NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

GUTHRIE S., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.S., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0344

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD527936

The Honorable Karen L. O’Connor, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
GUTHRIE S. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.1

B R O W N, Chief Judge:

¶1 Guthrie S. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his son, challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination. Because 

reasonable evidence supports the court’s order, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Lindsey B. (“Mother”) 2 are the biological parents

of A.S. (“the child”), born in July 2014. The Department of Child Safety 

(“DCS”) became involved almost immediately, after learning the child was 

born substance exposed and was diagnosed with Neonate Abstinence 

Syndrome. At the time of the child’s birth, Father had pending criminal 

charges for armed robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault.3 In August 

2014, DCS filed a petition requesting an in-home dependency. Following a 

hearing, the court entered a preliminary protective order allowing Mother 

to maintain physical custody of the child, with a safety plan. From the 

outset of the safety plan, Father received supervised visits, parent aide

services, substance abuse assessment, treatment and testing, and family 

preservation services. 

¶3 The following week, DCS removed the child from Mother’s 

care because the parents violated the safety plan. That same day, Father 

 

1 The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired Judge of the Court of 

Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2 Mother’s parental rights to the child were also terminated in 2016 

but she is not a party to this appeal. 

3 In February 2016, Father pled guilty to armed robbery, a class two 

felony, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. He was 

sentenced to three years’ probation. 
GUTHRIE S. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

3

filed a motion for the return of the child. The juvenile court promptly 

conducted an evidentiary hearing to consider Father’s request. The court 

denied Father’s motion, finding Father’s July 2014 hair follicle test was 

positive for cocaine, which contradicted his statements under oath that he 

had not used cocaine since the beginning of the year. The court also noted 

that although Father’s pending criminal charges were “not grounds for 

removal of the child, given the other circumstances of the case, it . . . should 

be concerning.” Finally, the court found that the parents took the child 

“from the safety monitor when they had no authority to do so and knowing 

they were violating” the court’s orders. The child was placed in a licensed 

foster-care home. 

¶4 The child was found dependent as to the parents in January 

2015 and the court adopted a case plan of family reunification. With DCS’s 

approval, Father completed intensive outpatient treatment with Calvary

Recovery Inc. and the parents successfully completed parent aide services

in June 2015. Parents continued to struggle, however, with substance abuse

and treatment, and in October 2015 the court approved DCS’s request to 

place the child with maternal grandmother in South Dakota. In November 

2015, the case plan was changed to severance and adoption and DCS filed 

a motion for termination based on Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)

sections 8-533(B)(3) (chronic substance abuse) and 8-533(B)(8)(c) (fifteen 

months’ out-of-home placement).

¶5 At the severance adjudication in August 2016, DCS case 

manager Carolyn Skytta testified that over the previous twenty-two

months, there were numerous problems with Father’s substance abuse test 

results including positive tests, failing to test, and attempts to manipulate 

tests. DCS made four referrals for Father to begin drug treatment through 

Terros, but he failed to complete any referral. Although Father completed

the intensive outpatient program with Calvary, he failed to complete the 

recommended after-care. Father’s last urinalysis test occurred in 

September 2015 and was positive for opiates. Skytta testified that Father 

failed to “have a full understanding of [his] substance abuse” and, in light 

of recent domestic violence allegations involving Mother and Father, she 

worried that the child “would be in danger of neglect and possible abuse.” 

¶6 The juvenile court granted the motion for termination on both 

statutory grounds. Addressing Father’s substance abuse, the court 

reasoned in part as follows:

While Father did successfully complete an Intensive 

Outpatient treatment with Calvary in June 2015 as stated 
GUTHRIE S. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

4

above, he did not follow through with aftercare treatment. 

His last drug test was September 10, 2015, after he completed 

the Calvary program. He tested positive for cocaine and 

opiates. He has not drug tested for DCS since then. To date, 

Father has not successfully completed a drug treatment 

program or demonstrated that he can maintain long-term 

sobriety.

. . . . 

Before trial, Father disclosed three hair follicle tests each three 

months apart. These are tests he did on his own and not 

through DCS. Father asserts that this establishes his sobriety 

for the last nine months. The Court disagrees. Father has not 

demonstrated over the past two years that he can maintain 

long-term sobriety in order to parent [the child]. Father has 

not provided DCS a urinalysis test since September 2015. 

Further, Father has not successfully completed a drug 

treatment program.

The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interests, 

and this timely appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 To support an order terminating parental rights, the juvenile 

court must find at least one statutory ground is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 78, 

¶ 6 (App. 2005). Additionally, the court must find by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the termination is in the best interests of the child. Mario 

G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 285, ¶ 11 (App. 2011); Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 8-533(B). As the trier of fact, the juvenile court “is in the best position 

to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of the 

witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 

209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Accordingly, we will accept the court’s 

findings of fact “unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings.” 

Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555 (App. 1997). 

¶8 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), the juvenile court may terminate 

parental rights to a child if “the parent is unable to discharge parental 

responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, 

controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to 

believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period.” Chronic substance abuse is long-lasting but not necessarily 
GUTHRIE S. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

5

constant substance abuse. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 

373, 377, ¶ 16 (App. 2010). Generally, a parent’s temporary abstinence from 

drugs and alcohol does not outweigh a significant history of abuse or 

consistent inability to abstain during the case. Id. at 379, ¶ 29. And, a child’s 

interest in permanency must prevail over a parent’s uncertain battle with 

drugs. Id. (citing In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa App. 1998)).

¶9 Father argues the juvenile court erred in finding him unable 

to discharge his parental responsibilities due to substance abuse. He asserts 

he demonstrated continued sobriety, pointing to his participation in the 

Calvary treatment program, and three hair follicle tests between December 

2015 and May 2016 showing the absence of drug use. Father therefore 

contends that DCS failed to meet its burden of proving that he has a history 

of chronic substance abuse that would continue for an indeterminate period 

and prevent him from being able to parent the child.4 Notwithstanding 

Father’s efforts, we conclude that reasonable evidence supports the court’s 

ruling.

¶10 Contrary to Father’s suggestion, § 8–533(B)(3) does not 

“require that the parent be found unable to discharge any parental 

responsibilities but rather that the parent be unable to discharge ‘the 

parental responsibilities.’” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS–5894, 145 Ariz. 

405, 408 (App. 1985). Additionally, as the trier of fact, the juvenile court 

could properly consider the evidence of Father’s prior substance abuse

when evaluating whether reasonable grounds exist to conclude an inability 

to discharge parental responsibilities would continue for a prolonged and 

indeterminate period. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 283, 288, 

¶ 20 (App. 2016). That evidence includes the length and frequency of 

Father’s substance abuse, the types of substances abused, prior efforts to 

maintain sobriety, and prior relapses. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

¶11 Father acknowledged a decades-long history of substance 

abuse dating from his teen years until the birth of the child and continuing 

through much of the dependency proceedings. Father maintained that he 

was “clean and sober” at the time of the hearing and presented the three 

hair follicle tests. However, Father did not submit any drug test results in 

the three months leading up to the severance hearing to demonstrate 

sobriety during that critical time. Additionally, DCS records indicate 

 

4 Father does not challenge any specific factual finding made by the 

juvenile court nor does he challenge the court’s legal conclusion that he has 

a history of chronic drug abuse. 
GUTHRIE S. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

6

Father missed more than 40 required drug tests during the nearly two years 

between August 2014 and April 2016. 

¶12 At different times in this proceeding, Father tested positive 

for various substances including heroin, cocaine, morphine, 

hydromorphone, codeine, oxycodone, oxymorphone, methamphetamine, 

and amphetamines. Father admitted to frequent use of substances 

throughout the case. Father’s last urinalysis was taken in September 2015, 

after he completed the treatment program at Calvary, and it was positive 

for opiates, cocaine, and heroin. Although Father testified that he 

completed the aftercare program with Calvary and participated with a 

mentor, he did not provide any confirming documentation, and the records 

DCS obtained from Calvary did not reflect such participation. These facts 

support the caseworker’s opinion that Father was unable to provide the 

child a safe and sober environment, and that reasonable grounds existed to 

believe that Father’s condition would continue for a prolonged, uncertain 

period of time. 

¶13 Father’s temporary abstinence from drugs, as suggested by 

three hair follicle tests, does not outweigh his significant history of abuse or 

his consistent inability to abstain during this case. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. 

at 379, ¶ 29 (explaining that when a parent consistently fails to remedy 

substance abuse, despite knowing the loss of a child is imminent, the parent 

has not overcome his or her dependence on drugs). The evidence in this 

record is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings that Father is

unable to discharge his parental responsibilities due to chronic substance 

abuse and that there are reasonable grounds to believe the condition will 

continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.5

 

5 Because we conclude that reasonable evidence supports termination 

for chronic substance abuse, we need not address the out-of-home 

placement ground. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, 

¶ 3 (App. 2002) (stating if sufficient evidence supports any of the statutory 

grounds on which the court ordered severance, it is unnecessary to address 

arguments relating to the other grounds). Similarly, as Father does not 

challenge the juvenile court’s best interests finding, we need not address it. 
GUTHRIE S. v. DCS, A.S.

Decision of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶14 Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court’s order terminating 

Father’s parental rights to the child is affirmed.