Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 20, 2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-19-00855-CR

NO. 14-19-00856-CR

NO. 14-19-00857-CR

NO. 14-19-00858-CR

EX PARTE ROBBIE GAIL CHARETTE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 21st District Court

Washington County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 18,345, 18,346, 18,347 & 18,348

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Robbie Gail Charette, appeals from the trial court’s order denying 

her “application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus and/or first motion to quash and 

dismiss the indictment as prosecution improperly brought” in four misdemeanor

cases in which she was charged under the Texas Election Code and Texas 
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Government Code. In two issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred in 

denying her relief. We affirm the trial court’s order.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant, a candidate for county court-at-law judge in Washington County

in the March 2018 primary, was indicted for four misdemeanor charges arising out 

of alleged violations of the Texas Election Code and Texas Government Code. A 

special prosecutor, Austin County District Attorney Travis Keohn, presented the 

case to a Washington County Grand Jury, which in June 2018 indicted appellant as 

follows: failure to disclose true source of communication in violation of Section 

255.004 of the Texas Election Code;

1 Misleading Use of Office Title in violation 

of Section 255.006 of the Texas Election Code;

2 Failure to Timely File Personal 

Financial Statement in violation of Sections 159.052, 159.056, and 572.027 of the 

Texas Government Code;3and Recordkeeping Required–Political Campaign in 

violation of Section 254.001 of the Texas Election Code.4 Appellant was released 

after posting cash bonds. 

In April 2019, appellant filed a “pretrial application for a writ of habeas 

corpus and/or first motion to quash and dismiss the indictment as prosecution 

improperly brought,” challenging the validity of the prosecution by Koehn in 

seeking and obtaining the four indictments. Appellant asserted that the indictments 

were void “due to the State’s complete failure to comply with applicable Texas 

1 A Class A misdemeanor in trial court cause number 18,345 is being appealed as 14-19-

00855-CR.

2 A Class A misdemeanor in trial court cause number 18,346 is being appealed as 14-19-

00856-CR.

3 A Class B misdemeanor in trial court cause number 18,347 is being appealed as 14-19-

00857-CR.

4 A Class B misdemeanor in trial court cause number 18,348 is being appealed as 14-19-

00858-CR.
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constitutional and statutory procedure requiring the Texas [Ethics] Commission’s 

. . . oversight of the alleged violations of the Election Code and Chapter 572, 

Government Code.” The State filed its response to appellant’s application for a 

pretrial writ, arguing, in relevant part, that it should be dismissed for failing to 

allege a due process violation which would entitle her to file an application for pretrial habeas relief and, alternatively, that it should be denied on the merits, as the 

Texas Ethics Commission (“TEC”) has no jurisdiction, discretion, or authority 

over a prosecutor’s decision to investigate and prosecute crimes. 

On April 25, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on appellant’s pretrial 

application. During the hearing, the trial court admitted an exhibit offered by the 

State, a news article entitled “Update – Charette Campaign Answers Questions.” 

Additionally, the trial court admitted an exhibit offered by appellant – a letter from 

the Texas Ethics Commission dated April 22, 2019, confirming no sworn 

complaint had been filed. After the hearing, appellant filed a post-hearing brief in 

support of her application for a pretrial writ, arguing that the special prosecutor’s

“leapfrogging” – failing to file a complaint with the TEC – violated appellant’s 

right to due process. Appellant also argued that the special prosecutor does not 

have “unfettered discretion” and that it “may be limited by Constitution and 

statute, as well as caselaw.” Appellant distinguished cases raised by the State 

during the hearing. 

On October 16, 2019, the trial court signed its Memorandum Ruling and 

Order denying appellant’s “application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus and/or 

first motion to quash and dismiss the indictment as prosecution improperly 

brought.” The trial court noted in its order that it found no legislative language 

granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations of the laws of which 

appellant is charged. Additionally, the trial court observed that there was no 
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requirement for the district attorney to present the results of an investigation in 

connection with an election or campaign finance law to the TEC prior to the 

commencement of a criminal prosecution. Appellant timely filed a notice of 

appeal of the trial court’s denial and the cases were consolidated in this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, appellant raises two issues: “Does a Special Prosecutor have 

authority, without a referral by the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC), to prosecute 

violations of Election Code, title 15, and Government Code, chapter 572, where 

the Texas Constitution and Government code specifically provide the TEC ‘shall 

administer and enforce’ the statutes alleged to have been violated?”; and “Did the 

trial court err in denying Appellant’s pretrial writ of habeas corpus because the 

failure to afford Appellant the due process provided by statute and/or Art. I, sec. 19 

due course of law violated her substantive rights in that as a subject of prosecution 

for alleged violations of statutes wholly within the jurisdiction of TEC, she was not 

able to first raise defenses in an administrate hearing, obtain formal and informal 

rulings by the TEC or have an opportunity to cure?”

A. PRETRIAL HABEAS RELIEF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for a writ of 

habeas corpus for abuse of discretion, viewing the facts in the light most favorable 

to the ruling. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ex 

parte Gonzalez, 525 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no 

pet.). However, when the resolution of the ultimate issue turns on an application of

purely legal standards, as here, our review is de novo. See Ex parte Martin, 6 

S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); cf. Ex parte Jones, 410 S.W.3d 349, 350 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) (explaining trial court has no discretion to 

analyze the law incorrectly), aff’d, 440 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We 
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will uphold the trial court’s judgment if it is correct on any theory of law 

applicable to the case. Ex parte Taylor, 36 S.W.3d 883, 886 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001); Ex parte Walsh, 530 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no 

pet.).

B. GOVERNING LAW ON COGNIZABILITY

“Pretrial habeas, followed by an interlocutory appeal, is an extraordinary 

remedy.” Ex parte Ingram, 533 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). As 

such, a defendant may only seek pretrial habeas relief in limited circumstances. Ex 

parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “Those limited 

circumstances are (1) to challenge the State’s power to restrain the defendant; 

(2) to challenge the manner of pretrial restraint, i.e., the denial of bail or conditions 

of bail; and (3) to raise certain issues that would bar prosecution or conviction.” 

Ex parte Gonzalez, 525 S.W.3d at 346 (citing Ex Parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 801).

A threshold issue is “whether a claim is even cognizable on pretrial habeas.”

Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 71, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Appellate courts must 

be careful “to ensure that a pretrial writ is not misused to secure pretrial appellate 

review of matters that in actual fact should not be put before appellate courts at the 

pretrial stage.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Except when 

double jeopardy is involved, pretrial habeas is not available when the question 

presented, even if resolved in the defendant’s favor, would not result in immediate 

release.” Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also 

Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Pretrial habeas 

should be reserved for situations in which the protection of the applicant’s 

substantive rights or the conservation of judicial resources would be better served 

by interlocutory review. Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 620.
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Consequently, we must determine if appellant’s claims are cognizable via

pretrial habeas before we are able to address the merits. See Ex parte Ellis, 309 

S.W.3d at 79.

C. APPLICATION

Appellant maintains that she presents a cognizable pretrial habeas claim –

“the prosecutor’s failure to properly refer the complaints or obtain a referral from 

the TEC for matters wholly within the jurisdiction of the TEC deprives the trial 

court from [sic] jurisdiction in this case.” Appellant asserts the indictments lodged 

against her must be dismissed because there was no referral from the TEC to the 

Special Prosecutor. According to appellant, the State is statutorily required to 

obtain a referral from TEC in matters solely within the enforcement authority of 

the TEC. Appellant further contends that the State’s failure to obtain a referral 

from the TEC deprived her of due process, including the informal, formal, and 

other complaint resolution procedures of the TEC and State Office of 

Administrative Hearings.

The State maintains that appellant has failed to allege a due process violation 

that would entitle her to pretrial habeas relief. The State contends that appellant’s 

current arguments, even if true, fail to deprive the Washington County District 

Court of jurisdiction over her cases or warrant her immediate release. See Ex parte 

Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 801; Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619; Ex parte Flores, 483 

S.W.3d 632, 638 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). We agree.

The Washington County District Court is vested with original jurisdiction 

over all misdemeanors involving “official misconduct.” See Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. art. 4.05.

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“Official misconduct” is defined as an “offense that is an 

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“District courts and criminal district courts shall have original jurisdiction in criminal 

cases of the grade of felony, of all misdemeanors involving official misconduct, and of 
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intentional or knowing violation of a law committed by a public servant while 

acting in an official capacity as a public servant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.

3.04(1). Section 1.07 defines “public servant” to include “a candidate for 

nomination or election to public office.” Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(41)(E). Here, 

appellant’s misdemeanor charges derive from crimes she is alleged to have 

knowingly committed while acting as a candidate for election to public office in 

Washington County. Thus, jurisdiction properly vested in the district court in 

Washington County. Appellant has not and cannot establish how a denial of any 

alleged civil due process rights afforded by a TEC investigation deprives the 

district court in Washington County of jurisdiction over her indictments.

In sum, in light of the clear pronouncements from the Court of Criminal 

Appeals detailing the limits of pretrial habeas review, we conclude neither of 

appellant’s issues are cognizable in a pretrial habeas corpus proceeding. See Ex 

parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d at 79.

We overrule appellant’s first and second issues. 

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude appellant has not stated a cognizable claim for pretrial habeas 

relief. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s pretrial 

application for a writ of habeas corpus and/or first motion to quash and dismiss the 

indictment as prosecution improperly brought.

misdemeanor cases transferred to the district court under Article 4.17 of this code.” Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. art. 4.05.
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/s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Poissant.

Do Not Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2.