J-S68008-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

STEVEN MICHAEL MARCHAND, 

 Appellant No. 1341 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 27, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000020-2014 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, SOLANO, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2016 

 Steven Michael Marchand (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of two counts of identity theft, 

one count of conspiracy to commit identity theft, one count of theft by 

deception, one count of conspiracy to commit theft by deception, two counts 

of forgery, and one count of conspiracy to commit forgery. We affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the operative facts of this case as follows: 

The charges in this case arise out of two separate transactions 

for the sale of timber. The first of these contracts was presented 

by Appellant to Frederick Clelland, a self-employed timberer, 

purportedly bearing the signature of one Sylvia Weed, the owner 

of the real property in question. Clelland in turn paid the 

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*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
J-S68008-16 

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Appellant a substantial amount of money in consideration[1] of 

the Appellant’s acting as a broker for Sylvia Weed. It was later 

revealed that Weed never actually signed or authorized the 

contract in question. 

 The second series of contracts were presented by the 

Appellant to David A. Sholtis, an employee of Sugar Grove 

Hardwood, bearing the purported signatures of James and Helen 

Berry. Sugar Grove Hardwood provided significant 

compensation to Appellant in consideration of his acting as a 

broker for two parcels belonging to James and Helen Berry.[2] 

During the course of negotiations between Sholtis and Appellant 

for the sale of timber on a third parcel, this one purportedly 

owned by Sylvia Weed, Sholtis came to discover that, contrary 

to Appellant’s representations, the actual owners of the parcel 

were James and Helen Berry. It was moreover revealed that the 

true landowners never actually authorized any of the 

transactions, in large part because they were in fact deceased. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/16, at 2–3. 

 Following Appellant’s conviction on March 20, 2015, the trial court 

sentenced him on July 27, 2015, as follows: 

On Counts 1 and 4, he received concurrent sentences of twelve 

(12) months less three (3) days to twenty-four (24) months less 

one (1) day [of incarceration]. With respect to Counts 2, 6, 7 

and 8, he was sentenced to terms of probation of seven (7) 

years, to run concurrently with each other, and consecutively to 

the sentence of incarceration imposed at Counts 1 and 4. With 

respect to Counts 3 and 5, the Appellant was sentenced to terms 

of probation of seven (7) years, to run concurrent to one another 

and consecutive to the term of probation imposed on Counts 2, 

6, 7, and 8. 

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1

 Mr. Clelland paid Appellant $45,000. N.T., 3/16/15, at 9. 

2

 The first contract was for $38,000, and the second contract was for 

$25,000. N.T., 3/16/15, at 37, 39. 
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Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/16, at 2. Also, Appellant was ordered to pay a total 

of $81,100.88 in restitution. N.T. (Sentencing), 7/27/15, at 24. This appeal 

followed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration: 

The verdict in this case was against the weight of the evidence 

when information was presented that supported his version of 

the events and the handwriting on the contracts in question 

supported his testimony 

The sentence in this case was manifestly excessive and clearly 

unreasonable when the court sentenced Mr. Marchand to a 

period of incarceration and did not take into account mitigating 

factors such as the Defendant’s background and the nature of 

the crime 

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (verbatim; full capitalization omitted). 

 Appellant first raises a weight-of-the-evidence challenge, which he has 

failed to preserve for our review. A weight challenge must be raised in the 

trial court or it will be waived. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, a “claim that 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial 

judge in a motion for a new trial: (1) orally, on the record, at any time 

before sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or 

(3) in a post-sentence motion.” A weight claim must be presented to the 

trial court while it exercises jurisdiction over a matter since “appellate review 

of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Pa. Super. 

2003). 
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Here, the trial court found—and our review of the record confirms—

that Appellant failed to raise his weight claim orally or in writing prior to or 

after sentencing. Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/16, at 3.3 In fact, Appellant 

raised the evidentiary challenge for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 2/1/16, at ¶ 5. Accordingly, we 

hold that Appellant’s weight claim has been waived.4

Appellant next argues that his sentence is excessive and that the 

sentencing court failed to consider mitigating factors. Appellant’s Brief at 

12. These issues are challenges to the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s 

sentence. Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1007 (Pa. Super. 

2014). 

It is well settled that there is no absolute right to appeal the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 135 A.3d 

1028, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2016). Rather, where an appellant challenges the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a 

petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 

822, 825 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

As we observed in Johnson: 

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3

 The record contains a post-sentence motion in which Appellant seeks only

a hearing for consideration of after-discovered evidence. Post Sentence 

Motion, 9/28/15, at ¶¶ 3–7. 

4

 Were this challenge not waived, we would affirm on the basis of the trial 

court’s well-reasoned analysis. Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/16, at 3–5. 
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Before we reach the merits of this [issue], we must engage in a 

four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal is 

timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether 

Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons 

relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise 

statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is 

appropriate under the sentencing code. 

Johnson, 125 A.3d at 825–826 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 

A.3d 1281, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted)). 

 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302(a) provides that “issues 

not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first 

time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Objections to the discretionary aspects 

of a sentence are generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing 

hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. 

Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Mann, 820 A.2d 788 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

Our review of the certified record reflects that Appellant waived his 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence by failing to raise the 

claim either at the sentencing proceeding or by means of a post-sentence 

motion.5 N.T. (Sentencing), 7/27/15, at 22, 25–26; Post Sentence Motion, 

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5

 At sentencing, Appellant requested a county sentence and bond pending 

appeal, both of which he received. N.T. (Sentencing), 7/27/15, at 19, 22, 

26. Appellant’s post-sentence motion does not include a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. 
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9/28/15. Appellant challenged the sentence imposed for the first time in his 

Rule 1925(b) statement. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 2/1/16, at ¶ 6. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s sentencing challenge has been waived.6

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/26/2016 

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6

 Neither the Commonwealth nor the trial court responds to Appellant’s 

sentencing challenge with waiver. Were this challenge not waived, we would 

affirm on the basis of the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis. Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/2/16, at 5–8.