Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, March 24, 2004 MILITARY 

PREPOSITIONING 

Observations on Army and 

Marine Corps Programs 

During Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Beyond 

Statement of William M. Solis, Director, 

Defense Management and Capabilities 

GAO-04-562T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-562T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-562T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

March 24, 2004

MILITARY PREPOSITIONING 

Observations on Army and Marine Corps 

Programs During Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Beyond 

The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated during 

OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps relied 

heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to decisively defeat 

the Iraqi military. They both reported that prepositioned stocks were a key 

factor in the success of OIF. Prepositioned stocks provided most of the 

combat equipment used and, for the most part, this equipment was in good 

condition and maintained high readiness rates. However, the Army's 

prepositioned equipment included some older models of equipment and 

shortfalls in support equipment such as trucks, spare parts, and other 

supplies. Moreover, the warfighter did not always know what prepositioned 

stocks were available in theater, apparently worsening an already 

overwhelmed supply-and-distribution system. The units were able to 

overcome these challenges; fortunately, the long time available to build up 

forces allowed units to fill many of the shortages and adjust to unfamiliar 

equipment. 

Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support 

continuing operations in Iraq. It will be several years—depending on how 

long Iraqi Freedom operations continue—before these stocks will be 

available to return to prepositioning programs. And, even after they become 

available, much of the equipment will likely require substantial maintenance, 

or may be worn out beyond repair. The Army has estimated that it has an 

unfunded requirement of over $1 billion for reconstituting the prepositioned 

equipment used in OIF. However, since most prepositioned equipment is still 

in Southwest Asia and has not been turned back to the Army Materiel 

Command for reconstitution, most of the funding is not required at this time. 

When the prepositioned equipment is no longer needed in theater, decisions 

will have to be made about what equipment can be repaired by combat units, 

what equipment must go to depot, and what equipment must be replaced 

with existing or new equipment to enable the Army to reconstitute the 

prepositioned sets that were downloaded for OIF. 

DOD faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning program and makes 

plans for how such stocks fit into its future. In the near term, the Army and 

Marines must necessarily focus on supporting ongoing OIF operations. While 

waiting to reconstitute its program, the Army also has an opportunity to 

address shortfalls and modernize remaining stocks. For the longer term, 

DOD may need to (1) determine the role of prepositioning in light of efforts 

to transform the military; (2) establish sound prepositioning requirements 

that support joint expeditionary forces; and (3) ensure that the program is 

resourced commensurate with its priority and is affordable even as the force 

is transformed. Congress will play a key role in reviewing DOD’s assessment 

of the cost effectiveness of various options to support its overall mission, 

including prepositioning and other alternatives for projecting forces quickly.

Since the Cold War, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has 

increased its reliance on 

prepositioned stocks of military 

equipment and supplies, primarily 

because it can no longer plan on 

having a large forward troop 

presence. Prepositioned stocks are 

stored on ships and on land in the 

Persian Gulf and other regions 

around the world. Prepositioning 

allows the military to respond 

rapidly to conflicts. Ideally, units 

need only to bring troops and a 

small amount of materiel to the 

conflict area. Once there, troops 

can draw on prepositioned 

equipment and supplies, and then 

move quickly into combat. 

Today’s testimony describes (1) the 

performance and availability of 

Army and Marine Corps 

prepositioned equipment and 

supplies to support Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF); (2) current status 

of the stocks and plans to 

reconstitute them; and (3) key 

issues facing the military as it 

reshapes these programs to 

support DOD's force 

transformation efforts. 

GAO’s observations are based on 

ongoing work as well as previous 

reports on equipment 

accountability, supply distribution, 

and other logistics issues during 

OIF, plus other past work on spare 

parts shortages and on the 

readiness of prepositioning 

programs. 
Page 1 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on logistical issues 

related to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), focusing on prepositioned 

stocks. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) 

has increased its reliance on prepositioned reserves of military equipment 

and supplies since it can no longer plan on having a large forward troop 

presence. Prepositioned stocks are stored on ships and on land in the 

Persian Gulf and other regions around the world. Prepositioning can speed 

response times. Ideally, the military needs only to bring troops and a small 

amount of materiel to the area of conflict. Once there, troops can draw on 

prepositioned equipment and supplies, and then move rapidly into combat. 

My statement today reflects our preliminary observations drawn from 

ongoing work as well as previously published reports. As requested, my 

testimony today will focus on the performance, reconstitution, and future 

of prepositioning programs. Specifically, it describes (1) the performance 

and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and 

supplies to support OIF; (2) the current status of the stocks and plans to 

reconstitute them; and (3) key issues facing the military as it reshapes 

these programs to support the military’s force transformation efforts. 

The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated 

during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps 

relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to 

decisively defeat the Iraqi military. The following summarizes our 

preliminary observations and issues to consider for the future. 

• Army and Marine Corps officials reported that prepositioned stocks were 

a key factor in the success of OIF. Prepositioned stocks provided a 

significant amount of the combat equipment used by the Army and the 

Marine Corps. For the most part, the prepositioned combat systems were 

in good condition and reportedly maintained high readiness rates 

throughout the war. However, the Army’s prepositioning program had 

some less-than-modern equipment and had shortfalls, such as trucks, 

spare parts, and other items. Moreover, the warfighters did not always 

know what prepositioned sustainment stocks were available in theater, 

apparently worsening an already overwhelmed theater supply-anddistribution system. While these challenges were not insurmountable to 

the units, they did slow them down. Fortunately, the long time available to 

build up forces allowed U.S. forces to fill many of the shortages and adjust 

to unfamiliar equipment. 

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

• Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support 

continuing operations in Iraq. It will be several years—depending on how 

long Iraqi Freedom operations continue—before these stocks will be 

available to return to prepositioning programs. And, even after these 

stocks become available, much of the equipment will likely require 

substantial maintenance, or it may be worn out beyond repair. The Army 

has estimated that it has an unfunded requirement of over $1 billion for 

reconstituting the prepositioned equipment used in OIF. However, since 

most prepositioned equipment is still in Southwest Asia and has not been 

turned back to the Army Materiel Command for reconstitution, most of the 

funding is not required at this time. When the prepositioned equipment is 

no longer needed in theater, decisions will have to be made about what 

equipment can be repaired by combat units, what equipment must go to 

depot, and what equipment must be replaced with existing or new 

equipment to enable the Army to reconstitute the prepositioned sets that 

were downloaded for OIF. In the interim, both the Army and Marines have 

kept some land- or sea-based prepositioned stocks in the Pacific to cover a 

possible contingency in that region. 

• The defense department faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning 

program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into the future. In the 

near term, the Army and the Marine Corps must necessarily focus on 

supporting ongoing operations in OIF. And while it may be several years 

before most prepositioned assets are available to fully reconstitute the 

Army’s programs, opportunities exist to address shortfalls and selectively 

modernize the remaining stocks. For the longer term, the department may 

need to rethink its prepositioning programs to ensure that they are in sync 

with overall transformation goals and the evolving military strategy. Some 

changes are already underway. For example, the Army and Marine Corps 

are pursuing sea-basing ideas—where prepositioning ships could serve as 

floating logistics bases. Importantly, DOD needs to consider affordability. 

The drawdown of Army forces made prepositioning a practical alternative 

in recent years because the service had ample equipment. However, as the 

services’ equipment is transformed or recapitalized, it may not be practical 

to buy enough equipment for units to have one set at their home station 

and another set in prepositioning. Consideration of the cost of various 

options will be critical as the department evaluates alternatives for 

transforming its force structure to achieve future mission objectives. 

Congress will have a key role in reviewing the department’s assessment of 

the cost-effectiveness of options to support DOD’s overall mission, 

including mobility and force projection. 

In responding to your request, we conducted work that included officials 

from Headquarters, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.; 

Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, Illinois; Combat Equipment 
Page 3 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Group-Afloat, Goose Creek, South Carolina; and Blount Island Command, 

Jacksonville, Florida. At these locations, we interviewed officials familiar 

with prepositioning issues during OIF as well as plans for the future. We 

reviewed and obtained relevant documentation and performed analyses of 

reconstitution and options for the future. We also reviewed after-action 

reports on OIF and Operation Desert Storm. We obtained service 

estimates for funding prepositioned stocks requirements, but we did not 

validate these estimates. In addition, we drew on the preliminary results of 

our ongoing reviews of OIF lessons learned and OIF reconstitution and on 

our recent reports on OIF supply and distribution issues, Stryker 

deployment, and Army spare parts shortages. We also relied on our 2001 

report on Army war reserve spare parts shortages, 1998 report on 

prepositioning in the Army and the Air Force, and early 1990s reports on 

Operation Desert Storm.1

 We performed our work in March 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The basic purpose of prepositioning is to allow DOD to field combat-ready 

forces in days rather than in the weeks it would take if the forces and all 

necessary equipment and supplies had to be brought from the United 

States. However, the stocks must be (1) available in sufficient quantities to 

meet the needs of deploying forces and (2) in good condition. For 

prepositioning programs, these factors define “readiness.” If on-hand 

stocks are not what is needed—or are in poor condition—the purpose of 

prepositioning may be defeated because the unit will lose valuable time 

obtaining or repairing equipment and supplies. U.S forces had months to 

build up for OIF, so speed was not imperative. Prepositioning sites became 

reception and staging areas during the months leading up to the war, and 

afforded the military the necessary time and access in Kuwait to build up 

its forces for the later offensive operations of OIF. 

 1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the 

Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment 

Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades, GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 30, 2003); Defense Inventory: The Army Needs a Plan to Overcome Critical Spare 

Parts Shortages, GAO-03-705 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003); Defense Inventory: Army 

War Reserve Spare Parts Requirements Are Uncertain, GAO-01-425 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 10, 2001); Military Prepositioning: Army and Air Force Programs Need to Be 

Reassessed, GAO/NSIAD-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 1998); Operation Desert 

Shield/Storm: Impact of Defense Cooperation Account Funding on Future Maintenance 

Budgets, GAO/NSIAD-93-179 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 1993); and Operation Desert 

Storm: Early Performance Assessment of Bradley and Abrams, GAO/NSIAD-92-94

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 1992). 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Prepositioning programs grew in importance to U.S. military strategy after 

the end of the Cold War, particularly for the Army. Recognizing that it 

would have fewer forward-stationed ground forces—and to support the 

two-war strategy of the day—the Army used equipment made available 

from its drawdown to field new sets of combat equipment ashore in the 

Persian Gulf and in Korea. It also began an afloat program in the 1990s, 

using large ships to keep equipment and supplies available to support 

operations around the world. The Marine Corps has had a prepositioned 

capability since the 1980s. Its three Marine Expeditionary Forces are each 

assigned a squadron of ships packed with equipment and supplies—the 

Marines view this equipment as their “go-to-war” gear. Both the services 

also have retained some stocks in Europe, although the Army stocks have 

steadily declined since the end of the Cold War.2

 Today, the Army has sites 

in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, while the Marine Corps retains 

stocks in Norway. Figure 1 shows the location of Army and Marine Corps 

prepositioned equipment prior to OIF. 

 2

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army War Reserves: DOD Could Save Millions by 

Aligning Resources with the Reduced European Mission, GAO/NSIAD-97-158

(Washington, D.C.: Jul. 11, 1997). 
Page 5 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Figure 1: Location of Army and Marine Prepositioned Equipment Prior to OIF 

Prepositioning is an important part of DOD’s overall strategic mobility 

calculus. The U.S. military can deliver equipment and supplies in three 

ways: by air, by sea, or by prepositioning. Each part of this triad has its 

own advantages and disadvantages. Airlift is fast, but it is expensive to use 

and impractical for moving all of the material needed for a large-scale 

deployment. Although ships can carry large loads, they are relatively slow. 

Prepositioning lessens the strain on expensive airlift and reduces the 

reliance on relatively slow sealift deliveries. However, prepositioning 

requires the military to maintain equipment that essentially duplicates 

what the unit has at home station. Moreover, if the prepositioned 

equipment stocks are incomplete, the unit may have to bring along so 
Page 6 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

much additional equipment that using it could still strain lift, especially 

scarce airlift in the early days of a conflict. 

The Army and Marine Corps reported that their prepositioned equipment 

performed well during OIF but that some problems emerged. We reviewed 

lessons-learned reports and talked to Army and Marine Corps officials 

who managed or used the equipment. We heard general consensus that 

major combat equipment was generally in good condition when drawn and 

that it performed well during the conflict. However, Army officials said 

that some equipment was out-of-date and some critical items like trucks 

were in short supply and parts and other supplies were sometimes not 

available. The officials agreed that, overall, OIF demonstrated that 

prepositioned stocks could successfully support major combat operations. 

Most of the issues we heard were with the Army’s program. Marine Corps 

officials reported few shortfalls in their prepositioned stocks or 

mismatches with unit equipment. This is likely due to two key differences 

between the services. First, the Marines view prepositioned stocks as their 

“go-to-war" gear and give the stocks a very high priority for fill and 

modernization. Second, the units that will use the prepositioned stocks are 

assigned in advance and the Marine Corps told us that the combat units 

feel a sense of “ownership” in the equipment. This manifests itself in 

important ways. For example, the Marines have periodic conferences with 

all involved parties to work out exactly what their ships will carry and 

what the units will need to bring with them to the fight. Such an effort to 

tailor the prepositioned equipment increases familiarity, allows for prewar 

planning, and thus minimizes surprises or last-minute adjustments. The 

Marines also train with their gear periodically. By contrast, the Army does 

not designate the sets for any particular unit and provides little training 

with the equipment, especially with the afloat stocks. 

Personnel who used and managed the equipment agreed that the tanks, 

infantry fighting vehicles, and howitzers were in good condition when they 

were drawn from the prepositioned stocks; moreover, the equipment 

generally stayed operational throughout the fight. For example, the Third 

Infantry Division after-action report said that new systems and older 

systems proved to be very valuable and the tanks and Bradleys were both 

lethal and survivable. Additionally, according to Army Materiel Command 

documents, combat personnel reported that their equipment, in many 

cases, worked better than what they had at home station. Moreover, 

operational readiness data we reviewed showed that major combat 

Prepositioned 

Equipment Performed 

Well in OIF, Despite 

Shortfalls and Other 

Logistical Challenges 

Prepositioned Combat 

Equipment Performed Well 
Page 7 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

equipment stayed operational, even in heavy combat across hundreds of 

miles. In fact, officials from both services agreed that OIF validated the 

prepositioning concept and showed that it can successfully support major 

combat operations. Moreover, the U.S. Central Command, in an internal 

lessons-learned effort, concluded that prepositioned stocks “proved their 

worth and were critical in successfully executing OIF.” 

Some of the Army’s prepositioned equipment was outdated or did not 

match what the units were used to at home station. At times, this required 

the units to “train down” to older and less-capable equipment or bring 

their own equipment from home. Examples include: 

• Bradleys—The prepositioned stocks contained some older Bradley 

Fighting Vehicles that had not received upgrades installed since Operation 

Desert Storm. Such improvements included items like laser range finders, 

Global Positioning System navigation, thermal viewers, battlefield 

identification systems, and others. In addition, division personnel brought 

their own “Linebacker” Bradleys instead of using the outdated 

prepositioned stocks that would have required the crew to get out of the 

vehicle to fire. 

• M113 Personnel Carriers—The prepositioned stocks contained many 

older model M113A2 vehicles. This model has difficulty keeping up with 

Abrams tanks and requires more repairs than the newer model M113A3, 

which the units had at home station. 

• Trucks—The prepositioned stocks included 1960s-vintage model trucks 

that had manual transmissions and were more difficult to repair. Most 

units now use newer models that have automatic transmissions. The effect 

of this was that soldiers had to learn to drive stick shifts when they could 

have been performing other tasks needed to prepare for war; in addition, 

maintenance personnel were unfamiliar with fixing manual transmissions. 

• Tank Recovery Vehicle—The prepositioned stocks contained M-88A1 

recovery vehicles. These vehicles have long been known to lack sufficient 

power, speed, and reliability. We reported similar issues after Operation 

Desert Storm.3

 According to data collected by the Army Materiel 

Command, these vehicles broke down frequently, generally could not keep 

up with the fast-paced operations, and did not have the needed capabilities 

even when they were in operation. 

 3 GAO/NSIAD-92-94. 

Some Prepositioned 

Equipment Was 

Out-of-Date or Did Not 

Match Unit Needs 
Page 8 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

None of these problems, however, were insurmountable. The U.S. forces 

had months to prepare for OIF, and plenty of time to adjust to the 

equipment they had available. Additionally, the U.S. forces faced an 

adversary whose military proved much less capable than U.S. forces. 

Our preliminary work also identified shortfalls in available spare parts and 

major problems with the theater distribution system, which were 

influenced by shortages of trucks and material handling equipment. Prior 

to OIF, the Army had significant shortages in its prepositioned stocks, 

especially in spare parts. This is a long-standing problem. We reported in 

2001 that the status of the Army’s prepositioned stocks and war reserves 

was of strategic concern because of shortages in spare parts.4

 At that time 

the Army had on hand about 35 percent of its stated requirements of 

prepositioned spare parts and had about a $1-billion shortfall in required 

spare parts for war reserves. 

Table 1 shows the percentage of authorized parts that were available in 

March 2001 in the prepositioned stocks that were later used in OIF. These 

stocks represent a 15-day supply of spare and repair parts for brigade units 

(Prescribed Load List) and for the forward support battalion that backs up 

the brigade unit stocks (Authorized Stockage List). While the goal for 

these stocks was to be filled to 100 percent, according to Army officials 

the Army has not had sufficient funds to fill out the stocks. In March 2002, 

the Army staff directed that immediate measures be taken to fix the 

shortages and provided $25 million to support this effort. The 

requirements for needed spare and repair parts were to be filled to the 

extent possible by taking stocks from the peacetime inventory or, if 

unavailable there, from new procurement. 

 4 GAO-01-425. 

Army Faced Spare Parts 

Shortfalls and Theater 

Distribution Issues 
Page 9 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Table 1: Status of Army Unit Spare Parts Available in Afloat and Selected 

Land-Based Prepositioned Sets in March 2001a

Location Unit type 

Type of spare 

parts Percent fill of authorization

Afloat Brigade set ASL 63

 PLL 60

 Corps Support ASL 0

 PLL 30

 Theater Support 1 ASL 18

 PLL 15

 Theater Support 2 ASL 0

 PLL 6

Qatar Brigade set ASL 13

 PLL 19

 Division base ASL 0

 PLL 0

Legend: ASL= Authorized Stockage List, PLL=Prescribed Load List 

Source: Army Materiel Command. 

a

Information is provided for prepositioned sets later used in OIF that were managed by the Army 

Materiel Command. Army Central Command managed the Kuwait set. 

By the time the war started in March of 2003, the fill rate had been 

substantially improved but significant shortages remained. The warfighter 

still lacked critical, high-value replacement parts like engines and 

transmissions. These items were not available in the supply system and 

could not be acquired in time. Shortages in spare and repair parts have 

been a systemic problem in the Army over the past few years. Our recent 

reports on Army spares discussed this issue5

 and, as previously noted, our 

2001 report highlighted problems specifically with prepositioned spares. 

According to Army officials, the fill rates for prepositioned spare parts—

especially high-value spares—were purposely kept down because of 

systemwide shortfalls. The Army’s plan to mitigate this known risk was to 

have the units using the prepositioned sets to bring their own high-value 

spare parts in addition to obtaining spare parts from non-deploying units. 

 5 GAO-03-705. 
Page 10 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Nonetheless, according to the Third Infantry Division OIF after-action 

report, spare parts shortages were a problem and there were also other 

shortfalls. In fact, basic loads of food and water, fuel, construction 

materials, and ammunition were also insufficient to meet the unit 

sustainment requirements. 

The combatant commander had built up the OIF force over a period of 

months, departing from doctrinal plans to have receiving units in theater 

to receive the stocks. When it came time to bring in the backup supplies, 

over 3,000 containers were download from the sustainment ships, which 

contained the required classes of supply—food, fuel, and spare parts, 

among others. The theater supply-and-distribution system became 

overwhelmed. The situation was worsened by the inability to track assets 

available in theater, which meant that the warfighter did not know what 

was available. The Third Infantry Division OIF after-action report noted 

that some items were flown in from Europe or Fort Stewart because they 

were not available on the local market. Taken together, all these factors 

contributed to a situation that one Army after-action report bluntly 

described as “chaos.” 

Our recent report on logistics activities in OIF described a theater 

distribution capability that was insufficient and ineffective in managing 

and transporting the large amount of supplies and equipment during OIF.6

For example, the distribution of supplies to forward units was delayed 

because adequate transportation assets, such as cargo trucks and materiel 

handling equipment, were not available within the theater of operations. 

The distribution of supplies was also delayed because cargo arriving in 

shipping containers and pallets had to be separated and repackaged 

several times for delivery to multiple units in different locations. In 

addition, DOD’s lack of an effective process for prioritizing cargo for 

delivery precluded the effective use of scarce theater transportation 

assets. Finally, one of the major causes of distribution problems during 

OIF was that most Army and Marine Corps logistics personnel and 

equipment did not deploy to the theater until after combat troops arrived, 

and in fact, most Army personnel did not arrive until after major combat 

operations were underway. 

 6 GAO-04-305R. 
Page 11 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Forces are being rotated to relieve personnel in theater. Instead of 

bringing their own equipment, these troops are continuing to use 

prepositioned stocks. Thus, it may be several years—depending on how 

long the Iraqi operations continue—before these stocks can be 

reconstituted. 

The Marine Corps used two of its three prepositioned squadrons (11 of 

16 ships) to support OIF. As the Marines withdrew, they repaired some 

equipment in theater but sent much of it back to their maintenance facility 

in Blount Island, Florida. By late 2003, the Marine Corps had one of the 

two squadrons reconstituted through an abbreviated maintenance cycle, 

and sent back to sea.7

 However, to support ongoing operations in Iraq, the 

Marine Corps sent equipment for one squadron back to Iraq, where it is 

expected to remain for all or most of 2004. The Marine Corps is currently 

performing maintenance on the second squadron of equipment that was 

used during OIF, and this work is scheduled to be completed in 2005. 

Most of the equipment that the Army used for OIF is still in use or is being 

held in theater in the event it may be needed in the future. The Army used 

nearly all of its prepositioned ship stocks and its ashore stocks in Kuwait 

and Qatar, as well as drawing some stocks from Europe. In total, this 

included more than 10,000 pieces of rolling stock, 670,000 repair parts, 

3,000 containers, and thousands of additional pieces of other equipment. 

According to Army officials, the Army is repairing this equipment in 

theater and reissuing it piece-by-piece to support ongoing operations. Thus 

far, the Army has reissued more than 11,000 pieces of equipment, and it 

envisions that it will have to issue more of its remaining equipment to 

support future operations. Thus, it may be 2006 or later before this 

equipment becomes available to be reconstituted to refill the 

prepositioned stocks. Officials also told us that, after having been in use 

for years in harsh desert conditions, much of the equipment would likely 

require substantial maintenance and some will be worn out beyond repair. 

Figure 2 shows OIF trucks needing repair. 

 7

 Marine Corps officials told us that they focused on getting equipment repaired to a 

mission-capable status, but did not return the equipment to the high standard to which it is 

normally maintained. 

Continuing Support of 

Operations Will Likely 

Delay Reconstitution 
Page 12 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Figure 2: Some Trucks Used in OIF that Need Repair 

Both the Army and the Marine Corps have retained prepositioned stocks in 

the Pacific to cover a possible contingency in that region. While the Marine 

Corps used two of its three squadrons in OIF, it left the other squadron 

afloat near Guam. The Army used most of its ship stocks for OIF, but it 

still has a brigade set available in Korea and one combat ship is on station 

to support a potential conflict in Korea, although it is only partially filled. 

Both the Army and the Marine Corps used stocks from Europe to support 

OIF. The current status of the services’ prepositioned sets is discussed in 

table 2. 
Page 13 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

Table 2: Current Status of Selected Prepositioning Programs (as of March 2004) 

 Location Status 

Army Kuwait and Qatar The equipment and supplies from these locations are still in use to support continuing operations 

in Iraq. 

 Korea This brigade set of equipment is currently filled to approximately 90 percent. 

 Afloat Equipment and supplies from 10 of 11 ships were downloaded to support OIF and most of this 

equipment remains in Iraq or Kuwait. One combat ship has been partially filled to support two 

Army battalions. One ammunition ship remains on station and another is in its maintenance cycle. 

The Army is also working to reconstitute equipment for a support ship and another combat ship, 

but it is unclear how much equipment will be available to source these requirements. 

 Europe Stocks in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy have been depleted to support ongoing 

operations. 

Marines Afloat (Guam) This 6-ship squadron was not used in OIF and has almost its full complement of stocks. 

 Afloat (Mediterranean) One ship has been downloaded in support of OIF and another has been partially downloaded. 

This squadron’s equipment is currently filled to about half of its requirement and will complete its 

normal maintenance cycle in 2005. 

 Afloat (Diego Garcia) This squadron’s equipment was used during the first phase of OIF, was repaired to combat 

condition but not to normal standards, and has been downloaded for reuse in Iraq. 

 Norway Stocks in Norway were used to support OIF. Currently, the stocks have approximately two-thirds 

of the authorized equipment. 

Source: U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps data. 

Army and Marine Corps maintenance officials told us that it is difficult to 

reliably estimate the costs of reconstituting the equipment because so 

much of it is still in use. As a result, the reconstitution timeline is unclear. 

Based on past experience, it is reasonable to expect that the harsh desert 

environment in the Persian Gulf region will exact a heavy toll on the 

equipment. For example, we reported in 1993 that equipment returned 

from Operation Desert Storm was in much worse shape than expected 

because of exposure for lengthy periods to harsh desert conditions. The 

Army has estimated that the cost for reconstituting its prepositioned 

equipment assets is about $1.7 billion for depot maintenance, unit level 

maintenance, and procurement of required parts and supplies. A request 

for about $700 million was included in the fiscal year 2004 Global War on 

Terrorism supplemental budget, leaving a projected shortfall of about 

$1 billion. Army Materiel Command officials said they have thus far 

received only a small part of the amount funded in the 2004 supplemental 

for reconstitution of the prepositioned equipment, but they noted that not 

much equipment has been available. Additionally, continuing operations in 

Iraq have been consuming much of the Army’s supplemental funding 

intended for reconstitution. Since much of the equipment is still in 

Southwest Asia, it is unclear how much reconstitution funding for its 

prepositioned equipment the Army can use in fiscal year 2005. But it is 
Page 14 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

clear that there is a significant bill that will have to be paid for 

reconstitution of Army prepositioned stocks at some point in the future, if 

the Army intends to reconfigure the afloat and land-based prepositioned 

sets that have been used in OIF. 

The defense department faces many issues as it rebuilds its prepositioning 

program and makes plans for how such stocks fit into the transformed 

military. In the near term, the Army and the Marine Corps must focus on 

supporting current operations and reconstituting their prepositioning sets. 

Moreover, we believe that the Army may be able to take some actions to 

address the shortfalls and other problems it experienced during OIF. In 

the long term, however, DOD faces fundamental issues as it plans the 

future of its prepositioning programs. 

As it reconstitutes its program, the Army would likely benefit from 

addressing the issues brought to light during OIF, giving priority to actions 

that would address long-standing problems, mitigate near-term risk, and 

shore up readiness in key parts of its prepositioning program. These 

include 

• ensuring that it has adequate equipment and spare parts and sustainment 

supplies in its prepositioning programs, giving priority to afloat and Korea 

stocks; 

• selectively modernizing equipment so that it will match unit equipment 

and better meet operational needs; and 

• planning and conducting training to practice drawing and using 

prepositioned stocks, especially afloat stocks. 

Based on some contrasts in the experiences between the Army and the 

Marine Corps with their prepositioned equipment and supplies in OIF, 

some officials we spoke to agree that establishing a closer relationship 

between operational units and the prepositioned stocks they would be 

expected to use in a contingency is critical to wartime success. The 

Marines practice with their stocks and the Army could benefit from 

training on how to unload, prepare, and support prepositioned stocks, 

particularly afloat stocks. While the Army has had some exercises using its 

land-based equipment in Kuwait and Korea, it has not recently conducted 

a training exercise to practice unloading its afloat assets. According to 

Army officials, such exercises have been scheduled over the past few 

years, but were cancelled due to lack of funding. 

Issues Facing the 

Prepositioning 

Program 

Near-Term Issues 
Page 15 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

The long-term issues transcend the Army and Marines, and demand a 

coordinated effort by the department. In our view, three main areas should 

guide the effort. 

• Determine the role of prepositioning in light of the efforts to 

transform the military. Perhaps it is time for DOD to go back to the 

drawing board and ask: what is the military trying to achieve with these 

stocks and how do they fit into future operational plans? If, as indicated in 

Desert Storm and OIF, prepositioning is to continue to play an important 

part in meeting future military commitments, priority is needed for 

prepositioning as a part of transformation planning in the future. 

• Establish sound prepositioning requirements that support joint 

expeditionary forces. If DOD decides that prepositioning is to continue 

to play an important role in supporting future combat operations, 

establishing sound requirements that are fully integrated is critical. The 

department is beginning to rethink what capabilities could be needed. For 

example, the Army and Marines are pursuing sea-basing ideas—where 

prepositioning ships could serve as offshore logistics bases. Such ideas 

seem to have merit, but are still in the conceptual phases, and it is not 

clear to what extent the concepts are being approached to maximize 

potential for joint operations. In our view, options will be needed to find 

ways to cost-effectively integrate prepositioning requirements into the 

transforming DOD force structure requirements. For example, Rand 

recently published a report suggesting that the military consider 

prepositioning support equipment to help the Stryker brigade meet 

deployment timelines.8

 Such support equipment constitutes much of the 

weight and volume of the brigade, but a relatively small part of the costs 

compared to the combat systems. Such an option may be needed, since 

our recent report revealed that the Army would likely be unable to meet its 

deployment timelines for the Stryker brigade.9

• Ensure that the program is resourced commensurate with its 

priority, and is affordable even as the force is transformed. In our 

view, DOD must consider affordability. In the past, the drawdown of Army 

forces made prepositioning a practical alternative because it made extra 

equipment available. However, as the services’ equipment is transformed 

and recapitalized, it may not be practical to buy enough equipment for 

 8

 Eric Pelty, John M. Halliday, and Aimee Bower, Speed and Power: Toward an 

Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Arroyo Center, 2003). 

9

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External 

Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of 

the Army’s Operational Evaluation Plan, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003). 

Long-term Issues 
Page 16 GAO-04-562T Military Prepositioning 

units at home station and for prepositioning. Prepositioned stocks are 

intended to reduce response times and enable forces to meet the demands 

of the full spectrum of military operations. Once the future role of 

prepositioning is determined, and program requirements are set, it will be 

important to give the program proper funding priority. Congress will have 

a key role in reviewing the department’s assessment of the cost 

effectiveness of options to support DOD’s overall mission, including 

prepositioning and other alternatives for projecting forces quickly to the 

far reaches of the globe. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope this information is useful to Congress as it considers 

DOD’s plans and funding requests for reconstituting its prepositioned 

stocks as well as integrating prepositioning into the department’s 

transformation of its military forces. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any 

questions that you or the Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

For questions about this statement, please contact William M. Solis at 

(202) 512-8365 (e-mail address: Solisw@gao.gov), Julia Denman at (202) 

512-4290 (e-mail address: denmanj@gao.gov), or John Pendleton at (404) 

679-1816 (e-mail address: pendletonj@gao.gov). Additional individuals 

making key contributions included Nancy Benco, Robert Malpass, Tinh 

Nguyen, and Tanisha Stewart. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

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