COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Clements 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MAURICE PURDIE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0970-00-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JULY 10, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Joanne F. Alper, Judge 

 Peter M. Baskin (Pelton, Balland, Young, 

Demsky, Baskin & O'Malie, P.C., on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 The appellant, Maurice Purdie, appeals his convictions for 

possession of cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-250, and for 

possession of marijuana,1 in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1. 

Purdie contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress the evidence of the cocaine and marijuana seized from 

his person. Because the police had probable cause to arrest 

Purdie at the time they conducted the search and seized the 

 1

 The Court notes that the sentencing order in Circuit Court 

No. CR99-994 indicates that appellant was found guilty of 

possession of cocaine. However, as the appellant was found 

guilty of possession of marijuana, this matter is remanded to 

the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting that clerical 

error. 
evidence, we hold the trial court properly denied Purdie's 

motion to suppress and affirm the convictions. 

BACKGROUND

 On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 

216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). On November 13, 

1998, at about 8:30 p.m., Officer Curtis Blake of the Arlington 

Police Department was on duty in an unmarked police car equipped 

with emergency lights and a siren. He saw a vehicle traveling 

east on 24th Street turn south onto Glebe Road. The vehicle 

attracted Blake's attention because it had tinted windows that 

the officer believed were darker than permitted by the Code of 

Virginia. Blake had previously written twenty to thirty 

summonses for "excessive tint," and believed the front window of 

the vehicle had "too much tint." 

 Blake activated his emergency lights and tapped on his 

siren several times in an effort to stop the vehicle. 

Nevertheless, the vehicle "traveled about 300 yards before it 

finally pulled over . . . ." Blake did not recognize the 

driver, but he knew the two passengers. Purdie was in the front 

passenger seat, and Terry Mangun was in the back seat. 

 Officer Blake knew Purdie was a "police fighter," as well 

as a "police runner." The officer also knew that he was 

involved in the distribution of narcotics and had committed 

 - 2 - 
"violent criminal offenses." Because Blake was the only police 

officer present when he stopped the vehicle, Blake was concerned 

for his safety. Shortly thereafter, backup officers arrived on 

the scene. 

 Officer Chris Dengeles, the next officer to approach the 

vehicle, also immediately recognized Purdie. According to 

Dengeles, Purdie had a reputation in the police community for 

being dangerous. Dengeles knew Purdie from his prior 

involvement with the police, beginning some time in late 1989 or 

early 1990. Specifically, Dengeles knew that Purdie had 

previously stabbed a police officer and had been arrested after 

he fled from an officer and discarded narcotics while attempting 

to flee. Dengeles's safety concerns were amplified by the fact 

that the vehicle failed to stop until it had traversed some 300 

yards after Blake activated his emergency equipment. Dengeles 

testified that the failure to stop immediately when ordered to 

do so often indicates that those in the car might "run" or are 

"buying time" before they encounter the police. 

 In order to safely conduct a test of the tint level of the 

windshield, Blake asked the occupants to exit the vehicle. 

Dengeles noticed that as soon as Blake gave the order to exit, 

Purdie "became very nervous." Dengeles described Purdie as 

"hesitant about getting out of the car," "looking around a lot," 

and "hunched over slightly." He remained in a bent position as 

he walked from the car, giving rise to Dengeles's belief that 

 - 3 - 
Purdie was hiding something in the area of his waistband, lower 

abdomen, or groin area. Once Purdie passed Dengeles, and his 

back was toward the officer, Purdie straightened up, giving 

further credence to Dengeles's suspicion that Purdie was 

concealing something somewhere on the front portion of his body. 

 Dengeles continued to observe Purdie as he headed toward 

the back of the car. Concerned about Purdie's suspicious 

behavior, Dengeles continued his observation as Officer 

Conigliaro conducted a patdown while Purdie stood next to a 

guardrail. When Conigliaro reached the areas of Purdie's body 

where Dengeles suspected Purdie was hiding something, Purdie 

lifted his leg and put his foot on the guardrail in a manner 

that concealed the groin and front waistband areas. Because 

Conigliaro failed to check Purdie's waist or groin areas at that 

time, Dengeles concluded the frisk was inadequate and his safety 

concerns were, therefore, not dispelled. 

 Dengeles continued to watch Purdie as he sat on the 

guardrail near the car. He saw Purdie look from side to side. 

"He started to look out of the corner of his eyes at the 

location of all of [the] officers" and looked "360 degrees all 

around him as well." He further observed Purdie, who was 

wearing a bulky jacket, move his hands, as if "gathering 

something" inside the pockets of the jacket, and remove them, 

his fists clenched. The officer further explained that Purdie 

then looked around, put his hands down by the side of the 

 - 4 - 
guardrail and then back into his pockets. Purdie repeated the 

movements "a couple more times where he would gather something, 

bring it out, look at me and then put his hand back in his 

pocket." 

 Based upon Purdie's behavior, and because Conigliaro never 

checked the area where Dengeles believed Purdie might have 

concealed something, Dengeles decided to conduct a second 

patdown. When Dengeles told Purdie to put his hands on the car, 

Purdie had his hands in his pockets "gathering whatever he was 

gathering." He "took his hand out of his pocket, closed fist, 

and walked slowly over to the car," with Dengeles beside him. 

Immediately before putting his hands on the car, Purdie "quickly 

brought his hand up to his mouth" and swallowed whatever he had 

in his hand before the police could stop him. 

 Dengeles had seen the hand-to-mouth movement dozens of 

times, characterizing it as the manner in which drugs are 

destroyed before the police can seize them. Consistent with his 

experience, and based upon his observations of Purdie's 

behavior, the officer concluded that Purdie was about to swallow 

narcotics. 

 The police unsuccessfully attempted to grab Purdie's hand 

as it went to his mouth. After restraining him on the ground, 

the officers were unable to retrieve anything from Purdie's 

mouth and found his hand empty. Their order to "spit out 

whatever he had in his mouth" went unheeded. Dengeles reached 

 - 5 - 
inside the pocket from which Purdie had taken his hand before 

bringing it to his mouth and retrieved a piece of crack cocaine. 

Marijuana was also found in Purdie's left jacket pocket. 

ANALYSIS

 On appeal from a trial court's ruling denying a defendant's 

motion to suppress evidence, the defendant bears the burden of 

showing that the denial of the motion to suppress constituted 

reversible error. Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 

S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980); Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 

440-41, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993). In reviewing the legality 

of a search, "we are bound by the trial court's findings of 

historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to 

support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from 

those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement 

officers." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 

S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). However, we review de novo

"[u]ltimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause." Id. at 197, 487 S.E.2d at 261; see Bass v. 

Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000); 

McNair v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 76, 82, 521 S.E.2d 303, 306 

(1999) (en banc). 

 Purdie does not challenge the stop of the vehicle in which 

he was a passenger, the request for him to exit the vehicle, or 

the initial patdown conducted by Officer Conigliaro. Purdie's 

claim is limited to the legality of Officer Dengeles's search of 

 - 6 - 
Purdie's jacket pocket. Purdie contends that Dengeles had 

neither a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Purdie was 

armed before conducting a second patdown, nor probable cause to 

search Purdie. We disagree with Purdie's contention and find 

that because Dengeles had probable cause to arrest Purdie, the 

search was legal. 

 When determining whether there was probable cause to 

support an arrest, we examine the "totality of the 

circumstances." Yancey v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 510, 516, 

518 S.E.2d 325, 328 (1999); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 

1, 9-10 (1989). 

[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense 

standard. It merely requires that the facts 

available to the officer would "warrant a 

man of reasonable caution in the belief" 

that certain items may be contraband or 

stolen property or useful as evidence of a 

crime; it does not demand any showing that 

such a belief be correct or more likely true 

than false. 

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (citation omitted). 

Probable cause does not require "an actual showing," but, 

rather, "only a probability or substantial chance of criminal 

activity." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983); 

Quigley v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 28, 34, 414 S.E.2d 851, 855 

(1992). "'Probable cause exists when the facts and 

circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he 

has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to 

warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an 

 - 7 - 
offense has been or is being committed.'" Jones v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 229, 231, 443 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1994) 

(citation omitted); see Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 

500, 211 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1975). "If an officer has reason to 

believe that a person is committing a felony in his presence by 

possessing contraband or a controlled substance, the officer has 

probable cause to arrest the individual without a warrant." 

Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 304, 456 S.E.2d 534, 

536-37 (1995). When looking at the totality of circumstances, 

we give deference to the officer's understanding of the 

situation based on his or her training and experience. McGuire 

v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 584, 593, 525 S.E.2d 43, 48 (2000); 

see also Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 877, 223 S.E.2d 

887, 889 (1976) ("In determining whether probable cause exists 

courts will test what the totality of the circumstances meant to 

police officers trained in analyzing the observed conduct for 

purposes of crime control."). 

 Based on the totality of the circumstances, consisting of 

furtive movements and suspicious conduct, which culminated in 

Purdie swallowing something that had been hidden in his hand, 

Officer Dengeles had probable cause to believe that Purdie had 

disposed of an illegal substance. At that point in time, 

Dengeles also had probable cause to arrest Purdie for possession 

of an illegal substance. See id. at 877, 223 S.E.2d at 889 

(furtive gesture of throwing down hand-rolled cigarette gave 

 - 8 - 
officer probable cause to search vehicle); Mavin v. 

Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 161, 165-66, 521 S.E.2d 784, 786-87 

(1999) (evasive actions, including furtive gestures to conceal 

prescription bottle, were factors to consider when determining 

probable cause to believe bottle contained contraband); see also

Lawson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 354, 355, 358, 228 S.E.2d 685, 

686, 687 (1976); Buck, 20 Va. App. at 304, 456 S.E.2d at 536-37. 

Buck, 20 Va. App. 298, 456 S.E.2d 534, involved furtive 

conduct similar to the conduct observed in this case. In Buck, 

the officers were in plain clothes and were patrolling a high 

crime area in an unmarked car. The officers observed the 

defendant, whom the police did not know, standing on a street 

corner talking to a group of men. When the police car passed, 

the group dispersed. The officers circled the block and upon 

returning, saw the defendant talking to a second group of men. 

This group also dispersed as the officers drove by. When the 

officers drove around the block a third time, they observed the 

defendant in the back seat of a car. The car drove around the 

block and returned a few minutes later. After the defendant 

exited the vehicle, one of the officers approached the defendant 

and announced he was a police officer. 

At that moment, the [defendant] quickly 

placed his closed fist to his mouth and 

began to run. The officers did not see 

anything in the [defendant's] hands or see 

him place anything in his mouth at the time, 

although it appeared from his motion that he 

was placing something in his mouth. Officer 

 - 9 - 
Baine pursued the [defendant] and tackled 

him within ten yards of the initial 

encounter. A scuffle ensued between the two 

of them. During the scuffle, the 

[defendant] was making a chewing motion. 

Id. at 301, 456 S.E.2d at 535. 

 Based on these facts, we concluded: 

The facts support the finding that the 

police officers, having observed the 

[defendant's] activity, reasonably believed 

that the [defendant] was trying to eat and 

destroy drugs in his mouth. Therefore, they 

had probable cause to arrest the [defendant] 

based on the objective, reasonable belief 

that he had been or was committing a crime. 

Id. at 304, 456 S.E.2d at 537. 

 In this case, Officer Dengeles recognized Purdie and knew 

he had a reputation for fighting and running from the police 

while carrying illegal narcotics. Specifically, Dengeles 

provided uncontroverted testimony that Purdie had previously 

stabbed an officer and had discarded illegal narcotics as he 

attempted to flee. His knowledge of Purdie's prior conduct is 

relevant in determining whether probable cause to arrest 

existed. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 169-70 

(1949) (officer's knowledge of defendant and his past conduct 

may be considered as evidence supporting a finding of probable 

cause); Schaum, 215 Va. at 500, 211 S.E.2d at 75 (knowledge of 

suspect and his prior criminal acts factor to be considered in a 

probable cause determination). 

 - 10 - 
 In addition, Dengeles observed nervous conduct on Purdie's 

part from the inception of the traffic stop. See Logan v. 

Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 353, 361, 512 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1999) 

(nervousness of the suspect is a factor to consider when 

evaluating an officer's actions). Dengeles had concerns at the 

outset of the traffic stop because the vehicle in which Purdie 

was riding did not stop when directed to do so and traveled 300 

yards before pulling over. These concerns were not dispelled by 

Purdie, who "became very nervous" when asked to get out of the 

vehicle. When he exited the car, he did so hesitantly and was 

"hunched over slightly." Purdie did not straighten up until 

after the front of his body was out of Dengeles's view. Based 

on this behavior, Dengeles, who had fourteen years of experience 

as a police officer, believed that Purdie was hiding something 

in the area of his waistband, lower abdomen, or groin area. 

 While sitting on the guardrail, Purdie had his hands inside 

his jacket and appeared to "gather something up" in his pockets. 

Purdie repeated the "gathering" motion at least twice, in what 

appeared to be an attempt to discard something from his jacket 

pocket, while looking around and watching the officers. 

 When Dengeles told Purdie to go over to the car and put his 

hands on it, his hands remained in his pockets, "gathering 

whatever he was gathering." When he took one of his hands out 

of the pocket, he kept it in a clenched fist as he walked toward 

 - 11 - 
the car and, just before placing his hands on the car, Purdie 

"quickly" put his fisted hand "up to his mouth." 

 Dengeles testified that he had seen individuals engage in 

the same hand-to-mouth movement on dozens of occasions, and 

described the action as a way in which people destroy drugs in 

order to avoid having the contraband seized by the police. See

Richards v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 612, 616, 383 S.E.2d 268, 

271 (1989) ("Trained and experienced police officers . . . may 

be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct 

which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer."). 

 When Dengeles subsequently searched Purdie's pocket, he had 

probable cause to arrest Purdie and was entitled to conduct a 

complete search of his person incident to that arrest. Buck, 20 

Va. App. at 304, 456 S.E.2d at 536-37 ("When an officer has 

probable cause to arrest a person, the officer may search the 

person, particularly where the evidence is of a highly 

evanescent nature."). 

 It is of no consequence that Dengeles conducted the search 

prior to formally arresting Purdie. Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 

29 Va. App. 102, 112, 510 S.E.2d 247, 252 (1999); Buck, 20 Va. 

App. at 304, 456 S.E.2d at 537; Poindexter v. Commonwealth, 16 

Va. App. 730, 733-34, 432 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1993); Rawlings v. 

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980). 

 Because Officer Dengeles had probable cause to arrest 

Purdie at the time he conducted the search, we find the trial 

 - 12 - 
court properly denied Purdie's motion to suppress the evidence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed. 

 - 13 -