Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-133 | June 22, 2020 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ross G. Thomas

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Myriam Serrano

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert W. Hamilton,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 22, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-133

Appeal from the

Decatur Circuit Court

The Honorable

Timothy B. Day, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

16C01-1712-F4-1389

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-133 | June 22, 2020 Page 2 of 14

[1] Robert W. Hamilton (“Hamilton”) was convicted of unlawful possession of a 

firearm by a serious violent felon,1 a Level 4 felony, possession of 

methamphetamine2 as a Level 5 felony, assisting a criminal as a Level 6 felony,3

possession of marijuana as a Class B misdemeanor,

4 and possession of 

paraphernalia5 as a Class C misdemeanor. He appeals the admission of 

narcotics, paraphernalia, and firearms at his trial and raises two issues under the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which we restate as:

I. Whether an officer’s visual observations through a 

window of Hamilton’s residence was an impermissible 

search; and

II. Whether exigent circumstances allowed officers to enter 

Hamilton’s residence without a search warrant.6

[2] We affirm. 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

2

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(b)(2). 

3

See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-5(a)(1)(A).

4

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a).

5

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b).

6 Hamilton contends that the officers’ actions also violated his rights under Article I, section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution. While Hamilton provides an extended recitation of the relevant law under Article I, section 11, 

his actual arguments consist of only two sentences. Therefore, Hamilton has waived his claim under the 

Indiana Constitution for lack of cogent argument. See Jarman v. State, 114 N.E.3d 911, 915 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2018), trans. denied. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-133 | June 22, 2020 Page 3 of 14

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 21, 2017, Sergeant David Durant (“Sergeant Durant”) and 

Deputy Robert Goodfellow (“Deputy Goodfellow”) (collectively, “the 

officers”) went to Hamilton’s residence in rural Decatur County to execute an 

arrest warrant for Jewel Johnson. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 70. Deputy 

Goodfellow had received a tip that Johnson would be at Hamilton’s residence 

that day. Id.; Tr. Vol. 2 at 6, 8, 33, 35. The arrest warrant was for Level 2 

felony dealing in methamphetamine. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 70; Tr. Vol. 2 at 

7. The officers also had two warrants for Johnson for violation of probation for 

her conviction for possession of methamphetamine in Jackson County. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 70; Tr. Vol. 2 at 7.

[4] When the officers arrived at Hamilton’s home, they noted that the house had

only one level and had a wraparound porch that surrounded the entire home. 

Id. at 98-106. The front door was located on the deck area of the wraparound 

porch. Id. at 98, 106. There were other entryways around the house, and there 

were many large deck chairs sitting on at least two sides of the house. Id. at 99-

105. The officers approached the front door by climbing the steps closest to the 

door. Tr. Vol. 2 at 23. Deputy Goodfellow remained on the wraparound porch 

by the front door, and Sergeant Durant walked on the wraparound porch to the 

west side of the house. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 70. Sergeant Durant went to 

cover the west side of the house because “it’s common knowledge that firearms 

could be used” and to prevent escape from a different exit. Tr. Vol. 2 at 10. 
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[5] As Sergeant Durant looked through a window on the west side of the house, he 

observed Johnson in the kitchen. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 70-71. She ran 

toward the front door, and Sergeant Durant radioed Deputy Goodfellow to 

alert him. Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. Deputy Goodfellow knocked on the door, Johnson 

answered the door, and Deputy Goodfellow identified himself. Id. at 33. 

Johnson ran toward the back of the house, and Sergeant Durant then saw 

Johnson run back into the bedroom and disappear into a bathroom. Id. at 33-

34; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71. Sergeant Durant could see a pump shotgun tied

with silk ties to the bed in the bedroom. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71; Tr. Vol. 2 

at 13. He knocked on the bedroom window where he had observed Hamilton 

and identified himself. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71. He instructed Hamilton to 

answer the front door. Tr. Vol. 2 at 14. Sergeant Durant then joined Deputy 

Goodfellow at the front of the house. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71; Tr. Vol. 2 at 

13. 

[6] Deputy Goodfellow continued to knock on the door, and Hamilton answered. 

Tr. Vol. 2 at 14, 34. Deputy Goodfellow identified himself and asked that 

Johnson come to the door. Id. at 34. Deputy Goodfellow explained that 

Johnson was wanted on several felony warrants. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71. 

Hamilton said that Johnson was not there. Tr. Vol. 2 at 14, 34. Deputy 

Goodfellow asked that Hamilton open the door, and Hamilton complied. Id. 

However, when both officers told Hamilton to have Johnson come to the door, 

Hamilton again denied that she was there. Id. Deputy Goodfellow informed 

Hamilton that he had seen Johnson, but Hamilton continued to deny she was 
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there and said the officers could not come into the house without a warrant. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71; Tr. Vol. 2 at 34. Deputy Goodfellow then placed 

Hamilton under arrest for assisting a criminal. Id. 

[7] Once Hamilton was taken into custody, Sergeant Durant entered the house and 

went directly to the bedroom where Johnson was last seen. He found her hiding 

in a closet and arrested her. Id. at 15, 22. While in the home, Sergeant Durant 

observed narcotics and a glass pipe in plain view on a dresser in the bedroom. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71; Tr. Vol. 2 at 15, 22. The officers did a protective 

sweep of the house to ensure no one else was present and exited the home. Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 22.

[8] Hamilton consented to a search of the house after being advised of his rights. 

Tr. Vol. 2 at 18; Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71. The officers went back into the 

home and found controlled substances, including methamphetamine, digital 

scales, and paraphernalia. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71. The next day, Sergeant 

Durant applied for a search warrant after discovering that Hamilton had prior 

convictions that prevented him from having firearms. Id. On December 22, 

2017, the officers retrieved a .22 caliber single action revolver, a .12-gauge

pump shotgun, .12-gauge shotgun shells, and .22 caliber bullets from 

Hamilton’s home. Id. at 72. 

[9] On December 27, 2017, Hamilton was charged with Count I, possession of a 

firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; Count II, possession of 

methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony; Count III, assisting a criminal, a Level 6 
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felony; Count IV, maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony; Count V, 

possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; and Count VI, possession of 

paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor. Id. at 14-15.

[10] On August 31, 2019, Hamilton filed a Motion to Suppress requesting that the 

court suppress “any and all evidence and fruits thereof gained as a result of the 

searched on [Hamilton’s] residence . . . on or about December 21, 2017 and 

December 22, 2017.” Id. at 33. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, 

and on January 25, 2019, it denied the motion. Id. at 58. On February 18, 

2019, Hamilton filed a Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal, which 

the trial court granted on February 18, 2019. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 60-62. 

On March 15, 2019, Hamilton filed a Motion to Accept Interlocutory Appeal 

with this court, and on April 22, 2019, we denied the motion. Id. at 63-66.

[11] On November 18, 2019, Hamilton filed a written waiver of his right to a jury 

trial and asked to proceed to a bench trial. Id. at 67. The parties agreed to a 

written stipulation of facts in lieu of testimony; the stipulation preserved 

Hamilton’s objections to the admission of evidence that he had highlighted in 

his motion to suppress. Id. at 68. The bench trial occurred on November 25, 

2019. Id. The trial court found Hamilton guilty of unlawful possession of a 

firearm by a serious violent felon, possession of methamphetamine, assisting a 

criminal, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. Appellant's 

App. Vol. 2 at 107. Count IV, maintaining a common nuisance, was dismissed 

per the State’s request. Tr. Vol. 2 at 66. On December 19, 2019, Hamilton was 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-133 | June 22, 2020 Page 7 of 14

sentenced to an aggregate term of eight years. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 108. 

Hamilton now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[12] Because Hamilton appeals after the entry of a final judgment, we review the 

trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. See Grayson v. State, 52 

N.E.3d 24, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs 

only when the admission of evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances, and the error affects a party’s substantial rights. Clark 

v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). We will not reweigh the evidence, 

and we resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the trial court’s 

ruling. J.G. v. State, 93 N.E.3d 1112, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. 

When the challenge to the trial court’s ruling is premised on a constitutional 

violation, the issue is reviewed de novo because it raises a question of 

law. Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226, 229 (Ind. 2017).

7

I. Sergeant Durant’s Visual Observations Were Not a Search

[13] Hamilton argues that when Sergeant Durant walked to the west side of the 

house and looked through the window, he committed an impermissible 

warrantless search of Hamilton’s home. Hamilton acknowledges that if police 

7 Because the stipulation of evidence preserved Hamilton’s objections to the admissibility of evidence, and 

because the trial court did not revisit its prior ruling as to admissibility of the evidence, we find that there was 

an implicit ruling by the trial court at the trial stage that the evidence was admissible. Therefore, we apply 

the standard of review used for reviewing evidentiary rulings in an appeal from a final judgment.
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use normal means of ingress or egress to access a building and see something 

from that vantage point, they have not conducted a search under the Fourth 

Amendment, thus obviating the need for a search warrant. See Divello v. State, 

782 N.E.2d 433, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. This is permissible, 

Hamilton admits, as long as police restrict their access to places that visitors 

would be expected to go, such as walkways, driveways, and porches. See id. 

Hamilton argues that when Sergeant Durant went to the side of the house and 

saw Johnson through a window, he went to an area that visitors would not be 

expected to go. In support, Hamilton claims that his front door was the only 

common means of access to his house and that there was no evidence that other 

entries to the house were used by visitors. Thus, he claims Sergeant Durant 

was not justified in walking to the west side of the house and looking into the 

home through a window. In Hamilton’s words:

When [Sergeant] Durant left the front door and walked around to 

the rear of the house and began peering through a bedroom 

window, he was “no longer in a place where visitors could be 

expected to go.” See Divello v. State, 782 N.E.2d 433, 439 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. This initial warrantless entry into 

the curtilage constituted an illegal search and any evidence 

observed from that location or further evidence derived from that 

initial search is inadmissible.

Appellant’s Br. at 15.

[14] Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches and seizures inside a home 

are presumptively unreasonable. J.K. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 222, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the curtilage, or the area 
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immediately surrounding and associated with the home, is considered part of 

the home. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). Thus, the “warrantless entry 

onto one’s curtilage is also presumptively unreasonable.” J.K., 8 N.E.3d at 229. 

The Fourth Amendment, however, does not protect “[w]hat a person 

knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office.” Katz v. 

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). The route a visitor to a residence would 

use is not private under the Fourth Amendment, and if police take that route for 

the purpose of making a general inquiry or other legitimate reason, “they are 

free to keep their eyes open.” Id. In other words, “an individual does not have 

a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to things or activities within a 

residence that may be observed by persons using their natural senses from 

places impliedly open to a visitor’s entry.” Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 437. 

Therefore, if police use normal means of ingress and egress to and from a home 

for a legitimate purpose, it is not a Fourth Amendment search for the police to 

see or hear or smell from that vantage point what is occurring inside the home. 

Id.

[15] Here, we reject Hamilton’s contention that Sergeant Durant was not in a place 

where he had a right to be and, therefore, that his observations of the shotgun 

and Johnson’s furtive and frenetic behavior was an impermissible warrantless 

search under the Fourth Amendment. First, when Sergeant Durant and 

Deputy Goodman came to Hamilton’s home, they were there for a legitimate 

investigative purpose, i.e., serving an arrest warrant on Johnson. “[P]olice 

entry onto private property and their observations do not violate the Fourth 
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Amendment when the police have a legitimate investigatory purpose for being 

on the property and limit their entry to places that other visitors would be 

expected to go, such as walkways, driveway, or porches.” Dora v. State, 957 

N.E.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 

802), trans. denied. Investigation of a tip is legitimate police activity so long as 

the investigation does not violate the federal constitution. Divello, 782 N.E.2d 

at 437-38.

[16] Furthermore, the west side of the house where Sergeant Durant situated himself

was an area where visitors, and police, would be expected to go. Thus,

Sergeant Durant’s visual observations through the window on the west side of 

the house were not a search, obviating the need for a search warrant. This was 

an area where people could be expected to go based on a variety of features of 

Hamilton’s property. There were two very wide sets of steps on each front 

corner of the property, and once a person had climbed those steps, the person 

would be on the wraparound porch and would be standing just a few feet from 

Hamilton’s front door. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 99. The wraparound porch 

itself was very wide, allowing easy access around the house, and had large deck 

chairs on two, perhaps even three sides of Hamilton’s home, suggesting to a 

visitor that he or she had free access to all sides of the home. Id. at 99-100, 103, 

105-06. The existence of a back door, which provided a third point of entry in 

Hamilton’s home, also suggested that visitors could be expected to walk around 

all sides of the house. Id. at 106. Furthermore, the home appeared have a 

fourth access point in the form of a large, double-paned sliding glass door. Id. 
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at 104. Hamilton argues that because there were no signs directing visitors to 

enter his home through any access point other than the front door, visitors 

would not be expected to walk on all sides of the home. However, the lack of 

signs indicating that visitors could not walk around the house – and the 

aforementioned characteristics of the house – support the reasonable inference 

that visitors could reasonably be expected to walk around all sides of 

Hamilton’s home. Id. at 99-106. 

[17] Hamilton claims that visitors rarely, if ever, actually entered his home via any 

means of entry other than his front door. Thus, he claims that the west side of 

the house where Sergeant Durant looked through a window and saw Johnson 

was not a place where people could be expected to go, and, therefore, Sergeant

Durant’s visual observations were an impermissible warrantless search. 

However, a place a person could reasonably be expected to go can be 

established by implication: “[A]n individual does not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy with regard to things or activities within a residence that 

may be observed by persons using their natural senses from places impliedly

open to a visitor’s entry.” Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 437 (emphasis added). 

Therefore, whether visitors actually entered Hamilton’s home through points of 

access other than the front door is immaterial. The question is whether the 

features of Hamilton’s home created an implication that visitors, and police 

officers such as Sergeant Durant, could be expected to walk around all sides of 

Hamilton’s home. We find that the evidence supports such an implication. 

Therefore, we reject Hamilton’s claims that Sergeant Durant’s visual 
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observations in the home were an impermissible warrantless search and that all 

evidence seized subsequent to Sergeant Durant’s visual observations should be 

suppressed as fruits of an illegal, warrantless search. 

II. 

Exigent Circumstances Allowed Entry into Hamilton’s Home

[18] Hamilton argues that the exigent circumstances rule did not allow the officers 

to enter his home because: 1) the officers had no right to enter the curtilage of 

his home; and 2) any exigent circumstances that may have arisen, such as the 

risk that Johnson would flee, were created by the officers’ illegal entry onto his 

curtilage and Sergeant Durant’s illegal warrantless search of Hamilton’s home

that occurred when Sergeant Durant looked through a window to see inside 

Hamilton’s home. 

[19] Under the exigent circumstances rule, a warrantless entry into a dwelling may 

be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of 

evidence, the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the 

police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 

U.S. 91, 100 (1990). The exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless 

search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable; that 

is, even if police behavior was the catalyst for the exigent circumstances, no 

warrant is required for the search as long as the police did not create the 

exigency by engaging in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. 

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011). 
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[20] Here, the situation was ripe for exigent circumstances because Johnson posed a 

potential threat to the officers; she was wanted on serious drug charges and had 

two arrest warrants because of probation violations. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 

70; Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. Given Johnson’s criminal history, Sergeant Durant 

understandably positioned himself on the west side of Hamilton’s house to 

thwart a potential escape by Johnson. Tr. Vol. 2 at 10. Actual exigent 

circumstances arose once Johnson realized that Sergeant Durant had seen her; 

she began to behave erratically, running to and fro in the house, coming near 

the shotgun in the bedroom, and eventually hiding in the closet. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2 at 71; Tr. Vol. 2 at 12-13, 18, 77. Before hiding in the bathroom, 

Johnson was in the bedroom with easy access to the shotgun that was tied to 

the bed. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71; Tr. Vol. 2 at 13, 33-34. Hamilton’s 

behavior also helped create exigent circumstances; he lied several times to the 

officers when he told them that Johnson was not in his home even though the 

officers knew otherwise. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 71; Tr. Vol. 2 at 14, 34. These 

factors created exigent circumstances in at least two ways: 1) they may have 

prompted Johnson to flee; and 2) they created a risk of danger to the officers as 

well as Hamilton and Johnson. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 100.

[21] Hamilton’s arguments that the officers’ conduct was not justified by exigent 

circumstances are unavailing. First, we can quickly reject Hamilton’s claim 

that the officers had no legal authority to enter Hamilton’s curtilage. In the 

previous section of this decision, we found that the officers did not violate 
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Hamilton’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering his curtilage or by looking 

into his home through a window. 

[22] Second, even if the officers’ actions triggered the exigent circumstances, they 

did not do so by engaging in conduct that violated the Fourth Amendment. See 

King, 563 U.S. at 462. The officers had the right to station themselves at 

various places on the wraparound porch and look through Hamilton’s 

windows. See id; see also Dora, 957 N.E.2d at 1052-53. Therefore, even if the 

officers’ actions prompted the exigent circumstances, their actions were not 

grounds to suppress the evidence because they did not engage in conduct that 

violated or threatened to violate the Fourth Amendment. See King, 563 U.S. at 

462. In sum, the officers’ entry into Hamilton’s home was justified by exigent 

circumstances. 8

[23] Affirmed.

9

Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.

8 Hamilton also argues that the consent he gave to the officers to search his house was not voluntary, arguing 

only that “the consent was a consequence of the prior illegal entry and thus cannot be considered voluntary.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 18. Because we have determined that the entry into Hamilton’s home did not violate his 

Fourth Amendment rights, this argument is without merit, and we need not address it at more length. 

9 Hamilton also argues that because the arrest warrant was for Johnson, not himself, the arrest warrant did 

not authorize entry into his home. Because we have determined that the officers’ entry into Hamilton’s 

home was justified by the exigent circumstances rule, we need not address this issue.