1 Plaintiff has filed numerous “responses” to the instant

Motion. (See Doc. Nos. 79, 84, 95, and 106-108). Although the

Court has considered all arguments made therein by Plaintiff in

ruling on the instant Motion, the summary judgment record in this

case consists only of the documents submitted by Plaintiff in

response to the instant Motion (see Doc. Nos. 85, 106-108) and the

documents attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, as well as

exhibits attached to Chase’s Motion. Chase has not challenged the

authenticity of the documents submitted by Plaintiff. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARTHA STEELE : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

CHASE MANHATTAN :

MORTGAGE CORP., ET AL. : NO. 04-217

ORDER-MEMORANDUM

Padova, J.

AND NOW, this 25th day of August, 2005, upon consideration of

Defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation’s (“Chase”) Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 30), and Plaintiff’s Responses

thereto,1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. Chase’s Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s

forgery and disclosure claims under the Truth in Lending

Act, and these claims are DISMISSED as against Chase;

2. Chase’s Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s

claims under the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act and

the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and these claims are

DISMISSED as against Chase; 

3. Chase’s Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 1 of 12
2

forgery and disclosure claims under the Pennsylvania

Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and

these claims are DISMISSED as against Chase; and

4. Chase’s Motion is DENIED with respect to the following

claims:

a. Plaintiff’s claim for failure to honor her notice

of rescission, in violation of the Truth in Lending

Act;

b. Plaintiff’s claims that Chase misrepresented that

her loan was insured by the Federal Housing

Administration and failed to give effect to her

rescission of the loan transaction, in violation of

the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and

Consumer Protection Law; and

c. Chase’s counterclaims for breach of contract and

unjust enrichment. 

This action arises from a home mortgage refinance agreement

allegedly entered into by Plaintiff Martha Steele and Chase on

September 20, 2002. Plaintiff, who is presently proceeding as a

pro se litigant, asserts several claims against Chase for

violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601

et seq., and related federal and state statutes. Presently before

the Court is Chase’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 2 of 12
2 Plaintiff also asserts claims against Service 1st Mortgage

Corporation (“Service 1st”), the mortgage broker and loan

originator which allegedly solicited Plaintiff concerning the loan

at issue, and White Rose Settlement Services, Inc. (“White Rose”),

the title company which allegedly served as Chase’s closing agent

in connection with the loan. Service 1st has failed to plead or

otherwise defend against this action. Although White Rose has

filed an answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, it has not moved

for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. 

3

all of Plaintiff’s claims and two of Chase’s counterclaims.2

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Chase violated the TILA by: (1) failing to accurately disclose the

amount financed, the finance charge, and the annual percentage rate

for the loan; (2) forging her signature on the promissory note; and

(3) refusing to honor her notice of rescission of the loan

transaction. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 30-31.) Plaintiff seeks both

rescission of the loan transaction and damages under the TILA.

(Id. ¶ 34.) Chase argues that it is entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s TILA claim for forgery because Plaintiff has failed

to produce any evidence that the loan papers were forged. Although

the summary judgment record is devoid of evidence that Chase forged

Plaintiff’s signature on any of the loan documents, Chase would be

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim even had

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 3 of 12
4

Plaintiff submitted such evidence because “forged documents receive

no protection under the TILA.” Walker v. Michael W. Colton Trust,

47 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865 (E.D. Mich. 1999); see also Jensen v. Ray

Kim Ford, Inc., 920 F.2d 3, 4 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal

of TILA claim based on forged contract because the TILA only

provides a remedy for persons “obligated” on a valid consumer

credit transaction) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1631). Accordingly,

Chase’s Motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s TILA claim

for forgery. Chase’s Motion is also granted with respect to

Plaintiff’s TILA claim for inaccurate disclosures because she has

failed to produce any evidence in support of this claim. 

Chase further argues that, inasmuch as Plaintiff seeks

rescissory relief, her remaining TILA claim based on Chase’s

refusal to honor her rescission notice is barred by the TILA’s oneyear statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). Chase notes

that Plaintiff did not file the instant action until January 20,

2004, approximately sixteen months after the consummation of the

loan transaction. However, the one-year limitations period set

forth in § 1640(e) applies only to claims for damages under the

TILA. See Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 896,

902-03 (3d Cir. 1990); Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243,

247 (6th Cir. 1980). Section 1635(a) of the TILA provides that

“the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until

midnight of the third business day following the consummation of

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 4 of 12
3 Section 1635(b) of the TILA provides, in pertinent part, that

“[w]ithin twenty days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the

creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as

earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action

necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security

interest created under the transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).

4 By contrast, an obligor’s right to rescission under § 1635

of the TILA expires three days after the date of the consummation

of the transaction where the obligor failed to properly submit a

rescission notice within the initial three-day period under §

5

the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission

forms required under this section together with a statement

containing the material disclosures required under this subchapter,

whichever is later, by notifying the creditor . . . of his

intention to do so.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).3 Section 1635(a) is

qualified by § 1635(f), which states that, in all events, “[a]n

obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the

date of consummation or upon the sale of the property, whichever

occurs first . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (f). Thus, a borrower may

file an action for rescissory relief under the TILA within three

years of the consummation of the challenged loan transaction where

the borrower properly exercised her right to rescind within the

initial three-day period under § 1635(a) and the lender has failed

to honor the rescission. See Curry v. Fidelity Consumer Discount

Co., 656 F. Supp. 1129, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (“When the rescission

provisions are not complied with by a creditor, the consumer has

the right to rescind the transaction within three years of its

consummation.”).4 In this case, Plaintiff has attached to the

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 5 of 12
1635(a) and the creditor has not otherwise failed to comply with

the TILA’s disclosure requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). 

5 Notice of rescission is considered given when mailed by the

borrower. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2).

6 Although Plaintiff filed the instant action approximately

sixteen months after the consummation of the loan transaction,

Plaintiff’s request for TILA damages is not necessarily barred

under the one-year limitations period of § 1640(e). See Ramadan v.

Chase Manhattan Corp., 156 F.3d 499, 505 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding

that statute of limitations in § 1640(e) is subject to equitable

tolling). The Court notes that, on or about September 8, 2003,

Plaintiff filed a separate action under seal that may have tolled

the one-year limitations period under the TILA. The Court need

not, however, resolve the issue at this juncture because Chase has

not raised a statute of limitations argument with respect to

Plaintiff’s request for TILA damages.

6

Amended Complaint a signed copy of the rescission notice provided

to her by Chase, as well as a copy of the United Parcel Service’s

tracking detail confirming that the notice was mailed to Chase on

September 24, 2002, prior to the expiration of the three-day

rescission period,5 and received by Chase on September 26, 2002.

(Am. Compl. Exs. C-D.) As Chase has failed to establish that

Plaintiff’s request for rescissory relief is time-barred under §

1635, Chase’s Motion is denied in this respect.6 

In Count II of her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Chase violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”),

12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., by failing to acknowledge receipt of her

written requests concerning the servicing of her loan and failing

to take any action in response to her requests. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-

41.) Section 2605(e) of RESPA imposes a duty on loan servicers,

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 6 of 12
7

such as Chase, to respond to certain inquiries by borrowers. In

particular, § 2605(e)(1)(A) provides that “[i]f any servicer of a

federally related mortgage loan receives a qualified written

request from the borrower . . . for information relating to the

servicing of such loan, the servicer shall provide a written

response acknowledging receipt of the correspondence within 20 days

. . . unless the action requested is taken within such period.” 12

U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Section 2605(e)(2)

further requires the loan servicer to take action with respect to

a qualified written request within sixty days after receipt of the

request. Id. § 2605(e)(2). RESPA defines the term “servicing” as

“receiving any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant

to the terms of any loan, including amounts for escrow accounts .

. . , and making the payments of principal and interest and such

other payments with respect to the amounts received from the

borrower as may be required pursuant to the terms of the loan.”

Id. § 2605(i)(3). The summary judgment record reveals that

Plaintiff’s written requests to Chase concerned only her rescission

demand, and not the “servicing” of her loan, as the term is defined

by RESPA. See MorEquity, Inc. v. Naeem, 118 F. Supp. 2d 885, 901

(N.D. Ill. 2000) (dismissing RESPA claim where “the letter sought

information about the validity of the loan and mortgage documents,

but made no inquiry as to the status of the [borrowers’] account

balance”). As Plaintiff’s written requests to Chase fall outside

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 7 of 12
7 Even if Plaintiff had submitted written requests to Chase

concerning the “servicing” of her loan, Chase would still be

entitled to summary judgment because the record is devoid of any

evidence that Chase failed to properly address such requests.

8

the ambit of RESPA,7 Chase’s Motion is granted with respect to

Plaintiff’s RESPA claim.

In Count III of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Chase violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §

1681, et seq., by failing to conduct an investigation into her

disputes about the accuracy and completeness of credit information

furnished by Chase. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44.) Section 1681s-2(b) of

the FCRA imposes certain duties on “furnishers of credit

information,” such as Chase, upon notice of a credit information

dispute. In particular, § 1681s-2(b)(1) provides as follows:

After receiving notice [from a consumer

reporting agency] . . . of a dispute with

regard to the completeness or accuracy of any

information provided by [a furnisher of credit

information] to a consumer reporting agency,

[the furnisher of credit information] shall

(A) conduct an investigation with respect to

the disputed information; (B) review all

relevant information provided by the consumer

reporting agency . . . ; (C) report the

results of the investigation to the consumer

reporting agency; and (D) if the investigation

finds that the information is incomplete or

inaccurate, report those results to all other

consumer reporting agencies to which [the

furnisher of credit information] furnished the

information and that compile and maintain

files on consumers on a nationwide basis.

 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1). Chase argues, and the Court agrees,

that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s FCRA claim

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 8 of 12
9

because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that Chase

received notice from a consumer reporting agency concerning a

credit information dispute by Plaintiff. See, e.g., Young v.

Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 639-40 (5th Cir.

2002) (affirming entry of summary judgment where plaintiff offered

no evidence that defendant received notice of dispute from credit

reporting agency). Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had produced

such evidence, Chase would still be entitled to summary judgment

because the record is devoid of any evidence that Chase failed to

properly investigate any such dispute upon receipt of notice

thereof. Accordingly, Chase’s Motion is granted with respect to

Plaintiff’s FCRA claim.

In Count IV of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Chase violated the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer

Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) by (1) misrepresenting that the mortgage

loan was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), in

violation of 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-2(4)(v); (2) forging

Plaintiff’s signature on the promissory note; (3) failing to

provide Plaintiff with disclosures required under 73 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 201-7; and (4) failing to give effect to her

rescission of the loan transaction, in violation of 73 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 201-7. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-50.) Plaintiff has

submitted no evidence suggesting that Chase forged her signature on

the promissory note, or that Chase failed to provide her with any

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 9 of 12
10

disclosures required under Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff has,

however, produced evidence that, despite Chase’s representations

that the loan transaction was an “FHA loan,” the loan was not FHA

insured because Chase failed to sign the appropriate forms. (See

Doc. No. 85.) This evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Chase violated § 201-2(4)(v), which

proscribes representations that “goods or services have . . .

characteristics . . . [or] benefits that they do not have . . . .”

73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-2(4)(v). As to Plaintiff’s claim

that Chase failed to give effect to her rescission of the loan

transaction, there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect

to whether the loan transaction resulted from “a contact with or a

call on [Plaintiff] at [her] residence either in person or by

telephone,” as required to bring the challenged transaction within

the scope of 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-7. In particular, the

record shows that an agent for Service 1st conducted a “face to

face interview” with Plaintiff in completing her loan application

on August 1, 2002. (See Doc. No. 85.) Accordingly, Chase’s Motion

is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s forgery and disclosure

claims under the UTPCPL and denied with respect to Plaintiff’s

misrepresentation and rescission claims under the UTPCPL.

Chase also seeks summary judgment on its counterclaims against

Plaintiff for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. As Chase

admits in its brief, however, resolution of its breach of contract

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 10 of 12
11

counterclaim turns on whether Plaintiff is entitled to rescind the

loan transaction. Because one Plaintiff’s TILA claims for

rescissory relief has survived Chase’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

Chase is not entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract

counterclaim. Moreover, it would be premature to resolve Chase’s

quasi-contractual claim for unjust enrichment since Chase may,

depending upon the Court’s ultimate resolution of Plaintiff’s TILA

claim and Chase’s breach of contract counterclaim, have an adequate

remedy under the loan agreement. See Curley v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

289 F. Supp. 2d 614, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“Pennsylvania law has

long recognized that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is

unavailable where . . . the relationship of the parties is founded

on a written agreement or express contract.”) (citations omitted).

In any event, even if the Court determines that Plaintiff is

entitled to rescind the loan transaction, the Court may impose

equitable conditions on the rescission to ensure that Plaintiff is

not unjustly enriched. See, e.g., Valentine v. Influential Sav. &

Loan Ass’n, 572 F. Supp. 36, 40-41 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that

TILA rescission “is an equitable remedy and the court may condition

it upon the borrower’s return of the monies advanced by the

lender”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b). Accordingly, Chase’s

Motion is denied with respect to its breach of contract and unjust

Case 2:04-cv-00217-JP Document 125 Filed 08/26/05 Page 11 of 12
8 The bench trial in this case, which is scheduled to commence

on October 31, 2005, will involve the following claims in light of

the Court’s disposition of the instant Motion:

1. Plaintiff’s TILA claim against Chase for failure to honor

her notice of rescission.

2. Plaintiff’s UTPCPL claims against Chase for

misrepresenting that the mortgage loan was FHA insured

and for failing to give effect to her rescission notice.

3. All of Plaintiff’s TILA, RESPA, and UTPCPL claims against

White Rose.

4. All of Chase’s counterclaims against Plaintiff.

5. All of Chase’s cross-claims against the other Defendants.

12

enrichment counterclaims.8

BY THE COURT:

s/ John R. Padova 

John R. Padova, J.

 

 

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