to the mechanical personnel. This important work always had to be taken care of by 

from expert 

several 

mechanics. 

companies Take, for example, a shop using personnel

squadron or squadrons; each company or

every outfit 

furnishes a detail for the Guard. Take six men out of that is employed in your shop and note the confusion caused in all of your departmentb This changing 

] ar,_ 

well 

'nd goes on day after day and keeps your departments very disorganized. 

-4 3. My statement boiled down is simply this; use mechanics for mechanical work; use laborers for kitchen police; use nonmechanics 

technical men for military police, and use soldiers, and non- for Guard Duty.

_88- 

A

2d Lt. Lee M. Rogers Engineering Officer, 1st Aero Squadron

(a) The quota of 18 planes assigned pilots is inadequate to a squadron having 18 during an oflensive operation. (b) When squadron is on the move great difficulty encountered is in obtaining replacement machines and supplies due to the number of channels from the squadron to the air park. . .-

5
Lessons 245

Learned

(c) Difficulty is encountered due to substitution of parts from

Supply Depot, and lack of inspection, especially propellers.

(a) Recommend that the squadron have an extra flight of six

(6) planes, making a total of twenty four (24) planes and four (4)

flights. Each pilot is to use his own plane. If washed out or on

repair to draw from 4th or repair flight, allowing more careful

inspection of plane before leaving on mission.

(b) A direct method of obtaining supplies and machines for

squadron from Air Park through Squadron Supply Officer.

(c) Particular attention to be paid to requisition of parts as

called for and only those parts to be supplied. A more distinct

line be made of parts for different types of machines supplied

from the same Air Park.

-89--

Engineering Officer

12th Aero Squadron

Three distinct obstacles hampered this department in its work:

1. Lack of Personnel. The shortage of personnel was caused

by faulty material furnished. By material we will cite motors and

magnetos as examples. Motors furnished to us and installed

without a thorough overhauling were unsatisfactory and unsafe.

This made a complete overhauling of every motor received for

installation, and a motor repair shop had to be maintained. This

drew three men from those available for hangar duty. Every

magneto had to be rebuilt to insure efficient operation. This drew

two more men from the hangar detail. A complete and thorough

inspection of all material furnished to a squadron should do away

with the necessity for the squadron doing this work and would

leave more men available for hangar duty.

2. Poor Material. Material furnished to our squadron was

faulty in almost every instance. Each motor received was

completely torn down, repaired, and reassembled. Not many

damaged parts were found, the main trouble being faulty assemblaqe. The same trouble be.ng encountered whether the

motor was a new or a rebuilt one. Magnetos were another

source of constant trouble until we started to rebuild them. 1h

wouid be a great aid to squadrons operating in the field if they

could use material without first overhauling and rebuilding it.

3. Supply. At all times during the period of the two

operations, the greatest difficulty was encountered in securing

. ..
|I

246 246 U .)Air Service

In Wir!d War I

Vol. IV

A f

-I ,[t, .!II: . ri I;i, .: .' iir S. I ( 'J u .

I'

'
Lessons 247

Learned

AIL7
248 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

supply of parts, motors, propellers, etc. This will be dealt with in

another part of the report. The Engineering Department has all it

can possibly do when operating in the field without being

hampered with lack of material.

In summing up, will say that personnel as provided for in

present table of organization is sufficient to do all work provided

proper material is furnished.

A closer relation between Air Parks and squadrons operating

in the field is suggested. The Air Park working with cur

squadron during this period was located so far from the

squadron that practically no cooperation was secured.

One of the most important facts connected with the successful

operation of the hangars and Engineering Department of this

squadron is the placing of responsibility for the work being done

directly on the man doing the work. This was carried out very

successfuly because in every instance of faulty or careless work

the responsibility was directly placed on the man doing the work

who was summarily dealt with by the squadron commander. It is

suggested that the Engineering Officer be allowed full control of

the man doing work on airplanes. Let him pick and choose his

men from the personnel as he sees fit. It is deemed unadvisable

for the Engineering Officer to take charge of any work other

than maintenance, repair, and the responsibility for successful

operation of airplanes.

-90-

1st Lt. E. E. Esslinger

Engineering Officer, 50th Aero Squadron

I found during my first experience, in the month of August,

that the Liberty planes were not ready for service. In fact at the

First Air Depot, the planes often required considerable amount

of work, which was done by our squadron mechanics, before

they could be delivered to our flying field. A great amount of this

work and repairs was necessary, however, owing to the ferry

pilots not being familiar with the flying fields. Often planes were damaged due to rough and unserviceable fields.

Have made recommendations for the following changes, some

of which have been made:

1. The Shock Absorbers originally designed for the DH 

4

were absolutely worthless. Perhaps, under the most favorable
Lessons 249

Learned

.

•I

Aircraft ccerhaul at the Ist Air Depot

conditions, perfect landing and ideal flying fields, these sho-A

absorbers would give limited service. We overcame this trouble

by using the Prequet shock absorber.

2. The Liberty wheel was entirely too light for the service

required The rims often buckled and the spokes would become

dangerously loose. The Brequet or Salmson wheels with the

Liberty tires were found to be entirely satisfactory

3. The Tail Skids on the first planes were not tipped with a

steel shoe Tail Skids would often be worn so badly that after

two flights new ones would be required This trouble was

corrected by building up the end of the skid and covering same

Aith 1 - i [inchi cold roll steel.

4 The radiator cap was poorly constructed and made from

light material The overflow tube was changed from the top of

the radiator cap to one side of the cap opening. This tubing was

then placed under the radiator cowling entirely out of line of

-- I
250 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

I

i

Wing repair

guns and also improving the streamline. By using heavy radiator

caps and cap openings the spraying of water was eliminated.

5 By far our greatest troubles were with spark plugs.' We

were furnished with the following kind of plugs during our

operations- Splitdorf, A C Titan. A C. New. Joly. Oleo 37. Oleo

82, M.Y., M. Y.[?]," and at least six other French made plugs

The Splitdorf plug gave absolute satisfactory service. One set of

these plugs gave satisfactory service for about forty hours of

actual flying time. Often the mechanics would find from five to

eight defective plugs of the other makes on he completion of

two or three hours of flying A great number of the porcelain

plugs would have broken off defective porcelains Many French

Mica plugs wiiuld foul tIp and short across the plugs. By actual

expe.ience and test the Splitdorf Mica plug proved to be

satisfactory

6 The DH 4 should he eq,.npoed with . coliapsible rear
Lessons 251

Learned

iii

cockpit seat. The Liberty steel seat interferes with the free and

unobstructed movement of the observer when he is standing.

Since he naturally stands in the center. it is very evident that a

side seat similar to the Salmson would be a great improvement.

7. I would also recommend that the wings, both upper and

lower be constructed with double ribs particularly between the

first set of struts. The continual vibration and propeller blast

- breaks the fabric stitching.

8. Owing to the limited vision for the pilot, particularly to

the front and above, I would recommend that the gravity gas

tank on or in [?] the upper wings and to "glass in" the center

section.

Squadrons should be supplied with some convenient means to

heat water and oil. The large amount of water and oil required

each motor makes it almost impossible to start motor other than

with some method to rapidly heat the above, especially during

cold weather.

In conclusion I desire to state, that with the above mentioned

improvements, some which have been made, I firmly believe that

the Liberty Motor has proved to be the best in the Field of

Aviation.

-91-

Capt. Harlowe Hardinge

Radio Division

L Office of the Chief Signal Officer

Services of Supply, AEF

IA. Generol

. . . . Information obtained from the allied armies and from

experience gained before operations became a war of movement j show that the organization of liaison, during a battle, between

headquarters and the different arms especially the infantry, had

been one of the most difficult problems. In fact, under intense

bombardments, the best organized means of liaison did not

function after a few hours of combat. Telephone lines were cut

and visual signalling was not only insufficient but not always

dependable and liaison by means of couriers was found to be

uncertain and slow. At the beginning of the war (19151 the

r

FF-I

IIi
252 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

difficulties encountered due to the inability to have perfect liaison

during combat resulted in the following:

1. The infantry was completely isolated during battle and

could no longer report in due time to headquarters relative to its

exact location and the turn of events. It could no longer point

out its needs in the way of reinforcements, ammunition, etc.

2. It compelled the artillery to fire in conformity to plans of

the artillery without taking into account unforeseen events or the

conditions under which fighting was being developed.

3. It left headquarters in almost complete ignorance of the

operations of the infantry during battle, of the events which

could bar its advance or force its retreat. It therefore prevented

the proper and timely use of reserves. Maneuvering could not

even be considered. Without going into details ccncerning the

development of the airplane liaison with special reference to radio

communication, it will simply be said that due to the airplane

equipped with radio, it has been possible to obtain definite liaison with the most isolated units at all times during atack. The

method by which this liaison was obtained will be outlined.

B. Methods Employed

1. Air Radio: (a) Artillery Reglage: Radio communication between the

airplane and the artillery receiving station was extensively used

for directing the fire of both heavy and light artlery. During the

long period of trench warfare this method of liaison was used

very extensively, much more so than during the short period of

open warfare. Up to the signing of the armistice, no two-way

communication between airplanes and ground stations was used

by the American units, owing to the fact that equipment was not

available until a short time before, and the facilities did not

permit the observers being instructed in this method of

communication. Satisfactory communication however was had

with the long range artillery, using the ordina-y one-way set

(Type "Y"-French) on airplane, the airplane flying back over the lines far enough to see the panels between each correction.

(b) Infantry Liaison: Very satisfactory cooperation between

the infantry and airplanes was had by the allied armies, and

while not as efficiently operated by the American Army, owing to

the limited amount of instruction, the liaison effected between the

airplanes and infantry proved of great value in many cases.

Locations of the lines were sent down by radio and also by

written messages dropped from airplanes in message containers.

Often during the recent operations, practically the only effective

method of liaison was by use of airplanes. (c) Reconnaissance: B1, means of radio on airplanes sent on

=.
Lessons 253

Learned

AI

"--- 7: -___

Rece;,r.g messages from an airplane by radio

reconnaissance missions, very ',aluable information was often seni

down. which would have proven useless had it not been made

known before the plane could fly back to its hangar. The

apparatus used for this work was also the standard French Type

"Y" Set, the only airplane radio equipment used at the front,

with the eyception of a few Type "U" Sets, which were later

Ie lt.'d Iy th, "Y" Sc!ts

2 Ground Rad'o.

ia) Trench Sets:

(b) Fank Radio

{.i Intelligence Serce: By means of Direction Finding.
254 U.S. Air Serce

in World War I

Vol. IV

was possible to locate hostile airplanes operating radio. The

Intelligence Service was, however, used primarily for recording

messages sent by the enemy and in locating enemy ground

stations.

(d) Network Communication: All main divisions and isolated

units, such as squadrons, were kept in communication by means

of radio

3. Discussion:

(a) As has already been stated the Type "Y" French Set

was the only one used on airplanes up to the signing of the

armistice. This set seems to have proven satisfactory for the

purpose for which it was intended. There has been considerable

discussion relative to this set at the front, due to the fact that

artillery operations when unable to receive messages sent with

this set attributed the cause to the limited range of the Type "Y"

set. It should be said, however, that after careful consideration

by those who have been concerned in the operation of this set,

conclusion has been reached that these failures were not due tu

lack of power in the "Y" set, but to lack of cooperation and

ignorance on the part of the artillery operations ...

(b) Network communication proved satisfactory as long as

the operators in any one net had received proper instruction

relative to the operation of undamped sets. The main trouble was due to the inability of the operators to obtain wave length

settings within five per cent accuracy. A greater error than five

per cent of stations within the set resulted in failures, due to the

I . " . .
iI

Lesson Leearno>ds 255 

1It

--
256 U.S Air Service

in World War I

voil IV

sharp tuning required by the undamped sets. The majority of air

radio personnel at the front up to the signing of the armistice

had little or no training outside of that given them in the

squadrons.

(c) Radio Telephone: No radio telephone sets were used at

the front up to the time the armistice was signed, as instruction

had only just begun. A sufficient quantity of sets had arrived

only a short time before the armistice was signed and all

fixtures, such as brackets, generator collars, etc., for their

installation had to be made, as none came with the sets.

(d) Direction finding: No airplanes equipped with direction

finding equipment were ever flown over the lines, consequently

no data is availabe relative to its usefulness under actual battle

conditions, although it has proven a success at test stations and

training centers.

-92-

[2d Lt. Knox W. Nicholson]

[Radio Officer, 1st Aero Squadron]

The French radio set TypeY Direc , %as and is used by the

1st Aero Squadron during its p3rticipation in the war. The

essential parts of this set are the high frequency fan driven

alternator mounted in the drift of the propeller, and the

transformer mounted within the fuselage. Much inconvenience and annoyance has been caused by this

set during recent activities because of the difficulty of testing it properly on the ground and because of its semi-permanent installation in the airplane, it would have been much more

satisfactory to have used a highly compact transmitting set not

installed but merely plared in the airplane, and then only when

that machine was going our on a mission involving the use of

radio. Such a set could be put in place and the necessary plug connections made in far less time than it takes to place a

camera. This would save the strain which is put on radio setf
Lessons 257

Learned

while in the air on missions not necessitating their use (i.e.,

photo or protection).

Another inconvenient feature of the French Type-Y set is that,

due to its semi.permanent installation, all minor repairs and tests

(the lather are very numerous) are made out on the field or in

dark hangars. If compact portable sets were used they could be

taken to the radio trailer shop where all facilities for repairing

and testing are available.

Antennae and weights, were lost at such a rate that the

following was resorted to: The weights were placed on an

improvised swivel and attached to the end of the antenna thru a

spring. The dimensions of the latter were 1 K12 cm. This

arrangement reduced the rumber of lost antennae and weights

materially

The radio apparatus available, gave satisfactory service at all

times, but better sem~ce could have been had, it seems, with

less effort and less chance for errors or failures, by using a compact portable set as referred to above.

-93-

2d Lt. Oliver N. Beymer

Radio Officer, 12th Aero Squadron

In the case of planes used for radio, it is much more

satisfactory to have the plane equipped at the factory Because of

the great amount of vibration with the generator mounted on

a bracket on the fuselage, leads to the generator fie!d and

brushes become broken. This vibration might be cut down by

mounting the generator on the lower wing. A more satisfactory

interchangeable reel might be developed. The leads on the

generator type "Y" to the field and brushes might be made of a

braided soft wire such as used on high speed exciters, as those .

would withstand greater vibration than the present stranded wire '

leads.

A short wave indirect set similar to the S.C.R. 72 would be of

greatest advantage because of the sharp wave. Less jamming

4

J
258 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol IV

t wcut occur at artillery receiving stations. The wave lengths of

tlhe "Ye 'N" indirect and also of the S.C.R. 72 were too high to x u,2d according to the wave length... [schedules?].

.11e vxorkshop could be mounted in a medium-size truck with

c'azhrq,. tfit installed. With this arrangement, the radio truck

coaid te moved from field to field without depending on the

squalio(r, %rar.sport~tion, since the ,adio department often has to

do wo(k o- ihP planes while the squadron is moving.

T- %!riem of supplies is *rot the best as the newly developed

a,,d ai.)roTed apparatus does not reach the squadron as soon as

;t 7v21ht. Oftn Cio supplies that are most needed cannot be had but ale fcur, Zi. r-2nty anywhere but the front.

With the light truck as above mentioned, the radio department

.vnild be more idch:tr.ndent of squadron transportation.

The radio enlisted personnel oight be put on a par with the

remainder of the squadron enlisted personnel in regards to non-

,:ommnissioned officers

As a w.,le, the equipment and personnel have been good but

improvements might be made especially in a short wave indirect

set for planes.

5' 

.

94--

2d Li. Harry W. Pribnow

Radio Officer, 50th Aero Squadron

Dunny :ny penod of dutv with the 50th Aero Squadron

becnning 5eptembe: 28, 1918, the radio section has had the

opportunity ot usiN its equipment under the greatest difficulties

cnd with great success. Before b.ir.9 assigned to this squadron, 

I was with the Ist Aero Squadron which used the same sort of

radio apparatus. although on a different type of plane. I found

thar (e radio scts mounted on the Salmson planes were easier

To take care cf than the sets on the DH 4 planes owtig to the

ionstruction of the machinec The Liberty planes have much

more vibration to contend with than the Salmson. For th:s

reason more care and attention must be given the radio

apparatus on the DH 4 than on the Salmson.

In ,pile of all ,he diffe ulties the radio s,ction had to

ooercone, we had but one complete radio failure since

September 28, 1QR, and tnis was unavoidable. The lead into the

field hookt an th. %inding and could not be prevented This .s

the Se,Onid M.Itdi..e of such an occurren,e since the Americ 

n

Army started to work with its owr. Air Service.

Vs,

I;=

'|
Lessons 259

Leame,

Llass in verate' I'he

wpire 265 at LeVak u-son.

The greatest trouble experienced wias broken leads to tic

brushes, caused by great vibration. We remedied this d ,iijy by

reinforcing the leads with small wire and resolderirng the

connections.A

Another great trouble was with propellers for the dtv~rnat( .$

We experienced great difficulty in securing 150 Kim prop- :! ,~

Untii just rei.entlv the DH 4 replacement planes for the s-taid~on

came equipped with 140 Km propeflers. This was ajite ;-npot.ar.t

because this sized propeller attained to a great spee6 and

consequently caused the mounting to get loose an- '- -everao

instances to break off. During thc wet weather,' muo1 t,Knn off

the wheels when taking off caused tany broken prupeie-,

We had a little trouble with the mountings for tl~e atumators ~ because thelt were not strong enough. As soon as ?'i- xev plane

catme to the squadron we reinforced the mcunting, b.'i or. thL

inside and outside with strips of sheet mstal. The *art t,, V'lare, we received were equipped with a much bet'.er mou Ift~

although it should have been made tr, allow the uwi ol a

constant speed propeller.I

The S.C.R. 57 Interphone Sets were quite satislautIory ' some l

the pilots and observers liked them very much, while others

would not use them because thie nurmerous wires interfered v-ith

An Cmelary kbJzrr cld'

i.- roe istrwtioi, -- radio

training at th?, 2d AIC
i260 U S. Air Service

in World War I

VoL IV

their work If the helmets could have been made to fit each man " :. ,s they vould be more satisfactory and more used.

Af'er having used the radio apparatus tinder all conditions, we

have from time to time found room for a few improvements; for

instance, when the new plane came to us it had a plug in

connection to the antenna. We changed this so it would have a

direct connection to the antenna at the fairlead, thus saving the

observer time, trouble and preventing many failures. The keys

were moved !a suit the operation also

During oin operations with the 42nd Division we worked on a

lcng wave length when on Infantry Contact Patrol work. This

necessitated a very long antenna on account of the direct "'Y"

set. Invariably the planes ri-turned with eilher the antenna

clipped off or weights lost When a plane is on this sort of a

tmibsior, it must fly low over the tree tops and shrubs and the

.j. long antenna is bound to drag If the Divisions used shorter

A wave lengths, and this is possible, especially for the Infantry

icorner ofthe American Contact Patrol work, nore of the missions would be successful.

AtCa eI he enlisted personnel of the radio section should be given

more training with the French undamped sets. All men should be

operators so that the squadron can have a man on duty all the

time. It has been quite often the case that the men do not

understand the working of the E-3 Bis and E-3 Ter radio sets.

After having been both in the Radio Schools in the Service of

Supply and on actual service at the front, I believe that the

instructors in the schools should be radio officers who have had

some experience with the apparatus at the front. This would

bring the actual work into and thus be better for the service The constant speed propeller should be highly recommended

for use on DH 4 pianes, but before this is possible the mounting

will have to be extended, as it is too close to the fuselage at

present.

The table of organization allowing eight men in the radio

section is quite successful. When a squadron is together with

a ,other squadron in its group, fewer men are needed, but when

at an airdrome alone and away from the group, all men are kept

busy all day.

-95-

2d Lt Joy Hopkins

Radio Officer, 104th Aero Squadron

1. It has been proven by experience that it is not necessary to
Lessons 261

Learned

assign one radio officer to each squadron operating in the field.

One officer assigned to the Group and vested with proper

authority can efficiently control all radio operations of the group.,

This officer should have transportation constantly at his disposal

so that he can make liaison at all times with radio officers of

corps and division, liaison to bring about a perfect understanding

of methods of battery adjustnent by aeroplane and to fix

responsibility for all radio failures. The Group officer should be

consulted relative to the feasibility of using wave lengths to

squadrons in his group.

- 2 As a rule, the trainint of enlisted personnel is too general. If

possible men should be trained as operators, storage battery

men, or generator reoair men, each course to include some of

the theory of radio t jiegraphy. Squadrons could then requisition

personnel according to their training, thus avoiding the necessity

of training men it. the field.

3 Radio operations of a squadron can ho Pfficipotly rconducted

by a well trained enlisted personnel commanded by a Sergeant

or a Sergeant First Class. Only in the case of a squadron

operating independently should there be a commissioned officer .n charge. Squadron operations for the most part embody merely

the repair of small generators, chrging of storage batteries, and The radio departmen at the

radio towcr, 2d AIC. Tours

bJ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .u' ~ ~ ~'-~nn~~i~ ~~ ~ ~~~~~~0 r esA..--~u~-~- '111116111- 1 
262 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

the requisitioning of supplies, which with the instruction now

available in our radio schools, car readily be handled by [a] Poncommissioned officer. The group radio officer should be

consulted relative to any changes.

-96-

2d Lt. J. G. Belcher

Radio Officer, I Corps Observation Group

Commissioned Personnel: It is suggested that one officer in

charge of Radio in a Group is all the commissioned personnel

necessary. An M.S.E. or sergeant first class would suffice in the

Squadron where the Radio work is limited entirely to the care

and instaiiation of equipment on the planes. This noncommissioned officer with the proper enlisted personnel could

handle the work with ease and could be made directly

responsible to the Group Radio Officer who in turn would be

responsible to the Group Commander. There is no necessity for

both Group and Squadron Radio Officers.

Enlisted Personnel: At lea.st six first class operators should be

attached to each group These are necessary to allow the

functioning of the "net" or long wave station, and to operate the

checking-out station, and includes one extra man for

emergencies. Besides these a battery man with an assistant are

necessary.

Equiipnent, Each group should be equipped with one long wave transmitting set, preferably undamped or sustained wave.

This Group has had one for each squadron, which has not been

necessary. The longest distance worked by this Group has been

about forty-five miles but it would be preferable to have a set

w th greater range. On several occasions, notably at ChateauThierry and in the Argonne, liaison between the group and the

divisions which it was working with has depended almost entirely

upon Radio and though communication has never failed it has al

times been rendered extrerrely difficult on account of distance.

This set should be mounted in as light a camion as possible

and should be accompanied by another with a charging outfit

and al; facilities for battery work.

Supplies. Supplies havc been a problem in Radio work on the

front for one reason. The Supply Parks attached to the Corps

have not carried a large enough or varied enough stock for us

to obtain what we needed promptly
L=

Lessons 263

Learned

-97-

Maj. F. N. Shumaker

O.I.C., Air Service Section

Radio Division, OCSO, AEF

General Patrick's "Final Report" on the Air Service. AEF, gave

some space to the organization of the radio service and the

problem of dividing the various functions between the Air Service and the Signal Corps. As the report pointed out, the situation was further complicated by a three-way division (Air Service-Signal Corps-Artillery) o! responsibility in matters pertaining to radio communications for artillery adjustment by aerial observers., In the report which follows, Maj. ShumaKer

advocated giving the Air Service control of both ends of the

radio communications system for regulating artillery fire. In

support of his proposal, he cited the success the British had

had with such an arrangement. He might also have noted that this was the system which had been advocated by the Technical

Section of the Air Service, AEF, late in the summer of 1917 but

which had been rejected. Shumaker had been engaged in radio work with the British before his appointment as Chief of the Radio Section, Air Service, AEF, when the section was created in April 1918. Subsequently, in September 1918, he had become Chief of the Air

Service Section when the Radio Section was taken over by the

Signal Corps. His immediate superior, Li Col L. R. Krumm.

Chief of the Radio Division, agreed that whoever controlled Air

Service radio should also control the receiving stations for

artillery adjustment, but whether control should be given to the

Air Service or to the Signal Corps was a matter for discussion 

I

At a conference presided over by Krumm on 11 January 1916,

and attended by a dozen Signal Corps and Radio Officers, including Shumaker, it was agreed unanimously thai ground sta- tions for army artillery should be manned by Air Service personnel. This was not extended to include divisional artillery because in the latter case radio was more concerned with cooperation with the Infantry than with the Air Service-c No s Jch

distinct.on was made, however, in the recommendation that

General Foulois made three days later to the Director of Mili'ary

Aeronautics in Washington (Doc. 98).

1. I have prepared the following outine as a suggested basis

for reorganization of radio cooperation between airplanes ard
A

264 U S. Air Service

in World War -

Vol. IV

Li

artillery as a permanent branch of military science along those

fundamental principles that must be followed in any military 

A

operation involving the extensive cooperation between two

separate arms of the service if efficiency, under the trying 

,

conditions of active service in the field, is to be maintained.

2. Effective cooperation between airpianes and artillery can

only be maintained by an efficient radio system and in this

regard it must be borne in mind that by far the greater skill in 

-

radio operation alone must be possessed by the receiving4

personnel on the ground, and that not only is this the case in

the strictly technical operation of the radio apparatus but that

the receiving operator must be familiarized by careful kr"aining 

=

with every detail of the airplane observer's duties and difficulties

so that he may feel that his duty is one of Loyalty to the

Obserier in the Air in rendering every possible assistance to the

latter in his ardluoub task, as well as of Loyalty to the Air

_ Serv~ice inipomtn the efficiency of that smeinevrwa

that lies within his power so that there will be no chance of

dissension, and the mutual confidence 30 vital to successtu!

cooperation between the two services will be upheld.

3. He must be made to realize that for the time being, he is

the most vital link in the chain of communication and that 

a

break or failure, which by his own personal sacrifice could

possibly be avoided, means much more than the failure of 

a

simple registration, though this in itself is serious enough,

especially during the preparation for an attack when there is

never sufficient good visibility flying time available to provide for

the amount of counterbattery worK that should be done to

properly safeguard our infantry troops when zero hour arrives. It

means that for the time the loss of an a;rplane and two flying

officers is being needlessIl;, risked and their services are being

worse than wasted, for during the minutes .vhen he is for any

reason not properly receiving its signals thie airplane is probably

sending coi,ntless calls intended for him but which are only

causing interference with the signals of otho~r airplane~s tryin3g to

work with other batteries near by. What is far more serious is

that when such a failure occurs due to (he operator's negligence

or incompetency of training (and courtless such failure have

occurred during actual operations in the A.E.F), it is only human

nature that, provided he is an artilleryman and rpsponsible only

to 1he Artillery for the efficiency of his work, he will report the

'allure to his immediate superior as the fli of the airplane, dn,;

each service will say that the other is at fault Therefore. if the

sender of the message, ie., the airplane observer, is to be

responsible to he Ai Service. and the receiver of the message
Lessons 265

Learned

to the Artillery, it must work out (and has in fact constantly

occurred in recent practice) that dissension and loss of mutuai

confidence without really discovering instantly where the trouble

lies and correcting it with the necessary disciplinary acti,mn has

been and w11 continue to be the result, as long as the present

system of radio cooperation employed between the Air Service

and the Artillery in the American Expeditionary Forces is

followed. The loss of flying time and tactical opportunities

through failed m~ssions, slow shoots and lack of confidence in

airpl3r.e observation due entirely to faulty operation of radio at

artillery reception stations because of operators being poorly

trained, and incompetently supervised whilst in action is an

appalling indictment of the plan which has been in effect in the

Ar C I

ASigjii~d Corp5 r idio soi

[ I S 0 i' d,' :':i i[

- - f-tl- ain , n - a . f--l.- , , --. .. .Lb r.-. --- , - '
266 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

A.E.F. whereby the operators for reception of radio from

airplanes at artillery stations are tr-ined by and responsible to

the artillery itself, and should be a sufficient object lesson to

prelude the possibility of this plan being considered as a basis of

permanent organization.

4. I have endeavored in th.2 foreguing to emphasize that in

considering any basis of recrganizatio of the radio functions of

this service insofar as cocporation wit'i the artillery s concerned.

it is necessary to assume that firstly the principle will be finall,

and firmly established by the War Plans Division or other

competent authori!y that because the sender of the radio

message from the airplane must belong to the Air Service, the

chain of responsibility for the radio function can only be logically

IA

Iif'1+ljllu_, 11 a DI 1 4

kI

I
Lessons 267

- Learned

completed by making the receiving end responsible to the

master, who will be charged both with training of the operatots

for this duty, and with supervision with authority over these

stations in actual operations. This latter function therefore

properly devolves upon the Squadron Commander of the

Observation Squadron which cooperates with the particular

artillery units affected, as there can be no argument but that he

is the officer held directly responsible by higher authority for the

percentage of success which has squadron ?tlains in the

missions of artillery observation with which his squadron is charged.

5. For this purpose he is provided with a radio officer

commissioned in and trained by the Air Service. There is also an

Air Service radio officer of the staff of the Air Service Group

Commander who might readily be charged with general supervision over the outside stations pertaining to all the

squadrons of his group, to standardize erection and general

technical and operating details of these stations. Under the

present system, these officers have only the responsibility for

maintenance of radio apparatus on airplanes within their

squadrons, a duty which might readily be left to a large degree

in the hands of the radio Master Electrician of the squadron,

leaving themselves free to maintain daily supervision of reception

stations in the field and to make immediate irvestigation and

report of any failure of airplane cooperationi with these stations

when radio operation is involved. In an active program, there

would be at ieast 20 such stations in operation pertaining to

each souadron and the best efforts of the Squadron Radio

Officer would be fully and usefully employed in their proper

superv.sion.

6. A sufficient commentary on the value of the work which

may be accomplished by the employment of this .simplified

system wherein the supervision and control of all the stations for

receiving messags from airplanes rests with the flying service is given by the following quotation of a typical day's work by a

British Wing, the 15th R.F.C., comprising three Artillery

Observation Squadrons, on June 2nd, 1917:

Successful registrations by airplaue radio cooperation 159

Direct hiis on enemy battery positions 101

Enemy gun pits destroyed 29

Enemy gun pits damaged 30

Explosions caused 21

Total number of rounds corrected in counter-battery

shoots by radio cooperation with 6, 8', 9 2",

and ]2"howitzers 5230

Radio failures, either at artillery reception stations

or in airplane apparatus None
268 US. Air Service

in World War I Vol. IV

As against records of this nature, we are only able to show by

the reports of Observation Group and Squadron Commanders,

Operations Officers, and the Artillery itself that our system has

been a source of contention and that but a small percentage of

the airplane cooperation by radio, which might have been

expected in fair comparison with the above typical record, has

been accomplished.

Relationship with Signal Corps

1. The relationship with the general communication service of

the army in this regard is entirely analogouIs with the telephone

service between the artillery battery and its forward observation

posts, a service in which, it will be noted, that the telephony

branch of the Signal Corps takes no part beyond the supply of

material on mass requisitions which are submitted by the

Artillery. This is due to the fact that this service is entirely

unique within the Ar-tillery itself and in no way affects the ~eneral

communication system of an Army, and it does not appear that

the introduction of Signal Corps personnel, either in maintenance

or operation of these lines, would contribute to efficiency.

Exactly the same is true in the subject of airplane radio

communication to the Artillery except that, for reasons as

already stated, this work must remain as a responsibility of the

Air Searvice.

2. The plan by which the Signal Corps is charged, as at

present, with the development and production of radio apparatus

for all branches of the Army is good and should remain in force,

the Air Service merely requisitioning on the Signal Corps for all

requirements to maintain its service of cooperation with the

Artillery, both for equipment of its air-planes and receiving

stations.

3. Chief Signal Officer of the Army should also, for purposes

of g_ neral radio control, designate the range of wave lengths,

powcr output, and wave form vuhich must be followed by the Air : Service in carrying out its cooperation with the Artillery,

i assuming supeivision of this service only insofar as these

i technical details are concerned. The Signal --ervice should,

I however, not attempt to assume responsibility for operation of

this service, either in training or actual field work, as it is

obviously a branch of communication entirely lying between the

Artillery and its observation and in no sense affects the general

communication system of the Army.

4. T]he above mentioned technical details may easily be

supervised by the Chief Radio Officer of an army in cooperation
Lessons 269

Learned

with the senior radio officers at Air Service Commands.

5. Installation of radio apparatus on aircraft is, of course, as

much a function of the Air Service as would be the installation

of any other part of airplane equipment and is provided for by a

sufficient radio personnel now included in authorized tables of

Air Service Squadron organization-

-98-

Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois

Assistant Chief of Air Service, AEF

1. The following suggestions bearing on the future organization

of Air Service radio work are submitted for your consideration

as the result of combined recommendations gathered from

experiences in active operations:

(a) For a permanent organization there should be a Rad'o

Section within the Air Service charged with administration and

training of radio personnel, experimental research and

development, and supply of air radio equipment. This

recommendation is largely influenced by the high degree of

specialization necessary in the development of communication

between airplanes by radio telephony and the navigation of night.

flying machines by radio direction, the vital importance of which

may now be readily foreseen in the light of developments already

accompished. Considering only the subject of Artillery

cooperation and taking as a possible permanent organization of

20 active observation squadrons as a basis it will be seen that

the total requirement of enlisted radio personnel for this service

alone is 760 men, although naturally this strength would be

largely controlled by the proposed permanent artillery program.

This figure however, would provide for the manning of 20

squadrons with the authorized complement of 8 enlisted radio

mechanics and operators each and would make possible the

immediate manning of 250 battery stations for receiving radio

signals from airplanes, with an emergency pool of 100 operators

for replacement. It would be unwise to restrict the radio operator

strength of the Air Service to a number exactly commensurate

with the suspply of two operators per Battery of Corps or Army

artillery on a peace-time basis for the reason that it takes much

longer to train an operator to competently handle this work than

it does to train and put together the personnel of the Battery

ft, 

_
270 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

itself. An over percentage of trained radio men should therefore

be held ready for assignment to Batteries under emergency

notice. An additional reason for this plan is that a most

important phase of the Battery's training is that of its

cooperation with airplanes, and it would be inimical to the

success of such training and unfair to both Artillery and Air

Service if it were necessary to send untrained operators to carry

out this important work with new batteries Just being formed.

(b) Successful cooperation with the Artillery can only be

obtained by means of special receiving stations having no other

function whatever aside from that of receiving signals from

airplanes, by reason of the highly specialized nature of the

service and the precise limitations of possible flying time due to

varying weather conditions. It is obviously impossible to gauge

the load of communication on these stations. Two hours of good

visibility weather dunng an otherwise bad day will make it highly advantageous to put up as many as 25 or 30 artillery reglage and

r,.istration machines over a short area of frontage and if the

radio stations detailed to receive signals under these difficult

conditions are involved in the operation of a regular ground radio

communication network both systems will break down at the

moment when perfect radio cooperation is most vitally important.

It is therefore recommended that all radio personnel for

operation of such stations be enlisted in, trained, and supervised

in action by the Air Service.

(c) All commissioned personnel should be first selected from

experienced radio men and young electrical engineers, likewise

enlisted personrel should have had practical work with electrical

apparatus and Morse code.

(e) Endeavors toward the perfection oi airplane radio telephone

apparatus and radio navigation of night.,iying machincs should be

vigorously supported and the maintenance by the Air Setvice of a separate radio development flying field and laboratory simlar to

that maintained by the British Royal Air Force at Biggin Hill,

reports on which have already been forwarded to your office, is

considered as vitally necessary to the maintenance of supremacy

in this branch, which will continue to grow rapidly in military

importance.

(f) Special effort should be made to instruct and give practical

examples to officers of the Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, in the

use of radio in airplanes and the methods of giving grcind

signals airplanes.

(g) In a similar way the ground or deck signals now usually

i17

17

,I i iin'''lf ' l l ~'T 'r rT~'~~ 1rff' ' - " " -
Lessons 271

Learned

KV

I.r

employed by the Army and Navy to communicate to airplanes

B should be coordinated so that Coast Defense work by airplanes

of either the Army or Navy will permit the prompt and intelligent

communication between Navy airplanes and Army stations and

between Army airplanes and Naval stations or ships.

(h) It should be borne in mind that all details of orgenization

f and training that Air Service radio officers wll be charged not

cily with radio instruction, installation, and maintenance, but also

with the electrical work incidental to lighting and heating of

airplanes, and with the supply and supervision of all stations

est3blished within the Army for the purpose of maintaining

V regular communication with airplanes.

-99-

1st Lt. Andrew Anderson

Supply Officer, I Corps Observation Group

1. Following report on supplies, transportation and rations

during existence of Observation Group, 1st Army Corps.

2. Since June 28, 1918 this Group has changed stations nine

times, and excepting at one field, Toul, no previous provsion

had been made or arranged for to accommodate personnel with

shelter, in many cases enlisted men had to sleep in trucks, under

airplanes, in hangars and other inconvenient places in urder to

keep dry during rainy weather; at no place was there sufficient

hangars to shelter planes. I would recommend that pnor to an

Trucks and water ianks used

at heA S Pioduct... Center

#2. RomorAntin

- ].Z
272 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

organization being ordered to a new field, said field should be

provided with enough hangars to accommodate 18 planes per

squadron, and buildings enough for sheltering officers and men.

3. There should be gasoline and oil delivered on a new field in

sufficient quantities for at least two days operations as it is

impossible for a Group to ca ry any amount of such with

transportation previously allowed.

4. The only real difficulty expenenced with airplane supplies is

that our base of supply has at no time been near enough, in

most cases have had to haul supp!ies, including gasoline and oil

a distance of from 50 to 80 kilometers, and only for a short time

have we had a Park Squadron assigned to Group, hence have

had to 'ely on our own transportation for our existence. I would

suggest that Sub-Depots be established nearer than heretofore;

not over 25 kilometers from any Group and have at ;ea. t one

Park Squadron assigned to each Sub-Depot to haul and deliver

gasoline, oil and supplies to Groups within the area

5. Lack of transportation and spares for such is and has been

our worst difficulty. Two of the squadrons composing this Group

have at times been unable to supply their kitchens with water,

wood and rations. We have requisitioned for transportation from

time to time; for spare parts nearly every week, but all to no

avail despite continually requisitioning for spare paits to repair

what little transportation we had on hand. We have re eived less

than 5 percent of what was needed; result is that we have had

to leave trucks ind cars behind when leaving. Prior to the time

the MTS people took over transportation and spare parts,' or

Water tanks used to supply

airplanes 44
Lessons 273

Learned

: when Air Service had their transportation under its control we did not have this dfficulty in obtaining supplies pertaining to

transportation as has been experienced for the past four months.

6. 1 would suggest that transpo)rtation pertaining to Air Service

be handled by officers of that service and not by the M.T.S., for

in the case of this particular Group which has operated ,on the

active fronts since last March, the Motor Transport Service has

done nothing whatsoever to help or relieve the serious state of

OUT needs.

i. We have experienced no trouble writh rations or clothing

' and no improvement could be made as to that.

-100-

1 st Lt. A. M. Wright

Supply Officer, 12th Aero Squadron

1. To improve the supply department, we must have the cooperation of all departments especially the Air Depots.

2. Supply departments must be allowed to draw supplies on

squadiron requisition and not [be] hampered by a Group supply,

as in the past. 3. We must have adequae transportation at the disposal of

the supply department at all times so that we may be able to

transport immediately gasolne, spare motors, tons, etc As we

never know wha the demand may be very at in advance, also

the above items cannot be carried in stock in any quantities.

0. D. Burwell

Supply Officer, 50th Aero Squadron

A resurne of the activities of the 50th Aero Squadron from the standpoint sf suppi es and transportation (which are closely

interlinked) has presented a rather complex and serious prcblem

during the recent operations.

In the first place the difficulties in obtaining spare parts for the

Liberty DH 4 planes considerably handicapped this squadron
274 US. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

during its entire operations. Planes kept out of active service in

innumerable instances through failure of both the Advanced Air

Depot at Behonne and the First Air Depot at Colombey-lesBelles to have in stock sufficient spare parts to take care of

emergency requisitions. Whether or not this situation could have

been improved, I do no, know; in any event it remained

uniformly unsatisfactory to the end-in addition to being (on

account of the constantly growing distance to the base of

supplies) the primary cause of the breaking down of the very

limited amount of transportation that we had available.

Aviation Gas. This squadron received at certain t:mes during

its operations, quantities of bad gasoline, or gas that did not test

high enough to successfully operate a Liberty engire. Some of

thc gas received by the 50th Squadron (,n alual test fell as low

as 60, while the test should be at least 70 to insure the

successful performance of a Liberty airplane mission. It is

believed that sufficient care was not taken in grading this gas, as

it has come to the writer's knowledge in at least one instance

that motor gas was delivered in drums stenciled "Aviation or

Fighting Gas,"

Initial Equipment. The initial eauipment received by this

squadron when it commenced operations, in the face of the

actual needs of a Liberty squadron after operatIng over a period

of months, does not seem adequate ....

Suggestions on initial equipment for planes.

(a) A seat patterned after the Salmson type seat, to replace

the present unsatisfactory type seat in the observer's pit.

(b) Planes to be equipped with rear cockpit fittings such as

compass and clock.

Gas and oil retueling station, (C) Pyrene extinguishers to be placed in both front and rear

Issoudun. cockpit.

r

I

I
Lessons 275

Learned

Repair d~pvt fs,? rotary motors, AIC, Wrgroom of the Aero Supply Depot,

fasoudun. AZC Issoudun.

Airplane salvage ai the Air Service Production Center 102, Romorantin

IA
276 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

(d) A safe place to be devised for carrying the Very pistol.

Compilation of index parts. Suggested that all parts for planes

be cataloged and that all spares be numbered, in order that

requisition for same car be made both by description and

number. This, it is believed, would reduce to a minimum the

errors that are made in supply depots by clerks who are not

familiar with parts and have little time to familiarize themselves in

a time of emergency.

Motor Transportation. The condition of our motor

transportation has been deplorable from the beginning, gradually

going from bad to worse. This squadron has never been a

mobile squadron due to the fact that it has never had any more

than about one-fifth of the transportation that is needed for the

purpose of moving, which together with the difficulty encountered

in getting spare parts and tires has bccn a source of great

inconvenience.

1st Lt. Selmer J. Tilleson

Supply Officer

Third Aviation Instruction Center

1. In my opinion, the most important lesson learned by the Air

Service in this war, has been the need for standardizing the

types of machines which have proven in the service to be most

practical- The need for a vast number of these chosen types of

planes and sufficient quantities of accessories and spare parts for

same is most vital. Each type of plane should be uniform with

interchangeable parts, to do away with the great amount of work

which has been necessary in the Air Service to convert spare

parts into suitable and useable parts for repairing planes. 2- Sufficient stocks of spare parts must be kept on hand [or]

be procurable with the least possible delay, which would go a

Salvage pile at the Ist Air

Depot.

iA
Lessons 277

Learned

!ong way toward improving the efficiency of our Air Service. One

of the bad features of procuring supplies in this war has been

the necessity for relying on the French and English Governments

for suitable types of aeroplanes and soare parts. These

governments have felt it necessary to take care of their own Air

Service and the U.S. Air Service thereby received only the surplus, which has been far insufficient for our needs. A

permanent and sufficient source of supply must be established.

3. The necessity for the best liaison possible between the Air

Service in the U.S. and the Air Service in France has been most

necessary in order to procure sufficient quantities of the essential

and urgently needed equipment. The need of a highly efficient

salvage service is necessary to recover vast amounts of good

material from wrecks and condemned planes.

4. L st!y, the need for qualified experts in each branch of the

Air Service, to be in charge of each department with sufficient

experienced personnel, is vitally important

-103-

Col. Thomas R. Boggs

Medical Consultant

Air Service, AEF

Dr. Boggs was associate professor of clinical medicine at

John Hopkins University and chief physician of Baltimore City

Hospital when he was commissioned a major In the Medical

Reserve Corps in 1917. He served ds chief medical officer of

Base Hospital No. 18 (John Hopkins Unit), which was sent overseas in June 1917. Later, after making a study of the work of the

medical department of the Royal Air Force for the Chief Surgeon, AEF, he had been directed in July 1918 to make a study of

existing medical work in the Air Service, AEF, and make recommendations for improving the medical care and supervision of

flying per3onnvl. Following submission of his report to the Chief

Surgeon he had been designated Medical Consultant to the Air

Service on 8 September 1918. In a report to the Chief of Air

Service on 28 December 1918. he included the following recommendations:

1. In order to arrive at any just appreciation of the needs of

the Air Service from the medical standpoint it is essential to

keep in mind that this branch of the service is fundamentally

........ t ......... ;: ... .. ..................... * +
278 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol !V

different from any other. The character of the duty demands 

a

very specially .elected personnel, which is peculiar not only in

physical but in mental makeup. To this is added the factors

arising from the small size of the basal unit, the squadron, and

the isolation demanded so frequently in order to obtain landing

fields and concealment of hangers. Lastly, even the enlisted

personnel differs from the other services in the combatant troops

in containing a large percentage of highly trained technicians, not

readily replaceable. It is obvious, therefore, that the medical

organization planned for the Army in general may fail in some

particulars to meet the very specialized needs of this service.

2. The difficulties met in the general medical service are

principally two. The first is in commissioned personnel, there

being a dearth of specially trained and adapted men for this

duty; and, furthermore, the transfer of medical officers from one

arm of the service to another which is unobjectionable in general

is quite impractical in relation to men once trained for a very

special service. Again the dependence of the medical service with

the aviation units upon the Division, Corps, Army, or Section

Surgeons, leads to difficulties from the lack of interest.

understanding and sympathy with its special needs and demands.

It is only natural that many men in responsible officers [?] with

the Army as a whole, object to the special demands made and

are annoyed by the privileges granted to this branch. Thus,

purely personal reactions of individuals in high executive position

may lead to serious handicaps. The sudden injection of 

a radically new member into a well crystallized formation may well

be expected to produce such results.

The remedy for these difficulties would seem to lie in the

separation of the personnel and property and channels of

communication into a distinct division of the general medical

service, or the placing on the staff of each Army, Corps, or

Section Surgeon of a specially qualified officer who should handle

directly for this surgeon the business of the aviation section. with

of course a corresponding chief, as representative in the offices

of the Chief Surgeon and the Surgeon General. Should Air

Service as a whole be separated from the Army and Navy the

solution would be simplified.

3. Medical Responsibility for Flying Fitness. The recognition

achieved in the Expeditionary Forces, of the essentially medical

nature of the decision, as to the fitness of the flying officers, and

the disposition of the unfit, must be perpetuated in the Air

Service if efficiency is to be increased and maintained. The

medical boards and laboratories and the flight surgeons should

e recognized as permanent parts of the Air Senuice

organization.

TA
Lessons 279

Leaned

;Ii

The system of record devised and made available i'- the last of the ssn active riod has many points of great practical value, and

should be incorporated into the record system of fine Air

Service- It is based upon the scheme evolved for the Royal Air4

Force, which has proved most successful. The essental features 

"

are compactness, completeness and constar, auailal.ility, as the .',a.-

flyer has the carbon copies of alh examinations from the entrance :.

into training to date, which follow him in ad his assignments,

whether to duty, recreation, 01 hospital.

4 General Hygiene of Flying Personnel. I-;:.', (s is so

intimately dependent on personal conduct an fia no

Learned tht 

'

amnount of legislation or regjulation NlcnL wJil p; -. : 

-! I , .,tsJl 

desired; it is only through the active coope.ratimon of n , r,: r,

themse~ves that we may hope to reacE, th*2 maximuni of

efficiency.

It seems evident that the most promising ap.proac¢h to t;-iq problem must be by endeavoring4 cultivte !hp spirit of the ' 

athletic teams of the colleges and Fmaeur assialions. The

flyers should be imbued with the reor thatteo team's success

depends upon the of each sitnes co.vponent member, and that

any infringement of rercqnied alt rties of good training

jeopardize the prospects of success for the eam. In this wa.y

there is a strong sentiment developed which helps in resistig th

tendencies to break the training rules As agencies making for

the same result there stculd be poviied materiai or active

exercise, especially in compelitive garr.,,s, as basket ball, medicine ba4l, tennis, fencing, boxing etc. anJ nte.-sqnadr, and i group

contests should be actively promoted. order In to carry out

these plans it would be desirabe or necessary to have specially

qualified ahletic drectors detailed to this duty.

S. Tainin Tables. Diet has such an important bearing on

fitness for any athat at it may not e neglected i

the ptans for the flyg man. Observation at the soci s and

permanenl camps makes it evident that, in genral, the flyers vat

too much uon the real demands of a sound body ande andpt to

concentrate on the sugars and other carbohdrate,. While no

accurate nutritional studies have as yet become ava;lab!e for this

class of men, it seems ciear in general th'at they should heive hiol

tea, soups, bouilon, etc. at any tme on departure for, or return

from, flights if they desire it. The reguar meal should he liberal

and of the best quality and well served, but promiscuous eating

between meals as now practiced should be discouraged. The

effects of overfeeding will be much reduced by active phsical

exertion

6. Alcohol. There is no genuine evidence to support the
280 U S. Air Serice

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Vol. IV

contention of a few well meaning but inaccurate proponents ofI

the view that the flying man may be benefitted by moderate or

even excessive doses of this drug. The contrary position, viz:

that the flying man should be a total abstainer, has the support

of scientific demonstration and practical experience, and by rule

and example every effort should be made to banish the use of

alcohol.

7. Tobacco. The laboratory tests show conclusively that visuai

acuity is promptly affected by the inhalation of a moderate

amount of tobacco smoke; the flyer is undoubtedly better

without any tobacco, though moderate smoking in hours off duty

will be well borne by most.

8. Rest and Recreation. The necessity for frequent rest and

change of scene with normal diversion has been pointed out in

other places in this report. This [was] thoroughly demonstrated

in the cxperience of the aviation services of the French and

British Armies as well as for a short time in our own before the

cessation of hostilities. We should and can improve on the

methods in use by the Allies by controlling the places of

recrentic in such a kac tat the aviator may have a thoroughly

agreeable change, with amusements and sports away from

centers of population. In this way the temptationF to license in

alcohol and venery may be minimized. The assistance of the Red

Cross and other auxiliary agencies would be invaluable in these

arrangements.

9. Venereal Disease. Prophylactic stations for officers should

be maintained in all organizations. The advisahility of ,cncr-al

inspection remains debatab!e. Certainly it should not be enforced

in the Air Service alone.

• / ' It should be a matter of regulation that: ( a. Officers acquiring syphilis should be reclassified and leave

the Air Service.

•.0 b. No officer under treatment for acute gonorrhoea or

S.. syphilis or any complication of these should be allowed to fly.

except after examination by and recommendation of a properly

qualified medical board.

S 10. It is most important that portable shower baths be

provided with each squadron; and that portable delousing and

clothing sterilizing plants be available for the air units with each

Army.

11. Hospitalization. In any permanent plans for the care of

aviators some provision should be made for special

hospitalization. The peculiar psychologic and physiologic factors

involved in any adequate medical attention to fh'ers will require a

staff of doctors able by experience and training to meet these
IJ3SSQITh 281

L .2 it~c'U

I

I

I

I

I

I Sin, ~ 2

r:. r' rr,., ri,' r., Qge; ~vas rtlri,'ri Fr, !h,'&r,->. *rr.u~A 7Qr~rrrnrq ii' Fr or.

A r~ r .J CI.. .c Mr '~r.: I R ,'~ 'lo Lcw H Br,' rio,: ,, rot Find to qrcot he Huron so or

F'

~
282 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

special needs. Again we must recognize in the hospital, as in

other army formations, that it is difficu0l to administer smoothly

any organization where one group gets a different treatment from

another, without reasons riatent to the uninstructed There is

every evidence from the experience of the Royal Air Force that

special hospitalization has paid in efficiency.

It is suggested that, in each Army, there should be at least

one evacuation hospital to which sick and inlured flyers are sent,

there to be attended by specially trained medical officers

attached for this purpose And, furthermore, that there should be

one base hosptal for the exclusive care of flying officers, sick or

wounded. This base hospita: would suffice for a group of Armies

if placed in a proper location Provision should also be made for

the hospitalization of the slightly sick enlisted personnel of the air

units with armies and schools in the organization or in nearby

hospitals. These slightly sick should be returned when well

directly to their units, and not evacuated from the area.

12. Laboratories The Nation should maintah, dt all times a

fully equipped research laboratory for the investigation of

physiologic, psychologic, hygienic and general medica! problems

relating to aviation, and for the special training of flight surgeons

for field and hospital work with the Air Service This laboratory

would also collaborate with the military in aiding in the devising

of new and improved methods of attack and defense, the

adaptation of special apparatus to flying needs, etc.

Separate from the research laboratory there should be

laborator es for the routine examinations of candidates for the

Air Service, students, and accepted qualified pilots and

observers. These laboratories should be so placed in schools,

depots and armies as to make a thorough examination quickly

available to any flyer, ordered for this purpose by the squadron

medical officers or commanders. A medical board would be

constituted from the members of the laboratory stafl, which

would pass upon the condition and fitness of each aviator

examined and recommend appropriate disposition. Tho base

hospital designated for the care of aviators should be equipped 'with such a laboratory in addition to the ordinary medical

laboratory equipment.

13. Dental Organization In the schools and depots and pilot's

pools the percentage of dental officers and assistants shoUld be

increased to meet the extra demands arising from the rapid

shifting of the enlisted and officer personnel in these places.

In the tactical formations there should be provided dental

ambulances, at the rate of one for each three squ?dions, or

more if these should prove insufficient. This would go far to

"III II IIII II ii............... ...... .. .. . . ...
Lessons 283

Learned

curtail the loss of time and valuable services resulting from a

shortage of dental service

14. Medical Officers. So long as the squadron remains the

indivisible unit of the Air Service it wili be nece:ssary tu provide

one medical officer with each. These officers shoulo have had a

special course of training to fit them for work with air units

With each group of squadrons there should be a senior surgeon

of higher grade and wider experience to direct the work of the

squadron surgeons

In each army there should be an Army Surgeon, Air Service,

with appropriate rank either as an independent otficer or

attached to the office of the Army Surgeon to control all the

medical work of the Army for the Air Forces To this officer the

Group Surgeons would report and be responsible Army

Surgeons in turn would be responsible to the Chief Surgeon, Air

Service, o the Air Service representative on the Staff of the

Chief Surgeon of the Forces. The medical personnel of the Air

Ser.*ice uni'. Lommissior.ed ii(] eniisted should he considered,

as an ;nseparable part of these units and not subject to

detachment for duty with other than Air Service organizations,

as has frequently been the case. The fact that when squadrons

are grouped there is an apparent excess o! medical officers and

personnel, does not justify this removal of the personnel

helonging to one or more squadrons. Squadrons are freely

moved and isolated or concentrated and must be prepared for

efficient work on an indep-ndent basis at all times. So long as

the squadron remains the basal unit of the Air Services, this

excess of medical personnel must be met and accepted as a part

of the waste ineradicable from military preparation and activities

The above remarks apply with equal force to the personnel,

commissioned and enlisted, of the laboratories, these are

specially trained men and it is destructive of efficiency to remove them into other duties to which their training does not apply.

and at the same timt make it necessary to train substitutes

for them

4'4

"r. , ,.
284 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

15- Transportation for Medical Officers and Patients. The

ambulance provision as laid dowr in the tables of orqanization, viz: one ambulance for each squadron, is sufficient so long as

the ambulance is in working order, but arrangement should be

made for reserve ambulances to supply tie shortage caused by

the frequent laying off of machines for repairs. This medical

property should not be subject to detachment on the order of

the Army Surgeon or his subordinates.

The size and nature of the flying fields, often separated by a

considerable distance from the quarters of the personnel, and the

infirmary, make it imperative that there be some means of rapid

transit at the disposal ot the squadron surgeon at all times, so

that he may reach the different points or duty without delay

Ford automobiles or motorcycle side cars would meet this need.

Air Service Suigeons of Corps and Armies should be provided

also with transportation by automobile, as otherwise they will be

unable to perform their duties. This may be covered either by

individual assignment of cars or of these officers to

tiaii-opurtation shouid be a matter of record in the tables of

organization and not left to chance and the good will of superior

officers.

Medical Research Board

Air Service, AEF

The Medical Research Boara had been appointed in October 1917 to investigate conditions affecting the efficiency of

pilots, to carry out experiments and tests to determine the

ability of pilots to fly at high altitude and to provide them

with suitable oxygen apparatus, and to consider all matters

relating to the physical fitness of pilots A laboratory, built

at Miieola, Long sand. was ready for use by January 1918.

The following August the board and its staff, a total of nearly 50 officers and enlisted men, embarked for service with the AEF_

The equipment taken overseas included a lo4-pressure chamber which the board had Deen using to study the ,.Ifects of high

altitude on breathing. In the chamber, which was large enough

to accommodate five or six me,). a reduced pressure corresponding to an altitude of 38.000 feet could be attained, Part of

the group remained in England to study British methods, while

the rest ccninued to France. The board, made up of four offica.rs, established itself at the Third Aviation Instruction Center

at Issoudun on 2 September 1918. A laboratory was set up im-
Lessons

Learned 285

A

OpthalmcgDcai roomn, Medical Research Laboratory, 3d AIC

mediately at ISSoudun, and another was established early inI

November at the Second Aviation Instruction Center at Tours for work in connection with observers. Following is an extract

from a report made by the board at the end of the war. ........ ..... I.................................. ...... ........

The tremendous importance of the aeroplane in the war and its obvious possibilities indicate, beyond the question of a doubt, hat it is here to stay and that its importance will be a conlatIVgrwin oe.The megeknowledge of the medical

profession, concerning the problems of the filer 3rd the need of post hbelium, careful, painstaking and lime-consuming reseairch in relation to them, is equally obvious. In order that the flier keep

pace in development with aviation itself, it is necessary that r! medical science apply itself to the study, dlevelopment and C protiction of the flier.

With these things in mind, thre Medical Research Board is grasping the opportunity no.w presented to ;ay the foundation for the creition, in America, for a permanent school oif aviation

triedicine TIhis school has its prototype in the Army and Navy
286 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

L

Opthalmological roam,

Medical Research Laboraoy

3d AIC.

Medical School in Washington, of which it should, henceforth,

constitute an integral part 4

To this end the Board is now engaged in collecting everything

utilized by the Allies, in relation to training of pilots and

observers, bombers and aerial giinners in relation to work of I, these groups at the front, in relation to admission of fliers to the

service, and in relation to admission of fliers to the service, and

in relation to maintaining their medical care while in the service.

This includes the following:

1. Paper work.

(a) From aviation schools-training schedules,

admission sheets, students reports, etc.

(b) From the front-forms covering admissions, maps, reports (individual, consolidated, weekly, etc.), from pilots,

observers, and bombers.

(c) From headquarters-papers covering assignment and

detail to various types of work.

(d) From Allied Countries-Papers as listed above, and, in

addition, papers relating to aviation medicine, such as admission

blanks, reexamination, accidents, proceedings of elimination

boards, etc.

2. Medical methods and apparatus. The Medical Research

Laboratory is abundantly supplied with apparatus for its wcrk. It

is attempting, at the present time, to collect and to try out

methods in use by the British and French in their work with the

aviators. The apparatus necessary for this is being collected.

3. Photographs, lantern-slides and moving pictures dealing with

the work of the aviator are being made or collected. In this

connection an attempt is being made to cover as many phases

as possible of the work and the conditions at the front.

4 Statistics. These are being collected, covering all matters

relatinq to health and efiiciency, accidents, morbidity and
fl _ __ _Ifl7 i ~

Lessons 287

Learned

mortality of man occupied in the various types of air work, both

in the schools and at the front.

5. A faculty and a board of consultants. The war has furnished ,

America with its early opportunity for the training of medical

men in aviation medicine. Similarly, the war has furnished

America with a group of medical men, specially trained for the problems of the flier. Recognizing this, the Board has attempted

to familiarize itself with all phases of the work in all the various

branches of the air service by .ending members of its staff to

the different training schools to undergo intensive training in the

different types of work. One member of the staff has been

trained as a pilot, another as an observer, while still others have

worked in relaticn to bombing, aerial gunnery, and Marine

aviation, etc.

The idea of a permanent school has intensified the interest, Testing visual fields with a

broadened the viewpoint, and enhanced the work of the Board. Hall Perimeter.

The Medical Research Board has looked upon its work in the

nature of a great trust. It was entrusted with the care of fliers

and with the creation of a new type of medicine. The Air Service

as represented by its fliers is small in personnel, but great in - importance, each flier therefore being an important iink in the

Air Service. This demands that each flier be handled not only

from the standpoint of his individual efficiency, but from the

broader point of view of the efficiency of the Army as a whole.

The urgency of war needs concentrated the attention of the

board on the war aspects of aviation, and only incidentally on

aviation as a commercial and transportation problem. The board A

has recognized, however, that aviation has infinitely broader and

more important aspects than those relating to war, but it feels

that the war served to reveal the possibilities of aviation and has

accomplished on a broad scale experimentations, investigations and realizations relative to flying which would have been

otherwise impossible.

A good beginning has been made, individually aviators have

been benefited, the morale of fliers generally has been improved

and consequently their efficiency. methods for determining the

functional capacity of fliers have been devised or borrowed from

our Allies, have been weighed in the balance, their significance

and value determined, and have been retained or discarded

according to their value. Utilizing these methods as a fulcrum, :

some important facts have been pried from nature. These have

been correlated in some instances, but only such theories as fit

the facts have been presented. A group of men has been trained

to investigate, treat and care for the flier. Medical problems,

many of which are fundamental to success in flying, have been

recognized and investigated, in some instances with partial or

f ,- - - - - - - - - - ... - - -. . ._ ..". . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. __.. 
288 U.S Air Service

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I

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complete success, in some instances without success. These

constitute, however, the material for subsequent investigations

when more time and greater facilities are available.

The greatest achievement of the Medical Research Board

consists of its recognition of the shortcomings of medicine, of the

possibilities of aviation and of aviation medicine, and its

recognition of the imperative need of a permanent school of

aviation medicine and a special medical air service.

-105-

Medical Research Board

Air Service, AEF

The board set up a program to educate aviators in matters

concerning health and efficiency. The doctors gave talks on

"such matters as the eye, the 'flu'and how to avoid it, the health

of the flier, etc " As part of this program they wrote a series of

articles for Plane News, the camp newsoaper of the Third Aviation Instruction Center, the purpose being to preach the "gospel

of training and clean living-" An abstract from one of these

articles was included in the board's report on its work.

All experience up to date has impressed one crucial fact on

medical men: only the fit should fly. In the flier, as in men

generally, this is dependent upon the simple fundamental things

of life, such as sleep, exercise, diet, and habits.

Sleep. Eight hours is a good average. There are but few men

who can do efficient work on seven hours or less. Sleep should

be taken at night and since the "crack of dawn" comes quickly,

an early start is necessary.

Exercise. WithouL it, physical fitness is impossible. The

aviator's life is sedentary, though out-ofdoors. Any out-of-door

sport ending in a good sweat is all that is needed. It can be

followed by a dry rub when a shower bath is not at hand.

Diet. Judging from the number of fliers consulting the board

for dige!,tive disturbances, this question is an important one.

Four factors should be considered: the balance of the diet, i.e.,

its food values, palatability, cooking, and serving. In this

connection two food experts were here during the last week of

October to deal with these very problems. Sugar and starches in

the form of breads, cereals, fruits, and fresh vegetables should

play a large role in the aviator's die.L It is desirable to have these

L'
Lessons 289

Learned

types of food preponderate in the early part of the day, while

heavy food, such as meats and fats, should be reserved for the

mid-day and evening meals.

Habits In no other line of work is attention to habits more

imperative. Despite anything that might be said to the contrary, alcohol is a subtle and deadly enemy to the flier. Worship should

be reserved for Mars and Vulcan, as the victims of Bacchus and

Venus are easy prey for the Hun. Tobacco in moderation to

those accustomed to its use may do no harm; but every man has his limit, and this should be neither reached nor passed.

Drugs should not be self-prescribed. The man who needs aspirin

should not fly, but he should see a doctor. Coffee, excellent for

breakfast, taken in the evening is responsible for many a restless

night.

These four great tactors can be summed unde the one word--training. Training is essential to fitness.

o!~~c a Cco rn r nodd, II:,

+ ' f +- . .......................... .......... = + 1 +1 I F 1 I I I

L
290 U.S. Air Service

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Vol IV

-106-

Col. William H. Wilmer

C.O., Medical Research Board

Dr. Wilmer, a graduate of the University of Virginia (M.D.,

1885), was professor of opthalomology at Georgetown University. Hc hod been a member of the Medical Reserve Corps since

April 1311 and had entered active service on 1 October 1917.

1. The lesson learned from the present war is the great need

of careful selection of the flyer and skillful, self sacrificing care of

him during training and in combat.

2. For the future the proper facilities for the study [of] these

problems by men who by training are fitted to do this work.

-- 107-

1st Lt. Azro J. Pardee

Surgeon, 104th Aero Squadron

1. In making any recommendations for the benefit of the

service as regards the Medical Department, many things have to

be taken into consideration, first of which I would place the

Medical Department itseif. In the early days of the war, the

personnel were picked and assigned to squadrons with the view

of getting the best men possible to take care of the health of the

command, to care for the sanitary situation, and in short to fulfill

all the duties of an isolated Medical Unit. When the Squadrons

were placed in training, the great majority of these Medical Officers and Enlisted men were detached and sent out with other

units not belonging to the Air Service. Consequentdy when the

training period was over, the Medical Detachment was picked up

here and there, with no particular view to fitness, as regards

training or intelligence.

2. The second is in regard to the Status of a Medical

Detachment with a Squadron. Definite status should be given to the Medical Department, and such duties and obligations as naturally belong to it should be so clearly defined as to allow no

opportunity for discussion or misinterpretation by inexperienced ~officers.

' f-'i I i ~ I ~I I I I I I : i 1- ' '='1 1i ' : i J l F J:i j l
Lessons 291

Leamd

3. Medical Officers without exception should have special

training in the physiological aspect of Aeronautics. Without this

training, the Officer is incompetent to judge whether or not the

flyer is unfit to fly, whelher or not high altitudes impede his

efficiency and whether or not he is getting stale from too

frequent flights. 4. The equipment of a Squadron on active service at the

present time is rather indefinite, varying more or less according

to the preferences of the Medical Officer, and the transportation

available. Inasmuch as Squadrons usually operate in groups of

two or more, The Group Surgeon or Senior Medical Officer

should cairy quite a complete equipment. This should include the

ordinary first aid and regimental equipment. Such special

apparatus as may be necessary for a cursory examination of

flyeis and a 6 bed hospital for each squadron. Each Squadron Medical Officer should have a medical truck and trailer, fitted

out similarly to the field operating truck or the dental truck, but

giving due regard to the particular equipment cartied. This would

do away with a great deal of unnecessary confusion and loss of

property when moving. It would furnish a permanent infirmary,

ready to operate at any and al! times. A comfortable place for

patients to be examined, and reduce the amount of lost property

to a minimum. Delays in transportation, lack of transportation,

and carelessness on the part of drivers have at different times

rendered the work of this department rather difficult. The trailer

could be utilized for transport of hospital tentage, beds etc. An

ambulance is an absolute necessity. I have found by experience

that the Ford ambulance is preferable to the heavier G.M.C. by

Testing stereoscopic vision.

II -V" - I I
292 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

virtue of its weight and simplicity. During wet weather it is

impossible to drive the heavier machine across the aviation field.

5 I believe that the Medical Detachment of a Squadron should

consist of one Medical Officer, one Serqeant, one Corporal, and

r ,four privates, two of whom are motor drivers. This will enable

the detachment to care for its own transportation, besides having

the same driver all the time.

6. Finally, I would say that there must be a thorough and

hearty spirit of cooperation between the Commanding Officer

and his Medical Officer. Lack of this cooperation results in a

dissatisfied C.O. and an indifferent Medical Officer.

7. 1 believe that the remarkably low sick rate in this 104th

Aero Squadron since its formation at Kelly Field and continuing

up to the present is in no small degree the result of the prompt

and thorough cooperation which its Commanding Officers have

accorded me. 8. The above recommendations are made from purely personal

observations covering thirteen months with the 104th .ero

Squadron, three of which were spent as Acting Group Surgeon,

5th Corps Observation Group.

Photographic Section

Air Service, AEF

The importance and value of aerial photography in warfare has

been clearly demonstrated to our army during the last few

months of military activities. This has been made clear in spite of

the fact that photography was certainly not used as fully or as

intelligently as it could have been. The following reasons are

g:ven:

(a) Lack of knowledge in the army at large as to the value of

photography and its uses.

(b) Lack of competent and trained personnel for interpretation

and exploitation of photographs. (c) Division of responsibility for photography between the Air

Service and Intelligence Section.

In reference to (a) it would seem advisable that all field officers

have a certain knowledge of aerial photography and the role it

.

. i"" '. plays lectures in modern on what warfare. photography They should be given illustrated can do in the way of aiding them,

and they should all have a summary knowledge of the

interpretation of photographs. It is further recommended that
S Lessons 293

- [,earned

popular lectures be given to field troops, this chiefly to acquaint

7L them as to how e2nemy can see, by means of aerial photogjraphy.

just wha! they, are doing, even miles ,behind the lines. By

iillustrated lectures or pamphlets they can be shown that [by being) careless in making paths at the front, or of allowing

camouflage to deteriorate etc., they are endangering their lives as

well as the success of their operations. it would be well for every

soldier to know that the enemy observation planes flying high

overhead are a much mote dangerous enemy to them than those

that come with bombs or harass them by machine-gun fire.

In reference to (b) and (c) the Photographic Section in

America gave considerable attention to the interpretation of photographs in training its photographic officers and

photographic laboratory men. As a matter of fact there were a

number of men in the Photographic Section who, as the result of

this training, Were better qualified to be entrusted with the responsibility of interpreting phot29ra3hs than were some of the

Branch Intelligence Offi':ers work ing with the observation groups.

It is quite obvious that the interpretation of photographs is, from

a military point of view, the most important phase of the Work,

and too much stress cannot be [aid on choosing an d training the

right men to do the same. The best French and British interpreters have insisted fi t essentia phe requisite in the

training of interpreters is that they shall know modern warfare,

either from having had exprience at the front or from having

made external study of the actual ground on reconquered

territory. The mistakes that are [madet by a student in

interpretation whose knowledge has been gained entirely fo s

the study of books and pictures are flagrant; a few hours spent

on the battlefield studying the ground and organizations in

connection with aerial photographs previously, are of more value than any amount of classroom work. The interpretation of

photographs is in no sense an exact science, but is largely a

matter of astute deductions, and men picked for this work must

have qualifications that will make it possible for them to deve!op along such lines. The Intelligence Section was not only charged

with the interpretation of photographs, but also with ordering

them to be made. With the exception of one or two cases the Branch Intelligence Officers know absolutely nothing about

phctography or its possibilities and consequently were not able to judge as to what could be done or what was desirable It is

believed that the Photographic Interpreter should ha e a very

thorough knowledge of photography Frequent cases have been

noted where an insiseter who knew nothing about photography

mistook imperfections in the photographic plate or print for

IIt

maeetrnlsuy ftea tua rd oeoqee

errItoy h isae htar1md]b a stuen in " I
294 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

things recorded by the camera. Numerous British officers have

stated that the French get more value out of their photographs

than the British do. From observation (his is also our opinion,

and while recognizing certain racial characteristics in the French

that particularly fit them for meticulous and keen work of this

kind, the fact that in the French service the interpietation and all

matters pertaining to aerial photography rest in the hands of the

French Air Service is chiefly responsible for his superiority. The

organization planned by the Intelligence Section to handle this

work was inadequate, and gradually more and more of the work

supposed to be done by the Branch Intelligence Officer and his

staff of draftsmen fell upon the shoulders of the draftsmen

attached to our Photographic Sections, and the better qualified

B I O's were qvick to realize the value of these photographic

men and wisely made use of it. In a similar way the Intelhgence

Sections planned to take over the mass reproduction of all

photographs, the making of assemblages, and the exploitation of

A

I
A

Lessons 295

Learned

=A

the information contained in the photographs for training

purposes. At a matter of fact very little work in exploiting

photographs for field training was done by the Intelligence

Section. It is reported that the mass photographic printing they planned to do for the St. Mihiel offensive was very unsatisfactory

because of slow production, and some of the pictures did not

arrive until two days after the attack. In the first Argonne

offensive this work of mass printing was turned over to the

Photographic Section, all the printing required was done

promptly and in due time under very difficult conditions. The

extemporized Photographic Section at Ligny-en.Barrois, which did

most of this photographic printing, also, with the help of 

a

French officer, did a major part of the interpretation of the

oblique photographs that were sent out, as the Intelligence

Personnel was insufficient in number to do the work.

Furthermore, this division of the work entails a great deal of

unneceisary duplication, as, for instance, in the packing for

distribution of prints to their ultimate destination. Our

recommendation would be that the officer charged with

interpretation of photographs at an Observation Group, be 

a

Photographic Officer belonging to the Photographic Section of

the Air Service: this would be along the lines of the French

Organization.

With aerial photography clearly understood and an

organization adequate to exploit same, this Photographic Officer

becomes a very important figure in the Air Service. He is chosen

first for his special and natural aptitude, such as keenness,

imagination, tact, astuteness, and personality. It is desirable that

he shall have had previous photographic experience and under

any conditions that he take the full course in photo laboratory work. He should also receive the training currently given to an

observer and be on a flying status, as it is desirable that this

officer make occasional flights over the enemy lines. In this way he will become personally acquainted with his sector and have a

better understanding of conditions. He will also in this manner

develop the Air Service point of view and will more fully

understand his observers and be able to intelligently advise them,

as well as secure information from them. He must have the

photographic point of view so that he may know just how much

he can get o't of the laboratory. This will further make the

whole Photo uection a more vital working force as it will

stimulate the whole section and keep up their interest which is

always important where such quantities of work must be speedily

turned out. With the aid of the observers and the Photo Section

he will interpret the photographs and properly record them.

rFrom this point onward the photographic material properly

I|
296 U.S. Air Service

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belongs within the domain of the Intelligence Section, so that this

Photographic Officer in reality acts as a liaison between the Air

Service and the Intelligence Section This Photographic Officer

should not command or administer the Photo Section proper,

but simply direct this work. The administration and laboratory

work should be entrusted to a subordinate officer. This

Photographic Information Officer should be responsible for the

photographs but not for the photography. He should be in 

a

position to know both what is wanted and what can be

accomplished. Up to the present phutography has been 

a

commodity without enough customers, and each army needs

officers q.ialifiz:- to drum up trade and to show the army what

they can gtt :,nd how they can use it

The Photographic Section was rarely asked to make

assemblages except for office ornaments. Stereoscopic prints

were only occasionally called for. Not once was fal large

as.,mblage requested of an entire sector Initiative in rhesc

direction[s] on the part of Photographic Sections was

t discouraged and there was a general atmosphere concerning

these things which suggested it was none of our affair and did

not conform to Army Intelligence Regulations

It was not until towards the end of hostilities and after the

Photographic Sections had thoroughly demonstrated their

efficiency by promptly meeting every proposition placed before

them, that a larger leeway was given and a few more months

would have seen the present relationship considerably changed in

our favor.

The fact an adequate supply of proper material and sufficient

personnel was at last beginning to arrive from America placed us

in a position to undertake new things. The following is cited as

an instance: A number of specialists. stereoscopic printers, had

been trained at the Photo School, 2nd A.I C., with a view to

assigning them to the various Photo Sections at the front. All

photo missions could then have been sent out in stereoprints as

well as the usual single prints. This would have materially

increased the work of the Photo Section in the field. The

experiment was successful, and in a short time this would have

become a general practice, and the value of the photographs to

those studying them would hav4E been very materially increased

In this connection it is noted that we recommended the

adoption of our Richard stereoscope to the Intelligence Section.

This was done and the instruments were secured by their Supply

Service, but, to the best of our information they were never

issued to the Branch Intelligence Officers and the Photographic

Scctions were consequently never called upon to make the

stereo-positives required for use in these instruments. It was on
a.... Fred. Place and.t thea stf of. th Phtorahi Scol 2d

LL

[I

II

Lessons 2971

Learned i

Capi Fred Miace and the staff of the Photographic School, 2d AIC

the strength of this failure that the Photographic Section took

the initiative and decided to force the stereographs on the

market instead of waiting for the request.

In addition to having a Photographic Information Officer with

each Photo Section at a Corps Observation Group, a Chief

Photographic Information Officer should similarly be attached to

the Air Service Army Headquarters Staff It would be the duty of

this officer to co-ordinate the work of the Corps Group officers

and to hold the army negative and print files. All negatives from

Corps Sections to be sent to the Army Section at the end of

two weeks so as to relieve the Corps Section of the task of

making the reprints required. This reprinting in a Corps Group

during periods of great activity unnecessarily complicates their

worl, This Army Photo Officer would also rece:ve first copies of

all prints from the Corps Sections. He will therefore be

acquainted with the work of the army and can furnish adjoining

armies with ary data of interest to them

In this case he also forms the liaison for photographic

information matters between the Air Service and G2 His office

would also furnish a center from which photographic material

could be drawn fot !raitir.y purpose at the flying schools He

would eiso have at his disposal an army base laboratory plant for

making reproductions, assemblies, copies and enlargements for

general distribution throughout the army This base laboratory

I
298 U.S. Air Service

in World War I Vol. IV

plant to be operated by a regular Photographic Section.

Not having a Photographic Officer at Army Headquarters,

except during the last few weeks of the war often made the coordination very difficult, and it has necessitated the writer's

personally taking charge of photographic operations during active i

periods.

-109-

Capt. Ernest Jones

Chief, Information Section

The following observations are presented as a result of

experience in this Section in the Am. E.F. and, previously, in its

counterpart in the United States, by the Chief of the Secion

and by bib Executive Officer, 1st Lieut. J. C. Farrer. These

relate particularly to such an office in the field and do r -t

attempt to cover operations at home. However, all the iticisms

Capt. Jones. made apply thereto equally well.

The purpose of such a Section is five-fold. Following are these

main divisions, with notes and suggestions under each.

a. To answer general inquiries of organizations in the Air

Service, ot other services, of individual officers, who desire

information on the wide variety of subjects connected with

military aeronautics, the Air Service itself, and that of allied and

enemy countries.

Where answers to such questions are not immediately

available, the information should be procured; or, as a last

resort, direct such inquiries to other channels.

An Information Section is competent only to the extent it can

answer aJl the miscellaneous questions put to it. Its scope, in

practice, should be broad enough to allow for the answering of

almost any question in reason. It has been the policy of the Section not to refer inquirers to

any other section or branch of the Air Service, or Army, but to

obtain the information desired and furnish it, without ado. The

Section has become. thus, just what its name implies, and has

fulfilled requests on the widest variety of subjects. It could have

done better.

Its usefulness is measured directly by its facilities for securing

information, and making it available. One adverse criticism which

can be made of the Section is the paucity of personnel during

the major portion of its existence.

An Information Section, particularly in the field, should not be

limited in personnel by a tab!e of organization to a definite

=-n . ~ ~ l * .=
Lessons 299

Learned

number. The number of liaison officers belonging to it depends

directly upon the number of headquarters and branches of the

Air Service established and upon their geographical location;

though, if these were grouped one officer might cover a numbet

of sections.

Aside from the normal routine work, which takes a certain

inumber ofl personnel, calls are made for special compilations.

As one example, the Information Section was called upon,

through channels, for a resume of the work done by America in

the air; authorized strength of the Air Service in 1914,

equipment, appropriations, status at entrance of the U.S. into the

war, growth in men and material and the standing at the signing

of the armistice.

Here was suddenly demanded a weeks work for one officer

and it is obviously improper to sacrifice normal routine to fill one

single inquiry.

b. To collect information on military aeronautics and our own

and other air services, from all sections and organizations of our

own and allied air services.

It has been demonstrated that the furnishing of information

automatically by departments, headquarters, armies, can not be

depended upon.

The Section should have a carefully planned liaison system of

its own with direct representatives in all training centers, sections

and headquarters of the Air Service, with the air services of

allied countries, and with the air intelligence office of the General

Staff. There should be a liaison officer attached to the

Headquarters Air Service of each of the armies in the field. He

would be charge ' with the collection of new developments in

tactics, and after obtaining the approval of the C.A.S. of the

Army, the forwarding thereof to the Information Section for

proper dissemination, among training centers for example, and to

the Information Section at home.

The Chief of the Section must be in a position to feel that his

files contain exhaustive data on all subjects of interest to the

C.A.S. and to the Air Service as a whole.

These liaison officers would ",th secure information and see

that information available in . ' ,ection is properly disseminated.

All information collected by the liaison officers would be

submitted for the approval at the chief of the organization from which it emanates.

Reports of programs at home should be filed with the Section

and copied for circulation to those directly concerned with the

subject discussed

c. To distribute information. Primarily the information would be

distributed by means of bulletins. In addition, there are
____________________________________________________ s -. --- .... '.

7 - , -. - . -

300 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

"; A LD AtJTp.S _.V

-".* . pamphlets prepared by other services, our own and allied, and

- the limited distribution among chiefs of departments of matter

not of general interest or too secret for issuing as bulletins.

Information on file in some offices is of value only when it can - - be given to those who can use it or when its presence and

availability can be made known.

For instance, it has been found that bulletins and other matter

of value which was particularly needed by pilots, observers, or students have not been made available although copies were sent

ALbATRO5 D to their headquarters.

The liaison, or information officer, at the headquarters, training centers, and the like, would see to it that information available is

furnished to those who can make use of it. At training centers,

he would establish a room especially set apart, where every

scrap of informative mattee would be at hand for perusal. He

would keep his Section informed as to needs and see that it

supplied those requirements.

It would seem advisable to make the Information Section a

branch of the office of the Chief of Staff, or directly under the

control of that office.

The Chief of Staff, Air Service, would be the final responsible

authority for the publication of bulletins and handbooks, obviating

approved by the Zone of Advance could be disapproved by the J Chief of Training. This plan would afford one authority for the final statement of the many questions of policy which necessarily

i - -arise in connection with publications. All publications of the Section would not, necessarily, be ALb/,l K.OS C I! issued as authoritative and fina but the decision as to whether

or not they were such, or simply for information or interest,

would rest with but one authority.

Information of all kinds should be promptly published in some

form. It is necessary that production facilities be adequate. The Section, as it has existed, has depended on the Engineers in Tours and Langres, on the Photographic Section, and, finally,

on engraves in Paris, for illustrations. The use of commercial

engraveir, has been the most satisfactory but the ideal plant

would include engraving or lithographic facilities.

For the text, mimeograph and multigraph machines are

unsatisfactory. Supplies for the former ran out and we turned to

the multigraph. The war had nearly ended before a typesetting

machine and presses were secured. More speed, better work,

larger volume, greater economy can be obtained with typesetting

machines and printing presses. A photostat machine should not

be forgotten. In addition, there is other machinery required, such

as a cutter, stapler, punch, and the like.
- : ...... -- L. .. _. .A.... a.L ---r 

Lessons 301

Q

Learned

F. F

d. To act as a central publishing office of the Air Service for

all manner of publications.

All publishing for the Air Service should be done in one _. 

.

central place-the Information Section-whether it be handbooks

on rigging and photographic interpretation, folders, tactical

bulletins, curricula, technical reports, progress charts or d 

I

organization diagrams. It

The text would, of course, be prepared by the Sections

concerned, or compiled by Information Section and submitted for

approval, final authorization being given by Chief of Staff. ROLAND DI'

Uniformity in size is a desideratum for reasons of economy,

indexing, filing, binding, press work, illustrating, etc.

All bulletins of the Section have conformed to this principle,

but the same remarks apply to all other publications as well,

except in some exceptional instance.

All such extraneous publicaticns, however, should dovetail with

the bulletins, tu the end that the bulletins and their indices

provide a definite centralized source of locating published

information on any subject.

For instance, were a handbook on propellers published, after

compilation by the Technical Section, a single sheet Air Service

bulletin would be issued, numbered serially like all bulletins,

stating that such a volume had been prepared and was available

for issue by the Information Section. The handbook itself would

bear the same number. The same would apply in the case of

large wall charts on rigging, or diagrams of maneuvers in the air.

Thus, there would be brought to the attention of all concerned

that such a book, or other, was available.

A certain number of bulletins would constitute a volume. At

the completion of a volume, the index would again point to the

handbook, etc.

A similar method would be pursued with all publications

stocked, allied or other. A number of books could be listed in

the same bulletin.

e. To furnish required information to the C.A.S., Chief of

Staff, and other high officials, of statistical or other character,

either from time to time or in accordance with a regular

schedule.

This Section has been charged with the comDilation of

historical information' (narratives of combats, for instance) while

the statistics thereof were attempted by another Section. There

is, thus, a conflict of duties on an identical subject and resultant

avoidable duplication of work.

It would seem that a Section properly organized, equipped and

conducted to furnish the Service at large with information should

be the one to post the Chief of Air Service on what is going on
302 '" U.S. Air Service

_ in World War

Vol. IV

HIALBERSTADT

in his world.

f All reports, statistical or otherwise, desired by the C.A.S., or

the Chief of Staff, should be obtained through the Information

Section.

Historical work. It is recommended that historical work be not

a part of an Information Section. The sole relation of the latter

to a Historical Section would be that of furnishing, like all other

Sections, what information it could in connection with the

compilation of a history.

Obviously from its scope, the Information Se:tion, as outlined

above, could furnish a great deal in the way of narrative and

statistics, charts and graphs, but the actual compilation of a

connected history belongs to a Historical Section.

A history is a large enough project to require specialization

and the organization of trained personnel.

-110-

Z 'Capt. R. G. Kincaid

Information Officer

Headquarters. Air Service, First Army

1. From experiences during the operations of the First

American Army, it is believed that unlimited opportunity exists

TroKKE, for the development of the Air Service Information Section and it

is believed that the Air Service performances with the First

American Army have demonstrated to a degree hitherto

unrealized the importance of the Air Service to an Army in the

field. Air Service operations are big enough to maintain an

information staff large enough to handle all the Air Service work

and it is believed that the Air Service itself should handle most if

not all of the Air Service work at present handled by G-2.

2. With personnel experienced in observation and photography,

the Air Service could handle both corps work and Army work.

Let the Army G-2 or Corps G-2 indicate to the Air Service the

work it wants done but let the orders for its accomplishment be

issued by the Air Service and make the Air Service responsible therefor. It is not believed that delay in any way would

result from such a method. On the contiary, they could more

expeditiously be handled by centralizing the control of all

squadrons and having at all times machines available for duty on

any part of the line.

3. The study of photographs also is one that should receive

more attention by the Air Service and photographic experts

II

: ] : , I := .j .. .=-" . . . . + .ktw=s-n+ " I .= ,=. - A r, n na- . -.- n - -

. . . -. " =in ' = = '
Lessons -- 303

LearnedALbATRO5 '

should be made a part of the Air Service Information Section in

order that material important to Air Service oprations may be

made immediately available.

4. The study of enemy aerial operations also presents a fertile

field for development. Time and careful study is recessary to - -

intelligently handle this part of the work. Much might be

obtained, it is believed from te interrogation of German aviator

prisoners. A cursory examination is not usually productive of

results but by casual conversations at intervals of days or even _ >- -

weeks, and allowing such prisoners to see a great deal of our I I

aviation activity, it is believed that they could be induccd to - -

disclose their owr methods, merely by comparison. k Arrangemen)ts could also be made, f sufficient effort was made, ,-

with the Anti-Aircraft and also other front line units to be helpful y

to the Air Service in the way of promptly reporting enemy aerial

concentrations, tactics, and directions of flights. More complete - - AX-..E iV. I -

reports of this kind can be obtained from ground stations than

from our own planes in the air who are engaged in watching the

ground.

5. Perhaps the greatest field for deielopment in the

Information Section of the Air Service consists in more

thoroughly covering the distribution of information to our units.

A campaign of education and instruction should be made and

should also include other branches of the service who most

evidently lack comprehensive knowledge of the uses of aviation,

its difficulties, and its limitations. The liaison between Air Service

units and Headquarters must be maintained and in order that . -

the men who fly over the lines may improve the quality of their

work, they must know the uses that are made of their

observations and the reasons for improving their methods. - .. :, - -

2d Lt. Edward C. Olds -

Adjutant, Second Army Air Service '-

2. Enterng the Air Service in the first class of the Adjutant's - :-- "

School at Columbus, Ohio, after six months service with the UMP 'I

French Army on the Chemin-des-Dames, I was immediately .

impressed with the character of the candidates selected to fill

Administrative positions in the Air Service. On the whole they

were experienced business men, who entered in the hope of

securing at a later time some actual training as Pilots or

Observers, and with the proper amount of military training would
304 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

have made splendid Administrative Officers. However, the need

for Officers of this character was so pressing that it was

impossible to give them sufficient military training and it is my

opinion, that in the future Ground Officers in the Air Service

should be detailed from trained Officers of other branches of the

Service who have exhibited exceptional Administrative ability. I

do not believe that the plan to use former Pilots or Observers as

Ground Officers has been a success, as these men have neither

the experience nor the temperament for Administrative work.

3. My observation of the Pilots and Observers as they came

to the front from the rear convinced me that much remains to

be accomplished in the selection of personnel for active duty. All

Officers were sent to the front line Squadrons with no

accompanying information whatsoever as to their mental or I

temperamental fitness for work over the lines. This situation

might have proven serious had the shortage of Pilots and

Observers, which existed at the beginning of November continued through several months of enforced activity. Until Pilots - and Observers can be trained by Officers who have had

extended front line experience and the unfit eliminated during the

training period, I believe the only solution would be to double

the flying personnel in Squadrons so that new Officers might be :

held under observation for some time in daily contact with

combatant officers before being given missions to perform over the lines4. The question of simplifying the handling of statistical reports

and information has been thoroughly covered in previous A

recommendations to the Chief of Service, which would have

gone into effect had not the war ended so quickly. I believe the

most serious problem to be solved in this connection is the

concentration in one Central Records Office of all essential

information so handled as to be instantly available when needed

and to which organizations might forward reports direct. 'hout

the necessity of utilizing military channels. Our organization!

were constantly handicapped by overlapping and unimportant

demands for reports of all sorts which took time and effort

which should have been spent on constructive work. Much has

been accomplished in the direction of improving the situaiion and

it is probable that had the war continued a satisfactory so!ution

might have been found

.

--. - .,~ikfi~
Lessons 305

S Learned

-112-

Maj. Percy H. Jennings

Chief Disbursing Officer

Supply Section, Air Service, AEF

Business men in uniform filled many important positions in

the Air Service, both in the United States and in Europe. Among

them was Percy Hall Jennings, who had been born in New York

City in 1881 and had been graduattd from Yale University in

1904. His father was an attorney and a member of the board of

directors of a number of railroads and various other corporations. Before the war the son was associated with American

Trading Company, of which he would become chairman of the

board of directors in the 1920's. As a captain in the Air Service,

he had been made Chief of the Disbursing and Legal Division

of the Supply Section in Paris in November 1917.

1. Your memo of December 21st. paragraph 2, e, asked for

suggestions for use in case of future need and the following is

submitted. These suggestions are not made in the spirit of

criticism, for I believe that the Supply Section of the Air Service

has done its work with marked efficiency and success; but with

the idea that their adoption for future organization would make it

possible to carry on the business a little more easily and with

somewhat less personnel.

3. Aside from the difficulties of doing business in a strange

country, I believe a principal difficulty which has confronted the

Air Service in the S.O.S. has been that of trying to do 

a

business job with military men and on military lines. It has been

impossible with existing regulations and traditions as to rank and

under existing laws to move officers and men freely from one

position to another, to put officers and men in the positions for

which they are best fitted by experience and capacity, and to get rid of them easily when there is no use for them. For an S.O.S.

in the future I would recommend that the Chief of Supply and

the chiefs of the various divisions under him be civilians, not

commissioned officers, and that as many of the men under them

as possible consi tent with proper control and hold on the

clerical force be :lso civilians. The Chief of Supply and the chiefs

of the divisions under him could get their authority in dealing

with the army outside of the section from the Chief of Air

Service, and in dealing with the men under them, through a few

L I
306 US. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. [V

captains and lieutenants handling the military control of the

force. The belief that an organization would succeed under

civilian management and comprised largely of civilians is forced

on me by the success of Colonel Dunwoodys organization. He

has handled the proposition for the Supply Section of the Air

Service as a business one. The chiefs have been made to feel

that they were expected to exercise independent judgment and

to assume responsibility. There has been a freedom in the

method of carrying the business that other supply branches of

the A.E.F. appear to have lacked. I believe this has beer, largely

responsible for the success of the organization.

4. The main difficulty which has been encountered in the

disbursing line has been the inflexibility of oui laws and

regulations governing appropriations and disbursements. I do not

think it would be a good thing to have one appropriation for the

whole A.E.F. b+cause each bureau is held responsible by

Congress for its own busaels and the proper disposition of

funds appiopriated for its use. I believe it is easier to obtain the

larger appropriations under the present decentralized system of

Fuselage supplies,

E

.
Lessons 307 12

Learned

finances. But I would urgently recommend that there be a 

I

general appropriation, in as large an amount as Congress is

willing to grant, to cover any emergency and any expenses, legal

or illegal according to U.S. laws, arising out of the necessities of

the A.E.F. This appropriation should be made for expenditure

under the direction of the C-in-C., putting the full power to

decide as to what it should be used for in him and in his bureau

chiefs. 

,

vi I

-113-

=4 Maj. Charles W. Godfrey

Post Quartermaster

Third Aviation Instruction Center

As Quartermaster of this important Aviation Center, it has

been emphatically impressed upon me that proper food for

officers engaged in flying duty was essential to their safety and

success. The garrison ration is suited to men engaged in physical

labor, but men engaged in flying where the mental effort is

strenuous and the physical exercise light, every effort should be

made to supply them with a varied diet, particularly laxatives in

the form of fresh and evaporated and condensed fruits.
308 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Lt. Col. George W. DeArmond

Chief, Personnel Section

Air Service, AEF

Upon graduation from the U.S. Military Academy in 1906,

DeArmond had been commissioned a second lieutenant in the

Cavalry. His assignments before the United States had entered

the war included two tours of duty in the Philippines and one as

instructor in mathematics at West Point. Commissioned a major

in the Aviation Section in August 1917, DeArmond had been

stationed at Kelly, Rich, and Scott Fields before being sent to

France in April 1918. 

I

When I became Chief of Personnel the latter part of August, I

found a section excellently and logically organized internally into

sub-divisions, the heads of which were without exception

intelligent and capable young officers. And yet, there seemed to

be something amiss. It appeared to me that the Chief of the

Personnel Section, had endeavored to carry in his own hands or

even in his own head alone, too many of both the policies and

the details with which the Section was chargea. The young

officers charged with the operation of sub-divisions seemed in

some cases to feel uncertain as to just how to proceed or where

to go for information on doubtful points. They seemed loath to

proceed on their own initiative for fear of making the mistakes

natural to their lack of familiarity with military procedure and

to their often only half knowledge of the policy and prior action

concerning the matter ai hand. In my opinion an organization is

not as good as an organization if, in order to carry on its regular

functions, it is greatly dependent upon its head as an individual.

Before being made Chief of the Persunnel Section ' had for

some months been in a position to observe rather closely its

general operation, and I had formed a general opinion as to the

cause of its deficiencies. My first act was to abolish 'he pomp

and ceremony that seemed to precede or preclude access to the

Chief of the Section. I endeavored to make myself readily

accessible to not only all members of the Section itself but also

to anybody else who might have business with me. I tried to

make the officers under me feel that each one was charged with

the operation of his own part and was supposed to know all

r_ about it, and that they were at all times free to come to me for

• I
Lessons 309

Learned

decisions on doubtful points. I announced that I was entirely

willing to take the responsibility for their mistakes provided they

would use their intelligence to the end of making as few mistakes

as possible and of not making the same mistake twice. The

personnel composing this Section was most excellent and the

reponse therefore was almost immediate. The large bulk of the

work of the Personnel Section consists on handling details,

matter which day after day is of much the same order, and as

doubtful points were cleared up and method of procedure

established, the Section soon become practically automatic in its

operations. I endeavored to adhere strictly tc the principle that

the duty of the Personnel Section was largely service to other

sections and that it was not charged with running or attempting

tu run the Air Service. On the 11th of November 1918, the

Personnel Section was in my opinion an efficient machine,

operating in close and friendly harmony with all other sections of

the Air Service. The flexibility of the Section was shown when

after the cessation of hostilities the Personnel Section was

charged with the details of the evacuation of Air Service troops

from France. By close liaison with the Adjutant General's Office

and the Sections concerned of the General Staff of the S.O.S.

the procedure entailed was quickly established and the necessary

machinery quickly put in motion. I have been told that the

machinery of evacuation in the Air Service was working

smoothly at a time when that of some of the other Staff Corps

had barely been started. This I attribute not to myself personally but to the excellent organization of the Personnel Section and to

the initiative and intelligence of my subordinates whose plans and

suggestions I merely had to approve. The evacuation is now

proceeding most satisfactorily and at the present time the

operations of the Personnel Section are almost entirely automatic

and independent of me as an individual and that in my opinion,

is as it should be.

Of the lessons to be learned, in general I should suggest the

following points:

1. As to the Personnel Section in particular, handling as it

does that in which individuals are most vitally interested, namely

themselves, I believe its operations should be as automatic and

impersonal as possible.

2- In dealing with the supply and demand of personnel in time

of war, I believe it to be almost axiomatic that a pool or

generally several pools must be formed, in which to accumulate

personnel from the source, and from which to draw it to satisfy

the demand. The demand can never be smoothly and

satisfactorily filled by direct requisition on the source.

3. Considering the same number of men involved, I believe it

.!
310 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

is a sounder principle to furnish replacements to old

organizations rather than to move up new ones. Old

orqanizations already broken in furnish in themselves a quick and

ready' school for raw replacements, and if kept filled to strength are practically always ready for saiisfactory action. Under the

circumstances as they actually existed and developed, I believe

the Air Service of the American E.F. would have been benefited

if more replacements and fewer squadrons had been sent from

the United States.

4. Unless the necessity be great I believe it to be inadvisable

during active operations to change iadically, as to numbers of

enlisted men and especially as to grades, the specified

organizations of units. If the number is increased there follows a

sudden and unusual call for replacements, which can often be

supplied only by breaking up other units. If the number is

decreased it usually involvp the reduction of many desern-ng

noncommissioned officers. In either case I believe the effect is

liable to be a reduction in morale.

5. A fault which I think I have sometimes observed is the

application in military affairs of the spirit of the selfish

ccmpetition of business and commercial affairs, the ides;re to

build up one service or part of the service at the cost of

another. This spirit has no proper place in the military service.

The one object of war is to win it, and this result can be

accomplished against a strong enemy only by co-operation not

destructive compelition, within an army. For many reasons, but

largely on account of practical every day human nature, I believe

the Air Service should never at any time be seyarated from or

independent of the Army and the War Department. So far as I

have been able to learn or observe, the first lavw of human

nature has never yet been repealed nor have its subsidiary laws

fallen into disuse. The Air Service should never be in a position

to compete, especially in manufacturing fields, against the Army

as a whole, nor should it ever be in a position to feel that it is

other than an auxiliary arm of the Army, entirely subservient to

the success of the Army as a whole and to the command of the

Commander in Chief.

t8
Lessons 311

Learned

-115-

Capt. Frederick W. Zinn

Chief, Personnel Section

Zone of Advance

A large proportion of the matters concerning personnel

handled through this office, during the time Colonel Van Morna

was in charge. had to do with the American flying personnel

which was then attached to French units for training. Over these

Officers this office had entire control. A certain number of pilots were flying with the French during that period but a considerably

larger number of these attached officers were Artillery Okberveibs

. . . . who were attached to French Observation Squadrons.

When the system of attaching personnel to French Units was

first inaugurated it was realized that these officers

might, or might not, do a larqe amourt of work over the lines,

but in the case of the Observers particularly, it was assumed

that given an opportunity to study the actual working conditions Capt. Znra.

of a Unit on the Front, the officer would absorb a knowledge of

a squadron operations and of liaison between the Air Service

and the other Arms of the service which would be of inestimable

value to him when he began work with an inexperienced

Amencan Unit. In actual practice it was found that these

observers during this stay with the French Units had on the

average very nearly 10 hours of flying each. The result was that

when the 1st, 12th, 88th and 91st Squadrons went to the front,

they were practically experienced squadrons. The inexperience of

the pilots was more than compensated for by the war experience

that the Observers had gained while with the French.

Approximately 165 Observers were attached for varying

periods to French Squadrons. Through the French Mission

attached to this office, arrangements were made so that a total

of approximately 80 places were held available in Observation

Units belonging to 4th, 6th, 7th and 8th French Armies. The

exploitation of this privilege would have enabled at least S0

Observers a month to receive actual service training, but very

shortly the number of Observers arriving in the Zone of Advance

became insufficient even to keep our own squadrons up to

strength.

It has always been considered by this office that a very serious

mistake was made by the Training Section in failing to appreciate

the opportunity herein afforded. If student Observers had been

given a single course in an Observation School as was frequently

recommended, either in America or in France, with a course in

r =s~r ~ r~= -~ Td.fl- fl~4Ssa - ~ ~ a. r~h&~t-t'~A . -a..n~ - ~ rtvxA~--=~'===~a r l n a ~ in
312 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

gunnery, and had been sent immediately to this station for

assig .ment, it is evident that the shortage of observers during

critical times would have been eliminated. The unduly long

course of training in America followed by a long delay at St.

Maixent, while on the waiting list for 2nd Aviation Instruction

Center and the course at 2nd Aviation Instruction Centei which

was apparently a duplicate of the course as given in America,

held back the supply of Observers so that during the two

offensive operations in which the American Army took part, the I

number of Observers available was so low that in many

squadrons it was necessary to use in work over the lines

Giound Officers and sometimes even the non-commissioned

officers of Observation Squadrons. No agreement would have

been required by the French as to the length of time an Observer was to be attached to a Unit and 48 hours notice was

sufficient to brig back to this station, &ny, or all of the

Observers who were with the French. A pool of at least 80 Observers could have been continually maintained ready to be called at any moment.

C

Aerial view of Aviatior, Feild #3, Issoudun.

* ,

I
Lessons 313

Learned

-116-

Lt. Col. Philip A. Carroll

Assistant Chief, Training Section

Air Service, AEF

Like Raynal C. Boiling, Carroll had begun his flying lessons at

Mineola in 1915. The following year he had organized the GovI

ernors Island Training Corps to give civilians flying training, a

project patterned after the Military Training Camp for Business

Men at Plattsburg. In May 1917 he had been among the men,

including Boiling, who had organized the 1st Reserve Aero

Squadron. When Bolling left for Europe in June 1917 on a mission for the War Department, Carroll had taken charge of the

squadron, which he led overseas in August 1917. Redesignated

the 26th Aero Squadron, Carroll's unit had helped to establish

the Third Aviation Instruction Center at Issoudun. Carroll had

become assistant to Lt. Col. Walter G. Kilner, Chief of the Training Section, In May 1918.

1. This Memorandum is written in response to the direction of

the Chief of Air Service to submit a frank statement of lessons

learned in the A.E.F. It does not purport to lay a basis for

definite recornmendations, but is intended merely to call attention

to certain principles which, though often obscured, are believed

to be of more or less governing force under all circumstances.

Difference Between Civil and Military Effort

2. Civilians are slow to realize the difference between civil and

military life. Almost universally their first impulse is to judge a

military enterprise in comparison with some well established

business with which they were previously connected. The result

is naturally unfavorable to the Army.

3. This sort of comparison is unjust. No basis for comparison

as a matter of fact exists. Neither the results to be

accomplished, the motives for their accomplishment, nor the

methods used to attain them are the same in the Army as in

business. In business, the balance sheet and profit and loss

account are the dominant factors; in a military enterprise they

play only a minor part. In business the measure of success is the

success of the individual; in the Army it is the success of the

whole expedition. Competition is the mainspring of civil activity;

co-operation and united effort are the mainsprings .f military

effort. What in civil life would be a laudable effort toward self.

advancement may become in military :ife, a menace to a Service.
314 U.S Air Servce

in World War I

Vol. IV

4 The means at the disposa! of the business manager are

much more varied and powerful than those given to the military

commander. He can generally employ whom he pleases; he can

pay what he pleases; he can reward whom he pleases; he can

discharge whomever he sees fit. His object is single-the success

of his own business.

S. The military commander on the other hand is subject

everywhere to rigid limitations. He must pay all men of the same

grade the same wages, give them the same food and provide

them with the same equipment. His rewards can as a rule be

given only for most exceptional service. His punishments are

confined to the most flagrant examples of worthlessness or

misbehavior. He is limited in his choice of men, not only by an

arbitrary number made available by higher authority, but also by

the necessity of accommodating his organization to their

respective ranks.

6. ["le must rely on a system of discipline based on implicit

obedience, his power of promotion and demotion, and his ability

to create in his organization a high morale and esprit de corps, which will replace in some measure the positive stimuli of civil

life. In order for him to succeed he must be given by his

superiors the widest scope and the firmest backing in the use of

hi, limited resources.

Discipline and Morale of the Air Service

7. The problem of maintaining discipline in an Air Service has

presented extreme difficulties in all Armies in the Present WarWhile many reasons for this fact have been put forward, it

seems to me that one of the main reasons, namely, that the Air

Service is in effect the voluntary service. has not been given sufficient

consideration, and has frequently been entirey overlooked.

8. The voluntary nature of the Air Service becomes apparent when it is considered that it is impossible to teach a man to fly

or to become an observer against his will, and that it is

extremely difficult, even after he has been taught, to get effective

use out ot him except by his most whole-hearted co-operetion.

The reason for this is that the management of highly complicated

machinery cannot be made the subject of order and direction in

m,nagement of a pack. The Infantry officer can be ordered into

the Line and when once there his conduct is more or less

insured by the intensely strong desire not to appear in a

despicable light before his men. The Aviator on the other hand

can say without fear of losing caste, that he has "lost his nerve"

or that his physical condition is such that he cannot fly. He can

present a hundred excues relating t, his ma(hine, and it his

fI

ix
Lessons 315

Learned

record is otherwise tolerably good, he can escape the loss of

caste which a confession of weakness would bring to him in the

Cavalry, Artillery or Line. The reason for this is that the

operation of an airplane requires more than moral courage. Whil troops can proverbially be led by an officer who, although

suffering from intense physical fear, os buoyed up by moral

courage, an airplane cannot be successfully flown by a frightened

man, any more than an express train can be run by a timid

engineer, or a racehorse ridden by a jockey who has lost his

nerue. The feeling that he ultimately and in effect is the judge of

what he has to do is. I believe, the basic reason for the lack of

discipline of the Aviator It is increased by his extreme youth

and by the tact that as a rule he has no responsibility placed

upon him outside of operatirg a machine.

9. hi the case of the cnisted men, the situaain is analhnis

You cannot make a man a good mechanic. Many soldiers of the

Pnup girls boosted morale for ihe oficers of the 96th Aero Squadron
316 US Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

most estimable character utterly failed to comprehend the

inticacies of the modern airplane, which are such that they can

be mastered only by a comparatively small number of men, and

the failure to master them, therefore, cannot render a man

amenable to discipline, or in fact reflect on him in any way.

10. In the Infantry, discipline has been maintained and

improved for thousands of years by methods of life, drills and

kindred exercises. These exercises all bear sonme relation to the

work which the Infantry soldier does, and perfection in them

results in a high standard of morale and efficiency in the Field.

In the Air Service, however, the drills, hours and general

methods of life of the Army bear little or no relation to the work

which the enlisted man is to do. His woith is judged necessarily

more by his ability to take care of a motor than by his soldierly

appearance, and the relation with his officer who pilots the

machine in his charge cannot be the relation of the Private in 

a

Infantry Company to his Captain or Lieutenant whom he must

implicitly obey, but is rather the relation of an advisor and

guardian to the man whose life depends on the advice and care

given.

11. It is not a question of there being r'ecessanly less discipline in the Air Service than in any other branch of the Service, but it

is rather that the discipline must be of a different sort, and that

the means of attc.ining it, which work in other branches of the

Army are in many cases not applicable to the Air Service.

12. Such being the case, the only remedy in ,sight is first, to

procure the oest possible personnel by careful selection and

strict elimination; second to encourage the highest morale and

esprit de corps. This should be borne in mind continually, and

everything that favors high morale should be done, and

everything that tends against it should be strictly avoided.

13. In the present War, the advertising and notoriety given to

the Air Service was sufficient in the beginning to secure for it 

a

personnel of most exceptional quality. It is due to this fact, and

especially to the extraordinary quality of the enlisted personnel, that such successes as have been attained in the Air Service can

be attributed. 'in this exceptional quality of personnel also is due

the fact that the morale of the Air Service was able, more or

less, to resist a number of unfortunate factors which were

calculated to destroy it, such as: the early promulgation of 

a

piograin so large that it was sure to fail; the selection of officers

for important commands who were wholly ignorant of the

activities they commanded; the unequal pay of flying officers; the

delays in training which reduced candidates to a frame of mind Vbordering on despair; the unequal assignment of duties which

brought about in many cases the result that the willing and

I
Lessons 317

Learned

competent were kept on disagreeable and routine duty while the

less estimable were permitted to go forward to the duties they

desired; the inability to give recognition to deserving enlisted

men; the inability for a long time to secure necessary promotion

and effective elimination, and lastly, the attitude of ignorance,

contempt and disdain assumed by the Line of the Army on

whose opinion in the last analysis the morale and esprit de corps

of every Service must rest.

14. These matters are not to be treated in a spirit of criticism.

They were in large measure the result of circumstances which

could not be controlled. However, they should be carefully

studied with a view to avoiding them in future as their repetition

will be to a greater or less extent destructive of any Air Service

hereafter created.

15. The selection of Air Service officers and their promotion

deserves special consideration. In addition to all the difficulties

which this subject presents for the Line one has the fundamental

fact that men, highly trained in technical lines, resent in all

manner and ways the command of others who have less

knowledge of their specialties than they have. Though this

applies, in my opinion, only to immediate command, it renders

the selection of officers extremely difficult because those qualified

in technical knowledge and training so often lack the ability to

organize and conduct even a fair sized command. 

i

16. In any future War it is going to be necessary again to call

largely on newly made officers and on officers of the Regular 

-

Army who have had no experience by which their capacity can

be judged. Only the most inadequate means of grading these -

officers are on hand at the beginning of a campaign, and the

artificial difficulties caused by improper ranking do not need

exposition. The experiment of promotion by selection may, so far

as the Air Service is concerned, be regarded as a failure, and

there is little hope that it can be improved. The only possible

solution seems to be the adoption of a system of "acting rank"

as distinguished from the "temporary rank", supplemented by a

system of promotion by seniority with necessary elimination. The

difference between acting rank and temporary rank is that acting

rank follows the position and is lost when the officer is relieved

from the duty which gave it, while temporary rank continues

until action is taken to reduce it. In the one case the burden is

on the officer to hold his increased rank, in the other, the

burden is on the Government to take it away. The difference is

vital.

17. As a matter of practice, in our Army the loss of temporary

rank, which can only be brought about by a decision of a Board,

savors so much of dzmotion that its value in properly readjusting
318 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

the grades of officers is absolutely useless. If a system of acting

rank were adopted, however, officers could be tried out for

responsible positions and be relieved and lose their rank without

any obloquy attaching to them. Under the present system,

officers have been put into high positions with a rank which was

entirely inadequate to enable them to fulfill their duties, simply

because one could not be sure that they would make good and

be deserving of what practically amounted to permanent

promotion for the period of the War. This is not fair to the

officer and tends to defeat the purpose for which the trial is

given. For instance, at Issoudun outlying fields have been placed

ir charge of First Lieutenants who commanded $2,000,000 worth

of property, 400 enlisted man and 500 officers. Only one in every

two or three of these men made good and when he did so, it

was due to a natura! force and character so unusually high that

no system based on it can be uniformly successful. If a system

of acting rank had been in vogue the officer, on being assigned

to the command of such a field, would ipso facto, through the

action of, say, the Commanding General, been promoted to the

rank of Major which rank with the prestige that it gave him he

would have held during his command. On relief from his

command, for any reason, he would have reverted to his

permanent rank, unless his services were so exceptional, and his

ability so marked, that it was deemed advisable to promote him

permanently to a higher grade. The same system would have

applied with equal advantage to the command of squadrons at

the Front. Indeed, it would have been immeasurably helpful in all

branches of the Air Service. It prevents recommendation for

promotion based on other than military reasons by giving to

higher authority a ready means of checking the judgment

exercised by C.O.'s in making assignments.

Problems of Organization

18. In general, the problems of Air Service organization do

not, in my opinion, differ materially from those presented in

other forms of military activity, and the general theories of

military organization are adequate to cover them. Curiously

enough, these general principles are constantly overlooked, and

their study should be encouraged. The fixing of definite

responsibilities, the placing in the hands of the responsible officer

the control so far as practicable of all agencies on which the

success of his particular enterprise depends, the e.tablishment of

workable channels and the strictest adherence to them, both in

correspondence and in oral directions are as applicable to the

Air Service as to any other branch of the Army. In the last

analysis, however, the value of an organization will depend on

- - - r - -- ,-.a--
Lessons 319 Learned--

the character of the officer in charge and on his ability in

selecting personnel.

-117-

Col. Walter C. Kilner

Chief, Training Section

Air Service, AEF

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Kilner had been detailed to the Aviation Section in November 1914 and had received his Junior Military Aviator rating in June 1915. After

duty with the 1st Aero Squadron he had been Commanding Col Kilner

Officer of the Signal Corps Aviation School at Mineola before

being sent overseas in October 1917. After nearly six months

as commander of the Third Aviation Instruction Center at Issoudun, Kilner had become Chief of Training for the Air Service,

AEF, in May 1918. In the following report, dated 26 December

1918, Kilner made use of, and in places copied, the report which

his assistant had given him on 21 December and which had

been forwarded to the Chief of Air Service (see Document 116,

above).-

I In compliance with your telegram 2534D requesting a frank 3-

statement oi the most important Air Service lessons to be drawn

from our experience in the present War, the following report, "

based on my own ideas and those of my principal School

Commanders and Training Department assistanis, is submitted.

2. This report is divided into: First, Lessons which concern

general Air Service policy; Second, Lessons which concern

Training. No attempt is made to go into the details of Training,

as its problems are fully treated in the report on Training

submitted from this Section on December 31, 1918.t

Lessons Concerning General Policy

3. Morale. The most important element which makes for the

success of an Air Service is morale.

4. it is impossible to teach a man to fly or to become an

Observer against his will. and it is extremely difficult, even after

he has been taught, to get effective use out of him, except by

his wholehearted co-operation. The Line Officer can be ordered

into the Line, and when once there his conduct is practically

assuLed by an intensely strong desire not to appear in a
p

320 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

Vol. IV

despicable light before his men. I believe it is safe to say that. 

I

could the average line Officer follow his own wishes at certain

times in an action and separate himself from the fight without

fear of criticism or reflection being cast on him, many would

follow that desire The Aviator, even though he be a part of 

a

formation may put the nose of his machine down and

immediately leave the fight at any time. He can present many

excuses relative to his plane or engine, and if his record is fairly

good, can escape without difficulty the loss of caste, which 

a

confession of weakness would bring to him in the Line. While

troops can be led by an officer who, although suffering from

intense physical fear is buoyed up by moral courage, an airplane

cannot be successfully flown by a frightened man.

5. This I believe to be an essential difference between the Air

Service and the Line. The flying man must have more than high

moral courage; he must be backed by the best of traditions;

must feel himself a real part of the organization which he

represents and must be willing at any time to sacrifice his life for

the cause, even though he might very easily at his own volition

escape with absolutely no reflection being cast upon him.

Therefore, I put morale as the highest factor toward the making

of a successful Air Service.

6. The morale in the Air Service, particularly as applies to

flying personnel, has been lowered due to various causes stated

below:

(A) The promulgation at the outset of the War of a program

so large that it was sure to fail.

(B) The selection of officers, for important commands, who

were wholly ignorant of the activities they commanded.

(C) The unequal pay of flying officers.

(D) The delays in training which reduced candidates to 

a

frame of mind bordering on despair.

(E) The unequal assignment of duties which resulted in the

willing and competent being kept on disagreeable and routine

duty while the less estimable were permitted to go forward to

the dunes they desired.

(F) Delay in securing the necessary promotion for junior

officers who did exceptional work.

(G) The lack of speedy and effective elimination of worthless

personnel, especially officers.

(H) The fact that wings and rank were given to pilots who

simply passed an elementary test in the U.S.

(1) The fact that newly made officers were quartered in

tI
S Lessons 321

Learned

barracks in L~re numbers, permitting one malcontent to

influence a considerable percentage of the whole.

(J) The issuing, in many cases, of petty orders by higher - authority whch did not apply to the Air Service.

(K) The rapid promnotion of many non-flying officers in

contrast to few promotions of flying officers.

(L) The fact that, due to lack of discipline and of a sense of

responsibility, a small percentage of flying personnel did not

S behave as officers and gentlemen, resulting in restrcting to a considerable extent the freedom of all.

(M) "The fact that it was practically impossible, over a long

period of time, to obtain leaves for flying officers whose nerves were shattered or who were run down, except through long

delay.

(N) The fact that many officers who remained in the U.S., junior to those in the A.E.F., were promoted over the heads of

equally competent officers in the A.E.F.

(0) Lack of an efficient system, after a man had completed his training, of moving the flying personnel to the Squadrons in

rwhich they were to work.

(P) The fact that one specialty of Aviation Pursuit- was

i widely advertised, thus making the other specialties unpopular.

(Q) The fact that flyers were, in mnany cases, commanded by non-flying officers.

(R) Treatment of Cadets as school children, causin s

irresponsibility.

(S) Ignorance etne of Inspectors, of Aation Schools.

(T) The attitude of ignorance, contempt and hostility

assumed by the Line of the Army, on whose opinion in the last

analysis the morale and exprit de corps of every Strvice must

rest.

7. A number of these points to which it is desired to call special attention, are dealt with below in greater detail.

8. (B) Selection of Officers: Men highly trained along technical

lines, resent the command of others whom they know have less

knowledge of their specialties than they theiselves. This is most

applicable to imediate command. It renders the selection of Air

Service offictrs extremely difficult, because those qualified i

technical knowledge and training often lack ability to organize a d conduct even a small command.

In my opinion, promotion o9. by selection has been a failure,

* and the best solution appears to be the adoption of a system of

acting rank," distinguished from "temporary rank," supplemented
322 / ,- 2 U.S. Air Service

in World War!

Vol. IV

by a system of promotion by seniority, with necessary

elimination. By "acting rank" is meant the system at present in

vogue with the British. This system always makes the rank fit

the command, and when an officer is moved from a large

command to a smaller one his rank is reduced. Under our

present system, the loss of temporary rank which can only be

brought about by the decision of a Board, savors so much of ~demotion that its value in properly readjusting the grades of

officers is useless. Under the system of "acting rank", officers

'M .V could be tried out for responsible positions and could be relieved

without any obloquy attaching to them. Under the present it has been place officers of junior grades system, ihabennecessary toplcofiesfjuorgas

in positions which properly called for senior officers. At Issoudun,

for instance, Outlying Fields weze in charge of First Lieutenants,

""6 commanding $2,000,000 worth of property, 400 enlisted men and

500 officers. Ve.y few of these First Lieutenants proved up to

the mark, and their failure was largely due to the lack of authority resulting from inadequate rank. When they did succeed, A their success was due to a natural force and character sc, 1unusually high that no system based on it could be uniformly

successful. Under a system of "acting rank", on being assigned

to the command of such a Field, the First Lieutenant would

immediately have been promoted to the grade of Major, with

which rank and prestige he would probably have been able to

hold his command. On relief from his command, for any reason,

he would have reverted to his permanent rank, unless his

services were so exceptional and his ability so marked that it

was deemed advisable to give him the higher grade permanently.

This same system could have applied with equal advantage to

the command of Squadrons at the Front.

10. (D) Delays in Training: Under our system of training, a

man was sent to a ground school after a considerable delay.

Here he received possibly threc months instruction on ground

subjects. From this ground school, he was usually ordered to a

Pool. At this Pool he did Infantry drill, fatigue, etc., and usually

succeeded in forgetting practically everything that he learned in

the ground school. The delays here varied considerably, but in

some cases it covered a period of months. When a vacancy

occurred at a flying school, men were selected from this Pool

and sent to the flying school. Here also there might be another

delay for a short time. Finally, the man become an R.M.A He

was then ordered to another Pool and was informed that he was

ready for service in the AEF. There was a delay at this last

Pool, varying in length of time, but often amounting to months.

Finally, the Cadet was ordered Overseas, received at a Port

where there was another short delay and from thence, ordered
Lessons 323

Learned

to another Pool where he was again delayed. Finally, he was

ordered to an A.E.F., flying school. Here there might be another

slight delay due to weather, etc., and then he was obliged to

take a finishing course in order to fit him for service at the

Front. When he completed this finishing course, he was ordered

to Colombey-lesBelles, where there was possibly still another

delay. Meanwhile, in many cases, the prospective Aviator had

probably spent over a year in reaching the Front. During his

training in the U.S., there were still other delays, caused by the

fact that the schools were situated in vanous parts of the

Country, necessitating long trips by train.

11. Is it any wonder, after having passed through a system as

romplicated as this, that the prospective Aviator often wondered

whether he would ever get to the Front? This training should

have been accomplished in six months at the most. The result of

this complicated system oroduced pilots at the Front who were

already "fed up" on flying and who had lost much of their

former keenness.

12. (G) Elimination of Worthless Pesonnel: Usually, when 

a

stud, arrived in France, he was already commissioned as a

Seco - or First Lieutenant. He had just received his commission

and, while he was well versed regarding his privileges and rights

as a commissioned officer, in many cases his past training had

not really fitted him to be an officer, and he was still extremely

irresponsible and undisciplined.

13. The percentage of worthless personnel was low. However,

one worthless officer, barracked where there were many other

young and impressionable officers, would often influence ten

officers whose tendencies and characteristics were generally

good. This worthless officer would, in the course of time, usually

get into some sort of trouble. If the trouble were serious he

could be punished by Court-martial or eliminated from the Air

Service by the decision of a Board. if he were punished by

Court.martial, he would probably live in the same barrack,

having nothing to do except talk and spread discontent for 

a

period possibly of three months, while he waited for the sentence

of the Court. If he were eliminated by a Board, the delay was

not so great, varying between two weeks and six weeks. In due

course of time he might be eliminated. If it were in the U.S.,

there was a great possibility that he would be reinstated. If it

were in the AE.F., he would probably be reclassified and sent to

another Service, still wearing his wings. Both methods were

unsatisfactory. There was too much delay, and the example was

not sharp enough to influence the other officers. The

Commanding Officer of the school shou;d have been able

immediately to eliminate this worthless officer from the Service.
M

324 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

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Vol. IV

14. (H) The Giving of Wings and Rank on Passing an

Elementary Test: This resulted in greatly increasing the difficulties

of instruction. Many instances arose where officers of high rank

had to pass through A.E.F. schools before being fit for the

Front. These officers were usually instructed by First or Second

Lieutenants. This naturally had a bad effect. There was 

a

tendency for these officers of higher rank to dictate and belittle

the authority of the instructor at the schools. Men who were to

be sent to the Front should not have been commissioned until

they had taken a complete course and were absolutely fit to fly

at the Front.

15. (M) Leaves for Flying Officers: It is believed that flying personnel should be given as much freedom as possible and as Much comfort as their work permits. Comfortable living and

ability to get away occasionally from their work are the great

compensation for flying officers. The policy of holding them

unnecessarily because of the hostile feeling of the average Line

Officer toward their enjoying liberty, should be discarded. Pilots

and Observers at the Front should be given a leave after, at the

most, three months service. This leave should be compulsory

and should be of considerable duration, at least a month. There

should also be a definite system of leaves for the instructor personnel at schools. There are very few young men strong

enough to go through more than three or four months of

uninterrupted work at the Front or as instructors, without going

to pieces, particularly if there is no definite leave to look forward

to. A system similar to that of the British is recommended.

16. This matter of leave should be in the hands of the

immediate Commander of the flying personnel and there should

be no delay in obtaining it, especially in the cases of men sick,

wounded or with shattered nerves.

17. (P) Advertising Given to Pursuit: The wide advertisement

and publicity received by certain pursuit pilots probably did more

harm to the other specialties of Aviation than any other one

thing. It was the ambition of every young pilot to become 

a

pursuit pilot. Nothing else was regarded as worth while. In iact, other specialties were looked upon with a certain contempt. This

may have resulted in a certain small raising of the morale of

pursuit squadrons, but was certainly rrore than counterbalanced

by the harm done in the other specialties. In fact, the feeling

between non pursuit organizations and pursuit organizations

was very strong. Steps should be taken at once to eliminate this

idea.

18 (Q) Command of Flyers by Non-Flyers: The fact that non.

flying officers often commanded and dictated thie work to be

done flying officers resulted in much dissatisfaction. A flyer is not
S Lessons 325 -4

Learned1

fond of risking his life at !he direction of an officer whom he

- feels is totally incompetent to direct him It has been a fact that

: many positions of responsibility, both at the Front and in the

_ rear, pertaining directly to the ordering out of flyers on - dangerous missions has been in the hands of officers who have

never ridden in a flying machine and are totally unfamiliar with

the point of view of the flyer. It is hardly necessary to point out

the harm of such a system.

19. (R) Treatment of Cadets: It is believed that a system of

training must be adopted which will throw upon the Cadet 

a

certain amount of responsibility. One of the greatest deficiencies

S of our flying officers has been this lack of responsibility. It is

believed to be entirely due to the fact that these officers,

throughout their career of instruction were piactically treated aschool children. T]he British system is based on the idea of giving

a certain amount of responsibility to every student, and

apparently has been sticcessfu!. In this connection, I du not

believe that commissions should be granted immediately to a

man who completes a flying course. but that a grade such as

Pilot or Aviator, carrying the pay and privileges of a Second

Lieutenant. should be created. Officers should be selected and

examined for commissions from this class. In this way, the

i number of officers could be greatly cut down, more control over

the personnel could be exercised and there would always be an

incentive for doing the best possible work.

20. In our Air Service, during the past year, once a man had

obtained his commission as Second Lieutenant he had practically

nothing to look forward to. Promotion for junior officers was so

slow and uncertain that it was hardly considered probable by

most Second Lieutenants that they would ever be promoted. For

these young and keen men, there should always be a direct

reward in the shape of promotion for exceptional service

rendered.

21. (S) Inspection: The usual Army Inspector of an Aviation

School is quite likely to neglect entirely the idea of the school,

namely: to turn out finished pilots or observers, and usu&)Iy

! devotes himself to such details as apply strictly to Line, Troops.

~This results in the lowering of morale, as the most efficient flying

r 

- school where the best results are being obtained is often liab!e to

sharp criticism for details which really have little to do with the

main idea of the school. The Army Regulations were written

before an Air Service existed and are often not applicable to

problems which arise.

22. In closing the subject of morale, it is my belief that, in the

present War the advertising and notoriety given to the Air

Service sufficed to secure for it a personnel of exceptional
Lessons 325 

1

Learned

fond of risking his life at the direction of an officer whom he

feels is totally incompetent to direct him. It has been a fact that

many positions of responsibi!ity, both at the Front and in the

* rear, pertaining directly to the ordering out of flyers on

dangerous missions has been in the hands of officers who have

never ridden in a flyng machine and are totally unfamiliar with

the point of view of the flyer. It is hardly necessary to point out

the harm of such a system.

19. (R) Treatment of Cadets: It is believed th3t a system of

training must be adopted which will throw upon the Cadet 

a

certain amount of responsibility. One of the greatest deficiencies

of our flying officers has been this lack of responsibility. It is

believed to be entitely due to the fact that these officers,

throughout their career of instruction were practical!y treated as

school children. The British system is based on the idea of giving

a certain amount of responsibility to every student, and

apparently has been successful. In this connection, I do not

believe that commissions should be granted immediately to 

a

man who completes a flying course, but that a grade such as

Pilot or Aviator, carrying the pay and privileges of a Second

Lieutenant, should be created. Officers should be selected and

examined for commissions from this class. In this way, the

number of officers could be greatly cut down, more control over

the pe-sonnel could be exercised and there would always be an

incentive for doing the best possible work.

20. In our Air Service, dunng the past year, once a man had

obtained his commission as Second Lieutenant he had practically

nothing to look forward to. Promotion for junior officers was so

slow and uncertain that it was hardly considered probable by

most Second Lieutenants that they would ever be promoted. For

these young and keen men, there should always be a direct

reward in the shape of promotion for exceptional service

rendered.

21. (S) Inspection: The usual Army Inspector of an Aviation

School is quite likely to neglect entirely the idea of the school,

namely: to turn out finished pilots or observers, and usually

devotes himself to such details as apply strictly to Line Troops.

This results in the lowerinq of morale, as the most efficient flying

school where the best results are being obtained is often liable to

sharp criticism for details which really have little to do with the

main idea of the school. Tne Army Regulations were wrioen

before an Air Service existed and are often not applicable to

problems which arise

22. In closing the subject of morale, it is my belief that, in the

present War the advertising and notoriety given to the Air

Service sufficed to secure for it a personnel of exceptional
111

U.S. Air Service

in World War I

W Vol IV

quality. Due to this fact, such successes as have been attained in

the Air Service can be attributed. To this personnei is also due

the fact that the morale in the Air Service has been able to

survive the unfortunate factors which have just been mentioned.

These factors are not referred to in a spirit of criticism. It is fully

appreciated that they arose in large measure from circumstances

beyond control. However, they should be carefully considered in

order that the unfortunate results which follow from them may

be avoided so far ,as possible in any future organization of the

Air Service.

23. Discipline. The discipline of the Air Service is essentially

different from that of the Line. No amount of discipline can

make a good Aviator, a good Observer or a good Mechanic.

24. According to Line standards, there has been a lack of

discipline in the Air Service. This has been due in a large

measure to the extreme youth of the officer personnet and the

lack of responsibility pJaced upon him outside of operating his

plane. It has also been due to the example set him by the Air

Services of other Countries, namely: France and England. The

fling man feels that his duty is a voluntary duty. This is

absolutely true, and this fact has not been given sufficient

consideration and has been frequently entirely overiooked. The

feeling of the flying man that he ultimately is the judg' - of what

he is to do is, I believe, the basic reason for this apparent lack

of discipline of the Aviator.

25. The situation is analogous in the case of the enlisted man.

A good soldier is not necessarily a good mechanic. Many soldiers

of the best character fail utterly to comprehend the intricacies of

the modern airplane. Failure to master them cannot render the

soldier amenable to discipline or reflect on him in any way.

26. In the Line, discipline has been maintained and improved

for thousands of years by methods of life, drills and kindred

exercises, all of which bear some relation to the work which the

Line Soldier does, and perfection in them results in a high standard of morale and efficiency in the Field. In the Air Service,

however, drills, hours and the general methods of life in the

Army bear little relation to the work which the enlirted man has

to do. His worth is judged by his ability to take care of a motor

rather than by his soldierly appearance. The relation existing

between him and the officer who pilots the plane in his charge

cannot be the relation of the Private in the Infantry Company to

his Company Officer, but is much more ininiate. The Pilot

practically relies upon his mechanics for the safety of his life.

27. It is not a question of there being necessarily less di3ciline

in the Air Service than in any other branch of the Serice, but

is rather that the discipline must be of a different sort and that
Lessons 327

Learned

the means of attaining it which work in other branches of the

Army are in most cases riot applicable to the Air Service.

28. Organization. In my opinion, the various activities for

which the Air Service is responsible should be directly under Air

Service control. I refer to such instances as the Engineers having

all authority regarding construction, the Ordnance responsible for

the training of Armorers and Armament officers, the Signal

Corps charged with the training of Radio Operators, and the

Motor Transport Corps controlling all Motor Transport. This

division of authority has resulted only in slowing up the various

projects and the submission of numerous requisitions and letters

through various channels in an attempt to get something done, when no one was certain exactly who was responsible for the

doing. The Air Service schools were all practically built by Air

Service persontiel, in spite of the fact that the Engineers were

charged with this work. The Armorers were trained, in the main, by the Air Service and also ti, Armament Officers. The same

applies to the wireless personnel. It has been my observation

that, one branch charged with the training of personnel for any

other branch, is not so vitally interested in the excellence of the

product, nor the speed of production, as would be the branch

for whom they are going to work.

29. The squadron organization tables call for a number of nonflyin9 officers. I believe that the number is excessive. One nonfiyng officer in a squadron, namely, a Supply Officer, is in my

opinion sufficient. The Engineering Officer, the Photographic, Radio, Armament, and Compass Officers could be done away

with and their places taken by pilots and enlisted men, with 

a

gain in efficiency and at less cost.

30. A considerable amount or confusion in Training has been

caused by the tact that, while all details of Training were carried

out by the Chief of the Training Section at Tours, Section G-5

of the General Staff, from time to time, interposed its authority

to modify or direct the training to be done. As G-5 could not

possibly Keep in touch with the situation and problems of Air

Service Training, its action often resulted in uncertainty. It is

stronsly recommended that whatever system be adopted in the

future, the control of ali Air Service Training be placed under

one responsible head, to avoid the diversity of channels and

directions which can only result in the inefficient working of any

system.

Lessons Concerning Training

31. Engineering. Engineering is one of the most important departments of a flying school. Upon it depends largely the

general efficiency of the school. It is desired to bring out the
328 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

importance of trade testing in this connection. Though many

good mechanics were sent to the A.E.F., they were often

improperly placed, due to the fact that they had not received an

efficient trade test. Trade testing should not be done in a halfhearted way, but, due to its importance, a special installation

should be furnished and men should actually be tested out upon

the various tools and at their various trades. The result of this

trade test must be a matter of record and go with the man wherever he is sent. Trade testing should be conducted by

specialists in the various trades. In the past this was done largely

by Army Officers who were not sufficiently educated in these

various trades and therefore the results obtained were poor. The

squadrons first formed in the U.S., at Kelly Field, were good

examples of this routine method of selection. Wood workers

were rated as machinists; farmers as mechanics, and good

mechanics were given fatigue duties. Clerks were made

mechanics and good mechanics were made clerks, and then the

entire squadron would be turned over to a supposedly technical

officer for further training and asignment to duty. Under such

conditions it is not strange that mechanical work progressed

slowly and that much of it was not properly done.

32. The selection of Engineer Officers should receive special

attention. It has been found that the best Engineer Officers are men of practical education, not necessarily college graduates, but

men who can utilize the material at hand and who are

authorities on the subject so that the enlisted men may look to

them for example and real help. It is not possible to make a

good Engineer Officer from a man who has had merely business

experience and is not a mechanic by trade by simply sending

him to some institution for a three months' course. To be an

Engineer Officer the man should actually have had experience in

running shops and should be thoroughly familiar with the tools

used in the ordinary shops and also should have had

organization experience. He should be first and last a practical

man. I venture to state that fifty percent of the Engineer Officers

sent to the A.E.F. could have been eliminated without material

damage to the Service.

33. The importance of shops at Aviation Centers is often

minimized. The shop shold be one of the first buildings

constructed. It should be a comfortable place to work in, and

there -iould be plenty of room. Without an efficiert shop no

Aviation Field of any nature can be a success. 34. With reference to the enlisted men who work in the

various shops, a system should be inaugurated so that these men receive their promotion in the squadron, due to their

mechanical ability as shown in the shops. Various Sergeants,

FF II
Lessons 329

Learned 2 -

First Class Sergeants, and Master Electricians should be the noncommissioned officers in the shop in charge of the various

departments.

35. Gunnery. Sufficient attention was not civen the sub,ect of

Aerial Gunnery. Since most of our training, due to location, was

largely influenced by the French, pilots were led to believe that

Aerial Gunnery was more or less a minor matter. This has been

disproved. It was formerly the idea primarily to teach a pilot to

fly and to take a little Aerial Gunnery on the side. The Germans

discovered very quickly the fallacy of this method and insisted on

a very systematic and detailed course of Aerial Gunnery. The

Bntish were quick to follow and now the French are also

devoting more time to this important subject. All types of pilots

and observers must obtain a maximum amount of Aerial

Gunnery. The various records at the Front have shown that

those men who lacked interest in gunnery have not been

I Wing repair shop, Issoudun.

Ie

IAC

. + •.
R

330 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

A

successes, and those men who were keen students of gunnery

have made a success in spite of the fact that they were

oftentime mediocre flyers.

36. Navigation. Navigation as pertains to aircraft has been A

largely developed during the last year of the War. The training of

every pilot or observer should include a thorough course of

Navigation. Especially should they be taught the use of the = compass thoroughly and the reading and making of maps. It

must be an instinct for a pilot or observer to find his way home.

There are many cases of pilots being lost during our operations

at the Front. It must be remembered that in a fight where many

machines are engaged, the least of one's concern is to keep one's self oriented. Therefore, when the fight is over, he must be

able to locate himself (and it is extremely difficult) in order that

he may return to his own lines and not those of the enemy.

37. Observation. Observation is without doubt the most

important of all Air Service specialties. Upon efficient

Observation depends the safety and success of ground troops. There was a tendency, about the time of our entrance into the

War, to minimize the importance of all branches of Aviation

except Pursuit. This has been a very expensive fallacy. Observation, for the pilot and observer, requires the very

highest type of personnel. Due to the newspaper campaigns and

advertisement of certain pursuit pilots, Observation was a very

unpopular branch of Aviation. Every effort must be made to

eliminate this false idea by propaganda such as newspaper and

magazine article5 which show the real importance of the

Observation Branch of the Air Service. The Observation Pilot

must be every bit as good as the Pursuit Pilot. He takes as

many chances as the pursuit pilot and must be able to handle

his machine as well. The Air Service should be responsible for

the training of Observers in all branches of his instruction. That

is, technical training in radio, photography, aerial gunnery, etc.,

should be under Air Service control.

38. Especially has the importance of training with the Line

Troops been brought out during the past year. No matter how

efficient a squadron may be, if the Staff and Line Troops are

ignorant of how to use the Air Force and also ignorant of its

limitations, it is impossible to obtain results. Therefore it is

necessary that a very close ilaison be established with the Line

and that Staff Officers and Line Officers receive special

instruction regarding the importance and use of the Air Service.

39. Observers and Pilots should be on exactly the same basis,

should belong to the Air Service and be responsible to the head

of the Air Service for their promotion. When an observer has

demonstrated his fitness for command he should be taught to fly

I ~ ~ ,. ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ -rA, ~ -- ad-bamtE d 
,II

Lessons 331

Learned

£

before being allowed to command a squadron or higher command.

40. Supply. The problem of Supply in the Air Service is one of

the most difficult and the most important, especially as applies to

training. This makes the adoption of a standard type of training airplane and motor of paramount importance The training in the

A.E.F., has been, from the start, a makeshift This has been due

to the fact that we have been absolutely dependent upon foreign

governments for our planes and spare parts. Therefore, a

training system had to be built up, based on the types of

airplanes that could be obtained, not on those types which were

reafly desired. What this has resulted in is well exemplified at

Issoudun where there were over thirty two types of airplanes and

over thirty thousand items carried in the supply warehouses.

This condition of affairs has decreased the production of pilots

and observers rmatenally. Many types ot spare parts could not bc

obtained and additional work was thrown on the shops as these

spare parts had to be made up at the School. Had there been

A horse-drawn vehicle used to supply airplanes at the 1st Air Depot.

=44

aI

°" " . ."
332 U.S. Air Service

in World War 1

Vol. IV

an ample supply of spare parts, the number of planes kept in

commission would have been very much greater. The amount of

breakage at a flying school where last and delicate airplanes are

handled is tremendous. This means that the amount of overhead

material Larried must aso be tremendous. This point is usually

overlooked by officers not familiar with aviation problems at

schools.

41. Officers who are selected for the duties of Supply Officers

should be chosen with great care. These men should be

thoroughly famiiiar with the regulations concerning supply, should

be able to utilize matenal at hand and must be of the most

energetic type. Experience in the AE.F,, has shown the younger

type of business nan to be the best for this duty. However,

strictest elimination only will result in efficient Supply Officers.

42. A very close liaison must be kept between the various

Supply Depots and the Central Headquarters. Oftentimes one

Depot has an excess of certain articles which are vital to the

efficiency of another, which has none. A close liaison would

eliminate this failing.

43. In order to handle Aviation Supplies efficiently, warehouses

should be built among the first of the buildings of the project.

They must be waterproof and well constructed, due fo the fact

that aviation material is subject in the highest degree to

deterioration and a great loss of public funds will result if this

property is not most carefully protected.

-118--

Lt. Col. Philip A. Carroll

Assistant Chief, Training Section

Colonel Gorrell personally reviewed the reports on lessons

learned. When he had questions, as he often did, he sent a

memorandum, letter, or cable asking for clarification or additional Information. In a report forwarded on 26 December 1916

(Doc. 117), KIlner had listed 20 things that had lowered the

morale of the Air Service. Gorrell asked questions about three of

I
L1

f Lessons 333

Lean ed

these and wanted to know what had been done in each instance

to correct the condition. Carroll sent the following memoran- dum in reply.

1. Referring to the annexed memorandum; further discussion

of the criticisms contained in the letter of the Chief, Training

Section of December 26, is given below:

(F) Delay in promoting Junior Officers: I think an examination

of the records will show that from the arrival of the A.E.F. in

France to October 1918, not one Junior Flying Officer was

promoted. All these officers were of the rank of First and

Second Lieutenant, except one or two who had been promoted

to Captain in the U.S. This meant either that of the 3000 odd

flying personnel in Europe at the end of the Summer, 1918, not

one man had done anything worthy of advancement or, it meant

that the system of advancement was defective either in

conception or application.

The result, of course, was ludicrous. The largest school in the

A.E.F., was commanded, during the Spring and Summer by a

Major; outlying fields having a personnel of 500 enlisted men and

300 or 400 officers, all of them First and Second Lieutenants,

were commanded by a First Lieutenant; the officer in charge of

Day Bombardment Training, who made a notable success, was 

a

First Lieutenant, although a man of thirty-six years of age; likewise, the officer in charge of Observation Training was [a]

Lieutenant, and a number of Squadrons at the Front were

commanded by First Lieutenants.

In July, it is believed that a number of recommendations for promotion went through, however, the only promotions which

were cabled were those of Senior officers to Major and above, the others being sent by mail. The result was, while a number of

Headquarters Officers ..

. holding no particular jobs received

promotion, ... men who had really been doing the work

received rone until much later.

* (K) I am unable to give comparative figures on the promotion

of flying and non-flying officers. I am inclined to think that in-sofar-as this criticism is not explained by the above, Colonel Kilner

meant the word applied to officers who were engaged in

regular flying duty and actually flew. The promotion of officers in

the U.S. over the heads of officers in Europe also led to

dissatisfaction. The creation of a Promotions Board in August(?),

which regulated promotions and whose recommendations were

approved at GH.Q., did a great deal to remedy these conditions

and would in time have worked out a solution quite satisfactory.

.o I

I
i

334 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

(Qi Many schools in the U.S. were commanded by non-flyers,

with the result that pilots reached Europe with an ingrainled)

contempt and disgust for Commanding Officers. One important

school in the A.E.F. was commanded by a non-flyer, with

unsatisfactory results. For the rest, the criticisms must be taken

to mean that, in a number of cases men were commanded by

officers who were nominally flyers who never flew. Those matters

were being remedied during the summer and Autumn of 1918.

Remedies Applied to Criticism:

(A) No remedy possible.

(B) Was in the course of being remedied during the Summer

and Autumn of 1918, by more judicious selection of Commanding

Officers and by wider acquisition of Air Service knowledge.

(C) Attempt to remedy this situation made by cable -.

No result up to this time. 

A

(D) Delays for the most part were unavoidable owing to

pecuiiar situation and delay of prnduction program.

(E) Was being remedied in the Summer and Autumn of 1918

by careful watching of the records of individual officers and their

advancement so far as possible in accordaince with their merits shown

(F) See above,

(G) Remedied in the Spring of 1918 by resort to

reclassification.

(H) Could not be remedied.

(1) Could not be remedied under housing conditions in

Europe.

(J) Could not be remedied.

(K) Remedied largely by appointment of Promotions Board

in August, 1918.

(L-R) Could not be remedied (the question of handling this

kind of personnel does not seem to be as yet fully understood).

No definite recommendations can be made. The question involved is an extremely complicated one and demands sencus

consideration.

(M) Remedied in October 1918 by action secured at G.H.Q.

(N) Could not be remedied. I believe attempts were made in

August or September 1918 to secure co-operation of the U.S. in

equalizing promotions.

(0) Could not be remedied under the system of organizing

Replacing Squadrons at the Front, which had necessarily to be

used.

(P) Could not be remedied, though efforts were c3nstantlyV

made to do so, dating from January 1918.

(Q) Was by way of being remedied in the Autumn of 1918.

(S) Could not be remedied. Would doubtless have been
Lessons 335

Learned

much alleviated by the work of Air Service Inspectors of the i ir

Service Inspection Department put in operation in the last

months of the war.

(T) Could not be wholly remedied but was being gradually

overcome at the close of hostilities-

-119-

Maj. Thomas G. Lanphier

C.I.C., Training Third Aviation Instruction Center

Lanphier, the father of the pilot credited with shooting down

Admiral Yamamoto in World War I1, was a graduate of the U.S.

Military Academy in the class of 1914. An infantry officer, he had

arrived in France with the 8th Machine Gun Battalion in April

1918. As he indicated in the following report, he had been with

his battalion in the Chateau-Theirry Sector when he received

orders to report to Chief of Air Service.

1. In compliance with Office Memorandum No. 6, Office of the

Chief of the Air Service, dated January 7th, 1919, the following

is submitted as having been the most important lesson learned

by the undersigned while serving with the U.S. Air Service.

In June of the year 1918 1 was ordered from the front lines,

where I was then serving as a Captain of a Machine Gun

Company in the Third Division, to report to the Chief of the Air

Service for examination to determine my fitness for detail in that

branch of the service. In July I was attached to the Air Service

and reported to the Third Aviation Instruction Center for duty. 

I

was placed in command of the Headquarters Detachment. which

detachment was then composed of some eight hundred Student

Flying Officers. I ain mentioning all this because the situation

' gave me an excellent opportunity to compare the attitude of the

men whom I had just left fighting in the front lines to the men

who were in a few weeks expected to meet the Hun in the air.

The contrast in mo-ale was appalling. The Student Flying Officer

at that time seemed to fail to realize that he was really in 

a

serious game. He seemed to lack that sense of responsibility

which should have been shown by one who was soon to hold

the lives of many men in his hands. That All-important 'actorPride of Organization, or Esprit de Corps-was entirely lacking

This resulted in lack of interest in training and in consequence 

a

poor quality of pilot was produced and there was very little

keenness to get to the front. The cause for this lack of interest
336 US. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

did not rest with the pilots themselves. As soon as they were

told how important, how serious and how valuable their services

and their training was, and as soon as they realized that

everything that was being done at this Center was for their good

and for the attainment of the best results in the cause, and

when it was impressed upon them that team-work was most

essential in this game and that their work was most important

and necessary to any' good results that might be attained, their

increase in sense of responsibility and in enthusiasm and morale

was just as striking as the contrast which their previous attitude

had been to that of the men at the front. The result of making

the Student Pilot realize that he is the All-Important thing in the

aviation game, was a vast increase in morale and the generation

of a genuine Esprit de Corps. This was manifested in !he

surpassing of a]l previous records at this Center, both in the

performance of the pilots and of the enlisted personne!, and also

by the q-jality of the pilots graduated.

The lesson gained from this was: that the success of an Air

Service depends primarily upon the Esprit de Corps of the pilots,

and that this Esprit de Corps must be fostered and that the

prelininarv training of all pilots should be carried on with that

predominating idea in view at all times.

ROLA ND

, '. _ ..

i ' , i, f i - I .... .i i F - I l"" l -
Lessons 337

Learned

J

~-120

Maj. Howard S. Curry

C.O., Headquarters Detachment

Third Aviation Instruction Center

1. The most important lesson I have learned is the power of

discipline or lack of it for good or poor results.

2. Training has been hampered by extreme lack of discipline

among flying officers, particularly those underqoing instruction,

Few of them have ever handled any men either in civil life or in

the army, and have [no] conception of the responsibilities of an

officer.

3. 1 have fully considered the disadvantages under which the

Air Service has been compelled to dcvelop, and dn not mean

this as a criticism of any persons or pclicy, as it is much easier

to tudge things from the standpoint of after knowledge than to

plan and develop things which scarcely have a precedent.

Wonderful results have been accomplished but it is felt that

these results would have been more satisfactory if properly

handled.

4. Have personaliy seen cases of gross disrespect to superior

officers under circumstances which made it impossible to tell

who was guilty, and have heard from lips of some other officers

at whom mud had actually been thrown while drilling officers. It

is felt that officers capable cf such things do not have discipline

to the extent that would "enable them to sub-ordinate the law of

self-preservation to implicit obedience to the will of a superior."

5. Having attended training camp for Line of the Army, and

been originally commissioned in Field Artillery I may be stating

this from a biased viewpoint, but having had to check up on the

misdemeanor of several hundred of them for more than two

months I feel fully qualified to write.

6. It is felt that much better results would have been attained

if kept in cadet compa,.ies to the very end of advanced flying

training, under rigid discipline such as prevailed in Reserve

Officers Training Camps.

I
A338 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

-121-

1st Lt. Lewis A. Smith

Police, Prison and Labor Office

Third Aviation Instruction Center

I. Nothing is so productive of results from the enlisted

personnel of an organization than proper discipline. Men who are

trained to follow instructions promptly and accurately, whether it

be in the matter of saluting, obedience of squad-rooim

regulations, appearance at formations, or personal appearance,

will be most efficient in their regular work. On the other hand,

those who are allowed to be sloppy in their personal habits, vho

are not corrected for violations of regulations, and who are not

thoroughly drilled in the essentials of a soldier, cannot be

expected to show results in the duties to which they are

assigned.

2. Observe the actions of a man who is undependable and

"stalls" on his job, and you will find that he has no snap in his

salute, that he hides trash under his bed-sack, and that he does

not button his coat before addressing an officer. No matter what

the branch of service may be, the so!dier must first be trained to

respond instantly to the commands of his superiors, and to obey

to the letter the regulations imposed upon him.

3. This discipline is best secured not by the "drive" method,

but by forceful, kindly handling of the men, constant regard for

their welfare, and by conduct on the part of the officers that is

exempiary and thoroughly military.

-122-

Capt. Harry L. Wingate

Executive Officer

Third Aviation Instruction Center

I have been very forcibly imprest'd by the inefficiency of a

great number of the officers in the Air Service. The inefficiency

of these officers is not the fault of the officers altogether, but the

lack of proper training for this branch of the service

It has been very forcibly impressed upon me the disadvantages

of officers in the Air Service, such as Adtutants, Supply Officers,

Commanding Officers of training fields, and Commanding Officers
Lessons 339

Learned

Lt Cot W ter G Kitner. corlnanding Aviation I ramin at issoudun.

watches win hi, staff as a siuodIrt aviator takes ril

of souadrons, by their not having any knowledge whatsoever of

flying For an officer to hold a commission in the Air Service, 1

think it is very important that he should have a thorough

knowledge of the technical end of the game as well as the flying.

It has been very clearly shown that an officer trained for the

Infantry, Cavalry. Artillery, or other branches of the service

cannot he thrown into an equal position in the Air Service and

carry on efficiently, without any knowledge of that branch of the

service ! firmly believi' that thee should be some means of

giving officers ir. the An nervice a mumire thorough knowkledge of

the technical end of the gane as well as the flyin than there

has been heretofore. and that before an officer it- crPs hrs

commission in the Air Service, he should be a finished pilot.

i

I'
340 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

-123-

Capt. Lester E. Cummings

Adjutant, Third Aviation Instruction Center

1. The most important lesson I have learned during the

pre3nFr way is that the scheme of organizing the Air Service

i'ong th. lins of other orcanizations of the army was riot

productive of as good results as mght have been obtained, and

that a scheme simiiar to the following should be fo!lowed in the

Air Service of the permanent military establishment ond for any

war which may occur in the future.

There are too many officers and noncommissioned officers. No

flying officer should be commissioned in the Air Service until he

is a finished pilot and has demonstrated 'hat he has the other

requisite qualifications to be a commissiorned officer. Other

expert personnel should not be comm~ssioned until it is

determined that they are qualified therefore in addition to their

mechanical and other technical knowledge. A rating such as

"Aviatcr" and "Expert Mechanic" should be provided for this

class of personnel, which rating could carry a rate of pay

commensurate with their duties. There should be no more than

one noncommissioned officer to each 15 other enlisted men. The

mechanical and other technical personnel of a squadron should

be carefully classified and rated by a board of officers competent

to do the work. A rate of pay should be provided for each

classification, such as-Clerk, $35.00; Motor Engine Mechanics,

$67.00. Blacksmith, $50.00. Brazier. $45.00. etc For instanre. to

appoint a mechanic a Sergeant Ist Class and expect hm to

command the respect due his grade is a serious error, for the

reason that experience has proven that the majority of

mechanics could not, with any amount of training, become good

noncommissioned officers. This applies equally to the flying and

mechanical commissioned personnel. Nothing is so productive of

results as proper discrline and this cannot be obtained if

ccmmissions and warrants are issued to persons in order to

provide a rate of pay suitable to the class of labor they are

capable of performing and expect those same persons to

properly function as officers and noncommissioned officers.

aI
Lessons 341

Learned

-124-

1st. Lt. Louis H. Kronig, Jr.

C.O., Field Three

Third Aviation Instruction Center

1. In compliance with a request for the written statements of

the most important 'hings learned in the Air Service, durins the

present war, the fol,-ing are respectfully submitted as

suggestions whereby this branch of the Service might be

improved as seen from the viewpoint of an officer, transferred

from the Infantry. 2. Under the Present tables of organizations, an Ae7o

Squadron has too many noncommissioned officers. Mechanical

ability should be recognized and rewarded with extra pay, which

is met in the present organization by making t!-,ese rnechanics,

noncommissioned officers. This tends greatly to lower the

standard of discipine for several reasons. First, the p,.oportion of

noncommissioned officers to privates is entirely too iarge and

consequently "familiarity breeds contempt" and the iespect due

the noncommissioned officers by the other men is missing.

Unless the noncommissioned officer happens to te a man with

exceptional personality, he is unable to commaid 'he respect

that a man of equal grade would do, for irista.nce in the Infantry.

Expert mechanics perform a

preflight inspection, Issoudun.
-WWI"

342 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

The reason for this is that an astonishingly large number who

are the exceptional mechanics would never make

noncommissioned officers with any amount of training. These

exceptional mechanics are the men who deserve the extra pay,

hut it is an injustice to the service to make them

noncommissioned officers, and if they are not given warrants, a

great injustice is done the man who d -serves the extra pay

because of hs mechanical ability. My suggestions to remedy this

very Qvident fault of the present organization is to eliminate all

noncommissioned officers from the Squadron, except the First

Sergeant, the Sergeant Major, the Supply Sergeant, and the

Mess Sergeant who would hold the rank of sergeant 1st class;

four M.E.'s who would have charge of the work on the field. In

addition, six Sergeants, and four Corporals would assist these

men and fill the other places in the Headquarters and Supply

Sections. These men would form the Squadron noncommissioned

staff. All the other enlisted personnel would be rated as privates,

privates 1st class, mechanics, mechanicians, and mechanicians

1st class. With pay of privates, privates 1st class, corporal,

sergeant, and sergeant 1st class; respectively. Under this system,

the deserving mechanics would receive the pay due their ability,

but they should have no rank, and on the other hand, the

noncommissioned officers would hold considerable prestige

amorg the men, because they would be a very few, carefully

selected men, chosen for their ability to command men and

obtain results, and not for mechanical ability alone.

I would further suggest that the enlisted personnel of a

Squadron be increased to 200 men, because the present number

is inadequate to furnish the Guard and Squadron Fatigue, as well

as the mechanics, when a Squadron is operating alone.

3. I would further suggest that cadets, after receiving their

brevet, be given a rating as an Aviator with allowances and pay

slightly less than a Second Lieutenant, and that after a fair trial

the best men from the class be commissioned, and from this

class, the Aviators, shall become the source of Officers for the

American Air Service. This would decrease the numbers of

officers, while riot decreasing the number of oilots, and without

injustice to the pilot individual The Air Serice has, in the past,

suffered from the high proportion of officers to enlisted men, and

consequently discipline has lagged. I would further recommend

that every officer in the Air Service below the rank of Major, who is commissioned in the ReEerve, be given not less than 2

months strict discipline and training, and at the same time

receive very thorough instructions in his duties as an officer, if

this officer has not already received such training either in other

branches of the Service or Infantry Training Camps.
-t0

* Lessons 343

* - Learned

E 4. The above suggestions are offered as a result of my L observation and study of the Air Service personnel, and

I organization, since transferring into this branch of the service

from the Infantry in December 1917. Most of my time in the Air

Service has been as Squadron Commander, and these

S suggestions are written from the point of that office.

-125- -j 

2d Lt. M. S. McCullough

O.I.C., Transportation IThird Aviation Instruction Center

IThe undersigned has found that the majority of the men in the

V Air Service, with whom he has come in contact, are young and

C practically inexperienced. Their technical knowledge, if any. has

been acquired through study. They may have a general idea of

the work assigned to them but they lack a thorough

understanding of it as a whole. For instance, about 50 percent of

Ichauffeurs and truck drivers are good men at the steering wheel

but if there is any trouble with the motor they are ignorant of

;how to locate baid trouble oi how to repair it. Thus occurs a

great loss of time and labor.

Of course, these man in timie can become first class workers

in whateer work that has been assigned for themr, to do, but iishould i. happen that they were assigned to a different line of

work their previous experience would be useless. They would

£ have to commence at the very beginning again. And, as you Li know, efficient mechanics and chauffeurs cannot be made within

a few months. V I believe that if technical schools were estab!ished at large

camps, instructed by men thoroughly familiar with the different

branches of work, whereby soldiers and officers could attend

Pveral hours eacF, week, they would be rendered more efficient

and a higher standard obtained.

I!
I

344 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

J

-126-

Maj. L. H. Byam

Engineering Officer in Charge of Construction Third Aviation Construction Center

1. The most important lesson that I have learned from the war

4 is that it is entirely possible to train good soldiers from the

personnel available in the United States within a period of six or

eight months. It is impossible to properly train officers from civil

life in the same period of time. From observation and reports it

appears that the enlisted men at the front displayed qualities

, equal to or better than similar troops of other countries. The

Members of Staff, Head- officers both from civil life and from West Point appear to have

quarters, Issoudun: (bottom, been deficient in training suitable to enable them to handle large

1. to r) Capt. W M. Corant bodies cf men effectively.

and Maj. L. H Byam: (top, I. 2. In order to have a sufficient number of trained officers

to r.) Ist. Lt R. H. Merkle ready in event of future wars it would seem absolutely necessary

and Capt. H. L. Wingate. that a standing army of at least 500,000 troops be maintained in

the United States which would serve as a nucleus from which to

draw trained officers and non-commissioned officers for the

higher grades in event of hostilities Under the old system in the

United States with a small standing army few officers had

opportunity to handle troops in larger units than companies or

platoons. When such officers were suddenly placed in command

of regiments, battalions and larger units they lacked sufficient

training to handle them.

-127-

1st Lt. George W. Eypper

O.I.C., Aerial Gunnery

Third Aviation Instruction Center

1. No provision had been made to take care of an

organizatio ,' to run a school of gunner,/. Proper promotions were not possible thereby cancelling the logical incentive for the best

work. Men doing an unusually high class of work, viz. instructing

officers drew the pay of buck privates and quite naturally were

not accorded the respect which their knowledge and training

warranted.
Lessons 345

Learned

2. Men were wvithdrawn from the sqjuadrons to train as

gunnery instructors. Instead of drawing the older and mature

man in each instance, it seemed as though the squadron had

detailed their youngest and least desirable men for this work.

* This meant that the individual had not the confidence in himself

* which tends towards the efficient and productive instructor.

3. The aviator learns to fly so that he can use his machine

gun in thie air. The mediocre flyer if skillful with his guns, as

most Americans proved themselves, kills Huns. The flyer, no

matter what his tbility as a flyer, who cannot shoot might just as

well stay on his aerodrome. He is -nerely a source of expense to

the government. These facts were not recognized and gunnery

was relegated to second place.

4. The materil and supplies necessary for this work were held

up on all hands, no central organization equipped wvith the

knowledge necessary for it was in power and little effort made to

improve matters.

5. Proper liaison between the states and this country was

delayed. Students arrived here competent to handle guns they

would not use.

128-

1st Lt. Richard H. Merkel

QIC., Field No. 10

Third Aviation Instruction Center

In my opinion student flyers should receive more military

training to make them better soldiers. Under the present policy of commissioning cadets before their course of training has been

completed, instructors cannot enforce discipline as rigidly and

easily as if the students under them were on a cadet status. As

CO. of the 37th Aero Squadron, and later as Adjutant of Field

Nco. 7, and 0.1IC. of Field No. 10, 3rd A.IC. I have had 

a

splendid opportunity to follow the flying training of two enlisted

men of the 37th Aero Squadron. I interviewed their instructois

and was informed that they were both exceptional students, and

in every case the Instructors volunteered the information that

they were very much impressed with the respect and courtesy

with which these men regarded them. On the other hand, I have

seen student officers going at some of the less interesting details

of their course in half hparted way, thinking that as otficers they

should not be called upon to perform any of the "ordinary Army

routine"..
346 U.S. Air Seiwce

in World War I

Vol. IV

-129-

Capt. Charles M. Fleisclhmann

Army Air Service Headquarters in Italy

I. In accordance with verbal instructions I hereby submit 

a

recapitulation of the history of the American Aviation Camp at

Foggia, Italy . ..

2. During the time that I was commandant of the school 

I

observed the following details which might be of interest in the

future:

I. That it does not seem good policy to give preliminary

training by contract. The time needed for each man varies

considerably; some pilots, though able and willing, take

necessarily a longer time to master the first elements than

others, and every opportunity should be given such a man and

he should not be discontinued just because he has flown more

hours than called for by the contract.

n]. It was not possible to give any man "acrobatics" at the

school at Foggia, as the Farman type machine is not suited to

such work, and further, acrobatics are not necessaiy in a plane

of the Caproni type, but it is thought that an acrobatics course,

even of the simplest form, gives a man added confidence, which

aids him a great deal when in a difficult place.

III. American student pilots should have American

instructors. Temperament and language have so much to do with

instruction that very often a great injustice is done a student by

an instructor, through his lack of understanding of an

explanation or direction.

IV. A Commissary should be put at any post where the

number of men necessitates it, as it is found that American men

do better work and are much better satisfied when they are fed

on food they are accustomed to, even though it be of the

simplest kind.

V. That care should be taken that no American

Commanding Officer be sent to a foreign school who has higher rank than the Commanding Officer of the foreign school. The

foreign officers stand a great deal on etiquette and rank, and it

causes embarrassment which might be avoided if both officers

were of equal rank or the American of lower rank.

V1. Looking back over the training at the school and what it

has accomplished, I believe that the training in Italy was 

a

valuable thing, and if the war had lasted six months longer this

fact would have been proven. Pilots were beginning to arrive

who had had their preliminary training in France and England,
Lessons 347

I Learned F

and it would have been a matter of an extremely short course to

-" make them efficient as Caproni pilots. A navigation course was

iust being begun, and a sufficient number of planes were being

assembled to take cate of the Americans.

-130-

Capt. Remington Orsinger

Operations Officer IC

1st Army Observation Group

On February 21st, 1918, I entered the School for Aerial

_ Observers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma- On November 20th, 1918, 

I

arrived at the front. Nine months had elapsed from the time 

I

£ transferred from the infantry and the time that I arrived on the

L front. The first 4 months were spent in Observation and Aerial

Gunnery Schools in the states. One month was spent in crossing t the Atlantic. T.L last 4 months were wasted in Aviation School

of the S.O.S. in a useless repetition of the courses followed in

the states

My cas' s one of several hundred similar cases. While these

S officers w e held in the S.O.S., squadrons at the front were

', short of observers. The shortage of observers was so great that - in one squadron, the 91st, an Ordnance officer had to be sent

j up to do the work of an aerial observer; in another, the 24th,

g the Radio officer volunteered for the work and was gladly

S accepted.

F, The point that I want to emphasize is, that .,ven though there

was a shortage of observers at the front, officers who had been

completely trained in the work before leaving the states were

being held in the Aviation Schools of the S.O.S.

Courses of study in the Aviation Instruction Centers for "Aerial Observation for Artillery" were based on regulations

contained in Confidential Bulletir No. 80, G.H.Q., A.E.F.-

This bulletin furnished some .aluable information as to the

manner in which aerial observation was used in carrying on an

r "Artillery Reglage." The information was not detailed in many

cases and had to be supplemented and interpreted by the

instructor.

I was at the 2nd Aviation instruction Center at Tours August

to October. During that time there were no less than five

f different instructors in the course on Artillery Observation.

Information was often given by one instructor which was later I contradicted by another instructo:. This contradictory instruction

confused many of the students.
A

I

348 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

4

Vol. IV

A cursory study of the bulletin will show that no difference is

made between the manner in which a battery of 75's fires a problem and the manner in which a battery of 155's fires a

prob!em. This difference is of fundamental importance, yet it was

not in the bulletin and had to be conveyed to the classes

verbally.

There was plenty of time to publish a suitable manual of

regulations on Aerial Observation for Artillery. Other Branches of

the Service are furnished with such manuals, but up to the time

of this writing the Air Service has only Bulletin No. 8J, which

the writer considers insufficient.

-131-

Lt. Col. John F. Curry

Chief of Staff, Air Service, Second Army

The reports on lessons learned were full of suggestions for

things to be done in the future. In addition, General Patrick

asked some key officers to submit separate recommendations

for the postwar, peacetime Air Service.

In compliance with telegram from C.A.S., American E.F., in

reference to after the-war Air Service activities, I submit herewith

my views on this matter.

1. For Work with the Army.

(a) Mobile. The size of this branch of Air Service will

depend naturally on the size of the Army after the war.

Experience has shown that for each division there should be one

observation squadron, one balloon company, and one photo

sect:on. Besides this, there should be further observation units

for Army use as distinguished from corps and divisional use. In

addition to the observation aviation, there should be a small

nucleus of pursuit and bombardment aviation for the

development of the technical end of these branches and in order

that we may have something around which can be built up a

strong pursuit and bombardment force upon the outbreak of

war.

(b) Coast Defense Certain squadrons will have to be

provided for and definitely assigned to coast defense work

around the harbors along our coastline. Recommendation ac to

the number of these has already been made to the General Staff rby the Air Service in the United States.

C 2. Postal and Passenger Carrying Services. It is believed that
A

I

r]

Lessoi.. 349 • Le am.ned

the Future of Postal and Passenger Carrying Air Service in our

country, except in special circumstances, will not be very great.

Our experience to date with the Postal Air Service has shown

that the cost far outweighs any possible advantages. A machine

to be successful in the Postal or Passenger Carrying Services

must be large and have a large carrying capacity, thereby

necessarily slowing down the speed and bringinq it to the same

plane as regards competition with the railroads, with tiuinr of the

reliability and cheapness of the latter. However, I do believe that

there will exist many special situations for which it can be used

to great advantage. 3. Geological Survey, Mapping, Etc. Here it is believed a great future exists for the Air Service. Our Country is very largely

unmapped in the true sense of the word. Accurate photographic

maps can be made rapidly and cheaply provided the triangulating is done in advance by the Geological Survey. A greater need for

maps has never been better shown than by the difficultes

experienced by the Air Service in obtaining accurate maps of the

country surrounding the aviation field. All squadrons not

otherwise engaged could assist in this work, but there should

necessarily be a large number of squadrons moving from place

to place over the country doing no other class of work. Herein

lies a great future for the Air Service and one in which it can be

of value, not only to civil activities of the country but a vcry

reliable and dependable force which, with tre addition of some

training, can be thrown into the field immediately upon the

outbreak of hostilities.

SPhoto room, 91st Aero Sq
350 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

-132-

Col. Frank P. Lahm

Army Air Service Commander, Second Army

. .... I forward herewith:

(a) My recommendations concerning provisions that should

be made in the United States for after-war Air Service

(b) Recommendations as to changes in Air Service Tables of

Organizations .... 1 The Air Service of the U.S. Army to consist of.

For Garrison Duty in U.S. and overseas possessions:

4 Observation Squadrons

4 Balloon Companies

4 Pursuit Groups (each of two pursuit squadrons &

one park)

4 Bombing Squadrons

8 Photo Sections (for the 4 Observation & 4 Bombing

Squadrons)

Total permanent squadrons maintained at full strength--16

Total permanent Photo Sections maintained at full

strength--8 Total permanent Balloon Companies maintained at ful

strength-4

Total permanent Parks maintained at full strength-4

Training Cadres:

For 16 Infantry training divisions:

16 Obseation Squadrons

16 Photo Sections

16 Balloon Companies

For 4 Cavalry training divisions:

4 Observation Squadrons

4 Photo Sections

4 Balloon Companies For training of Corps Troops:

4 Observation Squadrons

4 Photo Sections for same

4 Balloon Companies

For training with Coast Defense Training Cadres:

8 Observation Squadrons

8 Photo Sections

8 Balloon Companies

For training in pursuit work:

4 Groups, each Group consisting of 2 squadrons & I

park. Total-8 Pursuit Squadrons

,L . . .... .. .. II" A L.... 
Lessons 351

Learned

For training in bombing:

4 Bombing Squadrons

4 Photo Sections

Total of Training Cadres:

-32 Observation Squadrons

8 Pursuit Squadrons

4 Bombing Squadrons

or

44 Squadrons

4 Parks

36 Photo Sections

32 Balloon Companies

Aggregate of the permanent forces and training cadres:

60 Squadrons

8 Parks

44 Photo Sections

36 Balloon Companies

Each Squadron, Company or Section at full strength to consist

of the 'ollowing:

Observation Squadron:

27 Officers

130 Men

12 Planes

Pursuit Squadron: 20 Officers

180 Men

18 Planes

Bombardment Squadron:

40 Officers

180 Men

18 Planes

Park Squadron.

6 Officers

180 Men

Balloon Company:

8 Officers

170 Men

1 Balloon

Photo Section:

0 Officers

12 Men

Each training cadre to consist of the following permanent

personnel:

Observation Squadron:

7 Officers

20 Men
IA

II

352 U.S Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

Pursuit Squadron:

6 Officers

30 Men

Bombardment Squadron.

8 Officers

30 Men

Park Squadron2 Officers

30 Men

Balloon Company:

2 Officers

30 Men

Photo Section:

0 Officers

4 Men

In addition to the foregoing, there will be necessary school

detachments at the various aviation schools which may iater be

determined as necessary for the instruction of candidates training

as pilots and observers

While it is realized that it is objectionable to disperse the Air

Service. particularly the pursuit and bombing which are in smal!

numbers, at the sarae time it is believed necessary for the Army

as a whole to become acquainted with all forms of the Air

Service, not only observation, but pursuit and bombing as well.

Furthermore it is believed that the pursuit should be where it

can work with observation squadrons and also with bombing squadrons, consequently at one point in ech of the four Corps

Areas there should be:

I Observation Squadron, with its Photo Section

1 Balloon Company

I Pursuit Group of two squadrons, with its Park

I Bombing Squadron, with its Photo Section, all under the

command of an Air Service Officer of suitable rank.

2. Training - Men to be trained as pilots or observers will be

selected from volunteers who possess the necessary physica' and

educational qualifications.

The United States will be divided up into three districts for the

purpose of assigning Air Service candidates to training schools.

ist: The East--With a school at Langley Field, Virginia.

2nd. The Cener -With a school in Texas.

3rd: The West-With a school in Southern California

Langle- Field at Hampton, Virginia, for the Easlern District,

Eliington Field at Houston, Texas, for the Central District and

Rockwell Field al San Diego, California, for the Western District,

are already built and ready for use If sufficient space is not
MII

LlLessons 353

ILamed

available at Langley Field for the number of men to be trained in

the Eastern District, use can be made of the fields at Arcadia,

Florida, to which should be se nt all the men to be trained from

the Southeastern States, those 1rom the Northeastern States

going to Langley Field at Hampton, Virginia.

yea.: -

30OsraiPilots

Ob0serseers,

albomnbing pilots anc. observers would report to Ellington Field,

i!xas, for instruction, pursuit pilots would be divided one thirdI

orapproximately 43 at Langley, Virginia, one-third at Eliington. Texas, aid one-thircd at San Diego. California

One-third of the jb)servatioi pilots and observers on

approximately 107 pilots and 107 observers would report at eachI

o,' the three fields, i.e., at Langley Field, Ellinigton Field and Rockwell Field

All rilots and obsprvers should be men of the cabss to be

called to the colors during the year, should be volunteprs for au- at

ion, and should report at the various schools on Januaryi 10th.A

By April 1st there viould be sufficient time to determine which

are uniuid for aviation. Thes.- should be eliminated and should

report for dutv with their class which begins i~s trainirng in

dlivisoris onr April it

The tr,~rninq of flying personnel should be divided Into three

periods: Ii 1st: 3round School & Preliminary Flying --January; 10th to

April 30th (3243 mnonths) 2rid Special~zed Training & Gunnerl - May Ist to July 31st

(.1 months)

3,d Wrork with Unit-August Ist to Octobecr 31st 13 rnon iis)

It is believed that the best -esults witl be ohtained b

concentrating in a few large schools and combining various kindsA

of training at one place rallier than by heving sepatate schook,

for grourd school training, preliniinar, 11lying, speciali/ed training

and gunnery The laltrr systemn was necessary when WV' Wenc

turnogq out lar'je num~bers (:f st- !ents in a nlinimuni length rW

time

It is believed that flyinrg and tlhiietical traming should be

cerried on at the sdrrw tir;,e: IS 11C Student Ldii fly Lut ai lmited

number Of lnnirs in the day
L

354 U.S. Air Serj"ice

in World War I

Vot IV

" ' It is further believed that the preliminary training of all flying

personnel should be the same. as it is to consist largely in

disciplinary training and the elements of aviation.

I believe that 9-2/3 months, or the time from Januarl c! - -

October 31st, is sufficient for training Air Service flying t.,.,onnel

and that it is not necessary for them to repor-t November 1st. If

the *raining began an November 1st, it would he interrupted by • " the holidays and, as many candidates will come from a long

homes k.ithout usin.s up a considerable length of tim.2. On the

35other hand, b reporting January 10th, aAl Air Service candidates, as well as th, permanent :nistruction force, would be better

I to eprepared start the year's work.oa-y

On November st, pilots and obeerve s trained that year, pass

into the First Reserve. The foloing yea, i e, dui'n their 21st

year, they report to the Division, Corps and Coast Defense

Training training. In Squadons their 22nd on year September they report 1st, for to these a month same and squadrons a halb of on August ust, for a month's training, in their 23rd year they

o hreport on July 1st, in their 2,,th year they report on June Ist.

pre-re tost the yer'awrk.hypasil

On Novmber st, iltheis 4nh oerveys inth the Second

Reservey rempnig their ti. the compltion of the calendaryear

taining Sue 3i t birthday. No furth-r service mnh will be dah

trg Intv eir n rey.r me oteesm rn

ohe above plan conteiplates maintaing in the four Corps

*- j ,Areas into which it is t.hered the United States is dividd:

, 4 Training Pursuit G,oups, each of 2 Pursuit Squadrons & I , Or oyPark

R rIn the same way each Group Area would have: I Training Bombing Squadron. The schools should Le utized after July 3st, ile., after the

departure of the year's class mo its units, for trairg pilots a; d

oAservs for the permanent personne; In enr , it is Ihieved

German olbservation post that t'ie permanent personnel would be. supphie I from the

temp orary personnel that would] apply for transfer. These appcations might be expected from men of the Frst Rserve at

any thie up to their 2roh year and would cut dwn by just that

many the number that would return fnr their month's traini ng mn the training s nquadron

The same leneral plan would be a followed J training ena sted

I men with the Air Service. lheir instructionl, if practicable. should

1e carried on at the same three tiainig centers and 0hould dhey 

go to their tTai m unns a the same a the I p itots and obervers,

an August 1st They should rexrt during iher 2stb 22nd. rd

and 24th years the wame as the flymng peronne, thus moilizig n

i i, III : f ' ' Ie at full ried strngann on. t the sam the squadrons tIaiii center beginning [I~n June the st --ofiould
LL

Lessons 355

Learned

each year and lasting through until October 31st of each year.

Balloon personnel should be trained according to the same

general plan as the heavier-than-air personnel, utilizing the

present Balloon Schools There would be approximately 192

Balloon Observers to train each year. They should be divided

between the three schools at Omaha, Nebraska, Arcadia,

California, and Camp John Wise in Texas. This would give

approximately 64 Officers at each. While the three heavier-thanair training centers are selected in parts of the United States

where weather conditions in winter are particularly favorable, this

is not true in the case of the Balloon School at Omaha.

However, I believe that past experience has shown that balloon

work can be carried on at Fort Omaha in the winter time. In the

case of balloon training the severe climate of the northern part

of the United States is rmuch less of a detriment than in the case

of aviation training

3. Relations with 0 2. The British system of handling

information has been in effect in the A.E.F., and we have had

tne opportunity of comparing it with the French system. I have

seen this question, first from the view point of the Army Staff

during the time I was assigned to C-3 of the First Army in the

Chateau Thierry, St. Mihiel and Argonne Offensives and later as

Army Air Service Commander of the Second Army during its

operation on the Toul Front. I do not believe the system we

have used is successful as far as its relations with the Air

Service are concerned. When the Staff, particularly the Chief of

Staff and G-3, want information during operations they want it at

once, and have not time to apply for it through G-2. As 

a

matter of fact, information gathered by the Air Service was

transmitted to 0-2 but also directly to G3, and this was 

a

necessity. In the same way, when G3 wanted information

procuted by the Air Service, it applied directly to the Air Service

and not to G-2. Our plan calls for reconnaissance missions being

given by G 2, but in order to mike it practicable for G-3 or the

Chief o' Staff to secure information more quickly, command

airplanes were placed at their disposal. This is simply beating

around the bush.

In some Corps the only missions given by G 2 were

photographc missions, the Group Commander prescribing all

visual reconnaissances on his own initiative or by direction of the

Corps, usualiy the Corps Chief of Staff.

The argument that information furnished ,j the Air Service is

rot complete and should be carefully weigh d and considered

with information from other sources before being acted upon. is

not sound. In fixed warfare ir, a quiet sector, this plan couid be

followed. but not during mobile warfare when conditions are
356 U.S. Air Service

in World War!

Vol. IV

rapidly changing. Under these circumstances information provided

by tne Air Service relative to the location of the enemy, his

numbers and activities, must be acted upon by G-3 without

stopping to compare it with information from other sources. The

latter is desirable and should be done and is a function of G.2;

t,,e studies made by G-2 should then be transmitted for use by

G-3, but action by the latter cannot and need not be held

awaiting G 2's reports.

The further argument that the Air Service is no longer

interested in information of the enemy after it has been secured,

is not sound. That is the Observation Air Service's most

important duty and is to it, intensely interesting.

It is reasonable to expect the one who assigns a mission to

know how it should be executed and that the one who executes

a mission should understand what will be done with the

information he secures. Missions are given by representatives of

G-2 who are not familiar with the Air Service and who are not

qualified to prescribe them. Observers on their return from

reconnaissances are questioned by a B.I.O. who is not a flyer,

who is not capable of intelligently asking questions to bring out

what the observer has seen and, moreover, the observer knows

this and is not so likely io respect his interrogator as he would if

he knew the latter was conversant with what he was talking

about. The B.I.O. or rather the one who q,,sons the observer

on his report of a reconnaissance, should himself be an expert

observer, preferab;y the senior or oldest observer in the

squadron. He should be a flyer ad should frequently go into the

air to study the ground on which he is to receive reports.

4. Organization.

I recommend that armorers be Air Service personnel and not

attached from the Ordnance Department.

Rifles should not be provided for Air Service Enlisted Men

except truck drivers. In time of war mechanics do not have time

to care for rifles and have little or no use for them All officers

and men (except truck drivers) should be armed with the pistol

and instructed in its use.

I recommend that all Enlisted Men be instructed in the use of

the machine gun. Lewis quns are available in all but pursuit

squadrons and the latter should be issued 3 for instruction

purposes. The mcreasing mportancc of the machine gun makes

it expedient that all officers and men should be familiar with its

use Officers -eceive yunriery training as part of their regular

intruction-Enlistej Men do not, consequently the above

recommendatior,.
Lessons 357

Learned

Engineer Officer. Unless the Engineer Officer is a well trained

technician, hc will devote his time simply to collecting, compiling

and forwarding reports and to assisting in securing supplies

wnich are propery the function of the Adjutant and Supply

Officer

Engineer Officers should be graduates of Technical Schools

who have afterward specialized on airplanes and motors. In an

old squadron long used to its equipment the mechanics under

the ditection of the Flight Commanders are probably capable of

handling all engineering difficulties and Squadron Engineer

Officers are not necessary, the Group Engineer Officer being

sufficient. Until we have standard equipment and are sure of the

ability of our Enlisted Mechanics, the Squadron Engineer Officer

should be retained but should be a man more highly trained than

the average we have had in France.

Machine shop, Issoudun.

kIK

V Ii

I-t
358 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

-133-

Col. Frank P. Lahm

Army Air Service Commander, Second Army

I send herewith the report called for on January 10th .... I trust that it is all you want, if not, write to me and I will be

glad to supplement or add to it anything that is desired,

I must apologize somewhat for the haste with which the "After 

A

the War Activities" was gotten up as I have had a lecture to

write and other matters which have come about the same time.-

points 

This 

of 

expresses which are:my general views on the subject, the salient 

I

1st: Schools to be concentrated and in parts of the United

States where climatic conditions will interfere least with the

training. For instance the excellent climatic conditions of St.

l)iego [sic] are equivalent to having a larger field and larger I

training forces at a point such as Mineola, as the number of

hours in the air during a given period will be so much greater.

2nd: The Air Service to be with the Army and become

acquainted with it. This applies not only to the observatior but

to the pursuit and bombing as well. A large part of the Army

will never know there is suLh a thing as a bombing or pursuit

squadron unless we put some out for them to see. That is the

reason I recommend putting pursuit and bombing squadrons in

the four Corps Areas.

3rd: Having aviation of different kinds work together and

become acquainted For that reason I put observation. bornbing

and pursuit together in each of the four Corps Areas so that

they may cooperate as they are required to do in time of war.

I nave made no provision for additional personnel that should

be put in'o training beginninq ,Iaruary 10th to aflow for the ones

who will be eliminated by April 1st. In other words there will be

lacking to fill the training squadrons to their maximum number, 

I

just the number that are eliminated during the first part of the

training oeriod. As a matter of fact this probably will give an

opportunity for training worthy enlisted men who 'hus would

have the opportunity for promotion to commitsio;ls and the

positicns cf pilot and cbserver after the reqlisite examination

There i. n, doubt a great future for the A;r Service io the

i.nost Office [lepertment and in Mapping Whether this should

come under the dirctIon of the Director ot Militari, Aeronautics

or whether al; aviation, both civil 3nd military, should come

uncer a separate department of aeronautics of the Government,

is a question to be determined. Feisonally I rather think they

should be ,;eparate in time of peace anc' im time of war the
F ± = " '- * : : : - i, . . .. - L.. , -- - ---...- . - - - -. _- -. _ . 'A .

Le

Lessons 359

*-- Learned

military should draw on the trained civilian aviators who would

then be available for mobilization. In the same way certain

industries are civilian in the time of peace but are militarized in

time of war.

In any event I am stili satisfied that the Air Service has a great future before it.

L_ Trust you will let me know what further you want and

- assuring you that it will be cheerfully furnished ....

P.S. My plan is based on Gen. Pershing's "Military Policy"

which designates 4 corps areas in the U.S., with 16 training

divisions.

r -134-

Col. 'homas DeWitt Milling

Army Air Service Commander, First Arny

... . .

1. All plans for the reorganization of the Air Service should be

correlated with the reorganization of the Army as a whole. The

Air Service is of value to the military establishment only insofar

as it is correlated to the other arms. Ignorance of the functions

of thc Air Service, its possibilities and limitations, which has

/. preailed on the part of most line officers throughout the war,

Shas been one of the heaviest tactical handicaps under which the '~ Service ~Air has labored. Unless tetv Air Service probleras ar,-

considered by the General Staff as problems of the Army, the

gulf that has hitherto existed between the Air Service and the

remainder of the Army will not be bridged.

2. Since the plan for the reorganization of the Army is not

known, no attempt will ke made to base these suggestions upon

that plan.

-1 "r )Li. Co: WiilaarnC Sherman, Col

Thomas D Miling. and Lt Col John

Paegelow

I-i
360 U S Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

2. Since the plan for the reorganization of the Army is not

known, no attempt will be made to base these suggestions upon

that p!an . . ..

3. The question oi organization of the Air Service for work

with our seacoast defenses of the continental United States,

Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Canal Zone is not entered into

as these questions have not come within the experience of

members of the Air Service of the American E.F. during the past

2 years, and it is believed that those who have been engaged on

such work are better able to handle the subject.

4. The war has clearly demonstrated one thing that was

always clear to those who have been connected with the Air

Service for some years and that is that regardless of the money

available for creating and expanding such an arm the expansion

of it, due to industrial reasons chiefly, will take its allotted time

for development and on the whole is a slower process than the

expansion of other arms of the service. It must be borne in mind

that a service airplane represents the acme of human engineering

and scientific achieverrient and that its development and

production cannot be extemporized within a few weeks.

5 Based on the above fact, a professional Air Service should

be maintained that is larger in proportion to the Army than is

commensurate therewith. Due also to the fact that the prime use

to which the Air Service in its present stage of development

lends itself is lard warfare, the creation of a separate Air Service

combining all branches of the Government pertaining to aviation

is not recommended for the following reasons'

(a) If such a service is formed, it will undoubtedly be placed

ur,der a civilian head, as a consequence of which the

continuation of the development of aviation from a military

standpoint will undoubtedly be subservient to its development

commercially. By this is not meant that the commercial end

should be neglected. Considering, however, as stated before, that

a service airplane represents the acme of human effort, and also

that as a general rule a commercial airplane may be considered

as entirely different ancG inferior to those of military types, it is

believed that the commerical types will be at:ained in our efforts

to develop the best types of two and multi-place airplanes. As a

Igeneral rule. it may be considered that the development of those

of commercial tye and ai " tho.,e for coast defense or naval

use, will take place with those for military development. In this

connection, it may be statc that while the development of

commercial aviation by civilian firms will afford some heip, d is

no; believed that commercial aviation possesses great possibilities

for the development of --.ilitary aviation.
Lessons 361

_ _LeaIed

(b) When aviation has reached a stage of development for

commercial use, it may be safely assumed that sufficient private

capital will be forthcoming to support it.

(c) Aviation has not yet reached the stage where it can be

efficiently employed in naval warfare. Under our present

organization, different from other powers, in which our Coast

Artillery forms part of the Army, we have been charged with the

development and maintenance of machi,"s for water flying. Up-_

to the present time, the principal basis of all appropriations for

naval use have been for coast defense purposes.

6. An experimental field should be established by the Army Air

Service for the development of all types of airplanes, motors,

aviation material and accessories This should be available to

civilian firms and engineers in developing new and untried

inventions. In connection with this plant, a practical school for

aeronautical engineers should be establithed fox the completion

of training of our Army aeronautical engineers.

7. The personnel should be of three general classes: first, a 

I

E permanent body of regular officers with commensurate rank for

all higher commands and staff work; second, regular officers

detailed in the Air Service for duty as pilots, squadron and group

commanders; third, officers in reserve corps to be called to

active duty or not depending on the exigencies of the service.

Easy provision should be available to retire the first class with

three-quarters 

relieve and send 

pay 

back 

when 

the 

they 

second 

become 

class 

useless 

to their 

to 

brnch 

the service; 

-t any

to 

4

time; and to discharge the third class when deemed necessary. It

is aso recommended that the present rate of increase of flying

pay be retained but that no increase of rank for the pilot rating

be allowed Special schools similar somewhat to our line and

staff schools should be established for the instruction and

developmeno of regular officers in the command and employment

of the Air Service.'

8. All Air Service officers should be pilots or observers.

Exception should be made only for nonflying officers who have

served satisfactorily during the war and who express at the

present time a desire for commission in the Reserve Corps This

opinion is due to the fact that it will build up esprit and will

make for efficiency inasmuch as a flying officer cognizant of the

problems of aviation is a more efficient Air Service administrator

(Adotant, Supply Officer, etc ) than an officer to whom the

p.cculiar problems of aviation (are] foreign.

'resent indications lead to th4 belief that commercial aviation.

aerial mail carryinq, etc., will not prov:de a large number of pilots

suitable for military purposes, as it is considered doubtfui

AwFether they would possess the necessary qualifications for
362 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

receiving commissions in the Army. Since the Air Service can

select its personnel from a large number of applicants, definite

standards must be maintained to exclude "aenal chauffeurs" wno

are neither desirable as officers nor are capable i.ilitary aviators

in time of war.

9. The United States should be divided into [ai number of

training areas where flying fields should be established near the

centers of population and properly equipped These will be

available for training reserve pilots and will provide facilities for

those reserve officer pilots not on active duty to fly throughout

the year, this is in addition to the period each year when they

will be called to active duty. Experience has shown that facilities

of this nature will be taken advantage of without compulsion,

especially on Saturdays anid Sundays.

10. The Reserve Air Service should be organized into

squadrons, groups, and wings, and the flying material for these

units should be maintained at all times in addition to the material

necessary for training. As this material becomes obsolete, it can

be utilized for training purposes when replaced by up-to-date

equipment. It is realized that this policy entails great expense but

unless industrial facilities are utilized in time of peace in the

design and production of service types of mi!itary airplanes, these

wil! not be forthcoming in time of war.

11. In conclusion, it is recommended that the highest possible

standard of personnel be maintained and that the fact be faced

squarely that without the expenditure of large amounts of money

in the development of strictly military types of airplanes, an

adequate Air Service cannot be created.
IIIII
I WN -I
Sr.., t I i: 363

Introduction

The reports on lessons learned were only a small part of the

vast collection of materal that Gorrell assembled at Tours during the first weeks of 1919 for the "History of the Air Service,

AEF." and General Patrick's "Final Report-" As this pile of papers grew day by day, Gorrell realized that something was lacking, Remembering his days in the Strategical Section and his

plans for a strategical bombing program, Gorrell wanted to find

out what effect aerial bombing had had on the enemy.' For that

information, he turned to the Intelligence Section (G-2) of GHO, AEF.

Brig Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2. designated Capt. Emery A. Greunke and 1st Lt. L. J. LeTourneau

of the Air Intelligence Section (G-2, A-7) to supervise the work

of obtaining data for the project The task. Nolan said. was "to

secure as complete and reliable information as possible upon

which the Air Service may base its future bombing plans. '

The First Army was asked to assign men to report to Greunke.

The ,cting G-2 of First Army, Capt. Donald S. McWilliams,

noted that the area where much of the bombing had been done

The dam y I ,,ho,e use , ,a230i lb BntIsh bomb. ,.i

iernied "considerabe by World Wai I aessements
364 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

had formerly been occupied by the First Army but had since

been turned ever to the Second Army. McWilliams suggested

that the request for people be sent to Second Army.

When the request was made, Lt. Col. Charles F. Thompson,

Second Army G-2, opposed the assignment of Second Army

personnel to the project. He thought that information concerning the effects of bombing was no longer available Thompson,

however, was the only officer Greunke met who thought thei

investiaation doomed to failure. A visit to Trier and Coblenz

satisfied Greunke that the information could be obtained If

G-2, GHQ, AEF. could not get the German-speaking officers

needed for the investigation, Greunke thought that the project

should be turned over to the Air Service so Air Service personnel could carry on the investigation.

Noting the difficulty that G-2, GHO, AEF, had had in trying

to find the large number cf German-speaking personnel re- quired for the job. Nolan suggested to the Air Service that the Air Service take over the project Instead. the Air Service detailed officers from various units to work with Greunke These

included 2d Lt. Richard W. Bonneville, A.S., Ferry Pilot. Orly: 2d

Lt. Arthur A. Coleman, A.S., 22d Aero Squadron; 2d Lt. Otto C.

Epp, A.S., 100th Aero Squadron; 1st Lt. Frank W. Letzig, A.S.,

Supply Officer. Third Aviation Instruction Center; 2d Lt. Henry T Pratt, A.S.. O.I.C., Machinery Department, 667th Aero Squadron; 2d Lt. Fred A. Spitznagle. A.S., Observer, 163d Aero Squadron; and 2d Lt. Robert Steinberger, A.S., Buyer, Procurement

Division, Paris. Four other officers were obtained from other

units of the AEF: Ist Lt. Marcus Thomas Bauch, Q.M C., a memt.er of a bakery company; Ist Lt. Harold J. Hotton, F.A.. G-2, VIII

Corps; 1st Lt. William S. Reid, Inf.; and 2d Lt. Theodore N. 8eckman, Inf.

Twelve team3 were formed, each consisting of one office: and

two enlisted men (a photographer and a chauffeur). The Instructions given to the teams began as follows:

The Allied Air Services have spent millions of dollars in 

A

preparing and executing a plan of bombardment against the

industrial centers of Germany. The opportunity is now afforded to investigate just whlat amount of damage was

caused and the value of this branch of the service in future

wars.

In order to gain this knowledge, a systematic investigation of the different towns is to be carried out ....

Detailed instructions were given as to what was desired. The

informdtion was listed under five headings: (1) General, that is,
US Bombing 365

Survev

the basic facts about each raid-time, name of factory, its product, etc-with each alert being covered, whether or not the

place was bombed; (2) material damage; (3) bombing of railroads, including the length of time that trains were held up; (4)

measures adopted in factories and town; and (5) moral effect. .- 

-

The teams were to d3termine which gave the better results, day

or night bombing, with regard to both material and moral Mffect. 

[

Field work was startea eariy ;n March 1919 and completed by

20 May. The area investigated was roughly west of the Rhine

River and south of a line from Dusseldorf on the Rhine to Mezieres on the border between Belgium and France. This area contained all of the targets bomoed by U.S. aero squadrons, part of 

A

those bombed by French unit3, and all of those bombed by the

Independent Force, Royal Air Force, except for a fewcities such

as Freiburg, Stuttgart. and Mannheim, on the east side of the 

A

Rhine, to which the American survey teams did not have access

The teams visited about 140 towns. In more than 40 percent of

these places, they were unable to obtain any information- Th. f:iur AiHl b ,tnbt,,

records either had not been kept or had been destroyed or car- squadrurs of Wurd War 

I

ried away by the retreating Germans. In some other places, the

data available was very meager The team that visited Merzig, for

example, was able to report only the number of raids (1). the

number of bombs (4), and the total damage (22,600 marks).

Some places, however, the Americans found excellent records.

At Trier. for instance, they obtained detailed data on 20 raids

and 120 alerts in the period from October 1915 to November

1918. In some cases, records were available only to, th'. latter

part of the war, but in many instances, they covered Ell rids and

alerts, going back in some cases as far as 1914. The inf',i,nation

obtained was presented in a series of 65 reports (somrj covering

two or more pl.,es) prepared by the various teams

American operations constituted o'l, a small part of the

bombing that the teams covered in the post-war survey The

British and French had begun bombing early in the war; the first

U.S. bombing unit, the 96th Aero Squadron. did not begin operations until 12 June 1918. Individually, as well as collectively.

the British and French flew many more missions and dropped

niany more bombs than the Americans did. Further, British and

French units reached out much farther than the Americans in

their bombing raids. While British units based in the vicinity of

Nancy sent planes to cities on the Rhine, to Mannheim (120

,"'inri C' hlenz (130 miles), and Cologne (160 miles), the targets for American units were all west of Metz and never more

than 60 or 65 miles from the operating base, first at Amanty and

later at Maulan.

m r ln - -- ---
w -

>&

AA

1Le

A
AA

U.S Bombing 367

Survv

Between 12 June. when it began operations, and 12 September, the beginning of the St. Mihiel offensive, the 96th Aero

Squadion dispatched 278 sorties on 35 missions and dropped

about 60,000 pounds of bombs. The targets were railway stations and yards at Conflans, Longuyon. Dommary-Baroncourt,

and Audun-le-Roman, all west and northwest of Metz. In September 1918 the 96th Aero Squadron was joined by two more

squadrons. the 11th and 20th, which were formed into the 1st

Day Bombardment Group. During the Battle of St. Mihiel, their

attacks were directed against German troop concentrations

immediately behind the lines, with lines of communication, including bridges and bridgeheads on the Moselle, as secondary

objectives. Later, in October. another squadron, the 166th,

joined the 1st Day Bombardment Group During the MeuseArgonne Campaign the group continued to direct its main effort

against troop concentrations, with lines of communication its

secondary objectives, until the end of the war. During the entire

period of American operations, the 96th, 11th, 20th, and 166th

Squadrons the only American bombing units that saw combat

during the war,' dropped a total of about 275,000 pounds of

bombs.

After the war, the American survey teams attempted to obtain

data on the effects of bombing attacks that American squadrons

had made on troop areas in the Argonne in the last days of the

war. Unfortunately, local records were not available. These

areas had also been under artillery 'ire, and without local records It was impossible to determine what damage had been

caused by aircraft and what had been done by artillery. Consequently, most of the raids covered by the survey were made

by British and French units engaged in operations against industrial or communications targets some distance behind the

lines Only eight places covered by the bombing survey reports -Conflans, Dommary-Baroncourt, Longuyon, Montmedy, Gorze. Corny, Bayonville. and Arnaville-appear on the AEF's

map of places attacked by American bombing squadrons.'

In addition to the 65 reports compiled by the 12 teams, the full

report of the survey includes narrative and statistical summaries, evidently prepared In G-2, A-7. The last two sections of the

narrative summary are of especial interest, one being a criticisii, of bombing - t.... _ dbinig World War I, the other some

suggestions for the future.'
368 U.S. Ai, Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

' Reports

Metz

Railroad Stations

Metz, situated at the confluence of the Seille and the Mosel!e

Rivers, was conquered and fortified by the Romans, sacked by

: ' Attila the Hun, taken by the French in the 16th century. beseiged

and captured by Prince Frederick Charles in 1870, and made

: part of Germany with the annexation of Lorraine at the end of

I the Franco-Pruss ian War. Heavily fortified, Metz had a place in

the defense of the German frontier similar to that which Verdun,

some 35 miles to the west, occupied in the defense of France in

pre-World War I military plans. One of the important military

installations in the Metz area during the World War was Frescaty

airdrome, southwest of the city, a target frequently attacked by

French and British bombers.

Metz also was the center of the great metals industries of Lorraine. To the north and west, in the region around Briey, were

mines that produced 80 percent of the iron ore used by German

industry. Some ore was smelted locally, but much of i! was

shipped to the Saar. where there were coal mines to provide fuel

for blest furnaces and foundries. The metals industry depended

on a vast network of railroads radiating in every direction from

. Metz. In addition to carrying ore and pig iron and coal and steel.

trains on these lines hauled troops and supplies for German

i armies on the Western Front.

Disruption of traffic in this rail system was one of the chief

objectives by French. British, and American bombing operai tions. The targets selected for attack were mainly railway sta-

~tions. Particularly those at important junrtkin. T.hree stations

- at Metz were targets for Allied bombers. The main station was at

, Sablon, where the various lines converged in the southeast part

of the city Another was in the west end, at Montigny. near

where the rail line running westward lo Conflans and Etain

crossed the Moselle. The ltrdJ was at Woipp v , just north of Metz

-+ on the line to Thionville and Luxembourg. The following report.

- prepared by the American team that visited Metz: to investigate

~the effects of Allied bombing. is concerned with raids on the

Sablon and Montigny stations,
A

U.S. Bombing 369

Survey

Resume of Results of Bombing

Number of Raids 92'

Number of Bornbs 1,187

Number of Duds 124

Number of Killed 50

Number of Wounded 57

Number of Hours Lost Due to Raids 98 Hrs. 15 Min.

Damage to Railroad Buildings at Metz 615,000 Francs

Damage to Locomotive and cars 1,004,000 Francs

Damage toTrucks 36,000

Damage to Railroad Building at

Montigny Station 60,000 Francs

Damage to Locomotives and cars at

Montigny Station 35,899.10 Francs

Number of Locomotives Damaged 14

Number of Cars Damaged 287

Bonus per month to Railroad Employees 100 Francs

Four hours is the average time required to repair tracks when

a direct hit is made.

The continuous bombing of Metz had a tremendous effect

upon the morale of the workers and civilia;s They lived almost

entirely in their cellars and it was stated that should the bombing

have continued a month or so longer, it would have been

impossible to keep employees at their duty. A crew of 250 civilians as well as severai hundred soldiers

were kept on hand to repair the damage from bombs.

-2-I

Conflans

The place most often and most heavily attacked by U.S.

bombing squadrons was Conflans, some 15 miles west of Metz.

There, the rail line from Metz to Etain crossed the line from

Charleville to Nancy. From Conflans, a narrow gauge track ran

to Brley and Audun-le-Roman, the latter being another rail

center on the target list for American bombing units.

In the first 3 months of American bombing operations in

France (12 June-11 September 1918), the 96th Aero Squadron,

the only U S. bombing unit in combat during that time. dis-
370 U S Air Serice

in World War I

Vol IV

Brequets of the 96th Aero

Squadron

patched 15 missions (119 sorties) to this target On another

occasion, on 4 September, the 96th dropped its bombs at Conflans when weather made it impossible to attack the assigned

target, another rai, station, at Dommary-Baroncourt. Later.

during the Battle of St Mihiel, the 96th and other squadrons of

the 1st Day Bombardment Group flew three more missions to

Conflans In these raids, U S units dropped a total of about

39.000 pounds of bombs at Conflans. Unfortunately, the team

sent there to collect information about bombing by U.S. and

Allied units was able to obtain very little, for the reason given in

the report which follows.

The following information is obtained from the Mayor, and

French workers employed at the railroad yards during the

occupation of Conflans by the Germans.

No official figures as to the amount of damage done could be

obtained owing to the fact that this information was taken into

the interior by the retreating forces. It was stated that during the

10 days between Sept 12 and Sept 22. 1918, when long range

artilery was especially acti-e, that r':nrc damage was done than

by all the previous bomb raids corn meed. the range of the guns

being very accurate.

Damage

Watet tank and purifier ....

Round house struck by one bomb, all windowks broken and

roof partly destroyed .... Damaqe to interior of round house ....

Side tracks and yards were repeatedly hit by bomls but

caused very little damage

Tiaffr( was delayed Only 1tu thie extetilt of about half an hour

when the yards and side tracks were hit. owing to the large

number of tracks making it possible to switch trams anound

L _
I

U S. Bombing 371

Surveyi

Whenever the main track was ht, which happened only once,

traffic was held up for about two hours. All traffic was held up

for 15 minutes to half an hour during every alert whicth was

given.

One company of pioneers, consisting of about 250 men,

together with 50 or 60 Russian pnsoners and approximately 100

French civilian laborers, were kept on hand for repair work.

Cunflan was proteLted by 3 anti-aircraft batteries, and

numerous searchlights, as well as by neighboring pursuit

squadrons such as Richthofen's Flying Circus during the last part

of the war. As far as admissions were made by employees

at the time of this investigation, very little effect on the efficiency

of the employees was caused byi repeated bombardments.

-3-

Dommary-Baroncourt

Dommary-Baroncourt, 14 miles northwest of Conflans, was

on the main rail line between Charlevilte and Nancy, at a junction of a branch line to Audun-le-Roman. The rail yards there

were the target for the 96th Aero Squadron on its first mission,

on 12 June 1916. The 96th made several more attacks during

August and early September, but American bombers were not

sent to Dommary-Baroncourt after the beginning of the St.

Mihiel offensive on 12 September 1918. The bombs dropped

by American airmen at this place totaled about 15,000 pounds.

The followin information was obtained from civilians working

here during the German occupation Diaries were kept at first

but their holders were held as spies and were obliged to destory

them

Nn officiai figures as to the amount of damage done were

obtainable owing to the fact that they had been taken into the

interior of Germany by the retreating forces.

Damage

I store house. 50 meters by 15 meters, filled with grain,

entireiy destroyed.

Hits on rail.vay track destroyed provision train

Pioneer encampment hit, killing one officer and 3 men

Three lines cut, numerous cars destroyed as well as damage

to railroad stcrehouses and machine shops.

Longuyon Conflans line cut; troops were obliged to detrain

outside of town and walk a considerable distance to the train on
?I

372 U S. Air Service

in World War I

V

N~ots and observ.er, ".,thc' 96t-. Aero Sc'..UadTon 9athe.ed !or a briefng

ta1.)o.ei prior ii: tie t om nql m- i ,svtn ir, r1.Arnmary Pmr nt.oljri on 12 1

the oth2r' Sid,: Of 1 thv bla ,) 1 hIs IImc w,.- -, ,(atedyi 'ut

fo~llovwing Sept 12, 191K. dela ,,in the regular s( hedule for 20

days

Trams were vet-y much retarded by (ontinual bombardrents.

there beln on~ly onle hlrl ,'+) 1 t'ngtir.ort and also but a single line

to3 ConflaTIs and Aridlz-le Roman

The damaqe done in the y;ards d'.d riot hoid in traffj( tcr ani,

great extent, repairs being complele~d in from one half t(, one

hour. When the main lines werec struckP during September. 1918,

traffic was held tip for ahotut 20 days, due to the almost

cont~nuc,us bonib~ardment and the accuracy of the bombnnmy

During L'aerts" all personnel were forced to take refuge in

bomb proofs

A special cre'w of pion-ers, COns.sting or about 60 men,

II

t:,gether will) a few o~ther laborers, werre kept on hand 31 311

times for rerair w&ork.t

The tcjn was provided with ant; airr:raft batteries and searchlights and numeroer s bomb profs were bui near thein

station
i

-A

U.S. Bombing 373

Survey

The efficiency of the employees was materially affected by continual bombardments, and great tea, esulted from the accutacy of the bombing.

-4

Longuyon

Longuyon, 14 miles northwest of Dommary-Baroncourt on

the rail line to Charleville, was another of the rail centers attacked by American bombing units From Longuyon, there was

a main line to Longwy and Luxembourg and a branch line to

Audun-le-Roman. The team that visited Longuyon during the

bombing survey obtained data on 18 raids during the period

from mid-February 1918 until the end of the war. Eight of the 18

attacks were made by U.S. squadrons.

The first three bombing missions sent to Longuyon by the Air

Service. First Army, were failures, the first one, on 26 June, because of mechanical difficulties, and the other two, cn 28 June

and 5 July, because of weather. On the first successful mission,

on 14 August, the 96th Aero Squadron dispatched nine planes,

including two supernumeraries, from Amanty at 0830. Staying

west of the St. Mihiel salient, the planes flew northward to Verdun before crossing the lines, and after the attack they came out

the same way, thus holding to a minimum the time over enemyheld territory. One supernumerary turned back at the front

Three planes, unable to keep up with the formation, dropped

out. Five reached the target Noting that visibility was good, the

96th Squadron reported that "three bursts were observed on the

tracks in front of the station, balance about station and among

warehouses." Three enemy pursuit planes followed the bombers from Etain to the target and back to tne lines Shots were exchanged at long range without damage to the Americans. Two

of the bombers were hit by shrapnel, but all returned home at

1105.

Another mission of nine planes was sent to Longuyon on 18

August. but because of weather all planes turned back before

crossing the lines. Two days later another mission, seven

planes, was dispatched at 1705. All crossed the lines and returned safely at 1920. Because of thick clouds at Longuyon. the

Americans dropped their bombs on railroad tracks at Flabeuville, about 3 miles northwest of the station at Longuyon.

The following day, 21 Auqust, the 96th Squadron dispatched

nine planes to Longuyon at 1000. Six reached the objective.
374 U S Ai- Srxic _(

in World War 

I

Vol IV

Visibility was excellent. The squadron reported "All bursts well

bunched, on yards between station and locomotive repair

shop."

On 25 August, 7 of 9 planes dispatched by the 96th Squadron

in the afternoon reached Longuyon 'Combs hit short of objective

and struck northeast of railroad yards Visibility was good

Unable to attack Longuyon on 30 August bctause ot high

winds, the 96th Squadron dropped its bombs at DommaryBaroncourt. On 2 September, bombs dropped by the 96th

Squadron at Longuyon "fell short of objective and landed east

of railroad yards." Visibility was excel!ent.

The next day. 3 September, nine planes took off for Longuyon. Two dropped out before crossing the lines. One developed

motor trouble, dropped its bombs at Dommary-Baroncourt. and

returned home. Six reached Longuyor., where members of the

96th Squadron observed "seven bursts on eastern end of yards

on tracks to Dommary-Baroncourt two bursts on locomotive

repair shop, and Iwo bursts observed on buildings northeast of

repair shop."

The next attack, on 1., September. after the organization of

the 1st Day Bombardment wes flown by the 11th and 96th Aero

Squadrons. Bursts were seen "on eastern edge of yards and

among buildings."

Three squadrons, the 11th, 20th, and 96th, took part on 16

September in the last U.S. raid on Longuyon. The 1st Day Bombardment Group reported "four bursts in town."

The following information was obtained from the Sergeant de

Vile who remained in Longuyon during the German occupation,

fiom a French engineer who had taken notes on the damage

done in this area, and also from a French citilian who kept 

a

d!ary on all aerial bombardments

Damage. (Taken from d ary mentioned above)

Feb. 15;,18. 10 P.M., b bombs fel; on aviation park south of

station.

Feb 16 18. 10 P.M. Bombs fell at same place but damage

small

Feb 18.18 Night 6 hombs t-l on a storehOuse near

baraqueinents, destroying some grain, etc.

Feh 19' 18 3 bomis el' in woods

Feb 26, 18 3 barracks destroyed near RR tracks and

so0me men killed

March 7. 18. Bormbs iLA on tra, ks. sweal dainige.

March 9'18 5 hombs tel; in the Bois des Serqeans and 

a

granary was desiriyed.
U.S Bombinig 375

March 14 18. 9 bombs fell near bridge on route to Longuy

March 1818. Munition train hit by bombs, doing large

damage,

Aug. 14'18. During the day 15 bombs were dropped near

baraquements, one partly demolished. Also near station

Aug. 20'18. Bombs fell on tracks near Ve2in.- Trains held

up about 45 minutes.

Auq. 21/18 3 alarms durino tho day, at noon, bombs fe!l near water tank, desioyiq same It is stated this was serious

and all trains held up for many hours

Aug 25 18. Bombs dropped by about 12 planes but no

results.

Sept. 2,18. 20 bombs fell near farm, small damage.

Sept. 3/18 15 to 20 bombs dropped, some destroyed

main line in depot. 3 locomotives destroyed near repair shop. It

is stated trains were hela up 3 or 4 hours.

I. Sept. 15/18. Bombs fell on private house: otherwise no damage

Sept. 16/18. Tracks damaged slightly and probably took half

hour to repair them; also believed that 9 locomotives were put

out of commission.

Oct. 29'18. Many bombs dropped but no damage to R R.

15 to 20 bombs fell on Longuyon

Munition train hit on March 18, 1918, which, in turn, destroyed

the station and surrounding buildings, also a train of soldies and

another train carrying aviation personnel and equipment. Also

telephone and telegraph lines were destroyed

Lines to Audun-!e-Roman and to Nancy were cut requiring 

3

hours to repair. Special tracks were built to a nearby hospital

where munition trains were parked during bombardments.

One munition train was struck on March 18, 1918, making it

impossnble for trains to run for 2 or 3 days. and it took about 

3

weeks to put the entire line in good condition again. The a'.erdge

time required to repair the tracks sufficiently for the trains to

pass after bombs fell on the line was about one hour Bombs

dropped in the yard did not delay traffic to any great extent as

trains were easily switched around on other tracks.

About 30 men were kept on hand for making repairs to

telephonic and telegraphic equipment and about 30 men repaired

the tracks At the time the munit'on train was hit, 2000 men

were employed in repairing the damage.

Four of five anti aircraft cannon and searchlights protected the

town. About fifty percent of the tiains cnriecd machine guns to

Lbe used against airplanes
*-

A

-J

376 UJ S Air Service

in World War I

: Vol. IV i

I

lk ~The efficiency of the employees was greatly affected, someA engineers refusing to run their trainsi Workmen and soldiWrs

were very discontented, saying that they were oblig'd to work all

day, and then were unable to get any rest at night - Night bombing was found to 'u,: more effective than day

bombing, as the machines could fly lower, thus dropping their

bombs with more accuracy.

Montmedy

The only other rail target attacked by U.S. bombers and coyered by the report of the post-war bombing survey was Montmedy, a town of some 2.000 people situated about 12 miles

northwest of Longuyon. From Montmedy, on the main rail line A

between Nancy and Charleville, a branch line ran northeast to

Virton, Belgium. American bombers attacked oniy once, on 4

November 1918. With 47 planes airborne, this was one of the

largest missions mounted by the 1st Day Bombardment Group -

during the war. Thirty-seven planes reached their oblective.

dropping a total of 3.887 kilograms (about 8,500 pounds) of

i ~bombs between 1520 and 1531 hours. Reporting fair visibility, the crews said they observed bursts on the railroad yards. on a

warehouse, and in the southeastern, southern, and southwestern parts of town. But neither this raid nor any of those by other

units succeeded in disrupting rail traffic at Montmedy, or such

was the infoimation obtained by the team that visited the town

after the war to survey the effects of Allied bombing

The following information was received fron the Maire uf the

town, who was there during the German occupation, the Sous.

Prefect and various employees of the railroad.

Damage.

Depot re Revitallement destroyed, together with a quantity of grain (about 50 wagon loads).

Completely destroyed a vegetable storehouse

Two private houses destroyed.

43 bombs fell on a hospital

Magasin de Revitallemeni completely destroyed. (Valued at

nearly 1,000,000 francs.)

Delay of Traffic. Trains were never heid up in this town owing to no bombs having fallen on the tracks
377

Sequence- of aerial photos

showing the bombing of

~: Montmedy oil 4 November
378 U.S. Air Seivice

in World War I

Vol IV

Special Repair Crews. About 400 men were kept on hand to

do general repairing.

Protection. The town was protected by searchlights and six

anti-aircraft guns.

Mars-la-Tour

Mars-la-Tour, west of Metz, was on the rail line that ran south

from Conflans, through Chambley and Arnaville, to Nancy. It

also was the site of an important German airfield.

The following information was received from the Maire of the

town and an employee of the railroad who was in the town

during the German occupation.

Damage.

Center of two principal tracks on Conflans.Chambley line;

trains held up for two hours.

Telegraph and telephone lines and water main were cut,

resulting in loss of communication for two days.

Aviation field near the town was bombed, all hangars and 13

airplanes being destroyed.

Delay of Traffic. The average time required for making repairs was from 30 minutes to one hour, although at one time when

the main tracks were hit, traffic was heid up for two hours.

Special Repair Crews. Russian prisoners and French civilians

were kept on hand for this work.

Protection. The town was provided with 8 anti-aircraft guns as well as 2 or 3 anti-aircraft guns mounted on autos

Moral Effect. Loss of sleep during the night resulted in

decreased efficicncy.

Ars, Noveant, Corny, Arnaville, Bayoriville,

Gorze Orny, Remilly, Courcelles

Information about A!lied bombing of the following towns in

the region south of Metz was presented in a single report Ars. a small industrial town on the Moselle. .bout 5 miles from

Metz. The railroad from Metz to Nancy crosses from the right to

the left bank of the Mosele just below Ars.
U.S Bombing 379

Survey

Noveant, about 4 miles south of Ars: German customs station

before the war.

Corny, across the Moselle from Novea.t, the two towns being

connected by a suspension bridge, Arnaville, the junction of the rail line from Conflans with that

from Metz to Nancy. Before the war, the French customs station

was nearby, at Pangy, where there was a bridge over the Moselle

Bayonville, just west of Arnaville on the rail line to Conflans.

Gorze, about 3 miles north of Bayonville and the same distance west of the Moselle.

Orny, about 7 miles southeast of Metz.

Remilly (Remelach), southeast of Meiz on the rail line to Saarburg. (Additional information about Remilly was submitted in a

separate report, which follows.)

Courcelles-sur-Nied, on the rail line about half way between

Metz and Remilly.

The towns and bridges on the Moselle were important targets

for Allied bombing during the Battle of St. Mihiel. As noted

previously, Corny, Arnaville, Bayonville, and Gorze were targets for U. S. bombing units.

Town Damage Protection

(francs) (francs)

Ars 40,000 2,000

Noveant 70,000

Corny 89,377

Arnaville 58,000

Bayonville 35,000

Gorze 30,000

Orny 3,700

Remilly 36,000 6,000

Courctlles 74,306 230,000

a-s n _a. ,n,.- t
I

i

380 US Air Senvice

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V'ol. IV

1-8-

Remilly

In making the survey of the effects of bombing, the American

teams frequently obtained copies of German documents. The

following, which makeup the report on Retnilly (Remelach).

were translated by G-2. A-2c (Press and Translations Branch

of the Information Section, Intelligence Division), GHQ, AEF.

June 26, 1918.

At 2.30 a.m. bombs were dropped by several hostile p!anes on the stretch from Remelach to Metz, 100 meters north of the

station. The track system was not damaged and no one wds

injured.

Hoffmann.

July 1, 1918 At 11.30 p.m. bombs were dropped by hostile planes 300

meters to the right of the Remelach-Metz line. At 12.15, bombs

were dropped 250 meters to the left of the same line, the

number of planes and bombs could not be determined The

tracks were not damaged, and so far as can be determined, no

one was injured.

Hoffmann.

July 2. 1918.

At 11.35 p.m. bombs were dropped 150 meters to the right of

the Remelach-Metz line The number of planes and bombs

unknown. No damage was done.

Hoffmann.

July 12, 1918.

About 1.10 a.m. bombs were dropped about 150 meters north

ot the Remelach-Metz line. The number of pl nes and bombs

unknown No damage.

Hoffmann.

July 29, 1918.

About 11.30 p.m. one hostile plane dropped 4 bombs 150

meters to the right of the Remelach Metz line They were aimed

at the railroad station. No damage.

August 17, 1918 V A;r raid at 11 05 p.m. Number of planes unknown Five bombs
US Bombing 381

Survey

dropped which fell 5 meters to the right of switch No. 5. The

objective was the railroad station. No damage.

Hoffmann.

August 30, 1918.

At 11.10 p.m. enemy raid. Number of planes unknown. Seven

bombs dropped fell in the immediate vicinity of the tracks

between the railroad station and line 117. Objective railroad

station Damage unknown. No interruption to traffic.

Hoffmann.

August 31. 1918.

As determined today, in addition to the 10 bombs reported as

being thrown last night, 11 others of the heaviest calibre were

dropped. All of them fell about 50 meters to the right of the

Remelach.Metz line. A hole was made 5 meters deep and 10

meters in diameter.

Hoffmann.

September 20, 1918.

Enemy air raid about 10.20 p.m. Numbe, of planes unknown.

Five bombs dropped, one of which destroyed a track on the

Saarburg-Metz line, the others fell about 50 meters to the right of the railroad station. Irack No. 2 out of commission for 6

hours, tracks Nos. 5 and 1, for 3 hours Through traffic was

shifted to tracks Nos. 6 and 7. No great damage done and no

one injured.

HoJmann.

September 21, 1918.

At about 11.15 p.m. 10 bombs were dropped 2 kilometers

southwest of the raiiroad station, at about 11.35 six bombs were

dropped about 300 meters east of the railroad station Number

of planes unknown. No damage.

Haof mann.

Kurzel,0 October 17, 1917.

About 11.53 p.m. immediately before the arrival of the local

train No. 945, an enemy aeroplane dropped two bombs close to

the right of the Kurzel-Remelach line, destroying the block and

telegraph lines between Kurzel and Sanringen b Connection was

possible between Metz and Remelach by telephone and trains

were reported by this method. Trains 144, 146, 150, A) and 57

were late. About 243 traffic with Sanringen was restored.

Kerth

IL
A

382 U.S. Air Service

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Kurzel, October 17, 1917.

About 4.00 a.m. the track between Pelter' and rhe Remelach

was torn up by an attack of about 20 enemy planes. Btween

Frontemingen and Kurzel countless bombs fell in the vininity of

the track. About 4.15 both main tracks between Kurzel and

Frontemirgen were damaged by a bomb. Traffic was interrupted.

The track between Pelter and Kurzel could be used again by

5.30 and single track traffic was again begun. About 8.15 the

Kurzel.Pelter track was in commission and double track traffic

was resumed by local train 135 about 8.40. All trains until further

notice received their orders to stop.

Kerth

-9-

Maizieres

In the great industrial region north of Metz. there were many

towns that provided excellent targets for Allied bombing planes. One of these was Maizieres, about 7 miles from Metz.

Number of raids: 17

Total damage to town: 62,009.17 Marks

-10-

Hagondange

Hagondar.ge (Hagendingen). about 10 miles north of Metz,

on the rail line to Thionville, was the center of the iron founding

industry of the Om Valley. The Americans who Investigated the

effects of Allied bombing collected Information not only about

Hagondange but also about RombaS (Rombach), on the Orne, 3

miles west of Hagondange (Report 11, below), and three other

towns--Joeuf, Homgcourt, and Atiboue-farther up the valley

(Report 12).

Other towns surveyed in the same general area wore Uckange

(Ueckingen), on the Moselle, about 4 miles north of Hagondange (Report 13), and Hayange (Hayingen), a short distance to

the northwest, in the valley of the Fentsch, on the rail line between Audun-le-Roman and Thionville (Report 14).
I7

US Bombing 383

Survey

Railroad Station,

22,'7/17 2 bombs near tracks, Hagondange-Gendringen.

23!,7/17 Kil 171.5, bombs 100 meiers east of tracks.

24/7/17 Bombs fell between Maizieres arid Woippy. No

communication from trains.

4.9/17 Duds dropped on track #4.

4/9/17 Bombs fell near tracks between Richtung Woippy.

5/9/17 5 bombs on steel works. I dud between tracks 14

and 15.

16/9/17 Direction of Gendringen at 10:00 PM. 3 bombs. 

2

bombs between Bussingen and (?). All telegraph

and telephone lines in direction of Gendringen cut

off. First communication with Gendringen at 2.24

AM.

22/9/17 50/60 bombs in vicinity of station.

23/9/ 17 Passenger track between Machern-Hagendingen

damaged. Gas pipe in the steel works and one

house in Stalh, m were hit. One child wounded.

17.,10/17 13 bombs on steel works. Telegraph lines and

windows destroyed. One person severely wounded

and 3 others slightly wounded.

21/10/17 Bombs dropped on tracks between Roplingen and

Moueuvre.

21/10/17 Bombs dropped on tracks Nos. 2 and 4, between

Hagendingen arid Mochern.

30/17/17 8 bombs dropped north and south of R.R. crossing

Kil. 170.86. One car derailed and damaged. 8 wires

broken. 3 bombs in steel works. No damages.

6'12/17 8 bombs dropped on steel works where the main

gas conductors were hit; one started to work the

same evening, the remaining furnaces not working

until next day.

27,12/17 Bombs dropped on track #1, between Maizieres

and Hagendingen.

14 1/18 Bombs fell on steel works.

19/2/ 18 10 bombs dropped in steel works. 10-12.000 marks

damage. Canteen Schmitt very badly damaged.

15,3/18 At 11:50 PM, some bombs were dropped on steel

works

24-3/ 18 4 bombs dropped on east side of station. Road bed

damaged

15151i8 Bombs dropped on station of Edingen.

245/18 12 bombs dropped south ol R R. station One R.R.

watchman slightly wounded; one peasant killed.

Several telegraph lines broken.
384 U.S. Air Service

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IF

8.6.,"18 Bombs dropped on steel works. One person

severely and five slightly wounded.

if9.;6,.'18 Bombs dropped near freight station Kil. 171. Tracks Nos. 16 and 17 torn up. 3 cars derailed.

13,"6/18 About midnight, 4 bombs dropped southeast of

steel workso no damages.

2986/18 5 bombs droopped on steel works Thysen; only

windows broken.

1;6,718 One bomb fell in steel works i eastern part of

Thyssen. 2 soldiers wounded, some trucks

damaged; :sitch also the r',Aitch at blocking place and #137 damaged.

5,'s18 7 bombs dropped on steel works Thyssen on and

! near an electric railway. Two Russians were

killed. Traffic delayed a Short time.

20/8!/18 Bombs fell south of station, Kil. 169.900. Track

torn up. 2 telephone ires broken.

21! 8/18 Bombs fell on Uckingen main tracks, d prailing train

#3918 and wounding two men. 9/10/18 Bombs near Mendelingen between Hq and

Macheren and in vicinity of station. Light switches

broken. Ono bomb fell in northern section of

village Hagendlingen. 23 1/018 Bombs on steel works.

29.,I0/18 Bombs dropped on roadbed near station of

Machern. Trains on main track held up.

The bombs were dropped generally not on the passenger

station alone, but also in the vic:nity, in the southern freight station, on the ma tracks, o and on the e Thyssen railroad station

and steel works.

No bonubs were paid employees at station.

stto"aoe utas i h icnt- ntesoten.rih
7-~

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U S. Bombing 385

Survey

Forges and Steel Mills"

1915

April 16 On April 16 at about 9:30 in the morning

enemy aeroplanes dropped five bombs on

Maizieres- and Hagondange.

One bomb fell on the Maizieres Factories,

two in the vicinity of these factories, one in the

plain and one on the blast furnaces of

Hagondange.

This last bomb fell on the cowpers and

exploded on the last concrete base without

causing any great damage. A few plates of the

cowpers and some mains were damaged. The work was not stopped.

April 18 On April 18 enemy aeroplanes again bombed

our establishmeni. Four bombs exploded in the

11 factory. S 1916

March During the night of March 29-30 bombs were

dropped on our factories. Seven of them

exploded. Four of them fell near the centra!

shops damaging the western facade and

breaking all the windows.

May Thirty-nine incendiary bombs were dropped on our colony during the night of May 17-18-

No damage was caused but they provoked a panic

among the inhabitants of the colony.

July Five bombs were dropped during the night of

July 1-2. One of them fell on the Thomas Steel

Mill, one on the house of the headquarters,

three on the railroad. Some material damage

was caused.

During the night of July 25-26 seven bombs

fell on our establishments One of them fell on

the Russian prisoner of war camp. One hit the

western portion of the air line leading to the

storage batteries of the blast furnaces. Three

fell right beside the lime-kilns and the mixers,

another on the blast furnace shops and one

between cowper I, blast furnace I and the

storage batteries.

The principal damage caused was the

breaking of all the windows in the

neighborhood including those of the Russian

prisoner's camp.
386 U.S Air Service

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Three men were slightly wounded and one

man severely wounded by pieces of the bomb.

August Due to the rainy weather there was only 

a

single air attack during the second half of the

month of August.

The bombs which were thro,.n fell outside of

the factory and of the colony. No damage was

done.

September During the night of September 10-11 twenty

eight bombs were dropped. Considerable

damage was done to the establishments and to

the material which was in storage. The roofs of

building 16, 18 and 17 suffered greatly. The

corrugated iron roofing and the gutters were

pierced.

Several traverse cables were damaged on the

rolling bridges. Considerable damage was done to the steel

cross sections which were being stored.

Beams were damaged and a large portion of

the iron which was in storage was rendered

unfit for use.

One bomb fell in front of building No. 1 of

the blooming mill.

In the slag dump one bomb fell on a car full

of slag and one of the buffers was torn off.

The windows on the western side of the

Thomas Steel Mill were broken.

A laborer was seriously wounded.

A bomb exploded in front of the assay shed

of our mineral crushing shops. No serious

damage was done

October During the night of October 22-23 fve bombs

were dropped between the central shops and

the office of the machine shop.

All the windows of the central shop were

broken as well as those on the southern side of

the bui!ding contaning the generatois. Many of

the windows were also broken in the rolling

mills 6, 7 and 8.

Damage was done to the main steam conduit

leading to the center of pressure.

The executive office itself suffered greatly.

The window" were broken, the doors torn off,

the roof damaged and the interior ruined.

Great damage was likewise done to several

L 

- t--
U.S Bombing 387

Survey

cars which happened to be on the tracks.

On October 23, aeroplanes flew over the

colony at noon. Two squadrons of about 7 to

10 planes followed each other at a short

distance. Part of the aeroplanes succeeded in

flying over the factory. Seventeen bombs were

dropped. They fell in the followinig order.

1) Three beside the porter of the cement

factory; they formed funnels of four to 450

meters in diameter.

2) Four in the coke dump. It is here that the

largest funnel was formed. It had a diameter of

seven meters and a depth of 3.50 meters.

3) One bomb in building No. 16.

4) One bomb in building No. 6.

5) One bomb in front of the northern facade

of building No. 3- This bomb did no: explode

and was unearthed intact.

6) Two bombs on the roof of building No. 1.

7) One bomb in front of building No. 1.

8) Four bombs on the steel mill.

The bombs which fell on building No. 6 and

16 and on the steel mill caused serious damage

to the roofing and to the windows of the

establishments.

November During the night of November 9-10 two

workmen were instantly killed by bombs and

one engineer was wounded in his arms and

legs,

Only a small amount of material damage was

done.

During the night of November 10-11 the

storage batteries and the vacant lots situated

between the Rumbas railway and the blast

furnaces were, as the French communique

says, literally sprinkled with bombs.

The extreme darkness of the night was the

cause that all the bombs, fortunately for us,

missed their objective. Approximately 15 bombs fell in the mineral

accumulators without causing any serious

damage.

Unfortunately for us one bomb fell in the

station which distributes the current to our

mines. It went through the switchboard and

stopped the transformers so 1hat the mines
388 U.S. Air Service

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remained for a long time without current. In

view of the water pressure in our Jacobus Mine

this accident might have had very serious

results. Thanks to the energy and skill

of the personnel of the electhical center it was

fortunately possible to start the current again

after a few hours of work.

The exact number of the bombs which fell

cannot be given, for many of t;hem exploded

close together. It is estimated that at least 50

must have fallen.

1917

February During the night of February 15.16 several

bombs fell on the rolling mills, on blooming

mills I. If. and Ill and on building No 7. Some

damage was done.

The roof of the mixer and of the lime-kiln was damaged.

Several small sheds were completely

destroyed.

One bomb fell in the middle of the barracks

of the Russians in which there were about

1,000 Russians prisoners. Four of them were

killed on the spot, 15 were severely and 10

slightly wounded.

In building No. 7 one woman and one man

running the moving bridges were severely wounded

April During the nigh of April 13-14, torpedoes were dropped on the establishments.

No material damage was done. All the

torpedoes (nine in all, of which 3 did not

explode) fell in the vacant lot situated to the

north of the rolling mil No. 18.

May During the night of May 23 about 22 bombs

were dropped in the plain between the rollhng

mills and the Thomas slag mill. No damage was

done.

June During ihe night of June 3-4 fifteen bombs

fell on the colony. Only a slight amount of I. material damage was done

One bomb fel! on the steel mill wthout

causing any particular damage.

July During the night of July 23-24 a large number

of bombs were dropped in the liagondange

district.
AI4

-AA

U.S Bombing 389

Survey

Four of these bombs damaged the tracks at 

I our station and caused some damage to the

material which was piled up there

Twenty-two bombs fell in the i eighl.orhood

of the pumping station near the Mo.',lle.

September During the month of September particularly

during the second portion of the month thc

Hagondange Mills were very often attacked by

enemy aeroplanes.

All branches of the service were considerably disturbed due to the fact that consecutive

alarms would sometimes last until 8 o'clock in

the morning. There were also several daylight

alarms.

r On September 22 at noon a strong squadron,

undoubtedly Americand sprinkled the distnct

between Thionville and Metz nth several

hundred bombs. Within a few minutes 160

points of fal! were noted within the mills. I

However, the damage was not very great.

One bomb broke the gas main and several

others damaged the railroad.

There were no victims.

October During the nights of the 1-2, of the 1617, of

the 17-18, of the 29.30 and of the 30-31 enemy

aeroplanes dropped a total of about 118 bombs

inside the mills.

Material damage was again done.

December During the first half of the month of

December the mills were obliged to stop work

for several hours during the night alarms of the

4-5 arid of the 5-6

Daylight alarms on the 4, 5, and 6.

The attack of the 6th was particularly violent.

At about 1:15 in the afteinoon 38 bombs were

dropped around and in the gas station. The

generator of a gas machine was very very

seriously damaged.

Gas mains, compressed air mains, water

mains and steam mains were broken. This

caused a complete stoppage of work.

All the tueirons of the blast furnaces which

were working were completely destroyed It was

only about 30 hours after that the first blast

furnaces could be started again.
390 U.S Air Service

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1918

February Alarm at 9:40 in the evening during the night

of February 19-20. The main gate was damaged

by a bomb. The damage is estimated at about

10,000 marks.

March During the night of March 12-13 at 11:10 a

bomb pierced the tunnel which leads from the

main gate to the offices ol the mi!l.

Three bombs fell in the neighborhcod of the

rolling mills near a wornens' rest room which

was almost completely destroyed. There were

no victims.

The bomb which fe!l to the north of this

room damaged the canal sv-,em which is

situated about 3 meters belc, the ground This

caused a stoppage of the blooming until 7

o'clock on the morning of March 15. The

damage done amounts to approximately 30,000

to 50,000 marks.

Damage caused by a 1,6001b. British bomb.

\ =
U.S Bombing 391

Survcy

May On May 24 one of the foreman of the

electrical station was killed by a bomb and one

man was wounded.

June Durinq the lasi weeks of the munth we

suffered enormously from air attacks.

The attacks became more and more frequent

and extraordinarily violent.

Several bombs were dropped during the

attacks of the 8th, 9th and 13th.

The damage was not very serious.

Nevertheless the office of the cement mill was

destroyed and the roof of the cement packing

building was seriously damaged.

1. few mains were damaged. Damage was

done to a gas valve in the gas dry refining

establishment.

No victims.

The chief engineer, Mr. Knuettel, was struck

by scveral pieces of bombs. His condition

necesitated his removal to the hospital in

Metz

A foreman of the cement mill was slightly

wounded.

During the night of June 29-30 several more

bombs were dropped.

Beyond breaking some windows and

darnging some roofing no irnporlant damage

was dor,e,

July 711 attack of July 17 resulted in nine

vktims Fourte'rn person! were tevercly

wounded and were removed to the hospital

Several of them died of their wounds. The

unfortunate oriel were the victims of their

Imprudien(e. In,lead of fulluwing orders ,ind

going imriedialely to the special dugouts they

remained outside in order to watch the

aeroplaneb out (if curiosity

A large number of the workmen who were

slightly wuunded were able to take up their

work ag4in after a short time.

Avugiit Luting the attack rf Aujuus 13 one workloan

was mortally wounded

[)uning ti right of August 15 16 th,, station

of the air line leading hurn the Jaobus miine t(i

the blast furnace% was very severely damaged

Two wurktan wure killed
I

392 U.S Air Service

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During the attack on the night of August 20-

21 four bombs fell inside the mills.

No important material damage was done. A

weighing station and two pointers were

damaged.

There were no victims.

October A great number of bombs fell during the

attack on the night of October 9-10.

No damage was done.

Rombas

Damages to houses and other buildings

of the factory of Rombas: 164,540.20 Marks

of the factory of Maizieres: 86,446.99 Marks

Total: 250,9A7.19 Marks

Cost of shelters,

Near the houses: 40,000.00 Marks

Near the factories: 150,000.00 Marks

Total: 190,000.00 Marks

Cost of buildings for barrage balloons: 185,000.00 Marks

Losses due to diminution in production:

Salaries during stoppages of work in the factories:

1,224,576.67 Marks

Inferior products caused by stoppages in work:

178,404.50 Marks

Deficit in production in the rolling mills: 4,092,334.99

Marks

Total: 5,495,316.16 Marks

Bonus paid to the laborers and employees because of the

damages resulting from aerial bombardment: 1,162,497,50 Marks

Insurance premiums paid for employees against accidents by

airplnnes: 16,509.00 Marks

Total: 7,300,308.85 Marks,

-- 12-

Joeuf, Homecourt, Aubous

1. The above are three French towns southeast of Briey and

i4
U.S. Bombing 393

Survey

very little information can be given regard'ng the bombardments

here, as there were but few raids on these towns, and these

were not disastrous. Although there are mines and smelters in

these localities, the smelters were all shut down, and but few of

the mines were in use. Being French towns under German

military occupation, the effect on morale does not enter into

consideration, but even if it did, the raids were so few that it

was negligible. Foliowing is all the data available for each town:

2. Homecourt. Although thirty bombs in all were dropped in

and around this town, most of them outside the town limits.

Two bombs dropped sometime in mid-summer of 1918, partly destroying two houses, and other bombs at various times

damaged fences, windows, etc., ihe total value estimated around

15,000 francs.

3. The smelter was shut down by the Germans, who only kept

the mines partially working, and no damage was done to either

mine or smelter.

4. Joeuf. About forty bombs were dropped in and around this

- town, ten of which dropped on the Wendel smelter works.

Neither the smelter or mines were in operation, the works being

* used by the military as a bakeiy and saw-mill, and later, toward

the end, as an o-Inance repair depot. All damage was immediately repaired and no records are available, but one of the

French directors of the works, who was evicted during the

German Occupation, estimates that about 30,000 (thirty

thousand) francs' worth of damage was done by the bombing

itself, and about 40,000 francs' worth of indirect damage was

caused by shrapnel from anti-aircraft gun fire dropping on the

roofs of some nine hundred houses owned by the company.

5. In the town itself, the heaviest damage was also caused by

antiaircraft guns; about 40,000 francs is the estimate of the

damage to the roofs of the town. In addition, three bombs

dropped on some small houses and damaged them to the extent

of 10,000 francs. The other bombs hit mostly in the surrounding

fields and no damage was reported.

6 Auboue. 

... About two hundred bombs in all were

dropped in and around Auboue, and a considerable number hit

the smelter and iron-mine property located here, and was

worked by the German military authorities, who employed

between 1,000 and 1,500 Russian prisoners to work in the mine

and smelter, under the supervision of engineer officers and men

Monsieur Munier, the present director the plant (which is part

of Cie des Founderies de Pont.a-Mousson) explained that it was

impossible to ascertain a definite sum for the damage done by

bombing, as the Germans, in evacuating, destroyed

a considerable part of the works, the value of which will run into
,394 U.S. Air Service

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millions. However, he estimated that the direct damage by

bombing might be approximately 400,000 francs, and this figure

was also given me by a Belgian engineer who was director Of the

plant during the German occupation. Of course, if the matenal

damage is as high as this, the indirect damage in loss of

production, etc., will be very large also. but unfortunately no

figures are available. (However, when we consider that

comparatively few raids were made on this plant ... and

further. that nearly all work was performed by prisoners of war,A

this production loss might not be so large after all, and labor

costs would not increase at all.A

8 Of course, as this town was under military control. the

effect on morale of the French civilian population that remained

does not enter consideration, and the effect on the German

troops is obviously impossible to ascertain. However, on the 25th

of Sept., 1917, over a hundred bombs were dropp:ed in one

night, and one of these, striking in the Russian prisoner Sbarracks, killed six Russians, and caused a panic and uproarq

among Use remainder to the extent of necessitating the

strengthening of the guards.

9. Joeuf, Homecourt and Auboue each had an anti-aircraft

battery stationed near the town, and in addition about four other

batteries were stationed in small towns in the vicinity, notably

two or three batteries stationed on the hills near Moutiers, a

small town between Briey and Joeuf. In addition, a number of

searchlights were ured, but no further protection against planes

(such as balloons, etc.) was taken.

-13--

Uckange

Number of raids: 0-

Total damage to town. 69,148.57 M

Total damage to factory: 9,463.00 M

Expenditure for protection by town: 6,500.00 M',

Expenditure for protection by smelter: 7,650.00 M.

Railroad Information

1. The railroad station at Uckange was bombed three times,
U.S. Bombing 395

Survey

iA

resulting in the following damage: About December 6, 1917, a

number oi bombs (about eighteen altogether) was dropped on

tracks and railroad property, but comparatively small damage

resulted. About two tracks were wrecked, also one switch, and a

number of signal and telegraph lines. Traffic was delayed very

little, as trains were switched over other tracks. Some time in

April, 1918, a bomb exploded on roof of railroad station, tearing

off roof, but otherwse doing very little damage. On July 20,

1918, three bombs hit tracks and damaged two of them for quite

some distance, also put signal lines out of commission.

2. Two bomb proofs were built at Uckange, one by the

railroad costing about 7500 marks, and the other by the military

authorities costing about 25,000 marks (used chiefly by troops

passing thru). Another large bomb-proof was built at the i

Florange station (between Thionville and Hayange) costing about

33,000 marks. An agitation was made in the summer of 1918 for

a "flieger-zulage" (increase in wages due to danger from air raids)

but thit, was not granted. No additional men outside of regular

workers were used to repair damage caused by bombs, provision

being made to communicate by phone to Thionv-Ile if additional

labor was required. This was not necessary at any time. The

morale of the railroad workers does not seem to have been very much affected, as the raids on this station were very few.

Town and Smelter

1. The smelter employed between 400 and 450 men, but about

200 of these were Russian prisoners. A bonus of 250 marks was

T

I1 5

= ., Th U~iange taclory
396 U.S. Air Service

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paid a short time ago (by order of the Soldiers' and

Workmen's Council) to the regular workmen, as a recompense for braving the dangers of air-raids. In addition, the Smelter constructed a bombproof, costing about 7,650 marks, and

suffered material damage from bombs to the extent of 9,463

marks (taken from records). 2. The number of raids over the town was comparatively

small, consequently the morale of the people did not suffer as

much as elsewhere. However, from various interviews, I judge

that toward the end the workers were beginning to show signs of distress, which would undoubtedly have increased

considerably had not the armistice intervened.

~-14--

Hayange

Wendle Steel Mills"

Damage from bombs, including the mine building and 10,000 IMk. for repairs, charged directly to maintenance: 63,290.70. Damages from A.A. bursts, including about 10,000 Mk. not yet F repaired: 28,910.90.

Taking down of protection: 15,000.00.

i - Expenses for barracks (A.A Defence). 20,990.87. 1< Instalation of sirens: 3,294.38.

Anti-aircraft insurance, personal, 2 years: 40,00000

Anti aircraft insurance, real estate, 2 years: 72,000.00. Lc,.s of salary during alarms: 720,355,1MKr255.600.00:

650,5()6.51 M-1 Loss of productioi: 1,283,900.00 M.

IBonus paid to employees: 369,233.00 F. 1As a result of the irregular operation of the furnaces during

the alarms, it was necessary to keep the ovens warmer than : -usual ir. order to assure the possibility of work at the steel _, works, as a result of which there was an increase in the consumption of coke of 50 kg. per ton for the average oven; 50

kg. x 330 T x 2 x 365 days = 12,045 T x 50 Mk: 602,250.00 M.

Furthermore, in order to avoid stopping the furnaces, it was

necessary as a precautionary measure, to use steam blowers en

route and to keep more heaters in operation. The increase in

the consumption of oil per day may be estimated at 15 T. 15

T x 625 days x 25 Mk: 234,375.00

There also must be reckoned an increase in the consumption
U.S. Bombing 397

Survey

* of ferro and Spieq?I (sic) at the steel works, as a result of

burned steel, which we value at 20,000.00.

Town

Hayar.qe itself suffered but slightly (in material damage) from

actual bomb hits, the majority of dlamage resulting from the

surrounding anti-aircraft gun batteries

* About six anti aircraft batteries were stationied near Hayange,

and served to protect the smelter of Wendel & Co., and also

the plant located in the neighboring town of Nilvange. Numerous

Damage in Hayange.
398 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

small searchlights were also used at first, but later, these were

replaced by a few highpowered searchlights located at strategic

points. The balloon barrage, about 45 of themr, completely

encircled the plants mentioned above, and were only used as aA

protective nieasure against nightraiders, being hauled in during

the day.

]No protective measures were ta!ken by the town itself against

air raids, people generally taking refuge in cellars durng an' alert.

The morale of the people, as in other towns in the vicinity, was

much effected, especially towards the end, when the raids

became more numerous. Night bombing seems to have been the

most effective here, in fact, comparatively few day raids were

made, and a comparison of the two is practically impossible.A

Thionville

Thionville jDiedenhoyen), situated about midway between

Metz and Luxembourg, was a fortified town of some 10,000A

people. Having large iron and steel works. and being an important rail center with lines running in all directions, to Trier, Saarbrucken, Metz, Longuyon, and Luxembourg, Thionville wasA

frequently visited by French and British bombers during the

latter part of the war.A

Resume

Results of Bombing on the Town of Thionville

Number of Raids: About 60,

Amount of Claimns Filed: 1,672,466 Marks

Amount Paid by Insurance Comrpanies on Claims

not Included in Above: 2,000,000 Marks

Approximate Amount of Unfiled Claims: 300,000 Marks

Results of Bombing on the Karlshutten Steel Works

Number of Raids: 22 :

Total Material Damage: 85,413.96 Marks -

Total Indirect Damage: 242,676.35 Marks

Direct Damage Marks

To Buildings and Houses of Factory 76,521.48

To Company Property at Ra'.lroad Static~n 3,055 09

, By Anti-aircraft Fire 5,837.39

' 85,411%9

; -1
U.S. Bombing 399

Survey

IIt

Indirect Damage

Loss of Production

Expenditure for Production 135,766.90

Bonuses Paid Employees 75,555.00

• Paid in Insurance Premiums 30,354.45

241,676.35

Results of Bombing on Railroad at Thionvlle

Number of Raids on Railroad: 61

Total Number of Hours Lost: 321 hrs. 5 min.

Total Damage: 1,552,150 Marks

Bonuses Paid: Over 1,000,000 Marks

Railroad Information

1. Based on numerous interviews with the various chiefs of r the different departments, all of whom are Germans who were

here for the past two to four years. The abstract referring to the

number and duration of alerts was taken from the books of the

machine department, the abstract regarding damage, values, etc.,

:. was taken from the day book of Herr Kienle, in charge of

construction department. Conflicting stories were told by these

officials but I have endeavored to check these up as much as

possible, and the bulk of the information may be taken as

correct, regardless whether it checks with our observers' report : i or not.

2. Every time an alert sounded, there was a total stoppage aof traffic, until the "all clear" signal was given, this regardless of

[ j whether bombs dropped on Thionville or not. As there are 

a

great number of tracks around this station, b traffic was delayed

very little, once the "all clear' signal was sounded, as trains were

switched from damaged tracks to others.

3. Due to very heavy traffic, a greatly increased personnel

was used around the railroad station of this town, and this was

fuither increased when the increasirg number of raids began to

lower the morale of the workers. In the summer and autumn of

1918, a total of 4,500 to 5,500 men were employed (iniluding

those working in the stations, shops, R.R. machine works, yards,

etc.) In the summer of 1918, an agitation for an increase of

- wages was made, and in August, a so-called "flieger-zulage"' was

given to the men, being an increase in wages of about 50 marks

a month for the workers, and from 60 to 100 marks for the

various officials. Up to the 11th of November, when this increase

. was stopped, well over one million marks were spent by the

- i Imperial German Government as an inducement to work in the

V danger zone around Thionville. (Similar agitations were made in

L the vatious Towns in the neighborhood, but with one or two

exceptions, these were not successful). A number of Russian
400 U.S. Air Service

in Word War I

Vol. IV

prisoners were also used for repair work, and these were the

men that generally repaired the damage inflicted by bombs.

4. Big damage was done on the 2nd and 3rd of May, 1918

when a bomb dropped on the south end of the passenger station

and smashed it, and another killed and seriously wounded about

eight persons near the freight station. However, there seems to

be no doubt that the damage done by a bomb dropped around

2 P.M. on July 16th, 1918, was enormous, in fact exceeding by far the combined damage of the hundreds of other bombs

dropped here- This bomb dropped on a munition train of some

40 cars, causing shells to explode, setting fire to the freight

station and other buildings in the vicinity, wrecking a string of

horse cars and killing a number of horses (from 40 to 75,

conflicting reports on number) as well as killing and seriously

wounding about a dozen people.- About half of this munition

train was finally cut off and pulled away by the clever'ness of a

City ruins in Thionville.

" uAk -
U.S. Bombing 401

Survey

Prussian officer, who yelled down in a dugout filled with workers,

"is anybody here heroic enough to attempt to cut this train," or

words to that effect. He found a "goat" in a Lorrainiar, trainman

who performed this risky undertaking, and was wounded for his

pains. The Prussian officer was awarded the "Eisenes Kreuz."'

About an average of 1,500,000 marks is the estimate of the

damage done by this one bomb. Traffic was held up for about a

week, but this was overcome in part by routing trains along

different routes. This was the only instance when military labor

was used, to repair damage inflicted by bombs.

5. The morale of the railroad workers seems to have

suffered considerable, especially after the above incident. Many

were taken sick and it was only by the increase in wages given

shortly after, that operations were carried on.

Detailed Report

Damage in Town and Factories

1. A very complete map gives us the location of nearly every

bomb dropped on this town. The key of this map tells us the

kind of bomb (dud, explosive, incendiary, etc.) as well as number

of people killed, wounded, part of town hit, etc. The record of

the alerts is the same as that kept by the railroad officials, and

generally, it can be said that a complete stoppage of work

resulted between the sounding of the alarm and the "all clear"

signal.

2. Smelters and steel works are the main industries of

Thionville, and although these figures are also approximate,

about four thousand (4,000) men were employed in the above

works. From interviews with a number of workers, it seems that

their morale also dropped considerably in the summer of 1918,

when our raids began to grow very numerous. Increased wages,

approximately the same as those given to the railroad workers

were necessary to carry on operations, and even then there was

difficulty in getting men to work. Two big auto trucks were

bought and fitted out as fire engines by these factories, for the

purpose of combating fires caused by air raids.

3. Six batteries of anti-aircraft guns and a number of

searchlights were used as aerial protection. Also towards the end

a flight of planes was stationed, outside of Thionville for defense

work, but it seems that during raids, their activities were

confined to the ground, and that of the aviators in the dugouts.

* 4. In the city itself, the most important hit occurred on July

17, 1918, when the St. Hubert Hotel, opposite the Hotel de Ville,

was demoished by a direct hit. Although in the official record

only one person is marked as killed, I have reports from various

sources stating that from 10 to 12 German officers who were
402 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

dining there were killed or wounded. Of course innumerable

plates of glass were shattered by the repeated raids, but these

values, also are not obtainable.

5. The moraie of the people held up fairiy well the greater part

of the war, but towards the end, when the bombing became very

heavy, it rapidly dropped, and the mental strain under which the

people labored seemed to have been enormous. Various opinions

were given as to the more effective, day or night bombing, but

on the whole day bombing, especially when a number of raids

were made in succession, seemed to be the most harmful, both

in material damage and its effect on morale, although night

bombing (in the winter time especially) played an important part

in breaking down morale.

Summary of Damages Caused by Air Raids

on the Carl Foundry, Thionville9

I. Direct Damages

a. By Air Raids on the Carl Foundry. The Carl Foundry was attacked 22 times by aviators. Altogether 186 bombs were

thrown. 116 were thrown on the foundry area and 70 in the near

vicinity .... The total involved damage is ... M76,521.46. Killed,

7 persons, wounded about 50 persons. The damage resulting

from the individual attacks were as follows:

Air Raid I. Four bombs thrown. The first bomb fell on the oil

refiner built in masonry about I cbm. masonry disturbed. The

second fell on the roof of the machine house 2 and exploded on

an iron purlin without any great damage. Bomb 3 hit the gas

connection of machine house 2; the damage was immediately

repaired. Bomb 4 fell on the roof of casting house and destroyed

a great number of roof tiles.

Air Raid II. Five bombs thrown; no damage.

Air Raid Ill. One bomb thiown; glass broken.

Air Raid IV. Four bombs thrown. The first bomb fell in the

vicinity of the rope walk on the crushing machine. Damage to

the light and power connections and to the towing-line of the

rope walk; also damage to glass. Bombs 2 to 4, no damage.

Air Raid V. Three bombs thrown. The first bomb fell on the

roof of the crushing machine 4 Little damage to the iron

construction work. About 2,000 roof tile thrown down.

Air Raid VI. Fifteen bombs thrown, no glass damaged.

Air Raid VII_ Two bombs thrown. Bomb one fell in the vicinity

of Colonic Terwin Damages to the glass. The second fell bes:de

the track of the Carl Gallery railroad; a few signal connections

were torn.
.11

U S. Bombing 403

Survey

Z:_ Air Raid VIIi. Sixteen bombs thrown The bombs I to 6 fell

on distant ground and broke the window panes of some houses

belonging to the officials. Bomb 7 fell on the foundry street and

caused damage to the glass. Bomb 8 and 9 fell on the Russian

Camp, destruction of the roof. Twenty-seven of the Russian

prisoners were seriously wounded and 13 were slightly injured.

L " Two of the former died from their injuries. Bombs ten and

eleven broke many window panes it, the vicinity of the officd'

buildings and of the magazine. Bomb 11 also caved in a partition

wall. Bomb 12 fell on the outer wall of the magazine, blew the

roof off and penetrated the ceiling. Bomb 13 glass damages.

Bomb 14 fell on an empty iron (50 t) self discharging vessel and

greatly damaged it. Bombs 14 to 16 damaged the partition wall

E between the gallery railroad and the Diedenhofen-Hayingen frail line].

Air Raid IX. Four bombs thrown. Glass damages; damage to

the foundry fence.

L Air Raid X and XI. No damage.

Air Raid XII. Seven bombs thrown in the vicinity of the Villa

Rochling. Serious damage to the window panes and to the doors

of the Villa.

Air Raid XIII. One bomb thrown. The bomb apparently

bursted in front of a house in the foundry street on the

telephone wires. Glass damage.

Air Raid XIV. Two bombs thrown. The first bomb fell on 

a

wooden annex to the locksmith's workshop and burst on iron

girder to which a transmission was attached Damages to the

surrounding wooden walls, to the sky-lights and to the windows

of the workshop and of the locomotive shed.

Air Raid XV. Five bombs thrown. Bomb one fell on the cabin

of the locomotive destroying it completely. The boiler remained

intact. The scalemaster, who had fled under the oil container of

oven four without obtaining the protection which was there hit

on the head by the bomb splinters and immediately killed. Added

to this many other persons were more or less seriously injured

by the splinters. A seriously wounded Russian prisoner died in

the course of the day. The corrugated sheet-iron roof of the

coke loading space was penetrated seven times by the splinters

so that it had to be entirely changed. One splinter struck a chief

wailermain. It was possible to close the leak in the meantime.

Bomb two fell in the vicinity of the slag-crusher. The wire rope

was destroyed. The work of crushing the slag was interrupted

one day. The other bombs fell on the construction area of the

steel workers.

Air Raid XVI. Eight bombs thrown on the construction area of

the steel works. Small amount of damage. An Italian civilian

laborer was very badly wounded on the head and died.
404 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Air Raid XVII. Nine bombs thrown. Three borribs fell in the

vicinity of the stone factory One manager was fatally wounded

on the head. Three other bombs fell on the oil container,

damages to the iron carriers and to two water pipes. One bomb

fell beside the oil container 4; one machinist killed. Fwo

prisoners wounded. Another bomb fell on the gaspipe over the

furnace house 2, penetrating the latter. The running of the gas

machine was stopped for two days. One bomb hit the house No.

44 Colony Cassion, 2 penetrating the roof; burst in the hay

stored there and blew off most of the roof. The other bombs

caused no damage

Air Raid XVIII. One bomb thrown to the working buildings.

Demolition of damage of three state trains [?]. Destruction of the

cast-iron windows of the workshop. Damage to the corrugdted

sheet-iron roof; great glass damage.

Air Raid XIX. No damage.

Air Raid XX. Seventeen bombs thrown. Eight bombs thiown

on the construction area of the steel works. No damage. Four

bombs fell in the vicinity of the gallery railroad. Damage to the

high tension conduit. A bomb fell on a house in the vicinity of

the former cement works, in which the guards of the Rus3ans

were lodged. The bomb tore off most of the roof and also

damaged the buildings in the vicinity. The guards had

opportunely taken shelter The remaining bombs caused no great

damage

Ai Raid XXl. Six bombs thrown in the vicinity of the

foundries enclosure. Damage to the fence of the Villa Rochling.

Air Raid XXII. Seven bombs thrown. Damaqlos to the electric

connections of the gallery railroad.

b. By Air Raids on the Diedenholen and Metz Railroad

Stations. The baggage shed of the Diedenhofen station was set

aflame by the air ri,d of July 16. 1918 occasioning ti loss of

our goods stored there. The damage to the Carl Foaj,.:j,

amounted to 2,577.21 Marks.

The wagon filled with cement for us was hit at the station

Metz-Sablon in the air raid of May 30 to 31, 1918. The damage

to the Carl Foundry amounts to 477.98 Marks c. By the splinters of the anti-aircraft fire which fell fror,, 

a

great height the roofs of the houses and the workshops

belonging to the Carl Foundry were damaged during the different

attacks on the city of Dederhofen. 1he reparation niecesilated

an expenditure altogether of 5,837.39 Marks

II. Indirect Damuuv a. In the Shortage of Production It is difficult to make an

estimate of the loss caused by the shortage of prodjichin It is
U' 5offibing 405 Surveyi -

I

-i

to Lw t,)Ii(.ud that nol only through air raids on the Carl

FoJuticdy was the prod uction hinde~red but also by the mary

alarin~, even though rno real1 direct attacks lo.ok place.

b 13 o expenditure in building retreats as protection for the

workmenl and machmneJ against thi' ,eect of the bumbs

UStlre Protection foundry gr40nd5 al Workinin to afford Fifty protection dhigouts were to the ipread workmen over the

against the bombs To assure this the existinql buildino.&, which could be ch-n:i ed it o dutl r so comp ed Thso exiCa inl Foryhcahtrs o the rdenholen nortreds were also used for this

afurrse. Added th h new dueouti, wer bult such as

uIif ,pound iuturei of m onry ement or iron Cemente.

Prolr ctn nd Maine agai Only frfant machines were

rolvictd ohe Wtenn turb (2,000 tye KW) with gsnerator on enachifir h oud wa s t turruundrd by wall and covered rk o aw 

be, 1x. mh proofr Ivlwetn Ihe "[-Girders a concrete roof 24 cmn

(hit k Wall Iv|fstrut led over the' switchboard in machine house

NoJ 1 7 he iiwilhhL~ird in machine house 2 was, alto f~ully walled

III AFnd Ljvrrvd, a uircumslance, which did not permit agristthenvnt ( f a ssre thi the o whih s o lar ha not been cxplnied b The swit(hboard wa omplelel s dt The ekisting i

du,3, th ut had if) Lw removed. C.oncernin3 further saft'ey measure'*,/ fo wi atini sill t e mnenionred ehe enclosin of o tin

wner ipe, rolectueh of mheor cmenta compressor by e a ion woll The av menlioned ant aircrah measte

n,ei, ilated Tle expenditure (. eah yvar -a ollrwi

1916 M 1,769.25

1917 42,998 73 -' 1 9 1 8 9 3 0 , 9 , 9 f 8 9 9 2 .( ., .

ih wa hoe c

N obpofBewe h rdr ocet of2 n
406 U.S. Aii Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

c. By payment of premiums to the workers. From January 1st

to October 31st, 1918, the workmen were voted a monthly

premium of 25 Marks, that is in altogether 250 Marks. This was

only paid in a lump sum at the end of the year, but was short 1

Mark or 1.25 francs. The entire sum expended amounted to

95.693.75 francs.

d. By insurance premium paid to officials and workmen for

accidents as well as for damages to the residences in the Carl

Foundry and to the futniture of the officials and workmen. The

entire sum paid out was 30,354.45 Marks.

Statement of Damages by Air Raids

on the

Carl Foundry, Diedenhofen

No. of

No. of Bombs

Bombs on Outside Damage

No. of Foundry Foundry to Carl

Attack Date Grounds Grounds Total Foundry

(Marks)

1 4/16/16 4 4 2,788.83

2 8/5/16 5 11 16

3 8/5/16 1 1 34.41

4 8/6/16 4 4 118.15

5 10/1 1/16 3 9 12 488.07

6 121/27/16 15 15 102.17

7 3/2/17 1 1 2 8665

8 7,'27-2817 16 11 27 5,934.07

9 913./17 4 4 8 1,912.68

10 9/4/17 4 1 5

11 9'22,17 2 1 3

12 10/1/17 7 11 16 5,08727

13 1/21-22/18 1 1 1,117.12

14 5/3/18 2 1 3 4,293-13

15 5/15,18 5 4 9 18,376.76

16 5/29/18 8 1 9 353.41

17 6/6/18 9 1 10 (10.296.51

2,134 53

.8 6'6 7/18 1 1 17,462.91

19 6,27'19 2 2

20 8,21 22-18 17 6 23 7,90803

21 10/5-6/18 6 6 181.51

22 10/9.10/18 7 7 59.80

Totdls 116 70 186 M76,521 43

.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
'1

S Bombing 407

I

Abstra, t 11;

Report of the Air Raids

Upon the Thionvie Railroad S1ation

D-ate of

Raid Kind of Raid and Damage Caused.

3!,231,'18 From 10.00 to 2 00, air raid upon the railroad

station. No d,,mage

3 24, 18 Fro~m 10.00 to 2.00. INQ (tdnid:ge

5.2.18 About 1.00 o'c.lock(, air raid by about ten hostile
rc

408 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol- IV

planes. One bomb dropped in the garden of

the station master Fanssen, which damaged the

fence, the latrine at the Turenne Barracks and

the barracks itself. Damage about 50 marks. In

the city of Thionville, seven killed.

5/3/18 About 11:15, air raid. The Stein building

badly damaged by a bomb, the Lane dwelling

completely destroyed. One conductor killed. In

the Luxemburg section, track 82 badly

damaged. In Elmingen, two soldiers killed. Near

the Schwarzenweg, one bomb dropped in the

Faeger garden and one train, in readiness,

appreciable damaged. Damage 25,000 marks.

5/18/18 From 1:30 to 2:30, air raid. Two bombs

dropped. Tracks 169, 64 and 65 damaged.

Damage 400 marks.

5/20/18 From 11:10 to 4:00, air raid. No damage to

station buildings. Several bombs dropped in the

coal dumps of the garrison administration and

several in the Moselle.

5/21/18 From 11:00 to 3:40, air raid. The station

buildings were not damaged, but the Catholic

Church and several houses in lower Yutz, were

1damaged.

5/29/18 About 9:00, air raid. About 100 meters from

the Upper Moselle bridge, several bombs

thrown. Telegraph and telephone lines

damaged. Two killed in the castle garden.

Damage to station buildings about 200 marks.

5/30/18 About 8:10. air raid. Two bombs dropped upon aviation landing place, several in the Luxemburg

section, and in the east section, tracks 5, 7,

and 8 were damaged as well as a large number

of windows and doors broken in various

buildings. Ten killed, one severely and four

slightly wounded. Four-thousand marks damage. No interruption of traffic.

5/31/18 From 1:00 to 3:30, air raid. No bombs dropped.

6/1/18 From 7:00 to 8:10, air raid. No bombs dropped.

6/4/18 From 8:00 to 9:00, air raid alarm.

6/6/18 About 4:00 in (he afternoon, ir raid The

station received no bombs but in Karlshuette

several were killed and wounded (9 bombs). At

6:00 in the afternoon, another raid. No bombs ~~dropped. -
I

U.S. Bombing 409

Survey A

6/7/18 About 11:30, air raid. The station buildings A

received no bombs but several fell upon the

city and upon !ower Yutz. From 1:00 to 2:00,

6/1/18air raid. No damage to the tracks.

6/13/18 From 7:00 to 8:00, air raid. No bombs dropped.

6/14/18 From 12:00 to 2:00, air raid. No bombs

dropped.

6/16/18 About 4:40 air raid alarm but the aviators did

not come to the station.

6/23/18 About 10:00, air raid. No bombs dropped. 6129/18 About 12:00 o'clock, air raid alarm. The hostile

aviators did not come to the station.

6/30/18 About 7:30, air raid alarm. The hostile aviators

did not come to the station.

7/1/18 From 12:30 in the morning until 2:45, air raid.

No bombs dropped.

7/2/18 From 12:30 until 3:00, air raid, No bombs

dropped.

7/5/18 About 7:45, air raid alarm. The aviators did not A come. 7/16/18 About 1:45, air raid upon the Thionville station

between the signal tower and the night shelter

building, one bomb; in the Witce district,

several; in the east section, one bomb. In the

Witte district a munitions train was hit and a

part of it blown up. Several buildings for storing merchandise and for the collection of customs

and several storehouses and 46 coaches were

destroyed Thirteen tracks and seven sidings

were badly damaged. Siding N. 89 had to be

completely restored. Forty meters of water

pipes were also damaged. Damage one and

one.half million marks. The traffic to

Luxemburg, Sierck and Knuzig had to be

stopped. About 11:00 o'clock in the afternoon,

track 24 was put into condition for the traffic

to Knuzig

7/17/18 The tracks 64, 5b, 6b, 7, 8 and 9 were put into

condition in the afternoon for the traffic which

had been interruoted in consequence of the I

damage suffered during thp air raid of the 16th.

About 3:00 o'clock, air raid. Bombs dropped on

721the Schwarzenweg. No damage.

7/22/18 From 12:00 to 2:00, air raid. No bombs

sdropped.

r ON
410 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

8/8/18 From 1:30 to 2:00, air raid. No bombs dropped.

8/13/18 From 1:30 to 2:00, air raid alarm. The aviators

did not come to Thionville. About 5:00 o'clock,

air raid. In Knuzig, bombs were dropped near

the station.

8/14,18 From 10:00 to 10:40, air raid alarm. The

aviators did not come to Thionville. From 11:30

to 1:30, air raid. No bombs dropped.

8/18/18 From 12:00 to 2:00, air raid. No bombs

dropped.

8/19/18 From 12:00 to 2:00, air raid. No bombs

dropped.

8/20/18 From 11:00 to 4:00, air raid. Ten bombs

dropped in the station yard: one bomb on track

135, one bomb on track 136, one bomb on

track 137, as well as two bombs in front of the

sleeping barracks in front of Schwarzenweg,

one bomb on track 5a. The attack about 4:00

o'clock, damaged the east section, tracks 3 and

21, as well as the siding 284; four bombs

dropped. Damage 6500 marks. Traffic was not

disturbed.

8/21/18 From 11:00 to 3:50, air raid. About ten bombs

were dropped upon the buildings of the railway

detachment and upon siding 118. Tracks la

and 107 were damaged. Several coaches

damaged. Hotel Terminus caught fire. Two

bombs dropped upon and two behind the new

locomotive shed. Damage about 15,000 marks.

No interruption of traffic. In the city, a large

conflagration ensued which was finally

overcome.

8/22.18 From 11:30 to 12:00, air raid alarm. The

aviators did not come near.

8/23!18 From 2:00 to 2:30, air raid. No bombs dropped.

From 11:30 to 1:00, air raid. No bombs

dropped. At the same time there was a heavy

thunder storm but little rain.

8/25,18 All day long several hostile planes were flying

over the station but dropped no bombs.

8/30/118 At 9:30, 11:30, 1:00 and 10:30, air raid alarm

No aviators came.

9/3/18 About 1100, air raid alarm. The aviators did

not come

9/13,;18 About 2:00 and 7:00, air raid alarm. No bombs
U.S. Bombing 411

Survey

dropped. About 10:00 until 7:00, three new air

raid alarms.

9/14/18 From 10:30 to 4:30, five air raids. No bombs

-* dropped in Thionville but in Floerchingen. The

number is not known here.

9/16/18 From 10:30 to 2:00, air raid. No bombs

dropped.

b 9/18/18 During the night repeated air raid alarms. The

9aviators did not come to Thionville.

9/20/18 [Same as 9/18/18 9/24/18 [Same as 9/18/181

9/26/28 [Same as 9/18/18] From 9:30 to 2:35.

10/3/18 About 1030, air raid alarm. The aviators did

not come to Thionville.

10/5/18 About 9:50, air raid upon the Thionville station.

r Eight bombs dropped. No damage.

10/18/18 From 4:30 to 5:00, air raid alarm. The aviators

did not come to Thionville.

10/21/18 About 1:30 in the afternoon, air raid. Both

tracks from Thionville to Knuzig and the siding rails were damaged. Until 5:00 in the afternoon,

C traftic to Knuzig stopped. Damage about 1,000 *marks. From 10:00 to 12:00 several air raid

alarms. No aviators came to the city

10/26/18 From 7:00 to 7:30, air raid alarms. The aviators

did not come.

10/28/18 From 10:00 to 12:30, air raid. No bombs

dropped. The anti-aircraft batteries displayed

very energetic activity.

10/29/18 From 10:00 to 12:00, air raid. No bombs dropped

10/31/18 From 2:00 to 2:40, air raid. A few bombs were

dropped but caused no daiage. 11/10/18 From 2:30 to 3:30, air raid No bombs dropped.

The fighting planes drove away the hostile

Ts a aviators. This is the last air raid.

This is an abstract from the day book of the chief of the

Thionville railroad district, G Kienle. Below is his estimate of the

number and value of the bomb proofs constructed by him as

protection against air raids.

"Bomb proof shelters were built to the number of six and 

a

cost of approximately of 15,000 marks. Besides these, six smaller

ones were built as a protection against flying fragments at a cost

of approximately 50,000 marks. These shelters, however, cannot

be looked upon as bomb proof."
412 U.S. Air Se'rvice ITI World War I

Vol IV

Damage to a rallv station near Luxembourg

-16

Luxembourg

Occupied by the Germans at the beginning of the war, the

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was almost immediately subjected to aerial attack. The Americans who surveyed the effects

of Allied bombing submitted reports on the capital city (includig the neighboring commune of Hollerich) and several industrial towns in the southwest corner of the country, centering

around Esch-sur-Alzetle, the second largest place in the grand duchy (Reports 16-23) Dudelange (Dudeliigen) is about five

miles east of Esch and midway between Thionviole and the city

of Luxembourg; Remelingen (Rumetange) and Oettlingen

(Ottange), about the same distance southeast of Esch, the

former being in Luxembourg and the latter across the line in

Lorraine; Differdange (Differdingen). about 3 miles northwest of Esch. Rodange. a little farther west, near the Belgian frontier;

and Alhus. just over the line in Belgium

Number of Raids: 17

Tola! amount ol damage 26,845 Marks

Anti aircraft shot, 4,15 15 2 switches on Metz Aman,.eiler

tracks destroyed Tracks out of commission 15;4 [April 151 4
A

-1

U.S. Bombing 413

- Survey -3

3- 1

hours, 16/4 2 hours. Cost 25.00 marks. Excavation to determine

whether shell exploded.

L Bomb, 6/21/16. 2 houses in residence district. Roofs and I

window panes destroyed, 220.00 marks. -

Bomb, 11/6/16. Residence in workshops damaged. Window

panes, doors, roofs, 155.00 marks.

Bomb, 9/30/17. Telephone wires destroyed, 65.00 marks. 4

Bomb, 10/1/17. Line Sablon-Moselle bridge destroyed and

supporting wall and telegraph connection destroyed. Tracks out I

commission 7 hours. Cost 575.00 marks. Bomb, 10/29/17. Dud fell near tracks Metz-Amanweiler, Track

out 6 hours. Cost 50.00 marks. Dud dug up.

Bomb, 2/26/18. Window panes in residence district, 180.00

marks.

Bomb, 3/24 and 25, 1918. Telegraph connections destroyed, 25.00 marks.

Bomb, 4-29/31-18 [?) Window panes in residence district.

Tracks 7 and 8 in the Montigny district. Track out of

commission 30 hours. 700.00 and 1,500.00 marks.

Bomb, 6/29/18. Window panes in residence district, 200.00

marks. , Fragments of anti-aircraft shells. April-June 1918. Roofs pierced

by fragments. Cost 600.00 marks.

Bomb, 6/24/18. Residence damaged, 1,500.00 marks.

Bomb, 7/1/18. Line Sablon-Moselie bridge and supporting wall

destroyed. Metz-Noveant, Metz-Amanweiler damaged. I track out

12 hours, 1 track 30 hours, 1 track 2 hours, I track 3 hours.

15,200.00 marks.

Long range guns, 9/13/18. 'Tracks Metz-Amanweiler, out 12

hours, 900.00 marks.

Long range guns, 9/15/18. Connecting tracks at Longville

destroyed, 8 hours, 200.00 marks.

Bomb, 9/27/18. Switch Sablon and telegraph lines, 9 hours,

550.00 marks.

Bomb, 10/10/18. Line Metz.Noveant as well as street crossing.

Track out 10 hours, 4,200.00 marks. Total: 26,845.00 marks.,

Bombing at Holfericht

Number of Raids: 19

Number of Bombs: 202

Total amount of damage: 699,942.03 francs

' Expenditure for Protection: 300,000.00 francs

A special crew of 50 was kept busy during the last two years

of the war to repair the damage done by bombs. They were paid

ten francs per day.

"_A 6= : - : :=:= = = =
414 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

AWA N,1

: -17-

~Information as to Balloon Barrage

in the Duchy of Luxembourg

A

- The balloon barrages surrounding the town and works . .

~39 balloons in ali, each balloon containing 160 cubic meters of

gas. With a new filling, each balloon could go as high as 3,000

meters and always were at an altitude of between 2,000 and

3,000 meters. One filling was sufficient for 10 days to 2 weeks.

Balloons were let up electrically, 6 balloons on one main lineBalloons were let up at night and pulled clown in the morning.

The same territory was also protected by 32 anti-aircraft guns, 2

guns in e. position. Each two guns had a personnel of 30 men.

These guns were composed of 7.5, 8.8 and 10.5 calibre, the 10.5

being a marine gun. These guns were capable of 9 shots per minute and would shoot as high as 6,000 meters. It is, however,

claimed that a grea deal of damage was done to the roofs of

factories and private dwellings in the enclosed country by the

pieces of shrapnel and unexploded shelis coming down from

Anti-aircraft Guns A balloon barrage also surrounded the industrial region in the

Saar Valley.

39 ach blk~ns allon n al, ontinig 16 cuic etes o
415

t

Esch

Number of Raids: 43

Total Material Damage: 1,348,709.21 [Marks]

Adolph Burbach- Adolph EschCityv Fmil DudelIagqe Factory Factory

Direct Damage 363,050.40 74.8,879.49 236,779.32

Loss of Production 9,871,690.00

Loss of Salaries 129,223.90

Protection 250,000.00 70,347.94

Bombs 76

Raids 14

Extra Consumption,

raw materials 54,406-00

Foundry at Dudelange.
416 US. Air Serivice 3

in World War 1 I

Vol. IV

-19--

Dudelange

Expenses caused by the attacks of aviators:

I. Building department: (Francs)

1. In 1916: Alarm dispositions 8,373.00

2. During 1916-1917: The first shelters against

attacks by avions were built in order to protect

our workmen, the important buildings and

engines 110,00500

3. Damages caused by aerial attacks on the factory

and on the buildings outside. 45,172.46

4. Damage to roofs remaining to be repaired; these

damages were caused by the fire of the defense

guns; they will be repaired as soon as we obtain

necessary materials. 6,600.00

II. Blast-furnaces:

1. Damages caused by charging supplementary coke 27,000.00

2. Supplementary wages 30,000.00

flI. Rolling Mills:

Supplementary wages: Plant I 8,428.00 Plant 11 6,566.00

Adjusting Mill 7,188.00

Coals 18,748.00

IV. Steelwork, supplementary wages: 6,300.00

V. Workshop and Foundry, suppl wages: 7,100.00

Total 361,351.46

-20-

Rumelingen and Oettllngen

Number of Raids: 9.

Total Amount of Damage: 1,230 Marks

Total Loss of Production: 3.386 Tons cf Iron

Expenditure for Protection: 26,500 Marks

Date of Raid Time Bombs Damage

(Ma rks)

Sept. 15, 1916 1:00 A.M. 4

Sept. 25, 1916 11:00 P.M. 4 980
I

I

I I

U.S. Bombing 417

F Survey'

z Feb. 11, 1917 10:00 A.M- 35

Feb. 13, 1917 10:00 P.M. 19

Jan. 6, 1918 4:00 A.M. 12

Jan. 25, 1918 10:45 P.M. 40 250

March 22, 1918 5-00 A M 10

July 17, 1918 12:10 A.M. 4 4

Sept. 22, 1918 3:00 A.M. 4 A

-21- 1

Differdange

Number of Raids: 39-

Number of Bombs: 395

Total Material Damage: 820,630 Marks

Loss of Production: 16,770 Tons

Expenditure for Protection of City: 51,883.37 francs

Expenditure for Protection of Steel Mills: 450,000 Marks

-22-

Rodange

Number of Raids: 9

Total Damage to Town: 20,000 Marks

Expenditure for Protection: 15,000 Marks

Total Damage to the Ongres-Marihaye Factory: 10,919.90 Marks

March 18, 1918, 10:30 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. 5 bombs were

dropped. 2 near RR station. I on tracks, and 2 in field. About 20

windows were broken and damage to tracks were repaired in ]Phours. None killed or wounded.

March 15, 1918, 10.30 P.M. to l1:00 P.M. 5 bombs, 3 in field

and 2 in city. Roof of one house was destroyed and another

house was partly destroyed. 2 children wounded.

March 14, 1918, 10:30 A.M. to 11:00 A.M. 5 bombs, 4 in fields

and 1 between RR tracks. Only damage, broken windows.

March 13. 1918, 11:00 P.M. to 11:30 P.M. 3 bombs in city.

Broken windows.

. ... .i , = == ,BM W
418 U.S. Air Servce

in World War I

Vol. IV

Feb. 20, 1918, 11:00 P.M. to 11:30 P.M 7 bombs, all near RR

station. Destroyed telephone wires and windows.

Feb. 18, 1918, (no hour). 1 bomb in city. Windows destroyed

Jan. 16, 1918, 10:00 P M. to 11:00 P.M. 5 bombs in city. I

house destroyed and windows broken.

Sept 27, 1917, 9:00 P M. to 9:30 P.M. 5 bombs, all in fields.

Sept. 2b, 1916 Haid during night, lasting half an hour. 6

bombs in city. Windows broken.-

-23-

Athus

Number of Raids: 8

Damage to Town: 19,000 fraics

Damage to Athus-Grevegne Works: 400.000 francs

May 26, 1917. Night. Damage to Houses, 3,000 francs.

Jan. 25, 1918. 11:00 P.M. 3 bombs fell; no damage.

Feb 17. 1918. 12:00 P.M. 10 bombs dropped, damage to

houses, 10,000 francs.

March 13, 1918. 11:00 P.M. 1 German soldier killed and I

wounded; damage to houses, 10,000 fiancs.

March 21, 1918. 10:00 P M. 4 bombs were dropped; damage to

houses, 2,500 francs. Dec 27, 1916 11:00 PM 8 bombs dropped. I striking freight

house at rilroad station; damage to same, 500 francs; no

damage railroad.

May 5, 1917. Midnight. 20 bombs dropped.

Oct 1, 1917. 9:00 P.M. 13 bombs dropped, no records were

kept in this town as to exact dates ano material damage or

plans showing where bombs fell.

-24--

Trier

Trier (Treves), situated on the Moselle River about 5 miles

below the mouth of the Saar and not far from the Luxembourg

border, had a population of about 50,000 people before the war.

It had some factories, but it was chiefly a commercial city Rail-
UJ S Kiluribii i~j 419

roads were important to its life, arid the liries running through

Ifier wie 0 0 strategic Importance to Germany and the Germian

armny

Up the river from Trier, rat tines parilleed the Moselle on

both sides At Trier there were two stations one on each side of

thA vf, he mtt-ain station be~rng on thC ca;t ;ldo in the mair pat

of tuwn blow the city, ins tine on the east Bide Crossed the

rivar at Ptalzat. julning the other line in tho yards at Ehrang.

runt ( Wanig therv wab a line noirtheast to Kohienz and another north to Erdonl arid Cologne. Soutn ot Trier the two tines

were connected by a bridge over the Moselte at Conz (Konz),

juist below the contluence with the Sear. The line on the west

side went westward to Luxembourg, the one on the east followIngj the Moselle south 10 'Thiorivllle arid Metz. From Conz there

also was a rioil line lip the Sear River to Saarbrucken

fluitway targoits In Il-4 area were sometimes assigned as objeCL'VVI for Allied bombing raids. On other occasions, they were

Aerial view~ of Irter
420 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

attacked by planes which, because of bad weather or for some

other reason, were unable to bomb another target assigned for

the mission. These raids are covered in three reports (#24-26)

on Trier. Ehrang, and Conz and neighboring towns.

Resume of Results of Bombing

Number o" Raids 20

Number of Alerts 120

Time Lost Through Raids and Alerts 75 hours. 1 minute

Number of Bombs Recorded 397

Material Damage Reported (does not include

the damage to 864 people who were

paid through Insurance Companies) 1,707,376.65 Marks

Indirect Damages 4,901,713.69 Marks

Total Damages ^ 6,609,090.34

Morale

The morale of the people was very much affected by air raids,

causing sickness and nervous breakdown and causing

dissati3faction with the military authorities which one German

interpreted into meaning that it was a desire of the German

people in this area to cease hostilities.

Night bombing had the greatest effect on the morale of the

people; day bombing also had a great effect.

Detailed Report of Alied Bombing

Sept. 13, 1915 Raid lasted from 8.30 A.M. to 9.00 A.M. 73

bombs were dropped, a good many of which were duds. Damage

was done to 47 people, in addition to the damage done to Trier

Walzwerk (Rolling Mill) on which damages were paid to the

extent of 33,090.50 M.; of this amount 7,732.00 M. was paid by an insurance company. One man was killed and seven people

injured. to 3 of whom 300 M. was paid as charity.

Oct. 17, 1915. Raid lasted from 10.35 A.M. to 11.00 A.M. 7

bombs were dropped, mostly in a field, wide of the city, 2 falling

in the city but were duds. No damage was reported on this raid.

June 22, 1916. Raid lasted from 2.32 A.M. to 2.45 A.M. 13

bombs were dropped, I of which fell or the military treasury,

setting it on fire In all, damage was done to the property of 153

people, including damage done to Edward Raus & Company and

to the People's Bank of Trier, on which damages were paid to

the extent of 66,855.12. Of this amount, 38,864.52 was paid by

the insurance company. This dous riot include all the d. mages,

as 7 people did not report their damages. 7 soldiers were burned
.... _ __..._ _ _ __. .t=-.L 

- _ --

I!

U.S. Bombing 421

Survey.

to death in the fire at the military treasury, and 2 people were

injured by bombs.

May 2, 1917. Raid lasted from 11.50 P.M. to 12.20 P.M. 38

bombs were dropped, one of which fell in a lumber yard, setting

it on fire. The rest of the bombs fell around the town, again

damaging the military treasury, the Dom church, People's

Restaurant, Industrial Bank, and many houses. Damage was done

te the property of 122 people, on which damages were paid to

the extent of 219,280.03 M. of which amount 63,599 M. was paid

by the insurance company. 47 people who suffered damage to

their property on this raid and were insured did riot report the 

.

amount of damage. One man was injured, to whom 75 M. was

paid as charity. June 4. 1917. Raid lasted from 12.30 A.M. to 1.3& A.M. 50

bombs were dropped in the center and south end of the city,

damaging the Piov. Museum, Mothers' Home, and many

buildings and houses, in all 164 places, on which claims to the

extent of 83,983.47 M. were paid, of which 21,984.76 M. were

paid by insurance companies. 4 peop!e were injured on this raid.

July 7, 1917. Raid lasted from 11.30 P.M. to 2.45 A.M. 45

bombs were dropped in the middle and south end of the city,

the greatest damage being done to a Nunnery, which was set on

fire and very nearly destroyed. 100 places were damaged, on

which claims to the extent of 89,673.08 M. were paid, of which

amount 87,390.80 M. were paid by insurance companies. 51

people who carried insurance failed to report their damage.

July 25. 1917. Camage, 1,000 Marks. 21 wounded, from British

report.

September 5, 1917. Raid lasted from 11.58 P.M. to 12.15 P.M.

14 bombs were dropped in the centre of the town, the greatest damage being dorn to a military barracks and Circuit Court

building. 56 buildings were damaged, and claims made to the

extent of 25,981.32 M., of which amount 20,432.78 M. was paid

by insurance companies 4 soldiers were killed in this raid. 24

people who carried insurance failed to report their damages.

October 1, 1917 Raid lasted from 9.10 P.M. to 10.27 P.M. 

7

bombs were dropped, damaging 82 buildings and houses, on which claims Io the extent of 1,405.80 M. were paid, of which

amount of 1,164.93 M. was paid by insurance companies. 45

people who were insured failed to report their damages.

Jan. 24. 1918. Raid lasted from 7.35 P.M to 8.35 P.M 

2

bombs fell in village of Seven just outside of Trier, damaginq

fourteen houses and buildings, on which claims of 406.55 M.

were paid, of which amount 180 M. was paid by insurance

companies. I man failed to report damiage

Jan. 27, 1918. There was no raid on Trier this day but anti

, I i I l °' I l I I I I : I: = I II II 

I
422 US. Air Sevce

in World War I

Vol. IV

IIo

Houses hit in aeral

bombardment of Trier

aircraft fire damaged property of 46 people, on which claims to

the extent of 994.56 M. were paid, of which 917.35 M. was paid

by insurance companies. 34 people who carried insurance failed

to report damage.

Feb. 4, 1918. No raid but anti-aircrafi shells damaged property

of 18 people, on which claims to extent of 441.30 M. were paid,

of which 115 M. was paid by insurance companies. 13 people

failed to report tieir damage.

Feb. 18, 1918. Raids lasted from 12.01 P.M. to 12.30 P.M., and

8.20 P.M. to 9.40 P.M In the first raid 12 bombs were dropped

in the east end of the city, along west side of railroad, and the

second raid 9 bombs were dropped in the middle of the town,

damaging 248 buildings and houses, on wh:ch claims for

224,885.51 M. weie paid, of which 42,572.84 M. was paid by

insurance companies. 158 of the people who received damage on

this raid have not reported the amount of their damage, which

was all insured

Feb. 19, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.10 P.M to 1.00 P M 17

bombs fell in south and southwest part of city, damaging 231

homes and buildings, on which caims for 26.415 54 M were

paid, of v 'ich 12,773.05 M. was paid by insurance companies

149 peop:e failed to report their damage. I i.vilian and I so!dier

were killed

March 12, 1918 No bombs were dropped but the property of

11 people was damaged by anti-aircraft fire on which claims for
U.S Bombing 423

Sur.'ey

305.47 M. were paid, of which amount 209.92 M. was paid by

insurance companies. 7 people who received damage have failed

to report the amount.

March 24, 1919. 1,500 Marks. British report.

May 21, 1918. No bombs dropped on this day but 21 people

received damages from anti-aircraft shells on which claims to

extent of 709.24 M. were paid, of which amount of 603 24 M.

was paid by insurance companies. 13 people failed to report

amount of their damages. June 1, 1918. No bombs dropped on this day, but 23 people

received damages from anti-aircraft shells, on which claims to

extent of 547.20 M. were paid, of which amount 357.50 M. was

paid by insurance companies. 20 people have failed to report

their damages.

June 4, 1918. Raid lasted from 9.03 A-M. to 9.48 A.M. 11

bombs were dropped in the south part of the city, damaging

121 buildings and houses, for which claims of 35,702.23 M. were

paid, 15,367.96 M. by the insurance companies. 74 people who

received damages on this raid failed to report it. 2 people were

wounded.

June 13, 1918. Raid lasted from 8.20 A.M. to 9.02 A.M. 20

bombs were dropped in the northern part of the city, the

greatest damage being done to a hospital and to the gas works.

f 57 buildings and houses were damaged, on which claims for

21,617.82 M. were paid, of which 7,964.43 M was paid by

* insurance companies. 26 people have failed to report amount of

their damages. 5 people were killed and 4 injured. 1 person received 100 M. as charity.

July 1, 1918. Raid lasted from 7.45 A.M. to 8.55 A.M. 18

bombs were dropped in the center and eastern part of the city,

damaging the property of 29 persons, on which claims to the

extent of 2,028.36 M. were paid, 752.70 M. of which was paid by

insurance companies 13 people failed to report their damages.

July 2, 1918. Raid lasted from 9.50 AM. to 10.50 AM. 

8

bombs were dropped on the northern part of the city, damaging

buildings and houses ot 45 people, on which claims of 2,421.05

M. were paid, of which amount 662.95 M. was paid by insurance

companies. 10 people failed to report damages,

Aug. 1, 1918. Raid lasted from 8.30 AM. to 9.30 A.M 14

bombs were dropped in the center of town, damaging a church

and several fine residences, as well as many smaller places, on

which claims to extent of 189,824. M. were paid, of which

amount 74,676.45 M. was paid by insurance companies 69

people failed to report amount of damages. 5 people were

wounded in this raid.

Aug. 23, 1918. No bombs were dropped on this day but their
424 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

anti-aircraft shells damaged property of 25 people, on which

claims of 1,861-69 were paid, of which 1,847.83 M. was paid by

insurance companies. 21 people failed to report amount of their

damages.

Sept. 2, 1918. No bombs were dropped but their own antiaircraft damaged property of 10 people, all of whom have failed

to report amount of damages.

Sept. 14, 1918. Raid lasted from 1.45 P.M. to 2.25 P.M. 

6

bombs were dropped on the city, damaging buildings and houses

of 62 people, on which claims of 20,744.27 M. were paid,

11,936.73 M. by insurance companies. 32 people failed to report

amount of damage. I man was killed and a child injured.

Sept. 16. 1918. Raid lasted from 10.40 P.M. to 11.05 P.M. 

6

bombs were dropped on south end of R.R. yards and around

southern part of town, setting one house on fire. Buildings and

houses of 59 people were damaged, on which claims of 10,835.92

M. were paid, 9,933.71 M. by insurance companies. 38 people

failed to report their damages. 1 man was killed, to whose

relatives 100 M. was paid as charity.

Oct. 1, 1918. Raid lasted from 12.30 P.M. to 12.55 P.M. 

5

bombs were dropped on Petrisberg, a hill on the edge of the

city, damaging the property of 5 people, on which claims for

10,016 M. were paid. Two people failed to report amount of their

damages.

All of the people that have failed to report amount of damage

carried insurance and there fare) so many that it would take too

long to interview each and every one, but when we get the total

amount of damages paid by insurance companies, I will be able

to determine their damage. I have not included in the damage

reported by raids any damage on factories, R.R. etc., or places

on which I have reported separately.

Expense City Was Put to on Account of Raids

57 bomb-proofs were built, costing 30,000 Marks.

Expense of making cellars in public buildings bomb-proof.

12,500 M.

Expense of making cellars of schools bomb-proof, 19,000

Marks.

An extra Fire Watch of 6 men and 2 horses were installed in

the southern part of the city at an expense of 33,000 Marks,

which is the amount it cost them to install and maintain it.

Protection of Monuments cost them 6,000 Marks

Installing 10 sirens cost them 14,500 Marks.

Removing and replacing street lamps cost them 4,000 Marks.

Insurance on public buildings cost them 19,150 Marks.

Expense of cleaning streets of debris cost 1,000 Marks

A
A

U.S. Bombing 425

Survey

A

It was necessary to employ an extra cierk to look after

damage by air raids, which cost 10.8,50 Marks, included in which =

is the expense of taking photographs.

The city was protected by eight searchlights, 1 machie gun,

six lO-Cml guns, four 9.cm. guns, and seven 7.5-cm. guns, most

of which were installed in the last year of the war. This

information was secured from the adjutant of the German -A

Commander of this post, and he was unable to give me the

number of rounds of ammunition fired or the number of men

that were kept here to man the guns, but he did say that men were used from the hospitals who were recuperating from

wounds. They have written to headquarters in Berlin to try and

get 'his information.

I called on the General Agent, Otto Plewka, of the Frankfort :

Allgerneine Versicherung Aktren Geselischaft to get the amount

of insurance premiums paid to him, also the amount of damage

paid by his company, which information he could not give mea

but has written to the home office for it.

I also called on the Agent, A. Schmitt, and Sub-agent, F.

Traub, of the Stuttgart -Berliner Insurance Company for th~e same

information. They received in premiums 390,000 Marks but have

witten to the home office for amount paid in damages.

All of the information regarding the number of raids and

claims, also material damage and expense the city was put to,

was taken from the records in the (Hochbanamt) Building

Department of Trier, by J. Alberts, City Building Director, Wm.

Kroschel, Clerk in this department, and H. Dietrich, building

police secretary.

Several times in the report I have mentioned small sums that

wvere pa'd to dependents of people who were killed, and also to

people who were injured; this was only done in the case of poor

people Damages are to be paid to the dependents o.f every one

killed and to people injured, the amount of which has not been

determined.

Railroad, West Trier

July 2, 1918. One bomb fell in coal supply on west side of

railroad tracks, setting it on fire. 500 marks was the estimated

amount of damage. One bomb fell on east side of railroad

tracks, destroying two latrines, the value of which the railroad

director claimed to be 4,000 marks. One latrine was rebuilt

which I saw and I do not believe he overestimated the cost.

3 bombproofs were built, one costing 4,000 marks and the

other two were built by soldiers, so that the only co~t was

material, about 1,500 marks.

Telegraph lines were also damaged on this raid but not to (he

ii _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ m- | ii -m 
426 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

extent that traffic was delayed in the least.

Their own anti-aircraft did quite a lot of damage to roofs of

buildings and windows and roofs of rolling stock, as the guns

were located directly above the railroad yards Estimated damage

12,000 M.

600 men employed in West Trier yards, all of whom received

the bonus of 80 marks per month (last 6 months of the war).

All traffic stood still when an alarm was given and remained

that way until alarm was called off or raid was over.

July 2, 1918, is the only time that the railroad in West Trier

was bombed.

This line handled almost all of the soldiers going to the front

and wounded were returned to hospital located in West Trier.

The above information was received from H. Irroste (Bahnhof

Director) railroad director in West Trier.

Railroad, East Trier

Sept. 13, 1915. One bomb fell 90 feet from station on open

sround and did . , little drtage. Damage was repaired in 

a

very few hours at a cost of 252.71 marks. No damage at all was

done to trucks or railroad system. June 22, 1916. One bomb fell on east side of railroad tracks

and only damaged windows in buildings nearby which was

repaired at a cost of 45 Marks.

July 7, 1917. Three bombs fell in south end of railroad yards

but did not damage rails, only damaging buildings which were repaired at a cost of 722.54 marks. Some damage was also done

to buildings by anti-aircraft shells which was repaired at a cost of

231.64 marks.

Feb. 18, 1918. Two bombs fell on the station, setting it on fire

and damaging the residence of the railroad director which is in

the station; trains were not held up in the least and damage was

repaired at a cost of 20,232.63 marks.

June 4, 1918. Three bombs fell in south end of railroad yards,

destroying two tracks of a four track main line, delaying traffic

entirely for two hours and then hindering traffic for eight hours

after which time damage was entirely repaired at a cost of 7,692

marks.

June 7, 1918. One bomb fell on telegraph lines but caused no

delay in moving trains, damage was repaired at cost of 100

marks.

August 23, 1918. One bomb fell in yard about 120 feet from

turn-table, breaking a water main, but did not delay traffic.

Damage was repaired at a cost of 312.55 marks

Sept. 9. 1918. Two bombs fell in south end of yards,

destroying one track on the main line and broke a water main,
_ _ _ _ _. .... .._ ... . _ __._:gL .. . .. _ -___ _: - _ - .... - -

U.S. Bombing 427

Survey

traffic was not delayed but it caused quite a lot of inconvenience,

damage was repaired at a cost of 2,143 marks.

Sept. 17, 1918. Two bombs fell in yards, destroying two main

line tracks, one of which was repaired in two hours and the

other in ten hours, traffic was not entirely delayed but although

it did not move as fast for at least two hours after the damage

was done. Cost to repaii darimd, 1,010 marks.

1,200 people are employed in the yards- Last six months of

the war employees received a bonus of 80 marks per month.

Five bomb proofs were built at a cost of 13,477.80 marks.

The cellar in station was made bomb proof at a cost of 2,000

marks.

*Anti-aircraft signal system was installed to Karthaus-Conz,

.* West Trier and Ehrang, at a cost of 4,000 marks.

20 extra men were kept on hand at ali times to repair damage

by bombs at a cost of 300 marks pei day.

All employees called out for extra duty received a 50%

increase in pay.

During an alarm or raid all traffic was stopped.

The above information was received from Oberbahnhofmeister,

Head Director Mols and (Bahnmeister) Director Wochgurtel, the

most of which was taken from their records.

Railroad Shops, West Trier

No bombs fell on shops.

Employs 1,000 people.

Were closed 360 hours on account of raids and aiarms.

Paid in wages for which they received no benefit, .360,000

V marks.

- Made 50 cm. grenades on and off for first nine months of the

war.

Manufactured 1,200 grenades at a cost of 10,000 marks.

Repaired 80 locomotives less on account of air raids.

Damage to roofs and windows by anti-aircrait shells, 600

marks.

Installed an air raid alarm system at a cost of 500 marks.

Built two bomb proof roofs over two large cranes which, had

either one been hit, would have closed the shops for at least

three months, at an expense of 2,000 marks.

Buil! one bomb proof over a magazine at a cost of 7,600

marks.

Built one bomb proof at workmen s houses at a cost of 2,000

marks.

All workmen received a bonus of 80 marks for last six months

i- of war.

The Manager, Chief Engineer and a couple of the shop
I

L %A

428 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

foremen were very much of the opinion that the efficiency of the employers was very much impaired by air raids.

The above information was received from the Manager, E.

Spino, and Chief Engineer, F. Seibert.

and hief Gas Works, Trier

June 22, 1916, 2.20 A.M. One bomb fell alongside of an 8,000

cubic meter gas holder, puncturing it in 72 piaces and setting it on fire but by transferring the gas ir, this holder to a larger

holder which they had, they were able to lower it until the

damaged part was under water, thereby putting out the fire and

stopping the leakage of gas.

After all the gas in the holder has been used it was repaired,

0 taking 4 days during which time it could not be used. Cost to

repair damage was 1,200 Mks.

600 cubic meters estimated as amount of gas lost through

burning and leakage, valued at 600 marks.

Damage to windows and office buildings, 2,200 marks.

Damage from, their own anti-aircraft guns 200 marks.

;. Fixing cellars into bomb proofs cost them 2,000 marks.

--.:: j-s4No time was lost on account of raids or alarms as plant is

automatically operated, boiler and gas furnace being fired by Damaged gas storage tank of automatic stoker.

the Trier Gas Works. Above information received from Directoi Wahl.

H. Loeser & Company

Manufacturers of artificial wool and of which uniforms for

German Army were made.

Employed 250 men and women.

Feb. 19, 1918. Two bombs fell on office building, setting it on fire and destroying it completely. Building was rebuilt in 9

months at a cost of 25,300 marks: Work in the factory was not

delayed in 'he least.

Production for last 3 months of the war was 150,000 kilos of

wool, valued at 500,000 marks.

Were closed 150 hours on account of raids and alarms and

lost through wages for which they received no benefit, 3,000

marks. Production was decreased by 3,000 kilos valued at 10,000

marks.

Considerable damage was done here by anti-aircraft shells

which [was] repaired at a cost of 1,000 marks.

Carried flying raid insurance for which they paid 2,192 marks.

Did not build any bomb proofs but used a wine cellar which

was conveniently located near the factory.

H. Laeser, his son and foreman, all thought the efficiency of

the employees was very much impaired on account of air raids.
U-S- Bombing 429

Survey

especially during 1918 as a decrease in production was

noticeable.

The above information was received from H. Laeser and his

son.

~Trier Eisengreserei and Machinerilabrick

(Trier Foundry and Machine Shops)

August Feniestein, Manager. Employs 115 people. ManufacturedA

15 cm. grenades and did work in 15 cm. Russtahl grenades, 7.6A

cm. grenades and rifles, also made machines such as drill

presses, lathes, etc. During the war they made and worked on:

16,286 Grenades, 15 cm., value 378,175 Marks

34,387 Grenades Presstahl, labor, value 649,815 Marks

50,780 Rifles, labor, value 557,600 Marks

4,240 Grenades, 7.6 cm., labor, value 8,480 Marks

621 Ton of Machines, value 552,230 Marks They were only able to ive me their daily production in value,

which was:

War Material, 1,250 Marks

Machines, 435 Marks

Were closed 86 hours on account o air raids, which they

estimated and which ! think was considerably under-estimated, at

a less in labor of 12,040 Mks. The amount of production lost they could only give e in

value, which was 14,491 marks.

No bombs fell on the factory but hey received damage from

bombs falling nearby and from anti-aircraft batteries which cost them 1,520 marks.

Carried flying raid invurance for which they paid 800 marks.

No bomb-proofs were built because they were also able tn use

the wine cellar used by Laeser & CoM 2. 

Above information received from August Fenestein and his

secretary, Felix Hubner, both o o of ir rsthe opinion that

the efficiency of the employees was impaired by air raids.

a(Trier Trier Walzwerk Action Geselschlaft Rolling Mills)

Employs 1,000 men. Manufacture band, strip and sheet iron. Manufactured bullets for the war. Production for the war was

29,047,478 kilos at a cost of 32,678,495 marks

Lost 87 hours due to raids and alarms, in addition to the one time that a bomb hit factory. Loss in wages for which they

received no beneit, 86,870 marks. Loss in production, 114,54 kilo, value 142,870 Marks.

seSept. 13, 1915. One bomb fell on transformer house of factory

th fiinyo h mlyeswsipie yarris
430 U.S. Air Service in World Wai I

Vol. IV

No. 1, damaging it to such an extent that they were closed

down for 4 full days at a loss in production of 114,54 kilos,

valued at 137,458 marks. The closing of this factory did not

bother the working of Factory No. 2. Damage was fully repaired

in 4 days by 15 men at a cost of 3,256 marks.

Built 3 bomb-proofs at a cost of 8,291 marks.

Making roof of the machine house bomb-proof cost them

2,368.84.

An air raid signal was installed at a cost of 600 marks.

Installing a special fire alarm box cost 2,300 marks.

It was necessary to install additional lights and burn more

electricity because lights were blinded so that they could not be

seen from outside, cost of which was 16,300 marks.

Carried flying raid insurance w-ich cost them for the 4 years

of war, 17,283.05 marks.

In the opinion of the Assistant Manager, the efficiency of

employees was very much impaired and went so far as to say

that if a raid came early in the morning or early in the afternoon

they practically lost a half day, he also said that on a clear day

or moonlight night the nervousness among the employees ,vas

very noticeable, in fact he said he noticed it in himself.

Above information received from Hans Baue:, Assistant

Manager.

Edward Loeis & Company

Employed 400 men.

Manufacturers of factory machinery.

Manufactured 100 mm. and 220 mm. qrenades for the war. Daily production was 14 tons valued at 14,300 nirks.

Total production for the war was: Machines, 11,464 tons, value 4,301,200 marks

220 mm. Grenades, 2,258 tons, value 2,600,000 marks

100 mm. Grenades 3,278 tons, value 1,988,000 marks

Were closed 300 hours on account of air raids and alarms arid

lost through pay for which they received nothing, 60,000 marks,

and lost in production, 210 tons of finished products, valued at

214,000 marks.

June 12, 1918. One large bomb fell in toundry, damaging it to

such an extent that the whole factory was closed for a week and

it took them until 5 months later to again reach their maximum

production. Production lost during this time was 350 tons, valued

a: 360,000 marks.

Damage by bomb was repaired at a cost of 120,000 marks.

Built 3 bomb proofs at a cost o 5,000 marks.

Installed an air raid alarm system at a cost of 2,000 marks.

Built a bomb proof roof over Transformer house at a cost of
U.S. Bombing 431

Survey

1,500 marks.

Carried flying raid insurance for which they paid in premiums

6,600 Marks.

The officers of the company were very much of the opinion

that the efficiency of the employees was very much impaired by

air raids.

Above information received trom Otto Frik, Mananer; William

Greunit, Chief Engineer; and August Schaefer, Chief Accountant.

I interviewed every German whose name appears on report,

along with other Germans with whom I have come in contact on

what effect the raids had on the morale of the people and the

opinion was held by everyone that it had a great effect, causing

much sickness and nervous breakdowns.

Dissatisfaction was also found with the military authorities,

claims being made that they were trying to save on ammunition.

I verified these claims by going to the Post Commander where 

I

found that during several raids batteries had run out of

aMmunition. One German interpreted the dissatisfaction with

the military authorities into meaning that it was a desire of the

Germans in this locaity to cease hostilities.

In the opinion of these people, night bombing had the greatest

effect or morale of the population, although day bombing also

had a great effect.

Kurenz

Sept. 13, 1915. 3 bombs also fell in this small city, damaging

property to the extent of 210.40 marks.

Nov. 24, 1916. 3 bombs were dropped in this city, damaging

the property of 47 people on which claims to the extent of 8,436

marks were paid, of which amount 415.86 marks was paid by

Insurance Companies.

August 23, 1918. 17 bombs fell in and around city, damaging

property on which claims to the extent of 6,507.70 marks were

paid (by Insurance Companies, 5,821.40).

Sept. 14, 1918. Several bombs fell in city, damaging property

of 4 people on which claims for 992.50 marks were paid, of

which amount 524 marks was paid by Insurance Companies.

This town is located just across the raiiroad from Trier and

received their damage when Trier was being bonbed.

Olew~g'

Feb. 18, 1918. 1 bomb was dropped in this small town as well

as Trier and damaged property of 4 people on which claims ol

1,082.21 M. were paid, of which amount 366.71 was paid by

Insurance Companies. 1 woman was killed.

July 7, 1917 Bombs were also dropped on this town as well
432 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

as Treves, damaging the property of 121 people on which claims

of 14,732.32 Mks were paid.

Kernschiedd

Sept 14, 1918 Bombs were dropped in this town, damaging

property of 1 man on which claim for 77.85 marks was paid.

Jrsche

June 1, 1918. 1 bomb was dropped in this town, damaging

property of one mdn on which claim for 1,206 marks was paid.

Fohren'

March 2, 19'8. 1 bomb fell in this city, damaging the property

of 5 people on which claims to the extent of 384.70 marks were paid.

Informatioii on these small towns received from District

Building Department (Kreis-bauant) for the district of Trier,

located at Trier.

r

-25-

Ehrang

Number of Raids: 9

Total Amount of Damage: 127,225 miarks. Ii 'Expenditures for Protection: 62,200 marks.

Information received trom (Burgomeister) Mayor Arend of

Ehrang, taken from the records of that city:

Sept. 13, 191., Hour unknown. One bomb fell on a transformer house located between Ehrang and Biewer., causing

damage to the extent of about 300 marks but did not damage

the lighting system.

Nov. 24, 1916. One bomb fell on house at Pfalzel, completely

destrcying it. Amount of damage, 3,000 marks.

July 7, 1917, 1:00 P.M. Several bombs fell in an open field

about 300 yards from the railway station causing no damage

other than breaking windows in the neighborhood. On this same raid, four bombs were dropped in an open field close to the

water works but did no damage.

Jan. 27. 1918. 1:00 P.M. One bomb fell close to the Russian

prison camp but did no damage.
1) S Iktimblf;j 433

butvv

July /, 91b. 2 001 I 6 txionibs full dt Qintl,' three were

duds .rd landed oil flip oisiron trof kra abvut 90 feet floral ihe

stifr,. oitiv ce,.pl,ded 240 fve froit a at oo hotjurw arid the

i,ttie. two ili A la, vtry I'.irk, none of tile t'orribb doing say

d-nii'..-if .at hitlii wa-i. I,, cloiriit filed for darrrarqe

Awli W'3 1Yif h. I 1' Ij Sixtren bomb. fell in and aroun~d the

R H yrdia At f 11100iJ. 11ls~ AboUt 30 feel fromt uric of the ovens

tit II.. U.id Tisl And Mantle worki, causing damoga: to the

ujallrt 4,1 1 - uN rilmrk.o

b.,'iIr t-Onrihl %4e04 direct hilt onia ltf,. f)t Cobt.'n,, putting it

out ti uorder for Z4 ti'urta 411itfih rirharv fins wer detoured

Ivl of lun 1 lie rIt otoI iepair INNui dAmnage, computed

%i.ko tuwr'imlia, was, 41).(XXJ itniskit '1 ti rest of the bornibs fell

01r1-11111-11 Ill, ty OAuting datna~c in tlip city to the exte'nt oif

11f. 1r,, .'ile, dif fr(ilr frsiili I.:' tiim rjsd arid a tatd inumbier

walt' sitk due to their besoiw it lip he l'ars so longU Al the eir raid

1111011.1 VIVIV uwviu at fqai fivir itise durinig the night This was

loll 11'r %olbsr Faid ilir fid

'w-pt 2. Mill, II 30 1' M Nine boirbe fell 1.500 feet east of

l: 141111it ufAtilij 11 11tret bWRet ittirang and f'fafrel doing no

ini - al dnuispr I arir rintesiti thia fights weev out fot 48

7, 111M. 2 30o P M ChliV biltibIt'l feltut right hland tilde osf tA';io IA, kra fi dmmisjislu prop er ty lo, f ixer u it o 1.269 marks

And fivr Ilttlis fell Ili A ivieadiuw (ar the it-ft hand side oif the

rrIll''.Arf d1101iYuit) riCIiAMtA

tlIi 1 4. 1911111. 1 45 P MI lwoi ltiribo' fell onl a new fine that

Wal hliui Iliii 'etfweeni f-tmili anid fsiewvrt Aurimil dArruage to

tt 'e Aietit of IOAW)0 itit, 1 wo bsionitb MAlt fell north (if 1'fAlzel

1s, A'l uit'ii fittld jsjsirilu,IrF 

Spinlaw (fAIIIAi.& Wall dfoie b min nurt taft shells froirm J net but

oall A l'i J- d41111 iit atiu'uitII1 i unth 101 ll 1(K) riiarkta

Atutia sivi ititist'. yii' iutilvks plmies were sightedl tr sompis

I I i - i i Irl ia..e is , Andir WI us', 1114 riln ii wa% givusis esvily

fiuiv,irtis htir mildf llyr wit llo)vif for At fIat Anl lI'VF

I I.VV Iiit.. lii' tIV, -md of W11-1 ei AllnIrI UF t ujis atid whferi

I leud ffi 'j, fl flip luitiei' 0f tunea flint kitl alarm wal, yivi arid

thrill Wear Ilo fIuiiuf's drtipli

11I l 4iu 01muilat' fiut tIi ttu1. ot'ii fud was turin rnifbutte

sa And thent on atl filte tutt tfour we~eks iif tlip war but the',,

All - ill,., wif'w% ait ivi ild in,c i-v 1 *.rsitil enuvtt aiud

url1 t is11 aull 6.i sf l-uN Il't *-a ,f'' t1- t.is Iit I.A a' fr b

fli, njiius! fiiviiu Ow1 workI dolue
434 U.S Air Service

ir World War I

Vol. IV

Damnage to the Railroad at Ehrang

Information received from Supt. N. Elsen and R. R. Director J

Silvornus:

Sept 2, 1918. 4 bombs fell on tracks running to Coblenz disabling the line completely for 24 hours, although all military

trains were detoured by way of the I track line to Quint- The

cost to repair this damage was 40,000 marks.

8 bombs also fell in the yards, destroying 12 6wit,-h tratcks and

I coal cars which were repaired in 43 hours, at a cost of 20,000

marksA crew cf 100 nien was kept on hand to repair damage from bombsa aa cost .-of bout ,000 marks per day.

All men called out for extra duty received 50% increase in pay.

During an air raid, all traffic was stopped.

"'rhe R.R. yards were divided into 3 sections and a bomb-prooif

provided for each section that could hold 200 men at a cost of

20,000 marks each, making a Iota] of 60,000 marks spent for this

purpose.

Factories United Tile & MaUt.e Works: (Vereinigte Serveis Geselschafe).

Did not make anythingi that could be used for war and did not

make anything ta.

I bomb on Aug 23, 1918 fell 30 feet from the factory,

aaging an oven and roofs to the extent of 1,328 marks.

Did not carry in ceely nst damage by air raids

Quint Smelter and Foundry: (Gewerckschaft Quint).

No direct hits cn factory 8 bombs dropped in a field 200

yards from the factory but did no damage.

First year of the war, this factory made shells and narrow gauge trails for the war. The manager of the factory claimed the factory was closed 7

hourson accountof air raids at a loss in p aoduction of 7.000

marks . Buit dugout at a cost o 2,000 marks and had no other

protection- Carried air raid insurance during the last year of the war

which cost them 5,242 marks on property valued at 2,140,000

marks. Raids as tated r by the Burgomeister of Ehrang and his staff

had a very great effect on the people of this area, causing many nervous breakdowns and ie belinves that they increased the

Germans' dese for a cessation of hostilities There was a great

amount of agitation in this area for the Allies and Germans to

quit bombing towns.

Dhe R.R Director said he did not believe air raids impaired

Qun mle n onr:(eecshf un)

Nodrc iso acoy ob rppdi il 0

yad rmtefcoybtddn aae

Fis ero h ati acoymd hlsadnro
-1

U.S. Bombing 435

Survey

the efficiency of the employees very much because they

were too far apart, although during a raid there was

practically no work done, the men not only being scared

but anxious about their families.

-26-

Karthaus, Merzlich, Conz,

Wasserlich, and OberemmelNumber of Raids 

7

Number of Bombs 29

Total Damage (including 500 marksdate not known) 61,216.58 marks

Expenditures for Protection 17,250.00 marks

Amount Paid in Bonuses 152,000.00 marks

Information received from Burgomeister Mayor Muller of

Karthaus, partially taken from record3 of that city.

Aug. 9, 1914, Time unknown, One dud and one bomb fell on

west side of railroad in a field. One bomb fell on east side of

railroad-had no record or recollection of any damage being

done.

May 10, 1918, 2:00 A.M. Number of bombs unknown. Fell in

city of Wasserlieach damaging property of one man to the extent

of 50 marks.

June 1, 1918, 8:00 A.M. Sixteen bombs fell in town along

railroad damaging the property of 22 people on which claims for

a 1,240 mark loss were filed and paid. One boy was killed.

June 4, 1918, 8:00 A.M. Number of bombs unknown. Several

fell in the city of Conz danaging the prorerty of ten people on

which claims for 1,761.20 marks were filed and paid.

June 7, 1918, 8:00 A.M. Two bombs fell on railroad main line,

four in the railroad shops and several in the town of Merzlich,

damaging the property of 35 peopie to the extent of 14,949.46

Marks. Two women and three children were killed on this raid.

July 1, 1918, 10:00 AM. Twelve bombs fell in the Moselle

River, one bomb fel' i.n switch line track to Ehrang and four

bombs in the town of Conz. damaging the property of 101

people, claims being filed to the amount of 11,333.38 marks and

t paid

Oct. 11, 1918, Time unknown. Two bombs fell in the town of
436 U.S. Air Se-ce

in World War I

Vol. 1V .

Oberemmel and eighteen bombs around the town, damaging the _

property of four people to the extent of 9,339.54 Marks. One

boy was killed.

The town oi Karthaus and Conz paid one-third of the cost of

installing a siren at railroad station which was 500 marks.--

z Five anti-aircraft guns, German 77s, were stationed around the :

town and there were fifty men to man the guns. ~~The town carried insurance against damage, by air raids on_.

! public buildings: -

1915-16 294.65

~1916-17 350.40.-

i1917-18 1,650.00

j 2,295.05

iA great number of the people also insured their lives

~and property.

Closing all of the cellar windlows in public buildings cost 200

marks.

- Cellar wndows in business houses and private dwellings were

also closed at the expense of the owner.

Damage to Railroads at Korrhous and Conz

June 7, 1918, 8:00 A.M. Two bombs fell on main line damaging

through tracks so that they could not be used for 48 hours,

although the traffic was detoured around the damage, a great

Sdeal of delay ensued. This cost to repair damage was 2,043

marks. Some bombs fell in the round hoase but missed the ~turntable by about 40 feet so that they could continue the work.

This damage was repaired at a cost of 20,000 M. One man was

also killed.

During the last year of the war, 50 to 75 men were kept on

hand to repair damage at a cost of about 9 marks per day per

man.

Employees called out for extra duty received 50% increase in

pay.

One siren was built at a cost of 1,500 marks of which 500

marks was paid by the city of Conz.

Five bomb proofs were built, costing 5,250 marks.

Dunng a raid all traffic was stopped, in all 119 hours.

011 one raid the date of which they could not tell me, the

! telegraph system was put out of order for 6 hours during which

time trains had to be held back to some extent. Cost to repair

! damage 500 marks.

! Railroad Shops, Karthaus

Employed 1,200 people. -

~~Repair Engines and "Tenders only.

I1I. . .It
[i

U.S. Bombing 437

Survey"

I

Were closed 324 hours due to Air Raids.

Loss in Production. Repaired 1,500 Locomotives less, at a loss

of labor costing 200,000 marks.

Built eleven bomb proofs for workmen costing 10,000 marks.

In talking with the Burgomeister of Conz and Karthaus, also

the directors of the Railroad, the same opinion was held as in

FEhrang that the air raids increased the desire of the people for a quick cessation of hostilities. The Railroad Director and Director of the Railroad Shops were

both of the same opinion that efficiency of the employees was

not impaired because of air raids.

There are no factories in the area other than the Railroad

Shops.

For the last six months of the war, all railroad and railroad

shop employees received a bonus of eighty marks per months,

A which amounted to approximately 152,000 marks.

-27-

Saarbrucken

Some of the most important targets for Allied bombers in

World War I were in the Saar Valley, one of the great industrial

areas of Western Europe, Here was produced much of Germany' aIron and steel, using coal mined locally in the Saar and

' ore or pig Iron shipped in from Lorraine. Blast furnaces in the

! area were concentrated around Saarbrucken. at Burbech (a

western suburb incorporated into the city in 1909), Brebach

(just east of the city). Volkllngen (down the Saar about 6 or 7

miles), and Dillingen (another 7 or 8 miles down the river). The a report on the bombing of Saarbrucken. printed below in its

entirety, should be read in conjunction with those for Burbach

and Brebach, which follow.

L

' i

|V
438 U.S. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

Number of Raids: 24

Total Damage: 2,987,650 Marks

Dates of Raids Damage (Marks) Killed Wounded

9 Avg. '15 140,000 13 43

6 Sept. '16 700,000 5 10

16 Sept. '16 9

9/10 Feb '17 40,000 12 3

16 March '17 19,500 1

16/17 June '17 148,000 4

24 Oct. '17 101,000 6 7

17 Oct. '17 53,000

5 Dec. '17 153,000 6 9

6 Dec '17 25,000 1 4

5 Feb '18 201,000 17

16 May '18 57,000 11 49

21 May '18 3,500

24 June '18 19,000 1 1

25 June '18 80,000 3 7

26 June '18 16,000

1 July '18 930,000

5 July '18 12,000

17 July '18 181,000

30 July '18 3,500

14/15 Sept '18 2,5W

23/24 Oct. '18 1,100

28/29 Oct. '18

29/30 Oct. '18 1,450

Totals 2,887,650 59 162

-28-

Burbach

Number of Raids: 13

Number of Bombs on Factory (Steel Works]: 93

Total Amount of Damage: 488,100 marks

Cost of Protection: 100,000 marks

A total of 93 bombs were dropped on the Foundry grounds

during the 13 different aerial attacks that took place. In addition.

5 other bcmbs were dropped in the gardens around the Foundry

and in front of one of the officials' buildings. . . .

..
U.S. Bombing 439

Survey

The damage caused by the bombs in each individual case is as follows:

Raid No of

No. Daiv Bornbs Place and Kind of Damage

1 9/8/15 1 Fell behind the furnaces on the Coke grounds, but caused no

damage.

2 6/9,/15 4 Fel! on the Railroad dam, in the field ana in a store of bar-iron,

but no damage was done.

3 15/9/16 8 Were dropped on the shipping yard and on the roofs over the

Dolomite furnaces, on the Block street, on the Generators

and Universal rolling mill and caused damage to the roofs,

window panes and tracks. 5,800.00 Marks.

4 10/11/16 24 Hit the Coke grounds-West, the smelting room, the blast engine

house and the steel workt-Pumphaus. The roofs of one

Valve room on the Coke grounds, of the smelting hall, and of

blast engine buildings were destroyed. In addition to that one

steam conductor and one steam kettle. 21,200.00 Marks.

5 23/11/16 4 Were dropped on the steel works and in front of a mortar

battery, partially destroying roofs and conductors.

4,000.00 Marks.

6 23/1/17 9 Fell near smelting furnace #3, in the steel works, near the

foundry, in the Modelling shed and on the port on the Saar,

darnaging a large water reservoir, different roofs and sheds and

also the tracks. 6,600.00 Marks.

7 17/10/17 3 Fell on a siding in rear of coke grounds.West, a near a cooling tower, and in front of the Foundry club-house thus destroying

some rails which were torn up from the tracks just behind the

cooling tower and damaging badly the club-house building and

the neighboring foundry officials' residences. 17,500.00 Marks.

8 5/2/18 19 Fell entirely on foundry property, except the 4 bombs

already mentioned, which fell in the gardens Hits were obtained

mainly on the smelting furnace grounds, slightly damaging some

conductors and dust collectors, also causing some slight

damage on shipping grounds. To this must be added the damage

caused to grass, flowers. etc. in the gardens 9,3()0 Marks

9 24/6/18 7 Hits oblained in railroad yards, destroying some tracks and

damaging the office building and a neighboring adjusting

(regulating) shop. 4,500.00 Marks.

10 2/9/18 8 Fell in the rolling mill, in the main shop, in the locomotive shop

and on the docks on the Saar River. Seven of these bombs

caused slight damage to the roofs, glass and railroad tracks.

Bomb #79, hit the roof of the mair work shop, destroying by

fire the whole roof and ceilings. The machinery remained intact

but had to be repaired. Main damage, however, was caused

by the burning of several models. I is impossible to look up the

prices of the damaged objects at pieseni, all books being
440 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Raid De No c Place and Kind of Damage

No. t Bombs

burned, but we estimate it to be 400,000 Marks.

11 16/9! 18 5 Hit the pump-house and the neighboring rolling mill halls. The

roof of the former and different conductors were completely

destroyed; as to the latter, the damage caused to the glass was

not altogether insignificant, and as in most of the other attacks, some damage was caused to the railroad tracks. 17,000.00

Marks.

12 5/10/18 5 Fell on and near the mixing building and only caused little

damage. 700.00 Marks.

13 6/11/18 1 Dropped in front of a foundry official's residence, damaging the

roof of the houe and also the nearby greenhouse. 1,500.00

Marks.

Total 98 488,100.00 Marks

Protection: Concrete shelters were built for the employees

amounting to 100,000 marks but no false roofing of any kind was

built over the factory.

Moral Effect: The workmen maintained a fairly good working

standard in the factory and many were glad when an alert was

signalled because it meant a loaf for a while. Night raiding was

more disastrous on the morale :ban day raiding as many men

had families which required more care and anxiety. On one

occasion, however, when four rrien were killed by a bomb, the

women working in an adjacent plant, became hysterical and

threatened to give up work but were calmed in the course of a

day or two.

Brebach

(Halburgerhutte Iron & Steel Works)

Number of Raids: 5

Total Amount of Damage: 89.256 marks

Cost of Protection: 250,000 marks

Number killed: 10
L U.S. Bombing 441

Survey

Date of Raid Marks

Aug. 9, 1916 Small buildings destroyed 446

Feb. 10, 1917 Benzol cooler hit 9,000

r Feb 22, 1917 1 shelter destroyed 1,150 May 22, 1918 Coal cleansers 8,970 tC Unknown, 690 89,256

. Protection. Dugouts and shelters were built to the cost of

250,000 marks. II Moral Effect. No bonuses were paid to employees and no

I - strikes ever occurred here. The nervous strain of alerts and raids

cut down their efficiency. Night bombing was more telling on

their nerves than day bombing.

V 30

SVolklingen

Number of Raids: 8'

Number of Alerts: 32)1

Number of Bombs Recorded: 213 Total Material Damage: :261,500.46 Marks

I i Total Loss of Productior, in Tons: 31,101.962

Total Expenditure for Protection: 457,719.98 Marks

r -Damage at Volklingen.

II

I
442 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Monthly Total of Direct Damage

Caused by Bombs and Anti-Aircraft

on Roechlingen Bros. Steel Works

Date Number Bombs By Bombs By Anti-Aircraft

(Marks) (Marks) Sept., 1916 13

Oct., 1916

Nov., 1916 33 42,171.53

Dec., 1916 5 5,575.90

Jan., 1917 93.00

Feb., 1917

March, 1917 22 1,015,174.97

April, 1917

May, 1917 51 77,737.96 June, 1917 868.90

July, 1917

August, 1917

Sept. 1917

Oct., 1917 86 71,865.32

Nov., 1917

Dec., 1917

Jan., 1918

Feb.. 1918 1,068.26

March, 1918

April, 1918

May, 1918 3 22,519.97

June, 1918

July, 1918

Aug., 1918 713.21

Sept., 1918 10 23,711.44

Oct , 1918

Nov., 1918

Total 213 1,258,85009 2,650.37

iI
4

U.S. Bombing 443

Survey

Monthly Totals of Indirect Damages

Due to Stopping of Work, Caused by Alerts

on Roechlingen Bros. Steel Works

Month Number Loss in Other Losses thru Quantity

and of Salanes Faulty Products in

Year Alerts (Marks) (Marks) Tons

Sept., 1916 7 2556.96 8798.86 1016.013

Nov., 1916 14 9700.63 6762.55 1713-898

Dec., 1916 4 3378.31 70.60 559.870

Jan., 1917 4 1671.38 904.00 326.600

Feb., 1917 9 7066.01 615.97 1522.200

March, 1917 7 4105.45 43063.13 1310.400

April, 1917 1 169.96 58422.50 82.350

May, 1917 1 4814.34 4547.80 2952.738

June, 1917 2 2577.62 3957.60 739.250

July, 1917 3 1990.10 2517.50 450.300

Aug., 1917 2 233.00 458.00 40. 1000

Sept., 1917 7 1012.08 204.00 351.000

Oct., 1917 17 20020.84 5588.20 4068.150

Dec., 1917 5 1620.17 150.00 160,300

Jan., 1918 11 9397.46 1020.80 978.200

Feb., 1918 11 7828.32 2091.80 958.500

March, 1918 8 4364.07 401.50 389.900

April, 1918 1 No interference in work whatsoever.

May, 1918 13 13734.41 1517.55 1651.395

June, 1918 33 18421.14 2643.92 2050.410

July, 1918 47 17447.36 3509.83 2106.025

Aug., 1918 50 28091.29 1889.92 2881.883 Sep.i, 1918 44 22541.79 3797.60 2622.960

Oct., 1918 23 14427.83 932.75 1768.875

Nov., 1918 4 3769.21 78.00 400.645

Total 328 200899.73 153844.38 31101.962

Amounts Expended for Protective Purposes

Marks

False roofing placed over factories 178,151.97 *The factory was

Bomb proofs for employees of the foundry 91,602.20 reimbursed for this

Bomb proofs for employees outside of foundry 37,587.13 expense by the 1 0th

Signal and communication arrangement for alerts 5,466.11 LandsturmJ E Bn 2

Balloons, anti-aircraft guns, etc. 112,! 15.32 from Magdeburg.

Expenses of 30 French officers held as hostages at

the plant for one year, to reduce the number of raids *32,797.25

Total 457,719.98
444 U S_ Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Measures for Protection

Attached is a blueprint drawing' showing a cross-section of a cement-screen set up between pieces of machinery (dynamos,

motors, etc.) in the various sections of the plant. A bomb that

exploded on the head of a motor would cause no damage to any

of the adjiacent machinery.

All the roofing at this plant which covered machinery of any

value was covered by a second roofing, raised up about 3 feet over it. The material used in the "False Roofing" was on

concrete, about 6 inches in thickness. A bomb sconng a direct

hit on the "False Roofing" exploded there but did not penetrate

below.

No bonuses were paid but the Company was obliged to

increase the workmen's food suppiy owing to these raids. During

the 'ears of 1917 and 1918, each day, at various hours, hot

soup rice, etc., were served to the workmen as a compensation,

and t ) stimulate those who suffered more consequences from

these alerts and actual raids.

Moral Effect

The morale of the workmen was affected to the extent that

when they "went on" again on their next shift, their physical

strength was somewhat reduced and were incapable of working

at their normal capacity, and would try to find some place to

steal a rest.

Night bombing had greater effect upon the morale of the

workmen. During the several raids that took place, some of the

women employees became hysterical and their lack of control

had its effect upon the workmen in the same building. Night bombing at this plant scored all the effective hits and

the consequent damages.

-31-

Dillingen

Number of Raids: 62.

Number of Alerts: 89

Total Number of Hours Lost: 90 hrs. 27 min.

Total Amount of Damage: 296,881.61 marks

Expenditure for Protection: 150,000 marks

..................................................
SU.S. Bombing 445

S 5urvy

==

-32-

Bous

Bous and Wadgassen (Report 33) are on the Sear, about halfway between Volklingen and Dillingen. while Merzig (Report 34)

is farther down the Sear, about midway between Saarbrucken

and Conz.

I The loss of production [at the Mannesmann Steel Works]

owing to total stoppage of 454 hours (during 301 alerts]

amounted to 9,437.5 tons, or, as stated approximateiy by the

director of the factory, 711 million marks. The actual damage

resulting from bombs amounted to 8,621 marks.

Protection: In addition to being piotected by the Saar Valley

Balloon Barrage, it had several anti-aircraft batteries and

searchlights. Moral Effect: The men at this fcoywr o ral

disturbed hut nevertheless found night raids more disquieting

than day raids.

~-33-

Wadgassen

No material damage from bombs was recorded at this place.

The loss oi production from alerts, however, was estimated at

48,000 marks for the glass factory of Villeroy & Boch, which was

closed down for a total of 10 hours.

- Anti.aircraft dropping on the office of the factory caused

damage to the extent of 3,000 marks.

-34- IiMerzig

Number of Raids: I

Number of Bombs- 4

Total Damage to Town: 22,600 marks

i ! , S.
446 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

-35-

K reuzwaid

The towns covered in this and the following eight reports are

all situated within a radius of less than 40 miles west and south

from Saarbrucken, Kreuzwald (Creutzwald-la-Croix) beeng

about 14 mites west.

Note: The following information was derived simply from the

memory of some of the office force of the Ste- des Mines de la

Houve, records, etc., not being available.

Number of Raids: 7

Total Damage to Town. 80,000 Marks

Value of Loss of Production at Electric Plant: 10,000 Marks

Expenditures for Protection: 10,000 Marks

-36-

Bouzonville

Bouzonville (Busendorf) is about 10 miles northwest of Kreuzwald.

No direct hits uwere obtained on the factory at this place but

about 1/4 of the daily production was lost every time an alert

was sounded, It was stated tn~t alerts, lasting on an average of

two hours, sounded about once ddily from January 1, 1918, to

November 11, 1918. The total tonnage lost in this way was 900

tons, representing a va!ue of 360,000 Marks. One re-inforced

concrete shelter was built at a cost of 12,000 Mark%.

-37-.

St. Avoid

St. Avoid, about seven miles south of Kreuzwald, is on the rail

tine between Metz (via Remilly) and Saarbrucken.

Station

June 15: 16, 1917, 9:00 PM-10 PM, 16 bombks.

June 18,119, 1918, 11:30 PM, locomotive destroyed,

July 21/22, 1918, 11:40 PM. 42 bombs

Aerodrome.-

No bombs ever dropped on the aerodrome.
-I3

Ill.

hsr~d~uI ~ I..ai.t ( i Af MutBi, Sill (n 1,1 (iii l4lj

.J...~~ to PM ~~, 6 . af.Us

Ai-.~ I PIV~ It. 11J NM . dmAqw~

11 'to P11 III Mf' - M 74 dd'I~I I~.' 4.

I 'l Ie ~ / f it~ 4r,..

44'. 14 1,41P Vo M~ . 4'~

l PII. PI 1 'A'l 1, N., d.1rr.Aw

M4, ti IVIA JjI

A-A I I P)if I
448 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

-A

=41

I

-- 39-

Die uzo

~~At ',tween Dituze. Bensdor a town and south Avricourt, of Benslorf, the chief on a industry branch rail was line a be- alr A

A

works,.

Dec. 23, 1914 Salt faciory damaged, 300 francs. I bomb,

Feb. 13, 1916 No dainage, 2 bombs.

Feb. 21, 1916 Few telegraph wires broken. I bomb droppod. Apr. 9, 1916 No damage. 7 bombi- dropped.

July 23, 1916 25 bombs in vicinity of barracks. Several

soldiers killed

Sep. 3. 1916 3 bombs on factory. Damage, 15W0 francs.

Feb. 16, 1917 3 bombs, no damage.

Mir 16, 1917 16 bombs dropped on airdrome killing 13 horses I

and wounding 2 men.

Mar. 27. 1917 17 bombs, d ,niiq, to buildirgs, 1,500 francs

Jul 6, 1918 Severa bornbr. .i upped, damage 7,000 fromns

Jui 16, 1918 2 bombs near stAtion, no damage.

A'ug. 12, 1918 17 bombs, no damage

Sep. 14, 1918 3 bombs, vicinily of station.

Nov. 5, 1918 12 bombs nvar hospital, I killed.

Morale not ldly affeted due to iniccuracy of bombing

--40

Huchicourl

1t. I' jrt is between Avriecoi and Homing. on the rail line

fron) Nancy to Saairburg

DaIe i )11W &IJmbb D)ei"

Aug In 19, 1918 1 30 AM ]3 No daliawi.

Seip ). 16, 1918 10 45 I'M 12 N(, damauI

selj .11 22. 1918 2 OU A M 13 No dnmarNov 9. 191b I Itj A M 4 N, cloi t 9

............ .. ..- J
S U-S. Bombing49

Sunmey

I Hemning

Homning Is on the ral ine from Nancy t arurg, about fiv.e

* ~ milos southwest of the latter place.

Sept. 6, 1918, 12:30 A.M. to 2:30. 13 Car6 ammunition

I destroyed, 50,000 rounds 77.' 200 meters of double track torn

E up. Lothringen Cement FactorV Copped work 2 days. Losf of

production: 19,000 francs' worth of cement.

I _ -42-

Saarburg-Rieding

Rail lines frorn Strasuburg. Nancy, Matz, and Searbrucken

meet In the Smarburg (Sarrebourg)F4Ieding (Rading) area, - abou~t 35 miles south of 54arbruckeln.

Rgb~Jrne of results of borubitig.

SaarbuM

Dal Time B',:mbi tDarnngv

I Dec. 16 19, 1914 12 M 10 No 1)iinag

S-ept. 10, 1416 2 P)ITt is Nil Dama~e

Aug 13, 1918H 1145 pmn 16 D~ouble track

dietruyrd, 17

hours to rCliAtt

St2516, 1918 [etuf

Nt.v 3, 1918h 1 30 pm16 fryia 11) 41A

Ilit, VXXI mer Ms

J1tly 12, lI1a P N.. fDattmao

Septf 23. l'9J8 11 WA PB SOX oilitkii

* A,4 1li 17, 1918 2(A) Bill1 30 mers a t
450 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

double track

destroyed

Sept. 21-22, 1918 2:00 am 10 50 meters of two

double ,racki destroyed

Rieding No 147, July 12, 1918

Today At no(,i (12 odLock) an attempted aerial atirirk on the

station at Hieding. abouit ten bovl,% ol unknown ih10rk which

fell at a distance of about 150 And 500 m from the railrood area.

The numb4,r of aviators could not be ascertained because ut the

heavy cloud&. [Nc, ?I Damage to the railroad yards. No lobs of

pet soniel.

Rieding August 17, 1918

lonight at 2 oj'clo.ck an aeial attat.k on the btnition at Rwding

Eight bomnbs of un known iralibre' thIrown 1 wi of themn bliods

'Div tra ks 20 aiid 21 were darmaged by on@ bomb lot is distarka

of about 30 mn The rest of the boniht fell in the vicinity of

Signal b about MO m south of this oira Tis number of aviators

(twmine l Polt y &I

lafraltt, trilkmwrij the all

rad UA 2Y A44,jof 1916S
U.S. Bomrbing 451

Surveyi

could nor bt iascerlainrd. No interruption of traffic. No damage

to trains. No Iosipes in Piursomntrl.

Tribachler

Rieding No 36 Sept. 3. 1918

Tonpigh from 10.50 P.M. to 3.15 A M. uninterrupted attacks or

enemy aerial siqiiadrnnt nn thte vmi ?nf and trf a:rcraf: bitterw; -

Nuillu of e area 51bij Rd. on the other side ot bignal L Abut

tan bombs --of unknown calibre -Were droppwd Tracks not

darnaged Pecause oif the bo~mbardmewnt with incrndiary bombs

the shed was partly~ burned Further the houilt itt~ated houtt oif

the tare Ho Rd (wtonying to t1e railroad quaid Bontrr was

COMpleteIiircduced to ashes The wawon 237." 5 1 at

Saarbruckmn also caught inr; 2 bottom boairdA burned Coat,

loader Mupel slightly, injured by bomb splifiter.

barratbo (Sofalbsatb) is OLrjul hllway bet wevo Wearburg anq

Nimiihvi i,1 Kait.I

Up~tenttlury 0 lotPotLtrori 0

T li ofily doiittij *ei 6#11h~ IWe.. Wall to he flip , e . ~~ ni h.lIvov & ('tinitaiiv (jul flip. ,.ii ilt life Whi ilt Atiil~ Wttwi

filly fullf 11it ' O It"r f of tife tll" r trualrifltt whItL h alrwourtlad

N.POV .W. (III firit tIetetsI were set ot' t1pWi' liptt.

I At V141111 iti tili. 1i...hltie at 111 i a ll 111 lfl rt' I 1111VVIl t..Utuj ,1tug.

trait. arts. he illiialo pttil sl, id .jt-airtm ieat oil handl

O ita'I.. l l'ti i~it ulli kfi'w. 'tairtl ei I, -' iti ll Owl w i V. sad.

tjial 14. 1t..jwe wwte er'e t -wd Atwil i i-i LA~ilt tirii
452 US Air Serce

in World WarI

Vol. IV

St Ingbert

St Ingborl, about 8 miles east of Saarbrucken, on the Rohr- back, a tributary of the Sear River, was an industrial town of some 220,000 parplb. At ilia i.nifor of ion extenaive anai-mlnng ores, It was the site of large Iron and steel worksA

Numbe~r of Raids 2

Numrto, of Brumbas 7

I otu) loals due to oth H&aol &,0 At,,. 400,00M marks kIualIag La ft lodutdiuri due to Wt Hi idis arid arito

WWUM Itilr wilinl fla-Jfa

600 'OF1 111111d eelJ

101ut1aPb rO 1(0ntW Ikji, 20,IKJU "tralks A Univ twut raid.f were recorrded of 0,14 piar U (it, it# 14, iitt t Hurniliio arid %I lirU''.rl hievi Will kit. at will, h 2,LV.Aj itler fit *rriluwdl. wit fill Augiust Y, IMnI, wife,,if I, builis were' tolujl,v

ewa t Vfln lbngnl~e I) ~, e, I l~ 1 nrn 1111*, ls.m~ Ulk ialit, fit Ob. fis~tory 0lated fiai to al alrti, dunig wlin It

as a ule 2 boo,. were l'1,ti Ows If,"i pt-! i loo i~selirlted 2,0010 milrk tit, veal'ree..d it, Ie,,rrs it i ti'rdur 1. MA) litl fit

islarl $lte. 6WO lulls u ti A)Irid teel, aird hiAIAA) lulls rat Puri

ut7J-Arilomil. NV1l., 'rir.g Ittl Ii ulsa rr.t'ne fli 0146vt t &~. the

Ili of1l Will Ven of ultm ero-rjJ',ye wits kiweten urity it, a lititeoJ eoitsif~ btiny flpaid.f

A
453

ASA

blu'i,gi jtjrq I Ut.Ily

liPIJIIPI Pgi(111&~i l 111106 *Iiuiil 14 It*110k MllboASI (if hal

1.111' Pun wai~ all ''u.JibPIlNIl ( 1 , Il a', .1 %lrbI *oulkii, k~whgt 1.

I'Q'U *-III (.Uhl I'm1 111 111& aIlp Ii fuali ureluJ[i 1 11V Isl bumil''

1811,11 I tl 4flifl l~ i l 1n I l . I. l ,

Oa .. itl 14.44i 4- 1A1 1 4

IL,.,l. d4 A. p1 , III,

lat 'I I 41 *L.1 SO,. II ' 1 t I4.'S 41
44U.S5 Air Service

In World War I

Vol, IV

A

-46

Zwelbruchen

Zwlbrucherr, southeast of Nwunkfrcksn and about 17 or IS10

miles 0as1 of BSabrucken, was an Industialil loan of $ornto

16,00 peupia

Nirtillir of Heed, b

lulmal tkerbal Lfoppvd 9,6

loe) lernd lost through alivne arnd raid, 1t1 hill Is 11eli11.

1(1 oiel anewje of u10tau 86,041 "mirke

F111'10rdetur. for PrlootsIkn I&,b 4 rmark.

It.411 111 sanpee OWN 1 eet UO,'4l w 02 riiarkb

1

1w eth#v of zwpelein ul ive wees slipe lod Wilti Iwil II Faide A"

Aiu Y. IWO 44 laeuiii p] sit A (A) A MI All linet eignga

ivouil ml 1U ID A Mr lttiw. Ill noill 'IW tee4eiuteerav 'l L).njri,&

d 31jg'dI. (aftf of daisgee 7l,4tA HM. Ia

Jene 4 6. IV) It haul gumo',uo. ci&1i11 4'j I'MI All; t

Ajil wrii atl 7 3. A MI lit. ?'j lesi. 11ue) cmipl'.;

ht11. i q,l I'I P (i ffi il~eu dotiiptim Iff' Ni A I ra.*sjs

1end'4.p 11 1 t lt / Hsd eeAwt dir l 60,7f l I... -&

v'%vli at 41' I' 11#1iF. ii rieiurcm 141 fun~w eiiila 6 t1ueiiA

dr11opled. 9, L.4-41 -of -l~ails. 12.741 rieuhs

10, I 191 ql lns-l smiieerd m of IC. (I', A NI All tes iise

ip* ii I I uo A H hiie. 6 It'imeuilw lpo wimuiis 4ai tnkes,, 4

N~'e. 14.. iless Alt laoftel-a . toi I 0jgw' Is idle tutii

M.0. 1, It. 1,411 it. I 0si''o'." ' r l of11 (0) N I i ro %ib'mia

f-Pl', Al 1 19j 1* MI mwO I tI 1.upaJ Iwtliui if tnn'i'.s f'sqq1 d,

14 toni ted deetue~j 11141 "wits

1t. # ilk lhad'I.,o (sil.lvi a * 'ie d .u 1 l i tj 1 liel qa.t

(4..1 ., . iiq. 4 . .. I

t ~ , I , e! 4ly gi. hI' lt (uii.114t'r - 1. '

I..I. q'. 'sst l.ui 6. . .lnl 1l t. I o 1 I. *H I' I"I

1J' s 1cii.. i % 14 e11 .4 1 l l 111ii, t% ". ,i -0i0ii- . A.

IA. ('4. A.#e'ee4 *D4t efhd 4F0 i1-seL i IntL. tlowth All I t ','ebs

WHOS 41P4.4 "t eb"I&4 14.1.10 i.0 1&dAiim4 rSI1

1). 1eas4mii twoi t6i 1jd 1s. ie MAI
.1A

A

1

U.S. Fimrbinjj 455

Survcy

lInformationi peirlairing Ii) the pruduotiori of war matetial iiits~ IN

two liactrles (rnj Zweitu'iksr sOwit mi followis

Peas her I cur turv l.Sc skualls wait Iprodur ad olat trale (if 2-5

daily. rm-in& Value Uf bilin being 24,000 marks

All uptralrorrs ceased duitil *it raids -ho1-urts ofi wurq "Is

was bitbyi h a o the Iii iii l I #h..jt i q-e ,,s a.

2,0Mikwe f200 k

Nm buius was paId errilows. but flull gINV was racvrutd tiv

ariltrourv elovinhs

Not Inarl 'If 11,1s Ia. fifty was aeur lgimnd duinig Ilia wall

011iglo, Str hne mut~ #iilnk IN larhlls waie tutodi. $4, at Ilia

tale IA lhtAjW daily, twjrrey v*1lu. (If uanw b, Iti.j hl.IMPJ Manic

All olitnt Lased diii Ai rid. l huts ol wil. I,o dutmru Ilmo.. raidD sInuukJ We hakin fnrr, ills Liry rijiIIt I" HII,

leturi l all (it *vi. vr kePt of file [IF 1-ny

I'Al g~i sto-mb wait vwrvil,ye tIdal toll Ofl daily wacprs Imeigli

uii we ir used ti-n pi.t 1in attif sit irrids *s1m 1, wirl I

hilr [tm1'ii well pand urmntl.vus fill) hayi wits tF. wlf.l trly Iletif

dornrru lllttlem they weire uraJor mhiplivr due t" it n am]

Nit liart of thins Is. lrish was vvir bumniied dunnig tlia wi

41

lei. 111106 *eesl "I Ivt,',. 1. '.. liiiau,1s-s 1"'91,iti6i Lth

Wtil a fi~u at ml112i1 taua Lot *'.Lil 40~j I-skPuia

1.4 srift nwtii.I sal timirtat4 4r.A 'Aaj rink
A

456 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Number m..icuI

Doe U1 Haid Anriuumied of Liombb IDamasW Killed

Mark%

(Xi 30. 1917 12(K 00 WJII 9 IOW0 I

hd' 20, 1918 12 45 P.M 7 A~0,000 2

IFeb 8, 918 12.18P M 6 90,000 2

Lk 1. 30, 1918 9.40 PM 6 175,000 5

44L,000 15 -

Tt. abov 6i4uis for ma'tal rfarnhU.reJrHlI A lrIaI o 791

claimb seinmrid fur domaisi bul dtoi riof Intludir all almuet

equal number (4 4 laimb which wv,, pa4wd thruugh insurarww a

K weser slaulutmn. wwIio hn tist nitirg thur bOU pigly, Ig

Iltuataed holwooli basebturken and Mannheim lite inllties

I jidl I use ul h udgi huh )i, 'rY Milriko

@4 1 t 'i ~.' .agi ie at,. ilIV I '

N. ~ le / Ijm a-. uIt IM All is jiwiA

at V i -M kidit 411i ie,iai Lualii Ia l.at . II

r'iiie ailr . I N--A -ilqj

M&,.. I mIi, IVIli Ila,.I 'Ju i 1 , I'MP. All - a

euaJw-0' apie I Al I' m 1 -*4 iml 11.1n fiu 1i tI I111

i, Vu.1i Ivin fj l -e p.. ,t l & I it Ali Al

iiaw,ij w r-~, I 4 I mwut I ho t II iiE uigu 4ei allw ii

J4 Ii II ; aIN w aeulw" &I ol~ II M. Ait 'c,4 *a.i*
F

U.S. Bombing 457

Survey

given at 5. 15 P.M. Time. 1 hr. 2 min Total number of bombs

dropped! 15, persons kllld, 1, injured, 3. Cost of darnagvii,

600,000 mark5.

Sep',. 14, 1918 Hitid iinounced iii 10 10 P.M All clear Signal

given at 11 47 AKNI Tint., 1 hr 37 min. Total number of bombs

droppeid, 10. Persons killed, 4, Injured, 2. Cqst of datmagei,,

250,000 mairks.

Sept. ?!,. 1918. Raid annwurd at 10 06 AM. All odear

signal giver, at 10 45 A.M. Timm, 39 min Total number of bomb.

dropped, I IPersons killed. 0, injiired. 2 Costl of damages,

250,000) marks.

Out 2161, 19114. Raid annourx-ed at 8 12 F) MI Ai clear sertal

given at 10 54 P MI Tinfoi, 2 hr. 42 min i(otal number of bombs

diopind, 4, perscrls killed, 1, injured, F, Lust of damages.

600,000 rriArkS

2 Tlw, niili1tr authioritiest fumnishad the city with 16 anti

aircraft uuni, Several seaulight. anid Signal bomi.,,,. cost ii those

floor kri),ril flyv III# (O£In iiari I~ugt'p ., The facltV sirunit,

lifel~hiiiive anid iutial Iorrmilib wort used Ailcioun1t irig air raid% No

shjelter ul niiy kind wab built for tlir Imiillaliori, therefore, Illrfc

WAS Fil iito" liIs ti j lior tilt, i thAt renllpet I All tjijkli~viw, In Ille

flyV WAS IlF'I *

1

OiyAt u a ,tgidVIItI il fm 11111 t off 4W 1~l oif raid

alit ll- t'liweri ll 111II.' 1si1iil of 1141 dall le1r4 wf ivbil

Ih radrittiflife~ twl -if %wilru401 ftlo bfiiiw, ii 2 bud aii

lit file li rit l?I(Yxl tiatka, thevir wIl i m,, utiii, of It'li

0)? '1tlirl daliia'jw, to, tilm 10raildi duuiiiu 0, 16 fotul or arty cillir

4 li14111i1i1t,111 110.'tarul it, flm ~I-uIt11 11uh oil WSJa n'intrla: by

Illp ~a 4t I 'e .. IIIde iiMase i air no f,i,.s

ta(n 11 lx ulalt, 1411 i''iealue ld~f,4,, 1,0611 tueIti 41 A111111'

All uioioet-t'i i easd llunliu sit tivils Il hours lt iaonl' Ilisr

iii.. ut .Ft ii ait , wrte ket I al tiris, la.ti,

111 1111:41 wfi v fiig .,vi~li 11116 i u 1,igt 1 il t id iI 11I V 'r 0

l'-iiiu YOU 1i.016 M l 4'itMin il I, t wi. r i.: Ii i ( A MI IL. 6 tAJ

N4.,:'ai cIi .leh.'e,. If It, Off ii~ Ii,,?, (if eiiijlhlf s elis

hut, we. trot it I, ii.'lon gis d e,

Fil '.4IW V~5i (ii.114'l. 111010 tl iipi 1u1 aut ")

1ti I b lif i s is e l fA . Wfl1.I.AJ infe us

A
L458 .S. ir S rvic inWrd a

Vol, IV

458,Amuuwr ht~ ~rMtra .s Airod Servei

01;%~i fIi( Worldr War 

(Y"Ild ~ ~ ~ diypoLI-11,2 ~ ~ ofbIV ~ ~ ~ rusVl 

1'.) 601 

21 1 200

7 6 8WX i04 200)

Smal Idfi 01 1 pIkIk

?~ sA 1 I., I l.i t~kt-r i ILnenil d I'l-Ii INi It,) f&SA i j
U.S. Bombing 459

Survey

G. M. Pflff Werke Factory. Locks for machine guns were

produced at a rate of 200 sets daily, money value of same being 40,000 marks.

All operations ceased during air raids. Hours of work lost

during announcements should be taken from the city report as

no record of raids were kept at the factory.

About 800 persons were employed. Total cost of daily wages

being about 9,000 marks. Hours of work from 7.00 A.M. to 6.00 P.M. No night work.

No means of defence for the protection of employees. Dugouts

were built for the protection of employees at an expense to the

factory of about 10,000 Mks.

No bonus was paid employees but full time was paid them

during the time they were under shelter due to a"r raid

announcements.

No part of this factory was ever bombed during the war.

-49-

Landau

The targets of the raids mentioned in the following report

were barracks and the railway station at Landau, a town of some

14,000 people, about 25 miles southeast of Kaiserslautern and

about the same distance southwest of Mannheim.

Number of Raids: 3

Number of Bombs 29

Total Amourt of Damage: 310,809.88 marks

Date ot Time Duration Killed Iombs

Raid Hr -Min Dropped

1918

May 20 11 30 AM. to

17-30 P.M 1 3 17

Jut.e 30 8 36 A M to

9 U5 AM 29 0 6

Juliw 30 1 12 A M to

2 27 A M I I, Li

lutll 2 44 3 29
460 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

r. -50-

Ka rlsruhe

Allied planes flew many bombing missions to cities on the

Rhine River and caused many more alerts in the area. Karlsruhe,

E being east of the river and outside the zone of occupation, was

beyond the reach ol Americans investigating the effects of Allied bombing. Consequently, the Americans could not obtain

detailed information about the raid the French made on 15 June

1915 in reprisal for the Germans' shelling of Verdun and Nancy.

Nor Could they report anything except casualty !igures foi the

French raid of 22 June 1916, which caused the Germans to reorganize and strengthen the home defense against aircraft.

yNote: It being impossible to go directly to Karlsruhe. the

following is all the informstion procurable.

o.:- of Raid Killed Wour.ded

June 15, 1915 30 55

June 22, 1916 117 152

Feb. 9, 1917 1 2

May 31, 1918 5 100

June 25, 1918 1

April 11, 1918 6

Aug. 22, 1918 10 5

Sept. 15, 1918 2

Sept. 20/21, 1918 4

Total 164 326

Speyer

About 20 miles north of Karlsruhe, on the eft side of the

Rhine, is Speyer, a historic city with a famous :ith-century

cathedral. The only bombing there apparently was by the British on the night of 21/22 July 1918, when the assigned target

for Handley Pages of Squadron 216 of the Independent Air Force was at Mannheim.-

Number of Raids: I
-~ -'I- - r7--7-- 3

U.S. Bombing 461

Survey

Number of Bombs: 5

Total Damage to City- 23,329.22 marks

Total Damage to Railroad: 5,952.11 marks

July 22, 1918. Raid lasted from 1:36 A.M to ? Five bombs

were dropped around the station damaging property of 42 people

to the extent of 23,329.22 marks. This was the only raid on this

town. No protection whatsoever was built against air raids.

R. R. Speier. One bomb destroyed a switch track which was

repaired by 15 men in about 6 days at a cost of 2,950 marks.

Traffic was not delayed in the lpast Windows in buildings and several small buildings were damnged

which was repaired at a cost of 3,002.11 marks.

Information obtained from Burgomeister.

-52--

Ludwigshafen

The Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik was regarded by the

British as one of the most important targets for their strategic

bombers Founded in 1865, the company made aniline de3 and

nitrogen. Its main plant, one of the !argest chemical factories in

the world, occupied the northern part of Ludwigshafen, a city of

some 90.000 people, on the left bank of the Rhine, opposite Mannheim., A branch plant was situated nearby, at Oppau, just

north of Ludwigshafen.

Resume of Result of Bombing

Number of raids. 22.

Total damage to city and private property: 1,565,230.50 M

Damage to military stores: 210,00000 M

Expenditures for protection: 168,000.00 M

Total expenditures paid to dependents of killed and wounded,

including funeral expenses: 1,607,000.00 M Damage to RailroadDitect damage by bombs: 44,012.91 M

By anti-aircraft: 39590 M

Expenditure for protection: 25,000.00 M

Factories. Although there are numerous factories in this town,

all bombing raids seem to have been concentrated on but one

plant, viz., The Il'dische Anilin & Soda Fabrick (See below). A

It
462 U S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

few of the other plants received only isolated bombs and the

majority of the material damage was caused by anli aircraft guns.

However, alt suffered indirect damage from loss in production,

insurance premiums, cost of bomb proofs, etc. Below are

statements on six of the largest plants in this town and it is

safe to assume that the remainder of the factories-about 18 in

number--also suffered in proportion, but as these are all small

plants employing between 20 and 100 people, it was impossible

to get detailed information The following covers all the important plants in town:

1. The Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrick. This plant

manufactured poison-gas-cheinicals during the war, and was the tj objective for all Allied bombing in this section .... The total

grand lof damagesl, about 6,700,000 marks, shows that

considerable damage was inflicted but the moral effect seems to

have been enormous also From various conversations with the

chief director, it was this moral effect which also considerably

curtailed production. A total of 13 workmen and I soldier were

killed in all raids, and others suffered injuries, but these were all

covered by insurance. However, these deaths also helped to

lower the morale of the workers, which seems to have suffered

considerably.

2. Gebruder Guilene. Also a chemical plant, located in

Mundenheiml (near Ludwigshafen). Only 4 bombs in all dropped

on this plant, and no great material damage uas caused. No

records were kept regarding production, loss, etc .... The morale

of the workers employed here seems to have suffered

considerably also, although not to the extent of the "Badische"

plant. 3. Ludwigshafener Walzmuhle. No bombs fell on this plant, but

as this plart was run on a 24 hour a day working schedule, 

a

considerable production loss was caused by the various

alarms. ... As this plant is concentrated in one five story

buiiding, a bomb-proof was constructed by simply blocking up 

a

few of the basement windows, and this, as well as the fact that

the plant was never hit, served to keep up the morale of the

workers.

4. Gebruder Sulzer.

H. Hessenmuller

Dr. F. Raschig.

A statement from each of these firms regarding bombing

damage shows that very little material damage was caused by bombs, and the majority of loss was occasioned by anti a,rcralt

fire, insurance premiums, and production loss. 

..

. The effect

on morale does not seem to have been very marked, as bombs

were not dropped often enough on these plants
U.S. Bombing 463

Survey

Badische Anilin & Soda Factory

General Summary of Damages

1. Direct damages on Buildings 284,109 OOM. L_

Machinery, etc. 142,414 00

Material 92,787.19

519,310.10

2. Insurance Premiums

Buildings, material, etc. 393,205.80M

Personnel Insurance _0,519.75

Deduct amount paid by 453.72555

I inburance companies 134,622 73

Loss 319,062.82

3. Cost of Bomb proofs, etc.

A. Bomb-proofs, building protections, & window barricade 1,529,751.72

B. Light-proofing windows 150,720.88 

j

C. Camouflaging Gasmeters (?) 27,719.11

D Camouflaged factory (for de

ceiving nightbombers,) 95.61.79A

1,803,811.50A 4- Indirect Damage.

Production loss caused by work

stoppage & interruptions. 3,299,19800

Amount paid and unproductive as wages and salaries 740972.00

Grand Totai 6,682,354.51

Ludwigshafen. Air Raids

May 27, 1915 Raid lasted from 7.00 AM. to 7.45 A.M. 40 bombs were dropped in north part of city. 19 people killed and 8 wounded.

Sept. 22, 1916 Raid lasted from 12.00 midnight until 12.40 A.M.

No bombs fell in Ludwigshafen; all fell in Mannheim.

Jan. 3/4, 1917 Raids lasted from 9.00 P.M. to 9.40 P.M., 11.07 P.M. to 11.27

P.M., 3.25 AM. to 4.00 A.M. Five bombs were dropped in

this city, the rest in Mannheim.

July 27, 1917 Raid lasted from 1 15 A.M. to 1.40 A.M. 40 bombs were

dropped. Dec. 24, 1917 Raid lasted from 12.50 A.M. to 1.20 A.M. 2 bombs were dropped

in this city, the balance in Mannheim

Jan. 24, 1918 Raid lasted from 9.00 P M. to 9.45 P.M. 3 bombs were dropped.

-j 

-.
464 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

Feb. 18, 1918 Raid lasted from 11.25 P.M. to 11.50 P.M. 2 bombs fell on wood

storage of chemical factory.

Mar. 18, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.20 P.M. to 2 00 P.M. 14 bombs were

dropped, 6 people killed and 18 wounded.

Mar. 24, 1018 Raid lasted from 12 20 A.M. to 2.25 A.M. 13 bombs were

dropped, killing 4 people and wounding 13.

Mar. 24, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.45 P.M. to 1.40 P.M. 14 bombs were

dropped, wounding 9 people.

May 22, 1918 Raid lasted from 1.00 A.M to 1.30 A.M. 26 bombs

were dropped.

May 23, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.00 midnight to 12.45 A.M. 20 bombs were

dropped on chemical iactory and around factory

May 28, 1918 Raids lasted from 12.55 A.M. to 1 45 AM., 2.25 AM.

to 2.40 A M. 6 bombs were dropped in open field

between Freinenheim and Ludvgshafen.

June 27, 1910 Raid lasted from 1.20 A.M. to 1.45 A.M. 9 bombs vere

dropped, the most of which fell in chemical factory.

June 30, 1918 Raid lasted from 1.20 P.M. to 1.50 P.M.

10 bombs were dropped on city and chemical factory, killing 4

people and wounding 4

July 20, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.20 P.M. to 12.50 P.M. 17 bombs were

dropped on the city.

Aug. 15 1918 2 raids lasted from 11.15 P.M to 11,30 P.M., 12.45 A.M. to 1.00

A.M. 10 bombs fell in Mundenheim.

Aug. 26, 1918 Raid lasted from 10.50 P.M. to 11.50 P.M. 18 bombs were

dropped on city and chemical factory.

Sept. 7, 1918 Raid lasted from 1.50 A.M to 2.35 A.M. 21 bombs were

dropped, injuring 1 person.

Sept. 16, 1918 Raids lasted friom 2.15 P.M. to 2.45 P.M., 3.05 P.M. to 3.35 P M.

Only I bomb fell in this city, the rest in Mannheim.

Oct. 24, 1918 Raid lasted from 8.40 P.M. to 10.20 P.M. 4 bombs fell on

chemical factory.

Oct. 30, 1918 Raid lasted from 10.00 P.M. to 12.15 AM. 11 bombs fell in north

part of Munderiheim and in open fields

Alurms July 30, 1915 11 00 AM. to 11.40 A.M

Jan. 6, 1918 4.30 A.M. to 5 05 A.M. Raid on Mannheim.

Feb. 20, 1918 11,40 P.M. to 12.10 A.M. Raid on Mannheim.

Mar. 17, 1918 1230 P.M. to 1.10 P.M Raid on Kaiserslauein.

May 20, 1918 11.15 A.M to 11.45 A.M.

June 29, 1918 8.40 A.M. to 9.05 AM.

June 30, 1918 8 40 A.M. to 9.10 AM.

July 7, 1918 4.30 PM to 4.55 P.M.

July 19, 1918 12.40 A.M. to 1.20 A.M.

... --..
U.S. Bombing 465

Survey

July 31, 1918 9.55 A.M. to 10.10 A.M.

Aug. 16, 1918 8.30 A.M. to 8.52 A.M.

Aug. 21, 1918 1 10 P.M to 1.50 PM

Aug. 22, 1918 11.20 AM. to 12.00 Noon.

Aug 22, 1918 12.35 P.M. to 1.10 P.M

Aug. 22, 1918 9.00 P.M. to 9.20 P.M.

Aug. 23, 1918 11.05 P.M. to 11.40 P.M.

Sept. 14, 1918 10.30 P.M. to 11.30 P.M.

Sept. 15, 1918 1.05 P.M. to 1.40 P.M.

Sept. 15, 1918 11.00 P.M. to 11.20 PM.

Sept. 21, 1918 9.20 P.M. to 10.20 P.M.

Sept. 25, 1918 11.45 P.M. to 12.08 AM.

Sept. 25, 1918 12.30 AM. to 1.05 A.M.

Oct. 21, 1918 4.05 P.M. to 4.15 P.M

Oct. 21, 1918 8.25 P.M. to 8.50 P.M.

Oct. 21, 1918 9.30 P.M. to 10.15 P.M.

Damage to private parties and to the city amounted to

1,565,230.50 M

Expenses for funerals, hospital bills, etc. for people killed and

wounded was 10:000 M.

Erecting special tombstones at graves of pe,;ple killed in air

raids, 5,000 Marks.

Money advanced to dependents of those killed and hospital

bills for wounded, 32,000 M.

Money that state vill have to pay to dependents of people

killed and those totally disabled, 1,560,000 Marks.

Expense of making cellars in public buildings bomb proof,

78,000 M.

Installing signal alarm system, 10,000 M.

Preparing quarters in school buildings for people whose homes

were destroyed by bombs, 40,000 Marks.

Maintaining a flying raid bureau to May 16, 1919; has cost 30,000 M., and before its work is completed, will cost another

10,000 Marks.

On the raid of Mar. 24, 1918, 13 full military gasoline tank cars

were punctured and quite a quantity of gasoline was lost; loss

estimated at 210,000 Marks.

All business houses were closed during a raid or alarm.

In the opinion of a number of people interviewed, the raids

had a great effect on the population in this area, causing nervous

breakdowns and generally impairing their efficiency.

Night raids had the greatest effect both on the morale of the

people and in amount of damage caused.

[h

I . .. .. ...a.. = iaaY - . . ..
466 U.S An Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Damage to R R., Ludwigshufen

July 27, 1917 One bomb fell alongside of switch tracks, damaging one R.R. car

traffic was not delayed and damage was repaired at a cost

of 1,434.74 Marks.

Jan. 3, 1918 3 bombs fell in R.R. yards damaging one locomotive and 4

passenger cars, traffic was not delayed and damage was

repaired at a cost of 1,593.42 Marks.

Jan. 6. 1918 1 bomb was dropped in R.R. yards, destroying one

main line track which could not be used for six hours, traffic

was not delayed but switched around damaged.

Damage was repaired at a cost of 805.81 Marks.

Jan. 24, 1918 One bomb fell between Ludwigshafen and Mannheim, damaging

the telephone line which was repaired at a cost of

42.84 Marks.A

March 18, 1918 3 bombs fell in R.R. yards at station, damaging one main line

and several pasenger cars; also the telegraph lines.

One mair line could not be used for one hour but traffic was

not delayed. Damage was repaired at a cost of 7,201.35 M.

March 24, 1918 a bombs fell on main line between Ludwigshafen and

Mannheim delaying traffic for 3 hours and hindering work

at the R.R. Rhine harbor for several days, 13 gasoline tank

cars a.,d 10 freight cars were also damaged. Damage was

repaired at a cost of 28,000 Marks.

May 21-22-23- Quite a ',)t of damage was done to R.R. buildings and rolling

27-28, 1918 stock which was repaired at a cost of 4,484.75 M.

June 27, 1918 Damage by anti-aircraft guns, 139.90 Marks.

July 20, 1918 One line over Rhine bridge was not used for 3 weeks because

of changing a girder which had been damaged by a bomb

on a previous raid. Cost to repair damage 450 Marks.

Oct. 23, 1918 Damage by anti-aircraft to building repaired at a cost of 256

Marks.

Expense of shading lights in R.R. yards and buildings,

6,700 Marks.

Installing alarm system in R.R. yards, 2,900 Marks.

Building bomb proofs and making station cellar bombproof, 15,400 Marks.

No specia! crews were kep; on hand to repair damage by

bombs.

No bonus of any kind was paid to employees.

During the first year of the war, bombing had no great effect

on the morale of the employees but as the raids became more

frequent and the sizes of the bombs larger, the efficiency of the

employees was very much impaired.

During a raid and alarm, all traffic was stopped and in the

opinion of R.R. officials the greatest damage sustained al this

point was from idleness during a raid or alarm.
U.S. Bombing 467

Survey

=I

--53-

Worms

Worms, a commercial and manufacturing city of some 40,000

people, had no great war plants and was not a primary target for

Allied bombers. The three attacks reported by the American

survey teani. the first by the French, and the other two by the

British, were made by planes which had been sent to nearby

targets at Mannheim or Ludwiashafen.

Number of Raids: 3

Total Amounl of Damage: 120,300 Marks

The city of Worms was protected against air raids by anti.

aircraft batteries and searchlights. All information on these is in

the hands of the military authorities.

There were 3 raids on the city, ... First: 6/7 July, 1917, 20

bombs were dropped in the outskirts of the city in the

neighborhood of the prisoner of war camp, damage amounted to

about 300 M- Second 15/16 August, 1918, 2 bombs fell in the

Rhine. Third: 28/29 October, 1918, 1 bomb fell between the

junction of two railway tracks, and damaged several cars on a

siding but did not injure the tracks or hold up traffic, material

damage amounted to about 120,000 M

Railroads. There were 3 different warnings: (1) Danger from

the air (Luftgefahr); (2) Danger of flyers (Fliegergefahr); (3) Flyer

alarm (Flieger-alarrn). No. I & 2 were merely preparatory, at 3

all trains were stopped by the dispatcher and from a central

switch all electric lights in the station were extinguished. The

passengers In trains went into the tunnels under the platfoim

and those in stations to the ce~lar.

The only bomb which fell near the railroad destroyed 4 freight

cars partially and slightly damaged the track. There was no

congestion for neighboring track was used. Usual yard crew

repaired damage.

Herr Rohmann stated that schedules were badly disrupted due

to these delays. Trains from Ludwigshafen 21 K. distant were

frequently two hours late.

i == - -. ~=
468 US i cxc

\ M)I d W'rc\ar

VJ. IV
U.S Bombing 469

Survey

-54-

Mainz

Mainz (Mayence), on the Rhine just below the influx of the

Main, was a commercial and manufacturing city of some 100.-

000 people. Furniture, shoes, and sparkling wine were its chief

products. There was some war industry in the city but no great

establishment comparable to the chemical works at Ludwigshafen that could be singled out as major industrial targets for

Allied bombers. The two raids reported by the American survey

- leam were flown by the Independent Air Force, the taiget for the

first being factories, barracks, and railways, and for the second,

the railway station.

Number of raids: 2

Total time lost: 18 hours, 30 minutes,

Results of Allied Bombing

The protections of Mainz against air raids, as in the case of

most German cities, were entirely in the hands of the military

authorities and definite information on all points could not be

gotten. It appears thlat there were sixteer anti-aircraft batteries

around the city, and many searchlights. Further information was

not availanle- The city govcrnment took no special precautionary

measures other than publishing how alarms would be given from

the "Militarsche Polizeicentral Telephone" and marking good

cellars to be used as refuges.

There appear to have been only two raids on Mainz, March 9,

1918 and Sept. 15, 1918 .... The raid report2d to have taken

place on Oct. 23.24, 1918, is absolutely denied. (... [In] the

first raid . . .eleven persons were killed and many wounded.)

The second raid took place during the night and it is asserted

that none were seriously injured nor were buildings damaged; the

greatest injury was done on the Johannes Kirche. No fires

resulted from bombing. Except for splinter marks on walls no

traces of bombing can now be observed.

As far as could be gathered from direct questioning the morale

of the population was not affected by alarms, but from siips in

the conversation and one or two confidential sources it appears

that they were quite worried. The people and authorities were

surprised at the few times the city was bombed, since planes

were almost continually over Mannheim and Frankfurt-a-M. They
470 U Vin S Air Service

World War 

I

Vol IV

attribute the sparing of the city either to the fact that it was

known that many Allied officer prisoners were kept in Mainz, or

to the fact that the Allies wished to get possession of the town

intact.

There were not enough raids to compare results of day and

night except that more people were caught in the street during

the day. During alarms all street car traffic and business stopped

in town.

Insurance - Frankfurter Allgerieine Versicherungs Akt.-Ges This was

undoubtedly the largest company dealing in air-raid insurance in

Germany: it is estimated that it had perhaps one-fourth to one- third cf all that type of business in Mainz. Rates: 1:2 M rvr 100n M on rea! estate; 1'3 M extra if offio:s iii

r house

2,3 M per 1000 M on certain retail stores.

1-14 M per 1000 M on munition factories.

Herr Harburger estimated that he had collected premiums of

between 50 and 60,000 M for all air raid insurance, durin last

year of war (real and personal) in Mainz and surroundings. Providentia Ins. Co. Estimated that they had 110-1/15 of the

air raid insurance policies of Mainz. Premiums on policies

amounted to from 5 to 6,000 M per year.

The remainder of the air-raid insurance business was scattered

among many companies having agents in Mainz, but no one of

these was -' qreat size

Railroads

On three occasions only were trains held up. July 2, 1918, 

4

trains lost a tota' of 2 lirs. 10 min Aug 20, 1918, 5 trains lost a

total of 3 hrs. 19 min. Sept. 16, 1918, i3 trains lost a total of 7

hrs. 50 min.

This is the total of trains actually stopped and causing

congestion. No bomhs made direct hits on tracks, but from

those which fell near tiacks, damage to railway property-glass.

wires, etc.--amou ited to 1871.80 M No tie-up in traffic resulted

from these bombs nor were special preparations in the way of

crews made in ca .e bombs should strike the tracks.

Factories of Mayence

All :he factories of the City of Mayence were connected with

the central military telephone office so that all had the ssme warnings and alarms The signal Tuftgefahr was preparatory

warning and only on the further notice of Fliegeralarm did work

in the factories stop. The approximate time lost for each factory

LI
A

U S. Bombing 471

Survey

was twenty hour_ Other manuiac-urers had no exact records of

time lost and estimated it from ten hours to sixty. I believe the

higher estimates are due to he increase in alarms toward the

end of the war.

Gspporat & Gusswerk, Akt.4Ges., Mo1z

Personnel: 1,000 men, 2,800 wornen.

Daily oroduction: 12.000-1.5,000 fuses: value 200,000 M.

Production lost about 10,000-13,000 fuses, 17,164 M wages.

Production 148,100 M, Factory insured, premium cost 12,000 M per year.

For Protection, 5,000 M was spent in reinforcing and building

14 cellars

Firm a erner & Merz

Personnel: 700 men and women

Product per day:

10,0O0 field cookers (same purpose as solidified alcohol, but paraffine 5,000 used); trench value lamps 35,000 (burned M paraffine ih wo, en wick;

known as Hindenburg Lampe); value Y,500 M,

5 tons paraffine, also shoe and meal polish, 10,000 M

Losst including labor:

10,000 cookers, 40,000 M

5,000 lamps, 7,8000 M

5 tons paraffine, 10,500 M.

Insurance: 10 million M premium cost 13,000 M per year. Protection used ordinary factory celars. Warnin siren

instd. cost 250 eured; M.

Gosmesser fbrik

0Personne e400, 000 of these worked on fuses.

Product 5000 fuses for 50 MM howitzer and field artillery;

value 60-75,000 IM. Loss equalled approximately one day's

production;, all labor on piecework basis, so no wages lost. Insurance: M per thousand on fire insurance, amounted to

n2,00 M every 3 months.

No special protection. This factory is in the central part of

town and was the nearest of any in Mainz (approximately 500

yards) to a spot where a bomb fell.

~Julius Kamheld

Employees: 300 men and women

Product daily: 350 shells cast And turned value 10,000 M

vaAlso foundry,. Loss including wames: 350 shells, 16,000 M

No insurance or special proteciion.
472 U.S Air Service in World War I

Vo! IV

Sichel u Cie G. m. b. H.

This is merely a warehouse handling plates, bars and other

rolling mill piuducts Employees, exclusive office force, 8 to 10

men who handled 4 5 tons a day, valued at from 4 5,000 M Loss

due to alerts inconsiderable.

Johann Schmohl Mainz.Mombach

Personnel: 150, chiefly men.

Product: 32 tons pei month of light gauge locomotive bodies

without driving mechanism; wheels for same, 100,000 M per mo.

Loss about 1-2 tons, 8-15,000 M, including wages.

Insurance. 1 million M premium 1300 per year No special

protection

Verein fur Chem Industr, Chemische Fabrik, Mainz

Personnel. 25 men and women, including 50 prisoners of war.

Product per day: 500 kg. of "dope" for airplane linen, value

10,000 M

Loss, including wiges 50 kg., value 14,000 M.

Factory was insured but amount not known as policy kept at

main office of the "Verein" in Germany No special protection,

but the City of Mainz installed the siren used for warning the

suburb of Mombach, in this factory. It was stated that employees

considered alarms a Joke.

Munitionsonstalt, Mainz

Personnel- 1,000 women, 50 men.

Product: (this was a government arsenal, so no prices for

cartridges car. be given) 300,000 small arms cartridges assembled

only in 24 hours.

Pay of employees, basis of 9 hour day:

500 women 5 95

50 men 7.02

400 worien 5.95 & bonus of 10 pf hr extra for night work.

Loss due to alerts: about 6,500 M in wages, 300,000 cartridges.

Herr Hasselmann stated that the plant had about 100 women

on the sick list, due to poor food, nervousness over air alerts,

and other causes

During alerts the emplnyees went to one of the neighboring

forts. A bomb struck this but appears to have been a "dud". for

I was assured that the hole made in the ground was barely

noticeable

No insurance or protection.
U S. Bombing43

Sulye" 47

K! p sketch of Frankfurt. taken fr)m Inteligence fies of the AE . GHQ

Lil /'' - "

N~i Ri 1 j,r j ~) 1 Tunrr

1/ouc pe mooyo

2~,0O) eectri bateriesfor IigbR vale 25,00 M

t 8,00 Feo osnt r~c eesaantbrs ie

etc..~bw soap 25000 M I/sitt 1tc 

O.5ise udn pViy& 70 bter rre10 ;160Kgmsci39 AMr G are j
474 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Insurance premium of 308.10 M was paid for the period from

Sept. 1918, to July 1919, and the manager is still wondering

whether he can recover from Nov. 1918. A loss of 100 M is

estimated due to skylights broken by anti-aircraft shell splinters.

No special protection.

Waggonfabrik Gabr. Gastell G. m b H.

Personnel: 1000, mostly men.

Product per month:

100 light railway cars with double trucks (8 wheels),

500,000 M.

100 light railway cars with single trucks (4 wheels),

170,000 M

Also ordinary wagons.

Lost about. 3 of each type cars, value 30,000 incl. wages.

Insurance: 600,000 M at rate of 1-1/3 M .,er thousand

premium; 800 M per year

No speci3l protectionFrankfurt

Frankfurt-am-Main, a commercial and Industrial city of more

than 400,000 peop!e, presented a number of good targets for

Allied bombers.

Number of Raids: 9

Number of Bombs- 108

Total Amount of Damage: 1,750,000 Marks

Expenditures for Protection: 75,000 Marks

The city of Frankfurt A.M. at the time investigated was not

occupied by any Allied troops zaii for that reason there was

nothing to compel the authorities morally or physically to qive

any information concerning air raids, so that a report is

necessarily limited to that information given freely in response to

questions.

The city was protected by anti-aircraft guns and searchlights,

but all this information is in the hands of German military

authorities ....

There were nine actual raids, the number of alerts must have

been at least equal to those of the siburb of t'jchst which

totaled almost 100.
U.S. Bombing - Survey 475

Frankfurt spent approximately 75,000 Marks building and

reinforcing cellars for the protection of the people; these

municipal refuges could accommodate between 15 and 20,000

people. If the war had continued, it was planned (in fact the

plans were completely drawn up at the time of the armistice) to

build shelters for the workers in the Osthaven at an expense of

1,000,000 Marks.

Resume of the Results of Bombing

on the Cho-mical Factory of

Meister, Lucius & Bruning, Hochsto

Number of Alerts. 98

Total Time Lost: 19 Hrs. 27 Min.

Expend.ture fo, PruteLtion: 435,i45 Marks

Insurance Premiums: 223,722 Marks

Bonuses Paid 2,290 Marks

Value of Loss of Production: 5,858,173 Marks.

Interviewed Herr Dr. Jonka, Oberburgermeister, of Hochst in

regard to official information on air raids. He stated that the

town had anti-aircraft and searchlight protection but that exact

information concerning this was in the hands of the military

authorities in Germany. All this equipment was maintained by the

Army at no expense to the city.

Although there were numerous alarms, no bomb was dropped

within the limits of the city. Dr. ,onka said it was not clear to

anybody why this town was spared on account of the large

chemical factory. The popular opinion was that English capital

was in the plant, but he said that the more intelligent knew that

this a' least was not the reason.

The Rathaus was insured but I did not learn to what extent.

The French in the city told me that the Germans were much

alarmed by the alerts, but, now that it is all over, the Germans

themselves as usual will not admit any anxiety at the time.

Both Dr. Jonka and Herr Blank absolutely deny . . . that the

workmen at Hochst were on strike and preferred the machine

guns of the troops to exposure to air raids. Herr Blank stated

that the factor, had been unusually free from strikes during

the wav and I t the workers were most loyal, putting their best

efforts into their work at all times. F

.,
476 U.S Air Servce

in World War I

Vol IV

-56-

-6 -WsanWiesbaden

Wiesbaden, then a city of 100,000 people, had long been

[ (, . - . ., . , famous as a watering place. The attack reported by the American survey team was made by a Handley-Page bomber of the

S" ' ,-- Independent Air Force. Squadron 97 dispatched six planes that

' k, night io targets at Mannheim, Essen, Cologne, Saarbrucken.

Ii ~ and Kaiserslautern. Because of poor visibility, fivs planes re- 1/ '.. ... ' .turned early The other dropped its bomb, a 1.650-pounder, in

the center of Wiesbaden.

, Number of Raids- I

fTotalAmouituf Damage: 1,250,000 Marks _ .--.- Number Killed: 14

The city of Wiesbaden is purely a residential place awd no Allied air raids were expected on it, however, as a measure of

safety and for the popular morale one anti-aircraft battery was

located near the city under the direction of the military

authorities at Mainz. Also cellars were marked for protection but

no money was paid by the city for reinforcing them.

During alerts all business in the town stopped but I was

unable to get a list of these alerts or the Iota! length of time

they lasted. From the position of the city with regard to Mainz

and Frankfurt a.m. I think there were probably between 25 and

35 alerts, but it was Gaid that the people were little affected by planes overhead for they did not expect any bombs to be

dropped.

The one raid took place on October 23, 1918. Serious damage

was caused by only one which tell in Riehlistrassre . . . The

damage done to certain houses totaled 693,900 M, added tu

which was other damage caused h, splinters. etc totaling

556,000 M . the entire damage amounted to about 1,250,000 M

In this raid, 14 people were killed and 20 more or less seriously

wounded.

As stated above Wiesbaden is not a manufacturing city, there

are no factories nearer than the cement mills at Biebricn and the

factories ol Mainz.

Railroads Trains did not stop running during alarms. It was

planned that if an attack actually took place cn the staton all

trains should stop running, but this never occurred

When an alarm was oiven all electric lights were extingiished

and passengers in the station went to the cellars All those

k -
US. Bombingi 477

Survey

= whose train was in got aboard and pulled out so it was afrrmed

practically on time.

No special crews were kept on hand in case rals should be

damaged

- -57-1

Coblenz

Targets for Allied raids on Coblenz (Coblence), a city of moreI

than 50,000 people, situaied at the influx of the Moselle into the

Rhine River, were railroads, barracks. and factories.

Number of Raids: 7

Number of Alerts; 37

Time Lost through Raids and Alerts: 36 hrs. 42 min

Number of bombs recorded; 110

Results of a raid on the residental area Of Coblen7

ofI

_
478 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Material damage reported (does not include damage to 122

people who were paid through insurance companies: 398,513.16

Marks)

Total Expenditure for Protection: 319,872.65 Marks

ICiryl

Oct. 1, 1917. Raid lasted from 10.00 P.M. to (?) Three bombs

fell around and in city damaging the property of 28 people to the

extent of 4045.41 M.

Mar. 12, 1918. Raid lasted from 11:40 A.M. to 12:30 P.M.

Twenty three bombs fell in the middle and west part of the city,

damaging R.R. station and R.R. Post Office. Damage was done

to the property of 122 people amounting to 54116,80 M. Twenty

three people have failed to report damage. In addition, the Post

Office received material damage amounting to 625 M One Post

Office employee was killed whose wife will receive 2,859 M. 

a

year until the high cost of living drops after which time she

receives 1,839 M. a year until her death. She is now 52 years old and can take 33,000 M. in a lump sum instead of the 2,859

M. a year. Three post office employees were wounded, costing

the government 1,353.70 M. In all 12 people were killed, 7 badly

wounded and 7 not badly wounded.

May 21, 1918. Raid lasted from 12:38 A.M. to 2:15 A.M.

Twenty six bombs were dropped, of which number five were

duds. Bombs fell on military barracks, Coblenz-Trier R.R. line,

hospital and in the city. Property of fifty one people was

damaged, amounting to 33,628.92 M. Eleven people have failed to

report damage.

June 6, 1918. Raid lasted from 7:53 A.M. to 8:50 A.M.

Seventeen bombs were dropped ralling on Telegraph Battalion

Barracks, in the Moselle River and next to a R.R. Water Tank.

Forty one people received damage to their property amounting

to 12,452.40 M. Fourteen people have failed to report amount of

damage.

July 2, 1918. Raid lasted from 10:40 A.M. to 11:50 A.M.

Twenty bombs were dropped on ship yards, in the Rhine River

and town. Two ships in ship yards were damaged, one being sunk; the damage to one ship was repaired at a cost of 3,871 M.

and the one which was sunk at a cost of 28,000 M. Neither of

these ships were used for military purposes, one being a private

passenger boat and the other a barge for hauling coal, etc.

Damage was done to the property of 55 people amounting to

13,505.41 M. Fourteen people failed to report damage. One

woman was killed.
U.S. Bombing 479

Survey

July 5, 1918. Raid lasted from 7:43 A.M. to 8:50 A.M. Six

bombs were dropped on R.R. ship docks, hospital, ship Moselle,

and on the city. Damage to the ship Moselle was considerable

and was repaired at a cost of 15,000 4. This ship was 

a

passenger ship and of no military value. The damage at the R.R.

ship docks was of no military damage, although it cost the city

quite a little to repair the damage. Damage was done to the

property of 163 people amounting to 158,000 M. Twtnty people

have failed to report amount of damage.

Aug.22/23, 1918. Raid lasted from 11:49 P.M. to 12 51 AM.

and 12:59 A.M. to 2.11 A.M., and 8:41 A.M. to 9:22 A.M. Fifteen

bombs fell in and around city of Coblenz damaging a ladies

seminary and the Fest Hall. Damage was done to the property of 114 people amounting to 23,367.94 M. Forty people failed to

report amount of damage. Two people killed and four injured.

Oct. 21, 1918. No bombs were dropped on this day but the

property of 29 people was damaged by anti-aircraft guns

amounting to 871.45 M.

City was protected by 12 anti-aircraft guns of 7.5 cm. and 

9

cm, calibre and eighteen machine g s. Two officers and 200

men were here at all times to take c_ e of and man the guns.

Did not have balloon barrage, aircraft or searchlights. This

information received from Wm. Benzich, Police Assistant, who

was in the home defence during the war.

City built two bomb proofs at cemetery costing 4554.65 M. for

both.

Closed all windows in the cellars of school houses at a cost of

3,996.50 M.

Installed and built an alarm system of 13 sirens at a cost of

38,536.50 M.

One man was retained to hand!e air raid claims and take care

of work in connection with raids, which cost the city 15,000 M.

This information received from F. Neumann. City Building

Director, and F. Behan, Post Office Director.

In connection with the people that were killed and wounded in

raids, the city paid 117 M. for funeral expenses to the relatives

of each.

Three wives of mer. killed are receiving 110 M. each a month.

How iong this will last, they were not able to tell me.

Amputations were necessary in the case of four wounded

which cost the city 2,267 M.

This information was received from Miss Loenartz, Director of

city Welfare work.

R.R. Coblenz

Oct. 1, 1917. One bomb fell just south of railroad station

Ei

f ... :- .. :

4/ I " I I 1 I 1,++
480 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

I

damaging main track to Mainz, a switch track, 18 passenger cars

standing on switch tracks and building. Passenger cars were sent first to Nippes and then to Lingen where they were repaired at a

cost of 4,550 M. Damage to the .:ne was repaired in a half a day

by sixteen mn at a cost of 100 M. Traffic was not delayed but

switched around the damage.

March 12, 1918. One bomb fell in front of R.R. std.,on

damaging the post office and station. Two bombs fell north of

the station but did no damage to rails. Damage to R.R. station

was repaired at a cost of 5,19.60 M. and damage from bombs

north of station repaired at a cost of 12.60 M. Ten men repaired

damage at R.R. station in three weeks. 

4

May 21, 1918. No bombs fell on R.R. line at Coblenz, but

damage which was was repaired done to at buildings 

a cost of by 1,629 their 34 own M. anti-aircraft guns 

I

Three bombs fell on two track line to Tripr a, Mosevweib'

which damaged one track so that it could not be used for 

4

hours. Traffic was not delayed as they used the other track. It

did handicap them though. Damage was repaired by ten men at

a cost of 100 M.

June 6, 1918. One bomb fell near office buildings damaging

them and a water tower. No damage was done to the system, or were trains delayed in the least. Damage was repaired at a cos;

of 2,755 M.

July 5, 1918- No bombs were dropped on R.R. lines but

damage was received from their anti-aircraft guns which was

repaired at a cost of 188 M.

Aug. 22/23, 1918. One bomb fell in round house at

Moselweiss, damaging the building but did not damage rolling

stock or hinder traffic in anyway. Damage was repaired at a cost

of 1,763 M.

Oct. 21, 1918. No damage from bombs but anti-aircraft did

some damage which was repaired at a cost of 490 M.

During an alarm or raid all traffic was stopped.

Employees did not receive a bonus but received 50% increase

in pay for overtime although not a 100 M. was paid for overtime

in connection with air raids.

Five bomb proofs were built at a cost of 34,094 M.

.. j._

-.-,
U.S. Bombing 481

Surley

Personnel tunnels at R.R. station were all made bomb proof at

a cost of 6,651 M.

No men were kent on hand to repair damage by air raids.

No special alarm system was installed on R.R. system. Efficiency of employees was impaired according to the

statement of the Chief Engineer.

This information received from Chief Engineer 1st class Grtes.,

J. Fen ,r';,:h, Round House Foreman, and R. Adam, R.R. director

at Winnigen.

Damage to Military Buildings

March 12, 1918. Bombs fell on Military Barracks and Wagon

Sheds of Pioneer Infantry. Damage was repaired at a cost of 610

M. One officer and three men were killed on this raid and one

more wounded.

May 21 1918. Bombs were dropped on wagon sheds, garrison

of Pontoon Company. Fort at Ober Ehrenbreitstein, new Artillery

Barracks. Clothing Office. Gymnasiums 2 and 3. Tradesman's

Building 3 and working parties' barracks. Part of damage was

repaired at a cost of 3,819 M., the balance to be repaired at an

estimated cost of 1400 M.

June 6, 1918. Bombs were dropped on "Telegraph Battalion

Barracks and Barracks at Ehreribreitstein Fort. damaging roofs,

windows and one trench mortar, damage was repaired at a cost

of 5,740 M.

July 5. 1918. Bombs fell on Lazerett Barracks, new field

barracks and train barracks, damaging roofs and windows. Part

of damage was repaired at a cost of 2400 M., balance to be

repaired at an estimated cost of 1700 M.

Aug. 23, 1918. Bombs fell on Barracks and oid train depot at

Ehrenbreitstein, damaging roofs and windows which were

repaired at a cost of 507 M. One officer was wounded.

There seemed to be a difference of opinion as to whether the

air raids had anything to do with the cnri of the war but

everyone interviewed were of the opinion that they did have

quite a decided effect on the morale of the people.

The opinions of the men who had seen prvvious military

service and had attended German officprs' schools were that the

- .4
482 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

raids on the Rhine provinces did help bring the war to and end,

not directly, but it was the means of carrying the war to the

people in power.

-58-

Bonn

The only attack on Bonn was made by six D.H.4's of the Independent Air Force which, because of bad weather, were diverted

from their assigned target at Cologne.

A report on the results on productio, of war material in Bonn

of Allied bombing is not very extensive, for the reason that there

are very few factor-es in town. About ten years or more ago, an

ordinance was passed prohibiting further building of factories

within some five kilometers of the city limits and when asked as to the factories of Bonn the universal answer is that the principal

factories are at Siegburg and Troisdorf, . .

The only raid on the city took place at 3.25 p.m. on October

31, 1918 when 10 bombs were dropped. . . 25 people were

killed or died of injuries and 37 were injured. No bombs fell in

the neighborhood of any factory.

In the early part of the war there had been anti-aircraft

batteries and searchlights for the protection of the city, but at

the time of the raid there were merely sirens and signal bombs

to warn the population.

The warning was given from Siegburg and Troisdorf and the

sirens sounded from a central switchboard in police headquarters.

Al; business and street car traffic was suspended during alerts.

A list of the alerts for the town is given on the attached list.

The morale of the population does not appear to have been

affected until after the first raid which was only eleven days

before the Armistice As may be noted from one of the red

posters, the people would not take shelter during alerts and an

example of what resulted fror this lack of caution in Cologne is

given.

Railroads One bomb on Oct 31, 1918 fell on the railroad but

buried itself in the ground between two ties without'exploding.

Trains were able to run without interruption and the slight

damage was repaired by the regular yard crew at odd times. No

crews were kept specially to repair damage by bombs.
U.S. Bombinq 483

Survey

Troisdorf

Resume of results of Bombing on the Rheinish

Westfalische Sprengstoff Act.-Ges.

Number of Raids: 0

Number of Alerts- 25

Total time lost: 19 hrs. 15 min.

Expenditures for Protection: 174,000 Marks.

Value of Loss of Production: 974,800 Marks.

Resume of Results of Bombing on the Falconeisen.

Walzwerk L. Mannstaed Co.

Number of Raids: 0

Number of Alerts: 11

Total time lost: 16 hrs. 30 rain.

Loss of Production: 600 Tons.

Value of Loss of Production- 300,000 Marks.

Expenditures for Protection: 21,000 Marks.

General information as regards town of Troisdorf. When

an alarm was given all the inhabitants of the town went to

the cellars, all business stopped, and street cars ceased

running for the duration. The town had had an antiaircraft battery in the early part of the war, but this was

removed before the first actual alert. There was one

searchlight in the center of town maintained by the

military; other than this, the town had no protection.

There was never a bombardment of the town and the

morale of the people was not appreciably lowered.

Railroads. In all, there were thirty alerts given the railway

authorities. During 4 out of the first 5, trains stopped running a

* total length of 3 hours and 53 minutes. During the 4th, lasting 30

minutes, schedules were partly suspended. Troisdorf is not a

railway center and this suspension of traffic was said to have had

little effect on other trains.

The town . Troisdorf has only two factories of any importance, the "Rheinish Westfalische Sprengstoff Akt-Ges."

composed of three branches: the powder factory, fuse factory,

and metal factory; and the "Faconeisen-Wa)zwerk L. Mannstaed

& Cie. Akt-Ges.".

.
484 U S Air Service - in-World War I

Vol. IV

i I I

4'

Bmb damage in Cologne

i -60-

Cologne

The ancient city of Cologne (Koln), famous for its magnficent

cathedral, had been bombed by a pilot of the Royal Naval Air

Service on 8 October 1914. Flying from Antwerp, Squadron

Commander Spenser Grey, had been unable to locate his target, the airship sheds, in a thick mist, so he dropped his bombs

in the middle of town, aiming at the main railroad station. British

planes did not return to Cologne until a Handley Page of the

Independent Air Force attacked on the night of 24-25 March

1918. the first mission mentioned in the following report. The

heavy casualties of the next raid, by D.H.4's of the Independent

Air Force on 18 May 1918, were the consequence of a breakdown of the German warning system.

Number of Raids: 4

Number of Bombs 35

Tortl Amount of Damage 872,000 marks

Loss of Production 138,500 marks

Cost of Protection. 10,200 marks

.. ... ...... .. ..... .... ... . ..
U.S Bombing 485

Survey

There were four actual an raidi on Cologne; during the 4th,

- only one bomb was dropped and the damage was insignificant.

The 10 bombs dropped dunng the first raid fell in Deutz, on the

east bank of the river, and a lumber pile was burned 

... This

was March 25, 1918.

In the second raid, May 18, 1918, carried out in broad

daylight, 43 people were killed and 55 wounded; 38 buildings

damaged. The estimated loss was about 340,000 Mks ....

In the third raid, Aug. 22, 1918, 6 people were killed and 10

wounded, 22 buildings damaged; loss 477,000 Mks

Sept. 16, 1918. None killed or injured, damage to 'he extent of

55,000 Mks., chiefly windows broken by concussio.

Cologne was protected by anti-aircraft guns, home defence

flight (apparently demanded by the people after the raid on May

18), and searchlights. Concerning these military questions.

information has been asked from FrankfL,t and will be forwarded

later. The raid on May 18 was entirely a surprise and after it the

commandant of the defences was dismissed for not being

prepared.

Insurance rates were not raised by bombing, but a special

policy was offered as follows:

2 Mks. per 1,000 Mks. for Life.

I Mk. per 1,000 Mks. for Real Estate.

1/2 Mk. per 1,000 Mks. for Personal Propetry.

it appears that after the first raid, however, more insurance than usual was taken out.

The moral effect on the people was rather insignificant. I am

informed that even before May 18, the better classes were

against bombing of the cities of the Allies; after that date the

feeling became more widespread. It seems, however, that the

people were in general quite stoical, the feeling being that

Cologne was a fortified city and the Allies had a right to bomb

it After the first raid, the people became quite resigned.

The one day raid on Cologne did not do most damage though

more people were killed on account of being in the streets.

There were not enough attacks to warrant a generalization as to

whether day or night raids did most damage. Moral effects, no

difference.

.... All work and trade stopped during entire alert. It seems

that Allied Commissions are covering or have covered the entire

subiect of the amounts of business done in Cologne and

surroundings; if a part equal to the length of time air alerts were taken, a fair estimate of the loss in production and business

could be gotten

Notes on factories making war material shut down during

alertsob In the first place it may be noted that no bombs were
486 U.S Air Seivice

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

If

dropped on any factories. All factories were varned by telephone

or buzzer from Police Headquarters each alert; all shut down

work for period of alert ....

Railroads. No bombs ever dropped on the railway tracks in

Cologne (I have this on good authority, besides all German

officials with whom I have talked, in spite of flyers' reports).

Tram schedules were not interrupted during alerts nor were

special crews kept on hand to repair damage should railway be

struck.

...........................

-61-

Duren

Finding their targets at Cologne obscured by clouds on 1

August 1918, D.H.4's of the Independent Air Force dropped

their bombs at Duren, a manufacturing city on the Roer River,

about 20 miles west-southwest of Cologne.

There was only one actual bombardment of Duren by Allied

flyers, that of August 1, 1918. The Germans report the dropping of 30 bombs while the Allied flyers report 35. Possibly the other

five were duds and location not noticed, or they fell at some

distance from the city and were not reported

.... 16 people were killed or died of iniurieb and 18 injured

seriously. The majority of places where bombs fell have been

investigated but all damage other than splinter scars have been

repaired except at the Susschule where a latrine is pretty badly

knocked about.

Conveniently forgetting whatever they may have done along

that line, the German population consider the attack on the

unfortified town of Duren an outrage and there is no doubt but

that the morale of the people was greatly lowered and later

alerts nearly caused panics.a It appears that before August 1, the town had no protection

or warning other than the fire and church bells, after that time

sirens were installed and the cellars of the town hall and postoffice cleared out and reinforced for shelters for people caught in

the center of town by an alert.

When the authorities were advised of "Luftgefahr," the news

was telephoned to the factonest to be prepared for an alarm but
U.S. Bombing 487

Survey

the sirens were not sounded, work did not stop, and the

population in general was not warned. At the Alarm signal, ali

work stopped, the street cars stopped running and the people

took shelter.

-62-

Morhange

German airdromes frequently were designated targets for

Allied bombing missions. The one at Morhange, about 25 miles

northeast of Nancy, was attacked many times, especially during

the latter part of the war. The Americans surveying the effects of

the bombing were able to obtain some information, although

not nearly as much as they would have liked, concerning the

raids on IAorhange. They found very little information about

attacks on the German air base at Buhl, near Saarburg (Report

#63). and had even less success some other places (Reports

#64-65). Further, the survey i.cludes no reports on many other

important German airdromes, such as the one at Frescaty, near

Metz.'

Resume of Results of Bombing at Morhange

Number of raids on towns: 

5

Total amount of damage to town: 107,500 marks

Bonus paid to railroad employees per month: 60 marks

Number of raids on airdrome: Almost daily after July 1, 1918

Total number of airplanes destroyed: 40

Total number of hangars destroyed: 

5

Note: Full information on the damage done to airplanes and

hangars is not available, due to the fact that it was taken away

nr destroyed by the retreating Germans.

Detailed Report on Effects of Allied Bombing

Morhange Station. Oct. 28, 1918. At 4:30 P.M., the alert was

given, lasting 15 minutes. Four bombs were dropped near

station. One direct hit was obtained on a passenger train

standing at the station at the time. One fourgon (last car of

passenger train) was completely destroyed, and one passenger

car badly damaged Fight meters of the track under the fourgon

was lori up. Two bombs hit the railway depot, full of supplies at

the time, destroying it completely. 

... Seven or eight meters

of one track in front of depot was also torn up, thus killing three

t
488 U.S. Air Service

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Vol. IV

men and wounding slightly about six. Repair of tracks lasted until

next morning. Two trains were delayed about 1, hours. These

trains and all the others which arrived later on were sAtched

around to another track until 8:00 AM., when tracks were

repaired and trains took up the direct route once more. No

congestion occurred however. Soldiers were employed for the

repair of the tracks. The total damage to the station amounted

to about 90,000 francs, including fourgon and damage to car.

This bombing also lowered the morale of the employees

considerably. Employees living in vicinity of station abandoned

their homes soon after. The morale was quite low after July, thus

resulting in an average bonus of 60 marks per month to each

employee for the months of July and August. There are 65

employees at the station. There is orc dugout at the station

which was built in 1915, On Nov. 10, 1918, at 1:30 P.M. and 4:45 P.M., several bombs

were dropped near the railway but no damage was done.

Morhange (City). In 1915, 14 bombs hit the military barracks,

damaging one of them very badly and in 1917, about the month

of August, several bombs fell behind the military hospital, lust in

front of the munitions depot, but no damage was done.

On the night o! Sept. 3-4, 1918, at 11:30 P.M., the alarm was

given, which was followed immediately by a raid, lasting ten

minutes. Four bombs of large calibre were dropped on the Rue

de la Gate ard one direct hit was obtained on a house in the

same street, destroying it completely. Damage amounted to

about 15,000 francs ...

Morhange Airdrome. Beginning with the month of July, 1918,

the airdrome has been bombed almost every day and night, and

sometimes tw.ce per day. Most of the bombs fell on the

airdrome (making numerous bomb holes), in vicinity of airdrome,

near the Tuileries (100 melers from airdrome), in the woods,

etc., and a few direct hits were obtained on hangars and

machines. The total number of airplanes destroyed and injured

during the period of the war was 40, about 12 of them being

damaged while landing on account of bomb holes on the

airdrome. These machines were replaced in from one to two

weeks. A total of 5 hangars damaged and one burnt down

Hangars were repaired at once with the exception of three which

were repaired a few days later by a special crew of Prussian

civilians employed for that purpose. These civilians would go

from one airdrome to another making repairs. Also one antaircra.t gun and one machine gun were destroyed. The morale of the aviators and personnel was affected to 

a

great extent and hindered considerably the progress of their
~1

U.S. Bombing 489

work. Several dugouts, having an average capacity of 40 men,

were constructed on the airdrome near the hangars. Three anti.

aircraft guns and about 20 machine guns were employed against

the raiding parties.

The photographs referred to in the British Official Report of 

I

4/9/18 has shown the disappearance of about 10 hangars but this

is explained as follows: The hangars were at first built close

together, but when the danger increased with the continuous

bombardments, several hangars (every other one) were torn

down, so as to derive the advantage of extended order.

In the month of July, 1918, 10 cows were killed near airdrome

by bombing. The cows were being watered at Lake Mulch, near

airdrome.

On Sept. 3, 1918, at 10:30 A.M., and on the night of Sept. 3-4, -A 1918, at 6:30 P.M., several bombs were dropped near and on the

house of Seebach am Pflugplatz, across the railway from the

airdrome, damaging it and the house in rear of it, very badly.

Damage 2,500 francs.

The small calibre bombs were more effective from the

standpoint ot damage, but large calibre bombs affected the

morale much rore, none having had confidence in any protection against them. The incendiary bombs did not cause

any damage whatsoever.

During the war, about 50 soldiers were killed in town of

Morhange and its vicinity by bombs, which gave it a bad

reputation as a rest area for which purpose it was used. The

soldiers coming from the front, feared the bombing most.

Haboudange.b Night of Nov. 10-11, 1918, some incendiary

bombs and 10 bombs of large calibre were dropped here at 7:00

P.M.; some direct hits were obtained on buildings, thus burning

11 houses, including the Chateau. No damage was done to

the troop.a stationed in the village. The morale of the population

was affected to a great extent.

L

-

*1*
I

490

-63-

Buhl Aerodrome

4 large dugouts, 12 hangars. Employed 200-300 civilians owing to ,shortage of squadron persunnel. Damage to village and fields estimated at 85.000) marks.

1918

July 8 4:00 pm--4:10 Aug. 7 4:00 10 Min. 40-50 bombs dropped pm- 4 10 10 min. I hangar hit; 2 planes dlamaged; I bomb hit concrete hangar, destroyed 2 Planes. Planes replaced next day., Aug. 14 10.00 prn-.2:00 am 4 hrs. 100 bombs dropped. Large hangar slightly

Aug. 23 7:30 am-7:38 damaged-. 4 killed.

Sept. 2 10:00 

8 min- 14 planes partiiPated; no dama.9e. am- 12:00 2 hrs. 32 5:00 PM-5.30 30 min. 3 hangars completely distroyed; 1 killed; 1

Sep. Sept.5 9-0 90 a-945 am9:45wounded. 15 min. 12 Planes participated; bombs dropped in field, Sept, .30 12:30 am-1:30 i hr. 4 houses in village destroyed by fire. ... 1

hangar set on fire.

Houses of Buhl village, destroyed by aerial bombardment.

go'. L
491

-64-

Airdrome at Boulay

Destruction of Gasoline Depot: 1,000,000 marks

_ Damage to Town: 250,000 marks

Note: Full information on the damage resulting to airplanes and hangars is unavailable, due to the fact that it was taken

away or destroyed by the retreating Germans.

-65-

Airdrome at Folpersweller

Thirteen machines were found destroyed, still on the airdrome.

.Six of these appeared to have been destroyed by the Germans

since the Armistice.

Note: Full information on the damage to airplanes and hangars

was not available, due to the fact that it was taken away or

destroyed by the retreating Germans.

Airdrome at Frlesdorf

f Number of Airplanes Destroyed or Damaged: 13 L- Number ol Hangars Damaged: 3

Note: Full information on the damage re3uliting to airplanes

and hangars is unavailable, din to the fact that it was taken

away or destroyed by the retreating Germans.

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US. Bombing 495

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Narrative Summary'

Material Damage

The material damage, as recorded in 66 of the 140 cities.

amounted to 35,449,190 marks but this should not be taken as

all of the damage done in the 66 cities because in some cases

records had been kept of on!y a part of the damage. For

example, the damage done in Boulay includes only that done to

the city and to the gasoline depot, while aerial photographs show

that considerable damage was done to the airdrome which was

one of the most important German airdromes on that front. 

A

fair opinion may be formed of the damage done in cities where it

was impossible to obtain an estimate in money by reading the

detailed reports on Longuyon and Hagondange because the

records in these two cities did show the kind of damage dont in

each raid.

Then, there are cities such as Karlsruhe, Freibourg, Offenburg,

Stuttgart, and Mannheim on the eastern side of the Rhine which

could not be covered because the German authorities refused to

give the American officers permission to enter them. One of the

American officers was taken to Karlsruhe by a French officer to

obtain permission from the German authorities to carry the

investigation into that city, and although permission was refused,

succeeded in seeing the city mayor who stated that 164 people

had been killed and 326 wounded by bombs.

Coat of Protection

The cost of protection as recorded in 36 cities amounted to

9,141,049 marks, which includes the expense of railroads, cities,

and industrial concerns. To this should be added the amounts

expended by individuals, by the military authorities, and the

amounts that will be spent in tearing down shelters and other

protection for which there will be no further use. Many

individuals walled in their windows and built small shelters in

their basements and small retail stores furnished some protection

for their employees. The military authorities probably expended

the largest amount of money for protection. Almost every city of

any importance was protected by anti-aircraft artillery, and some

were protected by balloon barrages and home defence flights.

The Germans had 11 home defence flights of 10 machines each

along the Rhine Valley prior to June ), 1918, and during the first

part of June increased the number of flights to 17 and the

strength of a flight to 14 machines. The original cost plus the

expense of maintaining these air units amounted to 53,000,000

i-
496 U S. Air Service in World War 

!

Vol. IV

marks at least. The military authorities also maintained a barrage

of 63 balloons at Cologne, one of 39 at Esch, one of about 45 at

Hayange and Knutange, and one of about 100 in the Saar Valley.

The original cost plus the expense of maintaining these barrages

amounted to 23,425,480 marks at least.

In addition to the balloon barrages and the home defence

flights, the military authorities funished anti-aircraft artillery,

machine guns, and searchlights for almost every city of any

importance. Coblen?., a city which was not important from an

industrial standpoint, was protected by 12 anti-aircraft guns of 7.5

cm and 9.0 cm calibre, and 18 machine guns with a total

personnel of 2 officers and 200 men. An attempt was made to

obtain the approximate number of anti-aircraft guns used to

defend cities in the interior but it was found that the information

was unreliable and resulted in duplications wherever the guns

protected more than one city.

The cost of protection against air raids was not limited to

those cities actua!ly bombed. Troisdorf and Hoechst were never

bombed but 174,000 marks were expended for protection in the

former and 435,145 marks in the latter. Undoubtedly every city

of any importance in the Saar, Rhine, arid Moselle Valleys made

some expenditure for protection.

Bonuses

As a general rule bonuses were not paid as a means of getting the

employees to work during a raid or alert or in factories which were

frequently bombed. The general opinion of the employers in the

factory was that during a raid or an alert they would be held

responsible for the casualties while if the employees went to the

shelters the employers would be relieved of

responsibility. Consequently, in most cases the employees sought

shelter as soon as the alert was sounded and no deduction was made

from their pay for the time lost In a few cases four or five men were

paid a bonus to remain at work during the alert to carry on the

V necessary work. Out of a total of 80 cities. 60 were found in which no

bonus5es were paid, l0 in which bonuses were paid which amounted

to 4,213,371 marks, and 10 in which the information was not

available

Loss of Production

Out of 80 cities, 20 were found where the infurniation on the

loss of production was not available, 22 in which there had been

ra loss of production which amounted to 71,563,723 marks, and 38 in which there had been no loss of production. This by no means covers the entire loss of production in the area

investigated. Hoechst and Troisdorl were not bombed but there

, I i , i t"•
r

974,800 th latr marks The los of 7153,2 mark an 

If,

iues Bombn th4osi90ciiswihwrebme n

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E7 which were not. All cities in the vicinity of those raided sounded

, the alert and production stopped. The 38 cities in which there

was no loss of production were usually railway centers, depots,

S airdromes, or cities in which there were no factories. With a

very few exceptions every factory manager admitted that there

had been a lsofproducton and temanager of the BurbackS Esch.Dudelange Iron Works at Esch stated that it took about 30

minutes after a raid or alert before the entire personnel was at

work.

While the loss of production is not an entire loss, the raw

material appears to be the only part that was saved.

Extra Expenses

In addition to the above listed damages there were a few

expenses incurred which could not be placed under those

headings which amounted to 7,956,751 marks.

Killed and Wonded

The information available shows that 641 people were killed

and 1262 wounded in 22 cities. While the number of killed and

wounded may not be considered very important, inasmuch as

S most of these were civlians, it did have a direct effect on the

- morale of the people and may have entailed an additional

L expense to the government. In Ludwigshafen a total of 1,607,000

marks was paid to the 53 wounded and to the dependents of the

33 killed. This was the only case found where such an

expenditure was made and it is doubtful whether it was made in

other cities bul if this same principle had been applied in other

IF cities an expenditure of approximately 35,000,000 marks would

have been necessary.

S B aid , Aler4s, and Working Hours Lost iIn 5 cities where the information on the number of alert,

ir .ids, and working hours lost was available, it was found that ,220 raids and 1647 alerts resulted in a loss of 2187 working

nhous or a loss of one hour and ten minutes for each raid and

alert. In 20 cities, where the number of raids and alerts were known, there were 29 raids and 2447 alerts d. r every raid. Troisdorf

and Hoechst were never raided but the forme had n 25 alerts .nd

the latter 96. The system o alerts varied in different parn s of Germany. In

the Saar Valley all industries controlled by the government were

Whl h oso rdcini o netr os h a

Exr xpne
498 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

not fied as soon as the bombing planes crotsed the lines and

again when it appeared likely that some city in the area would

be raided. In some cases the alerts were sounded along the

entire route which airplanes usually took in reaching certain

objectives so that an alert has been sounded in Cologne when

Ludwigshafen was raided, simply because the airplanes had

previously taken that route to Cologne. In other cases the alert

was sounded over a certain area such as the Thionville area

when it was known that the airplanes were proceeding in that

direction. However, the system of dlerts was undergoing 

a

change during the last part of the war which would have

reduced the number of alerts and the number of working hours

lost because of alerts A system was used in thp vicinity of

Kaiserslautern through which a city never sounded the alert until

it was known that the airplanes had passed over the nearest

large city between there and the front line. This system would

probably have been used more extensively had the war

continued and would have resulted in a smaller number of alerts

and a smaller number of working hours lost because of alerts.

Moral Effect

It is certain that air raids had a tremendous effect on the

morale of the entire people. Americans who had been in this

area during the war claimed that an alert always resulted in

confusion and factory managers admitted that the morale of their

employees had been affected, the manager of the Burback-EschDudelange Iron Works in Esch claiming that it took 30 minutes

after an alert to get everyone at work. In the raid of August 23.

1918, on Ehrange, three people died of fright Prominent citizens

in Treves held a meeting at which it was suggested that all

bombing be stopped. Railroadl officials at Thionville claimed that

it was necessary to increase the number of workmen around the

station because the morale of the workmen had been lowered by

bombing making them unable to perform the work which they

were expected to perform. Boulay had the reputation of being 

a

poor rest area for troops because it was bombed frequently and

because about 50 soldiers had been killed during one raid.

Judging by the information received, night bombing appears to

have had the greatest moral effect, probably because the largest

percentage of people lost sleep because of night raids and

because they would not see the airplanes which were dropping

the bombs while, in the event of a day raid, they merely stayed

in a shelter instead of in the home or factory and knew just

where the planes were.

In addition to the above named damages done by bombing,

there are some effects which cannot be expressed in terms of
..... a.d,.Ft. .-- s.--- n

U S. Bombing 499

Survey

money- Among these the delay of railroad traffic is probably the

most important. In Luxembourg the average time which one or

more tracks were out of commission in eight raids was 12 hours.

It is impossible to state just how much inconvenience to the German Army resulted from these delays and the many others

that occurred in other rail.oad yards because this depended - entirely upon the nature of the traffic passing through at that v.,.

time and whether a main track or a switch track was hit.

While an estimate of the loss of production has been given in

money, this shows only the selling price of the articles and not I

what the buyers would have paid for the products had it been

possible to manufacture them. Most of the factories were running

24 hours a day and a loss in production meant that the loss

could not be made up by working over time. Most of the iron

and steel turned out was used in the manufacture of war

material. The question comes up as to just how much the

government and business concerns would have paid to obtain

this extra product. The enormous expense of maintaining balloon

barrages, home defence flights, and anti-aircraft artillery must be

an indication that the material was needed as well as that the

popular clamor for protection was great. Too much emphasis cannot be given to the importance of

hindering the enemy's military organization. The importance of

the matenal damage as shown in this report may be discounted

because it includes a large amount of damage done to private

property which was of no military importance except insofar as it

affected the morale of the people. This also applies to a less

extent to the other forms of expenditures made by and the

damage done to the enemy's army and its manufacturing and

transportation agencies is of direct military importance, the

material damage hindering the work of the army and its agencies

and the expenditures necessitating an increase in loans which

would not have been necessary if the money had not been

expended fnr protection, etc

It has been shown that the morale of the fighting forces as

well as that of the civilian population was affected by bombing,

that the employees of organizations controlled by the government

were not able to perform their work because of bombing, that

the transportation of the enemy's troops and war supplies was

hindered by bombing, and that the manufacture of war materal

was hindered. It would be folly to attempt to estimate these

effects of bombing in terms of money, and it appears that

cuestioning whether these effects plus the effects which can be

estimated in money justified the expenditures made for bombing

is like asking "Did it pay to win the war?"
500 U S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Conclusion

The following points should be considered:

First: that the following amount of damage was caused by

bombing:

Direct:

Killed 641

Wounded 1262

marks

Material damage 35,449,190

Cost of Protection 85.566,529 Bonuses Paid 4,213,371

Extra costs 7,956,751

Total 133,185,841

Indirect

Loss of Production 71,563,723

Total direct and indirect as

far as has been ascertained 204,749,564

Second: that the material damage as shown above includes

only a large part of that done in 66 out of 140 cities which is

probably not more than 50% of what was actuallv done.

Third: that the cost of protection as shown above includes

only the expenditures made in 36 out of 127 cities, that it

includes only the expenditures made in two of the cities in the

vicinity of those that were bombed, that it does not include the

expenditures made by individuals or by the army for anti-aircraft

artillery, machine guns, and searchlights, and that it probably

does not include more than 50% or 60% of the actual amounts

expended for this purpose.

Fourth: that the bonuses paid as shown above iri,,de a

large part of those actually paid and that it was not a general

policy to pay bonuses.

Fifth that there was a loss of production in almost every

factory city that was bombed or that is in the vicinity of a city

which was bombed, that the loss ot production as shown above

includes the loss in only 22 out of 102 cities, that it includes the

loss in only two cities in the vicinity of those that were bombed,

and that it probably does not include more than 50% of the

production lost in this area.

Sixth: that the morale of the fighting forces as well as that

of the civilian population was lowered by air raids.

Seventh: that a great deal of inconvenience was caused to

the enemy such as the congestion of railroad traffic which

cannot be expressed in terms of money.
U.S. Bombing 501

Survey

After having taken the above points into consideration, it

appears that the total direct damage of 133,185,841 marks and

the loss in production of 71,563,723 marks may be doubled and

still keep the estimate of the damage done by bombing below

the amount which actually was done, and that the expenditures

made by the Allies for bombing were justified.

Criticisms of Bombing in the Present War

The greatest criticism to be brougm't against aerial

bombardment (British--American did not have enough bombing

aviation to warrant its employment other than with our ground

foces-France did not approve of this use of its bombing aviation) as carried out in the war of 1914-1918 is the lack of a

predetermined program carefully calculated to destroy by

successive raids those industries most vital in maintaining

Germany's fighting forces The evidence of this, is seen in the

wide area over which the bombing took place as well as the

failure of crippling, beyond a limited extent, any one factory or

industry. (It might be well to add that in many conversations

with officers of the British Independent Air Force there was a

growing feeling of dissatisfaction against their bombing policy. It

was the statement of these officers that they did not believe they

were getting the best results possible and that while the wish

and later the dec:sion to "bomb something up there" might have

appealed to one's sporting blood, it did not work with greatest

efficiency against the German fighting machine. It was on the

return of an American officer from a th-ee day visit with the British that it was learned of the disgus, I "i oy a British

bombing expert-who had achieved very good results in bombiiig

submarines-of the inaccuracy of bombing by the British

Independent Air Force and the unintelligEnt choice of targets.)

The criticism is also directed against the bombing of a town

rather than some definite objective of military value in the town.

This is shown in the bombing of Treves, Ludwigshafen, and

.everal of the steel industry towns where the legitimate targets,

which are respectively the railroad, Badische. Anlin and Soda

Factory, and steel works, are all easily capable of being hit and

the iction should have been concentrated on them alone.

This inestigation has decidedly shown that the enemy's morale

was rot sufficiently affected to handicap the enemy's fighting

forces in the field. The policy as followed out by the British and

French in the present war of bombing a target once or tNoce

and then skipping to another target is erroneous Greater results

wuuld have been dchieved by bombing a single target three or

four days in succession. By this method the effects of .umilative

results are obtained, it may be said, howevei, that the occasional
502 U.S. Air Service

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Vol. IV

bombing of a town of general manufacturing importance is

productive of good results for it tends to force factories to close

every time an alert is sounded ....

Bombing for moral effect alone such as took place over

Cologne, Frankfort, Bonn, and Wiesbaden, and which was

probably the excuse for the wide spread of bombs over a town

rather than their concentration on a factory, is not a productive

means of bombing. The effect is legitimate and just as

considerable when attained indirectly through the bombing of a

factory.

The bombing of railroads presents a particular plan of

bombardment, which either through lack of machines or disbelief

in the theory, which is outlined in the following chapter, was

never practiced in the area investigated.

Suggestions for Future Bombing Campaigns

The operations of a bombardment aviation must be an integral

part of the mission of the entire air force and consequently of

the ground forces and the army as a whole. There can exist no

such force as a separate or independent bombing force.

The three kinds of bombing that are of most importance are,

first, that directed against war industries; second, that against

railroad lines; and third, that against an enemy's troops in the

field. In considering the first a careful stud, should be made of

the different kinds of industries and the different factories of

each. This study should ascertain how one industry is dependent

on another and what the most important factories of each are. 

A

decision should be reached as to just what factories if destroyed

would do the greatest damage to the enemy's military

organization as a whole. On these factories the entire available

bombing force should be concentrated until it is satisfied that the

factory is sufficiently crippled Once the plan of bombardment is

chosen it should be held to religiously and a choice of immediate

targets affected only by weather conditions and airplanes

available. Factories should be bombed night arid day successively

as far as the weather will permit until the desired results are

thought to have been accomplished. However, therm is a limit to

this, inasmuch as the enemy will concentrate its protective

organizations to a prohibitive degree if one target is bombed

entirely to the neglect of others.

The bombing of railroads presents a different proposition. The

object in view is to hinder troops and supplies from arriving at

the front This is done by not only bombing two or three of the

larger yards and stations but at the same time bombing smaller

stations through which traffic could be diverted The instance

when all traffic was stopped in Thionville for one week may be
U.S. Bombing 503

Survey

well used as an illustration. This traffic wa- immediately routed

via other stations which were not bombed and the good results

obtained in Thionville were lost because traffic was probably not

heid up more than five or six hours.

A map of the entire network of railroads showing single and

double track lines should be studied with reference to each

sector of the front and with reference to the leas! number of

stations chosen which if successfully bombed would cut railroad

communications to the front. Under railroad conditions as

existing in northern France and western Germany five to eight stations would usually control about 100 kilometers of the front.

The bombing of railroad stations for the purpose of severing

communications to the front should be carried out only immediately preceding and during a major operation, and at this

time the entire bombing force should be concentrated on this

work, bombing night and day the various stations forming the

cordon. Only in this way can results be expected from bombing

railroads. The occasional attempt to cut a track is useless as the

resulting delay is negligible.

The fact is brought out very forcibly in the reports on the

several railroad stations bombed namely, Luxembourg, Thionville,

Treves, Ehrange, Metz, Conflans, and Dommary-Baroncourt, that

unless the main tracks are cut the delay in traffic is negligible

because the obstruction is easily overcome by switching in the

yards. It follows then that in order to obtain the greatest delays

the main tracks entering or leaving the station must be

destroyed This is not impossible as cain be seen from the

detailed report on Donrmary-Baroncourt.

Night bombing whenever possible has usually been found to be

more accurate than day bombing. This statement on the respective

value of night and day bombing is based on statements which

factory managers and city officials made on this subject

Concerning the third phase of bombing, viz : the bombing of

troops in the field, the value of this to affect the morale of the

fighting forces has been seen and is easily understood in all

armies.

r]
I1

504 Corci usior

The post-World War I survey served its purpose In that it

helped to shape bombing policies and operatione of the U.S.

Army Air Corps and the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF). It indicated. for instance, that the best results from a bombing campaign could be obtained by Identifying and destroying critical

components of the enemy's Industrial complex, a targeting

system which previously had been advocated by Gorrell in his

plan for stratogic bombing and which would be used by the

USAAF In the bomber offensive against Germany In World War

II. The survey also Indicated, to cite but one other example, that

more could be accomplished by bombing a definite military

objective in a town than by bombing the town itself, this being

the policy that would be adopted by American airmen who

opted for precision rather than area bombing of Germany in the

Second World War.'

The link between the bombing survey In 1919 and USAAF

bombing policies and operations In the 1940's was the Air

Corps Tactical School. The school's library, which contained

many World War I documents, Including Gorrell's plan for strategic bombing and other important Items from "Gorrell's History," had a copy of the narrative summary containing the con- clusions, criticisms, and suggestions resulting from the survey.'

The bombardment manual use. as a text at the school during

the 1930's cited and quoted the survey.' Laurence S Kuter,

Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Ira C. Eaker, Curtis E. LeMay, Emmett

O'Donnell. Jr., and others who would occupy key positions in

the USAAF in World War I were thus exposed, and had access.

to the survey while attending the Tactical School at Maxwell

Field in the 1930's.

Despite citation In the text. notes, and bibliography of the

Tactical School's bombardment manual, the survey seems to

have escaped the notice of persons writing on the early history

of U.S. military aviation and air doctrine.' One reason Is that the

copy of the summary report that was In the library of the lactical School when tho manual wes written in 1930 has been "lost."

If it has survived, it should be with other documents of the Tactical School In the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center

at Maxwell Air Force Base. Researchers do not find It, however,

in the Center's catalog (at least not under any logical heading),

and it has not been located among the Center's documents.'

Furthermoro. the two copies that were incorporated Into "Gorrell's History" were added after the basic history had been assemnbled at Tours in February 1919. Those copies became the

last two volumes of the massive 280-volume compilation tid,
L

: U.S. Bombing55

__ Survey

like some other late additions, were not entered into the index.

Consequently, there was nothing to call the researcher's attention to the presence of the survey as part of "Gorrell's History."

which over the years has been the principai source of documentary information about the Air Service, AEF, In World War I.

I:I
506 US Air Service

in World W,)r I

Vol. IV

NA&V
Appenbix A: 507

Tables of Ongzanization

Organizational planning in the AEF in the summer of 1917

resulted in a series of tables of organization approved for Air

Service units by Headquarters, AEF on 15 September. There

were some changes when a new series appeared in January

1918, but more substantial changes were made when new tables

were issued on 8 September 1918.

Cne of the most important changes in the tables was that pertairing to the rank of officers authorized for service squadrons.

World War I documentation, including reports of lessons

learned, contain many complaints about low rank and lack of

opportunities for promotion for pilots in the AEF. The tables of

organization of September 1917 provided for captains as squadron commanders, first lieutenants as flight commanders, and

second lieutenants as pilots. This was not changed until September 1918, when new tables authorized the rank of major for

= squadron commander, captain for flight commander, and first

lieutenant for about one third of the pilots.

Another important change, to cite but one more example, was

in the number of aircraft authorized for service squadrons. Eighteen per squadron were authorized in September 1917 in tables

that provided 15 pilots and 3 flight commanders for observation

and pursuit squadrons and 16 pilots, plus 3 flight commanders,

= for bombardment. The aircraft authorization was not increased

until September 1918, when 24 were provided for observation

squadrons and 25 for pursuit and day bombardment. Since

there was not a proportionate increase in the number of pilots,

the additional aircraft provided a badly-needed reserve for use

in place of planes undergoing repair.

All three series of tables may be found In "Gorrell's History.'"

The representative tables reproduced below are from the September 1918 series, which was in use at the end of the war,

I
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533

Appenrix B: Unit Costs

In February 1919 Mal. P. H. Jennings, Chief of the Disbursing

and Legal Division of the Air Service, AEF. completed an estimate of the cost of establishing aero squadrons, balloon companies, and training centers, and maintaining them for the first

year.? The figures-$6,000 for a pursuit plane, $2.800 for a spare

engine, $75 for a bomb sight, $9 for a pair of fur-lined flying

boots, and $0.57 a day for a man's rations-are interesting in

this age of much more sophisticated equipment and greatly inflated prices. More important, however, is the information the

estimates provide about the character and status of the U.S. Air

Service at the end of World War I. They show, for example, that 

a

day bombardment squadron with 18 Breguet 14 B2 aircraft with

Renault 300 motors and a reserve of 7 additional planes could

be expected to require 72 more planes a year for replacements.

49 extra motors, Lnd spare parts amounting to almost 50 percent of the total cost of all 97 planes and 146 motors. The same

attrition rate, 33 percent per month (figured on a basic allowance of 18 planes) was used for observation planes, but the rate

for pursuit was higher-S0 percent per month. Estimates for a

day bombardment squadron have been se!ected 'or inclusion as

an appendix to this volume.

Est;-.&:,ed Costs

I Establishment and maintenance for 1 year of squadrons and

balloon companies as per appended statements cost as follows:

Pursuit Squadron (based on Spad 7's

with H.S. 180 motors) $2,855,435.81

Observation Squadron (based on Breguet 4

A.2's with Renault 300 motors) 3,419,200.06

Day Bombardment Squadron (based on Breguet

B.2's with Renault 300 motors) 3,942,735.08

Night Bombardment Squadron (10 planes)

(based on D.H 9 planes) 2,006,000.00

Night Bombardment Squadron (10 p!anes) 

A

(based on Iiandley-l'age planes) 4,500,000.00

Balloon Company 400,664.91

2. These figures indicate an annual cost per fighting unit in each

kind of acro squadron (based on 18 pilots for a pursuit

squadron, 18 pilots and 18 observers for an

observation squadron, 18 pilols and 18 bombers for a ddy

bombing squadron, 10 pilots and 10 bombers for D H 9 night

bombarding squadron, 10 pilots, 10 observers and 10 bombers

for Handley-Page night bombardment squadron) as follows:

Pursuit Squadron $160.(X) per active combt pilot
534 U.S. Air Service

in World War!

Vol. IV

Observation Squadron 95,000 per active pilot or observer

Day Bombing Squadron 110,000 per active pilot or bomber

Handley-Page Night

Bombardment Squadron 150,000 per pilot or observer or

bomber

The above figures cannot be taken as representing the

investment of the United States in individual airmen. They do

not mean that the loss of a pursuit pilot represents a loss of

$160,000. They do, however, indicate the cost of putting and

maintaining each individual fighting unit on the front and they

give an indication of the substantial asset that each pilot or

observer or bomber represents to the United States.

3. The figures for a pursuit squadron are based upon the Spad

7's, while the experience here has been that Spad 13's were in

the most constant use. It is estimated very approximately that 

a

Spad 13 souadron would cost 25 percent more, due to the fact

that the Spad 13 and its motor are more expensive and that it

carries more armament, burns more gas, etc.

4. The figures cannot be taken as representative for the

second year, as they include the cost of original establishment. It

is Zstimated that 75 percent or 80 percent of these figures could

be taken as the cost for the second year.

5 Our figures do not cover the entire cost of a squadron. The

biggest items omitted are the proportion of general overhead

expenses and of park equipment and expense. Another large

factor in the expense would be the activity of operations and the

mobility of the lines. If a squadron had to move its airdrome and

all its equipment once or twice a month, that would mean 

a

substantial increase in exper,se.

6. The figures contain no allowance ior salvage. The salvage

on such things as instruments, radio and photographi," equipment

might be fairly substantial.

7 As a matter of interest and possible use in further analyzing

these figures, the averace number of flying minutes per plane per

day from September 1, 1918, to November 11, 1918, for the

squadrons with the First Army, AE.F., are given as furnished by

Colonel Gorrell:

Pursuit 41

Day Bombardment 28

Army Observation 18

Army Corps Observation 21

8. The average cost of an airplane and motor (training and

service planes included), based upon prices paid to the French
I

I

r Appendix B 535

Government and including the 5 percent commission, is 38,500

I Francs, or $7,060

t P. H. Jennings Major, Air Sermce

Day Bombardment Squadron

(Establishment and Maintenance for I Year)

Kind of Equipment or Sup.)lies Value

Airplanes and motors $1,254,412.84

Spare parts 655,468.65

Transportation equipment 151,032.00

Special clothing for aviators 13,319.88

Oxygen apparatus 18,315.61

Airplanes instrument 11,209.17

Ordnance equipment (individual) 5,492.42

Ordnance equipment (squadron) 4,007.24

Armament 345,309.36

Radio equipment 62,834.31

Hangars, barracks, etc. 38,566.68

Ammunition and bombs 688,580.64

Airplane gasoline 186,261 87

Automobile gasoline 15,688.83

Castor oil 94,818.71

Auto lubricating oil and grease 3.151.78

Gas masks 2,760.00

Subsistence of enlisted men 37,657.05 Pay of officers and enlisted men 243,342.00

Flying field roads and improvements 20,790.00

Special clothing for chauffeurs and mechanics 2,208.16

Family allotments 10,260.00

Photographic Section 77,157.

$3,942,735.08

The above contains no estimate for:

Stationery and forms

General stores

Individual clothing and equipment of soldiers

Camp equippage

Cooking utensiis

Office equipment Medical supplies

Land rentals
536 U.S Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Proportion of park expense

Proportion of general overhead expense Wireless telephone equipment

Mileage

No allowance is made for salvage.

Airplanes and Motors

Francs

Unit Price Total

25 Breguet 14 B2 Airplanes, equipped

with Renault 300 motors,

initial equipment 55,000.00 1,375,000.00

72 Breguet 14 B2 Airplanes equipped

with Renault 300 motors for

replacements (replacement

figures @ 33 percent per month

on the actual squadron of 18

planes, that is to say 6

planes per month including the

first month) 55,000.00 3,960,000.00

49 Extra Renault 300 motors (50

percent extra) 24,000.00 1,176,000.

6,511,000.00

5 percent Commission to

French Government 325,5.50.0

Francs 6.836,550.00

Reduced to U.S. Currency

@ 5.45 $1,254,412.84

Spare Parts

Francs

Unit Price Total

Spares for 97 Breguet B2 Airplanes

with Renault 300 H.P. motors 33,270.58 3,227,266.06

Spares for 49 extra Renault 300

H.P. motors 7,082.41 347,038.

3,574,304.15

Reduced to U.S. Currency

@ 5.45 $ 655,,t68 65

The above figures include the

French Government's 5

percent Commission
Appendix B 537

Special Clothing

Francs

Unit Price Total

48 Boots, flying, fur-lined 47.25 2,267.00

48 Coats, pilot, general service 84.00 4,032.00

14 Gloves, flying, fur, 

4

finger type 15.75 220.00

V 14 Gloves, flying, fur, 

1

r finger type 15.75 220.00

U 14 Gloves, flying, black leather,

4 finger type, detachable

knit lining 15.75 220.00

15 Gloves, flying, black leather,

1 finger type, detachable

knit lining 15.75 235.75

14 Goggles, type 1, Novial,

yellow glass 24.80 347 20

14 Gogglec, type 2, -Aupertough,

white glass 18.75 262.50

14 Gog1es, type 2, supertough, white glas, w..ith mask 24.80 347.20

15 Gogg1ettes 3, white glass 22.65 339.75

48 Hoods knitted 3.60 172.80

26 Helmets, hard leather 29.40 764.40

25 Helmets, soft leather,

fur-lined 24.95 618.75

41 Masks, face, soft leather 8.15 391.20

46 Scarfs, camels hair 6.60 316.80

26 Suits, flying, one-piece, fur-lined 136.50 3,549.00

25 Suits, flying, one piece, fur.

lined, electrically heated 215.25 5,381.25

48 Suits, one piece, summer 70.00 3,360.00

23,145.60

5 percent Commission to

French Government 1,152.28

Francs 24,19788

Reduced to U.S. Currency

@ 5.45 $ 4,439.96

200 percent for replacement Total $ 13,319.88
L

538 U.S. Air Service

in World WarlI

Vol. iv

p..

Transportation Equipment

Unit Price Total

2 Cars Motor $2,500-00 5,000.00

I Car Motor Light 800.00 800.00

7 Motorcycles with Sidecars 350.00 2,450.00

1 Mntorcycle 30000 30000

7 Motor Trucks 3-ton 3,500.00 24,500.00

2 Motor Trucks, repair 6,00000 12,000.00

F 9 Motor Trucks 1/2 ton 2,500.00 22,500.00

4 *Trailers 3-ton 1,025.00 4,100.00

3 Trailers 1-1/2 ton 425.00 1,275.00

9 Trailers -ton 40000 3,600.00

1 Trailer kitchen rolling 600.00 600.00

-I$ 76,125.00

Replacements for 1 year on

the basis of 5 percent per

month of the cost of the

initial equipment 45,675.00

$121,800.00

Replacement of spares for 

I

year on the basis of 2 percent per month of the cost of

equipment 29,232.00

Total $151,032-00

*One is a water trailer

Oxygen Apparatus

Unit Price Total

97 Dreyer Oxygen Apparatus

complete with Y

connections and light I pressure tubing $ 150.00 $14,550.00 i~194 Small oxygen cylinders :'

with valves 7.24 1,404.56

194 Masks complete ,with low

pressure hose

connections 2.00 388.00

IOxygen hand trans!er pump 220.00 220.00

60 Large oxygen cylinders 26.55 1,593.00

97 Manifold connections 1.65 160.05

$18,315.61
ppendix B 539

Airplane Instruments

Francs

Unit Price Total

97 Sets Technical Instruments 600.00 58,200.00

5% Commission to French

Government 2,910.00

Francs 61,110.00

Reduced to U.S. Currency

@ 5.45 $11,209.17

Ordnance Equipment

Indiuidual Equipment of a Soldier

81 Belts Pistoi model 1912

without ring 1.44 116.64

181 Cans Bacon .19 34.39

181 Cans Condiment .13 23.53

181 Cans Meat .41 74.21

181 Canteens .58 104.98

r 181 Canteens covers

dismounted .65 117.65

181 Cups .41 74.21

181 Forks .03 5.43

181 Haversacks 3.89 704.09

230 Helmets steel 5.00 1,150.00

81 Holsters Pistol model 1916 1.79 144.99

181 Knives .15 2715

362 Magazine Pockets web

double 1.06 383.72

162 Magazines extra .50 81.00

181 Mess kits .71 128 51

181 Pack carriers .87 157.45

81 Pistols, caliber 45,

1911 model 14.75 1,194.75

181 Pouches for first aid pocket .18 32.58

181 Spoons .12 21.72

$4,577.02

20 percent for maintenance and

replacements 915.40

Total $5,492.42
540 U.S Air Service

in World War I 

j Vol. IV

Ordnance Equipment

(Squadron Equipment)

24 Axes $ .65 $ 15.60

2 Bxs Cartridges, pistol, ball, calibre. 45, model 1911,

2000 per box 48-20 96.40

5 Bxs, cartridges, nle 46.80 234.00

1 Chest, arm repair,

1910 model, complete with contents 56.23 56.23

1 Kit, pistol cleaning, model 1912 6.80 6.80

1 Locker, arm for automatic pistols, calibre .45, model

1911, capacity 50-arms 7.20 7.20

2 Outfits, marking, model of

1910, for stamping metal 5.27 10.54

149 Rifles 19.50 2,905.50

1 Stamp, seal 2.10 2.10

1 Stencils, personnel equipment, model 1910,

Airplane Company 1.60 1.60

1 Stencil, Ord. Dept. Insigna 1.07 1.07

I Stencil, outfits 2.33 2.33

$3,339.37

Add 20 percent for

maintenance and

replacement 667.87

TOTAL $4,007.24

Armament

Francs

Unit Price Total 101 Vickers Machine Guns 4,590.00 463,590.00

202 Lewis Machine Guns, Air

type 3,987.00 805,374.00

100 Rifles, Reserve Browning 687.00 68,700,00

100 Pistols, Signal 35m/m 20 00 2,000,00 98 Bombs, offensive S & R

mark 5 687.00 67,326.00

100 Fixed machine gun sights

optical 90.00 9,000.00

100 Open ring and bead

sights 5' 40.00 4,000.00
-* Appendix B 541

100 Free machine gun sights,

Norman wind vane 148.00 14,800O

100 Bomb sights Wimperis N.A 412.00 41,200,00

98 Synchronizing gears or

type 2 Sop Kauper 650.00 63,700.00

98 Turret T.O. 3 530.00 51,940.00

100 I win gun mount, Jumeilage

with Bowden 357.00 35,700.00

98 Fixed machine gun sight

mounts for 5" 3000 2,940-00

98 Stick trigger and Bowden

9-ft. fixed gun 75.00 7,350.00

100 Gunner's Belt French

Standard 23.00 2,300.00

100 Gunner's Spring seat 20.00 2,000.00

97 Ammunition box for fixed 18 , machine gun 140.00 13,5W-.00

199 Magazines, Rifle reserve 7.00 1,393.00

1050 Free gun Mag. 97 Rds. 60.00 63,000.00

510 Free gun Mag. 47 Rds. 50.00 25,500.00

97 Compt. Free gun mag, for

Lewis gun 5.00 485.00

97 Compt. Reserve rifle

magazines 2.00 194.00

98 Reserve rifle racks 25.00 2,450.00

98 Fixed machine gun mounts 225.00 22,050.00

98 Signal Pirtol racks 12.00 1,176.00

98 Signal ammunition racks 12.00 1,176.00

3 Oscillating shafts with

ring mounts 3200 96.00

3 Oscillating shafts bail

sockets 5500 165 00

3 Adjustable screw caps

for ball sockets 4 00 12.00

5 Actuating levers with pins 2.00 10.00

5 Bowden return springs 3300 165.00

= 3 Push rod guides 3300 99.00

5 Push rods 3.00 15.00

8 Plunger levers complete 4.00 32.00

I Adjustable arm 38.00 38-00

8 Oscillating shaft, sphencal

collars 27.00 216.00

] Vickers gun for

ground practice 4,278.00 4,278.00

I Lwis gun for ground prantce 3,987.00 3,987.00
542 U.S. Air Seivice

in World War I

Vol IV

1 Vickers Tripod 463.00 463-00

I Lewis Tripod adapter 11.00 11.00

I Vickers Bell box links 10.00 10.00

15 Lewis Mag. boxes 5.00 75.00

2 Vickers loading machine

links 15.00 30-00

I Vickers Loading Machine

Belt 163.00 163.00

16 Loading handles, Lewkis 1.00 16 '0O

I Armorer's Tool Kit 825.00 825.00

2 Ammunition Gauges 10.00 220.00

18 Cleaning sets 55.00 990.00

12 Spare parts kits, Lewois 412.00 4,944.00

6 Spare part kits, Vickers 412.00 2.472-00

4 Oscillating shaft brackets 16.00 64.00

1,792,320.00

5 percent Commission to

French Governmen! 89.616.00

Francs 1.881,936.00

Reduced to U.S. Currency

@5.45 $ 345,209.36

Airplane Gasoline

Unit Price Tota4

886,950 Litres Gasoline, Arplane (18

Motors operating an

average of -1/e2 hours a day

each and using 90 itres

of gasoline per motor per

hou: -a total of 2430 litres

per day, or 886,950

litres in 365 days)

54,750 Litres Gasoline. Airplane for

mounting and trying

motors (estimated at 150

litres per day)

941,700 Litres

or

248,797 Gallon2 $0713 $177,392.26

5 pc Cormission to French F oveirnment 8,86961

$18626.2.87
rAppeaui B 543

F

E InstrumentsRadio Equipment Fac

IsrmnsUnit Price Total Total

graph complete, for

initial equipment 1.50000 27.00000

72 Sets E8 Avion, Telephone and Telegraph

complete. for replacemnrts (33 '( replace.

ments per mnonihi 1,500.0 108,000.00

I Set D3 bis with a,.

cumulators, for initial

equipment 5000 

'

r Aerial 3ccumulatoaccessories cnmp'ete,

initial equipment 8,500.00

1 Set Accumulator

,zhargig with accessories initial equip

mznt 4,000.00 4,000.00 147.500.00

Transportation

(a) 2 Trucks, Fiat, initia,

equipmrnt 20,000.00 40,000.00

(b) 1 Truch Crochat. initial

equipm-ent 45000.00 4r,000 00

85,000.00

R~plarkrnznts figured on basis of 51, per

month of initial cos!

of equipment 51.000,00 51d.000 wX

136,W0( 00

Spares figures -)n

basis of 21t, per

month of to!.il cost

of equipment and

replacements 32,640 00 168,640 00

Wrkshop

I Set, machiie tios,

t'rols and testiriJ

bench, initial equip

merit 10,000.00U 1O.WOu (0 luO0u.00

326,14000C
544 U S. Air Service

in World War I

'Vol. IV

5% Commission to

French

Government 16 0

Francs 342,441

Reduced to U S.

Currency @ 5.45 $62,834.31

(a) 1 Fiat Truck for mounting E3 bis %et

Fiat Truck 'or mounting accumulator

charging set

(b) I Ctochat Truck for

mounting workshop

and iest bench

Barracks, Buildings and Hangars

Unit Price Total

9,323 square feet. Barroicks $ 1.00 $ 9,323.00

1,220 square feet, 7- -)uildings 100 1,22000

3,3r. 3Te feet, .-res Buildings 1.00 3,300.00

X, ) jare feet, Administration 1.00 900.00

6 4quae feet, Hospitals 1.00 650P)

K50 Miscellaneous 1.00 850.00O

$16,243 00

O)ur year's maintenance at 15% 2,436.45

$18,6'19.4 5

4 Bessoneau Hangars 5,975.00 23,900.00

Maintl'ni,,(e of four Bessoneau

Hanairs for I year 3,6j6.67 14,666 68

Total $38,566 68

The Barrack space is estimated as follows...

Squate Feet Per Man

Personnel Quarterso Mess Total Total Square

Feet

I Senior Offik r 140 13 153 153

48 Junior Officers 70 V', &1 3,984

IMI Frit~sted Men 19 1 2 6 1/ 2 26 4,706

For Stcira92 and Orderly Rooni- 480

9,323
Appendix B 545

Ammunition and Bombs

Unit Price Total

196,344 Rounds of ammunition, all

types for Vickers or Lewis

machine gun $60. 00 pe r mn $ 11,780.64

27,072 Bombs 25.00 each 676.800.00

$688,580.64

Lubricatmng Oil anid Grease for

Motor Transportation and Equipment

Unit Price Total

40:5 GallonIs, lubricating oil for

motors equipment $0.69 $2,770.35

2007-1112 Pounds transmission grease .19 381.43

$3,151.78

The above quantities were determined as follows.

Gallons

Lubricatina and TransmisFion Oil Per Year

21 Cfars and trucks using an

average of 1/2 gallon of oil per

unit per day, making a total

of 10.1,,2 galions per day or 3.822 1/2

8 Motorcycles and sidecars

using an average of 1/2 pint

of oil per unit per day,

making a total of 1,12 gallon

per day or 182-1/2 4,015

Pounds

Transmission Grease Per Year

21 Cars and trucks usinq an

average of 1/4 pound of

grease per unit per

day, making a total of 5 1/4

pounds per day, or 1,916 1/4

8 Motor cycles and sidecars

using an average of 1;'32

of a pound of grease per

unii per ('y, making a

total of 1!4 pou~nd per day

or 91 1/4 2,007 F2
7 7.

546 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Gasoline for Motor Transportatior

Unit Price Total

23,642 Gallons Gasoline, automobile $0.632 $14,941.74

5% Commission to French

Government 747.09

Total $15,68883

The above quantity was estimated as follows:

Motor Transportation Miles 1 otal lotal Mile.s (3allons

Per Miles Miles in Per of

Unit Per 365 Gallon Gasoline

Per Day Days of for 365

Quantity Kind Day Gasoline Days

2 Cars, Motor, heavy 50 100 36,500 8 4,563

1 Car, Motor, light 50 50 18,250 15 1,217

7 Motorcycles with

sidecars 30 210 76,650 19 4,034

1 Motorcic!e 30 30 10,950 19 576

7 Trucks, Motor, 3-ton 20 140 51,100 9 5,678

2 Trucks, Motor

repair 7 14 5,110 7 730

9 Trucks, Motor,

11/2 ton 25 225 82,125 12 6,844

769 26U,666 23,642

Castor Oil

Francs

137,970 Litres, Casto- Oil (18 motors

operating an average of

1 1/2 hours per day each

and usinq 14 litres of oil per

motor per hour-a total

of 378 litres in ore day or

137,9;0 litres in 365 days)

8,504.5 Litres, Caclor Oil tot

mounting and trying motors

(estimated at 23.3 litres

-- per day)

146,474.5 Litres

oi

140,615.5 Kilos Frs: 3.50 492,15425

5% Commission to French

Government 24.607 71

516,761.96

Reduc(d Ii L.S. Currency

@ 5 45 $ 94,818.71
LL

A Appendix B 54

KN

Gas Masks

Unit Price Total

230 Gas Masks $1200 $2,760.00

Special Clothing for Motorcyclists, Chauffeurs,

Truck Dnuers and Mechanics

Unit Price Total

Francs Francs

For Motorcyclists

11 Breeches, kersey lined 25.00 275.00

11 Caps, winter 5.00 55.00 11 Gauntlets leather, woolen lined

11Goggles live-finger 15.75 18.75 206.25 173.25

11 Helmets, aviation, winter 35.00 385.00

11 Helmets, aviation, summer 25.00 276.00

11 Masks, face 8.15 89.65 z

11 Mufflers 6.60 72.60

11 Pea Jackets 4000 44000

11 Shoes, aviator, winter 50.00 5500

For Chauffeurs and Truck Drivers

24 CapG, winter 5.00 120.00

24 Gauntlets, wool lined 15.75 378.00

24 Goggles 18.75 450 00

24 Mufflers 6.60 158.40

24 Pea Jackets 40.00 960.00

For Mechanics

90 Overalls, one piere 10.00 900.00

5,730.70

5% Commission to French

Government 286.53

Total 6,017.23

Reduced to U.S. Currency

@ 5.45 $1,104.08

Add 100% (or replacements 1,104.08

Total $2,208 16

Subsistence of Enlisted Men

Unit Price Total

66,065 Rdtions (181 men for

365 oJys) $0.57 $37,65705

___A_~. il
548 US Air Service

in World War!I

Vol IV

Family Allotments

U.S. Currency

Unit Cost Total

57 Allotments $18000 $10,260.00

Pay of Officers and Enlisted Men

Rate Per Day Total

82,800 Days 1230 officers and

enlisted men for 360 days) $2.94 $243,432.00

(360 days are used here and

not 365 because the

personnel is paid on a basis

of 30 days in each month)

The average daily rate is

approximately as follows:

Officers Salary Per Yea- Total

1 Major, flyi~ng $5,029.20 $ 5,029.20

3 Captains, flying 4,035.72 12,107.16

16 Is'. Lieut-, flying 3,315.50 .53,048.00

1 1st. Lieut., non-flying 2,765.50 2,765.50

25 2nd. Lieut., flying 2,726.54 68,163.50

3 2nd- Lieui., non-flying 2,259.04 6,777.10

49 $147,890.46

Average yearly pay $3.018.17

Average monthly pay 251.51

Average daily pay 8.38

rApproximate Total

E,,liste'd Me~n Monthly Salary for 1 Month

SMaster Electricians $ 9600 $ 480.00

IOronance SergeAnt 51.20 51.20

22 Sergeants First Class 60.00 1,320.00

1 Mess Sergeant 57.20 57.20

It) Sergeants 51 20 819.20

24 Corporals 4i0 80 979.20

8 Chauffe,,-s First Class 60-00 480.00

13 Chauffeurs 51 20 665 60

6 Cooks 38.00 2 28. Cv.

2 buglers, 33.00 66 00

29 Pruvate First Class 36.00 1,044.00

54 Pivatcs 33 00 1,78200

181 ToiolPoyjfor Month 57,972.40
Appendix B 549

Average pay for 1 month $44,046.00

Average pay for 1 day 1,468.00

Total

Summary: Rate Per Day for 1 Month

49 Officers $ 8.38 $ 410.62

181 Enlisted Men 1.468 265.70

$ 676.32

Average rate per day $2.94

NOTE: The salaries of officers are figured at foreign pay rates

plus maximum allowance in France.

For flying officers, 25 percent is added to regular pay.

Lists of personnel were taken from page 14 of

Equipment Manual.

Flying Helds, Roads, Hoilroads

Water Supply and _lectnc System

Unit Price Total

50 Acres flyinG field

Cost of preparing, grading,

draining, etc. tA.lue of

land is not included) $ 255.00 $12,7S0 00

600 Yards, Road macadam 1.00 600.00

1.1'2 Kilometern Railroad (industrial) 3,000.00 Km 4,500 00

Water Supply System 600.00 600.00

.lectre System 600-00 600.00

$19,050.00

Yearly Maintenanc.

Flying Fields $1,225 00

Roadi 125.00

Industrial Ra:lroads 24000

Water Supply System 75 00

Electricai Systerr 75.00 $ 1,740.00

Total $20,790.00
550 U.S An Service

in World War I

Vol IV

I N• _ ,ir,: " K..

-- S

I-,., I.1 I AT I,,. Anur., Sn ,h
FI

I

551]

INotes

A

Preface fuselage between the pilot and GO 26, 15 Nov 1918).

the observer, and from the Another Fokker was shot

1. See Introduction to Vol 1, pressurization of the fuel down at 1315 hours the same this series. Hereafter this system. When the tank was day by two crews from the

work will be cited as punctured by a bullet, gasoline 104th Aero Squadron (First "Gorrell's History." was sprayed around inside the Army Air Service, GO 5, 28

Part I: Lessons fuselage. In October 1918 the Jan 1919), this being the last

Technical Section of the Air victory officially credited to a

Learned Service, AEF, attempted to member of the U.S. Air

correct this condition by Service.

Introduction means of protected tanks and 9. C-7, 393. The signature

1. See Introduction, Vol 1, a non-pressure system using block indicates that the report

this series. Selsden fuel pumps obtained was prepared by order of Lt.

2. See App A, Vol I, this in England. Col. Bert M Atkinson, the

series. 4. A-1. w-in9 commander. There is no

3. Extract in Vol 1I, Doc 29, a. Col. Wilson B. Burtt indication as to what part

this series, was Assistant Chief of Air Wentworth or the wing's

4. These are in "Gorrell's Service for Policy, Col. Henry operations officer, Capt. Philip

History," Ser A, Vol 23. C. Whitehead was Assistant J. Roosevelt, had in the

5. "Gorrell's History," Ser Chief for Administration, and preparation of the report.

A, Vol 15, p 167. Hereafter Col. Robert 0 Van Horn. Wentworth had been assigned

this work will be cited only by Assistant Chief, Operations, to the wing as Roosevelt's

series, volume, and page in Zone of Advance, during the assistant three days before the

the following forrn: A-15, 167. time Foulois was Chief of Air Armistice.

If the passage referred to Service, AEF. 10. A- 15, 224.

extends for more than one 5. E-20, 187. a. E-6, 5.

page, only the number of the d. Hist uf 1st Pur Gp, C. 11. E-7. 113.

first page will be given, if the 9, 9. 12. A-15, 239.

page is numhered. b c 9. 617 13 E-18, 57.

6. A-15, 165 c. Hartney later referred 14 E-18, 184 This appeared

7. I. B. Holley, Jr., ideas to these planes as "the finest as a recommendation in the

aund Weapons (New Haven, little all around pursuit ships squadron's history.

1953), p 19>. on the entire front " Harold E. 15 E.13, 46 This was Hartney, Up And At 'Em entited "Notes on Afrial

Reports (Harrisburg. Pa., 1940), p 233. Combat."

1. A-15, 1 d. Hartney, Up And At 16 E-13, 44. This was 2 A-14, 193. 'Er, pp 233-240. headed "Notes on Formation

3. A-15, 105. e Small, 20-pound, Flying."

a. Lahm had attended fragmentation bonibs. 17. E.6, 52.

this school before the war. 6 A.15, 244. 18 E.6, 49.

b. One of the worst 7 A.15, 213. 19. E 6, 59.

defecis of the DH-4 was thc 8 A 15, 214. 20 E 6, 55

fire hazard resulting from the a. Kirby's vicinry was at a. Frank Luke, Jr , the

i . construction of the 9-3soline 1050 hours on 10 November famous "balloon buster" of the

tank. which was in the 19119 (First Army Air Service, 27th Squadron
a *.

552 US Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

b. The ring sight most was meant. 33. N-17, 135.

often used in the U.S. Air 21. E-6. 61. 34. N-17, 136.

Service with fixed guns had 22. E-7, 114. 35. A-15, 226.

two parts. (1) Front sight a. Printed in Biddie, 36. E-17, 18.

consisting of a ring five inches Fighting Airman (Garden City, 37. N-17, 96. This report is

in diameter, inside of which 1968), pp 246-270. headed, "Remarks on

was a smaller concentric ring 23. E-18, 398. Methods of Carrying out

of one inch in diameter, the 24. C-8, 193. Routine Missions."

smaller being attached to the 25. A-15, 246. 38. E-9, 499.

larger by four cross wires; (2) 26. E-3, 7. 39. E-10, 222.

A rear sight consisting of a a. Heater's account of 40 A-15, 215.

small, red bead mounted on a "Americans on Day Bombing 41. A-15, 217.

conical, steel pin three inches with the Independent Air 42. A-15, 221.

high. The distance between Force" is in "Gorrell's 43. E-8, 172.

the gunner's eye and the ring History." B-12, 116. 44. E-8, 168.

was 38 inches, the bead being 27. A-S, 67. Wood, an 45. E.9, 501.

half way between. The sight observer, had been with the 46. A-15, 237.

was mounted so a line 24th Aero Squadron during 47. A 15, 234.

between the bead and the the last weeks of the fighting. 48. N-17, 159.

center of the ring was parallel His paper on lessons learned, 49. N-17, 163.

with the axis of the gun. entitled "Mobility of Aero 50. N-17, 161.

c. The Aldis Unit Sight Squadrons," is not dated. 51. E.8, 174. was an English modification of 28. A-15, 37. 52. E8, 165.

the French Chretien "clear 29. A-15, 72. a. The CC. interrupter

vision" collimator sight. In the 30. A-15, 60. gear was an hydraulic mech.-

U.S. Air Service it was used a. The report, d&ted 23 anism for synchronizing the

only with fixed guns. When December 1918, gives the firing of a machine gun with

used on U.S. planes, a ring name of the organization as the turn of the propeller

sight, for which it was a stated here. Presumably, this of an airplane. It was devel

substitute, was also installed, should be "V Corps oped by Gogu ConstantinesThe Aldis sight consisted of a Observation Group." co, a Romanian who, while

telescope mounted parallel 31 A-S, 57 associated with the Haddon

with the axis of the gun Non- a. See Note 30a. Er,gineering Works in England

magnifying, it projected a 32. E-l, 130. before the war, had investsystem of live, etched lines on a. Dated 22 October gated the transmission of im- the field of vision. An object 1918, the report was prepared pulsive forces through liquids.

directly ahead appeared in the in response to a memorandum In the development of the

center of this system of lines. Wiriant had received at 1830 synchronizing mechanism fot

Sighting was with the right hours the previous day with aircraft, Constantinesco was

eye, with the left eye open, instructions to reply by noon. assisted by Maj. G. C. Colley.

•which had the advantage of This, Winant said, did not 53. E-9, 508

giving a natural view of the a!low enouqh time "to make a 54. E-9, 505.

field ahead. proper report." 55 E 8, 167.

d This may be garbled. b. Nourrice, an auxiliary, 5C E-8. 176.

At any rate the editor has not gravity tank in the center a A star in a rudole had

been able to determine what section of the upper wing been used on airplanes of the
tNotes 553

Aviation Section of the Siqnal American airmen. 77. F 7, 186.

Corps before the war, and 65. E-8, 170. 78. A-15, 88.

continued to be used on 66. E-8, 159. 79. M-2, 105.

training planes at home after 67. E-9, 506. a. Bellinger returned to

the United States entered the 68. E-9, 502. Yale after the war and

war. In January 1918, a. Ist Lt. J.W. Livingston. received a Ph.D. degree in

however, the Joint Army and 69. A-15, 238. 1925. A member of the Yale

Navy Technical Aircraft Board 70. E-9, 510. fdiulty, he was Lampson

had adopted the rounde!- a. Kenneth P. Littauer Professor of Latin for many

white (center), blue, and red- previously had flown with the years.

r 

- which was used to mark French and had commanded b. See Vol II, Doc. 44.

aircraft of the Air Service, the 88th Aero Squadron. 80, A-15, 147.

AEF. See Bulletin of the 71. A-15, 9. 81. M-8, 16.

Information Section, Air a. Norman Wind Vane a. See also Blankenhorn's

Service, AEF, Vol III, No 114, Sight, used with machine guns "The War on Morale; How

20 April 1918. on movable mounts. America 'Shelled' the German

57. E-8, 178 b. The editor has not Lines with Paper," Harper's

58. A-15, 229. found this sight in manuals Monthly Magazine, CXXXIX

59. E-17, 18. and equipment lists of the Air (September 1919), pp 510-524.

60. A.15, 231. Service, AEF. b. Capt. E. Scholtz and

61. A-15, 228. 72. A-15, 109. See Lt. H. C. Wookey were shot

62. N.17, 92. introductory note to Doc. 3. down and captured near

63. N-17, 156. a. Whitter J. East, a Cambrai on 17 October 1917.

a. Teddy Bear, fur coat. graduate of the U.S. Military Tried by a German court,

64. E-8, 179 Academy (1915), had been they were found "guilty of

a. Hist, 50th Aero Sq, in assigned to the 1st Aero treason," sentenced to 10

"Gorrells History," F 8, 96-98, Squadron from the Aviation years of hard labor, and

141-142; Summary of Ops, Scho,6 at San Diego in May transferred from the prisoner.

CAS, I Corps, Nos 26/28, 5, 1917, had gone overseas with ofwar camp to a prison for

6, 7 Oct 1918, in "Gorrell's the squadron in August, and ordin~ary convicts. After the

History," C-12, 194.201, Rpt had been placed in charge of British threatened reprisal, thl

from Corps Obs Wg recd in balloon affairs of the AEF on Germans cancelled the

Info Office, AS, First .Army, September 1917. He sentences and sent the two

1415, 7 Oct 1918, in "Gorrell's returned to the United States officers back to their prisoner.

History," C-3, 208; Thomas in December and was of-war camp.

M. Johnson and Fletcher commander at Mitchel Field at c. The reference undoubtPratt, The Lost Battalion the time of his death in an edly is to the 88th Aero

(Indianapolis, 1938), psim, automobile accident on 2 Squadron (Ill Corps Observa.

especially pp 234-236 and map October 1918. tion Group), commanded at

opposite p 70; James L. 73. A-15, 21. that time by 1st Lt. Floyd E.

Hudson, Hostile Skies 74. A-15, 163. Evans.

(Syracuse, 1968), pp 266268. a The typed signature d. Mitchell.

Johrison and Pratt state (p block on this document gives e Fcr Blankenhorn the

235) that the pane! seen by Jouett's middle initiai as "J." future included work in

Roers had been laid out by 75 F-5, 469. psychological warfare with the

the Germans to deceive 76. F-7, 187. Office of Strategic Services in
-MM~-MV pop"

554 U S Air Scrvice

in World War I

Vol IV

North Africa and in the French at a cost of about 143 "U" sets from the French.

European Theater of $6,000 each. 92. E-1, 88.

Operations in Wold War I. c. A demountable building a. Trailing antenna of

82. C-12, 339. of wooden framing and truss twisted copper wire (No. 28,

a. The group had been construction covered with wiie 16.strand) 300 meters long,

formed in April 1918, but an mesh and tar paper. with lead weights on the end.

armament officer was not then 87. A-15, 195. 93. N-17, 140.

authorized for sroup 88. E-1, 87. 94. F8, 157.

headquarters. In fact, the 89. N-17, 137. a. Special helmets fitted

Tables of Organization of 15 90. E-8, 161. with receivers were provided

September 1917 and of 15 a. The Technical Section for pilots and observers. Tne

January 

armament 

1918 

officers 

showed 

authorized 

no concluded 

stone insulated 

that a 

p!ug 

porcelain 

could not 

or 

eliminate 

microphone, 

motor 

designed 

noise, 

to 

was

I

below wing level for corps be used satisfactorily in the strapped around the neck so

observation. Ordnance Liberty engine and that plugs as to be in front of the

personnel for corps with mica insulation were mouth, almost touching the

observation groups and required. The best one for the lips, for talking, but could be

squadrons appeared in the Liberty, the Technical Section pushed aside when not in use.

new Tables oi Organization believed, was the J.A Moreau 95. A 15, 234.

that became effective on 8 (J.AM.), the second best, the a. The Tables of

September 1918. Olen 75 (Special for Liberty). Organization, 8 September

b. Bureau of Aircraft b. The first three were 1918, authorized a radio

Pioduction, Air Service, U.S. American, the next three officer for observation group

Army, Handbook of Aircraft French. The editor has not headquarters, and a radio

Armament (Washington, been able to identify the other officer and eight enlisted men,

1918). is an excellent guide to two. including a master electrician,

the machine guns and other c. The gravity auxiliary for an observation squadron.

arnament of the Air Service. tank was in the upper wing, 96. C-12, 339.

See also Benedict Crowell, center section. The Technical 97. L-3, 91.

Americo's Munitions, 1917. Section's modification of the a. See Vol I, this series.

1918 (Washington, 1919). DH-4 fuel system (see note b b. Ltr, Krumm to Mai.

83 E-8, 153. to Document 3, above) Robert Loghry, 0 I.C , Radio

a. See note 82a. included the removal of this Base Section, 14 Dec 18, in

84. N-17, 93. tank and the installation of a "Gorreli's History," L-3, 90

85. N 17, 138. pressurized auxiliary tank c. Conclusions of

86 A-15, 86. under the pilot's seat. American E. F. Radio

a. William Mitchell, 91. M-40, 2. This is from a Conference, in "Gorrell's

Memoirs of World War I "Report on Radio Training in History," L-3, 97.

(New York, 1960), p 242. the American E.F." Hardinge 98. A-15, 160.

b. These demountable was director of radio schools 99. C.12, 342

hangars, consisting of a frame. at the Second Aviation a. Air Service transportawork covered with canvas Instruction Center, as well as t:on, previously exempt from

with a canvas draw-curtain at O..C of the Training Section control by Motor Transport

one end, wece about 65 feet of the Radio Division. Service (later, Motor

wide and 90 feet long. They a. The United States Transport Corps), came under

were purchased from the purchased 1,471 "Y" sets and MTS jurisdiction in May 1918.
S Notes 555

kThe functions of MTS Center at lssoudlun. 133. A-15, 112. Lahm's

included allocation of vehicles 115 A-15, 143- recommendations for the

r. and spare parts, both in short a. Col. Robert 0- Van postwar Air Service (Doc.

supply, among AEF Horn, Assistant Chief of Air 132), submitted in response to

organizations. Air Service Service, Zone of Advance. Patrick's request of 10 - units retained their b. Receiving and replace- December 1918, were dated 6

authorizations for motor cars ment station for the Air January 1919. This report,

and trucks (see Appendix A) Service, AEF. dated 9 January, was in the

but seldom were able to 116. A-15, 12. form of a personal letteW to

obtain all of the vehicles and 117. A-15. 44. Gorrell. The followinng day, 10

parts they needed. a. Having decided to use January, Lahm lectured to the

100- N.17, 139. both reports, the editor did graduating class of the

101. E-8, 150. not find it feasible to make Intelligence Officers' School at

102- A-15, 203. any deletions to avoid such Langres on the "Organization

- 103. L-3, 206, repetition. and General Use of the Air

104. L-3, 152. b. The reference is to Service."

105. L-3, 143, Carroll's memorandum, 134. A-15. 140.

106- A.15, 188. Document 116, above. a. In 1920 Milling was

107. A-15, 232. 118. A- 15, 55. assigned the task of

108. A-15, 152. 119. A- 15, 191. organizing the Air Service

109. A-15, 91. 120. A- 15, 189. Field Officers' School, which

a. For ,Jones' role in the 121. A-15, 202. late, became the Air Service

historical program of the Air 122. A- 15, 194. Tactical School and still later

S Service, AEF, see the 123. A-15, 197. the Air Corps Tactical Scho:)l.

Introduction, Vol 1. this series. 124 A- 15, 199.

110. C-3, 115. 125. A-15, 206.

11. A-1, 6. 126 A-1, 193 . Part II: U . S . 112. A.15, 76. Memorandum 12.7 A- 1S, 204.

for Col. Halsey Dunwoody. 128. A-15, 71. Bombling Survey

Assistant Chief of Air Service. 129- A 15, 242. This report,

Paris, and Chief of the Supply dated 19 December 1918, and Introduction

Section. addressed to the Commanding 1. The Statistics Branch of

113. A-15, 196. Officer, ASr Service in Italy. the War Department General

114- A-15, I149- was fortvarded to Colonel Staff had made a study of

a. DeArmond's predeces- Gorrell by Ma) Robert British and French bombinq

sor as Chief of Personnel had Glendirnning on 20 December. during the first half of 1918 A

been Lt. Col. Hiram Bingham, 130. A-15, 207. copy of this report, dated 7

who before the war had been a. Doc: 36, Vol 1I, this November 1918, had been

professor of Latin American series. sent to General Patrick. After

history at Yale University and 131. A-15, 74 he had seen it, it was sent to

had explored ,South America 132, A-15, %'. the Night Bombardment

under the auspices of Yale a. Lahrn later organized Section, where it was

and the National Geographic and commanded the Air iegarded as a "very

Society. After serving as Chief Cop riigCnete important" documentta

of Personnel he was head of "West Point of the Air," at should be preserved. Tlhus, in

" the Third Aviation Instruction Rnop ed.January 1919, it was

A*
556 U S Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

forwarded to Tours to be the evening of 10 November were ready for operations.

added to the section's history, 1918. Of the 92 raids, nearly 11. R.1, Rpt 50. See also

which had already been half (43) occurred in 1918. Rpt 9 on Maizieres.

submitted to Gorrell Receipt There were 16 during 1917 (all a. The format of the

of this report may have been in the last seven months of above recapitulation has been

a factor in Gorrell's decision the year), 28 in 1916, and 5 in changed slightly. The report

to ask G-2 for a fuller report 1915. contains detailed data on

on Aliied bombing. 2 R-i, Rpt 13. damages and losses for

2. Correspondence and 3. R.I, Rpt 18. factories at Rornbas and

other documents relating to 4. R.I, Rpt 35. Maizieres. and on 253 damage

the plans for and the conduct a. Barracks. claims made by various

of survey are in the National b. About 5 miles persons and the commiunity of

Archives, Records Gioup 120, northwest of Longuyon. Rombas.

Boxes 594, 5795, and 5799. 5 R-1, Rpt 44. 12. R-I, Rpt 28.

3. In addition, there was 6. R-I, Rpt 38. 13. R-1, Rpt 61.

some bombing by pursuit and, 7. R-I, Rpt 14. a. The report contains a less frequently, by observation 8. R.1, Rpt 48. summav listing of alerts by

units. a. Courcelles-sur-Nied. month from July 1916 to

4. See Fig 2, Vol 1, this 1918. November 1918. The number

series. b. Chailly-sur-Nied? of alerts during which no 5. There are two copies of c. Peltre, about 3 miles bombs were dropped was 396; this report in "'Gorrell's south of Sablon. the number of hours lost

History," in R-1 and R.2. The d. Frontigny? because of these alerts, 415.5.

reports are numbered 9. R.I, Rpt 39. See also the 14. R-I, Rpt 27.

differently in the two volumes, report on Rombas (Rpt 11, a. In the report, the

the numbering in R-I being below), which includes data name of the factory is spelled

followed in the citations on damage to a factory Lit both "Wendle" and "Wendel."

appearing subsequent notes. Maizieres. The latter appears in the

For this wo.':, the three major 10. R-i, Rpt 26. report on Joeuf (Rpt 12,

parts have been rearranged so a The following has been above).

that the reports on the extracted from a table of data b. It is not clear what this

various towns come first, pertaining to alerts and raids amount represents, or how

followed by the statistical at the station. The table lists the amount was determined. summar:), and then the nearly 300 alerts, with a total All amounis apparently are

narrative. The reports on the alert time of more than 400 marks except for the bonus,

several towns, which are hours, in the penod from which is in francs.

generally in alphabetical order April 1917 to November 1918. 15. R-, Rpt 58.

in Gorrell's History," have b. This report on the a. Fifty-nine appear on

been arranged by regions and bombing of forges and steel the list that follows this

types of targets, mills evidently was obtained resume of the results of

from some German source. bombing on the town of

Reports c. For information on the Thionville. They span a period

1. R-1, Rpt 42. bombing of Maizieres, see from 4 Apnl 1916 to 28

a. The report includes a Rpts 9 and 11 above. October 1Q18, with 5 in 1916,

list of these raids, the first on d. This was long before 21 in 1917, and 30 in 1918.

10 October 1915, the last on any American units in France b. On the right t ank of
Notes 557

the Moselle. opposite the been omitted, is a chart giving extracted (format changed)

town, data on traffic interruptions from a list of 48 raids and

c. Air raid pay and damages resulting from aleris that appears in the

d. These raids were made 181 air raids or alerts. report

by No 55 Squadron of the 16. R.I, Rpt 37 23. R-1, Rpt 2

RAF, 11 D.H 4's attacking on a. The format for the 24. R-1, Rpt 59.

the 2d, and 12 on the 3d. data pertaining to 17 raids has a. The figures for

e Six D.H.4's of been changed. "Material Damage Reported"

Squadron 55 and 12 D.H.9's b. On the southwest side and "Total Damages" are

of Squadron 99, RAF. The of the city of Luxembourg. corrected figures shown on

objective had been the Bosche The report also contains a list the copy in "Gorrell's

and Daimler works at of the 19 raids on Hollerich History," R-I, the correction

Stuttgart, with munition works (23 August 1914 to 26 being the addition of the

at Oberndorf as the alternate September 1918). The list amount paid by insurance

target, but because of bad shows 17 people killed and 49 companies (421,456.31 marks)

weather the leader turned and wounded to the amount of material

bombed Thionville. This attack 17 R-1, n. p This report, damage reported. Tne report,

has been characterized as which is not numbered, in the following section which

"one of the most successful of appears just before the first of has been deleted, gives

its kind made by British the reports pertaining to the detailed hreakdowns of both

aeroplanes in the war." H A. variuus towns. I numbered, ii irect and indirect damages.

,Jones, The War in the Air, would bring the total number b. Just east of Trier.

Vol VI (London, 1937), p 140. of reports to 66. c. East of Trier, south of

f. Iron Cross. 18. R.I, Rpt 22 The report, Kureriz.

g. This is a German as printed, contains all of the d. About 3 miles

document translated in G.2, information in the original southeast of Trier.

A-2c, GHQ, AEF. The raid report, but the format has e. South of Trie, and )ust

numbers correspond to those been changed. east of Kernschied.

in the list ("Statement of 19. R-I, Rpt 19 f. About 10 miles

Damages . . -") which was 20. R-I, Rpt 54. The report northeast of Trier, on the rail

appended and which is printed contains a list of nearly 200 line to Coblenz.

at the end of this iocument. alerts and raids on bast 25. RI. Rpt 21

h This raid is not listed furnaces at Rumelingen and a. Just west of EhTang.

in the report, printed above, Oettlingen between the end of b. North of Ehrang

on Metz Six F E.2b's of July 1916 and the end of c. East of the Plalze, rail

Squadron 100, RAF, bombed October 1918. bridge, in the area between

the MCtz.Sablon rail yard on 21. R 1, Rpt 16. the Moselfe and the Rumer,

the night of 30.31 May a. The report lists nearly which flows into the Moselle

i. Ths, document contains 350 alerts and raids, beginning from the south.

no explanatiun for the use of in May 1916 and running to 26. R-I, Rpt 32.

two amounts, bracketed November 1918, with the a The cover sheet to the

,,.,yliter. for this attack.. numbc- of tons of steel lost report lists these five towns,

j. This abstract from Herr as the result of each bu, ii. riffpr nt ordpr AlI ) -e

Kienle's day book was 22. R 1, Rpt 49. within less than 4 miles of

translated in G.2, A 2c, GHQ, a The data ion-erning Conz With relationship to

AFF Abstract I, which has the nine raids has been Conz, they aie situated as
558 U S. Air Senice in World War I

Vol IV

follows. Karthaus and reference to earlier raids, such b. The report contains

Herzlich, down the Moselle, as those by No. 3 Wing, information on only three

on the right side of the river, RNAS on 24 November and factories.

Wasserlich, up the Moselle, 27 December 1916 49 R-I, Rpt 34.

on the right side, Oberemmel, 32. R-1. Rpt 6. The report 50. R-1, Rpt 31.

to the south When Mer7lirh on Bou- lits tho totA! number 51 R-1, Rpt 57

and Karthaus merged in the of Alerts and hours lost a. Jones, The War in the

1940's, only Karthaus monthly from September 1916 Air, does not mention any

remained as the place name to November 1918. Of the 301 bombing of Speyer. According

for the area. alerts, 80 percent were during to the London Times, Friday,

27 R-1, Rpt 52. 1918. 26 July 1918, the Frankfurter

28. R.I, Rpt 10 33. R-1, Rpt 63. Zeilung had reported the

a. The 93 bombs (not 34 RI, Rpt 41. bombing of Speyer on Sunday

counting the one that fel! in 35. R 1. Rpt 33. night. Speyer is included in

the gardens) were numbered 36. R-1, Rpt 7. the list, published in the

consecutively in the order 37 R-1, Rpt 55. Times on 15 August 1918, of

given in the report. Bomb # 79 a. Not on G-2, A-7, places bombed by the

was one of those dropped on GHQ, AEF, list of German Independent Air Force during

2 September 1918. airdromes, 11 November 1918, July. The list of IAF targets in

29. R1, Rpt 8 in "Gorrell's History," M-1 Jones, The War in the Air,

a It seems possible, and 38. R-1, Rpt 3. Appendix XII, does not give

indeed probable, that the 39 R-l, Rpt 15. the usual details about the

amount given here was the 40. R-1, Rpt 47. execution of the mission of

result of morc than one raid. 41. R-1, Rpt 29. 21:22 July 1918 (p 62).

If 5o, the number of raids (5) a. Shells for 77 mm field 52 R1, Rpt 36.

would have to be revised, gun a. The plant often is

30 R-I, Rpt 62 42. R 1, Rpt 54 referred to as being at

a, This number, evidently a. This and the following Mannheim rather than at

obtained ny counting the messages reporting raids on Ludwigshafen.

months in which raids Rieding were translated by b Just south of

occurred, apparently is wrong. G-2, A 2c, GHQ, AEF. Ludwigshafen.

Wing No. 3, RNAS, for 43. R-1, Rpt 53. c. Between Ludwigshafen

example, bombed Vofingen 44. R 1, Rpt 56 and Oppau

on 10 and again on 11 45. R.]. Rpt 45. 53. R-i, Rpt 65

November 1916. 46. R-I, Rpt 66. 54. R 1, Rpt 40.

b loth Landstrum a. The report contains a a. The report, in the

Infanterie ErsatzBataillon? list of more than 200 alerts section deleted below, lists 23

c. Omitted. between 14 January 1917 and alerts in the period from 22

31 R 1, Rpt 17. 30 October 1918. May 1918 to 29 October 1918

a The report which 47 R.I, Rpt 46. The total, at the end of the

contains a list of the raids and 48. R.1, Rpt 30. listing, for total duration of

alerts (date. time ale-rt startod ; The repr r! roic;_, . th, 3 ov:its . 13 iuuib and

and ended, total time), covers list of 65 alerts (total time, 45 40 minutes The figures given

only the period from 1 hours) during which no bombs for the several alerts add to a

February 1918 to the end of WIee dropped. 1he earliest of total alert time of 18 hours

the Aai. It makes no these was on 22 April 1918. and 34 minutes.
ka

Notes 559

55. R-1, Rpt 25. alerts (total of 33 hours and 3 64. R-1, Rpt 5.

a. On the Main, just minutes) from 24 May to 10 65. R-1, Rpt 23

below Frankfurt. November 1918. 66. R-1, Rpt 20. Friesdorf is

56. R-1, Rpt 64. b. The report contains not on the list of German

57. R-1, Rpt 11. data (deleted below) on five airdromes on 11 November

58. R-1, Rpt 4 factories that were producing 1918, compiled by G-2, A.7,

a. Siegburg and TToisdorf shells, chemicals, metal tubing, GHQ, AEF, in "Gorrell's

are across the Rhine and etc History," M-1

about 5 or 6 miles to the 62. R-1, Rpt 43.

northeast. See separate report a. Some references to

(059) on Troisdorf. attacks on airdromes were Statistical Summary

59. R-I, Rpt 60. included, however, in some of 1. R-1, 10.

60. R-1, Rpt 12. the other reports, such as the 2. Included in report on

a. Spencer Grey later one on Mars-la-Tour (06). Frankfurt (055).

was a member of the staff of b. About 3 miles south of 3. Included in report on

the Strategical Section of the Morhange. Luxembourg (#22).

Air Service, AEF. Colonel 63. R-1, Rpt 9. 4. Two places covered by

Gorrell, then chief of the a From the format and the reports, Folpersweiler

section, said that Grey was spacing in the original copy, it (#65) and Rechicourt (140), do

considered "the world's is impossible to determine not appear in the above list.

greatest authority an how much of the above

questions dealing with aerial explanation, beginning with

bombardment." (Gorrell, Early "40-50 bombs," pertains to 8

Hist. of Strat Sec., in July, and how much to 7 Narrative Summary

"Gorrell's History," B6, 171.) August. 1. R-I. 2. The first Dage of

b. The report lists 24 b The ditto marks which the narrative summary,

alerts (total 17 hours and 51 follow apparently apply to the deleted below, contains

minutes) from October 1917 entire next entry (including information about the way the

to November 1918. the phra..e concerning the survey was organized and

61. R-1, Rpt 20. results of the bombing), with conducted That information

a. The report contains a only the figure for the number has been used in the editor's

list (deleted below) of 35 of planes being changed. introduction to Part II.

~. _ _ .. _ .
ii

II

I

=1 I

-1

I

I

71

560 Ii S Air Scrx'Ict? I

w.8;j War I I

VI IV

3

- ___ -- -- - - -- - --- - --

s.ra

-y

A

*il

4.

A

Pu

Ma. I an M, Is A' S -~iiiinii. u,. 4'
I

Notes 561

Conclusion

1. The survey, of course, was only one of the many factors

bearing upon the development of this and other USAAF bombing

policies.

2. The way in which the survey was cited in the school's

bombardment manual (see Note 3, below) seems to indicate that

only the narrative summary, rather than the full report, was at

hard. The citation was as follows: Report compiled by G-2,

A.E.F., at request oi A.S.A E F. Conciusions Re Effects of Allied

Bombing of Germany. Library Air Corps Tactical School.

3. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment Aviation (Lang!ey

Field, 1931). p 12 and n 41, pp 13.15 and n 45, and Bibliography,

Air Corps Tactical School, Genesis of Bombardment Aviation,

Preface to Bombardment Text (Maxwell Field, 1938). pp 14-15

and n 44. The Preface was a revision of Section I, "Development

of Bombardment Aviation," of the text published in 1931.

4. See, for exzmple, Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,

Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air

Force (ASI, AU, 1971); [Thomas H. Greer,] Historical Study 89.

De.elopment of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917.1941

(USAF Hist Div RSI, AU, 1955); I. B. Holly, Jr., Ideas and

Weapons, (New Haven, 1953): and Raymond Richard Flugel,

United States Air Power Doctrine (Norman, Okla, 1965).

5. The document evidently was in the school's library at

Langley Field when the manual was written early in 1930. The

!ibrary was moved with the school to Maxwell Field in 1931. to

the School of Applied Tactics at Orlando during World War II,

and back to Maxwell Field after the war to form the nucleus for

the new Air University Library. After the USAF Historical

Division moved from Washington to Maxwell Air Force Base in

1949, documents from the Tactical School Library were

transferred to the Histoncal Division now the Albert F. Simpson

Historical Research Center). The survey report apparently is not

listed in the present catalog of Ai! University Library.

6. n re editor had used "orrell's History" for reterence and :- research ior More than 15 years before be discovered the report

of the br mring 5urvov in July 1974. A notce of the report has

been published more recently in [Timothy K. Nenninger.]

National Archives Microfilm Publication Pamphlet Describing

M990, Gorrell's History of the American Expeditionary Forces

Air Service, 1917-1919 (Washington, 1975).

I
A

562 U S. Air Service

i Worldi War I

Vol P.,

Appendices

A A12 The tables used n tb's appendix have been reproduced

photographically from Hst, Div. USA. United SteesArmyw in tie 1,orld

W-ar. 191 7-1919 (Wash1 . 1918). Vol 1, pp 389-423 In the Table of

Oiganization covening Oose.votion Group. An Serve 1' p 51 2i ix'I.

column 12 has been changed from1 ~ " Y. which obviously is c rony. to

li 2ri..which makes it the same as the authorization. for Headquarters.

OHO. Air Service Reserve In the Table of Organization coverng

Observation Sqluadro0n. Air Scrvice ip 514). !:ne2 20i. column 10i. the

onginial reference to remarksckas dcf 'which clearly is wrong. It evidently

should be -z" rind has bieen changed accordingly

2 1-24. 166

=4-i

T5e S Adnauic. iepailig Brest f ranc. tueu i ainn rv ?Y S. i icr Se , i -. alter tie curt' Woirld War I
563

Glossa ,y of

Abbaeviations

A-2 Information Section, Military Information Division

A.2c Press and Translations Branch, Information Section,

=Military Information DivisionA

A-7 Air Intelligence Section, Military Information Division

AA Antiaircraft

AC of S Assistant Chief of Staff

AEF American Expeditionary Forces

AFSHRC Alhert F Simpson Historical Research Center

AIC Aviation Instruction Center

Akt.-Oes. Aktiengesellschaft

a.m.; a-M am Main

A AM; a r ante meridiem

Am EF American Expeditionary Forces

App appendix

- AR Corps d'Armee a moteur Renault

AS Air Service

ASAEF Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces

ASI Aerospace Studies Institute

AU Air University

BC Battery Commander

BIO Branch Intelligence Officer

BR Bentley Rotary

Brig Brigadier

B.T. Battery-Target

c centimeter(s)

CACS Corps Air Service Commander

Capt Captain

CAS Chief of Air Service

cc (Name given to synchronizing mechanism developed

by Constantinesco and Colley)

CG Commanding General

Chem Chemische

C ir,-C Commander -in -Chief

cm cenitimeter(s)

.Co Company - CID Commanding Officer

:: C of S Chief of Staff

Col Colonel

DH De Havilland

DiN, Division

- Doc document

DSC Distinguished S.ervice Cross

lr.Li II , 

. ... ....
564 U S Ali Service

in World Wcr I

Vol. IV

EA enemy aircraft

EF Expedtionary I-.

F franc(s)

FA Field Aruller'.,; Frenkiord Arseal

FE Faran Expe-imental

Fig figure

F© Fiek, ordcr

G-1 First Section (Administratun), General Staff

G-2 Second Section lintelhgence). General Staff

G-2 A Miltarv 'niormation Division, Intelligence Section,

Genera! Staff

G-2-D Censorship Division. Intelligence Section, General

Staff

0-3 T:,ird Section )Operations), General Staff

Gen General

GHQ General Headquatiers

G mb.H. Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung

Gp group

Hist Historical

Hr(), hr(s) hour(s)

IAF Independent Air Force

!nf Infantry

;nfo Information

Ins Insurance

Kil kilomete;

kg kiloglam(s)

km kilometer(s)

Lieut Lieutenant

Lt Lieutenant

Lit- let~er

rMA m meter(s); mark(s)

Maj Major

ME Master Electrician

MG machine gun

MID Military Intelligence Division

Min rnin minute(s)

Mk(s) mark(s)

mm millimeter

MSE Master Signal Electrician
.do

Glossary 565

MTC Motor Transport Corps

n note

NCO noncommissioned olcel

No(s) number(s)

Obs Observation

OCSO Office of Chief Signal Officer

OIC officer in charge

Ops operations

p, pp page. pages

PC Post of Command

p1 pfennig

PM, pm post meridiem

Pur pursuit

QMC Quartermaster Corps

RAF Royal Air Force

recd received

RFC Royal Flying Corps

RNAS Royal Naval Air Service

Rpt report

PR railroad

RSI Research Studies Institute

Ry tailway

SCR Signal Corps Radio (onginally Set. complete, radio)

SE Scout Experimental

Ser series

SOS Services of Supply

SPAD Societe pour Aviation et ses Derives

Sq(s) squadron(s)

USAAF United States Army Air Forces

USAF United States Air Force

VB Viven Bessieres (name of grenade)

Vol volume

Wg Wing

Z of A Zone of Advance
566 U S Air Serv'icez

in World] War I

Vol

Ir bex

Abernethy. Thomas J 60

A C. spark plugs: 250

Accountability Division: 213-214

Acting rades 317-318,321-322.3,33

Adjutant General s Office, GHS. 309

Adjutants. 338

Ad~lutants School 303

Administration

criism of workload 173

problems in 304

training programs 303-304

Adrian barrack 24 1

Adruat, SS. 562

Aeronautical Sco gnal Cops 200

Alerons maipulanon 135

Air atlaches. need for 51-52

Air Corps Tactical School 506

Air Depot. !st. 18. 235. 240. 242, 248-249. 274. 276. 331

Air depot squadrons, proposed 97

Air-ground cooperation See Ground units. ccoperation and

liaison with

Air Intelligence Subsection. GHO 216

Air Ministry jBritishi 26-27

Air Secretary. proposals for 25. 358. 360

Air Service

army organization 14-15

autonomy Tor, proposed and opposed 25-27. 278 310 358-360

command andconfrol 9.24.26-27. 310.318-319 327

corps organization 14-15

division organization 15
Index 567

expansion programs: 5, 360

G-2, relations with: 218. 355-356

geological survey, role in 349

headquarters move to Tours 199

mapping, role in. 349,358

naval air service, merger proposed 25

newsmen's imaqe of: 4-5, 169-170

organization. 6, 14-15, 17-18 318-319, 340, 350-352, 359

passenger service, role in developing 348-349

proficiency and quality required 22,316-317

popular image of 4. 316,325-326

posal service, role in: 348-349, 358

postwar activities, proposals for 348-349

psychological warfare, role in 221-222

reserve, provision for. 362

specialized nature of. 277-278. 314, 362

L staff organization and reorganization 210-214

Air Service Production Center No. 2. 139. 275

Air supremacy. U S position on: 22

Air un~ts. See by type

Aircraft

armament. See Armament; also by type

arming routine 234-237

armor protection: 122-124. 251

bombload capacities 86-88

characterist:Cs. desirable and faulty. 3, 32, 86-89. 95. 119-120.

122-124,132, 135-136

controls, protection and placement 86-87. 89, 135

equipment See Equipment and accessories

identification. friend or foe 32.92. 127-129. 163. 165. 219

inspection failures 95. 232. 234. 240. 245. 321. 325. 334

leaflets distribution by. 221-222. 225-226. 230

losses 10-11

mission, basis for design 84-85

number in inventory 4

production, procurement and replacement 5-6.20.57 121. 244

research and development in 6. 52. 361

shortages in number: 8, 28-29. 31. 76

spare parts cataloguing 275

standardization of models 6. 276

target presented by 166

tests. pre-flight 67. 71. 76. 155. 245

* t.ainers 7. 331
I

568 U S Air Sc'ixice'

in World War 

I

Vol IV

twin-engine bomber 30

two-place fighter development 13.20-21

types by name. See Aircraft types

visibility required 86. 89. 119

Aircraft industry

criticism of 57

developmeni and expansion: 22. 362

Aircraft losses, enemy: 30

Aircraft types

AE.G. 303

Albatros 300. 303

A.R -2:20

Breguet 85. 88-89. 249. 370

Caproni: 85, 346

De Havilland 11-12.20.87-88,95. 118-120, 131, 138-139. 177.

230, 232. 248, 251. 255, 258-260, 266, 273

Farman 346

F.F .301

Fokker 59. 72-73. 178. 302

Halberstadt. 302

Handley-Page 85

JN-4 7-8

Nieuport. 20. 83-84. 156 Roland. 301. 336

Ruinpler: 303

Salmson 20. 85. 108. 124. 1.31-132. 230. 232-233. 240, 249.

251. 258. 274

S.E -5 51

Sopwith Camel 12. 20 28 30

Spad 20. 63. 76-77. 85, 132

Airdrops 175. 176

Airfields

bombing strikes against 488-491. 497

command & control 15

communications systems. use at 102

dummies 34. 37

fighter strikes against 37

landing aids required 33-34

lighting systems 28. 3031. 33-34. 38. 74

obstacles removal 34. 38

site locations 6. 19 37-38. 362

unserviceable 248
....

Index 569

Ig

Air-raid alerts and shelters. enemy 395. 397. 405. 411. 424. 427-

430. 432-433. 436-437. 440-441. 443-444. 447. 451. 453-454.

457-459. 462, 464. 466-467. 470-472, 476. 479-481. 486. 497

498

Airsickness 2. 178

Alcoholic beverages, use by pilots: 279-280. 289

Aldis signaling lights: 34

Alternators. radio: 259-260

Altimeter 32

Amanty 29g. 365. 373

Amanweiler 412-413

Ambulances, provisions for 283. 291-292

American Red Cross 280

Ammunition

calibrating. 240

conservation of 117

defective lots: 234, 238 239

incendiaries. 71-72. 76

load capacities 89 119

tracers: 32. 232

types. 32

Anderson, Andrew. 271-273

Anderson, .OB : 207-209

Anderson. Robert M : 1!3-155. 177

Andrew. Flynn L A : 19C

t.ndrews. Horace A. 60

Antennas. trailing 257, 2t0

Antiaircraft defenses, enemy 371-373. 375. 378. 393-394. 397.

401. 405. 411. 415. 425. 431. 433. 436, 445. 451, 454. 457. 467.

469. 472, 474-476, 479.482-483. 485. 489. 495-496, 499. 502

Antiaircraft units (see also Ground units)

cooperation and liaison with 28,31. 42

enemy 371

merrjer with a;r units, proposed 42

danger from, minimizing 130. 136-136. 146-147. 149-152 154,

156. 158. 164-167. 174. 192. 195-196
570 US Air Sermce

in World War I

Vol. IV

Antiaircraft weapons

enemy types 137

tactical dispositions. 38

Antwerp. 484

Arcadia. Fla.: 353, 355

Archie batteries. See Antiaircraft units

Argonne Forest: 137. 155, 177

Argonne offensive. See Meuse-Argonne offensive

Armament

characteristics, ideal: 32

fighter aircraft: 75-76

installation, routine: 234-237

maintenance and repair: 236-237, 240

supply of 230-234. 237-238. 240

Armament mechanics 234-235. 356

Armament officers: 230-234, 240, 327

Armies.

air service organization: 14-15

balloon service organization 200-202

Armies (numbered) First: 115. 190, 225-226.,228, 302. 355, 363.,373

Second. 21. 85. 106-107, 217, 228, 355, 364

Third. 213

Arnaville: 367. 378-379, 492

Ars: 378-379, 492

Arthurr Dogan M . 146-148

Ailillery Aerial Observation School, Second: I

Artillery fire ~flying throughi 2. 185

on friendly troops: 178

Artillery fire adjustment and regulation

balloons in. 200-203. 206

observation, role in 3. 99. 101. 107. 113-114, 125. 143, 145.

149-150 1'j4-155. 160-162. 165. 169-170. 181, 252

radio communication in 252, 254, 263-271

training programs: 347-348

typical day's results 267
- -TIndex 571

weather. effect on: 270

Artillery units, tactical dispositions: 181. See also Ground units

Athus: 412, 418, 492

Atkinson. Bert M.: 28

Attila the Hun: 368

- Auboue: 382.392-394,493

Audun-le-Roman: 367,369. 371-373,375, 382

Austria, reaction to psychological warfare 225

Fi Aviation cadets: See Flying cadets

Aviation Instruction Centers

2d: 284,296,312 [ 3d: 284,288,307, 313.336

S Aviation medical officers. See Flight surgeons

Aviation medicine

achievements: 288

boards and faculties for: 287

equipnent for practice: 286-287, 291

A research required: 285

schools: 285-287

Aviation Section, Signal Corps. See Air Service

=' Avricourt: 448 Awards. See Decorations and awards

t Babcock. Char;es W ":244

Badische Aniline& Soda Works 461-463. 502

Baker, Newton D.: 220

Balloon companies

in army and corps organization: 200-202

*command and control: 200, 205,208

ighter pilots, liaison with: 203

first arrival. 199

ground units, assignment to: 200, 206-209

mobility required: 205

motor vehicles for: 209

orders, unreasonable: 207

organization. 17-18, 196
572 US Air Service

;n World War I

Vol. IV

tactical dispositions: 206-208

training programs 204

transportation for: 205. 207. 209

Balloon Companies

2d: 199

1 01h: 204

84th (French) 196, 198

Balloon groups: 204-205. 209

Balloons

activity periods: 203

artillery fire adjustment and regulation by 200-203, 206

barrage defense: 398. 414-415,445,495-496, 499

ground protection for: 72. 75. 77

leaflets distribution by: 221. 227-229

liaison with: 40, 203

meteorological balloons: 227

missions and functions 206

night operations by: 36

observation, role in: 206

strikes against: 10, 14, 30, 37, 50. 71.77

timing strikes against 72-74

unprotected strikes against: 75

weather, effect on operations: 72

Bar-le-Duc: 220

Barracks See Quarters

Barrage balloon defense: 398. 414-415. 445.495-496. 499

Bauch. Marcus T 364

Bayonville 367. 378-379.492

Beauz6e. 229

Beckman. Theodore N. 364

Bhonne 274

Belcher, J G.: 262

Bellinger. AlfredT 214-217

Bensdort (Benestorff): 447-449. 492

Beymer. Oliver N. 257-258

Biddle. Charles J. 2, 51,82
A

Index 573

Biebrich: 476

Biewer: 432-433

Biggin Hill, England: 270

Bingham, Hiram, 308

Bird, Allen I..Jr.: 136-136

Black, Edward C., Jr.: 187

Blankenhorn. Heber, 220-230

Blies River: 453

Boggs, Thomas R.: 277-284

Bois des Sergents: 374

Boiling, Raynal C.: 313

Bolt, William: 162-164

Bomb racks: 32, 86-89

Bombing operations

aircraft, number employed: 373, 376

against airfields: 488-491, 497

against lines of communication: 367

air-raid alerts and shelters, enemy: 395, 397, 405, 411, 424,

427-430, 433-434. 436-437, 440-441, 443-444, 447. 451.

453-454,457-459,462. 464,466-467,470-472,476. 479-481.

486, 497-498

altitudes for 88

against bridges: 104-105, 379

casualties, estimated: 369, 497, 500

civilian morale, effect on: 369, 373, 376, 378. 385. 393-396,

398-399, 401-402,420, A30.431, 434-435, 437, 440.441.

444-445, 448, 453, 462. 464, 466. 469, 472, 481-483, 485-

486, 488

F clouds, factor in: 373, 486

command and control: 14

cost of enemy protection: 495-497, 500

critique of: 501-502

day missions. 10

defense measures, enemy 371-373, 375. 378. 393-394. 397.

401. 405, 411. 415, 425, 431, 433, 436, 445, 451, 454. 457,

467, 469. 472, 474-476. 479. 482-483, 485, 489, 495-49b.

499,502

duration of missions, 369, 497
,. - - *. . _ a ~- .-

574 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

enemy operations. 10, 47

evaluation of results 91, 364-365.369-495,499-501

failed missions 373

by fighter aircraft. 9, 11-12.30.50, 82

fighter protection, enemy: 495, 499

fighter escort in 11,42, 50, 64

first mission: 365

French operations: 365,367-368. 398. 460, 467, 501

future, policies proposed for 502-507

ground units. slrikes against: 367. 375. 500, 502-504

against industrial centers. 364. 382-398, 402-407, 415-435, 437-

486.497, 501-502

intelligence, value in 91-92

interservice cooperation in: 502

losses in: 10-11

maps. use in: 91-92. 503

missions and target selections: 90-91. 367-368.497-498, 504

newsmen's conception of. 90-91

night missions: 12, 29, 37, 376, 444.464. 469. 476, 484. 498. 504

production, effect on: 496-497. 499-500

against railroads: 367-391. 394-395, 399-403, 407-414, 418-451,

457. 459. 461. 466-467. 469-474, 476, 478-480, 482-483, 486-

489. 497. 499-500, 502-503

ranges of missions: 365

Royal Air Force operations: 365, 367-368, 398, 460, 467, 469, 476.

482, 484, 486, 501

Royal Naval Air Service operations 484

searchlights in defense 394. 398, 401, 425. 454, 457 467, 474-

475. 482-483, 485. 496

sorties, number of: 365, 369-370, 373

strategic plan, lack of 501-502

survey of organization 363-365

tactics and maneuvers 90, 92

teamwork in. 18, 87. 93

training programs 8

troop morale, effect on 91, 497-502. 503

weather, effect on: 373. 386, 420

Bombs

Cooper fragmentation. 37

fuzes fr: 468

incendiaries 385. 451

leaflet drops by. planned 226

load capacties: 86-88

Michelin: 88-89
Index 575

volume expended: 365, 367. 369-37 1 376

kBonn 482. 493. 502

Bonnell, GH.: 60

Bonneville, Richard W.: 364

Borden, H.L.: 190-193

Boricon. H.C.: 137

Boulay: 491-492. 495, 498

Bous: 445, 492

9ouzonville (Busendort): 446-447. 492

Brebach: 437, 441, 492

Bridges, strikes against: 104-105. 379

Briey: 368-369, 392I

Buhl airfield. 487, 490, 492

: Buildings, identiying: 135

Burbach: 437-441

Burbach-Es,7hDudelange Iron Works; 415, 497-498

Burtt. Wilson B. 251

Burwell. O.D * 273-276

FBussingen: 382

Byam. L.H. 344

Cameras: 157-158

Camouflage measures: 293

Camp John Wise: 355

Carburelor jets. 120

Carl Foundry:402-407

Carroll. Philip A. 312-319. 3,32-335

ir Cassady. Thomas G.80-83
576 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Casualties from bombing, estimated: 369, 497, 500

Caufield,JohnH 169

Cavalry. observation role of: 190-193

Cazaux 193 A-1

Ch~lons 198

Chambley: 378

Chandler, Charles de F.. 198. 200-202

Charleville: 371, 373, 376

Chasse squadrons. See Fighter operations

Ch~teau-Thierry battle. 9,44, 72. 90. 174, 184, 233. 262,355

Chaurnont-en Bassigny: 199

Chemin des Dames: 303

Chief Signal Officer, War Department: 269

Civil aviation

development of: 52, 360-361 potential foreseen: 287

Civilians

Army. popular image of: 313-314

role in Air Service activities 3, 5

!n supply service: 305-306

training programs for: 313

Clark. George S.. 142-143

Clermont-Ferrand 8

Clocks: 274

Clothing, procurement and issue 273

Clouds factor

in air operations: 373, 486

in fighter operations: 69, 72. 75, 118

in observation operaticns 118,126.140, 163,183,187

Coal mines. 368

Coast defenses

radio communication in 270-271

squadrons allotment to. 348. 350. 360-361

Coblentz (Coblence) 364 365, 419, 433-434. 477-482. 492, 496

Codes: 34, 101-104, 186

"'--- - 1
Index 577

gI

)I

Coffee, use by pilots: 289

Coleman. Arthur A.: 364

Cologne (Kbln): 365, 476, 482, 484-486, 492, 496. 498. 502

Colombey-les-Belles. 120, 274, 323

Colonie Cassion: 404

Colonie Terwin: 402

Columbus, Ohio: 303

Command and control

Air Service: 9, 24, 26-27, 310, 318-319, 327

airfields: 15

balloon companies 200.205,208

bombing operations: 14

fighter operations: 14, 60, 66-67, 83

French system: 9

by General Staff: 24-26

of information sections: 300

Command posts

S liaison with 31. 181. 251-252

site locations: 38

strikes against. 10

Commissaries: 346

Communications systems (see also by type): 102-105, 111-112,

120. 179

at airfields: 102

- .research and development in: 269-270

- Signal Corps, role in: 268-269

i supply of materials and facilities: 258, 262, 269

training programs: 102. 256. 260-261, 264, 267, 269-270

Compagnie des Fond6ries de Pont-A-Mousson: 393

Compass officers 327

- Compass, orientation by: 177

Compasses 32-33. 74, 274

Conant, W.M.: 344

S Conflans: 367-372, 378-379. 492, 503

Conger, Arthur L. 214

- Congress

appropriations by: 5, 306-307

ll
578 U.S. Air Service,

in World War I

Vol IV

autonomous air force, proposals for: 25-26

Construction programs

demountable structures: 241-242

materials supply and control 241-243

Contract schools: 346

Convoys. str!kes against: 9- 10

Conz (Konz). 419-420, 427, 435. 437. 445. 493

Coordination Staff: 210-212

Cornell University: 133

Corn:ng. Merv: 175

Corny 367. 378-379, 492

Corps

air service organization 14-15

balloon service organization 200-202

liaison with 99

squadrons assignment toI 350. 354, 358

Corps (numbered)

1.218

I11 224-225, 229

IV 229

V: 292

Corps air service chief

as observation group commander 106

qualifications and responsibilities: 107-110

Correspondents See Newsmen

Courcelles-sur-Nied (Kurzel): 378-379. 381-382, 492

Courier service: 102. 111. 205,251

Cowle. H.H. 143

Coyle, Arthur J : 125. 281

Creech, Jesse 0. 56

Creuzwald-la-Croix See Kreuzwald

Cummings. Lester E 340

Cunningham. A L :29

Curry, Howard S. 337
Index 579

Curry. John F.: 105-107. 348-349

D'Amour, Fred E.: 171-173

Davidson, Robert L.: 149-150

Davis. Milton F.: 41

De Armond,.George W.: 308-310

Decorations and awards policies. 113, 172, 317

Demonstrations, value of: 92

Dental service. 282-283

:7 Depots. need for 20. 272

- Deullin, Captain (French): 82

- Deutz: 485

Devre. AdolphO0.: 180-182

* Diedenhofen. See Thionville

Diets, regulating: 2, 279, 288-289, 307

Dieuze: 448, 492

Differdange (Differdingen): 412. 417, 492

Dillingen: 437, 445,.492

- Dillon, Raymond P.. 96

Dingier Sche Machine Works 455

Direction-finding systems. 253-254. 256. 269

Discipline

instilling arid maintaining. 53. 112, 314-316, 326-327, 337-338

341. 345

* pilots 3. 8. 34. 43-46, 58

* status of: 214

Divisions

air service organization: 15

lir ., with 99-100, 109-111. 126

sq,- L.-cnns assignment to: 110, 121, 350

Divisiuns (numrbered)

1st~ 100

28th (German) 224

35th. 171
580 U.S Air Service

in World W~ar I

Vol. IV

42d; 100. 260

77th 176

80th 171

89th; 100

Dommarlin-la-Montagne 228

Dorrmary-Baroncourt; 367. 370-374. 492. 503

Dorrance. George: 143

Drugs. cautior on use. 289

DudeLange (Dudelingen): 412, 416. 492

Dummy airfields 34, 37

Dunwoody. Halsey. 306

DUren: 486-487. 492

Disseldorf: 365

Eaker, Ira C.: 504

East. Whitten J.: 196

Easterbrook. Arthur L.: 125

Edingen. 383

Education programs; 303

Ehrange; 4 19-420. 427. 432-435. 492. 498. 503

Ehrenbreilstein; 481

Ellington Field 352-353

Ellis. Henry: 143

Elmingen 408

Emil (Adolph) Factory; 415

Engineering officers; 121. 327-328, 357. 361

Engineers. Corps of. 241-242

Engines

G.R; 32

Clerget; 32

faults in; 245

Hispano-Suiza; 76

Le Rhone 32

Libierty. 20. 87. 89. 131. 155. 177-178, 251. 258
Index 581

Monosoupape 28, 32

protection., for: 136

quality and performance: 76

standardizing: 6

tests, pire-f light: 78-81, 95, 129-130, 153.,155

England. See Royal Flying Corps; Royal Naval A~r Service

S Engraving facilities 300

Epp. Otto C.: 364

Equipment and accessories: 274-276

Esch- sur-Alzette 412, 415, 492. 496-498

Essen. 476

S Esslinger, E.E. 248-251

Estes. J. Dickinson,: 131

I-tain: 368-369

Executive Section: 212-214

S Exercise, need for: 288

Eypper, George W :344-345

Farrer. J C: 298

Fentsch River and Valley. 382

Ferry pilots: 248

Fiat motor vehicles: 196

Fighter operations (see also Patrol operations)

acrobatics. use in: 70

alerts: 40

altitudes in: 35, 45, 47. 50. 61-63, 66, 69-70, 79

assembly and takeoff: 80-82

balloon-attack escort: 72, 75

balloons, strikes against. See Balloons. strikes against

bomb-carrying by: 9. 11-12. 30.50,.82

bomrber escor missions: 11. 42. 50, 64

cab~aret maneuver: 46

ch~ain formations: 49-50 clouds • and log, factors m 69. 72,75, 118

command and control: 14, 60, 66-67, 83

S day-flight periodls: 35

S defensive measures 3
[,

L

582 US Air Service

it World War I

VOL. IV

direction and route orientation. 330

enemy. locating and identifying 31. 36. 48-49. 62-64. 71. 129

134

enemy. protection against bombing. 495. 499

eneiny tactics and maneuvers 43. 45, 47. 49-50. 62. 115, 117.

148. 154. 164, 174-176. 178

firing ranges and techniques 63. 67. 7-71. 76-7

formations 9. 11. 43-46, 48.62-71 80-83

French tactics 45

individual combat, discouragement of: 13. 18. 45-46. 50. 64,

66-67

initiative in 67

last aerial victory: 42

low-flying strikes 10. 14

maps. use in: 74

mission 39 48. 53

night-flight equipment 31

night missions 12, 14.28-38

night visibility: 31

observation-escort missions 40. 64. 123-124. 126. 145. 151.

157 170

patrol-escort missions 30, 35-36. 39. 42 47

photographic-escort missions 69. 145. .60

radio communication in. 49-50

reconnaissance-escort missions 39, 69

rendezvousing: 64-65. 81. 84

iomance of. popularizing 321. 324, 330. 334

signal systems in: 46. 49. 82

speeds in 67

straggling. danger in: 64. 69. 82. 84

sun. factor in 67. 69. 74. 83. 117. 129. 148. 154. 178

surprise. use in 36. 40.49.61-62. 66. 69. 74. 129

tactics and maneuvers 39. 44-50. 61-77. 82-84

teamwork in 8. 13. 18. 58. 63-64. 66.68-71. 117. 128

visibilty. importance in 48-49

weather. effect on 69

winds, factor in 66-67

F,re extinguishers 274

Flabeuville 373

"Flaming onions": 72

Flares 33
U%

_--

Index 583

tactical use: 30. 163, 169. 173-174, 179,181 183-184, 189

testing: 33

! Flashlights: 32

Flash-and-sound detection. 165, 185

Fleeson, Howard T.: 173-176

Fleischmann. Charles M.: 346-347

Flight commanders

authority and functions: 95, 136,144

grades for. 95

Flight sergeants: 139

Flight surgeons (see also Aviation medicine)

assignment and replacement: 278, 283, 290-291

training programs: 283, 287, 291

transportation for: 283-284, 291

Floerchingen: 411

Florange: 395

. Flying cadets

morale and treatment 8.51,57-58,316.320-323,325,334-337. 342.345

rejections, unnecessary: 133

i Foch, Ferdinand: 27

Fogga 346

Fohren: 432

Foilpersweiler airfield: 491

Food service. 54, 60

Ford motor vehicles: 139, 284, 291-292

S Formations

bombing operations 365. 367-368. 398. 460. 467, 501

fighter operations: 9. 11.43-46, 48, 62-71, 80-83

training in flying. 8. 67-63, 71.136

- Fort Omaha: 355

Foucaucour, 229

Foulois. Benjam, D.: 200

background. 21-22

Mitchell, conflict with 22
584 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

reports on experiences: 1,21-28,269-271

France

aerial photography by: 293-295

aircraft procurement from: 8

Americans serving with: 311

bombing operations: 365, 367-368, 39B. 460, 467, 501

command and control by: 9

lighter tactics: 45

psychological warfare by: 226, 229

training by: 8-1C, 17, 45, 195-198, 204,311,329

Francis, Walter L. 183-184

Franco-Prussian War: 368

Frankford Arsenal: 234

Frankfurt Allgemeane Versicherurig A.G.: 425

Frankfurt-am-Main: 469. 474-476. 485, 492, 502

Frederick Charles. Prince: 368

Fretburg: 365, 495

Freisenheim: 465

French, Howard C.: 164-166

Frescaty airfield 368. 487

Friesdorf airfie!d. 491-492

.rontigny (Frontemingen) 382

Fuel and lubricants

adjustment of teed 120

consumption rates 32

leaks, danger from. 87

poor quality 274

supply o,. 272. 214

range capacities: 86, 89

Fuel pump. Selden 20, 120

Fuel tanks: 12, 20. 86-88, 119-120. 132, 136,251

Fuselage construction 88-89

Fuzes, bomb: 468

Gang fighting. See Fighter operations
Index 585

I

Gasoline tanks (aircraft). See Fuel tarks

Gasapparat & Gasswerk. A.G Mainz: 471

Gassr nsserfabrik Mainz: 471

Gastell Wagon factor': 474

Gendringen: 383

- General Motors vehicles: 291-292

General Staff (see also Staffs and staff officers)

air officers assignment to: 24-25

autonomous air force, policy on: 25-26

command and centre' by

Generators: 33

Geological survey, Air Service role in: 349

Germany (see also Bombing operations)

air force development: 22

psywar, reaction to. 222-225

,. training programs: 329 t Gilchrist, John W.S.: 167-168

~ Godfrey, Charles W : 307

Gorrell, Edgar S.: 1.2, 332, 363, 506

_ Gorze: 367, 378-379, 492 I ;Grand Pr4: 138,177 r Grant, Alfred A.: 77

Gray, Spenser: 484

, Great Britain See Royal Air Force; Royal Naval Air Service

r Green Hill. 433

Greene, Warwick: 210-214

Greisl, Harold- 143

Greist Werke: 457

Grench parachute flare. 33

Greunke, Emery A: 363-364

Grier, Alexander: 143

Ground crews 52 Ia
586 US Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

alerting: 54-55

grades and ratings: 340-342

jobs. assignment to: 54, 60-61

mechanics, improper use: 244

morale and dedication in: 56, 60-61, 112, 235-236

pilots, re!ations with. 41, 139-140, 316, 326

rela;iing regulations for: 53-54, 139

specialists, assignment of: 139-140

squadron complement: 340-342

supervision of 240, 248

training programs: 8-9, 315-316, 326-328. 343, 354-355

Ground units

balloons, assignment to: 200, 206-209

bombing strikes against: 367, 375. 500. 502-504

command and control from air 114

- i commanders' attitude toward air operations: 171

cooperation and liaison with: 3. 12, 16 19. 30, 32. 99-100, 102,

105-107, 109-111, 113-114, 121-122, 124-126. 149-150. 160-

163, 168-171, 174, 178-179, 189, 219, 251-252, 260, 262-

e71, 303, 330-331

enemy strikes aqainst: 45

fighter strikes against: 9-11.21.30, 37. 40.42.50.69.75,82-83,

147-148. 154,171. 174, 177. 191-192

friendly aircraft, fire on: 165

ignorance of air operations: 100-101, 107. 113-114, 121-122,

127. 168-171, 182. 188-189, 317,321,330,335, 359

interchange of personnel with: 107, 114. 127, 168. 171, 18r

morale effect of air strikes: 21, 83 isee also Bombing operations.

Fighter operations)

observation, value to 93, 178

panel displays by: 101. 123-124, 140. 146. 153154. 160, 163,

169-171, 173-174, 177-178. 181, 183-184. 189, 252

personal services for 126

relationswith 19, 99-100, 104, 108,278

squadrons assignment to. 100, 110, 121, 219-220, 348, 350,

354,358

tactical air suppon. 3

training exercises with: 171-1 72. 185, 189. 330-331, 358

warnings to aircraft 118-119

Group commanders

authority and functions 104, 110

as corps air service chief 106

grades for 92

..... '- m-m =_= -
?I

Index 587

oI

Groups

abolition proposed: 106, 172

headquarters functions: 110

overlap of functions in: 106

pe, sonnel complement: 93

squadron integrity in: 110. 112

Groups (numbered)

1 st Bombardment: 92, 367, 370, 374. 376

1st Pursuit: 10, 28-30, 73

2d Bombardment: 84

3d Observation: 191

5th Pursuit: 42-43

Guard duty, drawbacks caused by: 244

Guilene Brothers: 462

t Gunnery training: 3, 16, 41, 93, 141-142. 144, 193-196, 312, 329-

330, 344-345. 353. 356

Gutz Armaturwerke: 458

Hagondange (Hagendrigen): 382-393, 493, 495

Hall. Melville C :240

Hall, Norman W.: 96

. !Hall perimeter lest: 287

Hangars

Bessonneau type 241.243

movable 97

provision of. 272

Hansell. Haywood S., Jr. 504

Hardinge. Harlowe; 251-256

Hartney, Harold E.: 28-29, 60, 72

Haussirnont: 199

Hayange (Hayingen) 382,396-398. 492, 496

Hayden. Van 143

Health education training: 288-289

Heater, Charles L. 94-96

Heaters, supply to squadrons 251
588 U.S. Air Set-Ace

in World War I

Vol. IV

Hemning. 448-449. 493

H e nry. D. M.: 216

Hessenimuller factory: 462

Hill. Dudley L.: 42

Hills, identifying; 135

Hindenburg, Paul von: 223-224

Hbchst: 474-476, 493. 496-497

Holden, Kenneth M.: 150-153

Hollerich: 412-4 !4, 493

Homecourt: 382, 392-394,.493

Hooper, Thornton D.: 94

Hopkins, Joy: 260-262

Horses, in liaison service; 209

Hospital facilities: 280-282, 291

Hotton, Harold J : 364

Huron Sisters: 281

Hydrogen gas supply: 228-229

Identification, friend or foe: 32, 92,127-129,163. 165,219

Incendiary ammunition. 71-72, 76

Incendiary bombs: 385,451

Industrial centers, strikes against: 364. 382-398, 402-407. 415-

435, 437-486, 497. 501-502

Infantry contart missions: 108-110. 122-124, 136-137, 140-143,

145-147. 153-156, 163-167, 17U), 175-177, 183-185. 188. 190-

192, 252.,260

Infantry drill, value of. 112

Infantry Regiment, 108th: 176

Infantry units. See Ground units

Information officers: 215

Information sections

command arid control. 300

documents compilation and distribution: 299-30 1
Index 589

education programs: 303

facilities and personnel 298-299

liaison system: 299-301

hist_ rical work by: 302

mission and functions. 298-303

office machinery and supplies. 300

press releases by. 301

Inspection Department, proposed 212-213

Inspections, failures in: 95, 232, 234, 240, 245.321, 325, 334

Instructors

faults in: 347

pilots, use as: 58-59, 90, 121. 128, 144. 167,304

qualifications for: 58, 345

radio officers as: 260

t Instrument boards: 32 Instruments

lighting. 28, 32

placement- 92

shortages of: 95

training in use: 35

Intelligence officers: 181,215-216

Intelligence operations and reports 91-92, 215-217, 355-356

~Intelligence Section. GHQ: 214

Intelligence sections, squadron: 293, 296

Irar-h. 432

ssoudun: 246, 274-275,284,312-313,318,3 2 2 .

3 29. 3 4 1, 3 5

7

Italy, training by: 346

== Jacobus Mine: 388, 391

Jaeger lest: 290

Jennings. Percy H.: 305-307

Joeuf: 382, 392-394,493

Johnson. Davenport: 39-40

Jolly spark plugs: 250

Jones. Charles M.: 53-56

Jones, Ernest 298-302
-A

A

590 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol IV

Joralemon. Ira B. 24 1-243

Jouett, John H. 203-205

Kaiserslautern: 456-459. 476, 493, 498

Karlshuette 408

Karlshutten Steel Works: 398

Karlsruhe: 460, 493, 495

Karthaus: 427. 435-437, 493

Kelly Field: 328

Kennedy, Oavid S.: 132-136

Kennedy, Roy 0.: 96

Kernschied 432

Kilner, WalterG 313,339,319-333.339

Kincaid, R G :302-303

Kindley, Field E.: 57-59

Kinsley, Wilbur: 143

Kirby. Maxwell: 42-43

Knox, Walter B.: 56

Knulange: 496

Knuziy. 408. 410

Koblenz. See Coblentz

Kohless. Robert A.: 239

Komheld factory: 471

Konz. See Conz

Kreuzwald: 446-447, 493

Kronig, Louis H, Jr.. 341-343

Krumm. L R.. 263

Kurenz: 431

Kurzel. See Courcelles-sur-Nied

Kuter, Laurence S 504
Index 591

I

r Laboratories, aviation medicine: 282-283, 285 *Lacy, Clive: 143

S Laeser & Company: 428-429

Lae's & Company- 430-431

S Lahm, Frank P.: , 15-21. 196-200.350-359

Lake Mutch: 489

u Landau: 459,493

Landing flares: 30

? Landing gear, faults fn 88, 249

SI Landings

emergency: 3, 28, 30, 33, 35, 38, 77-80,148,153

p. regulations for: 34

Landis, Reed G.: 51-53

t,, Landmarks. See Terrain features VLangley Field: 352-353

i Langres: 300

S Lanphier, Thomas G.: 335-336

I

Last aerial victory: 42

Leaflets, preparation and distribution: 220-230

Lectures, value in training: 92, 195

Le May, Curtis E.: 506

Letourneau L.J.: 363

Letzig. Frank W. 364

Le Valdahon: 196, 198-199.259

Liaison operations courier service in: 102, 111,205, 251

difficulties and deficiencies in: 251-252

missions and functions: 180-182

with antiaircraft units: 28, 31, 42

with command po3ts: 31, 181, 251-252

with corps and divisions. 99-100,109-111,126

with GHQ: 215
L

V592 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

VOL IV

with ground units: 3. 12. 16. 19. 30. 32, 99-100, 102, 105-107.

k 171. 174, 178-179, 189. 219 251-252. 260. 262-271, 303,

330-331

horses in : 249

vwith information secticrns: 299-301

motorcycles in: 209

in observation operations. 40. 121I

with observation posts: 40

with ordnance off irers: 92

inl photographic missions: 296-297

pilots with balloons: 40. 203

by staffs and staff officers: 99-100, 181

in training. 345

Lighthouses: 31. 34

Lighting systems

airfields 28.,30-31. 33-34, 38. 74

el ectric- generated. 242

Ligny-en-Barrois: 2P5

Lindstrom, G.T. 157-160

Lingen; 480

Lippman,. Walter: 220

Lithographic facilities. 300

Littauer. Kenneth P : 191

Livingston. J.W.: 185

Lockwood, Alan. 143

Lokey, Walte; 0.: 96

Loniguyon: 367. 371 -376, 398,.493. 495

Longville: 413

Longwy: 373. 395

Lorraine sector: 368

Lost Battalion: 176, 175-177

Lothringen Cement Factory. 449

j Low, Seth. 28

Lowe, William. 143

Ludwigshafen 461 -467. 469, 493. 497-498. 501
Index 593

S Ludwigshafener Walzmuhle: 462

k Luke, Frank. Jr 73

Luxembourg: 368, 373, 398, 408-409, 412-415, 419. 493, 499, 503

YK

Machern: 383 384

Machine Gun Battalion, 306th. 176

Machine guns antiaircraft role: 138

damage to: 239

Lewis: 87, 89, 92,118-119, 232, 233,235-238, 356

Marlin. 230, 232-237

propellor-synchronized. 155, 230, 232, 235, 239

tail-mounted: 239

i test-firing: 71, 115-117,155,235

Vickers: 71, 75-76, 230, 232-233, 239

- Machine-shop facilities: 243, 258. 328

: Magnetos, faulty: 245

Main River: 469

Maintenance and repair (see also Ground crews)

armaments: 236-237. 240

motor vehicles: 213-214

in squadrons. 95

Mainz (Mayence): 469-474, 476, 480. 493

Maiziores: 382-383, 385, 493

Mannesmann Steel Works: 445

Mannheim: 365. 456,459-461. 463.465-467,469,476, 495

Mannstaed & Company: 483

Manuals. See Textbooks

Maps

Air Service role in compiling: 349. 358

bombing operat;ons, use in 91-92, 504

fighter operations, use in: 74

observation, use in 126. 142. 146. 150. 166. 177. 183, 186. 188

training in reading: 101. 196, 330

March, Peyton C.: 220

Mars-la-Tour 378.493
594 U S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Mathis, Evan T.: 230-234 =

Maulan 229, 365

Mc~ook, F.M.: 139-141

McCullough, M.S.: 343

McCurdy, James E.: 178-180

McNarney, Joseph T_: 98-105

McWillams, Donald S.: 363-364A

Mechanics. See Ground crews

Medical officers. See Aviation medicine. Flight surgeons

J

Medical Research Board: 284-2a9

Meissner, James A.; 60-61

Meister, Lucius & Bruninig: 475-476 -

Mendelingeri: 384

Merkel, Richard H.: 344, 345

Merrill, Linn D.: 187

Merz, Charles: 220

Merzig: 365, 445. 493

Merzlich: 435-437, 493

Mess facilities: 242-243. See also Food Service

Messagu drops -102.,104, 112,125. 154, 162, 185-186.192. 252

Meteorological balloons. 227

Meteorological Service 227

Metz: 51, 365, 367-369. 378-382. 389, 398. 412-413. 419, 447,

487,.493. 503

Mouse-Argonne offensive. 8, 10-11, 72, 78-79, 90,.109, 140,157.

190-193. 219.,242, 262. 295, 355. 367

Mexican Punitive Expedition: 4

Meyer chemical factory. 472-474

M~zibres. 365

Michelin parachute flare 33

Military Training Camp for Business mnir 313
.- IIndex 595 t '

I'

U I

SMilling. Thomas De W :91,4-15, 359-362

t Mineola, N.Y.: 284,358

k- Mirrors, advantage of. 135

a I Mitchell, William 24!

Foulois, conflict with. 22

psychological warfare, view on 226

report on experiences: 1.3

t Mobility (see also Transportation)

F. in balloon companies: 205 in squadrons: 11, 39, 97

fr Mochern: 383

-h Mont faucon: 225

Montigny: 368

Ii ~Montmddy: 367. 376-378,493

t Morale

bombing, effect on enemy: 91,369,373,378, 378,385,393-395.

398-399, 401-402, 420, 430-431, 434-435, 437. 440-441.

444-445, 448, 453. 462, 464, 466. 469, 472. 481-483, 485-

486, 488, 497-502, 503

ground units, effect of strikes on: 21, 83

flying cadets: 8.51,57-58.316,320-323,325.334-337,342,345

if ground crews: 56, 60-61, 112, 235-236

instilling and maintaining: 7-8, 11-12, 20, 39, 113, 314-316,

319-321. 325-326. 335-336 L observers: 130-131. 168

pilots: 51,60, 92, 287

psychological warfare, effect on enemy: 222-224

Morhange: 447,487-489.493

Moselle, SS: 479

Moselle River and Valley: 368, 378-379, 382, 389, 413, 419, 435, 477-478, 496

li Moselweiss: 480

. Motor Transportation Service: 273

Motor vehicles L 1" i in balloon companies: 209

Maintenance and repair: 213-214

squadron requirements: 241 258

'r Motorcyc!es, in ;iaison service: 209
596 U S. Air Service .n World War I

Vol. IV

4

Motors, aircraft See Engines

Moueuvre: 383

Moutiers. 394

Mudguiards: ,3. 20. 92

Multigraph facilities: 300

Mundenheim: 462, 465

Munitionsanstalt Mainz: 472

M.Y. spark plugs: 250

Nancy: 365, 371. 375-376, 378-379. 448-449. 460, 487

Naval air service, merger proposed: 25

Naval operations, aircraft role in 361

Navigation lights: 33

Navigation systems

development: 24, 269-270

training in use 30. 330, 347

Navy, opposition to air force autonomy 25

Neidecker, Bertrand. 14,

Neunkirchen. 453-454, 493

Newsmen

Air Service, image of 4-5, 169-170

bombing. conception of 90-91

Nicholson, Knox W. 256-257

Nickel. William: 193-196

Night operations

balloons in 36

bombing missions: 12, 29.37. 376.444. 464. 46j, 476.484,498,

504

fighter missions 12. 14. 28-38

fighter tactics in 36-37

observation missions 12, 30. 37

patrol missions 12. 35-36

photographic msssons: 37

training in 34-35

Nilvange 397
L-

= Index 597

£

Nippes: 480

i- Nixonwlle: !91

; Nolan, Dennis E.: 220, 363-364

Noncommissioned officers as observers and pilots. 94

Non-specialists. See Utility men

Nourrice fuel tank: 119

Nov(ant 378-379.413,492

Noyes, Stephen H.: 107, 120

Oberemmel: 435-437, 493

Observation operations. 3, 9, 69

' aircraft overuse in: 113

* alertness & caution in: 115. 128-129, 136. 140, 142. 150-154,

157-158. 162-164, 166, 173

alerts, unnecessary 168

altitudes for 40, 124. 135, 140, 145, 151, 154-158, 165, 177,

179-180. 183, 192

3rtillery fire adjustment and regulation: 3.99.101. 107,113-114,

125, 143. 145, 149-150, 154-155, 160-162, 165, 169-170

181,252

balloons, role in: 206

cavalry reconnaissance role: 190-193

| clouds, and fog, factors in: 118, 126, 140, 163, 1R3.187

combat, avoiding 115, 149,151,186

comb time duration. 195

compass, orientation by 177

defensive measures: 117-118

direction and route orientation 146-147, 153, 157-158. 173.

193.330

enemy. locating and idenliying 127, 129. 146-147, 164, 192

fighter escort of1 40, 64, 123-124, 126. 145, 151. 157, 170

firing techniques: 117, 119, 164. 176

flash-and-sound delection: 165. 185

formations: 119-120. 130, 145

friendly units, identifying: 147, 165-160, 170 173-174. 183-186,

1R_

ground units, value to: 93. 178

infantry contact missions. 108- 110, 122-124, 136-1.37, 140-143.

145-147, 153-156, 163-167, 170. 176.177, 183-185. 188,

190-192, 252, 260
598 US. Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

Z

information, collecting and disseminating 93, 104, 106, 112,

114, 129-130. 138.154-155.163. 166. 178. 181. 186,206

intelligence yield: 215

liaison and cooperation with 40. 121

low-altitude flight in 21, 124, 137-138, 140. 147. 153, 166-167,

183-185, 187

maps, use in: 126. 142, 146, 150, 166, 177, 183. 186, 188

message writing im 104-105

missions, assignment and authorization: 218, 355-356

morning missions: 114

night missions: 12. 30, 37

orders, unreasonable. 108. 218, 321, 334

photographic missions: 113. 125-126, 143, 145. 150. 152. 157-

160. 168

potential for development 114-115

signals in. 117, 151

speeds for 135. 138. 156

straggling, danger in: 130, 152

sun, factor in: 129, 140. 146, 152. 156. 173, 177

surprise, safeguards against 137-138, 156-158, 164, 166, 183-

184, 186

tactics and maneuvers: 136-137, 140-143, 145-146, 148-152,

154, 156, 158, 164, 173-176, 184-185

target designaton: 165, 170

targets o. opportunity. identilying: 161-162,181

teamwork with pilot: 18, 117. 128-131, 136, 142144, 147, 155.

164. 166, 180

terrain featues, orientation by: 31. 35. 74. 86. 118. 129. 134-

135, 146. 153, 163. 165-166. 173, 177. 187-188

tests, pre-flighl. 129-130

visibility, factor in. 135. 153, 163. 166. 174,188

weather, effect on 124. 126. 147. 168, 186-187

wind, factor in. 148,157

Observation posts 31-32, 40

Observers (s.e also Officers)

ages and physical qualifications: 

9

assignment and replacement. 115, 123

balloon observers, assinrnent and replacement 202

carelessniess, costs of 130

(lothing. proper. 129. 186

command assignments for 330-331

hindering advancement of 113, 115

inept, elimination of. 115. 198

interchangewithground units 107. 114, 127. 168, 171. 189
51

Index 599

liaison officers, detail as. 181

morale and dedication of. 130-131

noncommissioned grades for. 94

physical demands on. 178 Ishortages of: 17, 311-312

squadron command proposed for 173

training programs: 14, 17. 92-93. 95, 121-122, 128, 141-142, 311,330.347,352-354

O'Connor, Arthur: 143

t O'Donnell, Emmett. Jr.. 504

I Oettlingen: 412, 494

Offenburg: 495

Officers (see also Observers; Pilots. also by assignment) acting and temporary grades for: 317-318, 321-322, 333

I disrespect to: 337, 344

General Staff, 'ssignment to: 24-25

interchange with ground Lnits. 107. 114, 127, 168, 171, 189

inefficiency alleged: 338-339

inept, elimination of: 320. 323, 334

mission, authority and responsibililies: 314, 3 8. 322. 333. 337

qualifications, assignment and replacement. 316-317. 320-321,

324, 334, 361-362

Oleo spark plugs 250

Oles, Edward C. 303-304

Olewig: 431-432

Ongres-Marihaye Factory: 417

On-the-job training. 194-19:5

Operations officers

grades for. 115. 121

mission3 and functions: 112, 144. 181-182

- Oppau 461

Orders

air annexes to. 99-100

channels of issue 110-111, 172

- unreasonable 108 207. 218, 321,334

Ordnance. See Armament

i Ordnance officers 92

Orne River and Valley 382
600 U.S. Air Service in WoMid War I

Vol IV

Orny: 378-379, 492

Orsinger, Remington: 347-348

Ottange (Oettlingen) 412, 494

Ourches: 127

Paegelow, John: 359

Pancake landing: 79

Panel displays 101, 123-124, 140, 146, 153-154, 160. 163. 169-

171.173-174, 177-178.181, 183-184, 189,252

Pangy: 379

Parachute descents by enemy: 12-13

Parachute flares: 28, 33, 35, 37

Paradise, Robert C. 120-121

Pardee, Azro J.: 290-292

Paris: 300

Park squadrons 20. 97. 272

Parks, aircraft. 20, 248

Parks, balloon: 202

Parochialism among branches. 310.317

~Pair, Athlr rW : 143, 160-162

Passenger service. Air Service role in deve!oping: 348-349

Patrol operations (see also Observalion operations, Fighter opera- tirons)

Patrol operations (see also Fighter operations; Observation operations): 3, 9-10,47, 82

altitudes for: 35-36

barrage system: 39-40, 64

cooperation with other formations 48, 69

fighter escort of: 30, 35-36. 39. 42. 47

improvement, need for: 58-59

night missions. 12, 35-36 tactics and maneuvers: 48, 65-68

Patrols, ground. 124, 155

Pay and allowances 52, 316. 320,334, 340-342, 361

- =t r = =n
Index 601

E I

Peltre 382

&k Pershing, John J.: 359

Personnel sections

chief, accessibility of. 308-309 organizations and functions: 308-309, 311-312

k Pesch(e Factory: 455

Peters, Sidney V.W.: 96, 131-132 

1

S Petrisberg (hill): 424

L Petroleum, oil and lubricants: See Fuel and lubricants tI , Pfaff Werke: 459

Pfalzel: 419,432-

433

I Photographic information officers: 296-298

! Photographic offcers: 295-296, 327

r Photographic sections: 296-298

Photography French system: 293-295

f lighter escort of: 69, 145, 160 I importance and value: 292

I interpretation methods: 293-295, 302-303

intelligence yield: 215

f liaison in: 296-297

1 missions assignment authority: 218, 292

*, ght operations: 37 I uoservation role in: 113, 125-126, 143, 145, 150, 152, 157-160,

168

Royal Air Force system: 293-294

schools for: 296

supply system for: 296-297

technicians, assignment and replacement: 296

training programs: 292-293,295

- weather, effect on missions: 86

Photostat facilities: 300

Physical standards, pilots. 60, 133-134, 278-279, 282, 286. 290,

388

Pickrell, Floyd M: 155-156

Pierson, Norris: 143
602 U.S Air Service in World War I

Vol. IV

Pinup girls: 315

Pilots (see also Officers)

qualifications 9

alcoholic beverages, use by: 279-280. 289

assignment and replacement 41. 97. 105. 113, 115. 123. 321.

334,354

balloonpi ,s, training: 14. 17. 196-199, 202, 355

balloons, liaison with. 40, 203

clothing, proper 129

clothing, sterlization 280

coffee. use by: 289

conduct standards: 321. 334

dental service for: 282-283

diets, regulating: 2, 279, 288-289, 307

disabled, in admiristrative posts- 9

discipline and dedication required 3. 8. 34. 43-46, 58

drugs. caution on use by: 289

exercise, need for: 288

ferry pilots: 248

ground crews, relations with: 41. 139-140, 316. 326

health education training. 288-289

hindering edvancement of. 113. 115

hospital facilities for: 280-282, 291

inept, eliminating 115,323. 353 instructors, use as. 58-59. 90, 121. 128 144, 167, 304

interchange with ground units: 107, 114, 127, 168, 171, 189

limitations on: 86

morale and dedication required: 51. 60. 92. 287

noncommissioned grade. for: 94

non-flying officers relations with 9. 60. 324-325. 334

physical standards and records 9. 60. 133-134. 278-279. 282.

286,288. 290

positioning & comfort in aircraft: 87. 120. 122. 135

psychological warfare, role in 221-222, 225-226. 230

rest and recreation required 54, 59-60, 104. 279-280, 288, 321,

324. 334

shortages of: 16-17.28-29.51

solo flight, fear in. 57

tobacco, use by' 280, 289

training programs 5-8. 14. 16-17. 34-35. 41. 46. 53. 57-58. 67,

90, 93.95. 122. 136. 141-142. 144. 340. 346-347, 352-354

venereal diseases, safeguards against. 280

vision requirements 34-35, 134

work supervision by 61
Index 603

Pirmasens: 455-456, 493

S Place, Fred: 296

S Plane News: 288

S Plattsburgh Barracks: 3! 3

S Postal service, Air Service role in developing: 348-349, 358

[ Postes d command. See Command posts

S Pratt, Henry T.: 364

S Preparedness, need for: 22 ' Press correspondents. See Newsmen

Press releases: 301 I Prever rule test: 290

Pribnow, Harry W.: 258-260

I Printing facilities: 300

Prisoners of war Allied: 470

enemy: 222-224

Russian: 371-372, 378. 384-385, 388, 393-395, 399-400. 403,

1 432.467

i Production, effect of bombing on: 496-497, 499-500

Promotion policies: 3, 8, 59, 90. 107. 113. 139, 172. 240.317-318.

320-322, 325. 328-330, 333-334, 344, 361

Propaganda campaigns. See Psychological warfare

Propaganda Section. GHQ: 220-230

Propellors, damage to. 3. 20, 187, 259

Property inspection and accountability 213-214

Prophylactic stations: 280

Psychological warfare

Air Service role in: 221-222

enemy morale, effect on 222-224

by France: 226, 229

pilots role in: 221-222, 225-226. 230

by Royal Air Force: 225-226, 229

Publicity campaigns. 5
r =

I

604 U.S Air Service A

in World War I A

Vol. IV

Purcell, Stuart T.: 60

Pursuit operations. See Fighter operations

Pyrotechnics. See Flares

Quarters, provision for: 54. 60, 241-243. 271-272

Quint: 433-434

Quint Smelter & Foundry: 434

Rabe, Louis W. : 56

Radiators, faults in: 249-250

Radio communication

air-to-ground: 252-253. 263-269

failures in: 258-259, 264

in fighter operations: 49-50

in fire adjustment and regulation: 252, 254. 263-271

in night operations: 31-32, 86, 102, 111,153, 154, 162, 169,181, 185-186, 205, 252-256

organization and control: 263-271

Radio direction. See Direction-finding systems

Radio nets: 254-256, 270

Radio officers. 261-262, 267-269

Radio operators and technicians

grades, promotions and allocations: 258, 260-262, 269-270

training programs: 101

Radio sets: 252-260, 262, 265-266

Radiotelephone communication: 256. 270

Railroads

identifying. 135

strikes against: 367-391, 394-395, 399-403, 407-414, 418-451,

457, 459, 461, 466-467, 469 474, 476, 478-480, 482-483.

486-489, 497,499-500, 502-503

Rarecourt: 229

Raschig lactory: 462

Rations, procurement and issue. 273

Raus (Edward) & Company: 420
Index 605

L Rechicourt. 448-449

Reconnaissance operations See Observation operations. Patrol

operations

~ I Recreation facilities. 54

Redeployment program. 309

Regular Army, strength proposed: 344

Reid. William S-: 364

Reinburg, George E.A : 84-94

Reis. Alvin C.: 206-207

Rembercourl: 28

Remelach. See Remilly

Remicourt: 229

Remilly (Remelach): 378-382, 447, 492

Replacement depots, proposed: 309-3 10

Reports, reducing number of: 106, 218-219, 304

[ esearch and deveopment

arrf:6, 52, 361I

Royal Air Force: 270

Reserve officers: 361-362 I Reserve units: 15, 362

Rest and recreation programs: 54, 59-60, 104. 279-280, 288, 321,

324, 334

Reveille, excuse from: 54

Reynolds, Clearton H-.: 122-124

Rheinische West-falische Sprengstoff A.G.. 483

Rhine River and Valley: 365,460-461,466-467,477-478, 495-496

Rhoads, Robert B.: 2 i8-220

Richard stereoscope: 296

Rchthof en. Manf red von: 371 I Richtung: 383~
606 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Rickenbacker, Edward V. 2

Rieding (Reding): 449-451, 494

Rifles, issue to airmen 356

Roads, identify!ng: 135

Roberts, James S.: 144-145

Rocket signals: 153-154, 163, 165-167, 170, 173-174, 176-177,

183,185, 190

Rockwell Field: 352-353

Rodange: 412,417-418.493

Roechlingen Brothers Steel Works: 442-443

Roer River. 486

Rogers, Lee M.: 244-245

Rogers. W.J.: 175-178

Rohrbach River: 452

Rohrer, Loren: 143

Rombas (Rombach): 382, 387,392.493

Romorantin: 131,139,271. 275

Roplingen: 383

Royal Air Force

air supremacy. policy on. 22

autonomy adopted 26

bombing operations 365. 367-368. 398, 460. 467, 469, 476,

482. 484, 486, 501

hospital facilities in. 282

Independent Air Force operation: 26-27

photography by: 293-294

physical standards and records. 279

psychological warfare by: 225-226. 229

research and development by: 270

training by: 9-10, 17. 329

Royal Naval Air Service 484

Royaumeix: 199

F Royce. Ralph 281

Rudder systems 120.135
Index 607

* 

I

S Rumelingen (Rumelange): 412, 416-417,497

*Rumelinger & St. Ingbert Steel Works: 453

Rumont: 229

Runners. See Courier ziervice

!

Saar River and Valley: 368, 415, 418-419, 437-439, 445, 452,

496-497

L SaarbrUcken: 398, 419, 437-438, 445, 447, 449, 451-454, 456,

476,494

Saarburg (Sarrebourg): 379, 381, 447-451,487, 494

= Sablon: 368,413

Sain. Jam. s E.: 163-167

St. Avoid 447, 494

St. Ingbert: 452-453, 494

E St. Juvin: 138

St. Maixent: 312

j St. Mihiel offensive: 8-10, 44, 47, 18, 90, 100, 141, 157-158, 219,

228-229, 235, 242, 294,355, 365, 367, 370-371, 373, 379

L Ste. des Mines de !a Houve 446

t I Salvage operations: 95, 277

Salvage squadrons, proposed: 97

San Diego: 353, 358

Sanringen: 381

Sarralbe (Saaralben): 451, 494

Savage Arms Company: 233

Schauffler. William: 143

Schmahl factory- 472

Scholtz, E.: 225

* Schools

aviation medicine: 285-287

command and staff: 361

contract: 346

foreign, attendance at 17
608 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

general 14

location. 352-353, 358, 362

training cadres: 16

Search, Hendrick M 96

Searchlights

in bombardment defense 394. 398, 401. 425. 454. 457. 467,

474-475, 482-483. 485. 496

coordination with air operations. 28, 30-31. 35-38

Seats. aircraft: 86, 89.251,274

Security measures: 37

Sedan: 155. 177

Selleck. Lawrence M.. 96

Service squadrons: 17.97

Seyen: 421

Sherman. William C :359

Sherrck, John. 143

Shock absorbers, defective 248-249

Short-wave radio: 257-258

Shumaker, F.N. 263-269

Shuss, Pressley B.. 185-189

Sichel & Company: 472 

-

Siegburg: 482

Sierck 409

Sights

Aldis 76. 231

bombing: 88-89

illuminated. 32

Norman' 195, 232

Reille-Soult. 76. 195. 232

ring-and-bead 76. 92, 231

Signal Corps, role in air communications 268-269

Signal officers. 181

Signal flares and pistols: 124, 238-239

Signaling lights. 33-34

Sinln
A

Index 609

S It

Signaling systems: 251-2527

F- Simon, Louis C.. Jr.: 83-84

F4

Smart, L.L : 106

Smith, Lewis A.: 338

Smoke signals: 179 :

Solvay & Company: 450-451

Souge: 1, 198

Souilly: 225, 229 "

Souvenir hunters, safeguards against: 80

Spare parts (see also Maintenance arid repair)

cataloguing: 276

foreign sources, procurement from: 277

interchangeability in: 276

f shortages: 29, 232-233, 245-248, 272-274, 331

Spark plugs

performance by: 250

placement in engi-es: 88

Specialists. See Ground crews

Speed indicators: 32

Sperry lights: 34

S Speyer: 460-461. 494

t Spitznagle, Fred A. 364

Splitdorf spark plug: 250

Scluadron commanders

_.authority and functions: 54, 60, 9,4-95, 112-113, 172, 321

grades for: 120-121, 318, 322

medical officer, cooperation with: 292

observers as: 173

Squadrons

aircraft. complement authorized: 236.244-245

armament section complement: 96

coast defense, allotment to 348.350.360-361t

corps, assignment to: 3t0. 354. 358

direct-supply system for: 98, 245. 273

divisions;, assignment to: 110.,121, 350

GHO, liaison with: 215

tI
610 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

ground crew complement: 340-342

ground units, assignment to: 100, 110, 121, 219-220, 348. 350

354,358

._ integrity in groups: 110, 1 12

:- maintenance and repair in: 95

~medical complement : 292

Smobility, required and lacking 11. 39.97

~motor vehicles for. 241, 258

non-flyers. allotments of : 321, 324, 327.,338-339

-. officer grades, excess of: 94,340 orders, channels of issue: 110- 1 11, 172

personnel strength: 123-124. 245, 248.,310, 351

~regulations. relaxing in: 53

- specialized teams. efficiency from: 105. 113

~staffs and staff officers for: 52

_ training, allotment to: 350-352

~utility men, growing number &f 94. 96

~Squadrons (numbered)

1 st: 124-126, 172, 230.,233,256, 258, 311

~8th 100

11 lth: 367. 374

12th 121. 230, 233, 311

-- 20th 367.,374

IW 24th 347

~261h. 312-313

~271h 65-80

371h: 345

42d (French): 100

~501h 175, 176. 230. 233. 258, 273-274

W-!E 881h 311

- 90th. 100, 126-128. 141-142. 184

S91 st 128-131.,216, 311.,347. 349

~95th 62-66

961h. 315. 365. 367.,369-374

97th (RAF): 476

~991h 193

1 00th: 84

104th: 168, 292

13511h 100.,232 ~147th: 61-62

-'= 148th: 56

' !:63d: 84

~1661h, 187. 367

r 185th 28-29. 30

fI

I
I r Index 611

216111 (RAF): 460

Stafft, and staff officers (see also General Staff)

air officers assignment to: 24-25. 122

Air Service structure- 210-214

,liaison with: 99-100, 181

in squadror,s: 52

training programs. 14-15,

', Stelheim: 383

! Steinberger, Robert: 364

i Stereoscopic vision test : 289

L

Sterilization facilities. 280

ix

S Stoc'.k control. lack of: 331

Storage facilites.: 243

* Streamer signals: 190

Stuck, Eugene Er 1210-122

Stunim Brothers factory 452-453

Sluttgar 365. 495

Stuttgart-BerlRer Insurance Company 425

Sulzer Brothers: 462

Sun factor in ighter op2rations 67 69, 74.83. 117. 129 148. 154, 178

in observatior.: 129. 140. 146. 152. 156, 173. 177

Supply officers 327,331 338

oaSupply fystems and operaons. -8

tarmaments 230-234,237-238, 240

civSuan staffs for. 305306

communications equipment 2 262.269

Sdeficiencies in.- 19-20. 31, 272-273. 331, 345 depots needor: 20. 272

direct to squadron. 98. 2.15. 273

Siu pply ropr.ic supplies: 296-297

POL stock5 272 274

problems faced. 305-307

spare partis caaloguimng ?76 stock control, lack of 331

training of perscnrl. 277
[4

612 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

Vol. IV

Supreme War Council: 26-27

Surprise. application of

in fighter operations: 36, 40, 49, 61-62. 66.69. 74. 129

safeguards against 137-138. 156-158. 164, 166, 183-184,

186

Tactical air support: 3

Tactics and maneuvers

bombing operations: 90, 92

development 18

enemy fighters: 43, 45, 47, 49-50, 62, 115, 117, 148, 154, 164,

174-176. 178

lighter operations: 39, 44-50, 61-71, 82-84

foreign influence on: 9

night-fighter operations: 36-37

observation operations: 136-137, 140-143, 145-146, 148-152.

154,156, 158, 164. 173-176. 184-185

patrol operations: 48, 65-68

Tail skids, faulty 249

Target designation 165. 170

Target practice, butts for. 234

Targets of opportunity: 161-162, 181

Telegraph communication. 111

Telephone communication 102, 105, 111-112, 126,204-205, 251

Temporary grades, proposed. 317-318, 321-322. 333

Tents. as aircraft housing 97. 241

Terrain features, orientation by. 31. 35. 74, 86. 118, 129. 134-135.

146.153, 163. 165-166, 173, 177,187-188

Terry. Prentiss M. 214

Tests. pre-fligh: 67. 71, 76. 78-81. 95, 129-130. 153, 155,245

Textbooks. lack of. 348

'hionville. (Diedenhofen) 368. 382. 389, 395. 398-411,419,494.

498.502. 503

Thomas Sleel Mill 385-386. 388

Thompson. Charles F. 214. 216. 364

rhyssen. 384

Tilleson. Selmer J : 276-277 3
L

Index 613

Tillman, Fred 143

Tobacco, use by pilots: 280. 289

Toul sector: 43, 45, 47, 185, 203, 220,229,271. 355

Toulmin, Harry A., Jr.: 210-211

Tours. 199. 261,285, 300, 327, 504

Tracer ammunition: 32, 232

Tractors, use with balloons: 209

Traiiers, in balloon companies: 209

Training programs

acrobatics: 132-133, 136, 144. 346

administrative officers: 303-304

armament mechanics: 234-235

artillery fire adjustment anJ regulation: 347-348

* balloon companies: 204

balloon pilots and observers: 14, 17, 196-199, 202, 355

I bombing operations: 

8

civilians: 313

cloud flying: 35

codes: 101-102

communications systems personnel: 102, 256, 260-261, 264,

267, 269-270

contracl schools for: 346

control of: 327. 330

coordination among services 17-19, 53, 126-127, 171

criticism of: 57-59, 67-68. 76. 101, 132-133. 195. 252, 260, 320,

322-324. 327-328, 344, 338-339. 344, 347-348

enemy criticism of: 59

engineering and engineering officers 327-328, 357. 361

exercises with ground units: 171-172, 185. 189, 330-331. 358

flight surgeons: 283. 287. 291

at foreign schools: 346

formation flying: 8, 67-68, 71, 136

by France: 8-10, 17, 45.195-1

98 ,20

4

. 311,

3

29

general: 14

by Germany: 329

ground crews. 8-9. 315-316. 326-328. 343, 354-355

gunnery: 3. 16, 41. 93. 141-142, 144, 193-196. 312. 329-330.

344-345. 353, 356

health education. 288-289

instruments use 35

by Italy. 346

liaison in 345
614 U.S. Air Service

in World War 

I

Vol. IV

map reading: 101. 196.330

navigation 30. 330. 347

night flight: 34-35

observers 14, 17, 92-93. 95. 121-122, 128. 141-142. 311. 330. 347. 352-354

panel operators: 101 :o

photography: 292-293. 295

pilots 5-8 14, 16-17. 34-35. 41. 46. 53. 57-58. 67. 90, 93, 95.

122, 136. 141-142. 144. 340. 346-347. 352-354

radio operators 101 -

Royal Air Force. 9-10, 17, 329

squadrons assignment to. 350-352

staff officers. 14-15

supply personne: 277

weather, effect on: 355, 358

Transportation (see also Mobility) 

I

balloon companies 205. 207, 209

failures in: 10-!1.96-97.213.2_-0. 239-241, 258,272-274,276

flight surgeons: 283-284. 291

Trenchard. Hugh M : 27.94

Trier (Treves): 364-365, 398. 418-433, -A73. 480, 494. 498, 501,

503

Trier Foundry & Machine Shops. 429

Trier Rolling Mills: 420. 429-430

Troisdorf. 481-482. 494. 496-497

Trouble shooters See Ground crews 

A

Trucks. See Motor vehicles

Turenne Barracks. 408

Tuttle, Waldo E 96

Uckange (Uechingen) 382. 384. 394-396. 494

United Kingdom. See Royal Air Force. Royal Naval Air Service

United Tile & Mantle Works: 433-434

Urband, Edward M. 232

Vadenay 197

Valleys, identifying 135
IA

Index 615

Iii

Van Horn, Robert 0.: 25, 311

Varennes: 182

* t Vav'ncourt: 229

Venereal diseases, safeguards against: 280

Verdun sector: 79, 229, 368. 373, 460

Verein fUr Chemische Industrie. 472

Very flare and pistol: 92, 125, 128, 233-234, 236,239. 276

Vesle River: 104

Vezin: 375

Villa Rochling: 402, 404

Virton: 376

Visibility factor

in fighter operations: 48-49

in observation operations: 135, 153, 163, 166. 174, 188

Vision standards: 34-35, 134

V6lktingen: 437,441-445,494

Wadgassen: 445,494

Wallace. John. 143

I 'Walsh. R.L.: 14

War correspondents. See Newsmen

-; War Departmen, autonomous air force, policy on: 25

War Office (British): 225

Warehouses: 331

Wasse;-lich: 435-437, 493

Water supply: 242, 272

Waterways, identifying: 74, 134

Weapons. See Armament

Weather. effect of. 20, 30, 104, 229-230

on balloon.,: 72 on bombing operations: 373, 386, 420

on fighter missions: 69

on fire adjustment. 270

- -
616 U.S. Air Service

in World War I

L Vol. IV

on observation missions 124. 126. 147. 168. 186-187

on photographic missions: 86

on training programs. 355, 358

Wendel Steel Mills. 393, 396-398 II Wentworth. John. 43-50

Werner & Merz: A71

Werlimer, Sidney B. 96

El Wessman, R.H. 234-239

White. Merritt 0.: 141-142, 143

Whitehead, Henry C : 25

Wiesbaden: 476-477, 494. 502

Williams, Fay W. 170

Wilson, Woodrow: 222

Wilmer, William H. 289-290

Winant. John G. : 119-120

Wind tactor

in fighter operations: 66-67

in observation: 148, 157

Windshields- 120

Wing commanders 219-220

Wing flares: 28. 33

Wing ate. Harry L.: 338-339. 344

Wings (air units), abolition proposed: 219

Wings (aircraft). construction 88-89, ! 35, 251

Wings (numbered) 1 st Pursuit: 97

15th (RAF): 267

- I Wireless communica~on. See Radio communication

Woippy 368. 388

Wood. Harry T : 96-98

Wooded areas, identifying 135

Wookey, H.C. 225
I Index 617

Workshops. See Mahine-sop facilities

World War 11. st rategic bombing policies 504

Worms; 467.,494

Wright, A.M.; 273

Wyly, Lawrence T.: 56

Yamamoto. lsoroku: 3351

Ytz: 408-409

Zinn, FrederICK W.. 311-312

Zweibrucken; 454-455,.494

If i I I -P1-1 N It t 11