IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA 

V. 

TYRONE DORMAN 

MEMORANDUM 

Juan R. Sanchez, C.J. 

CRIMINAL ACTION 

No. 04-460 

CIVIL ACTION 

No. 16-6259 

January 28, 2020 

Defendant Tyrone Dorman has filed a prose motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set 

aside, or correct his sentence. He asserts his appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to 

determine that the sentence imposed for his supervised release violations exceeded the maximum 

term of imprisonment permitted by statute. Because the Court correctly calculated the maximum 

term of imprisonment to which Dorman could be sentenced for his supervised release violations, 

and appropriately sentenced him within that maximum, Dorman's ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims are meritless. Dorman's motion will be denied without an evidentiary hearing. 

FACTS 

In May 2005, Dorman pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l). He was sentenced to 90 months' imprisonment, followed by 

three years' supervised release. His supervision commenced on November 7, 2012. 

Five months later, on April 9, 2013, Dorman was arrested and charged in state court with 

possession of crack cocaine and marijuana. As a result, the Court revoked his supervised release, 

and sentenced Dorman to 18 months' imprisonment followed by 24 months' supervised release on 

January 29, 2014. Dorman was released from prison and his two years of supervised release 

commenced on August 29, 2014. 

Dorman again violated his supervised release on March 27, 2015, and May 19, 2015, when 
he was arrested for possession with intent to distribute heroin, crack cocaine, and marijuana. On 

June 22, 2016, the Court revoked Dorman's supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months' 

imprisonment with no period of supervised release to follow. 

On November 30, 2016, Dorman filed the instant motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his 

sentence. Dorman asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel when his counsel failed to argue that the terms of imprisonment for his supervised release 

violations exceeded the maximum penalty permitted by 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). 

DISCUSSION 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in federal custody may move the sentencing court 

to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence if the sentence was "imposed in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, . .. the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 

sentence, or ... the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law[ ] or is otherwise 

subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Dorman brings this § 2255 motion pro se, and 

his pleadings are thus construed liberally. See United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331 , 334 (3d Cir. 

2007). Even so, Dorman must plead "facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 

relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). In evaluating a§ 2255 motion, the Court 

"must accept the truth of the movant' s factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous on the 

basis of the existing record." United States v. Tolliver, 800 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2015). 

Dorman asserts a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See U.S. 

Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 

Assistance of Counsel for his defence. "). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a movant must show ( 1) "counsel's performance was deficient," and (2) "the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense." Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To show counsel's 

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performance was deficient, the movant must demonstrate "that counsel's representation fell below 

an objective standard ofreasonableness," when measured under "prevailing professional norms." 

Id. at 688. Failure to raise a meritless argument, however, is not constitutionally deficient 

performance. See United States v. Sanders, 165 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1999). To establish 

prejudice under the Strickland test, the movant must show "there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

In Dorman's motion, he argues his lawyer for his supervised release violation proceedings 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to address the Court's imposition of a 

sentence that exceeded a maximum of three years' imprisonment. For Dorman's first violation in 

2014, the Court sentenced him to 18 months' imprisonment followed by 24 months' supervised 

release-which he asserts exceeded the maximum permitted by statute. For Dorman's second 

violation in 2016, the Court sentenced him to 24 months' imprisonment with no supervised release 

to follow. This sentence, Dorman also asserts, exceeded the maximum amount of incarceration 

permitted by statute for the violations. For the second violation, Dorman argues the maximum term 

of imprisonment permitted by statute was required to be reduced by the amount of time he had 

already served in prison. According to Dorman's argument, each term of supervised release 

revocation imprisonment must deplete the maximum imprisonment time available for future 

supervised release violations. This argument is meritless. 

Dorman's argument appears to be premised on his interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 

The relevant portion states: 

The court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant 

to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute 

for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for 

time previously served on postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant to the 

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or 

supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 

violated a condition of supervised release, except that a defendant whose term is 

revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any such revocation 

... more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony. 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Third Circuit addressed the meaning of this provision in United States 

v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2012). In that case, the Third Circuit rejected an argument 

identical to Dorman's in this motion. The Third Circuit held the maximum term of imprisonment 

a district court may impose for each violation of supervised release is "the lesser of the term of 

supervised released authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised 

release, ... or the cap for the particular class of felony offense set by"§ 3583(e)(3). Williams, 675 

F.3d at 278. Contrary to Dorman's position, the Third Circuit has continued to hold that "[t]here 

is no statutory cap that limits aggregate revocation imprisonment." United States v. Cook, 775 F. 

App'x 44, 49 (3d Cir. 2019). 

In this case, Dorman pleaded guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l), which carries a maximum 

sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). With this maximum sentence, 

Dorman's offense is a Class C felony. See id. § 3559(a)(3). For a Class C felony, a term of three 

years or less of supervised release is authorized. See id. § 3583(b )(2). For a supervised release 

revocation imprisonment sentence on a Class C felony, however, § 3583(e)(3) only authorizes a 

maximum term of two years' imprisonment. See id. § 3583(e)(3). 

When Dorman violated his supervised release and was sentenced for those violations in 

2014 and 2016, the maximum term of imprisonment the Court could impose was the lesser of 

either the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term 

of supervised release (three years) or the cap for a Class C felony in§ 3583(e)(3) (two years). See 

§ 3583(e)(3); Cook, 775 F. App'x at 48 ("Section 3583(e)(3) contains an unambiguous per 

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revocation limit on revocation imprisonment." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

Thus, the Court could impose a maximum of two years' imprisonment for each supervision 

violation. In 2014, the Court sentenced Dorman to 18 months' imprisonment for his supervised 

release violation. In 2016, the Court sentenced Dorman to 24 months' imprisonment for his 

supervised release violation. Both sentences of imprisonment were within the two-year maximum 

sentence permitted by§ 3583(e)(3). 

Because the Court imposed sentences of imprisonment within the statutory maximums 

permitted, Dorman's argument is meritless and the failure of Dorman's lawyer to raise the 

argument was not constitutionally defective. See United States v. Canalichio, 369 F. Supp. 3d 625, 

635 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (holding attorney cannot be found to have been ineffective for failing to raise 

a meritless argument). As a result, Dorman has failed to establish the deficiency prong of the 

Strickland test. The Court need not address the prejudice prong. Dorman having thus failed to 

establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court will deny his § 2255 motion. 

Also, the Court will not hold an evidentiary hearing on Dorman's motion. When a§ 2255 

motion is filed, a district court must "grant a prompt hearing" and "determine the issues and make 

findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto" unless "the motion and the files and 

records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). 

In this case, the record conclusively shows Dorman is not entitled to relief. See Machibroda v. 

United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962) (holding § 2255 does not require "that a movant must 

always be allowed to appear in a district court for a full hearing if the record does not conclusively 

and expressly belie his claim, no matter how vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible his 

allegations may be"); Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 395 (3d Cir. 2010) ("We have repeatedly 

emphasized that 'bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not afford a sufficient ground for 

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an evidentiary hearing' on a habeas petition." (quoting Campbell v. Burris, 515 F.3d 172, 184 (3d 

Cir. 2008))). 

The final issue the Court must address is whether Dorman is entitled to a certificate of 

appealability, which is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l) as a precondition to his right to seek 

review of this decision by the Third Circuit. A certificate may only issue where a movant makes 

"a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), which, after 

a determination of the merits of a§ 2255 motion, requires a showing " that reasonable jurists would 

find the district court' s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because Dorman has failed to make a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right, and the Court finds it unlikely reasonable jurists would 

disagree with its determination of the merits, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. 

BY THE COURT: 

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