In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-3436

DENNIS ADKINS, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

CONNIE CURTS,

Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NESTLÉ PURINA PETCARE COMPANY and WAGGIN’ TRAIN,

LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 2871 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 2, 2015

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs contend in this suit, 

which the district court has certified as a nationwide class 

action, that Nestlé and Waggin’ Train sold dog treats that 

injured the dogs. The parties have reached a settlement, to 
2 No. 14-3436

which the district court has given tentative approval pending a fairness hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). That hearing has been scheduled for June 23, 2015. The order tentatively approving the settlement has one non-tentative provision: It enjoins all class members from prosecuting litigation 

about the dog treats in any other forum.

One case affected by this injunction has been pending for 

two years in Missouri, and it was certified as a statewide 

class action before the federal suit was certified as a national 

class action. It was on a schedule leading to a trial in May 

2015 when the injunction stopped it cold. Connie Curts, the 

certified representative of the Missouri class, intervened to 

protest the federal injunction.† She contends in this appeal 

that the district court has violated 28 U.S.C. §2283, the AntiInjunction Act, which provides: “A court of the United States 

may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State

court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or 

where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”

The parties (the representatives of the federal class plus 

Nestlé and Waggin’ Train) contend that the injunction is 

“necessary in aid of [the district court’s] jurisdiction”. Curts 

 † At least she tried to intervene. The district judge denied the motion 

with a brief oral statement. We have directed district courts to allow intervention under circumstances such as these. See, e.g., Crawford v. 

Equifax Payment Services, Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2000); Robert F. 

Booth Trust v. Crowley, 687 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 2012). The district court did 

not mention either of these decisions (or any other case, for that matter). 

Still, the error is not fatal, given Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002), 

and United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 1998) (a nonparty bound by an injunction is entitled to appeal).
No. 14-3436 3

maintains, to the contrary, that only federal actions in rem—

that is, suits about the disposition of specific property—

come within the scope of the “aid of jurisdiction” exception, 

because only then could a state court’s action override the 

federal tribunal by moving or destroying the property on 

which federal authority depends.

But when we sought to learn the district court’s view of 

this subject, we were stymied. The district judge has not explained why he entered the injunction. There are some hints, 

but nothing more. That won’t do. Rule 65(d)(1)(A) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every order 

issuing an injunction must “state the reasons why it issued”.

At oral argument, counsel for Nestlé insisted that the 

judge had provided reasons and referred us to six pages of 

the transcript of a hearing at which the settlement was discussed. According to counsel, the district judge found that

continuation of the Missouri action “has a great potential of 

tanking the entire settlement”. We’ll return to the question 

whether this has anything to do with “jurisdiction.” For the 

moment, it is enough to observe that Nestlé’s lawyer was 

quoting a statement by Morton Denlow, a retired magistrate 

judge who in a private capacity had mediated the negotiations, not a statement by the district judge.

And if we understand the judge as sharing Mr. Denlow’s

view, that would not satisfy Rule 65(d)(1)(A). Before issuing

an injunction, a judge must identify the appropriate legal 

standard and make the findings of law and fact required by 

that standard. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction 

must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that 

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, 
4 No. 14-3436

and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

The district judge did not discuss these subjects, and although Mr. Denlow’s statement may be relevant it is not conclusive on any of them. Take irreparable injury: It is established that the costs of ongoing litigation (the result if the 

settlement collapses) are not irreparable injury. See, e.g., Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 304 U.S. 

209, 222 (1938); Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 

415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 

244 (1980). More: an injunction that halts state litigation is 

permissible only if it satisfies §2283 in addition to the traditional factors that Winter catalogs. The district judge was silent about everything that matters.

The immediate question we must resolve, therefore, is 

whether to vacate the injunction and remand for further proceedings, or to reverse outright. We think the latter step appropriate, for two reasons: first, the final hearing is scheduled for June, and further proceedings in the district court 

(potentially followed by another appeal) could leave the 

state litigation in limbo until then, disrupting the state case 

almost as effectively as an injunction; second, in supporting 

this injunction the parties do not even contend that it is “necessary” in aid of the district court’s “jurisdiction.” Instead 

the parties contend that, if the Missouri case proceeds to final decision before June 23, then their settlement must be renegotiated and may well collapse. We take that as a given. 

Still, what has that to do with the federal court’s “jurisdiction”? And why is preserving a particular settlement “necessary” to federal jurisdiction?
No. 14-3436 5

Many decisions by the Supreme Court over the last 30

years tell us that “jurisdiction” means adjudicatory competence. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 

(2010); Union Pacific R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 558 U.S. 67 (2009); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

455 U.S. 385 (1982). See also Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 

683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). These opinions show 

that there is a fundamental difference between “jurisdiction”

and the many procedural or substantive rules that determine 

how cases are resolved. A court has “jurisdiction” when it 

has been designated by statute as an appropriate forum for a 

dispute of a given sort; other rules are non-jurisdictional.

No one doubts that the district court has subject-matter 

jurisdiction over this litigation, and no one contends that trial or judgment in the Missouri litigation could imperil the 

district court’s ability and authority to adjudicate the federal

suit. If the settlement collapses, the court’s adjudicatory 

competence remains. A need to adjudicate a suit on the merits after settlement negotiations fail does not undermine the 

nature or extent of a court’s jurisdiction. Yet if the Missouri 

case cannot diminish federal jurisdiction, §2283 precludes an 

injunction until the federal case reaches a final decision. (After a final decision, an injunction could be appropriate to 

protect the federal judgment, although class members who 

opt out would remain entitled to pursue their own suits.)

Parallel state and federal litigation is common. The first 

to reach final decision can affect the other, either through 

rules of claim and issue preclusion (res judicata and collateral estoppel) or through effects such as reducing the scope 

of a class from 50 to 49 states. Yet the potential effect of one 

suit on the other does not justify an injunction.
6 No. 14-3436

We have never viewed parallel in personam actions as interfering 

with the jurisdiction of either court; as we stated in Kline v. Burke 

Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922):

[A]n action brought to enforce [a personal liability] does not 

tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court in which a 

prior action for the same cause is pending. Each court is free 

to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court. Whenever a 

judgment is rendered in one of the courts and pleaded in the 

other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the 

application of the principles of res adjudicata ... .” Id., at 230 

(emphasis added).

No case of this Court has ever held that an injunction to “preserve” a case or controversy fits within the “necessary in aid of 

its jurisdiction” exception [to §2283]; neither have the parties directed us to any other federal-court decisions so holding.

Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977) (plurality opinion). More recently, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. 

Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013), held that parallel state and federal proceedings do not justify abstention by a federal court. 

The Court thought that both should be allowed to proceed, 

subject only to the equitable power of each tribunal to defer 

its own proceedings in deference to a case that is farther 

along. Nothing in Sprint or any other decision of the Supreme Court suggests that the court presiding over the case 

likely to reach judgment second can jump the queue by enjoining the suit that is likely to reach decision first. Our opinion in Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of California, 326 F.3d 816, 825–27 (7th Cir. 2002), dealt with just 

such a situation and held that the prospect of a state court 

reaching decision first, making federal decision unnecessary 

(or the federal case harder to adjudicate), does not justify a 

federal injunction against the state litigation.
No. 14-3436 7

We therefore need not address Curts’s argument that only in rem proceedings can satisfy the “aid of jurisdiction”

clause in §2283. We can imagine extreme situations in which

a state could imperil a federal court’s adjudicatory power 

over in personam actions. For example, suppose a state court 

were to bar a necessary witness from attending a federal trial 

or deposition; a federal injunction (or a writ of habeas corpus) might be an authorized response. Winkler v. Eli Lilly & 

Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1996), concludes that the 

“aid of jurisdiction” clause may be invoked when an inconsistent decision by a state court would “render the exercise 

of the federal court’s jurisdiction nugatory.”

The panel in Winkler thought that this might occur when 

the federal litigation sought an injunction (as in school desegregation litigation); an order by the state court to do 

something different from what the federal litigation sought 

could undermine federal authority as a practical matter. 

(Winkler itself entailed incompatible state and federal orders 

about discovery management.) But nothing of the sort has 

occurred here. Curts wants to litigate her own suit in Missouri, not to stop the federal court from adjudicating the suit 

pending before it, and the parties do not contend that there 

is a significant prospect of inconsistent injunctions affecting 

defendants’ future conduct. (Should that possibility be realized, it can be dealt with.)

No matter what one makes of the word “jurisdiction” in 

§2283, an injunction is proper only when “necessary” to protect federal jurisdiction. The parties argue that closing down 

the Missouri case would be prudent, beneficial, helpful, and 

so on; the unstated premise is that §2283 allows whatever a 

federal court thinks is good litigation management. But 
8 No. 14-3436

that’s not what “necessary” means. The Supreme Court told 

us recently:

The statute ... “is a necessary concomitant of the Framers’ decision to authorize, and Congress’ decision to implement, a dual 

system of federal and state courts.” And the Act’s core message 

is one of respect for state courts. The Act broadly commands that 

those tribunals “shall remain free from interference by federal 

courts.” That edict is subject to only “three specifically defined 

exceptions.” And those exceptions, though designed for important purposes, “are narrow and are ‘not [to] be enlarged by 

loose statutory construction.’” Indeed, “[a]ny doubts as to the 

propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings 

should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed.”

Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375 (2011) (internal citations omitted). One reason why doubts must be resolved 

against a federal injunction is the word “necessary”. Section 

2283 leaves only limited opportunities for federal intervention. In the main §2283 commits to the state court the question whether it would be prudent, beneficial, or helpful to let 

the federal case go first.

According to the parties, In re VMS Securities Litigation, 

103 F.3d 1317 (7th Cir. 1996), shows that the district court’s 

injunction is proper. Not at all. In VMS Securities the district 

court issued an injunction to protect the final decision in a 

class suit. That step was authorized by the relitigation exception to §2283. What is more, the parties had failed to raise

§2283 in the district court, and we held that this forfeited any 

entitlement to rely on it in the court of appeals. 103 F.3d at

1326. Nothing in VMS Securities supports the propriety of an 

injunction while the federal case remains in process.
No. 14-3436 9

Although the parties and Curts debate the significance of 

many decisions outside the Seventh Circuit, those opinions 

are so various that it would not be helpful to catalog them. It 

is enough to say that, to the extent any of them supports injunctive relief before the settlement of a federal class action 

has become final, it fails to discuss the Supreme Court’s understanding of “jurisdiction” and predates its reminder in

Bayer that doubts must be resolved in favor of allowing state 

courts to proceed with litigation pending there.

Curts and the parties have locked horns on a number of 

additional questions, such as whether it is appropriate to 

certify a national class (as opposed to a number of statespecific classes), whether the plaintiffs are adequate representatives of a national class, and whether the settlement 

ought to be approved. Our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§1292(a) is limited to the injunction, however. Whatever 

scope remains for pendent appellate jurisdiction after Swint 

v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 43–51 (1995), and 

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 n.41 (1997), this is not an 

appropriate occasion for its exercise. Disputes about class 

certification and the terms of the settlement are independent 

of the injunction against state litigation. Anyone dissatisfied 

with the district court’s final disposition is free to seek appellate review; we will not try to resolve issues still under consideration in the district court.

Effective immediately, the district court’s injunction is 

stayed. Curts and the Missouri court are free to proceed. But 

our mandate will issue in the ordinary course, to preserve 

the parties’ entitlement to seek rehearing.

REVERSED