### F I LE D U. S . COURT OF AP PE ALS E LEVE NTH CI RCUI T Jul y 28, 2004 T HOM AS K. KAHN C L E RK [ P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 02- 16135

________________________ D. C . Do c k e tNo . 9 8 - 0 1 9 3 8 - C V- S - NE S H E R R I W I L L I A M S , B . J . B A I L E Y , P la in tif f s - A p p e lle e s , B E T T Y F A Y E H A G G E R M A K E R , e t a l., P la in tif f s , A L I C E J E A N C O P E , J A N E D O E , D E B O R A H L . C O O P E R , B E N N Y C O O P E R , D A N B A I L E Y , J A N E P O E , J A N E R O E , P la in tif f s - A p p e lle e s , v ersu s A T T O RN E Y G E N E R A L O F A L A B A M A , D e f e n d a n t- A p p e lla n t,Be causethe various user appe llees and vendor appe llees are all represented by the 1 AC LU, thedrivingfo rc ebehin d th is l iti g atio n, “ theAC LU”wi ll b eus e d to re fer c oll e c tiv e ly to appellee s. 2 T I M M O R G A N , in h is o f f ic ia l c a p a c ity a s th e D is tr ic t A tto r n e y o f

th e C o u n ty o f

M a d is o n , A la b a m a , D e f e n d a n t.

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e N o r th e r n D i s tr i c to f A l a b a ma

_________________________ ( Ju l y 28, 2004) B efo re B IR C H , B A R K E T T an d H IL L , C i rcu i tJu d g es. B IR C H , C i rc ui tJudg e: I n thi s c a s e , the A m e r i c a n C i vi l L i be r t i e s U ni on ( “ A C L U ” ) i nvi t e s us t o a dd 1 a n e w r ig h t to th e c u r r e n t c a ta lo g u e o f f u n d a m e n ta l r ig h ts u n d e rth e C o n s titu tio n : a r i ghtt o s e xua l pr i va c y . I tf ur the ra s ks us t o de c l a r e A l a ba m a ’ s s t a tut e pr ohi bi t i ng th e s a l e o f

“ s e x t o y s ” t o b e a n i mp e r mi s s i b l e b u r d e n o n th i s r i g h t . A l a b a ma re spon ds thatthe st atut e e xerc i se s at i m e- ho no re d u se of st at e pol i ce pow e r— r e s tr i c t i ng the s a l e of s e x. W e a r e c om pe l l e d t o a gr e e w i th A l a ba m a a nd m us tde c l i ne the A C L U ’ s i nvi t a t i on. I . B AC KG RO UN D3

A l ab am a’ s A n t i -O b scen i ty E n fo rcem en tA ctp ro h i b i t s, am o n g o th er th i n g s, the c om m e r c i a l di s tr i but i on of “ a ny de vi c e de s i gne d orm a r ke t e d a s us e f ul pri m ar i l y f

or the st i m ul at i on of hu m an geni t al organs for any thi ng of pecuni ary v a lu e .” A la . C o d e § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 .2 ( S u p p . 2 0 0 3 ) . T he A l abam a s t atut e prosc ri bes are l at i vel y narrow band w i dt h o f a ct i vi ty. It pr ohi bi t s onl y the s a l e — butnotthe us e , pos s e s s i on, orgr a tui t ous di s tr i but i on— of se xu al devi ce s ( i n fac t , the user s i nv ol ved i n t hi s l i t i gat i on ac kn ow l edge thatthey al re ady posse ss m ul t i pl e s ex t oys) . T he l aw do es no taf fe ctthe di stri bu t i on of a num be rof

othe rs e xua l pr oduc t s s uc h a s r i bbe d c ondom s orvi r i l i ty drugs . N or doe s i tpr ohi bi tA l a ba m a r e s i de nt s f r om pur c ha s i ng s e xua l de vi c e s outof s t a t e a nd br i ngi ng the m ba c k i nt o A l a ba m a . M or e ove r , the s t a tut e pe r m i t s the s a l e of or di na r y vi br a t or s a nd body m a s s a ge r s tha t , a l though us e f ul a s s e xua l a i ds , a r e not

“ de s i gne d orm a r ke t e d . . . pr i m a r i l y ” f ortha tpa r t i c ul a rpurpos e . I d. F i na l l y , the st atut e e xem pt s s al es of se xu al devi ce s “ for a bo na fi de m edi ca l , sc i ent i fi c, e duc a t i ona l , l e gi s l a t i ve , j udi c i a l , orl a w e nf or c e m e ntpurpos e . ” I d. § 13A - 12- 2 0 0 .4 . T h i s case, w h i ch i s n o w b efo re u s o n ap p eal fo r th e seco n d t i m e, i n v o l v es a c ha l l e nge t o the c ons t i tut i ona l i ty of the A l a ba m a s t a tut e . T he A C L U , on be ha l f of va r i ous i ndi vi dua l us e r s a nd ve ndor s of s e xua l de vi c e s , i ni t i a l l y f i l e d s ui ts e e ki ngTh eAC LU also inv oke s th eF ir st, F ourt h, F if th, and Ninth Am e ndme nts . 2 4 t o e nj oi n the s t a tut e on 29 J ul y 1998, a m onth a f t e rthe s t a tut e t ook e f

f e c t . T he A C L U a r g u e d th a t th e s ta tu te b u r d e n s a n d v io la te s s e x u a l- d e v ic e u s e r s ’ r ig h t to pri vacy and p er sonal aut on om y und erthe F ou rt ee nt h A m endm entt o t he U ni t ed S t a t e s C ons t i tut i on. 2 F ol l ow i ng a be nc h tr i a l , the di s tr i c tc our tc onc l ude d tha tthe r e w a s no c ur r e nt l y r e c ogni z e d f

unda m e nt a l r i ghtt o us e s e xua l de vi c e s a nd de c l i ne d the A C L U ’ s i nvi t a t i on t o c r e a t e s uc h a r i ght . W i l l i a m s v. P r y or , 41 F . S upp. 2d. 1257, 1 2 8 2 - 8 4 ( N .D .A la . 1 9 9 9 ) ( W illia m s I ) . T h e d is tr ic t c o u r t th e n p r o c e e d e d to s c rut i ni z e the s t a tut e unde rr a t i ona l ba s i s r e vi e w . I d. a t1284. C onc l udi ng tha tthe s ta tu te la c k e d a n y r a tio n a l b a s is , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t p e r m a n e n tly e n jo in e d its e nf or c e m e nt . I d. a t1293. O n a ppe a l , w e r e ve r s e d i n pa r ta nd a f f i r m e d i n pa r t . W i l l i a m s v. P r y or , 240 F .3 d 9 4 4 (1 1 th C ir. 2 0 0 1 ) ( W il li am s I I) . W e r ev er se d th e d istrict co u rt’s c onc l us i on tha tthe s t a tut e l a c ke d a r a t i ona l ba s i s a nd he l d tha tthe pr om ot i on a nd p r e s e r v a t i o n o f

p u b l i c m o r a l i ty p r o v i d e d a r a t i o n a l b a s i s . I d . a t9 5 2 . Ho we v e r , we affi rm ed th e d i stri ctco u rt ’ s rej ect i o n o f th e A C L U ’ s f ac i al f u n d a m e n ta l- r ig h ts chal l enge t o t he st atut e. Id. at95 5. W e then rem anded t he ac t i on t o t he di stri ct5

courtfor f

urther c on si dera t i on of the as-app l i ed f unda m e nt a l - r i ght s c ha l l e nge . I d. a t955. O n r e m a nd, the di s tr i c tc our ta ga i n s truc k dow n the s t a tut e . W i l l i a m s v. P r y or , 220 F . S upp. 2d 1257 ( N . D . A l a . 2002) ( W i l l i a m s I I I ) . O n c r os s m ot i ons f or s u m m a r y ju d g m e n t, th e d is tr ic t c o u r t h e ld th a t th e s ta tu te u n c o n s titu tio n a lly bu rdened the ri gh tt o u se se xu al devi ce s w i thi n p ri vat e a du l t , consensual se xu al r e l a t i ons hi ps . I d. A f

t e ra l e ngthy di s c us s i on of the hi s t or y of

s e x i n A m e r i c a , the di s tr i c tc our ta nnounc e d a f unda m e nt a l r i ghtt o “ s e xua l pr i va c y , ” w hi c h, a l though unr e c ogni z e d unde ra ny e xi s t i ng S upr e m e C our tpr e c e de nt , the di s tr i c tc our tf ound t o be de e pl y r oot e d i n the hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i ons of ourna t i on. I d. a t1296. T he di stri ctcourtfurther f

ou nd thatthi s r i gh t“ encom pass [e s] the ri gh tt o u se se xu al de vi c e s l i ke the vi br a t or s , di l dos , a na l be a ds , a nd a r t i f i c i a l va gi na s ” m a r ke t e d by the vend ors i nv ol ved i n t hi s c as e. Id. T he di stri ctcourtac cordi ng l y app l i ed stri ct sc rut i ny t o t he st atut e. Id. F i nd i ng thatthe st atut e f ai l ed stri ctsc rut i ny, the di stri ct c our tgr a nt e d s um m a r y j udgm e ntt o the A C L U a nd onc e a ga i n e nj oi ne d the s ta tu te ’s e n f

o r c e m e n t. I d . a t 1 3 0 7 . A la b a m a n o w a p p e a ls th a t d e c is io n . T h e o n ly q u e s tio n o n th is a p p e a l is w he the rthe s t a tut e , a s a ppl i e d t o the i nvol ve d us e r s a nd ve ndor s , vi ol a t e s a nyAs a thre sh old matter, Al a

bama a lso argue s th at th edis tric t c ourt la c ke d ju ri sdic tio n to 3 hear the ca se bec ause thevendors a nd users do not havestandingto sue. The district cour t prop e rly c on c lude d th at vendor s and us e rs havesh own a

high p roba

bil ity of su ff e ringa le g a lly c ogniza bleinj ur y a s re su lt o f t

hestatut eand

thu s h avede mon strate d s tanding , a nd wea do pt i ts analysis in thi s reg ard. Williams I II , 220 F. Supp.2d at 1267-73. 6 f unda m e nt a l r i ghtpr ot e c t e d unde rthe C ons t i tut i on. T he pr ope ra na l y s i s f or 3 e v a lu a tin g th is q u e s tio n tu r n s o n w h e th e rth e r ig h t a s s e r te d b y th e A C L U f a lls w ith in th e p a r a m e te r s o f a n y p r e s e n tly r e c o g n iz e d f u n d a m e n ta l r ig h t o rw h e th e rit in s te a d r e q u ir e s u s to r e c o g n iz e a h ith e r to u n a r tic u la te d f u n d a m e n ta l r ig h t. I I . DI S CUS S I ON W e r evi ew a s um m ary j ud gm entdeci si on de no vo and app l y the sa m e l egal s t a nda r d us e d by the di s tr i c tc our t . N a t ' l P a r ks C ons e r va t i on A s s ' n v. N or t on, 324 F . 3d 1229, 1236 ( 11th C i r . 2003) . O urde novo r e vi e w be gi ns w i th a di s c us s i on of the as se rt ed ri gh t . H er e, w e r ea ff i rm ou r c on cl usi on i n W i l l i am s I I, 24 0 F . 3d at 95 4, thatno S up re m e C ou rtprec edent s, i ncl ud i ng the re ce ntdeci si on i n L aw re nce v. T e xa s , ___ U . S . ___, 123 S . C t . 2472 ( 2003) , a r e de c i s i ve on the que s t i on of the exi st ence of such a r i gh t . B ec ause the A C L U i s a ski ng us t o rec og ni ze a new f unda m e nt a l r i ght , w e the n a ppl y the a na l y s i s r e qui r e d by W a s hi ngt on v. G l uc ks be r g, 521 U . S . 702, 117 S . C t . 2258 ( 1997) . A s w e e xpl a i n, w e c onc l ude th a t th e a s s e r te d r ig h t d o e s n o t c le a rth e G lu c k s b e r g b a r .7

A . A s s e r t e d R i g ht T he D ue P r oc e s s C l a us e of the F our t e e nth A m e ndm e ntpr ovi de s tha tno S t a t e s ha l l “ de pr i ve a ny pe r s on of l i f e , l i be r ty , orpr ope r ty w i thoutdue pr oc e s s of l aw . ” T h e m o stfam i l i ar fu n ct i o n o f th i s C l au se i s t o g u aran t ee p ro ced u ral fai rn ess i n t he cont extof any depri vat i on of l i fe , l i berty, or prop er ty by the S t at e. T he user s a n d v e n d o r s h e r e d o n o t c la im to h a v e b e e n d e n ie d p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e s s . In st ead , th ey rel y o n th e D u e P ro cess C l au se’ s substan t i ve com po nent , w hi ch co u rt s h av e l o n g reco g n i zed as p ro v i d i n g “ h ei g h t en ed p ro t ect i o n ag ai n st go vernm enti nt er fe re nce w i th cer t ai n fun dam ent al ri gh t s a nd l i berty i nt er es t s. ” T r oxe l v. G r a nvi l l e , 530 U . S . 57, 65, 120 S . C t . 2054, 2060 ( 2000) ( c i t a t i on o m itte d ) . T h e A C L U arg u es th atth e u se o f sex u al d ev i c es i s am o n g th o se ac t i vi t i es th at , al tho ug h n otenum er at ed i n t he C on st i tut i on , ar e p r o t ect ed u n d er th e co n cep t o f su b st an t i v e d u e p ro cess. A cco rd i n g to t h e A C L U , the S t a t e of A l a ba m a , thr ough i t s pr ohi bi t i on on the c om m e r c i a l di s tr i but i on of s e x t oy s qua s e x t oy s , ha s i ntrude d i nt o the m o st i n t i m a t e of

pl a c e s — the be dr oom s of i t s c i t i z e ns — a nd the l a w f ul s e xua l c onduc ttha toc c ur s the r e i n. W hi l e t h e st a tut e ’ s r e a c h doe s not di r e c t l y pr os c r i be the s e xua l c onduc ti n que s t i on, i tpl aces— w i thout j us t i f i c a t i on— a s ubst an t i a l a nd undue bur de n on the a bi l i ty of the pl a i nt i f f s t o obt a i n de vi c e s r e gul a t ed b y t he s t a tut e . B y r e s tr i c t i ng s a l e s o f t h es e de vi c e s t o pl a i nt i f f s , A l aba m a ha s a c t e d i n vi ol a t i on of the fund am ent al ri gh t s of pri vacy and p er sonal au t on om y thatprot ec t a n i ndi vi dua l ’ s l a w f

ul s e xua l pr a c t i c e s gua r a n t eed by the F i r s t , F our th, F ifth , N i nt h, and F ou rt ee nt h A m endm ent s of the U ni t ed S t at es C ons t i tut i on.8

W i l l i am s I II , at12 61 (quo t i ng the A C L U ’ s a m ended com pl ai nt ). T he A C L U i nv ok es “ pri vacy ” a nd “ pers on al aut on om y” as i f s uch p hras es w er e c on st i tut i on al t al i sm ans. In the abstra ct , ho w ever , there i s no fun dam ent al r i ghtt o e i the r . S e e , e . g. , G l uc ks be r g, 521 U . S . a t725, 117 S . C t . a t2270 (f un dam ent al ri gh t s a re “ no tsi m pl y deduced from abstra ctconcept s of per sonal aut on om y” ). U nd ou bt edl y, m any f un dam ent al ri gh t s c urre nt l y r ec og ni ze d u nd er S u p r e m e C o u r t p r e c e d e n t to u c h o n m a tte r s o f p e r s o n a l a u to n o m y a n d p r iv a c y . H o w ev er, “ [t ] h atm an y o f th e ri g h t s an d l i b ert i es p ro t ect ed b y th e D u e P ro cess C l ause soun d i n p er sonal aut on om y does notw arra ntthe sw ee pi ng concl usi on that any a nd al l i m po rt ant , i nt i m at e, and p er sonal deci si on s a re so prot ec t ed. ” I d. at 727, 117 S . C t . a t2271. S uc h r i ght s ha ve be e n de nom i na t e d “ f unda m e nt a l ” not s i m pl y be c a us e the y i m pl i c a t e de e pl y pe r s ona l a nd pr i va t e c ons i de r a t i ons , but be c a us e the y ha ve be e n i de nt i f i e d a s “ de e pl y r oot e d i n thi s N a t i on’ s hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on a nd i m pl i c i ti n the c onc e ptof or de r e d l i be r ty , s uc h tha tne i the rl i be r ty nor j us t i c e w oul d e xi s ti f

the y w e r e s a c r i f

i c e d. ” I d. a t720- 21, 117 S . C t . a t2268 (i nt ernal ci t at i on s a nd qu ot at i on m arks om i tt ed). N o r, co n trar y to th e A C L U ’s as se rtio n , h av e th e S u p re m e C o u rt’s subst ant i ve-due-proces s pre ce dent s r ec og ni ze d a fr ee -s t andi ng “ ri gh tt o sexual p ri v acy. ” T h e C o u rth as b een p resen t ed w i th rep eat ed o p p o rtu n i t i es t o i d en t i fy aSee Tr. of Oral Argument, No. 02-102, at *4; Br. of the ACLU et al. a s Amici Curiae, 4 No. 02-102, at *11-25. 9 fund am ent al ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy— and h as i nv ar i abl y dec l i ned. S ee , e. g. , C ar ey v. P opul a t i on S e r vs . I nt ’ l , 431 U . S . 678, 688 n. 5, 97 S . C t . 2010, 2018 n. 5 ( 1977) (not i ng thatthe C ou rt“ has notdefi ni t i vel y a nsw er ed the di ff i cul tqu es t i on w hether a n d to w h a t e x te n t th e C o n s titu tio n p r o h ib its s ta te s ta tu te s r e g u la tin g p r iv a te consensual se xu al behavi or am on g adu l t s, and w e do n otpu rportt o answ erthat que s t i on now ” ) ( i nt e r na l c i t a t i on a nd punc tua t i on om i t t e d) . A l though m a ny of the C ou rt ’ s “ pri vacy ” dec i si on s have i m pl i ca t ed se xu al m att er s, se e, e. g. , P l anned P a r e nthood v. C a s e y , 505 U . S . 833, 112 S . C t . 2791 ( 1992) ( a bor t i on) ; C a r e y , 431 U . S . at67 8, 97 S . C t . at20 10 (c on tra ce pt i ves) , the C ou rthas neveri nd i ca t ed that th e m ere fact th atan act i v i ty i s sex u al an d p ri v at e en t i t l es i tt o p ro t ect i o n as a f u n d a m e n ta l r ig h t. T he S up re m e C ou rt ’ s m ostre ce ntop po rtun i ty t o rec og ni ze a f un dam ent al ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy ca m e i n L aw re nce v. T exas , w here pet i t i on er s a nd am i ci e xpr e s s l y i nvi t e d the c our tt o do s o. T ha tthe L a w r e nc e C our tha d de c l i ne d the 4 i nvi t a t i on w a s thi s c our t ’ s c onc l us i on i n ourr e c e ntde c i s i on i n L of t on v. S e c . of D ept . of C hi l dren and F am i l y S ervs. , 35 8 F . 3d 80 4, 81 5-16 (11t h C i r. 20 04 ). In L oft on , w e a dd re ss ed i n som e det ai l the “ qu es t i on of w hether L aw re nce i dent i fi edSee also L ofton v. Sec' y of the Dep' t of Children and F amily Servs., __ F.3d __, * 22-32 5 (11th Cir. 2004) (B irch, J., specially concur ringin denial of rehearing en banc) . L of ton state d in re le va nt p art : 6 We a

repa rtic ula rly he sitant to inf

e r a new f un dame ntal libert

y int e re st from an opinion whoselanguag e and r ea s o n ing a re inc onsistent with st andard fundamental-right s an al y sis. The Court has noted that it must “exercise the utmo s t care wh enever [it is ] asked to break new ground” in the f ield of fu nd ame ntal rights , whic h is pre c ise ly wh at th e L awrenc epe tition e rs and the ir amici curiaehad aske d the Court to do. T h at th e Court declined the invitation is ap pare nt f

ro m th ea

bs e nc eof

the" tw o p rimary

fe ature s" of

fu nd ame ntalrights analysis in it s opinion. First, the L awrenceopinion contai n s v i rtu all y no inquiry into the question of whether th e petitioners’ asser

ted right is one of " tho sefu nd ame ntal right s and

lib e rtie s whic h a

re , o bje c tiv e ly , d e eply

ro ote d in th i s N at i o n ' s h i s t o r

y an d tr a di t i o nan d

i mp l i c i ti nth ec o n c ep to f o rd e r e d l ib e rty, such that neither

liberty nor justice would exist i f they were sacri fi ced." Sec ond, the opinion notably

never p ro v i d es the " ' careful de scription' of the a sserted fu nd ame ntal libert

y int e re st" that is to ac c omp any fu nd ame ntal- ri ghts analy sis. Rather, the c onstitut ional lib erty i ntere sts on which the Court relied w ere inv oke d, no t w ith" c are ful de sc ripti on ," but w ithsw e epingg e nerali ty . M os t signific ant, however, i s th e fa ct that the L awrenceCourt never applied strict scrutiny , the proper st an d ar d when f undamental rights a

re implicate d, but ins te a d invalidated theTe xas s tatut eon ratio nal- ba sis gro un ds , h oldingthat it " fu rt hers no leg itimate state interest whic h can justify its intru s i o ninto the pers on al andpri vat e li fe of th e in di vi du al. "

10 a new fund am ent al ri gh tt o p ri vat e s exual i nt i m ac y. ” Id. at81 5. W e c on cl ud ed 5 that , al tho ug h L aw re nce c l ea rl y e st abl i shed the un const i tut i on al i ty of c ri m i nal proh i bi t i on s on con se nsual adul tsodo m y, “ i ti s astra i ned and ul t i m at el y i ncorrec t re adi ng of L aw re nce t o i nt erpreti tt o ann ou nce a new fund am ent al r i g h t ”

— w h e th e rt o h o mo s e x u a l s o d o my s p e c i f i c a l l y o r , mo r e b r o a d l y , t o a l l f o r ms of s e xua l i nt i m a c y . I d. a t817. W e not e d i n pa r t i c ul a rtha tthe L a w r e nc e opi ni on d id n o t e m p lo y f

u n d a m e n ta l- r ig h ts a n a ly s is a n d th a t it u ltim a te ly a p p lie d r a tio n a lba s i s r e vi e w , r a the rtha n s tr i c ts c rut i ny , t o the c ha l l e nge d s t a tut e . I d. a t816- 17. 6I d. at 816-17 (inter nal citations omitted). The dissent argues that certain dec larations of the L awrenceCourt signal a fundamental 7 right, for example: “the DueProcess Clause ha s a substantive dimension of fundamental signif ic anc ein de finingtheri ghts of thepers on ,”L awre nc e , 1 23 S. Ct . at 24 77 (emph a sis added) ; dissent at ___; and that “liberty g ives substantial protection to adult per sons in deciding how to conduct their private live s in matters pertaining to s ex, ” id. at 2480 (emphasis added) ; dissent at ___. However, neither of these quote d excerpts from L awrencesupport such a broad proposition when re ad in context. The first quotation comes from the L awrenceCourt’s sy no ps is o f Roe , whic h it

me nti on e d in

its surv e y

of theprivac y

c a se s p re c e dingB ow e rs . 1 23 S. Ct. at 2477 (“Roe re cognized the right of a woma n to make certain funda

mental dec isions aff ectingher de stiny

and conf irmed oncemore that the protection of liberty under theDue Process Clause ha s a substantive dimension of fundamental significanc e in def ining the rights of the per son.”). Thesecond c omes from the Court’s discussion of howBow ers overstated the leg al and historical condemnation of homosexual conduct, f ailing to recognize the “emerg ing awa rene ss that liberty

g ives substantial protection to adult per sons in decidinghow to conduct the ir privateliv e s in

matters perta iningto s e x.”I d. at 24 80 (“ Th is eme rg ingre c ognition sh ould have be en appa

rent when Bow ers wa s decide d.”). It is telli ngthat the best support for the fundamental-right-to-sexual-intimacy interpre tation of L awrencemust be assembled from bits of dic ta . It is equally telling the dissent cites no languag e from the opinion—much less languag e ar ticulating a

rule of la w—that states with any prec ision the right that L awrencepurportedly held to exis t, or the standard of review that it trigg ers. Instead, the dissent c haracterizes our analysis as “deme aningand dismissive” yet fares little better in its attempt to overstate the e ffe ct of the A labama la w on the day-to-day sexual activities of consentingadults in their homes. 11 T he di s s e nts e i z e s on s c a t t e r e d d ic ta fr om L aw re nce t o argue thatL aw re nce r e c o g n iz e d a s u b s ta n tiv e d u e p r o c e s s r ig h t o f c o n s e n tin g a d u lts to e n g a g e in p r iv a te i nt i m at e s exual cond uct , such thatal l i nfri ng em ent s of thi s r i gh tm ustbe subj ec t ed t o stri ctsc rut i ny. A s w e not ed i n L oft on , w e a re no tprepare d t o i nfera new 7 fund am ent al ri gh tfr om an op i ni on thatnever emp l oyed the usual G l ucksberg anal ys i s f

or i dent i fy i ng such ri gh t s. Id. at81 6. N or ar e w e pre pare d t o ass um e that G l uc ks be r g— a pr e c e de nttha tL a w r e nc e ne ve ronc e m e nt i ons — i s ove r rul e d by im p lic a tio n .Contrary to the dissent's accusation that “[t ]he majority ref uses . . . to acknow ledg e why 8 the Court in L awrenceheld that criminal prohibiti ons on consensual sodomy are unconstitutional,” we have re fused to do no such thing . What we haveref used to do, as we sug g est the dissent has done, is to createa rationale that was not a rticulated a s to the “why” for therulin g . Theop e rativ ele g a l c on c lus ion tha t w ec ometo a s a

ba sis fo r t

hede c isi on

in L awrenceis that Texas's sodomy prohibition did notfurther a leg itimate state interest. L awrence , 539 U.S. __, __, 123 S. C t. 2472, 2484; L ofton v. Sec. of D ep' t of Children and Family Servs., __ F.3d __, __ ( 11th Cir. 2004) (B irch, J., specially concur ringin denial of rehe aringen banc ). We appre ciate that the dissent does not agreewith our analy sis, but we have not “re fused”to answer

the dissent' s question—notably , nobody else in the litigation has posed the question. Th edis sent also fl atly

state s th at th eL awrenc eCourt re je c te d p ub licmora lity

a s a le g iti matestateint e re st that c an ju sti fy c rimin a lizingprivatec on sens ual se xua l c on du c t, b ut t his conclusion ignores the obvious diff erence in what this st atute for bids and the prohibitions of the Texas statute. Thereis nothing “private” or “consensual” a

bout the adver

tising and sale of a dildo. And such advertising a nd sale is just as likely

to be exhibit ed to children as to “c onsenting 12 T h e d i ssen ti n tu rn arg u es th atth e ri g h treco g n i zed i n L aw ren ce w as a l ongs t a ndi ng r i ghttha tpr e e xi s t e d L a w r e nc e , thus obvi a t i ng the ne e d f ora ny G l uc ks be r g- ty pe f

unda m e nt a l r i ght s a na l y s i s . B utthe di s s e ntne ve ri de nt i f i e s the source , t extual or prec edent i al , of such a pree xi st i ng ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy . It d o es ci t e G ri sw o l d , E i sen st ad t , R o e, an d C arey. H o w ev er, al th o u g h th ese p reced en t s reco g n i ze v ari o u s su b st an t i v e ri g h t s closel y r elat ed t o sex u al i n t i m acy, n o n e o f th e m r e c o g n iz e th e o v e r a r c h in g r ig h t to s e x u a l p r iv a c y a s s e r te d h e r e . G r i s w ol d, ( m a r i t a l pr i va c y a nd c ontr a c e pt i ve s ) ; E i s e ns t a dt( e qua l pr ot e c t i on ext ensi on of G ri sw ol d); R oe (abo rt i on ); C ar ey (c on tra ce pt i ves) . A s w e not ed abov e, i n t he m ostre ce ntof these deci si on s, C ar ey , the C ou rtspec i fi ca l l y observed th a t it h a d n o t a n s w e r e d th e q u e s tio n o f w h e th e rth e r e is a c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t to pri vat e s exual cond uct . 43 1 U . S . at68 8 n . 5, 97 S . C t . at20 18 n. 5. M oreover, 8adults.” More over, theSupreme Court has noted on repeated occ asions that laws ca n be base d on moral judgments. See B arne s v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991) (upholding a

public indecency

statute, stating, “ This and other public inde cenc y statutes werede signe d to prote c t mo rals a nd pu bli c order. Th etra dition a l po lic epo wer o f t heState s is de fine d a s th ea

uth ority to p ro videfo r t

hepu bli c he a lth , s a fety , a

nd mora ls, and

wehaveup he ld such a ba sis for leg islation”); id. (noting that “a leg islature could leg itimately act . . . to prote ct ‘the social interest in order and morality ’”) (citation omission); Greg gv. Georg ia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S. Ct . 2909, 2930 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding thedeath penalty , noting that “ca pital punishment is an expression of soc iety ’s moral outrag e at pa rticularly offensive conduct” ); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61, 93 S . Ct. 2628, 2637 (1973) (holding that Georg ia had a

leg itimate interest in regulating obsc ene material be causethe leg islature “could leg itimately

act . . . to prote ct ‘the soc ial interest in order and morality ’”) (quotingRoth v. Unite d St ate s, 35 4 U .S. 47 6, 48 5, 77 S. Ct 13 04 , 1 30 9 ( 19 57 )) ; Unit e d St ate s v . B a ss, 40 4 U .S. 336, 348, 92 S. Ct . 515, 522 (1971) (noting that “ criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community”). I n addition, our own re cent prece dent has unequivocally

aff irmed the fur

thera nce of public morality

as a le g itimate state interest. See , e.g ., Willi ams v . Pr

yor , 2 40 F .3 d 9 44 , 9 49 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 1) (“ Th ec ra ftingand sa fe gua rdingof pu bli c morality has longbeen a

n established par

t of the States’ plena

ry police power to leg islate and indisputably

is a leg itimate government intere st under rational basis scrutiny .”); seealso id. at 949 n.3 (“In fac t, the State’s intere st in publi c morality is sufficiently

substantial to satisfy

the g overnment’s burden under the morerig orous intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny applicablein some case s.”). Onewould expect the Supreme Court to be ma nifestly more specificand ar

ticulate than it was in L awrenceif now such a traditional and significant j uri s p ru d ent i al p ri n ci p al h as b ee nj ett i s o n edwh o l es al e ( wi thal ld u e r es p ec tt o Ju s t i ce S ca l i a's ominous diss ent notwithstanding) . 13 ne a r l y tw o de c a de s l a t e r , the G l uc ks be r g C our t , l i s t i ng the c ur r e ntc a t a l og of fund am ent al ri gh t s, di d n oti ncl ud e s uch a ri gh t . 52 1 U . S . at72 0, 11 7 S . C t . at 2267. In sh o rt , w e d ecl i n e t o ex trap o l at e fro m L aw ren ce an d i t s d ic ta a r ig h t to se xu al pri vacy tri gg er i ng stri ctsc rut i ny. T o d o so w ou l d b e t o i m po se a f u n d a m e n ta l- r ig h ts in te rp r e ta tio n o n a d e c is io n th a t r e s te d o n r a tio n a l- b a s is grou nd s, thatnever engaged i n G l ucksberg anal ys i s, and t hatnever i nv ok ed stri ct sc rut i ny. M oreover, i tw ou l d b e a nsw er i ng qu es t i on s thatthe L aw re nce C ou rtThe dissent indicate s that “even under themajority ’s own constrained interpretation of 9 L awrence , we a

re, at a bare minimum, obli g ed to re visit [ our] previous conclusion in Wil liams v. Pryor, 240 F .3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001) (“ Wil liams I I ”)”that this law has a rational basis in light of L awre nc e ’s ov e rr

ulingof B ow e rs and

our re lia nc ein Wi lli ams II“ on

theno w d e fu

nc t Bo we rsto concludethat public morality provides a le g itimate state interest.”Dissent at ___. We agree with the dissent that, on remand, thedistrict court, af ter c onsideringthe appropriate submissions of thepa rtie s, may e xamine“ wh e ther o ur

ho ldingin Wi lli ams IItha t A la bama ’s law h a s a rational ba sis (e.g ., public morality) remains g ood law now that B ower s has been overr uled.” I d. at ___, n.25. We save f

or a later da

y consideration of whether Justice Scalia’ s ominous (and perha ps ominous) predication that public morality may no longer ser

ve as a rational ba sis for leg islation after L awrence . 14 ap p ears t o h av e l eftfo r an o th er d ay. O f co u rse, th e C o u rtm ay i n d u e co u rse e xpa nd L a w r e nc e ’ s pr e c e de nti n the di r e c t i on a nt i c i pa t e d by the di s s e nt . B utf orus p r e e m p tiv e ly to ta k e th a t s te p w o u ld e x c e e d o u rm a n d a te a s a lo w e rc o u r t. 9 B . G lu c ks b e r g A n a ly s is B e c a us e the A C L U i s s e e ki ng r e c ogni t i on of a r i ghtne i the rm e nt i one d i n the C ons t i tut i on nore nc om pa s s e d w i thi n the r e a c h of the S upr e m e C our t ’ s e xi s t i ng fund am ent al -r i gh tprec edent s, w e m ustturn t o t he tw o-st ep anal yt i ca l fr am ew ork thatthe C ou rthas e st abl i shed for e val uat i ng new fund am ent al -r i gh t s c l ai m s. S ee G l u ck sb erg , 5 2 1 U . S . at7 2 0 -2 1 , 1 1 7 S . C t . at2 2 6 8 . F i rst , i n an al yzi n g a req u est f o rr e c o g n i t i o n o f

a n e w f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t , o re x t e n s i o n o f a n e x i s t i n g o n e , we

“ m us tbe gi n w i th a c a r e f ul de s c r i pt i on of

the a s s e r t e d r i ght . ” R e no v. F l or e s , 507 U . S . 292, 302, 113 S . C t . 1439, 1447 ( 1993) ; s e e a l s o G l uc ks be r g, 521 U . S . a t721, 1 1 7 S . C t. a t 2 2 6 8 . S e c o n d , a n d m o s t c r itic a lly , w e m u s t d e te r m in e w h e th e rth is as se rt ed ri gh t , ca re ful l y des cr i bed, i s one of “ tho se fund am ent al ri gh t s a nd l i bert i es15

w hi c h a r e , obj e c t i ve l y , de e pl y r oot e d i n thi s N a t i on' s hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on, a nd im p lic it in th e c o n c e p t o f o r d e r e d lib e r ty , s u c h th a t n e ith e rlib e r ty n o rju s tic e w o u ld e xi s ti f the y w e r e s a c r i f

i c e d. ” G l uc ks be r g, 521 U . S . a t720- 21, 117 S . C t . a t2268 (i nt ernal ci t at i on s a nd qu ot at i on m arks om i tt ed). T h i s an al ysi s, as th e S u p rem e C o u rth as stressed , m u stp ro ceed w i th “ u tm o st ca re ” bec ause of the dang er s i nh er enti n t he process of el evat i ng extra -t extual r i ght s t o c ons t i tut i ona l s t a tus , the r e by r e m ovi ng the m f r om the de m oc r a t i c f

i e l d of p l ay: B y e x te n d in g c o n s titu tio n a l p r o te c tio n to a n a s s e r te d r ig h t o rlib e r ty i nt e r e s t , w e , t o a gr e a te xt e nt , pl a c e the m a t t e rout s i de th e aren a of publ i c de ba t e a nd l e gi s l a t i ve a c t i on. W e m u stthe r e f or e e xe r c i s e the utm os tc a r e w he ne ve rw e are as ke d t o br e a k ne w gr ound i n thi s f i e l d, le s t th e lib e r ty p r o te c te d b y th e D u e P r o c e s s C la u s e b e s u b tly tr a n s f o r m e d in to th e p o lic y p r e f e r e n c e s o f

th e m e m b e r s o f

th is C o u r t. I d . a t 7 2 0 , 1 1 7 S . C t. a t 2 2 6 7 - 6 8 ( in te r n a l c ita tio n s a n d q u o ta tio n m a r k s o m itte d ) . T h e m a n d a te to p r o c e e d c a r e f u lly a p p lie s w ith a d d e d f o r c e w h e n v e n tu r in g in to t e r r a i n wh e r e th e S u p r e m e C o u r ti t s e l f h a s tr e a d l i g h t l y , a s i th a s h e r e . As we e xpl a i n, the di s tr i c tc our tf a i l e d t o e xe r c i s e thi s “ utm os tc a r e ” i n c onduc t i ng the tw o - p r o n g e d G lu c k s b e r g a n a ly s is . 1. C a r e f ul D e s c r i pt i on A s w e n o te d in W illia m s I I , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s in itia l o p in io n “n a r r o w ly f r a m e d th e a n a ly s is a s th e q u e s tio n w h e th e rth e c o n c e p t o f a c o n s titu tio n a llyAlthough our Wil liams I Iopinion indicated from the outse t that the district court’s 10 ini tial na rrowframin gof

theri ght w a s th eprop e r a pp ro a c h, 24 0 F .3 d at 95 3, weno tetha t it cre ated a degreeof ambiguity

by makinga subsequent shorthand re ferenceto this right as “ a fun d am ent al ri ghtt o s ex u al p ri v ac y , ” i d . at9 5 5 . Itap p ears th atth i s i mp re ci s i o ni no ur l an gu age was, at least in part, the sourc e of thedistrict court’s over-broad framingof the right on remand. Wil liams I II , 220 F.Supp.2d at 1276. 16 prot ec t ed ri gh tt o p ri vacy prot ec t s a n i nd i vi du al ’ s l i berty t o u se se xu al devi ce s w hen eng agi ng i n l aw ful , pri vat e, se xu al ac t i vi ty. ” 240 F . 3d at95 3 (i nt ernal qu ot at i on m arks om i t t ed). O n app ea l , w e a ff i rm ed thi s f

orm ul at i on , st at i ng that

“ the di stri ctcourtcorr ec t l y f ra m ed the fund am ent al ri gh t s a nal ys i s i n t hi s c as e. ” I d. H ow e ve r , on r e m a nd, the di s tr i c tc our ta ba ndone d i t s i ni t i a l , c a r e f ul f r a m i ng of the i ss ue and i nst ea d charac t er i ze d t he as se rt ed ri gh tm ore broadl y a s ageneral i ze d “r ig h t to s e x u a l p r iv a c y .” W illia m s I I I , 2 2 0 F .S u p p .2 d a t 1 2 7 7 ( e m p h a s is om i t t ed). 10 I n s e a r c hi ng f

or , a nd ul t i m a t e l y f

i ndi ng, thi s r i ghtt o s e xua l pr i va c y , the di stri ctcourtdi d l i t t l e t o d ef i ne i t s s cope and b ou nd s. A s f orm ul at ed by the di stri ct co u rt , th e ri g h tp o t en t i al l y en co m p asses a g reatu n i v erse o f sex u al act i v i t i es, i ncl ud i ng m any thathi st ori ca l l y have been, and con t i nu e t o b e, proh i bi t ed. A toral a r gum e nt s , the A C L U c ont e nde d tha t“ no r e s pons i bl e c ouns e l ” w oul d c ha l l e nge p r o h ib itio n s s u c h a s th o s e a g a in s t p e d e r a s ty a n d a d u lt in c e s t u n d e ra “r ig h t to se xu al pri vacy ” theory. H ow ever , m er e f ai th i n t he re spon si bi l i ty of the barAs Thomas Jeffer son noted, " In questions of power , then, let no more beheard of 11 con fi den ce i n m an, but b in d h imdo wn f rommi sch ief

by th e chai ns of the C on st itut io n. " Th oma s Jef

fers on , D ra ft

Kentu c ky

Re so lution s, 17 98 . A lth ough u su a lly inv oke d in

sli ghtly different contexts, thi s principle—that, in our republican system, we do not entrust c onstitut ional limit ations to human g ood will or self-restraint—has e qual forc e here. 17 s c a r c e l y pr ovi de s a l e ga l l y c ogni z a bl e , orc ons t i tut i ona l l y s i gni f i c a nt , l i m i t i ng p ri n ci p l e i n ap p l yi n g th e ri g h ti n fu tu re cases. 11 T he s ol e l i m i t a t i on pr ovi de d by the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s rul i ng w a s tha tthe r i ght w oul d e xt e nd onl y t o c o n s e n tin ga du lts . I d . a t 1 2 9 4 . T h e c o n s e n tin g - a d u lt f o r m u la , o f

c o u r s e , is a c o r o lla r y to J o h n S tu a r t M ill’s c e le b r a te d “h a r m p r in c ip le ,” w hi ch w ou l d al l ow the st at e t o p rosc ri be on l y c on du ctthatca uses i dent i fi abl e har m to a n o th e r . S e e g e n e r a lly J o h n S tu a r t M ill, O n L ib e r ty ( E liz a b e th R a p a p o r t e d ., H a c k e tt P u b . C o . 1 9 7 8 ) ( 1 8 5 9 ) ) . R e g a r d le s s o f its f o r c e a s a p o lic y a r g u m e n t, ho w ever , i tdo es no ttra nsl at e ip s e d ix it in to a c o n s titu tio n a lly c o g n iz a b le s ta n d a r d . S e e P a r i s A dul tT he a tr e I v. S l a t on, 413 U . S . 49, 68, 93 S . C t . 2628, 2641 ( 1973) (“ [F ] or us t o say thatou r C on st i tut i on i ncorpo ra t es the prop osi t i on thatcond uct i nv ol vi ng consent i ng adul t s onl y i s a l w ay s bey on d st at e r egul at i on , i s ast ep w e a re u n a b le to ta k e .” ) . If w e w ere t o accep tth e i n v i t at i o n t o reco g n i ze a ri g h tt o sex u al i n t i m acy, th i s ri g h tw o u l d th eo ret i cal l y en co m p ass su ch act i v i t i es as p ro st i tu t i o n , o b scen i ty, a n d a d u lt in c e s t— e v e n if w e w e r e to lim it th e r ig h t to c o n s e n tin g a d u lts . S e e , e .g ., id . a t 6 8 n .1 5 , 9 3 S . C t. a t 2 6 4 1 n .1 5 ( “T h e s ta te s ta tu te b o o k s a r e r e p le te w ith18

const i tut i on al l y unchal l enged l aw s a gai nstprost i tut i on , sui ci de, vo l un t ary se l f- m ut i l at i on , brut al i zi ng ‘ bare fi st ’ pri ze fi gh t s, and d uel s, al tho ug h t hese cr i m es m a y o n ly d ir e c tly in v o lv e ‘c o n s e n tin g a d u lts .’” ) . T h is in tu r n w o u ld r e q u ir e u s to s u b j e c ta l l i n f

r i n g e me n t s o n s u c h a c t i v i t i e s t o s tr i c ts c ru t i n y . G l u c k s b e r g , 5 2 1 U . S. a t721, 117 S . C t . a t2268. I n s hor t , by f r a m i ng ouri nqui r y s o br oa dl y a s t o l ook f ora ge ne r a l r i ghtt o s e xua l i nt i m a c y , w e w oul d be a ns w e r i ng m a ny que s t i ons not b e f o r e u s o n th e p r e s e n t f

a c ts . I nde e d, the r e qui r e m e ntof a “ c a r e f ul de s c r i pt i on” i s de s i gne d t o pr e ve ntthe r e vi e w i ng c our tf

r om ve ntur i ng i nt o va s t e rc ons t i tut i ona l vi s t a s tha n a r e c a l l e d f or b y th e f a c t s o f th e c a s e a th a n d . Se e Br o c k e t tv . Sp o k a n e A r c a d e s , I n c . , 4 7 2 U . S. 491, 501, 105 S . C t . 2794, 2801 ( 1985) . O ne of “ the c a r di na l rul e s ” of c ons t i tut i ona l j ur i s prude nc e i s tha tthe s c ope of the a s s e r t e d r i ght

— a nd thus the pa r a m e t e r s of

the i nqui r y— m us tbe di c t a t e d “ by the pr e c i s e f a c t s ” of the i mme d i a t e c a s e . I d . ; s e e a l s o Cru z a n v . D i r e c t o r , M o . D e p t . o f H e a l th , 4 9 7 U . S. 26 1, 27 7-78 , 11 0 S . C t . 28 41 , 28 51 (199 0) (“ [I ] n d ec i di ng a quest i on of such m a gni tude a nd i m por t a nc e i ti s the be t t e rpa r tof w i s dom nott o a t t e m pt , by a ny ge ne r a l s t a t e m e nt , t o c ove re ve r y pos s i bl e pha s e of the s ubj e c t . ” ) ( c i t a t i on a nd i nt ernal pu nctuat i on om i t t ed).19

G lu c k s b e r g a n d F lo r e s , c a s e s in w h ic h th e C o u r t w a s a s k e d to e x p a n d c e r ta in subst ant i ve du e proces s r i gh t s, ar e i nstruct i ve exam pl es . In G l ucksberg, the l ow er c o u r t a n d th e p e titio n e r s h a d v a r io u s ly c h a r a c te r iz e d th e a s s e r te d r ig h t a s “a lib e r ty i nt e r e s ti n de t e r m i ni ng the t i m e a nd m a nne rof one ’ s de a th, ” 521 U . S . a t722, 117 S . C t . at22 69 , “ a l i berty t o cho ose how t o d i e a nd a r i gh tt o con trol on e’ s f i nal days , ” i d. , and t he “ l i berty of c om pet ent , t erm i nal l y i l l adul t s t o m ake e nd -of- l i fe d e c is io n s f

r e e o f u n d u e g o v e r n m e n t in te r f e r e n c e ,” id . a t 7 2 4 , 1 1 7 S . C t. a t 2 2 6 9 . T he C our tr e

j e c t e d the s e c ha r a c t e r i z a t i ons a s ove rbr oa d, not i ng i t s “ tr a di t i on of ca re ful l y f

orm ul at i ng the i nt er es tatst ake i n sub st ant i ve-due-proces s c as es . ” I d. at 72 2, 11 7 S . C t . 22 69 . T hen, l oo ki ng t o t he spec i fi c s t atut e und erchal l enge— a ban o n a s s is te d s u ic id e — th e C o u r t r e c a s t th e a s s e r te d r ig h t a s “a r ig h t to c o m m it s u ic id e w h ic h its e lf

in c lu d e s a r ig h t to a s s is ta n c e in d o in g s o ,” id ., o ra s “a r ig h t to c o m m it s u ic id e w ith a n o th e r ’s a s s is ta n c e ,” id . a t 7 2 4 , 1 1 7 S .C t. 2 2 6 9 . U nde rc ha l l e nge i n F l or e s w a s a n i m m i gr a t i on r e gul a t i on tha tgove r ne d the de t e nt i on a nd r e l e a s e of a l i e n j uve ni l e s . 507 U . S . a t294- 98, 113 S . C t . a t1443- 45. T he r e s ponde nt s , a c l a s s of de t a i ne d a l i e n j uve ni l e s , a r gue d tha tthe r e gul a t i on vi ol a t e d the i r“ f

unda m e nt a l r i ghtt o f

r e e dom f r om phy s i c a l r e s tr a i nt . ” I d. a t299, 1 1 3 S . C t. a t 1 4 4 6 ( in te r n a l q u o ta tio n m a r k s o m itte d ) . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t, e m pha s i z i ng the i m por t a nc e of be gi nni ng s ubs t a nt i ve - due - pr oc e s s a na l y s i s w i th aTh eme refac t th at a prod uc t is us e d w ith in t

heprivac y

of thebe droo m, o r t

hat it 12 e nh anc e s intim atec on du c t, doe s n ot in it se lf bringtheus eof

that artic lewi thin th eri ght t o privac y . I f it wereotherwise, individuals whose se xual gratification requires other ty pes of mate ri a l or

ins tr umentalitie s—

perh a ps hallu c ino g e nicsu

bs tanc e s, depic tio ns of

c hil d pornography

or bestiality , or the ser

vices of a willing prostitute—likewise would have a colora ble argument that prohibitions on such activities and materials interfere w ith their privacy in t hebe dc hamber. Un der t

his the or y , all s uc h s e xua l- enh anc e me nt p ara ph e rn a lia (a s lo nga s it was used only

in consensual encounter s between adults) would also be encompassed w ithin the right to privacy

—and any

burden thereon subjec t to strict scrutiny .

20 “ ca re ful desc ri pt i on , ” r ej ec t ed re spon dent s’ broad form ul at i on of the i m pl i ca t ed l i be r ty i nt e r e s t s . 507 U . S . a t302, 113 S . C t . a t1447. T he C our tthe n r e s t a t e d the put a t i ve r i ght

— by c a r e f ul r e f e r e nc e t o the c ha l l e nge d r e gul a t i on: T he “ f r e e dom f ro m phy s i c a l r e s tr a i nt ” i nvoke d by r e s ponde nt s i s not a t is s u e in th is c a s e . . . . N o ris th e r ig h t a s s e r te d th e r ig h t o f a c h i l d to be re l ea se d fr o m al l ot her c ust od y i nt o t he cust od y of i t s par ent s, l egal gu ar di an, or even cl ose r el at i ves: T he chal l enged regul at i on re qu i re s such re l ea se w hen i ti s s ou gh t . R ather, the ri gh tati ss ue i s the al l eged ri gh tof a c hi l d w ho has n o avai l abl e par ent , cl ose r el at i ve, or l egal g u ard i an , an d fo r w h o m th e g o v ern m en t i s resp o n si b l e, t o b e p l a c e d in the cust od y of aw i l l i ng -a nd -abl e priv ate cust od i an ra ther than o f a gove r nm e nt - ope r a t e d orgove r nm e nt - s e l e c t e d c hi l d- c a r e i ns t i tut i on. I d . ( in te r n a l c ita tio n s o m itte d ) . A s i n G l ucksberg and F l ores , the sc op e of the l i berty i nt er es tatst ake here m us tbe de f

i ne d i n r e f

e r e nc e t o the s c ope of

the A l a ba m a s t a tut e . W e be gi n by obs e r vi ng tha tthe br oa d r i ght s t o “ pr i va c y ” a nd “ s e xua l pr i va c y ” i nvoke d by the A C L U a r e n o t a t is s u e . T h e s ta tu te in v a d e s th e p r iv a c y o f A la b a m a r e s id e n ts in the i rbe dr oom s no m or e tha n doe s a ny s t a tut e r e s tr i c t i ng the a va i l a bi l i ty of c om m e r c i a l pr oduc t s f

orus e i n pr i va t e qua r t e r s a s s e xua l e nha nc e m e nt s . I ns t e a d, 12Ad vo c atin gthat pu

bli c mora lity

sh ould n o lo ng er b ea

“ ra tio nal ba sis to re stric t private 13 se xua l a c tiv ity,”thedis sent s e e ks to i gno retha t th ele g isl atio n at is su eba ns by its e xpre ss t e rm s only the unsavory

adver tising and sale of sexual device s that the majority of the pe ople of Alabama may well find morally

offensive. The f

act remains that the c omplainants herecontinue to possess and use such devices, burdened only by inconvenient acce ss. 21 the chal l enged A l abam a s t atut e bans the com m er ci al di stri bu t i on of se xu al d e v ic e s . A t a m in im u m , th e r e f o r e , th e p u ta tiv e r ig h t a t is s u e is th e r ig h t to s e ll 13 a n d p u r c h a s e s e x u a l d e v ic e s . Iti s m o re th an th at , h o w ev er. F o r p u rp o ses o f co n st i tu t i o n al an al ysi s, r e s tr i c t i ons on the a bi l i ty t o pur c ha s e a n i t e m a r e t a nt a m ountt o r e s tr i c t i ons on the us e of tha ti t e m . T hus i tw a s tha tthe G l uc ks be r g C our ta na l y z e d a ba n on pr ov i di ngs ui c i de a s s i s t a nc e a s a bur de n on the r i ghtt o re ce i ve s u ic id e a s s is ta n c e . 52 1 U . S . at72 3, 11 7 S . C t . at22 69 . S i m i l ar l y, proh i bi t i on s on t he s a le of cont ra ce pt i ves have been anal yz ed as bu rdens on t he u se o f co n tracep t i v es. C arey, 4 3 1 U .S . a t 6 8 8 , 9 7 S . C t. a t 2 0 1 8 ( “[ T ]h e s a m e te s t m u s t b e a p p lie d to s ta te r e g u la tio n s th a t b u r d e n a n in d iv id u a l's r ig h t . . . b y s u b s ta n tia lly lim itin g a c c e s s to th e m e a n s o f

e f f e c tu a tin g th a t d e c is io n a s is a p p lie d to s ta te s ta tu te s th a t p r o h ib it the deci si on ent i re l y. ”) . B ec ause a prohi bi t i on on the di stri bu t i on of se xu al devi ce s w oul d bur de n a n i ndi vi dua l ’ s a bi l i ty t o us e the de vi c e s , oura na l y s i s m us tbe f r a m e d nots i m pl y i n t e r m s of w he the rthe C ons t i tut i on pr ot e c t s a r i ghtt o s e ll a nd buy s e xua l de vi c e s , butw he the ri tpr ot e c t s a r i ghtt o u se su ch d ev i ces. 2 . “ H i st o ry an d T rad i t i o n ” an d “ Im p l i ci ti n th e C o n cep to f O rd ered L i b erty”22

W i th thi s “ c a r e f

ul de s c r i pt i on” i n m i nd, w e tur n now t o the s e c ond pr ong of the f unda m e nt a l - r i ght s i nqui r y . T he c ruc i a l i nqui r y unde rthi s pr ong i s w he the rthe r i ghtt o us e s e xua l de vi c e s w he n e nga gi ng i n l a w f ul , pr i va t e s e xua l a c t i vi ty i s ( 1) “o b je c tiv e ly , d e e p ly r o o te d in th is N a tio n ’s h is to r y a n d tr a d itio n ” a n d ( 2 ) “im p lic it in th e c o n c e p t o f

o r d e r e d lib e r ty , s u c h th a t n e ith e rlib e r ty n o rju s tic e w o u ld e x is t if [ i t ] w e r e s a c r i f

i c e d. ” G l uc ks be r g, 521 U . S . a t721, 117 S . C t . a t2268 ( c i t a t i ons o m itte d ) . A lth o u g h th e d is tr ic t c o u r t n e v e ra d d r e s s e d th e s e c o n d p a r t o f th is in q u ir y , it a n s w e r e d th e “h is to r y a n d tr a d itio n ” q u e s tio n in th e a f f ir m a tiv e . W e f i nd tha tthe di s tr i c tc our t , i n r e a c hi ng thi s c onc l us i on, e r r e d on f our l e ve l s . T he f

i r s te r r orr e l a t e s ba c k t o the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s ove r - br oa d f r a m i ng of

the a s s e r t e d r i ghti n que s t i on. H a vi ng f r a m e d the r e l e va ntr i ghta s a ge ne r a l i z e d “ r i ght t o sexual pri vacy , ” the di stri ctcourt ’ s hi st ory a nd tra di t i on anal ys i s c on si st ed l a r g e l y o f

a n i r r e l e v a n te x p l o r a t i o n o f th e h i s t o r y o f

s e x i n Am e r i c a . S e c o n d , we f i nd tha tthi s a na l y s i s pl a c e d t oo m uc h w e i ghton c ont e m por a r y pr a c t i c e a nd a t t i tude s w i th r e s pe c tt o s e xua l c onduc ta nd s e xua l de vi c e s . T hi r d, r a the rtha n l ook for a hi st ory a nd tra di t i on of pr ot e c t i on of the as se rt ed ri gh t , the di stri ctcourtas ked w hether there w as a hi st ory a nd tra di t i on of st at e no n-i nt er f er ence w ith th e r ig h t. F i nal l y, w e f

i nd thatthe di stri ctcourt ’ s uncri t i ca l re l i ance on ce rt ai n exp er t23

de c l a r a t i ons i n i nt e rpr e t i ng the hi s t or i c a l r e c or d w a s f l a w e d a nd tha ti t s r e l i a nc e on c e r ta in p u ta tiv e “c o n c e s s io n s ” w a s u n f o u n d e d . a . T h e S c o p e o f

th e D is tr ic t C o u r t’s H is to r y a n d T r a d itio n A n a ly s is T he di s tr i c tc our tbe ga n i t s G l uc ks be r g- m a nda t e d hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on i nq ui ry by defi ni ng i t s t as k as one of det erm i ni ng w hether t o “ re cogn i ze a fund am ent al ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy . ” W i l l i am s I II , 22 0 F . S up p. 2d at12 77 . A ft er a n e x te n s iv e s u r v e y o f

th e h is to r y o f

s e x in A m e r ic a n c u ltu r e a n d la w — r e p le te w i th ci t es t o t he K i nsey stud i es and M i chel F ou ca ul t

— the di stri ctcourtconcl ud ed th a t “th e r e e x is ts a c o n s titu tio n a lly in h e r e n t r ig h t to s e x u a l p r iv a c y th a t f ir m ly encom pass es st at e non -i nt er fe re nce w i th p ri vat e, adul t , consensual se xu al r e l a t i o n s h i p s . ” I d . a t1 2 9 6 . As e x a m i n e d a b o v e , th e S u p r e m e C o u r t ’ s o wn re t i ce nce i n t hi s a re a, and i t s a dm on i t i on t o car ef ul l y def i ne the ri gh tatst ake, c onvi nc e us tha tthe di s tr i c tc our te r r e d i n unde r t a ki ng t o f i nd a ge ne r a l i z e d “ r i ght to se x u al p riv ac y.” G iv en th is o v er -b ro ad star ti n g p o in t, th e d istrict co u rt’s s u b s e q u e n t in q u ir y , p r e d ic ta b ly , w a s lik e w is e b r o a d e rth a n c a lle d f o rb y th e f

a c ts of the c a s e . T he i nqui r y s houl d ha ve be e n f oc us e d notbr oa dl y on the va s tt opi c of s e x i n A m e r i c a n c ul tur a l a nd l e ga l hi s t or y , butna r r ow l y a nd m or e pr e c i s e l y on the tre atm entof sexualdevi ce s w ith in th a t h is to r y a n d tr a d itio n .

b. T he D i stri ctC ou rt ’ s F ocus on “ C on t em po ra ry P ra ct i ce ”24

In re ac hi ng i t s hol di ng , the di stri ctcourtre l i ed heavi l y on “ cont em po ra ry prac t i ce , ” e m ph as i zi ng the “ cont em po ra ry tre nd of l egi sl at i ve and soci et al l i be r a l i z a t i on of

a t t i tude s t ow a r d c ons e ns ua l , a dul ts e xua l a c t i vi ty . ” I d. a t1294; see g en eral l y i d . at1 2 8 9 -9 4 ; see al so i d . at1 2 9 6 (h o l d i n g th at“ th ere i s a ‘ h i st o ry, l egal tra di t i on , and p ra ct i ce ’ i n t hi s c ou nt ry of del i bera t e s t at e non -i nt er fe re nce w i th p ri vat e s exual re l at i on shi ps betw ee n m arri ed coup l es , and a co n t em p o ra ry pract i ce of

the s a m e be tw e e n unm a r r i e d pe r s ons ” ) ( e m pha s i s a dde d) ( c i t a t i on o m itte d ) . O urf i r s tc onc e r n i s the l e ga l s i gni f i c a nc e , orthe l a c k the r e of , of m uc h of th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s s o u r c e m a te r ia l f o rth is c o n te m p o r a r y p r a c tic e . I n a d d itio n to i nvoki ng a c l us t e rof

S upr e m e C our tpr e c e de nt s t ouc hi ng on m a t t e r s of p r o c r e a tio n a n d f

a m ilia l in te g r ity , th e d is tr ic t c o u r t lo o k e d to s o c ia l s c ie n c e d a ta re spec t i ng prem ar i t al i nt er course , m arri age a nd di vo rc e r at es , and t he l i ke. Id. at 1290. I tf

ur the rnot e d the r e vol ut i ona r y i m pa c tof the K i ns e y s tudi e s , the

“ i m agery a nd i m pl em ent s of a du l tse xu al re l at i on shi ps [that ] pervade m od ern A m e r i c a n s oc i e ty , ” the a va i l a bi l i ty of “ por nogr a phy of

the gr os s e s ts or t , ” a nd the

“ w i despre ad m arket i ng of V i agra (i ncl ud i ng by such no t abl e per sonal i t i es as form erU ni t ed S t at es S enat e M aj ori ty L ea der a nd 19 96 R epub l i ca n p re si dent i al ca nd i dat e R ob er tJ. D ol e a nd po pu l arN A S C A R dri ver M ark M ar t i n). ” I d. at25

1294. W hi l e s uc h e vi de nc e undoubt e dl y c onf i r m s the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s di s c ove r y of

“ the spec t erof a tw ent i eth century s exual l i bera l i sm , ” i d. at12 91 , i t s r el evance u n d e rG lu c k s b e r g is s c a n t. T he di stri ctcourtj ust i fi ed thi s e m ph as i s by not i ng thatthe G l ucksberg C ou rthad rel i ed on cont em po ra ry prac t i ce i n rea chi ng i t s det erm i nat i on that as si st ed sui ci de i s nota c on st i tut i on al ri gh t . S ee , e. g. , i d. at12 75 (G l ucksberg

“ c ons i de r e d c ur r e nts t a tut e s , l e gi s l a t i ve de ba t e s , vot e ri ni t i a t i ve s , a nd the pos i t i ons o f c o n te m p o r a r y ta s k f

o r c e s a n d c o m m is s io n s o n th e is s u e o f a s s is te d s u ic id e ” ) . T hi s gl os s , how e ve r , c ons i de r a bl y ove r s t a t e s tha tC our t ’ s r e l i a nc e on cont em po ra ry att i tud es . W hatthe G l ucksberg C ou rtdi d w as t o n ot e that d em o crat i c act i o n i n m an y st at es h ad recen t l y reaffirm ed assi st ed -su i ci d e b an s, th u s b u ttr e s s in g th e C o u r t’s c o n c lu s io n th a t a s s is te d s u ic id e is n o t d e e p ly r o o te d in th e h is to r y a n d tr a d itio n s o f th e n a tio n . 5 2 1 U .S . a t 7 1 6 - 1 9 , 1 1 7 S .C t. a t 2 2 6 5 - 6 7 . B utthe exi st ence of thi s c on t em po ra ry prac t i ce w as never es se nt i al t o t hat concl usi on . T hati s, the C ou rtnever s ug gest ed thata l ac k o f c on t em po ra ry r e i nf or c e m e nt of the proh i bi t i on on as si st ed sui ci de w ou l d h ave l ed i tt o a cont ra ry c onc l us i on. T he di s tr i c tc our t ’ s i nt e rpr e t a t i on a l s o ove r l ooks the c ont e xtof G l uc ks be r g’ s c ont e m por a r y pr a c t i c e a na l y s i s . T he C our tbe ga n i t s e xa m i na t i on ofThe focus on the trajec tory of conte mporary

prac tice ultimately

proves too much. The 14 fac t that there is an emerg ing c onsensus scarcely provides justification for thecourts, who of ten s erv e a s anant i m aj o ri t ari ans eawa l l , t o b e s we p tu p wi thth e t i d e o f p o p u l ar cu l ture . I f any

th i n g, it is added rea son for us to per mit the democratic proce ss to take its course. See , e.g ., Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 735, 117 S.Ct . at 2275 (“ Throughout the Nation, Americans a re eng ag ed in an ea rnest and profound debate about the morality , leg ality , and practicality of physiciana ssi ste d s uic ide . O ur

ho ldingperm its thi s d ebateto c ontin ue , a s it sh ould in a

de moc ratic society .”). 26 h i st o ry an d trad i t i o n b y i n q u i ri n g “ w h eth er th i s assert ed ri g h th as any place i n our N a t i on’ s tr a di t i ons . ” I d. a t723, 117 S . C t . a t2269 ( e m pha s i s a dde d) . H a vi ng f ound tha ti tdi d not , the C our tha d no ne e d t o pr oc e e d t o the f ur the rque s t i on of w h eth er th atri g h tw as deepl y r oo t ed i n t ho se tra di t i on s ( no r w hether i tw as “im p lic it in th e c o n c e p t o f o r d e r e d lib e r ty ” ) . P a r t o f th e r e a s o n th e C o u r t w a s a b le t o di s m i s s the a s s e r t e d r i ghts o s um m a r i l y w a s be c a us e i tf ound tha tthe p r o h ib itio n o n a s s is te d s u ic id e “c o n tin u e s e x p lic itly ” to th e p r e s e n t. I d . I n s h o r t, the de m oc r a t i c a c t i on c i t e d by G l uc ks be r g w a s m e r e l y one f a c t ora m ong m a ny d is p r o v in g th e c la im th a t a s s is te d s u ic id e is a “d e e p ly r o o te d ” r ig h t. 14 c. T he D i stri ctC ou rt ’ s F aul ty E qu at i on of H i st ori ca l N on -I nt er fe re nce w i th H i s t or i c a l P r ot e c t i on T he di s tr i c tc our t ’ s c e ntr a l hol di ng— i t s di s c ove r y of a c ons t i tut i ona l “ r i ght t o u se se xu al devi ce s l i ke . . . vi brat ors, di l do s, anal beads, and art i fi ci al vagi nas”

— w as no tbase d o n any evi dence of a hi st ory a nd tra di t i on of af f i rm at i ve pr ot e c t i on of thi s r i gh t . W i l l i am s I II , 22 0 F . S up p. 2d at12 96 . T he di stri ct court ’ s l engt hy op i ni on ci t es no re fe re nce t o such a ri gh ti n t he usual re po si t ori es27

of ou r f re edom s, such as fe dera l and st at e c on st i tut i on al prov i si on s, const i tut i on al doc tr i ne s , s t a tut or y pr ovi s i ons , c om m on- l a w doc tr i ne s , a nd the l i ke . I ns t e a d, the c r itic a l e v id e n c e f

o rth e d is tr ic t c o u r t w a s th e r e la tiv e s c a r c ity o f s ta tu te s e x p lic itly bann i ng se xu al devi ce s a nd the ra ri ty of r eport ed ca se s of s exual -devi ce s pr os e c ut i ons — a l ong w i th va r i ous f a c tua l a s s e r t i ons f

r om de c l a r a t i ons by the A C L U ’ s e xpe r t s . F r om thi s , the di s tr i c tc our ti nf e r r e d “ tha thi s t or y a nd c ont e m por a r y pr a c t i c e de m ons tr a t e a c ons c i ous a voi da nc e of r e gul a t i on of [ s e x u a l] d e v ic e s b y th e s ta te s .” I d . a t 1 2 9 6 . T hi s ne ga t i ve i nf

e r e nc e e s s e nt i a l l y i nve r t e d G l uc ks be r g’ s hi s t or y a nd tra di t i on i nq ui ry . G l ucksberg, 52 1 U . S . at72 1, 11 7 S . C t . at22 68 . T he di stri ct c o u r t— r a th e rth a n r e q u ir in g a s h o w in g th a t th e r ig h t to u s e s e x u a l d e v ic e s is

“ de e pl y r oot e d i n thi s N a t i on’ s hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on, ” i d.

— l ooke d f ora s how i ng th a t pr os c r i

pt i ons a ga i ns ts e xua l de vi c e s a r e de e pl y r oot e d i n hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on. U n d e rth is a p p r o a c h , th e f r e e d o m to s m o k e , to p o llu te , to e n g a g e in p r iv a te di s c r i m i na t i on, t o c om m i tm a r i t a l r a pe — a tone t i m e ora nothe r— a l l c oul d ha ve b een el ev at ed t o fu n d am en t al -ri g h t s st atu s. M o reo v er, i tw o u l d creat e th e p erv erse i ncent i ve for l egi sl atures t o regul at e e very ar ea w i thi n t hei r pl enary pow erfor f ea r thatthei r r es tra i nti n any ar ea m i gh tgi ve ri se t o a ri gh tof const i tut i on al p r o p o r tio n s .28

B ey on d t hese ob vi ou s obj ec t i on s, the m ostsi gn i fi ca ntfl aw i n t he di stri ct court ’ s a nal ys i s i s i t s m i sr ea di ng of G l ucksberg. A dm i t t edl y, the G l ucksberg C our t , i n de c l i ni ng t o e xt e nd c ons t i tut i ona l pr ot e c t i on t o a s s i s t e d s ui c i de , c i t e d the e xt e ns i ve hi s t or y of

l a w s f orbi ddi ng ordi s c our a gi ng s ui c i de . B utthe c ont e xtof thi s i nqui r y w a s the C our t ’ s a t t e m ptt o de t e r m i ne w he the ra r i ghtt o s ui c i de , a nd p a r tic u la r ly a s s is te d s u ic id e , w a s d e e p ly r o o te d in A m e r ic a n h is to r y a n d tr a d itio n . N a tur a l l y , pr ohi bi t i ons on s ui c i de w e r e pa r t i c ul a r l y c om pe t e nte vi de nc e of the abse nce of s uch a hi st ory a nd tra di t i on . T he G l ucksberg C ou rt , ho w ever , never sugg es t ed thatthe re vi ew i ng courtm ustfi nd a hi st ory of prosc ri pt i on of a gi ven ac t i vi ty bef

ore decl i ni ng t o rec og ni ze a new const i tut i on al ri gh tt o eng age i n t hat a c t i vi ty . I d. a t710- 16, 117 S . C t . a t2262- 65; s e e a l s o i d. a t725, 117 S . C t . a t2270 (rej ect i n g th e an al o g y b etw een th e co n st i tu t i o n al l y-p ro t ect ed ri g h tt o refu se un w ant ed m edi ca l tre atm entand t he as se rt ed ri gh tt o ass i st ed sui ci de, no t i ng that the form erri gh t“ has never enj oyed si m i l arl egal prot ec t i on ”) . In short , no thi ng i n G l ucksberg i nd i ca t es thatan abse nce of hi st ori ca l pr ohi bi t i on i s t ant am ou nt , for purpo se s of f un dam ent al -r i gh t s a nal ys i s, t o an hi st ori ca l re cord of pr ot e c t i on un der the l aw . T o t he cont ra ry , the G l ucksberg s ta n d a r d e x p r e s s ly r e q u ir e s a s h o w in g th a t th e a s s e r te d r ig h t is “d e e p ly r o o te d in th i s N at i o n ’ s h i st o ry an d trad i t i o n ” an d “ i m p l i ci ti n th e co n cep to f o rd ered l i b erty,29

s uc h tha tne i the rl i be r ty norj us t i c e w oul d e xi s ti f [ i t ] w e r e s a c r i f

i c e d. ” I d. a t721, 117 S . C t . a t2268. N otonl y doe s the r e c or d be f or e us f a i l t o e vi de nc e s uc h a d e e p ly r o o te d r ig h t, b u t it s u g g e s ts th a t, to th e e x te n t th a t s e x to y s h is to r ic a lly ha ve a t tr a c t e d the a t t e nt i on of the l a w , i tha s be e n i n the c ont e xtof pr os c r i pt i on, n o t p r o te c tio n . T he c hi e f

e xa m pl e of

thi s pr os c r i pt i on i s the “ C om s t oc k L a w s , ” f e de r a l a nd st at e l egi sl at i on adop t ed i n t he l at e 180 0s. T he fe dera l C om st ock A ctof 18 73 w as a c r i m i na l s t a tut e di r e c t e d a t" the s uppr e s s i on of T r a de i n a nd C i r c ul a t i on of obs c e ne L i t e r a tur e a nd A r t i c l e s of i m m or a l U s e . " S e e B ol ge rv. Y oungs D rug P r ods . C orp. , 463 U . S . 60, 70, 103 S . C t . 2875, 2882 ( 1983) ( quot i ng A c tof M ar ch 3, 18 73 , ch. 25 8, § 2 , 17 S t at . 59 9 (18 73 )) . T he A ctproh i bi t ed i m po rt at i on of and u se of the m ai l s f or tra nspo rt i ng , am on g o ther thi ng s, “ every ar t i cl e or thi ng i nt ended o r a dapt ed for a ny i nd ec entor i m m oral use. ” U ni t ed S t at es v . C h ase, 1 3 5 U . S . 2 5 5 , 2 5 7 , 1 0 S . C t . 7 5 6 , 7 5 6 (1 8 9 0 ). V ari o u s st at es al so e n a c te d s im ila rs ta tu te s p r o h ib itin g th e s a le o f s u c h a r tic le s . S e e , e .g ., C ONN . G EN . S TAT . § 1 3 2 5 ( 1 9 0 2 ) ; M AS S . G EN . L AWS A NN . ch. 27 2 § 21 (W es t20 04 ) ( pass ed 1 8 7 9 ) . T he di stri ctcourt , ho w ever , di sc ou nt ed the si gn i fi ca nce of the C om st ock la w s , d e s c r ib in g th e m a s “a b e r r a n t to th e s e x u a l p r iv a c y ” g e n e r a lly a f f o r d e d to30

c ons e ns ua l , a dul ts e xua l c onduc t . W i l l i a m s I I I , 220 F . S upp. 2d. a t1286. T he di s tr i c tc our tc i t e d e xpe r tde c l a r a t i ons of f e r e d by the A C L U t o the e f f e c ttha tthe C o m s to c k la w s w e r e n o t m o tiv a te d p r im a r ily b y a d e s ir e to b a n s e x u a l d e v ic e s . I d. T he di s tr i c tc our tf

ur the rnot e d tha ts e a r c he s of the a nnot a t i ons t o the C om s t oc k A c ta nd of

F e de r a l C a s e s f

ound no r e f

e r e nc e s t o c a s e s i nvol vi ng di l dos a nd vi br a t or s . I d. a t1287. E ve n i f the s e pr ohi bi t i ons on s e xua l de vi c e s w e r e notw i de s pr e a d or vi gor ous l y e nf

or c e d, the i rm e r e e xi s t e nc e s i gni f i c a nt l y unde r m i ne s the a r gum e nt thatse xu al devi ce s hi st ori ca l l y have been fr ee fr om st at e i nt er fe re nce. M oreover, the l a c k of

s t a tut or y r e f

e r e nc e s t o s e xua l de vi c e s i s r e l a t i ve l y m e a ni ngl e s s w i thout e vi de nc e tha tc om m e r c e i n the s e de vi c e s w a s s uf f i c i e nt l y w i de s pr e a d, or suff i ci ent l y i n t he pu bl i c e ye , t o m er i tl egi sl at i ve att ent i on , atl ea stbeyond general a nt i - obs c e ni ty l a w s . L i ke w i s e , the f oc us on s e a r c he s of

f e de r a l c a s e r e por t e r s f

or re fe re nces t o “ vi brat ors” or “ di l do s” as sum es , un j ust i fi abl y, thatre po rt ed ca se s a re r e l i a bl e pr oxi e s f

ora c tua l pr os e c ut i ons , the va s tm a j or i ty of w hi c h w oul d ha ve ne ve ra ppe a r e d i n the c our tr e por t e r s ( i ta l s o ove r l ooks the pos s i bi l i ty of prosec ut i on s und er s ta te l aw ). Ital so ov er l oo ks the po ss i bi l i ty thattra di t i on al se nsi bi l i t i es and m ores re stra i ned cou rt s f rom expl i ci t l y m ent i on i ng part i cul ar s e x u a l d e v ic e s in th e te x t o f ju d ic ia l o p in io n s .31

In l i gh tof these re al i t i es , the negat i ve i nfer ence draw n b y the di stri ct court

— thatthe sc ar ci ty of e xp l i ci tre fe re nce t o sexual devi ce s i n st atut ory sc hem es and report ed ca se s r ef l ec t s a“ del i bera t e non -i nt er fe re nce, ” i d. at 12 86

— i s t oo spec ul at i ve a bas i s f or const i tut i on al i zi ng a hi thert o u nrec og ni ze d r i ght . T hi s i s e s pe c i a l l y true gi ve n the l a c k of a ny i ndi c i a of

a f f i r m a t i ve pr ot e c t i on unde rthe l a w . I n s hor t , the r e i s no c om pe t e nte vi de nc e i n the r e c or d be f or e us i nd i ca t i ng thatthe l ac k o f e xp l i ci tand agg re ss i ve proscr i pt i on of se x t oys w as , as the di s tr i c tc our ts ur m i s e d, “ c ons c i ous a voi da nc e of r e gul a t i on of

the s e de vi c e s by the s t a t e s . ” I d. a t1296.

d. T he D i s tr i c tC our t ’ s H a ndl i ng of the R e c or d i . T he D i stri ctC ou rt ’ s R el i ance on the A C L U ’ s E xp er t D ecl arat i o n s F i nal l y, w e not e our re cogn i t i on of the di stri ctcourt ’ s uncri t i ca l ac ce pt ance o f th e b a r e a s s e r tio n s c o n ta in e d in th e A C L U ’s e x p e r t d e c la r a tio n s — p a r tic u la r ly i n r e a c hi ng c onc l us i ons out s i de , ore ve n i n appa r e ntc ontr a di c t i on t o, the d o c u m e n te d h is to r ic a l r e c o r d . T h is p er fu n cto ry re li an ce w as es p ec iall y p ro n o u n ce d in th e d istrict co u rt’s de c ons truc t i on of

the C om s t oc k l a w s . T he m e r e e xi s t e nc e of both f e de r a l a nd s ta te C o m s to c k la w s — e s p e c ia lly th e f e d e r a l C o m s to c k A c t, w h ic h e x p r e s s ly32

proh i bi t ed i m po rt at i on and m ai l tra nspo rtof “ every a rt i cl e . . . for . . . i m m oral use”

— se ri ou sl y und erm i nes the A C L U ’ s f un dam ent al -r i gh t s a rgum entun der G l uc ks be r g. I ns t e a d, the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s r e vi e w of the C om s t oc k l a w s l e d i tt o the concl usi on that“ [t ] he po pu l ar i ty, l egal i ty, and eas e of a cc es s t o sexual devi ce s l i ke vi br a t or s a nd di l dos f ur the rde m ons tr a t e tha tthe f i r m l e gi s l a t i ve r e s pe c tf or se xu al pri vacy i n t he m ar i t al re l at i on shi p ext ended t o d el i bera t e non -i nt er fe re nce w ith a d u lts ' u s e o f

s e x u a l d e v ic e s w ith in th o s e r e la tio n s h ip s .” I d . a t 1 2 8 6 . T he s ol e s uppor tf

orthi s r a the rc ur s or y c onc l us i on a ppe a r s t o ha ve be e n the a s s e r t i o n s o f

o n e R a c h e l Ma i n e s , a n h i s t o r i a n a n d a u th o r , wh o s u b m i t t e d two s e p a r a te e x p e r t d e c la r a tio n s o n th e A C L U ’s b e h a lf . R 3 - 5 6 , E x . A ; R 4 - 8 4 , E x . 4 . H erdecl ar at i on s off

er ed cr i t i ci sm of the A l abam a s t atut e goi ng w el l beyond her spec i fi c e xp er t i se and d el vi ng i nt o t he l egal and p ol i cy di m ensi on s of the ca se : L a w s l i ke A l a ba m a ’ s t h a tt a r ge tthe a ppe a r a nc e , pa c ka gi ng or m ark et i n g o f [sex u al ] d ev i ces, ra th er th an th ei r fu n ct i o n al i ty, thus do notpr e ve ntor m i t i ga t e the s uppos e d “ e vi l ” of “c o m m e r c e o f

s e x u a l s tim u la tio n a n d a u to - e r o tic is m , f o rits o w n s a k e ” ( B r ie f

o f A la b a m a A tto r n e y G e n e r a l, 2 1 ) . T h e ir effect i s m erel y t o b en efi to n e s eto f ret ai l ers (d ru g st o res, h e a l th f o o d s t o r e s , a n d d i s c o u n th o u s e s s u c h a s Wa l m a r t , GN C and T ar get ) a tthe expense of another ( m ar i t al ai ds vend ors) . R 3 - 5 6 , E x . A a t 1 8 - 2 1 . O n t he h ist ori ca l re cord, i f devi ce s “ desi gn ed or m arket ed as usef ul pri m ar i l y for the st i m ul at i on of the hu m an geni t al or ga ns ” r e pr e s enta n e vi l a nd/ ora m or a l thr e a tt o the c i t i z e ns of33

A la b a m a , th e s ta te h a s b e e n r e m a r k a b ly d ila to r y i n m a k in g th is d i sc ove r y , ha vi ng w a i t e d f ors om e thi ng m or e tha n tw o a nd a ha l f m i l l e nni a f

r om the i nve nt i on of

the di l do a nd m or e tha n a c e n tu r y f r o m th e in v e n tio n o f

th e e le c tr o m e c h a n i c a l v ib r a to rto l e gi s l a t e a ga i ns tthe m . A ppa r e nt l y u nc onc e r ne d a boutthe a va i l a bi l i ty of

vi br a t or s t o c ons um e r s be gi nni ng i n 1899, a nd e ve n a boutthe i rus e i n the pr oduc t i on of or gasm i n w o m e n, f

or w hi ch there w as am pl e e vi dence by 193 0 , th e s t at e di d n otac t a ga i n st t h ese de vi c e s unt i l a s m a l l pe r c e nt a ge of the m t ook on a na t om i c a l f

orm s, a nd unt i l the y be ga n t o be a s s oc i a t e d w i th a new i nt e r e s t i n o rgas m i c m ut ual i t y i n h et er osexual re l at i on shi ps. S i gn i fi ca nt l y, V i agra , w hi ch enhances s exual e xpe r i e nc e f

orm e n butnotne c e s s a r i l y fo r w om e n, i s l e ga l by p rescri p t i o n i n al l st at es, i n cl u d i n g th o se w i th law s ag ai n st v ib r a to r s a n d d ild o s . A s a n h is to r ia n a n d a s a c itiz e n , I f a il to se e w hatl eg it im ate purpo se i s s erved b y i nst i tut i on al i zi ng an hypo cr i sy i n w hi ch the sa l e of ast andard and tra d i t i on al th e r a p e u tic d e v ic e is r e n d e r e d u n l a w f u l b y s e x u a l r e f

e r e n c e s in a ppe a r a nc e , pa c ka gi ng orm a r ke t i ng. I d . a t 2 3 - 2 5 . A l tho ug h M ai nes’ s s t at em ent s s ug gestan agenda i ncon si st entw i th an u n b i ased an d co m p l et e h i st o ri cal p resen t at i o n , th e d i stri ctco u rtn ev erth el ess r e pe a t e dl y r e l i e d on he rf a c tua l a s s e r t i ons , us ua l l y w i thouta ny i nde pe nde nt v eri fi cat i o n . W e n o t e sev eral typ i cal ex am p l es: ! In do w np l ay i ng the hi st ori ca l si gn i fi ca nce of the C om st ock l aw s, the di stri ct courtem ph as i ze d t hat“ se xu al devi ce s w er e notthe i m petus for the so-c al l ed C om st ock A ct s. ” W i l l i am s I II , 22 0 F . S up p. 2d at12 86 . T he on l y s up po rt f orthi s s t a t e m e ntw a s M a i ne s ’ s de c l a r a t i on s t a t e m e nttha t“ vi br a t or s a nd34

di l doe s [ s i c ] w e r e nots i gni f i c a ntm ot i va t i ons f

orthe pa s s a ge a nd e n f o r c e m e n t o f

th e C o m s to c k A c t.” R 4 - 8 4 , E x . 4 a t 2 . H o w e v e r , w e f in d in ne i the rM a i ne s ’ s de c l a r a t i on northe r e c or d e l s e w he r e a ny e vi de nc e — a s i de f r om M a i ne s ’ s ba r e a s s e r t i on— of the a c tua l m ot i va t i on be hi nd pa s s a ge a nd e n f o r c e m e n t o f

th e A c t. ! T h e r e c o r d b e f

o r e th e d is tr ic t c o u r t c o n ta in e d e v id e n c e th a t, a c c o r d in g to re cords m ai nt ai ned b y the N ew Y ork S oci ety f or the S up pres si on of V i ce , betw ee n 1 87 1 and 18 81 , som e 64, 83 6 “ A rt i cl es of i m m oral use, of rubb er , et c. ” w er e s ei ze d u nd erthe C om st ock A ctand o ther a nt i -vi ce l aw s. S ee A nt ho ny C om st ock, T raps for the Y ou ng 13 7 (R ob er tB re m ner e d. , H arvard U n iv e r s ity P r e s s 1 9 6 7 ) ( 1 8 8 4 ) . T h e d is tr ic t c o u r t, h o w e v e r , d is m is s e d th is e v id e n c e b y q u o tin g M a in e s ’s c la im th a t th e s e “w e r e a lm o s t a ll cont ra ce pt i ves. ” W i l l i am s I II , 2 2 0 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 1 2 8 6 ; R 4 - 8 4 , E x . 4 a t 3 . A l tho ug h o ur ow n revi ew of the re cord confi rm s thatthe ar t i cl es “ of rubb er ” l i kel y r epre se nt ed m any c on do m s, ou r c on ce rn i s the di stri ctcourt ’ s c as ual di s m i s s a l of

c ont e m por a ne ous doc um e nt a r y e vi de nc e i n f a vorof re trospec t i ve, and u nsup po rt ed, char ac t er i za t i on s of thatevi dence. F urther, al tho ug h M ai nes c i t ed se vera l autho ri t i es for heras se rt i on , ou r r evi ew of herHey wood B roun &Marg are t L eec h, Anthony Comstock 92, 153 (1927); Charles G. 15 Trumbull, Anthony

Comstock, Fighter (1913) ; Anthony Comstock, Traps for

the Young137 (Rob e rt B remner e d. , B e lkn a

p Pre ss o f H arv ard

Univ. Pr e ss 1 96 7) (1 88 4) . B e c a us eMaine s’ s did not provide a pinpoint citation for theTrumbull book, we did not review every pag e of thebook, but our review of the releva nt portions of the book did not reveal any support for Maines’s asser tion. 35 source s f i nd s no sup po rtfor the concl usi on thatthe re fe re nced art i cl es “ w er e a lm o s t a ll c o n tr a c e p tiv e s .” 15 ! T he di s tr i c tc our t ’ s c e ntr a l hol di ng— i t s di s c ove r y of a c ons t i tut i ona l “ r i ght t o u se se xu al devi ce s l i ke . . . vi brat ors, di l do s, anal beads, and art i fi ci al v ag in as ”— w as b as ed larg ely o n u n su p p o rted statem en ts fr o m M ain es ’s decl ar at i on s. W i l l i am s I II , 2 2 0 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 1 2 9 6 . I n d iv in in g th is r ig h t, the di stri ctcourtconcl ud ed “ thathi st ory a nd cont em po ra ry prac t i ce de m ons tr a t e a c ons c i ous a voi da nc e of r e gul a t i on of

[ s e xua l ] de vi c e s by the st at es , ” I d. T hi s c on cl usi on w as base d o n t he “ em er gence and w i despre ad accep t an ce” o f th e el ectri c v i b rat o r, i d . at1 2 8 3 , an d “ [t ] h e p o p u l ari ty, l egal i ty, and eas e of a cc es s t o sexual devi ce s l i ke vi brat ors a nd di l do s, ” i d. at 1 2 8 6 . T h e s e f

in d in g s in tu r n r e lie d o n M a in e s ’s d e c la r a tio n s , p a r tic u la r ly he ra s s e r t i on tha t“ [ v] i br a t or s r e m a i ne d l e ga l thr oughoutthi s pe r i od, a nd w er e m ai l abl e m att erun der the C om st ock l aw s of 187 3 - 19 14 . ” I d. W hat bo th M ai nes’ s dec l ar at i on and t he di stri ctcourt ’ s opi ni on om i ti s the fa ct th a t, a c c o r d in g to M a in e s ’s o w n w r itin g s e ls e w h e r e , th e v ib r a to r s a v a ila b leMaines, in her writingoutside the context of this l itigation, notes that the f irst evidence 16 of the availability

of mass-mar

ket vibrators a

ppear s in 1899. Rachel Maine s, The Te chnology of O rg a s m : " Hys t e ri a , " th eV ib r at o r , an d W o m e n ' s S e xu a lS at i s f

a c t i o n1 0 0 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . S i gn i f i c ant l y, sh estate s th at mo st o f t

he see arly “ ho mevib rator s”weremarke te d a s h e a lthand be a uty a ids , particula rly for home ma ssag e. I d. at 19-20. Consistent with this theory arethe turn-of

-thecentur y vibrator advertisements include d with Maines’s dec laration, none of which sug g est any se xua l us efo r t

hede vic e s. R3- 56 , E x. A at 19 -2 4. Ev e n if , a s Maine s c onte nd s, therewa s so me wink-and- nod encr

y ption in these adver

tisements, this hardly

supports the district court’s conclusion that sexual devices qua sexual devices were w idely availableand openly

marke ted duringthi s p e ri od . I d. ; se ea lso Ra c he l Maine s, Soc ially Camou fl a g e d T e c hn olo g ie s: TheCa se of the Elec tromagnetic Vibrator, T ECH . AND S OC ’ Y M AGAZ INE , June 1989, at 3. Indeed, Maines further asser ts that “[t] he social camouflag e of thevibrator a s a home a nd profe ssional medical instrument seems to have remained more or le ss intact until the end of the 1920s” a nd that it was not until the vibrator reemerg ed in 1960s and 70s that “it wa s openly marke ted as a

sex aid.” Maines, TheTec hnology

of Org asm, at 20. Thus, acc ordingto Maines’s own book, vibrators have be en available to the g eneral public for only

slightly over a centur y and—contrary

to the district court’s interpretation of Maines’s de clarations—expl icitly sexually-oriente d vibrators have been widely availableand acc epted f

or only the past four

decades, at most.

36 on the m a r ke tdur i ng thi s pe r i od w e r e ge ne r a l purpos e vi br a t or s m a r ke t e d f or non- s e xua l us e s , s uc h a s m a s s a gi ng the ha nds , f a c e , ba c k, a nd ne c k. T he 16 f a c t th a t th e s e g e n e r a l p u rp o s e v ib r a to r s w e r e le g a l a n d m a ila b le is h a r d ly p r o b a tiv e o f

th e le g a lity o f

s e x u a l d e v ic e s a s s e x u a l d e v ic e s . B ec au se o f o u r c o n clu sio n su p ra th at th e c o n stitu ti o n ality o f A lab am a’s st atu t e d o es n o th i n g e o n th e en fo rcem en t , o r l ack th ereo f, o f th e C o m st o ck l aw s, any e rr or by the di stri ctcourti n i t s i ncorpo ra t i on of M ai nes’ s l i t i gat i on -m ot i vat ed an d li ti g atio n -tailo re d as se rtio n s w as h ar m less . N ev er th eles s, th e d istrict co u rt’s truth- s e e ki ng dut i e s s houl d ha ve c om pe l l e d i tt o go be hi nd M a i ne s ’ s a s s e r t i ons a ndMoreover, in grantingsummary judgment to the ACLU, the district cour t was 17 obligated to view all evidence a nd fac tual inferences in the light most favorableto Alabama. Nat' l Parks Conservation Ass' n v. Norton, 324 F .3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). 37 s a t i s f y i t s e l f of the i rr e l i a bi l i ty be f

or e r e l y i ng on thos e a s s e r t i ons i n r e c ogni z i ng a n e w f u n d a m e n ta l c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t. 17 M or e ove r , thi s unc r i t i c a l r e l i a nc e on M a i ne s ’ s a s s e r t i ons a ppe a r s t o ha ve be e n ty pi c a l of

a l a r ge rpa t t e r n. F ore xa m pl e , the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on di s c us s i on w a s l a r ge l y a pa r a phr a s e d ve r s i on of the A C L U ’ s m ot i on f

or s um m a r y j udgm e nta nd i t s f a c tua l s uppor ta ppe a r s t o ha ve c ons i s t e d e nt i r e l y of the A C L U ’ s pl ea di ng s a nd se l ec t i ve append i ce s of hi st ori ca l i nt erpret at i on s of s ex throu gh ou tA m er i ca n h i st ory. O f the 10 4 sup po rt i ng foot no t es i n t he di stri ct c our t ’ s hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on a na l y s i s , 99 w e r e c i t a t i ons t o the s e pl e a di ngs a nd a p p e n d ic e s . i i . T h e D i stri ctC o u rt ’ s R el i an ce o n A l ab am a’ s “ C o n cessi o n s” T h e d istrict co u rt’s ra ti o n ale f o r its w h o lesa le ad o p ti o n o f th e A C L U ’s evi dence appear s t o h ave been i t s m i st aken vi ew thatthe A l abam a A t t orney G e n e r a l h a d c o n c e d e d th e A C L U ’s e v id e n c e o n th e h is to r y a n d tr a d itio n q u e s tio n . T he di stri ctcourt , as pref ac e t o i t s G l ucksberg hi st ory a nd tra di t i on anal ys i s, st at ed tha t“ the c our tnot e s tha ti ti s e xtr e m e l y s i gni f i c a nt , i f notdi s pos i t i ve , tha tthe A t t orney G ener al concedes that‘ there i s l i t t l e e vi dence t o sho w thatse xu al38

d e v ic e s , o rc o n s e n s u a l s e x u a l a c tiv itie s in g e n e r a l, h a v e h is to r ic a lly b e e n s u b je c t to gove r nm e nt a l r e gul a t i on. ’ ” W i l l i a m s I I I , 220 F . S upp. 2d. a t1277 ( quot i ng A t t orney G ener al ’ s M em orandu m i n S up po rtof M ot i on for S um m ary J ud gm ent , at 16 ). T hi s notonl y m i s quot e d the A t t or ne y G e ne r a l ’ s a c tua l l a ngua ge , but m i s c ha r a c t e r i z e d i ta s a “ c onc e s s i on. ” I n hi s m e m or a ndum s uppor t i ng hi s m ot i on f ors um m a r y j udgm e nt , the A t t or ne y G e ne r a l ha d de vot e d a s e c t i on t o de s c r i bi ng V i ct ori an-e raproscr i pt i on s, and enforcement there of, on se xu al devi ce s. R 3-78 at 14 -16. T he fol l ow i ng se ct i on began, “ A l tho ug h t here i s l i t t l e addi t i onal evi dence t o s how tha ts e xua l de vi c e s , orc ons e ns ua l s e xua l a c t i vi t i e s i n ge ne r a l , ha ve h is to r ic a lly b e e n s u b

je c t to g o v e r n m e n ta l r e g u la tio n , th e r e is a ls o n o e v id e n c e to s how tha tthe s e a c t i vi t i e s ha ve be e n s pe c i a l l y pr ot e c t e d unde rthe l a w . ” I d. a t16 (e m ph as i s a dd ed). T hatse ct i on w enton t o m ent i on som e of that“ addi t i on al evi dence, ” s uch as e ff

ort s by the st at es t o res tri ctse xu al devi ce s. Id. T he di stri ct c our t ’ s om i s s i on of

the c r i t i c a l w or d “ a ddi t i ona l , ” a s w e l l a s i t s out - of - c ont e xt qu ot at i on of a pre fa t ory dependentcl ause , si gn i fi ca nt l y a l t er ed the m ea ni ng of a st at em en tth at , i n p ro p er co n t ex t , ap p ears i n n o w ay t o h av e b een i n t en d ed as a c o n c e s s io n o f

o n e o f th e m o s t s ig n if

ic a n t a n d c o n te s te d is s u e s in th e c a s e .39

S i m i l ar l y, the di stri ctcourtel se w here st at ed: “ T he A t t orney G ener al c o n c e d e s th a t ‘th e r e is n o g e n u in e d is p u te a s to th e h is to r ic a l c h r o n o lo g y s e t f o r th b y th e p la in tif

f s ' ex p e r ts ,’ to th e e f

f e c t th a t th e r e is a ‘h is to r y o rtr a d itio n o f s ta te non- i nt e r f

e r e nc e i n pe r s ons s e x l i ve s . ’ ” W i l l i a m s I I I , 220 F . S upp. 2d. a t1276 (quo t i ng A t t orney G ener al ’ s M em orandu m i n S up po rtof M ot i on for S um m ary J u d g m e n t, a t 1 6 ) . In fa ct , the A t t orney G ener al conceded on l y t o t he his t or i c al c hr onol ogy se t f o r th b y th e A C L U ’s e x p e r ts a n d th e lib e r a liz a tio n o f a ttitu d e s to w a r d s s e x th a t th is chrono l og y dem on stra t ed. R 3-78 at12 . H ow ever , the A t t orney G ener al never conceded a “ hi st ory or tra di t i on of st at e non -i nt er fe re nce i n p er sons se x l i ves. ” S i gn i fi ca nt l y, the A t t orney G ener al ’ s use of thatph ra se appeare d fou r s ent ence s pr i ort o the “ c hr onol ogy ” c onc e s s i on a nd i t s e l f w a s pa r tof

a s e nt e nc e di s put i ng the A C L U ’ s v ersi o n o f h i st o ry an d trad i t i o n : “ In at t em p t i n g t o d em o n strat e a ‘ h i st o ry’ o r‘tr a d itio n ’ o f

s ta te n o n - in te r f

e r e n c e in p e r s o n s ’ s e x liv e s , [ th e A C L U ’s ] e x p e r ts ha ve pr of

f e r e d a l e ngthy hi s t or y of s e xua l i ty . ” I d. T he di s tr i c tc our t ’ s om i s s i on of the quot a t i on m a r ks s ur r oundi ng “ hi s t or y ” a nd “ tr a di t i on” pa r t i c ul a r l y di s t or t e d the A tto r n e y G e n e r a l’s m e a n in g . T he di stri ctcourt ’ s r el i ance on these “ conces si on s” appears t o h ave been s ubs t a nt i a l . I n a nnounc i ng i t s hol di ng tha tthe A C L U ’ s e vi de nc e de m ons tr a t e d a40

fund am ent al ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy , the di stri ctcourtstre ss ed that“ [t ] he A t t orney G e ne r a l ha s c onc e de d pl a i nt i f f s ’ e vi de nc e i n thi s r e ga r d. ” W i l l i a m s I I I , 220 F . S upp. 2d. a t1294; s e e a l s o i d. a t1295 ( “ G i ve n the br e a dth, de pth, vol um e , a nd w e ig h t o f

th a t e v id e n c e , a n d th e A tto r n e y G e n e r a l’s c o n c e s s io n , th is c o u r t is c o m p e lle d to a g r e e [ w ith p la in tif f s - a p p e lle e s ].” ) ; id . a t 1 2 9 5 - 9 6 ( h o ld in g th a t, in l i gh tof the A C L U ’ s e vi dence “ and t he concess i on t o t hi s e vi dence by the A t t orney G e n e r a l, th is c o u r t c o n c lu d e s th a t p la in tif f s h a v e m e t th e irb u r d e n ” ) . T o t he cont ra ry , the A t t orney G ener al ’ s pl ea di ng s, w hi l e notdi sput i ng m uch o f th e A C L U ’s e v id e n c e a b o u t th e lib e r a liz a tio n o f s e x u a l n o r m s , v ig o r o u s ly d is p u te d b o th ( a ) th e le g a l r a m if ic a tio n s o f

th a t lib e r a liz a tio n ( e .g ., th a t th is l i be r a l i z a t i on, i n i t s e l f

, s a t i s f i e d the f unda m e nt a l - r i ght s thr e s hol d) a s w e l l a s ( b) the cont ent i on thatse xu al devi ce s had go ne vi rtual l y unregul at ed throu gh ou tA m er i ca n hi st ory. R 3-78 at12 -20. W e c on cl ud e, ho w ever , thatthe di stri ctcourt ’ s r el i ance on the s e put a t i ve c onc e s s i ons w a s , a tw or s t , ha r m l e s s e r r or . T he i s s ue s tha tthe di stri ctcourttre at ed as havi ng been conceded pert ai ned t o t he exi st ence of a fund am ent al ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy , w hi ch, as w e e xp l ai ned sup ra , w as an ov er b r o a d f r a m in g o f

th e in q u ir y in th e f

ir s t p la c e . I I I . CONCL US I ON41

H u n t i n g ex p ed i t i o n s th atseek tro p h y g am e i n th e fu n d am en t al -ri g h t s fo rest m us the e d the m a xi m “ l ook be f or e y ou s hoot . ” S uc h e xc ur s i ons , i f e m ba r ke d upon r e c kl e s s l y , e nda nge rthe ve r y e c os y s t e m i n w hi c h s uc h l i be r t i e s thr i ve — our r e p u b lic a n d e m o c r a c y . O n c e e le v a te d to c o n s titu tio n a l s ta tu s , a r ig h t is e f f e c tiv e ly r e m ove d f

r om the ha nds of

the pe opl e a nd pl a c e d i nt o the gua r di a ns hi p of un el ec t ed j ud ges. S ee G l ucksberg, 52 1 U . S . at72 0, 11 7 S . C t . at22 67 -68. W e a re pa r t i c ul a r l y m i ndf

ul of thi s f a c ti n the de l i c a t e a r e a of m or a l s l e gi s l a t i on. O ne of the vi r tue s of

the de m oc r a t i c pr oc e s s i s tha t , unl i ke the j udi c i a l pr oc e s s , i tne e d not t a ke m a t t e r s t o the i rl ogi c a l c onc l us i on. I f the pe opl e of

A l a ba m a i n t i m e de c i de thata prohi bi t i on on se x t oys i s m i sgui ded, or i neff ec t i ve, or j ustpl ai n si l l y, they ca n repeal the l aw and b e f i ni shed w i th t he m att er . O n t he ot her hand, i f w e t od ay c r a f ta ne w f unda m e nt a l r i ghtby w hi c h t o i nva l i da t e the l a w , w e w oul d be bound t o g i ve thatri gh tful l forc e a nd ef fe cti n al l future c as es — i ncl ud i ng , for e xam pl e, tho se i nv ol vi ng adul ti nces t , prost i tut i on , ob sc eni ty, and t he l i ke. T h e d is s e n t e lo q u e n tly q u o te s J u s tic e B r a n d e is in its o p e n in g p a s s a g e s . W e f in d m e r it in th e w is d o m o f J u s tic e F e lix F r a n k f

u r te rin h is c o n c u r r in g o p in io n in D ennis v . U

ni ted St at es , 341 U . S . 494, 525, 71 S . C t . 857, 875 ( 1951) , w he n he obs e r ve d: C ou rt s a re no tre pres ent at i ve bo di es . T hey a re no tdesi gn ed t o b e a g o o d r e f le x o f a d e m o c r a tic s o c ie ty . ... T h e ire s s e n tia l q u a lity is42

de t a c hm e nt , f

ounde d on i nde pe nde nc e . H i s t or y t e a c he s tha tthe i n d e p e n d e n c e o f

th e j u d i c i a r y i s j e o p a r d i z e d w h e n c o u r t s b e c o me em broi l ed i n t he pass i on s of the day a nd as sum e pri m ary r e s pons i bi l i ty i n c hoos i ng be tw e e n c om pe t i ng pol i t i c a l , e c onom i c a nd so ci al p ressu res. F or the re as on s w e have expl ai ned, w e hol d t hatthe di stri ctcourtcom m i t t ed r e ve r s i bl e e r r ori n c onc l udi ng tha tthe D ue P r oc e s s C l a us e “ e nc om pa s s [ e s ] a r i ght t o u se se xu al devi ce s l i ke . . . vi brat ors, di l do s, anal beads, and art i fi ci al vagi nas. ” W i l l i am s III, 2 2 0 F . S u p p . 2 d . at1 2 9 6 . M o reo v er, w e rej ectth e A C L U ’ s req u est thatw e r edef

i ne the const i tut i on al ri gh tt o p ri vacy t o cov erthe com m er ci al d istrib u ti o n o f s ex to ys . W e R E V E R S E th e d istrict co u rt’s g ra n t o f th e A C L U ’s m ot i on for s um m ary j ud gm entand R E M A N D t o t he di stri ctcourtfor f urther p r o c e e d in g s c o n s is te n t w ith th is o p in io n .43

B A R K E T T , C i r c ui tJ udge , di s s e nt i ng: T he m a j or i ty ’ s de c i s i on r e s t s on the e r r one ous f ounda t i on tha tthe r e i s no s ubs t a nt i ve due pr oc e s s r i ghtt o a dul tc ons e ns ua l s e xua l i nt i m a c y i n the hom e a nd e r r o n e o u s ly a s s u m e s th a t th e p r o m o tio n o f p u b lic m o r a lity p r o v id e s a r a tio n a l b a s is to c r im in a lly b u r d e n s u c h p r iv a te in tim a te a c tiv ity . T h e s e p r e m is e s d ir e c tly c onf l i c tw i th the S upr e m e C our t ’ s hol di ng i n L a w r e nc e v. T e xa s , 123 S . C t . 2472 (200 3). T h is c a s e is n o t, a s th e m a jo r ity ’s d e m e a n in g a n d d is m is s iv e a n a ly s is sugg es t s, abou tse x o r abo utse xu al devi ce s. Iti s abo utthe tra di t i on of A m er i ca n ci t i ze ns fr om the i ncept i on of ou r dem ocra cy t o v al ue the const i tut i on al l y prot ec t ed r ig h t to b e le f

t a lo n e in th e p r iv a c y o f th e irb e d r o o m s a n d p e r s o n a l r e la tio n s h ip s . A s J us t i c e B r a nde i s s t a t e d i n the now f a m ous w or ds of

hi s di s s e nti n O l m s t e a d v. U ni t e d S t a t e s , 277 U . S . 438 ( 1928) , w he n “ [ t ] he m a ke r s of ourC ons t i tut i on un dert oo k t o sec ure c on di t i on s f avorabl e t o t he pu rs ui tof happ i ness . . . [t ] hey co n ferred , as ag ai n stth e g o v ern m en t , th e ri g h tt o b e l etal o n e– th e m o st com prehensi ve of ri gh t s a nd the ri gh tm ostval ued b y c i vi l i ze d m en. ” 277 U . S . at 4 7 8 ( Br a n d e i s , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) o v e r ru l e d b y Be r g e rv . St a t e o f N e w Y o r k , 3 8 8 U . S. 41 (196 7); K at z v. U ni t ed S t at es , 38 9 U . S . 34 7 (19 67 ).44

T he m a j or i ty c l a i m s tha tL a w r e nc e , l i ke B ow e r s v. H a r dw i c k, 478 U . S . 186 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , f a ile d to r e c o g n iz e th e s u b s ta n tiv e d u e p r o c e s s r ig h t o f c o n s e n tin g a d u lts to e nga ge i n pr i va t e s e xua l c onduc t . C onc e di ng tha tL a w r e nc e m us tha ve done s om e thi ng, the m a

j or i ty a c know l e dge s tha tL a w r e nc e “ e s t a bl i s he d the un const i tut i on al i ty of c ri m i nal proh i bi t i on s on con se nsual adul tsodo m y. ” M a j or i ty O p. a t*10. T he m a j or i ty r e f us e s , how e ve r , t o a c know l e dge w hy the C ou rti n L aw re nce hel d t hatcr i m i nal proh i bi t i on s on con se nsual sodo m y a re u n c o n s titu tio n a l. T h is f a ilu r e u n d e r lie s th e m a

jo r ity ’s f la w e d c o n c lu s io n in th is ca se . A s e xpl a i ne d m or e f ul l y be l ow , L a w r e nc e he l d tha ta s t a t e m a y not cr i m i nal i ze sodo m y bec ause of the exi st ence of the very ri gh tt o p ri vat e s exual in tim a c y th a t th e m a

jo r ity r e f u s e s to a c k n o w le d g e . L a w r e n c e r e ite r a te d th a t its pr i orf unda m e nt a l r i ght s c a s e s pr ot e c t e d i ndi vi dua l c hoi c e s “ c onc e r ni ng the i nt i m ac i es of [a ] ph ys i ca l re l at i on shi p. ” L aw re nce, 12 3 S . C t . at24 83 (i nt ernal qu ot at i on m arks and ci t at i on om i t t ed). B ec ause of thi s pre ce dent , the L aw re nce C o u r t o v e r ru le d B o w e r s , c o n c lu d in g th a t B o w e r s h a d “m is a p p r e h e n d e d th e c la im of l i be r ty the r e pr e s e nt e d” a s i nvol vi ng a pa r t i c ul a rs e xua l a c tr a the rtha n the b r o a d e rr i g h to f

a d u l ts e x u a l p r i v a c y . I d . a t2 4 7 8 . I n s t e a d o f h e e d i n g th e Su p r e me C our t ’ s i ns truc t i on r e ga r di ng B ow e r s ’ e r r or , the m a j or i ty r e pe a t s i t , i gnor i ngSe eRoev. Wade , 4 10 U. S. 1 13 , 1 39 (1 97 3) ; se ea lso Carey v. Pop ulatio n Serv ic e s Int’ l, 1 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. B aird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). As the majority

acknow ledg es, thereis no constituti onal distinction between a ban on 2 the privateuse of se xtoy s and a ba n on the sale of

sex t oys. See Majority

Op. at *21 (“ For purposes of c onstitut ional analysis, restrictions on the ability to purcha se an item a

re ta ntamount to re stric tio ns on

theus eof

that it e m.” ). Ac c ording ly , A la bama c ann ot b eperm itt e d to a c c o mp l i s hi n di r e c t l y wh ati ti s n o tc o n s t i tut i o n a l l y p e r m i tt e d t o d o di r e c t l y. 45 L a w r e nc e ’ s t e a c hi ngs a bouthow t o c or r e c t l y f r a m e a l i be r ty i nt e r e s ta f f e c t i ng s e x u a l p r iv a c y . C om po un di ng thi s e rr or, the m aj ori ty a l so i gn ores L aw re nce’ s hol di ng that a l though hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on m a y be us e d a s a “ s t a r t i ng poi nt , ” the y a r e notthe

“ e ndi ng poi nt ” of

a s ubs t a nt i ve due pr oc e s s i nqui r y . I d. a t2480 ( i nt e r na l quot a t i on m arks and ci t at i on om i t t ed). In ca se s s ol el y i nv ol vi ng adul tconsensual se xu al pr i va c y , the C our tha s ne ve rr e qui r e d tha tthe r e be a l ong- s t a ndi ng hi s t or y of af fi rm at i ve l egal prot ec t i on of spec i fi c c on du ctbefore a r i gh tca n b e r ec og ni ze d un der the D ue P roce ss C l ause . T o t he cont ra ry , beca use of the fund am ent al nature o f th is lib e r ty in te r e s t, th is r ig h t h a s b e e n p r o te c te d b y th e C o u r t d e s p ite h is to r ic a l, l egi sl at i ve re stri ct i on s on p ri vat e s exual cond uct . A pp l yi ng the anal yt i ca l 1 fram ew o rk o f L aw ren ce co m p el s th e co n cl u si o n th atth e D u e P ro cess C l au se p ro t ect s a ri g h tt o sex u al p ri v acy th aten co m p asses th e u se o f sex u al d ev i ces. 2 F i na l l y , e ve n unde rthe m a j or i ty ’ s ow n c ons tr a i ne d a nd e r r one ous in te rp r e ta tio n o f

L a w r e n c e , w e a r e , a t a b a r e m in im u m , o b lig e d to r e v is it th isIhave also developed the se arguments in my dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc 3 in L ofton v. Sec. of D ept. of Children a nd Family

Servs., __ F.3d ___, ( 11th Cir. J an. 28, 2004) (B arke tt, J ., dissenting) . 46 C our t ’ s pr e vi ous c onc l us i on i n W i l l i a m s v. P r y or , 240 F . 3d 944 ( 11th C i r . 2001) ( “ W i l l i a m s I I ” ) , tha tA l a ba m a ’ s l a w s ur vi ve s the m os tba s i c l e ve l of r e vi e w , tha tof r a t i ona l ba s i s . S e e 240 F . 3d a t949. T ha tde c i s i on e xpl i c i t l y de pe nde d upon the f in d in g in B o w e r s th a t th e p r o m o tio n o f p u b lic m o r a lity p r o v id e d a r a tio n a l b a s is to re stri ctpri vat e s exual ac t i vi ty. Id. W hi l e the m aj ori ty r ec og ni ze s thatB ow er s has be e n ove r rul e d, i ti ne xpl i c a bl y f a i l s t o of f e ra ny e xpl a na t i on w ha t s oe ve rf orw hy p u b lic m o r a lity p r o v id e s a r a tio n a l b a s is to c r im in a liz e th e p r iv a te s e x u a l a c tiv ity in th is c a s e , w h e n it w a s c le a r ly n o t f o u n d to b e a le g itim a te s ta te in te r e s t in L a w r e n c e . F o ra ll o f th e s e r e a s o n s , w h ic h a r e a m p lif ie d b e lo w , I d is s e n t. I . L aw r e n c e R e c ogn i z e d a S u b s t an t i ve D u e P r oc e s s R i gh t t o S e xu al Pr i v a c y. 3 T h ere i s n o q u est i o n th atL aw ren ce w as d eci d ed o n su b st an t i v e d u e p ro cess grou nd s. T he do ctri ne of subst ant i ve du e proces s r equi re s, fi rs t , thatevery l aw m ustaddres s i n a re l evantw ay on l y al egi t i m at e gov ernm ent al pu rpose. In ot her w o rd s, n o l aw m ay b e arb i trary an d cap ri ci o u s b u trath er m u stad d ress a p erm i ssi b l e st at e i n t eresti n a w ay th ati s rat i o n al l y rel at ed t o th ati n t erest . A s aThe SupremeCourt has explained that this right includes the a bility of adults to make 4 de c isi on s re latin gto t

heri ght t o a

bo rtion , Ro e , 4 10 U. S. 1 13 ; c ontra c epti on , E isens ta dt, 40 5 U .S. 43 8 a nd Grisw old , 3 81 U. S. 4 79 ; ma rriag e , L ov ingv. Virg ini a , 3 88 U. S. 1 (1 96 7) ; f amily relationships, P rincev. Massac husetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); procreation, Skinner v. Okla homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and c hild rearing a nd education, Pi erc e v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) a nd Meyer v. N ebra ska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). T h e m aj o ri ty

ac kn o wl ed ges th atati s s u e i nth i s ca s e i s “th e D u e P ro ce s s C l au s e's 5 substantive component, which c ourts have longrec ognized as providing ‘ heightened protection a g a ins t g ov e rnme nt interf e renc ewi th c e rt a in f

un dame ntal rights and

lib e rt y int e re sts .’ ”Ma

jority Op. at *7 (quotingTroxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000)). 47 co n seq u en ce, an y l aw ch al l en g ed as v i o l at i n g a su b st an t i v e d u e p ro cess ri g h tm u st s u r v iv e r a tio n a l- b a s is r e v ie w . H o w ev er, th e S u p rem e C o u rth as fo u n d th atso m e d eci si o n s are so f unda m e nt a l a nd c e ntr a l t o hum a n l i be r ty tha tthe y a r e pr ot e c t e d a s pa r tof a r i ght to p r iv a c y u n d e rth e D u e P r o c e s s C la u s e , a n d th e g o v e r n m e n t m a y c o n s titu tio n a lly 4 r e s tr ic t th e s e d e c is io n s o n ly if it h a s m o r e th a n a n o r d in a r y ru n - o f - th e - m ill go vernm ent al pu rpose. In such ca se s, the C ou rtsubj ec t s these go vernm ent al 5 r e s tr i c t i ons t o a he i ght e ne d s c rut i ny , r e qui r i ng tha tl e gi s l a t i on be “ na r r ow l y dr a w n”Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (“Where certain fundamental rights are involved, theCourt has 6 held that re gulation limi ting theserights may be justified only

by a compe lling state interest” a nd that such leg islation “must be narrow ly drawn”) ( internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). The only sexual privacy

casewhere the Court did not use this languag e wa s in Pl anned Parenth oo d o f S outhe a stern Pe nn sylva

nia v. Ca sey , 5 05 U. S. 8 33 (1 99 2) , whereit a naly zed c ivi l burde ns on

a wo man’ s right t o a

bo rtion , n ot a

n o utright c rimin a l ba

n. Th eCourt

fo un d th at a state re gulation that had “the pur pose or e ffe ct of plac ing a substantial obstacle in the path of a wo man s e e kingan a

bo rtion of a no nv ia blefetus ”wo uld

plac ean “un du eburde n”on theri ght t o abortion and theref

ore beunconstitutional. Casey , 505 U.S. at 877. Se e , e .g ., Carey , 4 31 U. S. at 68 5 a nd Grisw old , 3 81 U. S. at 48 6 (ri ght t o u se 7 contra ception); Casey , 505 U.S. at 869 (right to seek out an a bortion). 48 to a c h ie v e a “c o m p e llin g s ta te in te r e s t.” I n c lu d e d w ith in th is r ig h t to p r iv a c y is 6 th e ab i l i ty t o m ak e d eci si o n s ab o u ti n t i m at e sex u al m at t ers. 7 In i nv al i dat i ng the sodo m y s t atut e a ti ss ue i n L aw re nce, the C ou rtre af fi rm ed th i s ri g h tt o sex u al p ri v acy, fi n d i n g th atp ri v at e h o m o sex u al co n d u cti s l i k ew i se e nc om pa s s e d w i thi n i t . F r om i t s ope ni ng pa r a gr a ph, the C our te xpl a i ne d the i m po rt ance of the l i berty a ti ss ue here: L i be r ty pr ot e c t s the pe r s on f r om unw a r r a nt e d gove r nm e nti ntrus i ons i nt o a dw e l l i ng orothe rpr i va t e pl a c e s . I n ourtr a di t i on the S t a t e i s not om ni pr e s e nti n the hom e . A nd the r e a r e othe rs phe r e s of ourl i ve s a nd e xi s t e nc e , out s i de the hom e , w he r e the S t a t e s houl d notbe a dom i na nt p r e s e n c e . . . T h e in s ta n t c a s e in v o lv e s lib e r ty o f th e p e r s o n b o th in its s p a tia l a n d m o r e tr a n s c e n d e n t d im e n s io n s . L aw re nce, 12 3 S . C t . at24 75 . T he L aw re nce C ou rtno t ed i n i t s opi ni on thati thad grant ed ce rt i orar i spec i fi ca l l y t o con si der “ [w ] hether P et i t i on er s’ cr i m i nal conv i ct i on s f

or adul tconsensual se xu al i nt i m ac y i n t he ho m e vi ol at e thei r vi t al i nt e r e s t s i n l i be r ty a nd pr i va c y pr ot e c t e d by the D ue P r oc e s s C l a us e of theUnlike the sodomy statute at issue in L awrence , which only applied to homosexual 8 se xua l c on du c t, t

heGe org ia

statut ein B ow e rs c rimin a lize d a c ts o f s odomy e ng a g e d in

by bo th heterosexuals and homosexuals. See B ower s, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1. The L awrenceCourt indicated that the sodomy statute could havebeen invalidated usingan equal protection analy sis. 123 S. Ct . at 2482. Indeed, this wa s the conc lusion of Justice O’Connor in her concurrence. Id. at 2484-88 (O ’Connor, J., concurring ). The L awrencemajority

went on to state that “ [w] hen homosexual conduct is made 9 criminal by

the law of

the State, that dec laration in and of itself is an invitation to subj ect homosexual per sons to discrimination both i n the public and in the private spheres.” 123 S.Ct. at 2482. Although E isenstadt was de cided on e qual protec tion grounds, the Court in L awrence

10 noted that Eisenstadt “w ent on to state the funda mental proposition that the law impaire d the 49 F our t e e nth A m e ndm e nt ? ” I d. a t2476 ( i nt e r na l quot a t i on m a r ks a nd c i t a t i on o m i t t ed ) (em p h asi s ad d ed ). W h i l e th e C o u rtal so g ran t ed cert i o rari t o ad d ress w hether T exas ’ s s od om y s t atut e vi ol at ed the E qu al P rot ec t i on C l ause , the C ou rt 8 ex p l i ci t l y d eci d ed t o resti t s h o l d i n g o n a su b st an t i v e d u e p ro cess an al ysi s b ecau se i tfo u n d th ati f a so d o m y l aw “ rem ai n [ed ] u n ex am i n ed fo r i t s su b st an t i v e v al i d i ty, i t s s t i gm a m i gh tre m ai n even i f i tw er e notenforce abl e a s dra w n for equal p r o te c tio n r e a s o n s .” I d. a t2482. T he C our ts t a t e d tha tthe “ c a s e s houl d be 9 r e s o lv e d b y d e te r m in in g w h e th e rth e p e titio n e r s w e r e f r e e a s a d u lts to e n g a g e in th e p ri v at e [sex u al ] co n d u cti n th e ex erci se o f th ei r l i b erty u n d er th e D u e P ro cess C la u s e o f

th e F o u r te e n th A m e n d m e n t.” I d . a t 2 4 7 6 . I n r e s o lv in g th is is s u e o f w h e th e rth e p e titio n e r s w e r e “f r e e a s a d u lts ” to en g ag e i n “ p ri v at e [sex u al ] co n d u ct , ” th e C o u rtretraced i t s su b st an t i v e d u e p ro cess ju r is p ru d e n c e b y d is c u s s in g th e f u n d a m e n ta l r ig h ts c a s e s o f G r is w o ld , E is e n s ta d t, 10exercise of . . . personal rights.” 123 S. Ct. at 2477. Further, while L awrencecited Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), a s an example of how B ower s had been cast into doubt, the Court immediately

declined to de cide the c ase under Romer’s e qual protec tion rationale, instead insisti ngthat the dec ision be resolved on substantive dueproce ss grounds. I d. at 2482. 50 R o e , a n d C a r e y a n d e m p h a s iz e d th e b r e a d th o f th e irh o ld in g s a s in v o lv in g p r iv a te de c i s i ons r e ga r di ng i nt i m a t e phy s i c a l r e l a t i ons hi ps . I d. a t2476- 77, 2483. B e gi nni ng w i th G r i s w ol d, the L a w r e nc e C our tf ound tha ti t s pr i orde c i s i ons co n fi rm ed “ th atth e p ro t ect i o n o f l i b erty u n d er th e D u e P ro cess C l au se h as a s ubs t a nt i ve di m e ns i on of f unda m e nt a l s i gni f

i c a nc e i n de f

i ni ng the r i ght s of

the pers on ” a nd “ thatthe ri gh tt o m ake c er t ai n d ec i si on s r egar di ng se xu al cond uct e xt e nds be y ond the m a r i t a l r e l a t i ons hi p. ” I d. a t2477 ( s um m a r i z i ng G r i s w ol d, E is e n s ta d t, R o e , a n d C a r e y ) . B e c a us e of

the e xi s t e nc e of

thi s r i ghtt o m a ke pr i va t e de c i s i ons r e ga r di ng s e xua l c onduc t , the L a w r e nc e C our tw a s c om pe l l e d t o ove r rul e the a nom a l y of B o w e r s , w h ic h h a d f

a ile d to a c k n o w le d g e th is r ig h t in p e r m ittin g G e o r g ia to c r i m i na l i z e s odom y . S e e B ow e r s , 478 U . S . a t194- 96. L a w r e nc e f ound tha ta tthe t i m e of the B ow e r s de c i s i on the C our t ’ s pr i orhol di ngs ha d a l r e a dy m a de

“ a bunda nt l y c l e a r ” tha ti ndi vi dua l s ha ve a s ubs t a nt i ve due pr oc e s s r i ghtt o m a ke deci si on s “ concerni ng the i nt i m ac i es of thei r physi ca l re l at i on shi p[s] , even w hen no ti nt ended t o p rodu ce offs pri ng . ”123 S . C t . at24 83 (quo t i ng B ow er s, 47 8 U . S . atIn Carey, the Court wrote that it had “not definitively answered thedifficult question 11 wh e ther a nd to what e xtent th eCon sti tution proh ibi ts s tatestatut e s re gulatin g(p rivate consensual sexual) behavior among adults.” 431 U.S. at 688 n.5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 51 2 1 6 ( S te v e n s , J ., d is s e n tin g ) ) . T he L aw re nce C ou rtthere fore concl ud ed that “B o w e r s w a s n o t c o r r e c t w h e n it w a s d e c id e d .” I d . a t 2 4 8 4 ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ) . G iv en th es e s tatem en ts in L aw re n ce , I fa il to u n d er stan d th e m ajo rity’s r e l i a nc e on a f

ootnot e f r om the S upr e m e C our t ’ s 1977 de c i s i on i n C a r e y , w he r e the C ou rti nd i ca t ed i n d i ct a thati thad n ot“ defi ni t i vel y a nsw er ed” the ext entt o w hi ch th e D u e P r o c e s s C la u s e p r o te c ts th e p r iv a te s e x u a l c o n d u c t o f c o n s e n tin g a d u lts . M aj ori ty O p. at*9 , 12 (c i t i ng C ar ey , 43 1 U . S . at68 8 n . 5). O bv i ou sl y, C ar ey 11 do es no tre sol ve i n any w ay the m ea ni ng of a c as e thatcom es tw enty- si x yea rs la te r . N o rd o e s it p r e v e n t L a w r e n c e f r o m a n s w e r in g th e v e r y q u e s tio n p o s e d in C a r e y ’ s f ootnot e . L a w r e nc e doe s pr e c i s e l y thi s i n a f f i r m i ng the r i ghtof

c ons e nt i ng adul t s t o m ake pri vat e s exual deci si on s. M oreover, thi s c ou l d n othave been a new r ig h t. C a r e y ’s f

o o tn o te n o tw ith s ta n d in g , th e L a w r e n c e C o u r t d e te r m in e d th a t its pr e - B ow e r s de c i s i ons ha d a l r e a dy r e c ogni z e d a r i ghtt o s e xua l pr i va c y . T hi s i s the onl y w a y t o m a ke s e ns e of the L a w r e nc e C our t ’ s s t a t e m e nt s tha tB ow e r s w a s “ not c or r e c tw he n i tw a s de c i de d, ” a nd tha ti t s de c i s i ons be f or e B ow e r s ha d a l r e a dy m a de “ a bunda nt l y c l e a r ” tha ta dul t s ha ve a r i ghtt o m a ke de c i s i ons “ c onc e r ni ng the52

i nt i m a c i e s of

the i rphy s i c a l r e l a t i ons hi p[ s ] . ” L a w r e nc e , 123 S . C t . a t2483- 84 (i nt ernal qu ot at i on m arks and ci t at i on om i t t ed). I n l i ghtof

the C our t ’ s c onc l us i on tha ti t s pr i orde c i s i ons i n G r i s w ol d, E i se nst adt , C ar ey , and R oe had al re ady m ade “ abun dant l y c l ea r” thatadul t s have a r ig h t to m a k e in tim a te d e c is io n s a b o u t th e irs e x u a l r e la tio n s h ip s , th e m a jo r ity ca nn otse ri ou sl y m ai nt ai n t hatthi s di ss ent“ never i dent i fi es ” a prec edent i al source of the ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy . M aj ori ty O p. at*1 2. T he m aj ori ty’ s a rgum entthat th is d is s e n t f

a ils to id e n tif

y a te x tu a l s o u r c e o f

th e r ig h t to s e x u a l p r iv a c y is e q u a lly u n t en ab l e. Id . A s n o t ed b el o w , th e L aw ren ce C o u rth el d th atth e p et i t i o n ers’ “r ig h t to lib e r ty u n d e rth e D u e P r o c e s s C la u s e g iv e s th e m th e f u ll r ig h t to e n g a g e in th e ir[ p r iv a te s e x u a l] c o n d u c t w ith o u t in te r v e n tio n o f th e g o v e r n m e n t.” 1 2 3 S . C t. a t2484 ( e m pha s i s a dde d) . T he C our tc oul d notha ve be e n m or e c l e a rtha tthe pe t i t i one r s ’ r i ghtt o e nga ge i n pr i va t e s e xua l c onduc tha s i t s t e xtua l l oc us i n the D u e P r o c e s s C la u s e . B ow er s e rr ed because i t“ m i sapp re hend ed the cl ai m of l i berty there p r e s e n te d ” w h e n it f

r a m e d th e is s u e b e f

o r e it a s w h e th e rth e C o n s titu tio n p r o te c ts

“ a f un dam ent al ri gh tt o eng age i n con se nsual sodo m y” : T o s a y th a t th e is s u e in B o w e r s w a s s im p ly th e r ig h t to e n g a g e in c e r ta in s e x u a l c o n d u c t d e m e a n s th e c la im th e in d iv id u a l p u t f o r w a r d , ju s t a s it w oul d de m e a n a m a r r i e d c oupl e w e r e i tt o be s a i d m a r r i a ge i s s i m pl y a bout the ri gh tt o h ave s exual i nt er course . T he l aw s i nv ol ved i n B ow er s a nd here53

ar e, t o b e s ure, st atut es thatpu rportt o d o n o m ore than p rohi bi ta par t i cul ar s e xua l a c t . T he i rpe na l t i e s a nd purpos e s , though, ha ve m or e f a r - r e a c hi ng consequences, t ou chi ng up on the m ostpri vat e hum an cond uct , se xu al behavi or, and i n t he m ostpri vat e of pl ac es , the ho m e. L aw re nce, 12 3 S . C t . at24 78 (e m ph as i s a dd ed). In ot her w ords, B ow er s depar t ed f r om the pr ope ri nqui r y by f oc us i ng on a pa r t i c ul a rs e xua l a c ti ns t e a d of upon the ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy , w hi ch encom pass es ac t s of a du l tconsensual se xu al i nt i m a c y . A s I e xpl a i n i n the ne xts e c t i on, the m a j or i ty r e pe a t s the ve r y m i s t a ke m ade i n B ow er s by f

ocusi ng on w hether there i s ari gh tt o eng age i n a part i cul ar se xu al ac t– h er e the use of s exual devi ce s – ra ther than aski ng w hether the cond uct b u r d e n e d b y Al a b a m a ’ s s t a tu t e i n v o l v e s p r i v a t e c o n s e n s u a l s e x u a l i n t i m a c y . As L a w r e n c e d e m o n s tr a te s , s e x u a l in tim a c y is in e v ita b ly d e m e a n e d , a n d its i m por t a nc e t o the pr i va t e l i f e of the i ndi vi dua l tr i vi a l i z e d, w he n i ti s r e duc e d t o a p a r tic u la rs e x u a l o rp h y s ic a l a c t. A s the L aw re nce C ou rtexpl ai ned, the prop eri nq ui ry i s s i m pl y w hether a d u lts h a v e a r ig h t to e n g a g e in “p r iv a te [ s e x u a l] c o n d u c t in th e e x e r c is e o f th e ir lib e r ty u n d e rth e D u e P r o c e s s C la u s e o f th e F o u r te e n th A m e n d m e n t.” I d . a t 2 4 7 6 . In answ er i ng thi s quest i on , L aw re nce e xp re ss l y a do pt ed the re as on i ng of Just i ce S t ev en s’ d i ssen ti n B o w ers: [I ] nd i vi du al deci si on s by m arri ed pers on s, concerni ng the i nt i m ac i es of thei r physi ca l re l at i on shi p, even w hen n oti nt ended t o p rodu ce o ffsp ri n g , are a fo rm o f ‘ l i b erty’ p ro t ect ed b y th e D u e P ro cess C l au seTh ema jority argue s th at a c kn ow le dg inga ri ght o f adult s e xua l privac y wo uld le a d to 12 the invalidation of laws ba nning, a mong other thing s, prostituti on, incest, the use of hallucinog enic substanc es, child pornography, and bestiality . See Majority Op. at *18, 21 n.12. Here ag ain, the majority

fails to cre dit L awrence , which cle arly stated, for

purposes of guiding futurec ourt s, wh at th eri ght o f c on sens ual a dult s e xua l privac y is a nd is n ot a bo ut: The pre sent ca se does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or

coerced or

who are situated in re lationships where c onsent might not easily be re fused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitut ion. It does not inv olv ewh e ther t

heg ov e rnme nt m

us t g ivefo rm a l re c ognition to a ny re latio ns hip that homosexual per sons seek to enter. The c ase doe s involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from eac h other, eng ag ed in sexual practice s common to a homosexual li festyle. 123 S. Ct . at 2484 (e mphasis added) . As the Court explained, as a “ g eneral rule,”the state or a court should not attempt “to def ine the mea

ning of [a] relationship or to set it s boundaries a bsent injury to a per son or abuseof an institution the law protec ts.” I d. at 2478 (e mphasis added) . For e xamp le , in

thec a seof

pros tit uti on , th e remay

bea thre at th at in div idu a ls w illbeha rm e d, wh ile adult incest poses a

threat to the insti tution of the family and involves a “relationship[ ] where consent might not easily

be re fused.”I d. at 2484.

54 o f th e F o u r te e n th A m e n d m e n t. M o r e o v e r , th is p r o te c tio n e x te n d s to i n t i m at e ch o i ces b y u n m arri ed as w el l as m arri ed p erso n s. I d . a t 2 4 8 3 ( q u o tin g B o w e r s , 4 7 8 U .S . a t 2 1 6 ( S te v e n s , J ., d is s e n tin g ) ) ( e m p h a s is a dde d) . B e c a us e the pr i va t e c onduc ta ti s s ue i n L a w r e nc e a l s o c onc e r ne d the

“ i nt i m a c i e s ” of

a “ phy s i c a l r e l a t i ons hi p, ” the C our the l d tha tthe pe t i t i one r s ’ “ r i ght to lib e r ty u n d e rth e D u e P r o c e s s C la u s e g iv e s th e m th e f u ll r ig h t to e n g a g e in th e ir cond uctw i tho uti nt ervent i on of the go vernm ent . ” Id. at24 84 . T he L aw re nce 12 C o u r t’s a n s w e rto its q u e s tio n o f w h e th e ra d u lts h a v e a r ig h t to e n g a g e in p r iv a te s e xua l c onduc ti s c l e a r l y a bi ndi ng hol di ng. I know of no pr i nc i pl e of i nt erpret at i on thatsupp ort s, i n any w ay , the m aj ori ty’ s c hara ct er i za t i on asMajority Op. at *11. 13 As the majority

acknow ledg es, the SupremeCourt has held that the “ same test must be 14 a pp lie d to statere gulatio ns that bu rde n a n in div idu a l’ s right . . . by su bs tanti a lly

lim itinga c c e ss to the means of e ffe ctuatingthat decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision entirely .” Majority

Op. at *21-22 ( quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 688). 55 “ sc att er ed di ct a” the S up re m e C ou rt ’ s di re ctre spon se t o t he qu es t i on i tgrant ed 13 c e r t i or a r i t o a ns w e ra nd tha ti tf ound w a s ne c e s s a r y t o r e s ol ve be f or e di s pos i ng of the c a s e . S e e i d. a t2476 ( “ W e c onc l ude the c a s e s houl d be r e s ol ve d by d e te r m in in g w h e th e rth e p e titio n e r s w e r e f r e e a s a d u lts to e n g a g e in th e p r iv a te [ s e xua l ] c onduc ti n the e xe r c i s e of the i rl i be r ty unde rthe D ue P r oc e s s C l a us e of the F ou rt ee nt h A m endm ent . ”) .

L ik e b o th B o w e r s a n d L a w r e n c e , th is c a s e in v o lv e s “th e m o s t p r iv a te h u m an co n d u ct , sex u al b eh av i o r, ” o ccu rri n g “ i n th e m o stp ri v at e o f p l aces, the hom e . ” L a w r e nc e , 123 S . C t . a t2478. A l a ba m a ’ s s t a tut e , by pr ohi bi t i ng th e s a le o f

s e x u a l d e v ic e s , th u s a f

f e c ts th e s a m e “v ita l” lib e r ty in te r e s t in a d u lt c o n s e n s u a l s e x u a l in tim a c y th r e a te n e d b y th e s o d o m y s ta tu te s in B ow e r s a nd L a w r e nc e a nd s houl d l i ke w i s e be i nva l i da t e d. I be l i e ve the 14 ma j o r i ty e r r s i n i t s s tr a i n e d e f f o r tt o a v o i d th e f

a i ri mp o r to f

a Su p r e me C o u r t p r e c e d e n t. II . T h e M ajori ty Ign ores L aw re n ce ’s T each i n g R egard i n g th e P rop er Fr a m i ng o f

a Li be r t y I nt e r e s t a nd t he A ppr o pr i a t e U s e o f H i s t o r y.See Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Reno v. F lores, 507 U.S. 292 15 (1993). 56 Be c a u s e th e ma

j o r i ty e r r o n e o u s l y c o n c l u d e s th a tLa w r e n c e d i d n o tr e a f f i r m a subst ant i ve du e proces s r i gh tt o sexual pri vacy , i tatt em pt s t o con du cta G l ucksberg anal ys i s w i th res pectt o w hether t o rec og ni ze a “ hi thert o u nart i cul at ed fund am ent al r i ght . ” M a

j or i ty O p. a t*6, 14. I n doi ng s o, the m a j or i ty notonl y e r r s by proceedi ng as i f L aw re nce a nd i t s pre sc ri pt i on s f or cond uct i ng a f

un dam ent al r i ght s a na l y s i s do note xi s t , buta l s o e r r s by i nve nt i ng ne w c r i t e r i a tha ta r e not s u p p o r t e d b y Gl u c k s b e r g , F l o r e s , o ra n y o th e rc a s e l a w. 15 R egar dl es s of the m aj ori ty’ s bel i ef thatL aw re nce di d n otre cogn i ze a subst ant i ve du e proces s r i gh t , i tca nn otthen si m pl y c on du ctan anal ys i s that i gnor e s L a w r e nc e ’ s c l e a rs t a t e m e nt s a boutthe e r r one ous a na l y t i c a l f r a m e w or k of B o w e r s a n d r e p e a t th a t m e th o d o lo g y h e r e . E ven i f L aw re nce w er e noti t se l f a f unda m e nt a l r i ght s de c i s i on, i tr e m a i ns the c a s e tha tB ow e r s c onduc t e d a fu n d am en tal rig h ts an alys is th at L aw re n ce fo u n d to b e d ee p ly flaw ed . L aw re n ce ’s re pu di at i on of B ow er s’ subst ant i ve du e proces s app roac h canno tbe di sm i ss ed as d ic ta , s in c e o v e rru lin g B o w e r s w a s n e c e s s a r y to th e d is p o s itio n o f th e d e c is io n in L aw re nce. L aw re nce, 12 3 S . C t . at24 76 (“ [W ] e dee m i tnece ss ary t o rec on si der the C ou rt ' s hol di ng i n B ow er s. ”) . T he r e f or e , L a w r e nc e , c om i ng a f t e rG l uc ks be r g,The majority erroneously

insists that “the sc ope of theliberty interest at stakehere 16 must be defined in referenc e to the scopeof the Ala bama statute,”Majority

Op. at *20, even though L awrencerec ognized that the liberty interest thre atene d by

sodomy statutes could not be define d by

the par ticular c onduct those statutes prohibited. Selec tively quoting f rom the district court’s opinion, the majority repe atedly

insists that the right at issue hereis the “ ri ght t o u se sexual devices like . . . vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and ar tificial vag inas.” Majority Op. at *27, 35, 42. In contra st to the majority , the district court properly framed the question in terms of the broader right to sexual privac y . The district cour t frame d the inquiry

as follows: “Doe s th[ e] fundamental right of sexual privacy between marrie d and unmar ried adults in private, c on sens ual, s e xua l re latio ns hip s enc omp a ss a ri ght t o u sese xua l devic e s li kethevib rator s, dildos, anal beads, and ar tificial vag inas distributed by the vendor

plaintiffs in this action? ” Wil liams v. Pryor, 220 F . Supp. 2d 1257, 1296 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (“Williams I II ”). 57 m ustbe re ad as prov i di ng bi nd i ng gu i dance aboutho w t o p roperl y a nal yz e a l i b erty i n t erestaffecti n g sex u al p ri v acy. A. T h e P ro p er F ra m i n g o f a L i b erty In terest Justas the B ow er s C ou rtfr am ed the qu es t i on before i tas “ w he the rthe F e d e r a l C o n s titu tio n c o n f e r s a f u n d a m e n ta l r ig h t u p o n h o m o s e x u a ls to e n g a g e in s odom y , ” B ow e r s , 478 U . S . a t190, the m a j or i ty a l s o m i s t a ke nl y r e duc e s the as se rt ed l i berty i nt er es there t o a part i cul arse xu al ac t , as ki ng no tw hether consent i ng adul t s have a ri gh tt o sexual pri vacy , bu tw hether a n A l abam a c i t i ze n has the ri gh tt o u se se x t oys. S ee , e. g. , M aj ori ty O p. at*2 2. T he L aw re nce C ou rt 16 e xpl a i ne d tha tthe na r r ow f r a m i ng of

the que s t i on i n B ow e r s “ de m e a n[ e d] the c l a i m ” s e tf

or th a nd “ di s c l os e [ d] the C our t ’ s ow n f a i l ur e t o a ppr e c i a t e the e xt e ntof the l i be r ty a ts t a ke ” i n tha tc a s e . 123 S . C t . a t2478 ( B ow e r s “ m i s a ppr e he nde d the cl ai m of l i berty there pres ent ed t o i t ”) . T he L aw re nce C ou rtfurther e xp l ai ned t hatSee Majority Op. at *21 (“ For

purposes of c onstitut ional analysis, restrictions on the 17 ability to purcha se an item a

re ta ntamount to restrictions on the use of that item.”). The district cour

t found that “history

and contemporary

prac tice demonstrate a 18 conscious avoida

nce of regulation of [sexual] devices by the states.” Williams I II , 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1296. The ma

jority dismiss es this analysis. See Majority Op. at *23 (“ [R ]ather than look for a history and tradition of protection of the a sserted right, the district c ourt asked whether therewas a

history and tradition of state non-interferenc ewith the right.”). 58 “ [ t ] he l a w s i nvol ve d i n B ow e r s a nd he r e a r e , t o be s ur e , s t a tut e s tha tpurpor tt o do no m or e tha n pr ohi bi ta pa r t i c ul a rs e xua l a c t . T he i rpe na l t i e s a nd purpos e s , though, have m ore f

ar -r ea chi ng consequences, t ou chi ng up on the m ostpri vat e hum an c onduc t , s e xua l be ha vi or , a nd i n the m os tpr i va t e of pl a c e s , the hom e . ” I d. a t2478 ( e m pha s i s a dde d) . I n e xa c t l y the s a m e m a nne r , the m a j or i ty ’ s c ha r a c t e r i z a t i on of th e r ig h t a t is s u e h e r e a s in v o lv in g th e r ig h t to u s e c e r ta in s e x u a l d e v ic e s s e v e r e ly d is c o u n ts th e e x te n t o f

th e lib e r ty a t s ta k e in th is c a s e . A la b a m a ’s la w n o t o n ly re stri ct s the sa l e of c er t ai n sexual devi ce s, bu t , l i ke the st atut e i n L aw re nce, bu rdens pri vat e a du l tse xu al ac t i vi ty w i thi n t he ho m e. 17 B . T h e U s e of

H i s t or y an d T r ad i t i on I n a d d itio n to r e p e a tin g th e a n a ly tic a l m is ta k e o f B o w e r s in n a r r o w ly f r a m in g th e r ig h t a t is s u e , th e m a jo r ity a ls o e r r s in its u s e o f h is to r y . T h e m a

jo r ity c l a i m s tha tunde rG l uc ks be r g, the di s tr i c tc our tw a s w r ong t o r e l y on a hi s t or y a nd tr a d itio n o f

s ta te n o n - in te r f

e r e n c e w ith th e p r iv a te s e x u a l liv e s o f a d u lts a s a b a s is t o rec og ni ze a r i gh tt o sexual pri vacy . A cc ordi ng t o t he m aj ori ty, G l ucksberg 18Majority Op. at *27 (notingthat the district court’s a nalysis was “not base d on any 19 evidenc e of a

history and tradition of affirmati ve prote ction of this right [ to use sexual device s]”). In Roe, for instanc e, the Court’s historical analysis of Ang lo-Americ an statutory and 20 co mm o nl aws erv edt o p ro v i d e e v i d en ce o f th e r el at i v el y re ce nt(l at e n i n et ee nth -c entury) v i nt age of state restrictions on abortion, not to demonstrate a tradition of af

firmative protection of the ri ght t o a n a bo rtion . 4 10 U. S. at 13 2- 41 . D e sp itethela c k o f a his tor y of prote c tin gtheri ght t o a bo rtion , th eRoeCourt

ne vert he le ss h e ld t

hat th e“ ri ght o f p riva c y

. . . is broad eno ugh to encompa ss a woman’ s decision whether or not to terminateher pregnancy .” I d. at 152-56. 59 r e qui r e s tha tthe r e be a l ong- s t a ndi ng hi s t or y of a f f i r m a t i ve l e ga l pr ot e c t i on of spec i fi c c on du ctbefore a r i gh tca n b e r ec og ni ze d u nd erthe D ue P roce ss C l ause . 19 C ontr a r y t o the m a

j or i ty ’ s c l a i m , ne i the rG l uc ks be r g nora ny othe rr e l e va nt S upr e m e C our tpr e c e de nts uppor t s the r e qui r e m e nttha tthe r e m us tbe a hi s t or y of a f f i r m a t i ve l e gi s l a t i ve pr ot e c t i on be f or e a r i ghtc a n be j udi c i a l l y pr ot e c t e d. T he m a j or i ty s i m pl y i nve nt s thi s r e qui r e m e nt , e f f e c t i ve l y r e de f

i ni ng the doc tr i ne of s u b s ta n tiv e d u e p r o c e s s to p r o te c t o n ly th o s e r ig h ts th a t a r e a lr e a d y e x p lic itly pr ot e c t e d by l a w . S uc h a r e qui r e m e nti gnor e s notonl y L a w r e nc e buta l s o a com pl et e bod y of S up re m e C ou rtj uri sprudence. H ad the S up re m e C ou rtre qu i re d a f f i r m a t i ve gove r nm e nt a l pr ot e c t i on of a n a s s e r t e d l i be r ty i nt e r e s t , a l l of the C ou rt ’ s pri vacy ca se s w ou l d h ave been deci ded d i ff er ent l y. F or i nst ance , there w as n o le n g th y tr a d itio n o f

p r o te c tin g a b o r tio n a n d th e u s e o f c o n tr a c e p tiv e s , y e t b o th w er e f ou nd t o b e prot ec t ed by a r i gh tt o p ri vacy un der the D ue P roce ss C l ause . 20 I n i t s a na l y s i s , the tr i a l c our the r e c or r e c t l y c ons i de r e d the hi s t or y of non-The majority also claims that the district cour t should have limited its hi storical 21 analysis to legislation involving the useof sexual devices. Theproposal for such an unjustifiably

narrow inquiry

flows from the ma

jority ’s er ror in framingthe right at issue too n ar ro w l y. 60 in te r f e r e n c e b y g o v e r n m e n t. I ts a n a ly s is w a s e x p r e s s ly v a lid a te d b y L a w r e n c e , in w h ic h th e r e w a s n o h is to r y o f a f f ir m a tiv e ly p r o te c tin g th e r ig h t to e n g a g e in c o n s e n s u a l s o d o m y . I n o v e r ru lin g B o w e r s , th e L a w r e n c e C o u r t n o te d w ith a ppr ova l J us t i c e P ow e l l ’ s obs e r va t i on i n B ow e r s tha t“ [ t ] he hi s t or y of n o n e n f o r c e m e n t[ o f

s o d o m y l a ws ] s u g g e s t s th e m o r i b u n d c h a r a c t e rt o d a y o f l a ws c r i m i na l i z i ng thi s ty pe of pr i va t e , c ons e ns ua l c onduc t . ” 123 S . C t . a t2481 ( i nt e r na l quot a t i on m a r ks a nd c i t a t i on om i t t e d) ( e m pha s i s a dde d) . T he r e f or e , the m a j o r i ty i s p l a i n l y i n c o r r e c tth a tth e r e m u s tb e a h i s t o r y a n d tr a d i t i o n o f l a ws p ro t ect i n g th e ri g h tt o u se sex t o ys. 21 M or e ove r , w hi l e hi s t or y a nd tr a di t i on c a n be i m por t a ntf a c t or s , the y a r e not th e o n ly r e le v a n t c o n s id e r a tio n s in a s u b s ta n tiv e d u e p r o c e s s in q u ir y r e la te d to s e x u a l p r iv a c y . S e e id . a t 2 4 8 0 - 8 1 . A s the L aw re nce C ou rtem ph as i ze d, “ [h] i st ory a nd tr a di t i on a r e the s t a r t i ng poi ntbutnoti n a l l c a s e s the e ndi ng poi ntof the s ubs t a nt i ve due pr oc e s s i nqui r y . ” I d. a t2480 ( i nt e r na l quot a t i on m a r ks a nd c i t a t i on o m itte d ) . F u r th e r m o r e , lik e th e d is tr ic t c o u r t in th is c a s e , L a w r e n c e lo o k e d to m o d e r n tr e n d s a n d p r a c tic e s . T h e L a w r e n c e C o u r t w r o te :Wil liams I II , 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1259, 1296 (“ [P ]l aintiffs’ evidenceestablishes that 22 thereexis ts a constitutionally inherent right to sexual privac y that firmly

encompa sses state noninterferencewi th p rivate , adult, c on sens ual se xua l re latio ns hip s”and tha t th is right, “ e ven in

its narrowest for

m, protects plaintiffs’ useof sexual devices like those ta rg eted”by

Alabama ’s law) . Ma jority Op . at *1 0 (no tin gtha

t L awre nc e“ultimate ly

a pp lie d ratio nal- ba sis review”to 23 strike down Te x as’s sodomy statute). 61 [W ] e th i n k th ato u r l aw s an d trad i t i o n s i n th e p asth al f cen tu ry are o f m o st r e le v a n c e h e r e . T h e s e r e f e r e n c e s s h o w a n e m e r g in g a w a r e n e s s th a t lib e r ty g iv e s s u b s ta n tia l p r o te c tio n to a d u lt p e r s o n s in d e c id in g h o w to c o n d u c t th e ir p r iv a te liv e s in m a tte r s p e r ta in in g to s e x . I d. ( e m pha s i s a dde d) . G i ve n thi s une qui voc a l s t a t e m e nt , the m a j or i ty c a nnot l egi t i m at el y c ri t i ci ze the di stri ctcourtfor i t s a t t ent i on t o “ cont em po ra ry prac t i ce and at t i tud es w i th res pectt o sexual cond uctand sexual devi ce s. ” M aj ori ty O p. at *23. I n l i ghtof

a l l r e l e va ntS upr e m e C our tpr e c e de nt s , the tr i a l c our t– notthe m a j or i ty – s tr i ke s the pr ope rba l a nc e be tw e e n a c onc e r n w i th hi s t or y a nd c ont e m por a r y pr a c t i c e , a nd a r t i c ul a t e s a c a r e f ul a nd c or r e c tde s c r i pt i on of the a s s e r te d lib e r ty in te r e s t. 22 II I. U n d er L aw re n ce , “P u b l i c M oral i ty ” C an n ot B e D ee m ed a L egi ti m ate G o v e r nm e nt a l Pur po s e f o r C r i m i na l i z i ng Pr i v a t e Se x ua l A c t i v i t y. T h e m a jo r ity s ta te s th a t L a w r e n c e h e ld th a t s o d o m y la w s f a il r a tio n a l- b a s is re vi ew . H ow ever , the m aj ori ty negl ec t s t o add re ss w hether A l abam a’ s s t atut e has

23 a r a t i ona l ba s i s e ve n though A l a ba m a r e l i e s upon the s a m e j us t i f i c a t i on f or cr i m i nal i zi ng pri vat e s exual ac t i vi ty r ej ec t ed by L aw re nce – pu bl i c m oral i ty. In L a w r e nc e , T e xa s ha d e xpl i c i t l y r e l i e d upon publ i c m or a l i ty a s a r a t i ona l ba s i s f orRespondent’s B rief in L awrence , 2003 WL470184 at *48 (“ The prohibition of 24 homosexual conduc t in [ Texas’ sodomy statute] represents the rea soned judgment of the Te x as L eg islature that such c onduct is immoral and should be deterre d . . . . [L ]ong-e stablished princ ipl e s o f f

e deralis m di c tatethat th eCourt de fer t o th eTe xas L e g isl ature ’s judgme nt a nd to thec oll e c tiv eg oo d s e ns eof thepe op leof

theStateof

Te xas, in t

he ir e ff or t to e nf orc epu bli c morality and promote f

amily values through the promulg ation of penal statutes such as [the sodomy statute].”) (internal footnote omitted) (empha sis added) ; see also Transcript of Oral Argument in L awrence , 2003 WL1702534 at *38 (state’ s counsel arguing that sodomy law wa s justified beca

use “Te x as has the right to set moral standards a nd can se t bright line moral standards f

or its people.”) . The majority

states that “[t] he only

question on this appeal is whether the [Alabama] 25 statute, as applied to the involved users and vendors, violates any fundamental right protecte d under theConstitution.” Majority Op. at *5-6. A

ppellants, however, claim that Alabama’ s statut evio late s th eDu eProc e ss C la us e , whic h n e c e ssa

ri ly inc lude s a

c laim that th estatut efails ratio nal- ba sis review. On remand , th edis tric t c ourt mus t c on sid e r whe ther o ur ho ldingin Wil liams I Ithat Alabama ’s law ha s a rational basis remains g ood law now that B ower s has been overr uled. See, e .g ., Venn v. St. Paul Fire& Ma rine Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1058, 1063 (11th Cir. 1996) (notingthat the “law of the c ase . . . doe s not apply to bar re consideration of an issue when 62 i t s s odom y l a w . L a w r e nc e s um m a r i l y r e j e c t e d T e xa s ’ s a r gum e nt , hol di ng tha tthe 24 s odom y l a w “ f

ur the r [ e d] no l e gi t i m a t e s t a t e i nt e r e s tw hi c h c a n j us t i f y i t s i ntrus i on in to th e p e r s o n a l a n d p r iv a te lif e o f th e in d iv id u a l.” 1 2 3 S . C t. a t 2 4 8 4 ( e m p h a s is added). In W i l l i am s I I, thi s C ou rtprevi ou sl y uph el d A l abam a’ s l aw on ra t i on al b a s is g r o u n d s , r e ly in g o n th e n o w d e f u n c t B o w e r s to c o n c lu d e th a t p u b lic m o r a lity pr ovi de s a l e gi t i m a t e s t a t e i nt e r e s t . 240 F . 3d a t949- 50 ( the “ c r a f t i ng a nd safeg u ard i n g o f p u b l i c m o ral i ty h as l o n g b een an est ab l i sh ed p arto f th e S t at es’ pl e na r y pol i c e pow e rt o l e gi s l a t e a nd i ndi s put a bl y i s a l e gi t i m a t e gove r nm e nt i nt er es tun der r at i on al basi s s crut i ny”) . O bv i ou sl y, no w thatB ow er s has been o v e r ru le d , th is p r o p o s itio n is n o lo n g e rg o o d la w a n d w e m u s t, a c c o r d in g ly , r e v is it o u rh o ld in g in W illia m s I I . Y e t d e s p ite th e L a w r e n c e C o u r t’s r e je c tio n o f

p u b lic 25. . . c ontroll inga uth ority ha s sinc ema dea

c ontrary de c isi on of law a pp lic a ble to that issue”). 63 m o r a lity a s a le g itim a te s ta te in te r e s t th a t c a n ju s tif y c r im in a liz in g p r iv a te consensual se xu al cond uct , the m aj ori ty, al tho ug h ackno w l edgi ng thatthe di stri ct courtw i l l have t o d o so, never once addres se s how ou r hol di ng i n W i l l i am s I I c an re m ai n g oo d l aw . Just i ce S ca l i a, i n h i s L aw re nce di ss ent , spec i fi ca l l y not ed that the pr i nc i pl e s w e r e l i e d upon i n ourde c i s i on i n W i l l i a m s I I ha ve be e n “ di s c a r de d” by L aw re nce: Itse em s t o m e thatthe “ soci et al re l i ance ” on t he pri nci pl es confi rm ed i n B o w ers an d d i scard ed t o d ay h as b een o v erw h el m i n g . C o u n t l ess j udi c i a l de c i s i ons a nd l e gi s l a t i ve e na c tm e nt s ha ve r e l i e d on the a nc i e nt prop osi t i on thata gov erni ng m aj ori ty’ s bel i ef thatce rt ai n sexual be ha vi ori s “ i m m or a l a nd una c c e pt a bl e ” c ons t i tut e s a r a t i ona l ba s i s f or r e gul a t i on. S e e , e . g. , W i l l i a m s v. P r y or , 240 F . 3d 944, 949 ( C . A . 11 2 0 0 1 ) ( c itin g B o w e r s in u p h o ld in g A la b a m a ’s p r o h ib itio n o n th e s a le of s e x t oy s on the gr ound tha t“ [ t ] he c r a f t i ng a nd s a f

e gua r di ng of p u b l i c m o ral i ty . . . i n d i sp u t ab l y i s a l eg i t i m at e g o v ern m en ti n t erest un der r at i on al basi s s crut i ny”) . 12 3 S . C t . at24 90 (S ca l i a, J. , di ss ent i ng ) ( em ph as i s a dd ed). W he the rA l a ba m a ’ s l e gi s l a tur e be l i e ve s tha tthe us e of s e x t oy s m a y be i m pr ope rori m m or a l , the S upr e m e C our tha s e xpl a i ne d tha t“ [ t ] he s e c ons i de r a t i ons d o n o t a n s w e rth e q u e s tio n b e f o r e u s , h o w e v e r . T h e is s u e is w h e th e rth e m a jo r ity m a y us e the pow e rof

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or c e the s e vi e w s on the w hol e s oc i e ty thr ough o p e r a tio n o f

th e c r im in a l la w . O u ro b lig a tio n is to d e f in e th e lib e r ty o f

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m a n d a t e o u ro wn m o r a l c o d e . ” I d . a t2 4 8 0 ( d i s c u s s i n g tr a d i t i o n a l m o r a l v i e ws di sapp rovi ng of ho m osexual i ty) (i nt ernal qu ot at i on m arks and ci t at i on om i t t ed). I V . C on c l u s i on F or al l the re as on s e xp l i ca t ed abov e, A l abam a’ s s t atut e s ho ul d b e i nv al i dat ed b e c a u s e it v io la te s a s u b s ta n tiv e d u e p r o c e s s r ig h t o f a d u lts to e n g a g e in p r iv a te c o n s e n s u a l s e x u a l a c tiv ity a n d b e c a u s e th e s ta te ’s r e lia n c e o n p u b lic m o r a lity f a ils t o pr ovi de e ve n a r a t i ona l ba s i s f ori t s l a w . I gnor i ng L a w r e nc e , the m a j or i ty tur ns a r e lu c ta n c e to e x p a n d s u b s ta n tiv e d u e p r o c e s s in to a s tu b b o r n u n w illin g n e s s to c o n s id e rr e le v a n t S u p r e m e C o u r t a u th o r ity . I d is s e n t.