[Cite as Thiel's Wheels, Inc. v. State Route 30, Ltd., 2022-Ohio-2093.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

WYANDOT COUNTY

THIEL’S WHEELS, INC.

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO 16-21-06

 v.

STATE ROUTE 30, LTD., O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Wyandot County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. CV 2019-CV-0076

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: June 21, 2022 

APPEARANCES:

Doug Holthus for Appellant

Bradley S. Warren for Appellee
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SHAW, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, State Route 30, Ltd. (“Route 30”), appeals the 

October 27, 2021 Judgment Entry of the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas 

which granted judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee, Thiel’s Wheels, Inc. 

(“Thiel’s”).

Facts and Procedure

{¶2} On August 13, 2019, Thiel’s filed a complaint in case number 

19CV0076 for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Thiel’s alleged that it 

had entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with Route 30 and that Route 30 had 

failed to fulfill its obligations under the Agreement by not making the $50,000.00 

per year racing sponsorship payments pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Agreement. 

On September 4, 2019, Route 30 filed an Answer. Route 30 filed its counterclaim 

on March 6, 2020. In the counterclaim, Route 30 alleged breach of contract by 

Thiel’s and unjust enrichment.

{¶3} Subsequently, on April 20, 2020, Thiel’s filed a second complaint, case 

number 20CV0038, against Route 30. Thiel’s alleged that following the sale under 

the Asset Purchase Agreement, Route 30 had wrongfully retained a metal lathe

which was not included on the Bill of Sale’s asset list. Upon motion by Thiel’s, the 

trial court consolidated the two cases.
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{¶4} The complaint, counterclaim, and second complaint arose from the 

following facts. On June 11, 2018, Thiel’s and Route 30 entered into an Asset 

Purchase Agreement whereby Route 30 purchased the assets of Thiel’s HarleyDavidson motorcycle dealership located in Upper Sandusky, Ohio. The terms of

that Agreement included paragraph 6 which was titled “Racing Sponsorship.” The 

resulting Ohio Bill of Sale was signed by Thiel’s on August 1, 2018.

{¶5} A trial was held before a magistrate on April 22, 2021. Thiel’s 

representative, Marc Ingwersen (“Ingwersen”), appeared at the trial and Route 30 

appeared by its sole member, Amanda Crates (“Crates”). Following the trial, the 

magistrate found that Route 30 breached the Agreement when it failed to make 

monthly payments from January 2019 for the racing sponsorship. The magistrate 

also found that Route 30 was in wrongful possession of the lathe. The magistrate 

issued a decision recommending Thiel’s be awarded judgment on its complaint on 

the grounds of breach of contract on a monthly amount, plus a judgment for

$2,950.00 representing the value of the lathe. The magistrate recommended that 

Route 30’s counterclaim be dismissed as to both counts.

{¶6} Route 30 filed preliminary objections to the magistrate’s decision, 

which were later supplemented once the transcript from the trial was filed. Thiel’s 

then filed a response. The trial court filed two judgment entries, one which 

overruled Route 30’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision, but with 
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judgment granted in favor of Thiel’s in the amount of $129,166.65 for breach of 

contract and $2,950.00 for the value of the lathe, plus statutory interest on both 

amounts. The other entry included the trial court’s judgment in favor of Thiel’s and 

dismissed Route 30’s counterclaims as to both counts.

{¶7} Route 30 has appealed, raising two assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. 1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF THIEL’S ON ITS BREACH OF CONTRACT 

CLAIMS.

Assignment of Error No. 2

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ROUTE 30’S 

COUNTERCLAIMS.

{¶8} We jointly consider Route 30’s assignments of error. 

I. Legal Analysis

{¶9} As a ground for its first assignment of error, Route 30 contends that the

racing sponsorship paragraph in the Asset Purchase Agreement is not enforceable 

because it is not supported by consideration, as Thiel’s promise of performance is 

illusory. In the alternative, Route 30 argues that the undisputed evidence shows 

Thiel’s failed to perform its obligation under the terms of the racing sponsorship, 

and, as a result, the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Thiel’s on its 

breach of contract claim. Route 30 then argues in its second assignment of error

that the trial court erred when it dismissed Route 30’s counterclaim for unjust 
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enrichment for five payments made under the sponsorship or, in the alternative, for 

breach of contract against Thiel’s to recoup the payments as damages.

A. General Contract Principles

{¶10} “ ‘A contract is generally defined as a promise, or a set of promises, 

actionable upon breach. Essential elements of a contract include an offer, 

acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit 

and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of 

consideration.’ ” Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, ¶ 16, 

quoting Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F.Supp. 409, 414 (N.D.Ohio 

1976).

{¶11} It is well established that when interpreting contracts, “ ‘[c]ontracts 

are to be interpreted so as to carry out the intent of the parties, as that intent is 

evidenced by the contractual language.’ ˮ Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 

148 Ohio St.3d 524, 2016-Ohio-7549, ¶ 9, quoting Skivolocki v. E. Ohio Gas Co.,

38 Ohio St.2d 244 (1974), paragraph one of the syllabus. As recently stated by the 

Supreme Court of Ohio in Beverage Holdings, L.L.C. v. 5701 Lombardo, L.L.C.,

159 Ohio St.3d 194, 2019-Ohio-4716, ¶ 13:

[I]f the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, we 

enforce the terms as written, and we may not turn to evidence

outside the four corners of the contract to alter its meaning. * * * 

When considering the language of a particular contractual 

provision, “[c]ommon words * * * will be given their ordinary 

meaning unless manifest absurdity results or unless some other 
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meaning is clear from the face or overall contents of the 

agreement.” Anders, 99 Ohio St.3d 156, 2003-Ohio-3048, at ¶ 34, 

citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 

(1978), paragraph two of the syllabus.

Additionally, the construction and interpretation of contracts are matters of law 

subject to a de novo standard of review. Roberts v. Marks, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-

16-15, 2017-Ohio-1320, ¶ 11, citing Langfan v. Carlton Gardens Co., 183 Ohio 

App.3d 260, 2009-Ohio-3318, ¶ 24 (3rd Dist.). 

1. Consideration

{¶12} “Consideration may consist of either a detriment to the promisee or a 

benefit to the promisor.” Williams v. Ormsby, 131 Ohio St.3d 427, 2012-Ohio-690, 

¶ 16. “A benefit may consist of some right, interest, or profit accruing to the 

promisor, while a detriment may consist of some forbearance, loss, or responsibility 

given, suffered, or undertaken by the promisee.” Id. Additionally, “ ‘[a]bsent a 

showing of fraud, consideration is not deemed legally insufficient merely because 

it is inadequate.’ ” First Natl. Bank of Omaha v. iBeam Solutions, L.L.C., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 13AP-850, 2016-Ohio-1182, ¶ 44, quoting Brads v. First Baptist 

Church, 89 Ohio App.3d 328, 336 (2d Dist. 1993). See also Carlisle v. T & R 

Excavating, Inc., 123 Ohio App.3d 277, 283 (9th Dist. 1997) (courts generally do 

not inquire into the adequacy of consideration once it is found to exist).

{¶13} “An illusory promise is a promise that lacks consideration and thus, is 

unenforceable.” McGlone v. Motorist Mut. Ins., 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-2000-25, 
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2001-Ohio-2188, *4, citing Hilton v. Tire Tread Development, Inc., et al., 11th Dist. 

Portage App. No. 92-P-0053 (June 30, 1993).

2. Breach of Contract

{¶14} The elements of a breach-of-contract claim are the existence of a 

contract, performance by one party, non-performance by the other party, and 

damages or loss to the performing party. Bob Rhodes Co. v. Polychronopoulos, 3d 

Dist. Allen No. 1-11-10, 2011-Ohio-3434, ¶ 33.

B. The Plain Language of Paragraph 6

{¶15} Paragraph 6 of the Asset Purchase Agreement, which is titled “Racing 

Sponsorship,” provided:

6. As further consideration for the conveyance of assets contemplated 

under this Agreement, the Purchaser agrees to sponsor the Seller’s 

motorcycle racing team for a period of three (3) years commencing 

with the closing of the transaction contemplated herein. Purchaser 

agrees to pay to Seller the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) 

per year for said sponsorship. The first payment shall be made on or 

before September 1, 2018 and shall be paid out on a monthly basis for 

a total of thirty-six (36) consecutive months. Purchaser shall be 

recognized as a sponsor of the motorcycle racing team in such manner 

as may be determined by Seller. In addition, Purchaser also agrees to 

lease to Seller the portion of the real property to be conveyed herein 

which is identified as the “race shop” for a period of five (5) years 

subsequent to the closing of the transaction contemplated herein. 

Purchaser agrees that during the three (3) year sponsorship period, the 

race shop shall be provided to the Seller rent free. After the end of 

the sponsorship period Seller agrees to pay to Purchaser the sum of 

Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month for the lease of the race 

shop. The lease may be terminated by the Seller at any time upon 

thirty (30) days written notice to Purchaser. The lease shall be in form 
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and on such standard terms as may be agreed upon by the parties 

hereto.

(Plaintiff’s Ex. 1).

C. Consideration

{¶16} We begin our analysis by noting the existence of consideration given 

in exchange for the racing sponsorship being established in the first sentence of 

paragraph 6, which begins, “As further consideration for the conveyance of assets 

contemplated under this Agreement, the Purchaser agrees to sponsor the Seller’s 

motorcycle racing team for a period of three (3) years commencing with the closing 

of the transaction contemplated herein.” In addressing Route 30’s claim of “illusory 

contract,” the trial court came to the conclusion that such claim is “incorrect when 

one considers that the sponsorship clause in the contract is what led to the agreement 

between the parties being achieved.” (Oct. 8, 2021 J.E. at 6). The trial court further 

noted that Crates testified that she felt that sponsoring Thiel’s would be a benefit to 

her business.

{¶17} On appeal, Route 30 argues that the consideration is “illusory” because 

“[u]nder the plain language of the Sponsorship Agreement, Thiel’s was not 

obligated to do anything in return for Route 30’s $150,000.00 sponsorship 

payments.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8). Specifically, that Thiel’s made only an illusory 

promise that “[Route 30] shall be recognized as a sponsor of the motorcycle racing 

team in such manner as may be determined by Seller.” (Id. emphasis sic.) However, 
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this argument focuses on the adequacy of the consideration given, and, therefore, 

does not render it insufficient. First Natl. Bank of Omaha, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

13AP-850, 2016-Ohio-1182.

{¶18} After a review of the record, we agree the trial court correctly reasoned 

that the racing sponsorship was not an illusory promise. This is consistent with the 

apparent intent of the parties as evidenced by the Asset Purchase Agreement itself. 

The Agreement between Thiel’s and Route 30 consisted of the sale of the business 

assets for the purchase price plus the $150,000.00 racing sponsorship to be paid over 

three years in monthly payments.

D. Breach of Contract

{¶19} In this case, each party claimed the other failed to perform on its part 

of the racing sponsorship pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Asset Purchase Agreement. 

Thiel’s claims that Route 30 did not make its monthly payments for the sponsorship 

and Route 30 claims that Thiel’s failed to perform by not acknowledging it as a 

sponsor. The annual sponsorship amount was to be made by monthly payments, for 

a total of thirty-six months. As stipulated by the parties, Route 30 made five (5) of 

the thirty-six monthly payments to Thiel’s totaling $20,833.35. The parties further 

stipulated that Thiel’s occupied the “race shop” portion of the building for a period 

of seventeen (17) months, also pursuant to paragraph 6.
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{¶20} In support, Route 30 argues that evidence was presented at trial that

(1) after entering into the racing sponsorship, Thiel’s made the decision to withdraw 

from all motorcycle races for the remainder of the 2018 racing season and, as a 

result, Thiel’s did not and could not recognize Route 30 as a sponsor, or even engage 

in the activities that the sponsorship was designed to support, and (2) Thiel’s never 

requested that Route 30 provide Thiel’s a logo or other promotional materials.

{¶21} At trial, evidence indicated that Thiel’s operates a high-end 

professional motorcycle racing team that has participated in racing across the 

country. The evidence also indicated that its racing team cancelled some of their 

races and did not race for the remainder of the 2018 racing season to allow Thiel’s

crew chief and Route 30’s employee, Jon Miller, time to acclimate himself to Route 

30’s new business venture.

{¶22} As to the racing sponsorship, the trial court acknowledged that neither 

party had requested or supplied any specific materials or logo’s, etc. However, the 

trial court also cited expert testimony indicating, among other things, that “the use 

of name, image and likeness of a racer is a form of sponsorship.” (Oct. 8, 2021 J.E. 

at 4, citing T.II p. 162).

{¶23} The trial court then summarized the additional trial evidence on this 

point as follows:

Further, Marc Ingwersen, Seller’s representative, is a pro motorcycle 

racer (T.I. p. 13) and his racing team has enjoyed success. (T.I. p. 14) 
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Ingwersen opined that his name, image and likeness are valuable. 

(T.I. p. 15) Ingwersen testified that despite not being given anything 

by Purchaser, he did the best he could in promoting Purchaser’s 

business. Ingwersen used Facebook, websites, print and a billboard 

to “sponsor” Purchaser. His name, image and likeness were used and 

some of his screen shots were still on Purchaser’s Facebook page in 

the Fall of 2020. (T.I. p. 48) Seller testified of other efforts 

undertaken on behalf of Purchaser. (T.I. pgs. 51-67) (Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 

11).

(Id. at 4-5).

{¶24} The trial evidence further revealed that by the end of 2018, Crates

decided she no longer wanted to be publicly associated with the former owner and 

Thiel’s. As noted by the trial court, during her testimony, Crates recounted that 

“within the first month of ownership” when she attended the Marion Popcorn 

Festival to distribute tickets for beer, she had been “cussed out” by people who dealt 

with the previous ownership and that she had never been so offended. (Id. at 5, 

citing T.II p. 200).

{¶25} This Court has considered the entire record of proceedings in the trial 

court and, upon consideration, we find that the record contains sufficient evidence 

to support the trial court’s conclusion that Route 30 breached the terms of the Asset 

Purchase Agreement after December 2018 by not making the monthly payments to 

Thiel’s for the racing sponsorship.
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II. Lathe

{¶26} The other issue raised on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in 

ruling that the metal lathe was excluded from the list of assets under the parties’ 

Asset Purchase Agreement. On appeal, Route 30 points out that Ingwersen admitted 

at trial that the lathe is a piece of machinery. Route 30 argues that, based upon the 

clear and unambiguous language of the Agreement, the lathe was included in the 

sale and Route 30 did not breach the Agreement by retaining the lathe.

{¶27} Paragraph 1 (“Purchase and Sale”) of the Asset Purchase Agreement

provided that Seller [Thiel’s] would sell and deliver its “business property used 

exclusively in the operation of the business commonly known as Thiel’s Wheels, 

Inc., including, but not limited to Seller’s FF&E, Parts & Accessories, Rolling Stock 

and Goodwill & Intangibles, more particularly described in Exhibit ‘A’ attached 

hereto and referred to herein as the ‘Assets.’ ˮ (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1). Also provided 

was: “ ‘FF&E’ shall include all furniture, fixtures and equipment and includes but 

is not limited to all computers, lifts, machinery, tools, desk chairs, phone system, 

part bins, racks, video systems and alarm systems.” (Id.)

{¶28} Paragraph 7 (“Deliverables”) set forth that the Seller [Thiel’s] was 

required to deliver a Bill of Sale conveying “the Assets to be sold pursuant to the 

terms of this Agreement in favor of the Purchaser.” (Id.)
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{¶29} Thiel’s introduced as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 an Ohio Bill of Sale 

containing the asset list (Exhibit “A”). The asset list had a total value of 

$1,388,014.08 of which $597,051.16 of line items had been crossed out.1 The 

document Thiel’s relied upon constituted evidence that the parties could not have 

come to the figure to be excluded from the sale ($597,051.16) without line item 

#245 being included. As Thiel’s representative testified, item “245 Shop Mach” for 

$2,950.00, represented the lathe which was part of the crossed out items that were 

excluded from the sale. Further, Crates’ “acknowledgment that motor vehicles were 

to be excluded from the list of assets bolsters [Thiel’s] contention that the lathe was 

crossed out, because on the list of assets attached to the Bill of Sale, numerous motor 

vehicles were crossed out as well.” (June 17, 2021 Magistrate’s Decision at 9).

{¶30} The trial court upheld the magistrate’s decision that Thiel’s evidence 

proved its claim. The trial court noted that the magistrate was in the best position 

to judge the credibility of the witnesses, but “mathematical calculations involved 

also favor Seller’s [Thiel’s] position in this matter.” (Oct. 8, 2021 J.E. at 8). The 

trial court further noted that, although the parties disputed the meaning of markings 

on the asset list, “both Seller and the Magistrate noted the only way to make the 

mathematical figures reconcile is to exclude the value of line item 245, the metal 

1 We recognize the list originally was produced for tax purposes, but was acknowledged as an asset list. 
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lathe.” (Id.) The trial court concluded “[t]his circumstance supports the Seller’s 

contention that the metal lathe was to be excluded from the Sale.” (Id.)

{¶31} We conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling in Thiel’s favor. 

Evidence in the form of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, as well as testimony, was presented 

from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that the lathe was excluded 

from the asset sale between the parties.

{¶32} Based on the foregoing, Route 30’s two assignments of error are 

overruled, and the judgment of the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas is 

hereby affirmed.

 Judgment Affirmed

MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.

/jlr