Biplanes arid Boabsights

British Bombing in World War I

George K. Williams

, 4

STAEMMYO fo Pub

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Biplanes and Bombsights

British Bombing in World War I

George K. Wffliams

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Air University Press

Maxell Air Force Base, Alabama

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for Public Release

Distribution Unlimited

May 1999

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Williams, George Kent, 1944-

Biplanes and bombsights : British Bombing In World War I / George Kent Williams.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. World War, 1914-1918--Aerial operations, British. 2. Bombers-Great Britain.

I. Title.

D602.W48 1999

940.4'4941--dc2l 99-26205

CIP

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

ii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER ........ .............. ii

FOREWORD . ................... v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR .................... vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................ ..

INTRODUCTION ................. xi

1 NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

(JULY 1916-MAY 1917) ............. 1

Notes ........ ................ 30

2 BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS ........... 35

Notes . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 67

3 41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

(JUNE 1917-JANUARY 1918) .......... 73

Notes ... ..... ....... ... ..... 125

4 EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

(FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER 1918) ......... 133

Notes .. ...... . ...... .... .... 180

5 EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

OPERATIONS ..... .................. 189

Notes ...... .. .... .. .... ..... 231

6 POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS .............. 239

Notes ............................ 264

APPENDIX .................... 269

BIBLIOGRAPHY .... .................. 289

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

iii
nlustrations

Table Page

1 Battle Casualties, Night Squadrons,

June-November 1918 ...... .............. 210

Photographs

Handley Page ....... ................... 9

DeHavilland 4B ....... .................. 43

FE2c ........... ....................... 63

iv
Foreword

This study measures wartime claims against actual results

of the British bombing campaign against Germany in the

Great War. Components of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS),

the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), and the Royal Air Force (RAF)

conducted bombing raids between July 1916 and the

Armistice. Specifically, Number 3 Wing (RNAS), 41 Wing of

Eighth Brigade (RFC), and the Independent Force (IF) bombed

German targets from bases in France. Lessons supposedly

gleaned from these campaigns heavily influenced British

military aviation, underpinning RAF doctrine up to and into

the Second World War.

Fundamental discrepancies exist, however, between the

official verdict and the firsthand evidence of bombing results

gathered by intelligence teams of the RAF and the US Air

Service. Results of the British bombing efforts were

demonstrably more modest, and costs in casualties and

wastage far steeper, than previously acknowledged. A

preoccupation with "moral effect" came to dominate the

British view of their aerial offensives. Maj Gen Hugh M.

Trenchard played a pivotal role in bringing this misperception

to the forefront of public consciousness.

After the Armistice, the potential of strategic bombing was

officially extolled to justify the RAF as an independent service.

The Air Ministry's final report must be evaluated as a partisan

manifestation of this crusade and not as a definitive final

assessment, as it has been mistakenly accepted previously.

This study develops and substantiates a comprehensive

evaluation of British long-range bombing in the First World

War. Its findings run directly counter to the generally held

opinion. Natural limitations, technical shortfalls, and aircrews

lacking proficiency acted in concert with German defenses to

produce far less results than those claimed.

Mention must be made here of the excellent appendix that

concludes this study of British bombing efforts in the Great

War. Prepared by Steve Suddaby, it presents a compact yet

V
comprehensive view of British bombing raids against German

targets during World War One. Both the author and Air

University Press are indebted to Mr. Suddaby for his fine

contribution to this treatise.

George K. Williams

vi
About the Author

George K. Williams was born on 30 March 1944 in Lamar,

Colorado. He graduated from Lamar High School in 1962 and

entered the US Military Academy at West Point in 1964,

graduating in June 1968 with a Bachelor of Science degree.

He earned a Master of Arts in US Intellectual History from

Cornell University in 1973 and a PhD in Modem History from

Oxford University, England, in 1988.

Colonel Williams was commissioned as a second lieutenant

in the US Army upon graduation from West Point in 1968.

Following graduation, he attended US Army Ranger School at

Fort Benning, Georgia. He later completed the Armor Officer

course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the Advanced

Jumpmaster course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

From August 1968 to August 1969, Colonel Williams was a

platoon leader with 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 82d Airborne

Division, at Fort Bragg. From August 1969 to August 1970, he

was a platoon leader and company commander with 1st

Squadron, 1st Cavalry, I Corps, in South Vietnam. Upon

returning to the United States, Colonel Williams completed the

Armor Officer advanced course at Fort Knox and attended

Cornell University at Ithaca, New York. From August 1973 to

July 1975, he served as instructor of English at the US

Military Academy.

Colonel Williams was an exchange officer and assistant

professor of English and Fine Arts at the US Air Force

Academy from August 1975 to July 1976. He then returned to

the US Military Academy and served as assistant professor

and course director in the English Department until August

1977, when he completed an interservice transfer to the US

Air Force and entered Air Weapons Controller training at

Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. After graduation, he

was assigned to 963d Airborne Warning and Control

Squadron, 552d Airborne Warning and Control Wing, Tinker

AFB, Oklahoma. From October 1977 to July 1981, he served

as airborne weapons controller, senior director, and airborne

vii
battle staff member on the E-3A airborne warning and control

system aircraft.

Colonel Williams entered Oxford University in August 1981

and completed his resident studies in July 1984. He was

assigned as special assistant to the commander, Air Force

Logistics Command, from August 1984 to August 1985. He

then served as Deputy Air Force Historian in the USAF Office

of History, Washington, D.C., until November 1996, when he

was assigned as research fellow, National War College,

National Defense University, Washington, D.C. He retired from

active duty in June 1998.

viii
Acknowledgments

Many fine people on both sides of the Atlantic encouraged

and assisted in the convoluted development of this study. The

sustained support of my family and the peerless example of

Sir Michael Howard, decorated infantryman and Regius

Professor of Modern History, have been particularly

noteworthy and are gratefully acknowledged.

tx
Introduction

In broad brush, this study balances wartime claims against

actual results as determined after hostilities. It also

documents the cost, in men and equipment, of the bombing

offensive waged by 3 Wing, Royal Naval Air Service, and

components of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Air

Force-specifically 41 Wing, Eighth Brigade, and Independent

Force, between July 1916 and the Armistice. The study's

organization was based on the organizational scheme of Sir

Charles Webster and Noble Frankland in their four-volume

history of Bomber Command in World War II, The Strategic Air

Offensive Against Germany.

Maj Gen Hugh M. Trenchard's Independent Force, the major

strategic force to undertake significant and protracted

bombing operations in the Great War, levered into place the

cornerstone of the postwar Royal Air Force and shaped its

doctrine during the interwar years. It also conditioned

domestic expectations concerning the offensive potential of

aerial campaigns in any future conflict. The lessons

supposedly gleaned from the Great War heavily influenced the

progress of British military aviation during the 1920s and

1930s, underpinning RAF doctrines, expectations, and

policies up to the initial phases of the Second World War. The

subject thus deserves careful study in its own right.

Fundamental discrepancies between the materials and

conclusions reported in the January 1920 Air Ministry's

classified evaluation of the Great War's long-range bombing

offensive on the one hand, and those contained in seven

volumes of evidence gathered firsthand by RAF intelligence

officers who surveyed German-occupied territory immediately

after the Armistice on the other, prompted an initial interest in

this aspect of military history. Data from seldom-consulted

records of the bombing study conducted independently by the

United States Air Service complicated these differences.

Subsequent examinations of RAF, Air Ministry, and other

official archives brought even more contradictions to light.

xi
Opinion of British long-range bombing efficacy during the

First World War has previously been unduly influenced by two

factors: (1) the laudatory judgments rendered in the

six-volume official history, The War in the Air, by Sir Walter

Raleigh and H. A. Jones, and (2) a retrospective awareness of

the Anglo-American combined bombing offensive. Compared

to the scale and intensity of its successor, the 1917-18

bomlbing effort seems to shrink into insignificance, serving

merely as a slight and inconclusive prelude.

Contributing further to this neglect has been the general

unavailability of definitive materials that might refute or

corroborate the enthusiastic assessments of bombing

promulgated in The War in the Air. By default, the flawed

conclusions of the official history have been accepted and

echoed by many later studies. Even those investigators who

have delved deeper have often been led astray, most notably

by the Air Ministry's classified report of January 1920,

"Results of Air Raids on Germany Carried Out by the 8th

Brigade and Independent Force, R.A.F."

In point of fact, the results of the 1917-18 RFC and RAF

bombing offensives were demonstrably far more modest-and

costs in aircrew and aeroplanes far steeper-than previously

acknowledged or estimated. When other pertinent information

is compiled and used, it severely undercuts the traditional

view. Inordinate personnel losses and equipment wastage

must be attributed to the policy of unrelenting offensive action

that characterized RFC and RAF activities during the period. It

impacted negatively upon aircrew proficiency and replacement

programs, and on the muddled concepts of employment under

which bombing squadrons in the field found themselves.

Weather conditions and technical deficiencies also exacted a

heavy toll.

From the outset, a preoccupation with the "moral" effects

versus "material" results of bombing characterized the British

view. This stance was not, however, shared by any of their

major allies. By mid-1918, when Trenchard assumed control

of the Independent Force, this preoccupation had evolved into

a widespread obsession. It affected not only target

selection-it affected the manner in which the targets would

be assaulted. After the war, the alleged moral effect of aerial

xii

L
bombardment became the predominant justification for the

RAF. Trenchard, as wartime bomber commander and later as

Chief of the Air Staff in the decade following 1919 (when

histories were written and doctrines formulated), exerted a

pivotal influence in this regard.

When Trenchard took over the IF in June 1918, his

arrangements with Lord Weir, the Air Minister, were such that

he could wage his bombing program quite independently of

the Air Ministry and even the War Cabinet, guided only by his

own prejudices and predilections. Further, his IF

headquarters staff originated and disseminated all reports,

summaries, and other returns detailing the results of his

aerial offensive. This exclusive control meant that any

assessment of success would have to depend largely upon

documentation produced by those who had waged the

bombing campaign.

In the lean years after the Armistice, strategic bombardment

was extolled to justify the continued viability of the Royal Air

Force as an independent third service. Trenchard strove to

mold opinion and was overwhelmingly successful. Wartime

encounters with Zeppelins or Gothas, and memories of the

protracted attrition of the trenches, had predisposed domestic

citizenry toward the arguments of Air Ministry; British society

developed an exaggerated consensus of bombing's potential.

The widely cited January 1920 Air Ministry evaluation of

bombardment must be viewed as a partisan manifestation of

an official crusade, not as a definitive final assessment.

Point-by-point analysis and comparison of its assertions with

those contained in the RAF field reports from which it was

ostensibly derived, as well as those in the US Air Service

bombing survey, lead one inescapably to this conclusion. The

Air Ministry's final report, exemplifying the bombing rationale

unceasingly preached during and after the hostilities,

illustrates the extent to which exaggerated notions and fears

quickly permeated the body politic. A ruthless aerial

counteroffensive appeared to offer the only realistic future

hope for home defense. The 1923 recommendations of the

Salisbury Committee, confirming the RAF as a coequal-and

conceivably preeminent-fighting service, endorsed and

enshrined this nearly universal misconception.

xiii
In sum, this study develops and substantiates a

comprehensive evaluation of British long-range bombing in

the First World War that runs directly counter to more

generally held opinions. Natural constraints, technical

limitations, and training shortfalls combined with the impact

of enemy countermeasures to create a considerable disparity

between the bombing results officially claimed and those

actually produced. Conversely, personnel losses and aircraft

wastage rates were demonstrably far greater and more

operationally significant than hitherto realized or admitted.

Finally, the misrepresentations of the January 1920 Air

Ministry report highlight the extent to which the potential of

strategic bombardment was touted between the two wars to

rationalize and guarantee the continued existence of the Royal

Air Force as a separate service.

Had the Royal Air Force and the Air Ministry critically

analyzed their own files, they probably would have understood

the restrictions that adverse weather, navigational precision,

sighting accuracy, and the state of aircrew training and

morale impose upon the conduct of any sustained campaign

of long-range aerial bombardment. In fact, very little such

institutional introspection occurred between the wars.

xiv

L
Chapter 1

No. 3 Wing

Royal Naval Air Service

(July 1916-May 1917)

Any study of British long-range bombing campaigns against

Germany logically commences with the operations of No. 3

Naval Wing from its bases at Luxeuil and Ochey in France.

Between July 1916 and April 1917, this Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) unit launched 18 raids into Germany and German-occupied territory. The average formation (15 Sopwith

11⁄2/ Strutter aircraft) dropped an average of 2,500 pounds of

bombs per mission.' By October 1916, No. 3 Wing had proved

able to cooperate effectively with French air forces in a series

of aerial attacks against German iron works and blast furnaces in the Saar valley, where the British Admiralty believed

steel for U-boats was being produced.2 Yet, No. 3 Wing never

realized more than half its proposed strength of one hundred

machines.

Examining the plans and operations of No. 3 Naval Wing

during its short career reveals the divergent conclusions of the

Admiralty and the War Office concerning the relative importance of strategic bombing and the practical difficulties surrounding Anglo-French cooperation. These issues were to vex

British policy makers throughout the war.

The RNAS had enjoyed a somewhat greater freedom of action and diversity of function than its army counterpart, the

Royal Flying Corps (RFC).3 While the latter had developed into

an air arm tied to ground elements, the RNAS independently

probed the application of airpower. In large measure, the wartime increase in naval air strength beyond the immediate

needs of purely maritime activities provided an operational

surplus to encourage RNAS experimentation. Unfortunately,

Britain's aviation industry failed to satisfy the expansion programs of both services, thus compounding RFC suspicions as

to the purity of RNAS motives and generating arguments

about aircraft procurement between the War Office and the
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Admiralty.4 On balance, the weight of advantage lay with the

navy.

The doctrinal tradition that aircraft could best defend Britain by

taking the offensive against the enemy had already been established

during the early R.N.A.S. raids against Zeppelin bases. Finally, the

interest of the Admiralty in the more indirect application of force, as

opposed to the War Office's increasing fixation with the titanic struggle

on the Western Front, made the notion of striking at the German war

industry with naval air forces seem particularly attractive.5

Thus, the navy was able to take the lead in the first strategic bombing operations against Germany. The RNAS received

"little encouragement" from its army counterpart, however, or

from the British Expeditionary Force in France. In the spring

of 1917, No. 3 Wing was disbanded to provide men and machines for the Royal Flying Corps.6

On 4 April 1916, the Admiralty's director of Air Services

prepared a memorandum, "Defense Against Zeppelin Raids,"

for the War Cabinet. In this paper, Rear Adm C. L. VaughnLee argued that a purely defensive policy did not adequately

respond to the growing menace of airship raids on England;

he asserted that such a limited approach "cannot compare

with a vigorous offensive." He emphasized that an organized

and systematic attack on the enemy home front would restrict

Zeppelin activities and have an immense "moral effect" on

Germany itself. The naval staff officer concluded that Britain,

by regaining the initiative, could then inflict both direct (material) damage and indirect (morale) casualties on her foe.

It now appears essential that a definite policy of Retaliation be laid

down and carried into effect without any further delay. A sustained

offensive will have a decided effect in weakening the enemy's activities

at the front by calls for defensive measures. 7

The idea that strategic bombing could force a recall of German fighter units from the front to the homeland while damaging Germany's industrial base was seductively attractive to

Admiralty planners. This notion surfaced again in late 1917,

in the Air Ministry, to justify the creation and expansion of No.

3 Wing's successors.

The Admiralty Air Department had received considerable

encouragement and support from the French, who also advo2

h.
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

cated bombing on a large scale. At the end of May 1916, the

Admiralty received a formal request from the French naval

attache, who proposed a combined French/British bombing

force to be based near Luxeuil, south of the British sector.8

The French, who supplied engines to the British but had not

yet developed a suitable daylight bombing machine themselves, emphasized that their participation would depend

upon a continued supply of serviceable aircraft from the British. The Allies agreed not to initiate operations until sufficient

force had been assembled, as ineffective attacks would merely

alert the enemy and permit him to disperse production and

deploy countermeasures. 9

At an Anglo-French conference in London on 4 July 1916,

the concept and details of the forthcoming aerial campaign

were discussed at length."° By this time, the Admiralty had

already dispatched a small advance party under Capt W. L.

Elder to arrange for the arrival of the British component. The

Admiralty agreed that French bombardment groups should

receive one-third of the Sopwith bombing machines delivered

to Luxeuil and that the French would have operational control

of the English squadrons committed to the joint offensive.

These concessions further damaged Admiralty-War Office relations.11 Apart from difficulties with their army colleagues, the

navy had no misgivings about allowing the French air staff to

select targets based on the French bombing plan.

This arrangement was perfectly acceptable to the Admiralty, who were

able to secure the use of a French base which was within the

operational range of the principal German industries. In any case, the

French bombing plan was an eminently practical one and included

many targets which the Navy wanted to attack. 12

A revision of the original French plan of 1915, this plan constituted the most comprehensive scheme for strategic bombardment of German military and industrial objectives available to British authorities at the time.

In formulating their plan, the French air staff first drew up

a list of critical targets in Germany and determined their relative importance. They then ascertained whether each objective

lay within range and whether it was vulnerable to aerial attack. Finally, they allocated an order of priority based on op3
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

erational feasibility. They did not concern themselves with the

force required to destroy or severely damage their targets.'3

From this process, the French determined that the four

most important enemy industrial complexes were located in

four target areas: Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, Mainz, Cologne,

and Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg. The first three were then discarded because the forces required to bomb these targets frequently and systematically were not available.

Since Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg emerged as the only tactically feasible target area, the French defined the main task of

the long-range bombing force as "annihilating the iron districts of Lorraine and Luxembourg." The blast furnaces there

produced nearly half of Germany's total steel output."4 In bowing to present constraints, however, the French air staff did

not lose sight of the future.

When the number of squadrillas will have increased, other objectives

may be attacked. Then the industrial centres of MANHEIMLUDWIGSHAVEN, on the Main (Frankfurt), of Cologne, and eventually

Westphalia, may be classed as the most important objective, and It

will be against the latter that the aerial forces of industrial destruction

will be marshaled. '

5

This pragmatic evaluation conceded that, given the size of the

force available at Luxeuil, the iron and steel industry in the

Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg area was the only vulnerable objective of importance.

One must note that the French assessment considered material damage to enemy industry primarily; moral effect was

unimportant, even as a secondary consequence of aerial attack. The Allied force was authorized to bomb selected towns

and cities at greater distances only as "specific reprisals" in

response to particular illegal actions by the enemy. The

French dissociated these attacks from the strategic strikes

against German blast furnaces.

Since the British Admiralty agreed in principle with the

French proposals, they set about gathering machines and aircrews. Captain Elder had been sent to Luxeuil in early May

1916 to arrange for establishing the new unit.'6 Once sufficient long-range bombing machines became available, No. 3

4
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

Wing would be able to raid German munition works and industrial centers in the Saar valley.

A key region, the Saar valley was accessible to Allied units

based in the vicinity of Luxeuil and Ochey. It was hoped that

the wing would be equipped with 35 bombers (mainly Sopwith

11/2 Strutters) and 20 escort aircraft (11/2 Strutters configured

as fighters) by 1 July 1916, with steady expansion to an eventual strength of 100 planes."7 Later that fall, this planning

estimate was revised upward-to a minimum of at least two

hundred bombers, with two thousand high-horsepower engines on order to support future replacement.' 8

Some evidence exists that the Admiralty attempted to assemble this sizable aerial force without consulting the War

Office."9 In fact, however, these levels for No. 3 Wing were

never realized-due largely to War Office opposition and the

necessity to reinforce the Royal Flying Corps in support of the

army on the Somme.

The army rested its case upon the questions of strategic

priorities and unity of effort on the Western Front. It adhered

to the principle that strategic bombing ranked far down the

scale of aerial duties, well below such missions as aerial observation and adjustment of artillery fire. In a paper presented

to the Air Board on 9 June 1916, Maj Gen Hugh M. Trenchard

argued that "this observation must be regarded as of primary

importance to all bombing operations . . . efforts should be

devoted to providing observation requirements in the first instance. "20

Further, the War Office asserted that if scarce aviation assets were diverted from support of the army to participate in

the Luxeuil sideshow, operations on the Western Front (which

the War Office saw as the decisive theater) would be hampered

in direct proportion. Sir Douglas Haig crystallized this position

in his memorandum to the War Office on 1 November 1916.

Unless my requirements have first been adequately provided, the

provision of flying machines by the naval authorities for work on the

fronts of the French and Belgian armies in France amounts to very

serious interference with the British Land Forces, and may

compromise the success of my operations. 2

'

5
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Field Marshal Haig and General Trenchard opposed the

scheme. They based their formidable dissent on the grounds

that, since no surplus of aircraft existed, implementing the

Admiralty plan would commit machines and crews needed

elsewhere to an endeavor of secondary importance. This dissipation of resources, they said, would seriously hinder their

primary effort.

The army's demands for flying machines at the expense of

No. 3 Wing began in late spring 1916 and continued until the

Wing was disbanded a year later. In July 1916, when the

Luxeuil force had been expected to consist of 55 serviceable

bombing and escort aircraft, its actual strength had been

whittled to fewer than a dozen machines and pilots. On one

occasion, when Brig Gen Sir David Henderson, director-general of military aeronautics for the army, needed a minimum

reinforcement of 72 planes but could only comb out 12 suitable machines from the home establishment, he sought aid

from the RNAS. But, as the official history notes, "The Admiralty could only respond at the expense of their new bombing

wing." By mid-September 1916, a total of 62 Sopwith twoseaters had been transferred to army squadrons. 22 These War

Office requests significantly delayed expansion of the Luxeuil

wing and reduced its strength below that necessary to conduct effective bombing.

Even after No. 3 Wing commenced active operations in the

fall of 1916, it never recouped its logistical losses. It was able

to expand somewhat, but on a more modest scale than originally calculated. For the period of peak bombing activity,

October 1916 to March 1917, an average of 43 pilots and 35

serviceable machines were available for operations. On 25

March 1917, the Admiralty acquiesced to War Office pressure

and began to disband the Luxeuil force in order to reinforce

the Royal Flying Corps.

By May, the remnants of No. 3 Wing had been transferred to

No. 10 (Navy) Squadron for support of the armies in the British sector of the Western Front.2 4 Even during its decline, the

wing managed to fly four bombing missions, including one in

April with the French, before its withdrawal from action.25

6
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

The Admiralty planners hoped the Luxeuil wing, in cooperation with the French, could damage enemy industrial centers

and depress civilian morale sufficiently to affect German combat power on the Western Front. That hope never reached

fruition.

The preeminence of long-range bombing was by no means

universally acknowledged. The War Office in particular looked

askance at the Admiralty's preoccupation with what seemed to

the soldiers to represent a peripheral mission for airpower.

The army chiefs emphatically asserted that flying machines

would best be employed in ground support, with squadrons

tied to a subordinate, cooperative role. Additionally, the War

Office argued there was no surplus of aircraft that could be

committed to strategic bombardment. The struggling British

aviation industry had yet to fulfill Field Marshal Haig's requirements for tactical aviation and seemed unlikely to do so

in the foreseeable future.

These two interservice issues were initially aggravated by

the Admiralty's attempt to organize and deploy the Luxeuil

force without informing the War Office. The consequent uproar at the Air Board, combined with the necessity to reinforce

the Royal Flying Corps for the Somme, kept No. 3 Wing well

below its planned rate of expansion. Finally, No. 3 Wing was

disbanded in order to bring RFC squadrons in the British

sector up to strength. The high-level dissension over roles and

priorities seriously affected the scale and pace of No. 3 Wing's

operations. Even if the Admiralty had been able to carry out

its original program of expansion for the unit, the Luxeuil

wing would probably not have developed into a decisive strategic weapon.

The Sopwith 11/2 Strutter, when configured as a single-seat

day bomber, took 24.6 minutes to reach 10,000 feet. Carrying

a pilot and four 65-pound bombs, it cruised at 98.5 miles per

hour. Its service ceiling was 13,000 feet and it could remain in

the air for three and three-fourths hours .

2 These characteristics restricted its combat radius to less than 150

miles-assuming that its pilot prudently chose to climb to at

least 10,000 feet before crossing the lines. The small size of its

bombs made them useless unless a direct hit could be at7
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

tained. As a fighter escort, the 11/2 Strutter carried a pilot and

an observer/gunner to a service ceiling slightly in excess of

15,000 feet. The aircrew, in addition to the stress induced by

flying in marginal weather conditions and the threat of enemy

countermeasures, faced a number of physiological obstacles

as well. In their open cockpits, they spent extended periods

well above the level at which the average healthy individual

begins to suffer from oxygen deprivation (anoxia typically commences between 8,000 and 12,000 feet). They were also subjected to ambient temperatures that varied from plus 15 degrees Fahrenheit to minus 30 degrees Fahrenheit, summer to

winter.

The ratio of serviceable machines to the number available

stood at around 20 percent, and the average number of sorties

per assigned aircraft stood at a very low 1.4 percent.2 8 Even

under ideal conditions of equipment and weather, No. 3 Wing

would have found it extremely difficult to meet the ambitious

goals set by its Admiralty advocates. The operational record of

the Luxeuil force must be analyzed against this background.

Although Captain Elder's newly created unit was anxious to

attack enemy industrial targets in the Saar valley, it was not

equipped with sufficient machines to launch a major strike

until October 1916. In the interim, No. 3 Wing cooperated with

six French aircraft in a raid on the benzine stores at Mulheim

on 30 July. The Wing's contribution apparently consisted of

two bombers and one escort machine, or one-third of the

Allied force that dropped 1,450 pounds of bombs.29 The

Luxeuil wing participated in no further operations for nearly

two and one-half months.

The first large raid in October encountered spirited enemy

resistance, an unwelcome phenomenon that underscored the

necessity for fighter escort to protect bombers in daylight attacks. On 12 October, German fighters attacked the AngloFrench force (31 bombers and numerous escorts, including 15

navy bombers and six navy fighters), both inbound and outbound, shooting down six French and three British aircraft

against no losses. The Luxeuil component dropped 3,780

pounds of bombs on the Mauser arms factory at Oberndorf,

with unreported results.

8
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

On their 23 October mission against the Thyssen steel

works at Hagendingen, just 25 miles behind the lines, returning aircrews claimed "direct hits on the blast furnaces" from

twenty-six hundred pounds of bombs. No losses occurred

among their nine bomber and six escort machines.3 °

Five raids in November and December concentrated on blast

furnaces and iron works in the Lorraine coal basin, objectives

of priority to the French. On 10 and 11 November, nine and

fourteen bombers, escorted by eight and seven fighters, hit the

iron works at Vblklingen. German records collected by British

intelligence teams after the Armistice list 14 air raid alarms

within the Vblklingen complex in November 1916, a consequent shortfall of 1,713 tons in steel production, and a total

repair cost of 42,171 marks.3' British escort pilots reported "considerable fighting," but no British losses.

Nine Luxeuil bombers escorted by seven fighters dropped

2,280 pounds of bombs on the blast furnace and iron works at

St. Ingbert on 12 November. The same force configuration hit

the iron works at Dillingen on 24 November and on 27 December, the last raid of 1916. Aircrews reported "many direct hits"

on each mission. No naval aircraft were damaged, and the

escorts claimed one enemy fighter destroyed.

:::::::::::::::::::: :.. ...... . .

This Handley Page is being hand-pushed to the runway.

9
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

The five missions conducted in the final two months of the

year targeted three iron works within 10 miles of V6lklingen,

two of which were hit twice in successive raids. Given the

marginal weather conditions and the state of No. 3 Wing's

resupply, such activity indicates that the Luxeuil force attempted to concentrate its striking power in space and time.

The Luxeuil wing continued to concentrate its attacks primarily upon blast furnaces and iron works in 1917 till its

official disbanding on 25 March. Four of the six raids were

directed against the iron works at Saarbrficken. During the

winter, freezing weather presented two problems in particular:

oil in aircraft engines congealed, and targets were obscured by

ground fog. Such obstacles held the wing's operational

strength to that achieved in late 1916 and curtailed the

number of missions flown. Nevertheless, No. 3 Wing achieved

some degree of concentration with its small force.

The Saarbrficken iron works were struck on 23 January by

10 bombers with six escorts; on 25 February by 13 bombers

escorted by five fighters; on 4 March by 10 bombers with five

escorts; and on 22 March by six bombers with three escorts.

These missions aimed a total of 10,140 pounds of bombs at

the blast furnaces. The French supported this effort with missions against V61klingen in January, February, and March,

and with day and night raids against Dillingen and Hagendingen during February.32

Two raids against other types of targets also occurred during this period. On 16 March, nine No. 3 Wing planes dropped

1,560 pounds of bombs on Morhange, aerodrome. That night,

a single Handley Page dropped twelve hundred pounds of

bombs on the railway station at Metz, with unobserved results. When an Admiralty telegram directed that No. 3 Wing

be disbanded, its assets were transferred to the RFC.

No. 3 Wing continued to operate until mid-April, even as it

was being slowly dismembered. Improving weather conditions,

and the incongruous arrival of two more Handley Pages (threeman bombers carrying nearly five times the payload of the

Sopwith 11/2 Strutters), allowed No. 3 to mount four more

missions before passing into history.

10
0

NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

The rail junction at Arnaville was struck on 5 April. On the

night of 13/14 April, the blast furnaces at Hagendingen were

hit, followed by a raid the next night on the supply depot and

aerodrome at Chambley. Each of these sorties was flown by a

single Handley Page-perhaps the same machine-carrying

approximately twelve hundred pounds of bombs.33

Freiburg was hit on 14 April as a reprisal for German submarine attacks in March against two hospital ships (Asturias

and Gloucester Castle).34 (The French had established a practice of launching retaliatory raids against designated German

towns only when specifically provoked.) The Luxeuil wing contributed 15 bombers and eight escort fighters to the Allied

force that struck the small German city. Two and one-half

tons of bombs were dropped in two raids, mingled with leaflets

explaining the action to the population of the town. All the

French pilots returned safely, but No. 3 Wing lost three escort

machines plus four crewmen killed and two taken prisoner.

That these casualties could be inflicted despite an escort of 17

fighters indicates the intensity and determination of enemy

opposition that day. It seems certain that this attack on

Freiburg was intended solely as a reprisal and that no material damage to the war machine was intended. Aircrew reports

refer to "a reprisal raid on the centre of town," and there is

nothing to suggest a military objective. German records indicate that "the bombs fell in the most thickly populated quarter

of the city."35

The French separated planned reprisals from the strategic

goals of their aerial campaign against the Saar industries. The

British Admiralty, hoping to undermine the will of Germany's

civilian population to continue the conflict, optimistically attributed "an immense moral effect" to every bomb that fell on

Germany, whether or not it hit anything of military importance.3 6 But since the Freiburg mission marked the end of the

Luxeuil Wing's operational career, the Admiralty's thesis could

not be conclusively tested.

After the Luxeuil wing had been in operation for some

months, the Fifth Sea Lord, Commodore Godfrey Paine, queried Haig concerning whether bombing enemy blast furnaces

had significantly restricted steel output. He also wanted to

11
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

know the extent to which naval bombing operations had

forced the Germans to withdraw fighting squadrons from the

front for home defense duties."

In his responses, Sir Douglas Haig indicated that his earlier

judgment (that strategic bombing "as a means of defeating the

enemy is entirely secondary") had been confirmed and that,

even when successful, "results are comparatively unimportant."38 He answered a definite "no" to the question of whether

bombing had caused the enemy to withdraw aircraft from the

battle front, elaborating that a general expansion in enemy

aviation units had occurred all along the front. Regarding

Paine's question as to whether enemy steel production had

been reduced, Haig replied, "No such information has reached

me, and it would, therefore, appear highly improbable that the

output has been seriously affected."39 To the War Office, field

results seemed to indicate that the Admiralty's bombing experiment had merely siphoned assets from tactical support of

British ground units. Lord George Curzon's Air Board agreed

with Haig's view in its final decision, which was forwarded to

the War Committee.4 °

Faced with this adverse summary from the army, the Admiralty had little choice but to disband the Luxeuil wing.

Whether No. 3 Wing attacks had shaken the morale of the

German industrial population was a point that neither the

Admiralty nor the War Office explicitly addressed at the time.

The assertion that the moral effect of strategic bombardment

could outweigh its material results had to wait for the Royal

Air Force and 1918.

One consequence of No. 3 Wing's existence centered upon

the issue of British unity of command. The affair hardened

Haig's suspicions that independent operations of any sort seriously interfered with his ability to organize and control a coordinated, unified campaign. Further, it jeopardized British operations in what he considered to be the decisive theater of

war.

Widespread public dissatisfaction with the conduct of the

war led to Asquith's replacement by Lloyd George. The new

prime minister, who had a low opinion of the military, underscored Haig's pessimism and was fully capable of withdrawing

12
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

units from the Western Front to stage an operation in some

peripheral theater.

The field marshal's opinion of strategic bombing was consistent with his greater concern that the politicians, with an eye

toward his reassignment or dismissal, hoped to discredit his

professional judgment. He objected to the existence of an independent Allied air detachment outside his control and operating from French soil, contending that "the employment of

bombing machines in France is. . . . Primarily, even if not

entirely, a military question." He condemned "interference by

the naval authorities with the British land forces" and argued

that the Luxeuil force undermined his authority as the director of Britain's effort in the field.41

Sir Douglas Haig's misgivings concerning independent

bombing detachments and unity of command seem partially

justified, since the French air staff clearly dominated the tactical conduct of No. 3 Wing's activities. Not only did the French

develop the plan-they also selected specific targets for attack

by the British naval aviators. The Admiralty voiced no objections to this arrangement because the plan had been discussed at the July 1916 joint conference and seemed practical.

In fact, permitting the French authorities to take charge of

British squadrons created a local unity of command for coordinating the efforts of the Luxeuil force. And targets listed by

the French were those the Royal Navy had hoped to bomb in

any case. Throughout the campaign, the French continued to

dictate specific targets for No. 3 Wing's daylight missions-even after the French began to bomb exclusively by

night after the costly day raid against Oberndorf on 12 October 1916.42

Official reports forwarded to the Admiralty from the commander of the British component substantiate the Gallic control: "a raid on Brebach Iron Works, this being the objective

assigned us by the French."43 On several occasions, in order to

maintain pressure, the French coordinated day attacks by the

British Sopwiths on targets that French forces were hitting at

night. V61klingen, bombed successively by No. 3 Wing on the

10th and 11th of November 1916, was also hit by a French

13
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

force during the intervening night. After the British raid on

Dillingen on 27 December 1916, the French attacked targets

in the vicinity. "Aeroplanes were around the district for 10

hours with intervals."44 Timely execution of such joint operations was considerably assisted by a single planning staff.

Collocation of the British squadrons with their French

counterparts simplified tactical cooperation. And since the

French assumed responsibility for logistical support, the decision to place the French air staff in charge of flying operations

was also quite logical. It is doubtful that such a degree of

coordination could have been achieved had the Royal Navy

refused to surrender its squadrons to French operational control. The alternative would have been to have British positions

resolved miles away from Luxeuil and transmitted, with concomitant delays, to the French air staff. The effectiveness of

the joint force would have unavoidably declined, even if the

planners had been of like minds.

The subordination of British aviation units to a foreign

authority guaranteed an effective, coordinated unity of effort,

albeit under a French commander. Field Marshal Haig considered this policy to endanger his authority and the unity of

effort on the Western Front. At Luxeuil, however, no one questioned the arrangement; it functioned with a minimum of

Anglo-French friction.

That an Allied long-range bomber force with a workable

plan could mount a systematic offensive against selective objectives seems indisputable, given the example of No. 3 Wing.

The campaign, however, was hampered by weather conditions,

mechanical and design difficulties, and chronic resupply problems. These factors severely limited the size of the bomber

force as well as its opportunities.

Of particular note is the cumulative effort directed against

enemy blast furnaces, which were attacked on 11 of the 19

raids launched and in 58 percent of the sorties flown by No. 3

Wing.45 The French apparently adhered to their overall plan

rigorously. Two other missions, on 16 March 1917, had also

been scheduled to raid blast furnaces but were forced to divert

to alternate targets.46 No. 3 Wing's attentions were not only

concentrated in a small, well-defined region (the iron works

14
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

within the Lorraine coal basin); they were also distributed in

time, other conditions permitting.

The French plan of bombardment identified targets in accordance with a system of clearly defined priorities. Raid totals

for the remaining target categories, excepting Freiburg and the

two diversions, indicate that they were not prime objectives of

the Luxeuil force. The intensity and cadence of attacks against

identified targets were largely determined by such factors as

availability of machines and trained aircrews, design limitations, poor weather, and the effects of extreme cold.

The retaliatory raids on Freiburg, a joint operation in which

the French returned to daylight attacks, characterize the second element of the French strategic plan: reprisals. Shortly

after the demise of No. 3 Wing, the Chief of the Imperial

General Staff (CIGS) in London received an elucidation of the

French reprisal policy from his liaison officer at the French

War Ministry.

Bombardment of an open German town, by way of a reprisal, follows

on every bombardment of a French town. This bombardment Is carried

out by decision of the Government.

There exists, beyond these reprisals, a permanent plan for

bombardment by aeroplanes. This plan established by the

Government has solely military objectives in view. These objectives

are, at present, the factories and stations of the Saar valley. 47

Thus the two partners in strategic bombing differed fundamentally on the importance of morale within the enemy's civilian population. Based on the No. 3 Wing campaign, targeting

the German population remained a moot issue. It would, like

the debate over unity of command, emerge again in 1917 and

1918.

The means for estimating material damage and moral effect

during hostilities were necessarily fragmentary and often contradictory. The indicators needed to evaluate the campaign's

effectiveness were largely unavailable to the Allied air staffs.

Without the required indicators, such as poststrike photographs and access to enemy industrial records, British and

French planners had to rely upon available indicators (aircrew

observations, captured letters, agents' reports, and articles/editorials in German periodicals) to judge the results of

15
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

bombing programs. These latter indicators had to be used

with caution.4"

Both the Admiralty in London and squadrons in the field

assumed that bombing is effective and that measuring the

level of bombing effort would reflect the degree of damage

inflicted upon the enemy. Official raid reports transmitted to

the Admiralty from No. 3 Wing invariably featured the

number of sorties flown and the total weight of bombs

dropped.49 Lacking other indicators, planners were forced to

rely almost exclusively upon friendly data for evaluating the

effects of their aerial attacks. In doing so, however, air staffs

at Luxeuil ran the risk that their statistics would become

ends in themselves.

"The utilization of these indicators did have the effect.., of

orienting operational activity to the indicators that had been

designed to measure attainment of objectives."50 In sum, flying

missions and dropping bombs, tasks controlled by commanders and their staffs, can assume lives of their own. As the only

reliable sources of cumulative statistics, these endeavors inevitably become goals in the eyes of the men performing them.

To the extent that this translation occurred in the Luxeuil

Wing, it obscured the original purpose for collecting such information: to aid in assessing the damage caused by bombing.

Appendix I of Captain Elder's final report, in which he compared the totals of his No. 3 Wing with the French No. 115

Wing at Malzeville, shows his preoccupation with numbers

and bombing effort.

It will be seen that we made 12 raids against Commandant Lefort's 12,

but amongst the latter are raids of the 9th, 10th and 15th February

1917, which took place during a period of cold so intense at Ochey

that all efforts to start the engines proved unavailable [sic] so that

during the periods preceding and following the spell of very low

temperature, we actually beat the French record by three raids or 33

1/3 percent.

Commandant Lefort told me that to attain that number of raids he

had to take more than usual risks. 51

This focus upon activities that squadron commanders could

oversee and influence seems to indicate some degree of goal

displacement-a confusion of ends and means-within No. 3

Wing. In concluding, the naval commander identified a factor

16
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

beyond his control (a period of extreme cold) as the cause of

his difficulties. Then he rearranged the statistics in an effort to

demonstrate that "we actually beat" the French wing's performance by a sizable margin. Further, he intimated that his

French counterpart at times resorted to unsafe practice in

order to bolster his totals. This elaborate rationalization tends

to confirm the hypothesis that goal displacement was occurring at least as high as wing level in the Luxeuil bombing

force.

The contrast between returning aircrew reports and data

gleaned after the war highlights the optimism prevalent in

London and in Luxeuil. Official raid reports forwarded from

Luxeuil to the Admiralty provide extracts of the results reported for each mission. Typical of such reports is the narrative forwarded by Captain Elder to the Admiralty on 27 January, following the 23 January 1917 raid on the Burbach works

at Saarbrficken.

The pilots report that the atmosphere was clear over Burbach and that

considerable damage appears to have been done by the 2,600 lbs. of

bombs which were dropped . . . three Pilots, one Observer and one

Gunlayer returned suffering from severe frostbite.5 2

The Admiralty subsequently summarized this mission: "16

British naval aeroplanes bombed the blast furnaces at Burbach (basin of the Saar) which appears to have suffered considerable damage."5 3 Thus did results percolate through the

British chain of command to the Air Department.

In addition to field data, the Admiralty collected and evaluated other intelligence via the Directorate of Aerial Intelligence. This data typically consisted of fragments, such as a

quotation from a captured letter in which a factory manager in

Saarbrficken complained to his clients that he would be unable to meet his scheduled deadlines. This particular executive blamed the general suffering caused by the war "and more

recently from aerial bombardment, [so] that it is absolutely

impossible to make promises for numerous orders in hand.""4

And this disparate data was compiled and evaluated by the

same units or agencies responsible for conducting the bombing.

17
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

No direct indices of effectiveness came into Allied hands

until after the Armistice, when teams of British and American

air intelligence officers were able to obtain information from

the Germans themselves. The British team of three experienced air intelligence officers and three of other ranks, all

under the direction of Maj H. W. M. Paul, examined and catalogued the results of Allied bombs. Between 7 December 1918,

just after the Armistice, and 20 January 1919, Major Paul's

group visited over two-thirds of the objectives that had been

attacked from the air, up to the left bank of the Rhine. 5 Their

final report, comprising seven volumes of data organized by

target category, was submitted through Headquarters RAF in

the field to the Secretary of the Air Ministry on 26 February

1919.56 This study of the effects of aerial bombardment systematically investigated the "material damage done" and the

"moral effect caused," as well as the "organization of the enemy's countermeasures against bombing." The British team

also collected information to "enable decisions to be made as

to how far the Allied bombing policy was correct and effective

from a military point of view."

The survey groups dispatched by the US Air Service had

similar tasks. Between early March and 20 May 1919, 12

American teams (one officer, one photographer, one chauffeur)

investigated bombing sites in 140 towns in the Allied Zone of

Occupation west of the Rhine."7 Surprisingly, neither British

nor American teams seemed aware of the existence of the

other. Their reports thus provide an independent means for

cross-checking data and comparing conclusions; in fact, the

American report was misplaced soon after its completion and

not rediscovered until July 1974.58

Considering the limitations imposed by lack of time and

personnel, the two bombing surveys are remarkably complete,

due largely to the cooperation of the German authorities, who

kept meticulous records of air raid damage and associated

costs. Apparently, they hoped for Allied reparations should the

Fatherland win the war. At almost every location, the air intelligence teams were able to gather information:

* A list of the air raids, giving dates and numbers of bombs

dropped.

18
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

* Sketches of objectives, showing positions in which bombs

had been dropped on various dates.

* An account or report of the damage caused by the bombs,

cost of repairs, moral effect, and various details of

interest.

* General organization and positions of all antiaircraft

defenses.

o Different methods of warning and intercommunication.

e Any photographs that showed material damage caused by

raids, as well as others that might be of military value. 59

This firsthand information depicted the actual results, as

opposed to the reported results, of bombardment. The low

correlation between wartime claims and postwar findings

emerges clearly from the case of No. 3 Wing's two raids

against the Burbach Works at Saarbrlicken on 23 January

and 22 March 1917. After the first mission, Captain Elder

cabled the Admiralty that "the atmosphere was clear over Burbach and . . . considerable damage appears to have been

done.""° The Sopwith 11/2 Strutter bombers dropped a total of

forty 65-pound bombs in this attack.

In its postwar survey of Burbach, the British team relied upon

a large diagram compiled by the works directors. It plotted every

bomb that fell on the works between 1915 and 1918.61 On 23

January 1917, according to this map, nine bombs (out of 40

dropped) fell on Burbach, mainly in its southwest sector. The

American group's findings agreed with the British data. Moreover, the American survey included a narrative description of the

points of impact and the damage caused.

No. of

Raid No. Date Bombs Place and Kind of Damage

6 23/1/17 9 Fell near smelting furnace

no. 3, in the steel works,

near the foundry, in the

Modeling shed and on the

port on the Saar, damaging

a large water reservoir, different roofs and sheds and

also the tracks. 6,600

Marks.6 2

19
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Under conditions of good visibility, British aviators could

accurately observe and report the points of impact of their

payloads; however, their damage assessment betrayed a tendency toward wishful thinking.

Six bombers and three escort machines participated in the

Wing's 22 March visit to Burbach. "Conditions over Germany

were bad, and heavy cloud banks were met.... On the return

journey compasses froze."63 One machine landed at Malzeville

with a frozen oil pump. Many airmen sustained frostbite from

the intense cold. Despite the best efforts of the British aviators, no bombs fell on blast furnaces in or near Saarbrficken

that day. Local authorities recorded no attacks against the

city, and managers at the Burbach works logged no air raids

after the 23 January attack until October 1917.6 Twenty-four

65-pound bombs dropped from No. 3 Wing's formation on 22

March 1917 had no determinable effect upon machinery or

morale in the Saar valley.

Likewise, when missions were flown against the Burbach

works on 25 February and 4 March 1917, neither inflicted any

noticeable damage.65 A force of 23 machines carrying 92

bombs comprised the total British effort on these two raids.

Similarly, the nine Sopwith bombers that raided the St.

Ingbert Steel Works on 12 November 1916 went unrecorded inr

the local tabulation of bomb damage. This plant was hit only,

twice during the entire war (9 August 1915, six bombs; 11

November 1917, one bomb), according to the files of the municipal and factory officials.66

Of five daylight missions flown by No. 3 Wing against blast

furnaces, four went completely unnoticed by the industrial

and civilian populations. This meager result would not become

apparent until after the war, however, by which time subsequent campaigns in 1917 and 1918 had imbued the concept

of strategic bombardment with a vitality of its own. This campaign against German blast furnaces is illustrative of a

chronic tendency for the advocates of strategic bombing to

overestimate results. These postwar data are presented here to

provide a scale for evaluating the information reported and

evaluated by British airmen and staff officers during wartime,

not to criticize the accuracy of their conclusions.

20
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

Nor were the disappointing results at Saarbrficken unique;

Dillingen, eight miles downstream, provided a similar case in

point. When No. 3 Wing first struck there on 24 November

1916, the "target was large and visibility good." Encouraging

results were reported to the Admiralty.

The majority of the bombs were seen to actually strike the objective,

and it is thought that very considerable damage must have been

done-the actual weight of bombs dropped being 2,340 lbs.67

On the 27 December mission, flown after several weeks of

poor weather, Captain Elder admitted to the Admiralty that

results were not observed.

It was impossible to observe the results owing to the haze and clouds

over Dillingen, but as the target is a large one it is probable that many

bombs reached the objective.68

The Admiralty uncharacteristically waited for confirmation

of this field report, which apparently was revised due to other

intelligence data arriving at the Aerial Intelligence Directorate.

The announcement that "no damage was done during the raid

on Dillingen on the 27th December 1916" came nearly a

month after the raid.6 9 Satisfactory bombing seemed to depend

on satisfactory visibility, though the aviators implied that

some targets were too large to miss completely even when

visibility was poor.

Postwar German records revealed that all the bombs

dropped by No. 3 Wing in these attacks fell on the outskirts of

the factory complex. American investigators catalogued only

the raids subsequent to February 1918.71 In the British survey, which summarized the effects of all Allied attacks between 25 August 1915 and 23 October 1918 on Dillingen,

Major Paul concluded that "in no case has any stoppage of

work resulted from the damage caused by air raids."7 1 In this

instance, accurately delivered ordnance, confirmed by bomber

crews if conditions permitted, consistently failed to inflict serious damage. Under such circumstances in wartime, the tendency to inflate results would be inevitable, regardless of any

other pressures upon the bombardment advocates to justify

their expensive campaign. Contradictory information would

seldom surface.

21
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

The well-documented raids on the Thyssen Steel Works at

Hagendingen graphically illustrate the scale and precision of

the Luxeuil wing's aerial effort. In this case, a bomb-by-bomb

comparison of actual effects with reported results is possible.

Both postwar survey teams collected records from the German

authorities, which permits us to analyze the accuracy and

influence of reported results during wartime.

No. 3 Wing's 23 October 1916 day attack by nine bombers

on Hagendingen has generally been considered a successful

operation. 2 On the evening of 22 October, aircraft of the

Luxeuil wing moved north to an advanced base at Malzeville

aerodrome while the 4th Groupe de Bombardment took off to

strike the Thyssen works. 3 The next day, 23 October, nine

Sopwith bombers and six escorts from No. 3 Wing also hit the

Thyssen works; Wing Commander R. B. Davies reported a

successful operation.

Our aircraft kept excellent formation, moved into single line and went

down to bomb in succession, and I could see the bombs bursting

amongst the furnace buildings. The return journey was uneventful,

with little AA fire. 74

Captain Elder agreed, notifying the Admiralty that "only two

factory chimneys were left intact after the last two bombs had

dropped ... the majority of the works will be out of action for

some considerable time."7 5

The Air Department then overstated the reported results:

Hagendingen. The results of the raid of the 25th October

were very satisfactory. Three out of five blast

furnaces have been completely destroyed. 6

Both London and the field agreed that the joint bombing campaign was off to a promising start.

A widespread desire to encourage the program and silence

its critics in the War Office increased the Admiralty's tendency

to exaggerate damage reports-and air staffers were handicapped by the scarcity of reliable information concerning the

effects of air raids. The results of the bombing campaign were

observed, analyzed, and judged by men who had a considerable stake in the campaign's success. Under such conditions,

wishful thinking would rationalize any ambiguity.

22
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

For the most part, the Thyssen files available to Allied investigators in early 1919 substantiated the reported results of the

French and British attacks on 22/23 October 1916. In the

French night raid, five bombs fell "between the central shops

and the office of the machine shop," damaging the main conduit and shattering numerous windows.77 To show the detail

typical of many such records, the German report of damage

caused by No. 3 Wing's attack is presented here in full.

On October 23, aeroplanes flew over the colony at noon. Two

squadrons of about 7 to 10 planes followed each other at a short

distance. Part of the aeroplanes succeeded in flying over the factory.

Seventeen bombs were dropped. They fell in the following order:

1) Three beside the porter of the cement factory; they formed funnels

of four to 4.50 meters in diameter.

2) Four in the coke dump. It is here that the largest funnel was

formed. It had a diameter of seven meters and a depth of 3.50

meters.

3) One bomb in building No. 16.

4) One bomb in building No. 6.

5) One bomb in front of the northern facade of building No. 3. This

bomb did not explode and was unearthed intact.

6) Two bombs on the roof on building No. 1.

7) One bomb in front of building No. 1.

8) Four bombs on the steel mill.

The bombs which fell on building No. 6 and 16 and on the roof of the

steel mill caused serious damage to the roofing and to the windows of

the establishments.7 8

This narrative, extracted from the US Air Service survey,

and the bomb-plot diagram included in the British survey,

permit one to ascertain the sequence and points of impact of

each bomb that fell on the Thyssen works that day. The German documents largely support the wartime claims of Allied

bombing accuracy, but they differ radically with respect to the

actual damage inflicted upon the objective.

Further study of the bomb-plot diagram confirms the futility

of Anglo-French attempts to destroy such a sprawling industrial complex with a handful of planes carrying four 65-pound

bombs each. Despite appearances, vital facilities within such

complexes as Thyssen were relatively few and often protected

by overhead cover or adjacent structures. The small scale of

the Allied aerial effort against German blast furnaces did not

23
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

support a reasonable probability of damaging or destroying

such key points. Planners and squadron commanders did not

emphasize the need for a high degree of accuracy; they were

content with designating and attacking the targets in toto,

accepting the hypothesis that "bombs anywhere on Thyssen

(or Burbach or Hagendingen) hurt the Hun." In fact, however,

they did not."

In addition to errors in navigation and imprecise bombing,

design deficiencies in British ordnance also vitiated the results

of No. 3 Wing raids. Interviews inside Germany after the war

indicated that the Allied bombs, particularly those of 112-

pound weight or smaller, lacked "any real penetrating effect"

against most factory structures. In instances where such

bombs struck "massive and solidly built" machinery or buildings, the bomb casings often telescoped without detonating.8 0

German plant managers also revealed that blast effects from

aerial bombs were almost exclusively directed vertically rather

than horizontally, so that "near-misses" had little effect.8'

They considered that our bombs lacked blasting effect. They pointed

out that Works were very solidly built, and it required a big bomb to

cause really serious damage. They did not overlook the effects bombs

had had on their Works, but they considered that both the French

bombs and our own were deficient both in penetrating and blasting

effect.8 2

The German authorities also remarked on the persistent

and perplexing problem of "bombs well made and apparently

faultless" failing to explode; these "blinds," which occurred on

almost every raid, were carefully recorded.8 In the French raid

on Saarbrficken on 6 September 1915, 38 of 45 bombs failed

to detonate-and throughout the war, 25 percent of the bombs

dropped on this industrial area were blinds.84

As the means for-and the goals expected from-the British

strategic bombing offensive expanded, the emphasis upon

moral effects increased proportionately. This preoccupation

with "moral effect" (reducing the enemy population's will to

continue fighting) seems to have been a peculiarly British

obsession.

By the end of hostilities, General Trenchard, commanding

the Independent Force, could proclaim that the importance of

24
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

moral to material effect was "as 20 to 1" without much fear of

contradiction.85 Neither the French air staff nor the American

Air Service attached a commensurate importance to such an

intangible indicator. Nor did they acknowledge civilian morale

as an appropriate bombing target.

Calculation of moral effect and its estimated impact was an

Admiralty activity rather than a field concern during the tenure of the Luxeuil wing. References to moral effects from British and French attacks began to appear in Air Department

communiques in the spring of 1917. Included with reported

results of material damage, under the heading "Results of

Raids," these citations included agent and neutral reports as

well as excerpts from German periodicals and correspondence.86 These data, screened and published in London, supplemented the No. 3 Wing's reports and satisfied the Admiralty's desire for independent information.

Under certain conditions, the two sources served as a crosscheck on the progress of the bombing campaign. Taken together, they supplied ammunition to silence War Office critics

and to aid the Admiralty in competing for scarce machines

and crews. In official bulletins, moral and material claims

combined to justify strategic bombing and confound its detractors.

During wartime, no independent means existed for testing

the reliability of intelligence coming from Germany. Likewise,

that the Admiralty Air Department uncritically accepted and

distributed such material lent it disproportionate credibility as

a barometer of effectiveness. No. 3 Wing's efforts against industries in the Saar valley provided the impetus for developing

moral effect into a major rationale for continuing to bomb.

In the course of No. 3 Wing's assault on German blast

furnaces, Admiralty bulletins devoted increasingly more attention to indicators of moral effect. Initially, such indicators

seemed to claim that indirect damage resulted from otherwise

ineffective attacks. Although an earlier release stated unequivocally that "no damage was done during the raid on

Dillingen," this assessment was followed by other intelligence

data two weeks later." The subsequent communiqu6 sug25
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

gested that, though no militarily significant results had been

achieved, there were some indirect benefits.

It is reported that during the raid on Dillingen on the 27th December

1916 aeroplanes were around the district for 10 hours with intervals.

People took shelter in cellars four times.88

The implication of this second Admiralty communiqu6 on

Dillingen was that German morale-and hence productivity-could be impaired simply by the proximity of Allied bombers. That is, depression resulted from the threat of attack as

well as from attacks themselves; it was independent of any

actual damage caused. The bombing focus had subtly broadened to include not only German industry but also its labor

force. This linkage of bombs and moral effect, largely forged by

the wishful thinking of the Admiralty Air Department, was

initially tentative.

Barely two months later, however, presumption of moral

effect had developed to the point that it was accorded equal

space with "reported military results" in the "Results of Raids"

column. On 24 March 1917, the column excerpted a letter in

which a German factory manager in the Saar valley regretted

that he could no longer give his clients definite delivery dates

due to wartime disruption "and more recently from aerial

bombardment.""9 Two weeks later, under severe pressure from

the War Office to abandon the long-range bombing from

Luxeuil and disband No. 3 Wing, the Admiralty issued this

statement:

It is reliably reported that the Allies' recent frequent aerial

bombardments of objectives in the Saar Valley have caused panic

among the workmen, and they refuse to carry on their work. Nearly all

of them have cancelled their agreements, fearing for the safety of their

lives on account of the Allies' machines. 90

The Admiralty assumed that deterioration of morale within

the enemy populace, from initial curiosity through annoyance

to eventual panic, was a feasible bombing goal; the relationship between bombs and morale was presumed to exist.

Similarly, moral effect was presumed to be a cumulative

phenomenon. Its importance persisted for two reasons: (1)

very little data existed that could be used to evaluate bombing

results during wartime and (2) selective use of moral effects by

26
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

the Admiralty could support propitious assertions of results

which opponents of strategic bombardment could not definitely refute. While the war raged, the effectiveness of air attack had to receive the benefit of the doubt.

Few assumed that the German populace would eventually

become habituated to bombing or that the enemy would develop effective countermeasures. Yet, some indication of this

trend existed even during the war. For example, an article in

the Sarregemunder Zeitung cautioned its readers against remaining in the open during air raids.

One was able to notice yesterday for the twentieth time that all our

warnings to the public have been useless. The streets were blocked

with people, and one could tell by the number of bombs that were

dropped, what would be the inevitable result of these assemblies ...

that there were no victims among the crowd, it is most certainly to be

put down to the English inexperience. 9 1

Apparently, the novelty of sighting enemy aircraft above

one's city outweighed any fears that the average German citizen felt on such occasions. The newspaper editor argued for

caution; the possibility of panic was not mentioned.

Interviews with German managers and workers at the Saar

blast furnaces after the war emphasized that the British had

consistently overestimated the moral effects of their raids. Material supplied to the Americans led US Air Service investigators to conclude that the main effect was insufficient rest

among the workers.

The morale of workers was affected to the extent that when they "went

on" again on their next shift, their physical strength was somewhat

reduced and [they] were incapable of working at their normal capacity,

and would try to find someplace to steal a rest.92

The team of American intelligence personnel at the Burbach

works reached a similar, if blunter, conclusion after their interviews: "the workmen maintained a fairly good working

standard in the factory and many were glad when an alert was

sounded because it meant a loaf for a while."93 At Burbach,

the Americans noted that "no bonuses were paid to employees

and no strikes ever occurred here."94 Since the bombing survey included data from the RFC and RAF raids in late 1917

and 1918 as well as No. 3 Wing raids, one can conclude that

27
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Admiralty bombs never posed a threat to German productivity

along the Saar.

Throughout the war, the morale of the enemy population

was considered by British planners to be susceptible to aerial

attacks. During late 1916 and early 1917, this concept received official attention as a secondary "bonus" effect resulting

from air strikes against industrial targets of military importance. The utility of moral effect as one of the few available

indicators of bombing progress led to its frequent use by the

Admiralty Air Department to rationalize the lack of direct results and to justify strategic bombardment. This preoccupation with morale was to become an obsession later in the war;

it was largely a fond hope.

Against this evaluation of the Luxeuil wing, one must set

the conclusions of the official historian, H. A. Jones. In this

regard, the sixth volume of the official history, The War in the

Air, published in 1937, has set the tone for subsequent verdicts.

With our fuller knowledge it is clear that the effect produced by the

naval bombing wing was disproportionate to the number of raids,

which were comparatively infrequent and are not to be judged by the

material results. The British and French bombing attacks went some

way to shake the morale of the industrial population and had an

adverse effect on the output of munitions of war, but chiefly they

compelled the Germans to divert aeroplanes, labor, and material to the

beginnings of widespread schemes of home defence. 95

Here, Jones evaluated the fortunes of the Luxeuil wing

merely as a prelude to the later bombing of the RAF; altogether, he devoted eight pages (three in volume 2, five in

volume 6) to this inaugural experiment in British strategic

bombardment. A recent author, Neville Jones, cited the official

history paragraph below in agreeing that "the bombing campaign of the naval wing was remarkably successful."96

It can hardly be doubted that the removal of No. 3 Wing brought great

relief to the Germans to whom the provision of an air defence system

(no matter how inadequate) was an intolerable burden. 97

This latter Jones then proceeded beyond The War in the Air.

While he repeated The War in the Air's argument that civilians

"compelled the German government to build up a defense sys28
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

tem at a great cost both in men and material," he also favorably contrasted the Admiralty raids with German airship attacks on Britain in 1915.

Whereas the Zeppelins were seldom able to locate and bomb their

objectives at night, the naval bombers, operating in more favourable

conditions and at a shorter range, had proved themselves capable of

finding and bombing specific targets both by day and night. In

consequence, these operations were far more dangerous to the

Germans than the airship raids had ever been to the British. 98

In making these pronouncements, neither author appears

to have compared post-Armistice survey materials with wartime claims. The universal tendency has been to accept wartime observation reports and intelligence information. German

records made available after 11 November 1918 have been

largely ignored or selectively employed. Documentation contained in the postwar bombing surveys simply fails to support

the wartime reports.

The widespread opinion that one major effect of the French

and British air raids was to "compel" Germany to commit

aviation assets to home defense makes sense only if strategic

bombing is analyzed in vacuo. The evidence for the alleged

redeployment of German fighter units to counter Allied air

raids stems almost entirely from Air Ministry and RAF intelligence estimates prepared in August and September 1918, a

period when British bomber losses in daylight missions were

increasing sharply.99 This support has been demolished by

recent research into the surviving logs and records of the

German interceptor squadrons assigned to defend the fatherland.

In fact, the German home defense system (Heimatlufschutz) was first

constructed because of French air raids which had been going on

since 1915, and were to continue, albeit erratically, throughout the

war. There was none of the dramatic movement of fighter aircraft

between the front and the industrial arena which the British were

quick to perceive in any redeployment of German Jagdstaffein fighter

squadrons along the Western Front. Until 1918 at least, German home

defence squadrons (Kampfeinsitzerstaffein) remained a separate and

largely unreinforced contingent, fighting a small-scale campaign

against predominantly French opposition.100

29
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

German archives also confirm that until late 1918, the

home defense squadrons were forced to operate with warweary machines discarded by other units. Coordinated formation attacks against British bombing machines by such a motley variety of veteran aircraft were correspondingly rare. 10' The

perception of No. 3 Wing aircrews and Air Department staff

officers that enemy resistance stiffened because German frontline fighters were diverted to the home front proved, in the

final analysis, to be illusory.

Notes

1. Public Record Office (PRO), Air Ministry Record (AIR)

1/2266/209/70/18, "Notes on Report of Bombing Operations by No. 3

Wing, RNAS, in France during winter, 1916/1917," Capt W. L. Elder, Royal

Navy (RN), Commanding No. 3 Wing, to Admiralty, 24 May 1917.

2. AIR 1/2266/209/70/18. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, Being the Story

of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol. 6 (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1937), 118. (A note of clarification is in order here: War in

the Air is in six vols.; Sir Walter Alexander Raleigh wrote volume 1, H. A.

Jones wrote vols. 2-6.

3. Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical

Survey (London: Jane's 1979), 111-13.

4. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 3, 251-300.

5. Malcolm Cooper, "The British Experience of Strategic Bombing"

(Oxford University typescript, 1982), 10.

6. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 2, 452; and Sir Charles Webster and

A. Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany

1939-1945, 4 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1961),

34.

7. PRO, Admiralty Records (ADM) 1/8449/39A, "Defence Against

Zeppelin Raids," in Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, ed. Stephen

W. Roskill (London: Navy Records Society, 1969), 342-44.

8. AIR 1/2266/209/70/18, Captain Elder.

9. Ibid.; and AIR 1/1 15/15/39/68. Admiralty to Captain Elder, 27 July

1916.

10. PRO, AIR 1/508/16/3/52, Report of Aviation Conference, 4 July

1916.

11. Ibid.

12. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the

Development of British Air Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918

(London: Eimber 1973), 107.

13. PRO, AIR 1/1976/204/273/39, "Account of the Aviation Plan of

Bombardment by Airplanes," French General Staff, 18 November 1917,

trans. by Technical Division, US Air Service, 3 December 1917.

30
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

14. Ibid.

15. AIR 1/1976/204/273/39.

16. Sir Walter Alexander Raleigh, War in the Air, vol. 1, 451; Cooper, 13.

17. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 2, 452.

18. AIR 1/515/16/2/84, memorandum to Air Board, 26 October 1916.

19. ADM 1/8844/39A, "Defence Against Zeppelin Raids," 4 April 1916.

20. PRO, AIR 1/978/204/5/1139, Chief General Staff (CGS) to Air

Board, 3 June 1916.

21. ADM 1/8844/39A, Haig to Army Council, 1 November 1916, 405-7.

22. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 2, 452.

23. AIR 1/2266/209/70/18, Captain Elder.

24. Ibid.; and Webster and Frankland, vol. 1, 34.

25. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 2, 452.

26. Ibid., Appendix 17, Table A.

27. US Army Air Forces Air Service Command, Technical Order 30-1-5,

Medical Officer's Guide, 258-63.

28. AIR 1/2266/209/70/18, Captain Elder.

29. Ibid.; and H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 2, 452.

30. For this raid, Jones lists five more aeroplanes (four bombers, one

escort) than Elder, who, being on the spot, probably gave the more accurate

total.

31. PRO, AIR 1/2104/207/36, "Results of Air Raids on Germany

Carried Out by the 8th Brigade and the Independent Force, R.A.F., January

1st-November 11th, 1918," Air Ministry publication Directorate of Air

Intelligence (DAI) no. 5, 1 January 1920.

32. PRO, AIR 1/1999/204/273/269, "Report on the Effects of Bombing

German Blast Furnaces," Maj H. W. M. Paul to Air Ministry, 26 February

1919.

33. Neither Elder (AIR 1/2266/209/70/18) nor H. A. Jones (War in the

Air, vol. 6, 120-21) specifies the payload; a typical Handley Page 0100 bomb

load is assumed.

34. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6., fn. 121.

35. Ibid.

36. ADM 1/8844/39A, "Defence Against Zeppelin Raids," 4 April 1916.

37. H. A. Jones, Warin the Air, vol. 6, 121-22.

38. PRO, AIR 2/123, Haig to War Office, letter, subject: Sir Douglas

Haig's Criticism of Aerial Policy in France, 1 November 1916.

39. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6, 122.

40. AIR 2/123, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, memorandum to War

Committee, 9 November 1916.

41. AIR 2/123, Haig to War Office, letter, 1 November 1916.

42. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 114.

43. PRO, AIR 1/111/15/39/1, Official Raid Report, Officer Commanding

No. 3 Wing to Admiralty, 4 March 1917; see also Official Raid Report, "No. 3

Wing, R.N.A.S. Operations from Luxeuil and Ochey-Detalls of Air Raids over

Enemy Territory," 26 February 1917.

31
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

44. AIR 1/111/15/39/1 Official Raid Report, 11 November 1916; and

Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 330, 7 February 1917.

45. A "sortie" is one takeoff and one landing by one aircraft.

46. AIR 1/2266/209/70/18, Captain Elder; and AIR 1/111/15/39/1.

Official Raid Report, 16 March 1917. Bombers diverted from Burbach works

in Saarbraicken to Morhange (16 March 1917) and from Hagendingen to

Moulin-les-Metz (16/17 March 1917).

47. AIR 1/2266/209/70/22. Lieutenant Colonel Spiers, Paris, to CIGS,

cipher telegram, subject: Reprisals for Bombing Raids by the French, 9 July

1917.

48. James Clay Thompson, Rolling Thunder, Understanding Policy and

Program Failures (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1980),

87-91.

49. AIR 1/111/1539/1, Official Raid Reports.

50. Thompson, 92.

51. AIR 1/2266/209/70/18, Captain Elder, Appendix I.

52. AIR 1/111/15/29/1, Official Raid Report, 27 January 1917.

53. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 317, 25 January 1917.

54. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 375, 24 March 1917.

55. PRO, AIR 1/1998/204/273/262, Maj H. W. M. Paul, RAF in the

field, to Air Ministry, letter of transmittal, subject: Reports of British

Bombing Raids on German Railways, Railway Stations and Railway

Objectives, 1918, 26 February 1919.

56. Ibid.

57. Maurer Maurer, ed., The US Air Service in World War I: vol. 4,

Postwar Review (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Force Historical Research

Agency, 1979), 364-66.

58. Ibid., 561, note 6.

59. AIR 1/1998/204/273/262, Major Paul to Air Ministry, 26 February

1919.

60. AIR 1/111/15/39/1, Official Raid Report, 27 January 1917.

61. AIR 1/1999/204/273/269, Major Paul, RAF in the field, to Air

Ministry, letter of transmittal, subject: Effects of Bombing German Blast

Furnaces, 26 February 1919.

62. Maurer, vol. 4, 439.

63. AIR 1/111/15/39/1, Official Raid Report, 22 March 1917.

64. Maurer, vol. 4, 439.

65. Ibid., 440-41; and Neville Jones does not distinguish between

Burbach and Brebach in The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 122.

66. Maurer, vol. 4, 452.

67. AIR 1/111/15/39/1, Official Raid Report, 25 November 1916.

68. Ibid., Official Raid Report, 28 December 1916.

69. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 318, 28 January 1917.

70. Maurer, vol. 4, 558, note 31a.

71. AIR 1/1999/204/273/269, Major Paul to Air Ministry, 26 February

1919.

32
NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

72. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 116; and H. A.

Jones, War in the Air, vol. 2, 452.

73. AIR 1/111/15/39/1, Official Raid Report, 23 October 1916.

74. R. B. Davies, Sailor in the Air (London: 1967), 154.

75. AIR 1/111/15/39/1, Official Raid Report, 30 October 1916.

76. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 269, 6 December 1916.

77. Maurer, 386-87.

78. Ibid., 387.

79. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 112-13; and AIR

1/111/15/39/1, Official Raid Reports.

.80. PRO, 1/1998/204/273/266, Major Paul, RAF in the field, to Air

Ministry, letter of transmittal, subject: Reports as to the Effect of Various

Types of Bombs on Buildings, Streets, etc., and General Conclusions,- 26

February 1919.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Maj Gen Hugh M. Trenchard, Dispatch of 1 January 1919,

Reprinted in Aeroplane, 8 January 1919, 129-31.

86. AIR 1/111/1 5/39/1, Admiralty Communique.

87. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 318, 28 January 1917.

88. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 330, 7 February 1917.

89. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 375, 24 March 1917.

90. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 388, 10 April 1917.

91. Ibid., Admiralty Communiqu6 no. 379, 28 March 1917.

92. Maurer, 444.

93. Ibid., 440

94. Ibid., 441.

95. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6, 122.

96. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 123-24.

97. Ibid., 123-28.

98. Ibid., 129.

99. PRO, AIR 1/477/15/312/229, Lieutenant Colonel Davidson, DDAI,

to Director of Flying Operations, subject: The Increase of (1) German Home

Defence Flights and (2) Anti-AIrcraft Defences of Germany, 24 September

1918. See also AIR 1/682/21/13/2217-8 and AIR 1/7/11/27/13/2214.

100. Nebel Papers, Deutsches Museum, Munich, Germany,

Kampfeinsitzerstaffel la, squadron records. Quoted in Malcolm Cooper,

note 5 above, 40.

101. Cooper, 'The British Experience," 17.

33
Chapter 2

British Bombing Begins

Following the demise of No. 3 Naval Wing, the British government's concern with strategic bombing dwindled. Official

interest in aviation detachments -committed to independent

bombardment almost disappeared. The exception was No. 5

Wing, Royal Naval Air Service at Dunkirk. The Admiralty continued to underwrite No. 5 Wing, which raided German naval

bases along the Belgian coast with DeHavillands and Handley

Pages.

However, No. 5 Wing eventually found itself saddled with

diverse tasks unrelated to long-range bombing. This dissipation of effort, and the willingness of Vice Adm Sir Reginald

Bacon, commander of the Dover Patrol, to subordinate squadrons to Field Marshal Haig, kept the wing from its primary

mission. It never waged a systematic bombing campaign of

sufficient intensity to substantiate the worth of its independent activities, defaulting to Germany the strategic initiative for conducting long-range aerial operations. No. 5 Wing,

RNAS became No. 5 Group, Royal Air Force in April 1918.1

The forced retirement of RNAS brought a de facto acceptance of the RFC attitude about the division of responsibilities.2 Sir David Henderson, Director-General of Military Aeronautics (DGMA), sent this memorandum to the Admiralty in

late 1916:

It is, to my mind, absolutely essential that during this winter, the

duties and requirements of the different air forces should be definitely

laid down. The French ought to be able to look after their own front,

and I have no ground for believing that they are unable to do so. The

Navy have our own, and hostile coasts to look after, and their duties

with the fleets. For the performance of these latter, not much material

appears to be at present necessary .... All air duties . . . with the

Field Armies should be carried out by the Royal Flying Corps, and it is

for the military authorities to decide the relative numbers of the

different types of aeroplanes to be used for these purposes. 3

The DGMA left no doubt that satisfying the aviation requirements of Field Marshal Haig should have first call on British

35
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

aircraft production. The navy, with strictly maritime responsibilities (as defined by the War Office) would need far fewer

machines. The French aviation service, now that the Sopwith

11⁄2/2 Strutters at Luxeuil had been transferred to the RFC, was

to be left to its own resources. This army position, which

reduced air force roles to cooperative support of their respective parent services, represented a return to the uneasy status

quo ante for No. 3 Wing. The proposal required no extensive

rearrangement of the British command structure.

The opposite perspective, that strategic bombardment embodied a potential independent of land and sea campaigns,

contained major doctrinal and organizational perturbations for

the conduct of modern warfare. At the time, British command

authorities preferred to acquiesce in the War Office's evaluation. However, this expedient solution survived only until the

Germans resumed daylight raids on Britain in summer 1917.

Gothas forced a reappraisal of the air Issue.

The new German offensive had an impact upon British public and political consciousness out of all proportion to the

force that the enemy dedicated to their bombing attacks. Initially intended as an experiment to try British morale and

produce propaganda, these raids from Belgian aerodromes

employed approximately one-fourth of the German heavy

bomber strength.4

The German bombing offensive was halted in May 1918 so

that the Gotha squadrons could be committed elsewhere. The

shift was not due to the relatively high wastage rate (15 percent), which was caused more by accidents than by British

defenses.5 Between May and August 1917, two daylight attacks (of eight for the period) reached London. Between August 1917 and May 1918, 15 night raids (of 19) penetrated to

the capital. Casualties included three thousand killed or injured and 1.5 million pounds in property damages; the Germans had dropped 120 tons of bombs.' These raids, particularly two daylight raids on London (13 June and 7 July),

accelerated review of the British air program, transforming it

from an interservice issue into a political question of considerable public interest.

36
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

After more than a year of procrastination, the Lloyd George

government reacted with all possible speed to resolve its

chronic difficulties with the military and naval air services.

Enemy bombs on London had highlighted inadequacies in the

present organization. In a matter of weeks, decisions were

taken that eventually unified the two fractious components as

the Royal Air Force. The issue of strategic bombardment was

from the outset inextricably conjoined with the creation of the

third service.

Even with this crisis, politicians might have been deterred

from such a merger during wartime. Their impulse wavered

momentarily "in the hiatus between the summer daylight

raids and the start of the fall nighttime series."7 The German

"Harvest Moon" attacks, which commenced in September

1917, remotivated the British decision makers. The Cabinet

hoped to quell not only the public outcry for a workable home

defense system but also for prompt reprisals in kind against

German cities, since civilians at home now seemed to share

the same risks as their uniformed colleagues in France. Besides satisfying these popular demands, the government also

sought to solve the recurrent problems of duplication, shortages, and waste caused by RFC-RNAS rivalries. Unification

also seemed likely to provide the means to exploit the potential of an aerial offensive, an attractive alternative to the campaigns on the Western Front. "The great motive force of the

Royal Air Force was the offensive one enshrined in the idea of

strategic bombing."8 The locus of this force lay within the War

Cabinet.

Faced with these difficulties, the government summoned

Trenchard to London for discussions on strategy. But his first

appearance before the Cabinet (20 June 1917) provided little

encouragement; he dismissed the politicians' scheme to

mount an airborne patrol belt across southern England as

purely defensive and doomed to fail. To halt the Gothas, he

advocated seizure of the Belgian coast, where they were based,

as "the most effective step of all."9 This overland offensive

would dovetail nicely with the plans of Trenchard's superior,

Sir Douglas Haig, who presented his plan for the forthcoming

Flanders campaign to the War Cabinet.

37
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

As the next best solution, Trenchard proposed an aerial

counteroffensive on the Western Front to destroy the enemy's "aeroplanes and bases," thus "reducing his power to send

expeditions to England."10 Attrition, said Trenchard, would

eventually force the German aviation service to redeploy

squadrons in order to minimize high tactical losses. There

would then be no surplus of suitable machines to undertake

long-range bombing.

Both suggestions reflect Trenchard's faith in maintaining

constant offensive pressure and keeping aviation tied to the

ground plan. They also echo his 1916 objections to the Admiralty's creation of No. 3 Naval Wing at a time when aerial

assets were in scant supply. Trenchard then had convincingly

argued that no surplus of machines could be combed out to

equip independent detachments such as the Luxeuil longrange bombing force. His assertions that all available planes

should be sent to understrength RFC squadrons had ultimately prevailed.

Trenchard's logic also reveals that he projected upon his

German antagonists his own assessment of strategic bombing.

The head of the RFC assumed that the Germans would consider strategic bombing only if they possessed air forces surplus to the requirements of tactical support of their armies.

Any need to recoup losses would deplete their aerial surplus;

tactical attrition in France could therefore hinder strategic

bombardment of London. An unrelenting RFC offensive on the

Western Front would theoretically place German aviation in

just such an irksome circumstance. Trenchard's reasoning

demonstrated that he had not significantly altered his view;

that is, long-range bombardment should be low on the list of

aerial priorities.

Trenchard objected on pragmatic grounds the reprisal

bombing of German cities, the course of action espoused by

Lloyd George and buttressed by public opinion.

Reprisals on open towns are repugnant to British ideas but we may be

forced to adopt them .... The enemy would almost certainly reply in

kind. Unless we are resolute, it will be infinitely better not to attempt

reprisals at all. At present we are not prepared to carry out reprisals

effectively, being unprovided with suitable machines. "

38
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

For Trenchard, the prime minister's proposal for reprisals

against the poison gas works at Mannheim exhumed the same

questions of means and priorities that No. 3 Wing's activities

had done. Trenchard again argued that no aerial force for

independent operations, retaliatory or otherwise, could be created until the requirements for squadrons to support Haig had

been met. Like his chief, he kept his attention fixed on the

Western Front. These assessments, however, seemed unduly

restrictive and somber to the War Cabinet. They subsequently

discounted Trenchard's hardheaded analysis in favor of a

more pliable approach.

On 7 July 1917, the War Cabinet decided to reinforce home

air defenses by withdrawing operational squadrons from the

front and by diverting new fighting machines scheduled to go

overseas. They also decided to launch at least one retaliatory

raid on Mannheim as soon as possible.12 Four days later, the

prime minister appointed a committee of two (himself and Jan

Christiaan Smuts, the highly regarded South African general

and statesman) to reevaluate British air policy. In particular,

they would examine home defense and the air organization:

1. The defence arrangements for home defence against air raids.

2. The air organisation generally and the direction of aerial

operations. '1

These initiatives must now be examined insofar as they affected the program to resume the long-range bombardment of

Germany.

To this end, Smuts's "Second Report of the Prime Minister's

Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence against Air

Raids," submitted on 17 August 1917, provided considerable

impetus. (His first report, 19 July 1917-completed within

eight days of its War Cabinet mandate-analyzed the organization and forces necessary for defending London.)' 4 An outsider, Smuts naturally sought expert advice-first from Weetman Dickinson Pearson (Lord Cowdray), president of the Air

Board, and then from Sir David Henderson, director-general of

Military Aeronautics-in drafting his second report. His evaluation, however, neither tapped the empirical wisdom of the air

establishment in the field nor acknowledged the immense difficulties attendant upon implementing its precepts.

39
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Smuts's Second Report was unduly influenced by a minority

view. In effect, he was "exposed almost exclusively to reports

advocating the formation of some sort of independent air ministry and the prosecution of a strategic bombing campaign."'5

General Trenchard, the apotheosis of dissenting opinion, had

been unavailable for consultation because RFC was supporting Haig's Ypres offensive. Both Haig and Trenchard were justifiably concerned that London's preoccupation with home defense and retaliatory raids would interfere with their own

plans and with the flow of reinforcements at a critical time.' 6

The entire affair bore a disturbing resemblance to the situation regarding No. 3 Wing and the French Air Service less

than a year earlier.

Not surprisingly, Smuts's final paper incorporated the biases of his advisors. Henderson's "Memorandum on the Organisation of the Air Services," submitted to Smuts on 19

July, had argued for prompt creation of an Air Ministry, fully

staffed and endowed with executive responsibility for the air

war, coequal in ministerial authority to the Admiralty and the

War Office."7 Lord Cowdray's report of 28 July, 'The Duties

and Functions of the Air Board," predicted a "Surplus Air

Fleet" of some four hundred to five hundred bombers by the

year's end, with ranges of over four hundred miles carrying

payloads of three hundred to five hundred pounds. By 1918,

said Lord Cowdray, more machines would swell this superabundance. He urged that this fleet be earmarked exclusively

for War Cabinet employment, distinct from the cooperative

duties of RFC and RNAS units in the field."8 This glowing

estimate perpetuated the on-paper protections of aerial might

that the Air Board had been producing since spring 1917;'1

the machines had yet to materialize in France.

Six weeks after the War Cabinet injunction, Smuts submitted his second report. Its scope and vision offered an attractive

panacea to the vexed politicians.

[Air forces] can be used as an independent means of war operations.

Nobody that witnessed the attack on London on 1 1th July could have

any doubt on that point. Unlike artillery, an air fleet can conduct

extensive operations far from, and independently of, both Army and

Navy. As far as can at present be foreseen, there is absolutely no limit

to the scale of its future independent war use. [Germany] is no doubt

40
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

making vast plans to deal with us in London if we do not succeed in

beating him in the air and carrying the war into the heart of his

country.

The program of aircraft production which the War Cabinet has

sanctioned for the following twelve months is far in excess of Navy and

Army requirements. Next spring and summer the position will be that

the Army and Navy will have all the Air Service required in connexion

with their operations; and over and above that there will be a great

surplus available for independent operations.

This means that the Air Board has already reached the stage where

the settlement of future war policy has become necessary. Otherwise

engines and machines useless for independent strategical operations

may be built. The necessity for an Air Ministry and Air Staff has

therefore become urgent. 20

Smuts insisted that neither Admiralty nor War Office was

especially competent to supervise this imminent armada; the

creation of an Air Staff for planning and directing independent

air operations would soon be pressing. The political consequences of ignoring Smuts's logic seemed perilous indeed.

On 24 August 1917, the War Cabinet endorsed Smuts's

second report and charged him with its supervision.21 Thus

was conceived the Royal Air Force as an independent flying

service. Its subsequent vitality depended upon a largely unseated offensive capability-the strategic potential of bombs it

hoped to drop on Germany from its as yet nonexistent surplus

of aircraft. "Smuts was an advocate of strategic bombing even

before much possibility of carrying it out existed."22 Britain's

retaliatory will was, furthermore, distressingly short of means.

This shortage was most evident to the field commanders, who

would have to implement the War Cabinet's decision.

In general, the British public welcomed these developments,

hoping the new organization would expedite punishing Germany from the air. As one observer noted, the 7 July Gotha

raid on the capital had heightened popular susceptibility to

drastic remedies for the "humiliating and intolerable situation."23 The proposed counteroffensive mirrored the hope of

British citizens that their recent disquiet under aerial attack

could be visited upon the Germans. 'The raids were a method

of exerting psychological pressure upon Germany as a whole

and the creating there of the mental complexes which were an

essential condition of a readiness to accept reasonable peace

41
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

terms."24 The RAF bomb that disrupted munitions output and

diverted enemy fighters to defend their homeland would also

convince the Hun that "two could play the same game," and

would create a demand for the cessation of raids on Britain.2"

In the popular view, moral effect and material destruction

seemed equal. The experience of London under the Gothas

legitimized the demand for retaliation in kind.

Strategy became a topic for public speculation. In a typical

instance, an illustrated weekly developed its own scheme for

exacting retribution, confusing reprisals and military strategy

in the process. The editor hypothesized that aerial destruction

of key junctions would hasten the German collapse. To sever

"such nodal points behind the German lines in France" as

"Conflans . . . Mezieres on the Meuse; and Aix-la-Chapelle"

would mean that German frontline troops "would be beggared

for supplies."2" The Fleet Street strategist solemnly warned of

the "poetic justice" that would soon overtake enemy practitioners of the "backdoor assassination business," whose outrages included "bombing . . . open towns with the object of

killing as many civilians as possible."2" Whitehall satisfied this

widespread sentiment by incorporating it into a plan of campaign aimed at the enemy's industrial and munitions centers.

This shotgun approach satisfied the citizenry but frustrated

the military authorities.

Political confusion over specific goals of the counteroffensive

muddied the government's guidance to the field. Bombing as a

practical undertaking received little more coherent direction

than it had in the past. On the day following Smuts's second

report, the War Office notified Haig (in reply to his query) that

the War Cabinet had yet to develop a definite plan or clarify

their intentions for bombing Germany. From the War Office

perspective, the Air Ministry question had contributed to the

delay.

The War Cabinet are now considering the establishment of a separate

Department of State to control and administer the Air Services, and in

the event of such a Department being formed, the strategical

disposition, and the employment of such surplus force may be among

its functions. 28

42
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

The second wave of German aerial attacks on London, five

of which reached the capital between 24 September and 2

October 1917, motivated the War Cabinet to accelerate its

deliberations. Amidst this enemy night offensive, the Cabinet

met frequently to formulate new air policies. At the morning

session of 2 October, the diversion of antiaircraft artillery from

France to home defense duties was authorized and the First

Lord of the Admiralty reported that eight Handley Page bombers were en route to Ochey to join 41st Wing.29 On the matter

of East London's susceptibility "to give way to panic during

Gotha raids," the Prime Minister decided to ask editors not to

publish photographs or descriptions of air raid damage and

casualties.30 In closing, General Smuts announced that the

RFC head had been recalled from the field.

At the afternoon meeting, with Trenchard present, the War

Cabinet continued its discussions. These centered on the immediate deployment of a small force to begin active operations, with expansion to a large-scale offensive to occur later.3"

The CIGS promised that 20 DeHavilland 4s (DH4) in crates

would be sent to Ochey, with a like quantity to follow within

six weeks. 2 This "Russian Windfall" had been gleaned from

the Russian government, which agreed to forego delivery on

condition that 75 DeHavillands be supplied in spring 1918.,1

Thus did the government marshal the machines to initiate the

British aerial offensive against Germany; urgency overThis DeHavilland 4 was faster and more maneuverable than its successors,

DH9 and DH9A.

Source: USAF Photo

43
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

whelmed detailed planning. Much would depend upon the

"Surplus Air Fleet" that Lord Cowdray had promised to Smuts.

Trenchard then received his orders. The prime minister,

noting "the great and growing demand on the part of the

British public for retaliation," emphasized the immense popular interest in 41 st Wing. Very likely, the situation in the east

end was still fresh in Lloyd George's mind for he impressed

upon Trenchard the importance of making the forthcoming air

offensive a success. He believed that success would have a

moral effect on the people at home. 4

The prime minister left his air chief in no doubt that he was

expected to make a success of this endeavor. Trenchard assured the prime minister that the promised planes would begin to bomb Germany within six days of their arrival at

Ochey.35 He was never asked to evaluate the military feasibility

of the scheme.

On 15 October 1917, the War Cabinet made two further

decisions with regard to strategic bombardment. A new Air

Policy Committee was established to "advise the War Cabinet

on all questions relating to air policy." The military authorities

in France were at last told that "immediate arrangements

should be made for the conduct of long-range offensive operations against German towns where factories existed for the

production of munitions of all kinds."3" Two days later, eight

DH4 bombing machines-of 11 launched-from No. 55 Squadron dropped 1,792 pounds of bombs on the Burbach works at

Saarbrficken, a target often visited by No. 55's naval predecessors in No. 3 Wing.3 7

The War Cabinet had finally developed an aerial policy. Disregarding the views of their generals, they had favored the

visionary concepts embodied in Smuts's Report of 17 August.

Lord Cowdray's projected aerial surplus and Henderson's argument for an independent service had made the South African's proposals appear deceptively realizable. They had endorsed a policy of retaliation, partially as a response to public

indignation and partially in the vague hope that enemy morale

would crumble under every RAF bomb that fell on Germany. A

second wave of Gotha attacks had underlined the urgency of

this plan. A small British force was hastily assembled to un44
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

dertake immediate bombing, even as schemes for expanding

the strategic fleet were being debated. Preparations at Ochey

continued, under the fitful scrutiny of the War Cabinet in

London. The commencement of active air operations did not,

however, signify that the points of contention between Whitehall and the field had been resolved.

As head of the Royal Flying Corps in France, and responsible for the fortunes of this new Cabinet bombing scheme,

Trenchard was particularly disturbed at the government's recent decisions. The politicians had ignored his pleas for Western Front offensives. Instead, they had adopted a policy of

defense and long-range bombing of Germany; much of their

rationale seemed to reflect an acute consciousness of the public mood. After the Smuts Report, Trenchard fretted that

Whitehall would interfere with the RFC's primary mission:

obtain army cooperation.

Tuesday August 28. The War Cabinet has evidently decided on

creating a new Department to deal with Air operations, on the lines of

the War Office and the Admiralty. Trenchard is much perturbed as to

the result of this new department just at a time when the Flying Corps

was beginning to feel that it had become an important part of the

army.38

The 2 October session with the War Cabinet had only' increased Trenchard's misgivings. He was saddled with responsibility for a bombing scheme that he had continually opposed, in person and in principle. It seemed apparent that his

political prestige had perceptibly diminished, from strategic

authority to military technician. Under the circumstances, his

supervision of 41st Wing, despite its prominence, was more

likely to be subversive than conscientious. Once official interest in the Ochey force waned, it seemed likely that he would

attempt to redirect 41st Wing from independent operations

back to army cooperation missions.

The War Cabinet had also considered that, if given an opportunity, Trenchard might preempt their supervision of the

independent bombing force. This matter of command and control would not be settled until after the Ochey force had begun

to bomb. The 41st Wing, an organization within the RFC, was

accountable to Trenchard, the wing commander. Lt Col C. L.

45
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

N. Newall had previously headed Trenchard's headquarters.

Newall was unlikely to antagonize his superior, whom he admired and respected. The operational effectiveness of the longrange bombing wing depended in the main upon its links to

London.

Consequently, the War Cabinet intended to supervise the

activities of 41st Wing as closely as possible. Such direction

would require frequent and detailed communications with the

Ochey force. Detailed information would be critical in managing the long-range bombing force. Initially, however, 41st Wing

reports were not promptly forwarded to London, due largely to

Trenchard's intervention. To ensure that Colonel Newall had

no doubt as to his ultimate superiors, the War Cabinet sent a

message to Sir Douglas Haig.

In order to enable them to decide as to the future policy as regards

bombing, the War Cabinet will be glad of fullest information as to the

difficulties which have hitherto been encountered by the special

bombing squadrons, and the extent to which these difficulties are

likely to increase in proportion as distances are extended into enemy

country. In particular they require information as to the efficiency of

the enemy anti-aircraft defences, difficulties experienced from climatic

conditions, in finding objectives, and the losses experienced.

Please, therefore, forward a detailed report from the Officer

Commanding the Bombing Squadron in regard to operations which

have already been carried out, and arrange that a similar report be

furnished in the case of all future bombing raids. In reporting losses of

aeroplanes, those experienced by the special bombing squadrons

should be shown separately to those caused in normal flying. 39

Haig's staff duly transmitted the CIGS directive to Headquarters (HQ) RFC for information and for transmission to

Newall. Trenchard, however, added his own instruction in his

forwarding letter.

In future, in addition to your daily summary of work, a short report in

narrative form will be sent on each raid that takes place by the first

orderly subsequent to the raid. It should give a short story of the raid,

machines taking part, results, etc., and should include the particulars

asked for in the C.I.G.S.'s letter.40

One must note that the War Cabinet was mainly concerned

with factors that constrained the bombing campaign; Trenchard, on the other hand, desired information on the positive

aspects of the missions that 41st Wing had actually flown. He

46
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

was interested in data corroborating the success of the Ochey

force, in accordance with Lloyd George's admonition on the

afternoon of 2 October.

On 29 October, even as the CIGS letter was filtering down to

Newall, the War Cabinet again asserted its desire to control

the strategic bombing campaign. In this instance, they required 41st Wing to submit justifications for inactivity.

War Cabinet desire to have a daily report on working of bombing

squadrons on NANCY front stating weather conditions or other causes

which prevent operations when none have taken place.4'

This report was to include such meteorological data as

cloud height, wind direction, and wind strength. The message

was clear: the War Cabinet expected 41st Wing to mount operations against Germany unless prevented by circumstances

beyond their control. Such messages lucidly and repeatedly

reminded field commanders of the War Cabinet's desires for

timely information from Ochey. However, the politicians were

still uneasy about their direction of the strategic bombing

force; they worried about the influence that Haig or Trenchard

could potentially exert by virtue of their positions.

The issue surfaced in Whitehall at least twice more, the first

time at the 31 October 1917 meeting of the new Air Policy

Committee. 42 At the War Cabinet session two days later, command and control of 41st Wing received further consideration.

The discussions at that meeting also disclose the degree to

which the British independent bombing force was an ad hoc

aggregation of personnel and machines, building aerodromes

and billets even as they undertook to fly missions.

As regards independent aerial offensive operations in France, all the

necessary preparations were being made. Aerodromes were being

constructed, and depots for the Air Service were being established in

France, to be ready for the large independent operations it was

intended should be carried out during the following summer. There

was, however, a slight difficulty to be overcome in regard to the

Command and Second-in-Command of these independent offensive

operations. Sir Douglas Haig desired that they should be under

General Trenchard, commanding the Royal Flying Corps in France.

The idea of the Air Policy Committee was that they should be under

the direct orders of the Field-Marshal Command-in-Chief in France

for the present, as if they were placed under General Trenchard, there

was a possibility that they might be subordinated to the ordinary

47
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

operation of the Royal Flying Corps in Flanders. The question was one

of many.

43

To "discuss command of independent aerial operations," the

War Cabinet delegated the indefatigable Smuts to see the

CIGS and Haig in Paris the next day." However, the Royal

Flying Corps had already settled the matter.

After the 41st Wing had begun to fly and in the absence of

any timely directives from London, HQ RFC had quietly drawn

the Ochey force firmly into its orbit. The need to establish

channels to transmit administrative data and operational results made a workable hierarchy imperative. The RFC units

arranged their information conduits to conform with military

practice. As the War Cabinet had feared, such initiative placed

Trenchard at the keystone of the command arch.

Routing of correspondence such as detailed raid reports,

submitted immediately after each mission, illustrates the de

facto command arrangement between 41st Wing and London.

Initially, paperwork passed from Newall at Ochey to Trenchard

at HQ RFC and stopped. Trenchard did not forward documents to GHQ at Montreuil until specifically directed to do so

by the CIGS. Eventually, this routing included Sir Douglas

Haig, who in turn communicated with the CIGS. Only then

was the War Cabinet able to enjoy access to materials that

41st Wing had originated. As the ranking authority on military

aviation, and as one who enjoyed the confidence of Haig, Trenchard was ideally situated in the hierarchy that supervised

long-range bombing.

On 1 November 1917, DH4s from No. 55 Squadron dropped

1,362 pounds of bombs on a munitions factory south of Kaiserslautern. 45 The detailed raid report for this mission was sent

from Newall at 41st Wing to Trenchard at HQ RFC in the field

on the following day. Upon request from CIGS for raid results,

Trenchard's headquarters staff retyped the 41st Wing detailed

raid report, appended their own comments, and forwarded the

information to GHQ on 4 November. On that same day, the

report and Trenchard's letter, plus GHQ's own comments,

were sent to the CIGS. Forty-first Wing's detailed raid report

on Kaiserslautern, with accretions from intermediate staffs,

48
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

circulated among the War Cabinet on 6 November, five days

after the mission.4"

All subsequent detailed raid reports followed the same

channel to the War Cabinet. HQ RFC customarily transcribed

Newall's reports into more presentable formats and occasionally appended its own narratives-and typographical errors.4 7

The flow eventually became a routine that kept everyone informed of 41st Wing activities. The chain of command directing strategic bombardment included those who had vigorously

opposed its inception and prosecution. They were well placed

to influence its objectives.

Trenchard exhibited the disconcerting habit of monopolizing

information pertinent to long-range bombing operations. In

instances in which he was directed to forward materials, he

managed to interpose his command presence through letters

and summaries accompanying 41st Wing reports. When Trenchard became responsible for strategic bombardment (as general officer commanding [GOC] of the expanded and renamed

Independent Force) in early June 1918, submission of detailed

raid reports to the War Cabinet ceased.48 Thereafter, his staff

at IF headquarters collected after-action data from subordinate squadrons and compiled all intelligence returns that

reached Whitehall. Personally charged with responsibility for

the success of the campaign, he insisted upon retaining a

monopoly over its documentation.

Trenchard's refractory attitude toward independent bombing did not change appreciably during the final months of

1917. His philosophy was explicated at length in his view of

the probable contributions of American aviation to the war. In

his evaluation, he took the opportunity to present a compendium of his canon on airpower. He noted that the bombing of

Germany had been projected to begin "as soon as resources

permitted, and every preparation has been made to carry out

the policy with the greatest vigour."49 He cautioned, however,

that one must not lose sight of priorities in the meantime.

It is essential to remember however that long distance bombing can

only be carried out on a sufficient scale if we are able, by pursuing our

offensive policy elsewhere, to prevent undue interference with our

bombing machines .... The completion of the programme of fighting

49
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

squadrons is therefore of primary importance and nothing should be

allowed to interfere with the output of these machines.5 0

Trenchard again stressed that strategic bombing was an

aerial luxury to be indulged only after the needs of army

cooperation squadrons had been met. Likewise, insofar as

American aviation units could be expected to assist, they

could do so only after the requirements of Gen John J.

Pershing's infantry had been satisfied. Trenchard expected

their first priorities to be for "the necessary local work with

their own Army."

[However,] as their production increases and in view of the enormous

resources they should eventually possess, [they] will be of especial

value for bombing operations in GERMANY. 51

The RFC chief postulated that the American Air Service

could eventually take over responsibility for long-range bombing from 41st Wing at Ochey, thus permitting his machines to

return to the British sector to operate from bases close to Sir

Douglas Haig's forces.

Assuming that the American Army will occupy its present situation in

the line, the American aviation will be very favourably placed to bomb

German industrial centres in the Upper RHINE Valley and should

gradually allow us to withdraw our squadrons from the NANCY

neighbourhood to our own Army area whence they should be able to

bomb targets in the Lower RHINE Valley and beyond with the

machines which should then be available. The advantages of operating

from our own Army area are obvious. 52

Geographical collocation of the strategic bombing force with

the British armies would have placed Newall's wing firmly

under military control, as opposed to War Cabinet control.

Under such an arrangement, Haig's and Trenchard's priorities

might well have prevailed. Bombing machines might have

been diverted to tactical contingency missions even more often

than they in fact were. Trenchard's implicit intentions corroborated the doubts that the War Cabinet had aired at their 2

November meeting.

The RFC chief closed his memorandum with an oblique

thrust at Lord Cowdray's "Surplus Air Fleet," and at Smuts.

I would repeat that it is essential to get into touch with the Americans

at once and decide upon our future joint production. Policy must in

fact guide production instead of production dictating policy.5 3

50
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

Trenchard continued to protest against what he considered

to be a mistaken critical decision, even as he took steps to

translate War Cabinet policies into "aeroplanes, aircrew, and

aerodromes." Before the end of 1917, he would alter his tactics if not his position, owing to his forced participation in the

other organ of the War Cabinet's scheme: the new Air Ministry.

Concurrent with the government's bombing initiative had

been the amalgamation of the RFC and the RNAS into a unified fighting service. Trenchard was of course the unanimous

choice to become the first-ever Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). He

did not want the job, preferring his field command. Sir

Douglas Haig argued that he would release his aviation chief

only on condition that he also retain his position as GOC of

British aviation in France. Whitehall overruled this peculiar

proposal and in December ordered Trenchard home to a desk.

Trenchard reluctantly left France to assume his new post.

Haig noted that Trenchard confided "the Air Board are quite

off their heads as to the future possibilities of Aeronautics for

ending the war."54 Even after he occupied the position of CAS,

Trenchard continued to doubt the viability of the new service.

He was especially perturbed by the policies of the Secretary of

State for the Air Force, Harold Sidney Harmsworth (Lord

Rothermere), one of Lloyd George's less enlightened political

appointments.

All this is very sad at a time when officers and men are so badly

needed. Trenchard thinks that the Air Service cannot last as an

independent Ministry, and that Air Units must again return to the

Army and Navy. 55

Now chief of the Air Staff, Trenchard could hardly criticize

policy as Britain's preeminent field authority on airpower. His

selection as first CAS trammeled his prestige and integrity to

the very organization he now supervised. Despite his views, he

had to operate within the bureaucratic confines of the Air

Ministry. Trenchard would have to modify his tactics in order

to influence the system from within.

Once it became apparent that the War Cabinet intended to

persevere in a large-scale aerial offensive, the CAS's strategy

was altered. When head of the RFC, so long as his objections

51
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

could siphon aircraft from independent bombing schemes and

into his own units, he had protested to London. To continue

on that tack would be futile, in the face of the government's

commitment. Further, such obstinacy with regard to policy

would diminish his influence. He would need a different dialectical approach to Whitehall; henceforth, he endeavored to

make the campaign conform to his own philosophy of bombing.

Indeed, Trenchard found himself consulted by the War

Cabinet for his views. In late November, his RFC headquarters

in France had prepared a lengthy paper on the issue, "Strategic and Tactical Considerations involved in Long Distance

Bombing," which had accompanied Trenchard to the Air Ministry.56 The CAS-to-be enjoyed some success in impressing his

airpower premises upon the government.5" In January 1918,

the Air Policy Committee incorporated parts of his study, virtually verbatim, into their policy statement, "Memorandum on

Bombing Operations."58 This widely circulated memorandum

and Trenchard's RFC paper are of considerable significance in

understanding the final British plan.

Together, these reports synthesized political and military

positions into the broad strategy intended to guide bombing.

Trenchard contributed the concepts of continual offensive action and the targeting of German morale. These two factors

overshadowed any other considerations and to an extent hindered the formulation of a specific and feasible scheme of

operations.

Moral effect, as the 26 November 1917 RFC paper makes

clear, represented for Trenchard the foremost consequence of

strategic bombing. He considered attacking the enemy's morale to be a "definite military purpose," one that could yield

significant or even decisive results.5 9 Like the French, he considered reprisals to be separate from this military goal. Unlike

them, he linked indirect "moral" effects to the direct "damaging" effects of aerial ordnance. (His Gallic colleagues considered devastation as their sole criterion; German morale was

not considered a worthwhile objective.) Trenchard's fusion of

moral effects and material results was never seriously challenged by Whitehall, though a few felt he overstated his case.6"

52
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

This union of direct and indirect results, largely attributed to

British experiences under the Zeppelins and Gothas, characterized their assumptions about strategic bombing.

Since constant attack would undermine enemy morale,

Trenchard's emphasis upon an unrelenting offensive becomes

comprehensible. Likewise, as maximum moral effect did not

depend upon actually obliterating German industrial centers,

one scheme of operations was probably as good as another.

These premises supported Trenchard's entire rationale.

Long distance bombing is an integral part of the offensive aerial work

on the Western Front. It is designed to serve a definite military

purpose, quite independently of any question of retaliation for what

the enemy may do. That purpose is to weaken the power of the enemy

both directly and indirectly-directly by interrupting his production,

transport and organization through infliction of damage to his

industrial, railway and military centres, and by compelling him to

draw back his fighting machines to deal with the menace-indirectly

by producing discontent and alarm amongst the industrial population.

In other words, it aims at achieving both a material and a moral effect.

Actual experience goes to show that the moral effect of bombing

industrial towns may be great, even though the material effect is, in

fact, small.6 1

Trenchard asserted that every bomb dropped on German

territory would be destructive, directly or indirectly. Later, the

Air Ministry would likewise argue that bombing's impact upon

morale in many instances compensated for the apparent lack

of perceptible results. Moral effect provided a conveniently

protean index for the airpower strategist.

On the importance of moral effect and actual damage, Trenchard referred dismissively to the French policy of bombing

only accessible, vulnerable targets.

It must be remembered that a very large portion of the iron ore used

by Germany in the war comes from Lorraine and Luxembourg, and

therefore the systematic and regular bombing of industrial towns in

those areas is calculated to inflict quite a severe material damage on

the enemy as reaching even more distant targets. On the other hand,

it is essential to be provided with machines which can travel further

into enemy territory in order to secure the all important moral results

of bombing purely German towns.62

At this time, the British authorities were aware of their ally's

bombing plan. However, they identified a more ambitious

53
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

goal-erosion of enemy morale. This concept diminished any

chance of cooperation between the British and French bombing wings. To a large degree, the vulnerability of the German

population's will would depend upon the scale of the aerial

offensive launched against it. Trenchard estimated that 15

squadrons would be available by 31 July 1918, and 31 by the

end of October 1918.63 When units failed to appear, however,

British plans did not lessen proportionately.

The CAS-elect stipulated further that a continuous offensive

was necessary to realize the highest returns. After naming

suitable aeroplanes, competent aircrews, and suitably located

aerodromes as prerequisites, he outlined the spirit needed for

success. Trenchard emphasized that, "long distance bombing,

which has already been carried out as far as our means admitted, ought to be vigorously developed, as part and parcel of

the offensive policy of the Royal Flying Corps."64 He did not

dwell upon the high casualty rates that had accompanied this

policy in the past.

The Air Policy Committee concurred in the propositions

Trenchard had advanced. Their memorandum of January

1918 accepted his assessments and conclusions. However, the

Air Policy Committee paper, which incorporated Trenchard's

preoccupation with moral effect, ducked the question of

method.

The policy Intended to be followed is to attack the important German

towns systematically, having regard to weather conditions and the

defensive arrangements of the enemy. It is intended to concentrate on

one town for successive days and then to pass to several other towns,

returning to the first town until the target is thoroughly destroyed, or

at any rate until the morale of workmen is so shaken that output is

seriously interfered with.65

The more than one hundred German cities and towns appended to the memorandum as possible targets underscores

the vagueness of the authorities on this point. The committee

simply noted that British squadrons should be employed "as

far as possible for raids on the industrial towns on and near

the Rhine, such as Mannheim and Karlsruhe."66 When poor

weather precluded such penetrations, closer targets in the

Briey and Saarbrficken areas could be scheduled. The choice

54
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

of objectives would be "left to the French so that the closest

cooperation is secured between the Allies in this work."6"

Significantly, civilian authorities concluded their memorandum with a passage lifted in its entirety from the CAS-elect's

own study. Their summary consolidated the dual bases of

constant offensive and moral effect.

Long-distance bombing will produce its maximum moral effect only if

the visits are constantly repeated at short intervals, so as to produce

in each area a sustained anxiety. It is this recurrent bombing, as

opposed to isolate and spasmodic attacks, which interrupts industrial

production and undermines public confidence.

On the other hand, if the enemy were to succeed in interrupting the

continuity of the British bombing operations, their achievements (as

the Allies success against Zeppelins show) would be an immense

encouragement to them which would operate like a military victory.

The Allies must therefore adopt a programme of bombing operations

which, whenever the weather permits, must be constantly kept up and

under which it can be assured that the heavy losses, which are bound

to occur, can be instantly made good. 68

With these broadly conceived goals, the British government

set requirements above the capabilities of Newall's three

squadrons billeted in the autumn mud of eastern France. By

formulating grandiose schemes, contingent upon large quantities of suitable machines and crews, the Air Policy Committee

quite overlooked the needs of their existing small bombing

force. No one ever thought it necessary to determine, in order

of priority, the targets to be bombed.

Ironically, British authorities, including Haig and Trenchard, could have enjoyed substantial assistance from the

French in this matter. Despite the disbanding of No. 3 Naval

Wing in spring 1917, the enthusiasm of the French Air Service

for long-range bombing had persisted. With field experience

dating from late 1915, the French periodically refined their

goals and procedures. Their commanders, doubtless recalling

the Admiralty's largesse in supplying Sopwiths and accepting

French operational control, seemed eager to aid this latest

British scheme.

Since July 1917, two days after the second Gotha daylight

raid, British liaison with the French War Ministry had kept

Whitehall informed of French bombing policy.69 Examining the

55
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

French program reveals several significant points and insights

useful to the British had they but seized upon them.

General De Castelnau, general officer commanding (GOC),

GAE (eastern army group), signed the comprehensive "Plan of

Bombardment Operations during winter of 1917-1918" on 18

October 1917. Two days later, the British received their copy,

complete with map." This document augmented the French

statement of 9 July but did not radically depart from earlier

plans.

The French air staff still defined objectives and targets on

the basis of feasibility, the same criterion that had characterized their direction of the Anglo-French bombing force at

Luxeuil from July 1917 to April 1917. Unless targets were

both accessible and vulnerable, the French reasoned, attempting to bomb them represented an exercise in futility. French

planners accepted that "prevailing weather conditions" and

"types of machines actually alloted to all the bombing groups"

heavily influenced selection of the overall strategic goal. Such

considerations reduced their aerial offensive from the ideal to

the attainable: "being the blockading of the Ore Mines and

Works of Lorraine and Luxembourg."'7 The French program of

October 1917 thus narrowed their earlier strategic assessment, prepared when No. 3 Wing and 4me Groupe de Bombardment had been active. The previous goal of "annihilating"

those regions had been downgraded to a "blockading effort." 72

This new aim reflected their straitened circumstances; disbanding No. 3 Wing undoubtedly contributed to the French

retrenchment. To isolate these regions and to curtail shipment

of raw materials to German industrial centers, French analysts decided to sever key rail links, namely the "large stations

and communications in the area METZ-LUXEMBOURG."

This approach also considered the capabilities of machines

comprising the French bombing wings. The majority of airplanes in service were Breguets-markedly inferior in speed,

range, and payload to the Sopwith 11/2 Strutters, as combined

operations with No. 3 Wing had demonstrated .

7 British naval

aviators had considered the Breguets unsuitable for daylight

missions across enemy lines; after their losses on the 12 October 1916 day attack on Oberndorf, the French agreed. They

56
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

subsequently restricted the Breguets to night operations.74 At

the other performance extreme stood Escadrilles F29 and

F123 of the 4me Groupe de Bombardment at Luxeuil. They

had inherited from the Admiralty a number of agile Sopwith

111⁄2 Strutter scouts (two-seaters) and bombers (single-seaters)

which had escaped the depredations of the RFC.7 1 Consequently, these units were employed exclusively on long-range

daylight operations.

The French air staff determined target priorities based on

their analysis of the most feasible mission and the weather

and forces available. Two-thirds of all missions, day or night,

were to be directed against the primary objectives of 'THIONVILLE and BETTEMBOURG," and the junctions of "LUXEMBOURG and MAIZIERES-les-METZ" comprised the remaining one-third.7 " Cutting the German rail network at those

points would virtually isolate the Longwy (northern) and Briey

(southern) coal basins. Alternate targets for both day and

night units were blast furnaces in the vicinity of each of the

primary objectives, highly visible and readily identifiable in

marginal weather conditions. These alternate targets correlated very closely with objectives the French had previously

assigned No. 3 Wing aircraft. Short-range machines and those

unable to reach higher priority objectives could attack rail

junctions at Longeville, Courcelles-sur-Neid, Arnaville, and

Wavreille as last-chance targets. SAircrews of 4me Groupe, in Sopwiths with greater range and

defensive capabilities, were assigned more challenging duties.

Their bombers were to attack iron and steel works in the Briey

and Ruhr districts, in addition to those in the Saar region,

whenever possible. Their fighting machines were to launch

mass raids on enemy aerodromes and railway stations in Alsace, "carefully avoiding the Alsatian towns and villages."77 In

this fashion, the French air staff hoped to take maximum

advantage of their high-performance aircraft.

In short, the French tasked their squadrons according to

their capabilities. Cutting rail links between the LuxembourgLorraine basins and Germany appeared to offer the best

chance for success. This operationally feasible goal typified

the pragmatic French approach to strategic bombing. Their

57
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

rationale and detailed plan were shared with the British policy

makers in fall 1917.

British response to the French plan of attack against strategic railways was understandably cautious. Because of targeting and range considerations, the newly assembled RFC

bombing wing had to be based in the Nancy-Ochey vicinity.

This area, miles from the British sector, included No. 3 Wing's

forward aerodrome in the French GAE zone. As an isolated

detachment, largely dependent upon Allied logistical support,

the activities of 41st Wing, RFC, would be vulnerable to

French coercion. Two squadrons of 4me Groupe, the bombing

unit which had flown alongside No. 3 Wing, already occupied

part of the Ochey airfield."7 To British commanders, who had

previously castigated the Admiralty's Luxeuil force as a dissipation of effort, De Castelnau's latest scheme seemed likely to

reopen old questions of control and priorities. Neither the government nor Haig was inclined to cooperate with their Gallic

ally to the extent which the Admiralty had in July 1916.

As squadrons of the 41st Wing began to arrive at Ochey in

October 1917, De Castelnau asked whether the RFC machines

could be expected to cooperate in the French plan as opportunities offered. Haig replied that few such occasions were likely

to arise. He would, however, direct Colonel Newall, the officer

commanding 41st Wing, to contact the French Army Group

commander and "to carry out the latter's instructions as regards cooperation within the limits stated above.""9 Haig emphasized to De Castelnau that the mission assigned to the

British force diverged considerably from the French concept of

operations.

While the British pilots are learning the country, they will be able to

carry out attacks on targets in the Saarbrucken area, but not in the

Briey-Longwy area which lies outside the line of approach to their

main objectives. As soon as the British pilots have learned the country

sufficiently to find their way to the Rhine by night, they will be able to

cooperate in attacks on targets in the Briey-Longwy area as well,

whenever the weather is not settled enough for long-distance raids

into Germany.8 O

En route to their Rhine targets between Cologne and

Mannheim, 41st Wing machines from Ochey would overfly the

Saarbrlicken area. Since no German cities lay within range

58
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

beyond Briey-Longwy, British bombers at first would have no

occasion to hit French-designated rail targets in that region.

The commander in chief of the British Army, in accordance

with War Cabinet guidance, reminded his French colleague

that the primary mission of 4 1st Wing was "long-range attacks

on German commercial towns as reprisals for enemy air raids

on Allied towns."81 In contrast to France's dedication to a limited aerial blockade, British bombing had been committed to a

more ambitious but less clear-cut goal. His reply to De Castelnau leaves little doubt that Haig considered retaliation to be a

significant component of the British bombardment plan in

October 1917.82 The Air Policy Committee memorandum of

January 1918, which amalgamated War Cabinet and Air Ministry positions, would do little to alter his judgment. As a

soldier, Field Marshal Haig was bound by the policies of his

civilian superiors. Like Trenchard, he personally did not favor

strategic bombing.

The French authorities were concerned that any reprisals be

strictly supervised so that they did not generate a vicious cycle

of atrocities upon French and Belgian civilians. To preclude

this situation, Gen Henri Phillipe Petain suggested three

guidelines:

1. to limit our activity exclusively to attacks against hostile

aerodromes;

2. to concentrate our efforts against territory which is entirely

German (a sensitive issue, owing to enemy occupation of

Alsace-Lorraine): and

3. to make it clear that these operations are conducted as reprisals.83

Petain did not consider German morale per se to be susceptible in this retaliatory tit-for-tat. He pointed out only that the

enemy population must be aware that "Rhenish Bavaria or the

Duchy of Baden" would be bombed whenever Dunkirk, Calais,

or Boulogne were attacked.84 This French policy, consistent

with earlier directives to No. 3 Wing, emphasized that reprisals

represented a special application of airpower.

In his reply to Petain, Haig made it clear that he did not

advocate long-range bombing for reprisals or any other purpose. His views duplicated Trenchard's: Offensive support of

the land campaign must constitute the sole concern of air

59
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

forces; diversions such as reprisals diminished their effectiveness in this role. "Success in the air can only be attained by

the prosecution of a vigorous offensive at all times."85 The field

marshal remained skeptical of the value of reprisals, even if

his government did not.

The effect which reprisals on German towns in South Germany would

have on the German army on the Western Front, and especially on the

German army in Flanders, is a factor the value of which has not yet

been fully tested. As you know, the principle has been accepted by my

Government and British air forces have been detailed for this special

purpose.

86

Even as 41st Wing mustered at Ochey, Haig communicated

to Petain that he personally opposed War Cabinet policy.

Petain wrote again to Haig on 21 October 1917, still concerned

that the campaign, given its retaliatory genesis, might degenerate into indiscriminate bombing of Germany. French citizens

would conceivably suffer, with no compensatory military advantage.

In order to avoid comparatively slight, and in consequence somewhat

ineffective, bombardments of German towns, bombardments which

can have no other results than to provoke reprisals on French towns,

or at least to furnish a pretext for them, I have given orders to the

French bombing Squadrons not to carry out any reprisal

bombardment which does not include dropping at least two hundred

kilogrammes of projectiles on each objective. Scattered bombing by

individual machines is forbidden.

If you agree with these views, I shall be obliged if you will kindly give

similar orders to the British squadrons which have been detached in

the Nancy region. 87

Petain quite naturally attempted to make his British Allies

aware of the predicament that their undertaking might cause.

Haig's prompt response reassured the French commander.

He promised that he would direct 41st Wing to conduct their

missions within the constraints that the French had imposed

upon their own aircrews.

I agree with you in principle that our aerial operations should be

directed with the sole aim of delivering frequent and heavy attacks on

aerial objectives, and that isolated and weak attacks are unsound

quite apart from the questions of provoking reprisals.

60
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

My instructions to the British air squadrons are to avoid promiscuous

bombing and to attack selected military objectives only. As regards the

scope of these attacks, I have laid down that never less than 6

machines shall be detailed either by day or night to attack any given

objective. Owing to technical considerations I do not consider it

advisable to lay down a minimum weight of bombs to be dropped, but

I am satisfied that the result of my instructions will be the correct

application of the principle on which we both agreed.ss

Haig forwarded his correspondence with Petain to the CIGS at

the War Office on 26 October 1917. British policy makers and

commanders on both sides of the channel enjoyed access to

French plans even as they developed their own bombing program.

However, the prospects for a coordinated campaign remained dim during the winter of 1917-18. Fundamental differences of purpose divided the French plan from British perceptions about independent strategic bombardment.

In this respect, Haig's convictions were congruent with

French doctrine: Both assessed bombing's effectiveness on the

basis of its military results; considerations of moral effect

seemed irrelevant. Reprisals, a special category, could easily

backlash if not carefully managed. By contrast, the British

government placed considerable faith in aerial assaults on

German civilian morale, attacks to be mounted partially in

response to enemy raids and partially to cripple German war

industry. These ambitious aims, direct and indirect, would

require a huge independent aerial fleet and a new military air

ministry to supervise it. Neither existed.

Trenchard, first GOC RFC and then CAS-elect during all

this, favored Haig's outlook, although he was charged with

responsibility for the British bombing effort's success. His influence led to the Air Policy Committee memorandum of January 1918, which stipulated that the British Campaign would

be prosecuted by rigorous offensive action. Overall, inspiration

rather than deliberation characterized the British outlook.

With such a stance, neither politicians nor generals evinced

much enthusiasm for the French plan, even as a point of

departure for their own hypothesis.

Undaunted by British demurrals, the French pursued their

own bombing policies. They updated their scheme of blockade

61
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

on 18 November 1917 and 5 January 1918, in response to

changes in the pattern of German rail traffic. (They dutifully

transmitted these revisions to their British counterparts.)8 9

These documents provided lists of alternate targets, a useful

service during the deteriorating weather conditions of the winter of 1917-18. As such, these revisions provided a possible

basis for coordinated bombing, as Haig and De Castelnau had

agreed upon in 1917.

In the 18 November update, emphasizing that it was a "result of evolution during action, rather than a strategic plan,"

French analysts listed nine rail stations as specific targets.9 °

From the Saarbrfacken and Lorraine basins, Germany obtained roughly 80 percent of the iron ore for her wartime

industrial output; 40 to 50 percent was smelted locally.9

"

Daily, over ten thousand rail cars moved between the basins

and German works on the right bank of the Moselle, on the

Rhine, and in Westphalia.92

To curtail this traffic, the French air service designated nine

targets:

Luxembourg Athus Woippy

Petange Longuyon Thionville

Rodange Conflans-Jarny Bettembourg93

All lay on the periphery of the Briey and Longwy iron areas;

not one was more than 45 miles behind the lines. Three had

already appeared on the October 1917 list as primary targets

(Luxembourg, Thionville, and Bettembourg). As Haig had acknowledged to De Castelnau, 41st Wing could attack these

objectives whenever weather precluded long-range missions to

the Rhine towns. These nine rail targets, pivotal to the French

plan, made ideal short-range objectives.

The British squadrons, however, despite worsening weather,

persisted in efforts to reach Germany during the last quarter

of 1917. Of 18 raids attempted during this period, six were

canceled due to weather and a seventh had to divert to another target (No. 55 Squadron, 5 December 1917, from Kaiserslautern to Zweibrilcken and Saarbrfcken) .4 Just one of the

12 missions that were completed ranged as far afield as the

Rhine valley. On 1 November, six DH4s (of 12 launched) managed to reach a munitions factory south of Kaiserslautern, a

62
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

town that was 80 miles from their base but 30 miles short of

Ludwigshafen and Karlsruhe. 95 On Christmas Eve 1917, 10

machines (of 12 launched) finally reached Ludwigshafen,

dropping 2,252 pounds of bombs on the Heinrich Lanz works,

the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik (BASF), and the railway

station. Difficult weather conditions stymied British intentions

during the winter of 1917-1918. Forty-first Wing did not elect

to cooperate with the French in the interim.

The first 41st Wing attack on a target on the French list

occurred by accident the evening of 3/4 January 1918, when

10 FE2bs of No. 100 Squadron were assigned the blast furnaces at Maizieres-les-Metz as their objective. Only two machines bombed their target. Five aircraft aborted the mission

due to extreme cold. Three pilots in the five-ship formation

became disoriented en route; they bombed Woippy, just north

of Metz, and a rail junction south of Metz (probably SaintPrivat). Woippy, one of the French objectives, lies between

Metz and No. 100's primary target, Maizieres. Postraid reports

noted that the Moselle River was frozen and snowed over,

depriving aircrews of a major navigational aid on a "dark and

hazy night with no moon." More bombs fell on Woippy and

Saint-Privat (760 pounds) than on Maizieres (430 pounds).

This mission typified No.100 Squadron's night operations.

During the first four months of its work with 41st Wing, its

This FE2c was forced down after suffering battle damage over Metz. The FE2c

was virtually identical in appearance to the FE2b.

63
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

machines never were able to concentrate their payloads

against a single target on any mission. War Cabinet directives

and Haig's reassurances to Petain proved to be operationally

unrealizable.

From a tactical perspective, the 3/4 January 1918 Maizieres mission was unremarkable. From a strategic viewpoint,

41st Wing ignored a rail station (Woippy) the French had designated six weeks previously as one of their key objectives,

and picked another target just five miles away. That Woippy

was hit was entirely fortuitous.

On the following evening, eight FE2bs from No. 100 Squadron

were again assigned Maizieres as their main target. Again, four

machines overflew Woippy to reach their objective. Another aircraft claimed hits on Woippy's railway station. Altogether, the

eight FE2bs scattered bombs along 25 miles of railways, from

Courcelles-sur-Neid to Maizieres-les-Metz, that night.

These two incidents typify the 41st Wing's low degree of

interest in the French bombing plan. Prevented by adverse

weather from attacking the Rhine towns, British crews flew

past targets that their ally considered important. When shortrange objectives were assigned by 41st Wing, they were likewise often located adjacent to targets on the French list. Under such conditions during their first three months of

operations, the British bombed targets in the Longwy and

Briey basins according to no perceptible scheme of priorities.

At this stage, the 41st Wing had developed no criteria to direct

its activities on those frequent occasions when poor weather

kept them from the Rhine valley. Unlike No. 3 Wing, they

preferred to operate autonomously rather than cooperate with

the French air service.

The French revision of 5 January 1918 could have been of

considerable intelligence value to 41st Wing, whether or not

they persisted in operating independently. This update

pointed to change effected by the enemy that lent "a different

aspect to the relative importance of the various centres of

traffic congestion hitherto announced."96 French analysts now

considered it necessary to bomb just four rail targets "indispensable to a successful blockade of the ferriferous watershed:

BETFEMBOURG-THIONVILLE, PETANGE, ATHUS."g7 (These

64
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

points lie along the northern and eastern boundaries of the

Longwy area.) They concluded that the Germans had altered

their rail networks for two reasons:

1. to strip the area "without using and consequently without

burdening the main arteries of supply to the front" and

2. to use "the shortest possible route, in view of the shortage of rolling

stock (locomotives and wagons), and in order to economize pit

coal.""

The French consequently traced "two independent traffic systems, the one economic, the other strategic," within the enemy

railway complex. From a careful study of the former system,

adjudged more vulnerable, they selected their four bombing

targets. German logistical reorganization in fact simplified the

tasks facing the French. The British force could have reaped

the same benefits.

Of more immediate concern was the information about German countermeasures contained in the second part of the

French paper. The French documented significant changes in

the activity of smelters in occupied territory: Lorraine foundries "are in full blast"; in the hitherto productive area of

Longwy and Briey, they "have been shut down" and facilities

razed or shipped to Germany. 99 In Briey, to confuse Allied

bombers, iron works "are brilliantly illuminated every night in

order to create an impression of activity." The enemy could

have spared themselves time and effort spent on these decoys,

so far as 41st Wing night operations were concerned. Neither

No. 100 (FE2b) nor Naval "A" (Handley Page) Squadrons

bombed them before 6 June 1918, when the Independent

Force took over responsibility for bombing. As the overwhelming percentage of targets for night missions was railways, 41st

Wing reaction to the French intelligence may have been more

accidental than deliberate.

What is clear is that the French air staff developed their

bombing policies early in 1916-before the No. 3 Wing

era-and thereafter adhered to them, with periodic modifications, whether British authorities chose to cooperate or not.

When, with Admiralty approval in July 1916, the French took

operational control of No. 3 Wing, this subordination made

possible a coordinated plan of attack. Unity of command led to

65
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

joint missions, with day and night raids on the same objective

on several occasions. However, from the British point of view

the price for this success was French direction of the Admiralty's bombing squadrons. At the time, strategic bombing detachments were the subject of an internecine Whitehall controversy between the War Office and the Admiralty staffs.

In the urgency and emotion precipitated by the Gotha raids

in summer and fall of 1917, British subordination to French

views, however well intentioned, seemed politically inexpedient

and militarily unpalatable. The British force, just 41st Wing in

1917 but with expansive ambitions, thus tended to ignore or

minimize opportunities to cooperate with the French. British

command authorities in London, preoccupied with the potential of independent airpower, approved this field attitude. In

distancing themselves from their ally, the British unfortunately deprived themselves of the benefits a closer relationship

might have yielded. In point of fact, the rationale for the two

bombing programs demonstrates that they could have been

complementary.

It seems significant that most historians of British strategic

bombardment in the Great War have underestimated or oversimplified French bombing policy and its potential utility to

41st Wing. The official history describes just one phase of the

French plan-the 18 November 1917 plan, which enumerated

nine rail targets-without summarizing its antecedents or

subsequent revisions.1'0 Such oversimplification creates the

impression that French aerial bombing policy was shortsighted and preoccupied solely with tactical aspects. H. A.

Jones fails to examine the extent to which 41st Wing could

have participated effectively in a ready-made joint bombing

scheme during the winter of 1917-18. He does not comment

on these lost opportunities. Instead, he leaves the reader with

the mistaken conclusion that 41st Wing worked closely with

the French when selecting and attacking short-range targets.

That British aviators were unable to comply with the provisions of Haig's reply to De Castelnau or the Air Policy Committee's directives in this regard also eludes the scope of Jones's

narrative.

66
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

Neville Jones, writing in 1973, perpetuates these impressions-primarily because he relies upon H. A. Jones' War in

the Air. In summarizing 41st Wing's activities, Neville Jones

repeats the former Jones's mistaken assertions of close interAllied coordination.

The raids were not based on any bombing programme, and this is

hardly surprising, since the majority of the targets it was desired to

attack were not at that time operationally feasible. As a result, the

choice of targets during the winter of 1917-1918 was for the most part

left to the French whose bombing plan concentrated on objectives

which were at short range from the Nancy base. 101

Neither Jones places French bombing policy in its proper

context vis-d-vis British plans. Nor do they analyze the significance of the Haig-Petain correspondence on reprisals and concentration of force and the consequent operational directives

to 41st Wing. It is now time, having examined plans, to determine how 41st Wing fared in actuality.

Notes

1. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the

Development of British Air Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918

(London: Eimber, 1973), 124-25, 127.

2. Malcolm Cooper, "British Air Policy on the Western Front, 1914-1918"

(PhD diss., Oxford University, 1982), 245.

3. Trenchard Papers, Army Council Memorandum, November 1916,

Royal Air Force Museum (RAFM), Hendon, England.

4. Public Records Office (PRO), Air Ministry Records (AIR)

1/711/27/13/2214, trans. of German Accounts of Strategic Bombing; and

Raymond H. Fredette, The Sky on Fire: The First Battle of Britain 1917-1918

and the Birth of the Royal Air Force (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,

1966), 262-65.

5. Fredette, 262-65.

6. Ibid.

7. Barry D. Powers, Strategy without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy,

1914-1939 (London: Groom Helm, 1976). 95.

8. A. Noble Frankland, The Bombing Offensive Against Germany:

Outlines and Perspectives (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 27; H. A. Jones,

War in the Air, Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the

Royal Air Force, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), vol. 5, 88, 90-91

and vol. 6, 122-23; Powers, 99-101; Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic

Bombing, 138; and J. M. Spaight, The Beginnings of Organised Air Power

(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), 126-30.

67
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

9. Andrew P. Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962), 222.

10. Ibid.

11. Trenchard to War Cabinet, 20 June 1917 in Boyle, Trenchard, 222.

12. PRO, Cabinet Office Records (CAB) 23/3, War Cabinet 178.

13. Ibid., 181-83.

14. PRO, AIR 9/69, Smuts, First Report of the Committee on Air

Organisation and Home Defence against Air Raids, 19 July 1917. This PRO

file also contains his Second Report of 17 August 1917, which was

reprinted in H.A. Jones, War in the Air, Appendix ii, 8-14.

15. Cooper, 246.

16. Paul Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914-1918 (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1965), 249-51, summarizes the War Cabinet's "an

intermittent support for Haig's planned offensive."

17. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, Appendix 1, 1-8.

18. Science Museum, A.9 (Pearson Papers), "The Duties and Functions

of the Air Board," 28 July 1917 in Cooper, "British Air Policy," 248.

19. PRO, AIR 8/2, pt. II, Air Board to War Cabinet, 17 April 1917; AIR

6/6, Air Board Minutes for March 1917, lists the practical difficulties of

metallurgy design and manufacture that curtailed production of aerial

resources.

20. PRO, AIR 9/69, Smuts, "Second Report," 17 August 1917.

21. PRO, CAB 23/4, War Cabinet 223-12.

22. Frankland, 16.

23. Spaight, 128.

24. Ibid., 126-17. For a contemporary analysis of the effects of the

Gotha raids upon the British public, see The "Manchester Guardian" History

of the War, 9 vols. (London: John Heywood, 1914-1920), vii, 315-20; W. 0.

D. Pierce, Air War: Its Technical and Social Aspects (London: Waltz, 1937),

66, also discusses the public demand to retaliate on the Rhineland towns;

and N. Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 133-34, details the

opprobrium visited upon those who refused to condemn the German aerial

offensive.

25. Spaight, 127.

26. Edmund Dane, The War Budget: A Photographic Record of the Great

War (London: 1917), 268-69.

27. Ibid., 268.

28. PRO, AIR 1/522/16/12/5, War Office to Haig, 18 August 1917.

29. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 5, 89-90.

30. Ibid., 90.

31. Trenchard's cross-channel flight of three R.E.8 planes in bad

weather on 2 October caused air raid alarms to be raised; business in

London was delayed several hours. See Boyle, Trenchard, 234-35.

32. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 5, 90.

33. Ibid., vol. 6, 123.

34. PRO, CAB 23/4, War Cabinet, 242-44.

35. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 5, 90.

68
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

36. PRO, AIR 1/678/21/13/2102, War Cabinet, 15 October 1917.

37. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, Royal Flying Corps, 11 October

1917-31 January 1919, entry for 17 October 1917, Newall Papers, RAFM,

Hendon, England.

38. Robert Blake, ed., The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919:

Being Selections from the Private Diary and Correspondence of Field-Marshal

the Earl Haig of Bemersyde (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952), 252.

39. PRO, AIR 1/1649/204/95/6, Robertson, CIGS, War Office, to Haig,

letter, 27 October 1917.

40. Ibid.; Trenchard, Advisor HQ, RFC, to Newall, Operations

Commander, 41st Wing, letter, 30 October 1917, Trenchard Papers, RAFM,

Hendon, England.

41. PRO, AIR 1/1649/204/95/6; Letter from Trenchard, 30 October

1917; and Trenchard to Newall, letter, CRFC 1721/9/30.G, 29 October

1917.

42. PRO, AIR 1/678/21/13/2102, Air Policy Committee, 30 October

1917.

43. PRO, AIR 1/2266/209/70/25, "Extract from minutes of a meeting of

the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W., on Friday November 2,

1917, at 8 p.m."

44. Ibid.

45. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, entry for 1 November 1917.

46. PRO, AIR 1/2266/209/70/26, File, "Reports of Bombing Operations

at Ochey Squadrons, Nancy area (41st Wing and 8th Brigade), November

1917 to June 1918, including Summary of Operations by RFC, Western

Front, for months of October and November 1917 (for the information of the

War Cabinet)"; Correspondence on Kaiserslautern raid, 1 November 1917.

47. Ibid. For typical added narrative, see Trenchard's typed comments

on the 11 December 1917 Pirmasens Raid Report; for typographical errors,

signature block on transcribed raid report dated 21/22 January 1918 ("C.

L. N. Newall" rendered as "C. S. Alendale").

48. Final detailed raid report is dated 26 June 1918.

49. PRO, AIR 1/725/97/6, "A Short Review of the Situation in the Air on

the Western Front and a Consideration of the Part to be Played by the

American Aviation," Trenchard to War Cabinet (n.d., probably late 1917).

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. PRO, AIR 1/725/97/6.

54. Blake, Haig, 273; For Sir Douglas Haig's detailed objections to

Smuts' proposals, see H. A. Jones, War in the Air, Appendix 3, "Sir Douglas

Haig's Views on a Separate Air Service," 15 September 1917, 14-18.

55. Ibid., 280.

56. PRO, AIR 1/725/97/7, "Strategic and Tactical Considerations

Involved in Long Distance Bombing," Trenchard to War Cabinet, 26

November 1917.

69
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

57. N. Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 162.

58. PRO, AIR 1/463/15/312/137, Air Policy Committee, "Memorandum

on Bombing Operations," January 1918. Reprinted in H. A. Jones, War in

the Air, Appendix 6, 24-26.

59. PRO, AIR 1/725/97/7, Trenchard to War Cabinet, 26 November

1917.

60. For Churchill's view of the effects of bombs on civilian morale, see

Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive

against Germany 1939-1945, 4 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery

Office [HMSO], 1961), vol. 1, Preparation, 47.

61. PRO, AIR 1/725/97/7, Trenchard to War Cabinet, 26 November

1917.

62. Ibid.

63. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, Appendix 5; Trenchard to Prime

Minister, 13 January 1918, Trenchard Papers, RAFM, Hendon, England.

64. AIR 1/725/97/7, Trenchard to War Cabinet, 26 November 1917.

65. PRO, AIR 1/463/15/312/137, Air Policy Committee, January 1918.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. AIR 1/463/15/312/137; Trenchard's paper to the War Cabinet, par.

8, 26 November 1917, Trenchard Papers, RAFM, Hendon, England.

69. AIR 1/2266/209/70/22, Lt Col E. L. Spiers (Paris) to CIGS, cipher

telegram, subject: Reprisals for Bombing Raids by the French, July 1917.

70. PRO, AIR 1/2266/209/70/23, "Plan of Attack against Mining

District of _, October 1917," containing the French plan, was sent

to Haig at Montreuil by Petain in October 1917. It was subsequently

forwarded by Spiers (Paris) to Maj Gen F. Maurice, director of Military

Operations (DMO), at the War Office on 20 October 1917. Maurice's reply to

Spiers on 31 October states that Trenchard was explicitly tasked to study

and comment upon the French program.

71. PRO, AIR 1/1976/204/273/40 (IF "I" 4/30, HQ, IAF), "Plan of

Bombardment Operations during Winter of 1917-1918," signed by GOC,

GAE, 18 October 1917. De Castelnau states that the concept "was fixed by

the G.O.C. in C. on the 17th of July 1917." Map in same file dated 13

March 1917.

72. AIR 1/1976/204/273/39 (IF "I" 4/28), "History of the Evolution of

the Plan of Bombardment by Aeroplanes," French General Staff, 18

November 1917. This file also contains a translation of the same plan by the

Technical Division, US Air Service, dated 3 December 1917, "Account of the

Aviation Plan of Bombardment by Airplanes."

73. Kenneth Munson, Bombers, 1914-1919 (London, 1968), 98-99.

74. PRO, AIR 2/123 Capt W.L. Elder, RN, to Air Board, subject: Report

on Raid by British and French Airmen on Oberndorf, 25 October 1916.

75. Bruce Robertson, Sopwith-The Man and His Aircraft (Bedford:

Sidney Press, 1970), 81-82.

70
BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS

76. PRO, AIR 1/1976/204/273/40, French Plan of Bombardment, 18

October 1917.

77. Ibid.

78. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6, 124.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., 125-26, the official historian's rationalization that Haig spoke

of reprisals "in a popular and not a legal sense."

83. PRO, AIR 1/2266/209/70/24, Petain to Haig, letter no. 20919,

subject: Bombing behind German Lines-Views of Sir D. Haig and Gen.

Petain, 20 September 1917.

84. Ibid.

85. AIR 1/2266/209/70/24, Haig to Petain, letter no. OB/1837/1, 15

October 1917.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.; and Petain to Haig, letter no. 24068, 21 October 1917.

88. AIR 1/2266/209/70/24, Haig to Petain, letter no. OAD 644/1, 24

October 1917.

89. AIR 1/1976/203/273/39, "Account of the Aviation Plan of

Bombardment by Airplanes," French General Staff, 18 November 1917

(trans. Technical Division, U.S. Air Service, 3 December 1917); and AIR

1/1976/204/273/40, "Minute on the Blockade of the Ferriferous

Watershed of Luxembourg-Lorraine," 5 January 1918. Latter revision

contained in HQ, IF file "I.F. T 4/30," "Bomb Targets: French Bombing

Policy, October 1917-January 1918."

90. AIR 1/1976/204/273/39, French Bombing Plan, 18 November

1917.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. No reliable comprehensive operational summary exists for 41st Wing

activities. Information must be compiled from a number of sources: RAF

Hendon, B392 (Newall Papers); War Diary of Eighth Brigade: B393 (Newall

Papers); Detailed Raid Reports submitted by Eighth Brigade RFC/RAF to

Independent Force Headquarters on Bombing Operations, October

1917-June 1918. Some of the latter are also in PRO, AIR

1/2266/209/70/26, "Reportsof Bombing Operations of Ochey Squadrons."

See also AIR 1/1976/204/273/111, Intelligence Reports of Raids before

15th June 1918; Maj H. W. M. Paul (41st Wing, RFC) to Air Ministry; and

AIR 1/2085/207/5/3, Approximate Results, 41st Wing, RAF, 17 October

1917-11 November 1918.

95. Distances computed from tactical pilotage charts (TPC) E-2C and

E-2D (1:500,000), Director of Military Survey of Ministry of Defence, United

Kingdom, HMSO, 1979.

96. AIR 1/1976/204/273/40, French Bombing Plan, 5 January 1918.

71
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., French Bombing Plan, 5 January 1918.

100. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6, 124-25.

101. N. Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 150.

72
Chapter 3

41st Wing

Royal Flying Corps

(June 1917-January 1918)

The activities of 41st Wing, RFC, between October 1917 and

January 1918 were governed by the War Cabinet's double

mandate: to prepare aerodromes and bomb Germany. The former mission, more prosaic than operational, deserves explication-not only because of its contemporary importance but

also because it has not been examined as a proper component

of the British program. In particular, as with formulation of

strategic plans, the French contribution has been ignored and

denigrated.

The official history has again established the standard. Subsequent studies have accepted H. A. Jones' version of airfield

construction difficulties in the French sector. His narrative

relied heavily upon Trenchard's final dispatch of 1 January

1919 and a retrospective interview granted by the retired Chief

of Air Staff in April 1934. However, other records and accounts from the period tend to contradict Jones' conclusions.

It now seems questionable that Trenchard faced an Augean

task in erecting aerodromes on inhospitable terrain ceded by

the French only after protracted negotiations.

In August 1917, prompt construction of airfields to house

Smuts's and Cowdray's bombing fleet indeed seemed critical.

Charged with building aerodromes for 10 long-range bombing

squadrons by the end of August 1918, Haig opened discussions with the French in June 1917.1 During summer and fall

of 1917, Trenchard, as GOC of the Royal Flying Corps, had

reconnoitered possible sites in the zone of General De Castelnau's Eastern Army Group.2 In November 1917, after these

personal surveys, he informed the Air Policy Committee that

the French hesitated to provide support because they "were

strongly opposed" to their Ally's plan to bomb German cities. 3

The official history notes that he later informed the Air Council in 1918 that "there were grave difficulties in the way of

73
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

obtaining aerodrome accommodation."4 In 1973, Neville Jones,

echoing this verdict, agreed that securing a British base of

operations at Ochey required "difficult and protracted negotiations" with the French.5 He further observed that Trenchard

confided to H. A. Jones in 1934 that "the French had put

every difficulty in the way."6 These allegations deserve further

scrutiny.

Neville Jones, with Trenchard's biographer, A. P. Boyle, attributes French opposition mainly to the effects of the mutinies following the Nivelle offensive begun 16 April 1917.7

Jones asserts that disaffection, involving over half the French

army, also depressed civilian morale. French cities thus would

have been susceptible to the shock of German air raids as

reprisals for 41st Wing attacks. Certainly Petain, who succeeded Robert-Georges Nivelle on 15 May, realized that his

nation could not sustain a prolonged offensive until confidence and discipline had been restored. As Cyril Falls recorded, although 119 cases of "collective indiscipline" were

distributed among 54 French divisions, mainly between 25

May and 10 June, only 55 mutineers were ever shot.8 Trenchard well may have encountered a few localized examples of

French military disintegration during his site surveys around

Nancy and Ochey.

That his testimony before the Air Policy Committee in late

November should contradict the consensus reached by Haig

and Petain the month before is even more puzzling. Their

correspondence reveals that the two commanders reached virtually complete accord on policies, especially for reprisals, before Trenchard left France for the Air Ministry. Given Trenchard's cordial working relationship with Sir Douglas Haig, he

would have been privy to this exchange. It is therefore difficult

to accept his views, either by contemporary documentation or

through the speculations of later historians.

Similarly, the persistent notion that French authorities contributed little toward the success of British bombing seems

mistaken. Neville Jones, again taking his lead from the official

history, has concluded that the French "were prepared to give

no more than the minimum of assistance, and even that was

given reluctantly."9 Surviving records do not fully justify this

74
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

verdict. In his final dispatch after the Armistice, Trenchard

himself praised De Castelnau and his GAE staff "for the very

valuable assistance" they had rendered to the British bombing

force."° The euphoria of victory might conceivably account for

such magnanimity; however, French aid to Newall's 41st Wing

merited such praise.

In autumn and winter of 1917, the French had readily

agreed to support the 41st Wing operation to the maximum

extent possible. In October 1917, a British liaison officer inspected the sites of proposed aerodrome areas and spoke with

the local French commander about the possibilities of French

cooperation. In his report to HQ RFC, the officer assured Trenchard that the French commander "gave us to understand

that every facility would be given and that the French would

do all they possibly can to help us."" Specifically, the French

agreed to

a) arrange for hiring agricultural instruments and horses for

airfield levelling;

b) make available "any ground required.., on our behalf' through

appropriate administrative action;

c) provide their own vehicles for transport, up to a maximum of

thirty lorries;

d) issue French rations to working parties; and

e) arrange for suitable billets for working parties. 12

Furthermore, wrote the RFC liaison, the French "had no

objection to Black labour" battalions for airfield work. Given

this response to British requests, French aid to 41st Wing has

been belittled in retrospect. In fact, the French continued to

render considerable logistical assistance throughout the British program of expansion.

On the British side, building aerodromes often absorbed

more attention than monitoring 41st Wing's missions. While

RFC chief, Trenchard, accompanied by Maurice Baring and a

French liaison officer, visited Newall's base area between 8

and 10 November.' 3 His itinerary included, besides the usual

briefings with squadron commanders and officer aircrew,

tours of the sites for the aircraft depot at Rambervillers and

the Azelot aerodrome.14 Three Bengal Indian labor companies,

approximately twelve hundred men, had been engaged in construction at these locations since the latter part of October.'

75
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Trenchard's subsequent report to Haig described the "stupendous" work necessary in the 41st Wing area to house 12

squadrons at Xaffevillers and Azelot. 16

With an eye to the future bombing fleet of Smuts and Cowdray, the GOC RFC asked that "formal application be made"

for three more airfield sites. Though Gen Maurice Duval, chief

of French Aviation, had tentatively allocated sites near Ortoncourt, St. Reminont, and Bettoncourt to the US Air Service,

work had not yet begun. As the bulk of the American squadrons were to be emplaced west of the 41st Wing rear area,

southwest of Toul, the French promptly acceded to Trenchard's request.17 Two weeks later, another twelve hundred

Indian laborers of the 58th, 72nd, and 75th Companies arrived; on 4 December 1917, Colonel Dixie of the Royal Engineers and Colonel Harrison of the Works Directorate arrived to

supervise aerodrome construction.'8 Throughout November

and December 1917, frequent visits from observers attached

to London or Montreuil kept authorities abreast of developments.19 By the end of the year, Colonel Newall's three operational squadrons were overshadowed and outnumbered fiveto-one by the rank-heavy labor organization dedicated to

housing the future might of British strategic bombing.

Throughout December 1917, aerodrome construction remained a matter of urgency owing to War Cabinet preoccupation with forecasts of increased aircraft production. These inflated predictions complicated the supporting plans of British

ground and air commanders in the field.

At this time, Trenchard summarized his proposals for airfield expansion for Haig, outlining his current situation and

the units scheduled to arrive throughout 1918. Already in

place were two night-bombing squadrons, No. 100 (FE2b) and

Naval "A" (Handley Page); they shared the spacious French

aerodrome at Ochey with components of De Castelnau's

bombing force. 20 The sole day unit, No. 55 (DH4) was in the

process of moving from Ochey to a new field at Tantonville,

with well-camouflaged hangars recessed into surrounding

woodland. As a member of No. 55 observed, 'The aerodrome

was loaned from the French, and the work on it had all been

done by comic little stock French colonial troops from Cochin

76
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

China."2" (In fact, the French provided all the necessary accommodations and facilities to support the British bombing

campaign during 1917, including Newall's headquarters building in Bainville-sur-Madon.)

By summer 1918, Trenchard had been warned to expect a

force comprising 25 line squadrons, plus support agencies

that would include five Wing headquarters, one Brigade headquarters, and two aircraft replacement parks. The War Cabinet planned for seven DH4 day squadrons and two Handley

Page night squadrons to be active by April 1918, with an

increase thereafter of five squadrons monthly. 22 In anticipation, Trenchard requested even more Indian labor units to

augment twenty-five hundred workers already employed.

Just three weeks later, on 26 December 1917, he revised

this scheme in view of the latest pronouncements from the Air

Council. In addition to the 25 squadrons forecast earlier, he

was to expect 15 more squadrons by June 1918 and another

15-squadron increment no later than August.23 Confronted

with ever-increasing projections of aircraft, military commanders adjusted priorities accordingly. At times, construction took

precedence over flying. American records provide a perspective

on this climate of uncertain cooperation between British and

French.

At the end of 1917, the newly arrived Americans entertained

hopes of instituting their own bombardment plan for the air

service accompanying the American Expeditionary Force

(AEF). In early December, to expedite this program, Chief of

US Air Service Brig Gen Benjamin D. Foulois delegated newly

promoted Lt Col Edgar S. Gorrell to coordinate with Allied air

commanders.24 Gorrell, the energetic "Head of Strategical Aviation, Zone of Advance, A.E.F.," was eager to develop his program from the best of the Allies' plans. His summary of British

and French attitudes illuminates their several points of variance. 25

It appears that personality clashes aggravated fundamental

differences in bombing philosophies. At the aviation conference held at French General Headquarters (GHQ) on 22 December 1917, Trenchard's uncompromising tone made it clear

that joint cooperation was not his major goal.

77
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

At this meeting General Trenchard told that he had been ordered by

his Government to establish a force of bombardment aviation in the

vicinity of Germany, that whether or not the Allies intended to join

with him in this work did not affect whether or not he continued such

work, and that he intended to increase the size of his force and to

push this work to the maximum extent in compliance with the orders

of his Government on this subject.26

General Duval, commanding the French Air Service in the

field, replied, "it did not pay to heterogeneously bombard enemy industrial centres."27 Duval pointed out that German

bombardment of Allied towns "was a much easier task" than

the converse; here he echoed the same fear of enemy reprisals

that Petain had expressed to Haig two months before. The

French air chief also emphasized that the British plan was not

feasible. Firstly, neither ally had sufficient material to conduct

an effective campaign of strategic bombing. Secondly, "the use

of bombardment aviation as contemplated by the British did

not agree with French tactical plans." He concluded with the

warning that "the French do not expect to join this operation."

On paper, the respective bombardment programs appeared

to be commensurate. As Haig had explained to De Castelnau,

British bombers eventually could be expected to attack targets

on the French list. However, the divergent attitudes that characterized the 22 December conference made even limited cooperation unlikely. One would even expect hitherto cordial

relations between Newall's 41st Wing and the French to deteriorate, following disagreements of their chiefs.

The relationship between the British and American air

chiefs on this question is also enlightening. Although the

French had demurred at the Compiigne meeting, Colonel Gorrell reacted tentatively but affirmatively to the British statement.

The American representative stated that it was the intention of the

United States to also undertake this work along the lines now being

commenced by the British but that he could not pledge the United

States or the AEF to such a procedure for the reason that decision on

that subject lay with GHQ, AEF. 28

At that time, Trenchard hoped to incorporate American

units into the force to be expanded from 41st Wing. During

the Christmas holidays, 1917, General Foulois and Colonel

78
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

Gorrell visited Headquarters Royal Flying Corps (HQ RFC) in

the field, to discuss this matter. Lacking both training and

maintenance facilities, the Americans readily accepted Trenchard's proposal to billet their squadrons at aerodromes occupied by seasoned British units. The combination of squadrons

would be commanded by a British officer, though Americans

would take back control of their aviators once their force outnumbered the RFC in the area.29 Since the American rate of

growth remained disappointingly low until the Armistice, this

agreement mainly affected individuals rather than squadrons.

On this diminished scale, it was mutually satisfactory.30

Later, in June 1918, this happy state of affairs disintegrated. As Gorrell observed, Allied cooperation was a twoedged sword.

Later, approximately the summer of 1918, the British Bombardment

Forces in the vicinity of Nancy were separated from the Royal Air Force

in the Field and placed under the command of General Trenchard who

would honor the orders of no one except the British Air Ministry.

General Trenchard received no orders and would acknowledge no

superior in the Field, not even Marshal Foch, who we supposed to

command the Allied forces on the Western Front.31

On 18 June 1918, the AEF Chief of Staff decided that the

US Air Service could no longer assist the British bombing

campaign. Henceforth the Americans would support the coordinated plan promulgated by Foch as commander in chief. In

the case of the United States as well as of France, British

intransigence did much to alienate an initially cooperative

ally. These and similar incidents make Trenchard's remarks to

the official historian at their 1934 interview more intelligible.

In late 1917, Trenchard, the man responsible for the success

of British bombing, clearly valued autonomy above cooperation. His was a myopic view of the principle of unity of effort.

Also, the RFC chief was being kept busy by his superiors in

London at the time.

The War Cabinet was not easily reassured, chronically fearing that airfield space would constrain the bombing program.

The perspicacious Maurice Baring captured the mood perfectly in his diary entry for 19 December 1917:

There was, at this time, a panic in London about the Aerodromes at

Ochey. It was thought apparently that not enough energy was being

79
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

put into the matter. Gracious heavens, did they but knowl The

General thought he might have to go there, and we were ready to start.

I was summoned hastily back from St. Omer, whither I had taken Mr.

Grey (i.e., G. C. Grey, editor of The Aeroplane). However, Commodore

Paine was sent out from London to see the place, and he reported that

the Aerodromes would be ready long before we had one-tenth of the

number of machines which they were to accommodate, which proved

to be more than true.32

The promised bombing fleet had failed to materialize by late

spring 1918, and the strategic force numbered just four

squadrons.

The Aerodromes which we had seen in the autumn, and which at that

time had looked like unreclaimable moorland, were now wide and

smooth surfaces of grass. Thanks to Newall, the miracle, the

impossible had been accomplished.33

Except for Trenchard's postwar allegations, none of the surviving contemporary documents attest to other than full cooperation by the French in this endeavour.

One last point on British aerodrome construction concerns

the suitability of terrain allotted for building airfields. In his

final dispatch, Trenchard directed the attention of his Minister, Lord Weir, Secretary of State for Air, to the difficulties

encountered in carrying out the government's construction

schemes.

My first work was at once to push on and arrange for the

accommodation of a Force in the neighbourhood of 60 squadrons. This

was a much larger task than may appear at first sight.

The country is throughout hilly and woody, and where there are any

level places they consist of deep ridge and furrow, there being as much

as 3 ft. 0 ins. between furrow and ridge.

The aerodromes had to carry heavy machines and heavy bomb loads;

in order to enable this to be done, draining work on a large scale had

to be very carefully carried out, and arrangements had to be made for

a large installation of electrical power for workshops and lighting and

petrol in order to save transport.

The work was practically completed by Nov. 1st, 1918.34

Twenty miles of drains had to be laid on Azelot aerodrome

and 60 miles at Xaffevillers for the field to be leveled and

sown.35 However, similar exertions would have been necessary

in almost any sort of terrain. Azelot and Xaffevillers are atypi80
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

cal examples in that they lie in the deeply furrowed country

north of the Moselle; only two other bombing aerodromes were

ever built in that inhospitable neighborhood."

The 41st Wing in fact occupied relatively more favorable

land than the US Air Service had been allotted; a topographical map study substantiates this observation." The same

study also reveals numerous military and private airfields still

in use in the region, proportionately more on the sites of old

British aerodromes than in the American base area. Trenchard and Newall admittedly faced an urgent task in building

sufficient aerodromes to satisfy the War Cabinet. However,

their concerns were neither unique nor prohibitively difficult

in that regard.

With headquarters at Bainville-sur-Madon, Colonel Newall

and his staff were roughly equidistant from 41st Wing's main

bases at Ochey (seven miles west) and Tantonville (eight miles

south). Early in November 1917, No. 55 Squadron (the daylight unit) had moved to the latter aerodrome, leaving No. 100

and "A" Naval Squadrons with the French atý Ochey.3 6 As the

squadron represented the smallest self-contained operational

unit of the bombing force, a brief overview of its organization

and responsibilities is necessary at this time.

Besides its aircraft flights ("A," "B," and "C"), the squadron

contained specialized sections that performed functions ancillary but essential to flying. Generally a major, the squadron

commander controlled five support groups-headquarters, orderly room (administration), armament, stores, and transport-as well as his flyers. 39 Headquarters section (one captain, one technical warrant officer, one flight sergeant, 10

other ranks) managed the unit's maintenance program and

supervised special tasks ranging from ensuring aerodrome

readiness to incising memorial crosses. 40 Duties of the armament, stores, and transport sections were much as one would

expect.

The orderly room section, responsible for discipline and administration, kept records and forwarded returns to 41st Wing

headquarters. To assist the recording officer (adjutant), the

section included a warrant officer in charge of disciplinary

matters and a flight sergeant (chief clerk) who supervised two

81
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

administrative clerks. A telephone operator and a motorcyclist dispatch rider provided communications to and from

Bainville-sur-Madon. This orderly room section typed, filed,

and forwarded the raid reports and supporting documents

that eventually reached the War Cabinet. From a purely administrative viewpoint, the squadron commander was adequately supported.

Because of its isolation, the squadron also had specialized

officers: a chaplain, a medical officer, a meteorological officer,

and a photographic technician. Since one of the unit's key

tasks was to provide postraid results and assessments to wing

staff as quickly as possible, a branch intelligence officer was

assigned.41 In practice, however, the squadron commander

customarily .debriefed returning aircrews, collected their observations, and composed, edited, and signed the squadron's

raid report. This summary was en route to 41st Wing Headquarters by motorcycle within three to six hours of the mission's completion. 42 Maj W. R. Read, who commanded a Handley Page squadron during 1918, described this tedious but

vital routine.

It takes an awful time after the raid is over to collect all the pilots' and

observers' reports. From all these reports I have to make a general

report which takes about an hour. All this then has to be typed twice

over in order to make 6 copies and this takes anything between 1 and

2 hours according to the length of the report. I have to wait up till it is

all finished to read it through and sign them all. Then they go off to

the Wing at Xaffevillers-50 miles distant by a dispatch rider so that

Wing may have them before 7 a.m. 43

The main sources of information used by Whitehall and others

to ascertain bombing results were the reports submitted by

aircrews to their squadron commanders.

The cutting edge of the squadron was the flight, consisting

of six planes and generally eight or more pilots, under the RFC

system of unit organization. Three such flights comprised a

squadron in 41st Wing, except for "A" Naval whose Handley

Pages were organized into two flights of five machines each.

The flight commander, a captain and the highest-ranking officer to participate in frequent service flights over the lines,

generally held his position by virtue of his tactical experience.

82
4 1ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

The success of each mission depended upon his flying skills

and leadership qualities.44

The aircraft types in Newall's force represented the contemporary state of the art in late 1917. Whatever their other

obstacles, British bombing squadrons were not hampered by

unsuitable aircraft designs.

No. 55's DeHavilland 4s, first flown at Hendon in mid-1916,

represented one of the more successful types of its day. Like

the Sopwith 11/2 Strutter of No. 3 Wing, it was an open-cockpit, two-seater biplane used for day bombardment; unlike the

Sopwith, the DH4 carried its bombs on external wing racks.45

During its mobilization at Lilbourne in spring 1917, No. 55

Squadron had been the first RFC unit to receive the DH4,

then powered by the 250-horsepower Rolls Royce Eagle III.

They flew DH4s throughout the war, preferring the model that

became available in January 1918, with the 375-horsepower

Eagle VIII, an engine originally allocated to the RNAS. With a

service ceiling of 23,000 feet, the DH4 (Eagle VIII) generally

bombed from 16,000 to 17,000 feet, taking approximately 45

minutes to climb to that height after takeoff.46

The main disadvantage of the DH4 arose from its main fuel

tank, sandwiched between the cockpits for the pilot and observer. The design undoubtedly simplified Geoffrey DeHavilland's attempts to maintain a stable center of gravity. However, this arrangement made crew coordination extremely

difficult, even with speaking tubes. In a crash, the tank often

left its bedding and crushed the pilot against the engine, a

tendency compounded by the relatively weak undercarriage of

the DH4. In combat, one experienced pilot complained that

the "tank is unprotected, works by pressure and explodes

when shot up."47

Of 33 DH4s lost to enemy action by the US Air Service, eight

fell in flames-"no worse than the average at the time."48 (On

12 November 1918, the day after the Armistice, the first DH4

fitted with a self-sealing fuel tank arrived in France.)49 Later

DeHavilland designs, notably the DH9 and DH9A, relocated

the fuel tank just aft of the engine and incorporated a winddriven petrol pump. This arrangement placed the pilot and

83
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

observer within arm's length of one another and minimized

fire and crash dangers.

With their DH4s, No. 55 Squadron adopted tactical procedures of formation takeoff in two six-ship wedges, a configuration maintained to and from the target area. The raid leader

normally fired a red Very signal to alert his companions, who

released their payloads when they observed the leader's

bombs falling. Similarly, the raid leader was responsible for

navigating en route and selecting alternate targets if formations proved unable to bomb their assigned objective.5 0 This

follow-the-leader approach, besides being tactically sound,

permitted newly trained and inexperienced aircrews to be

used on missions. In at least one instance when the flight

commander had engine trouble and had to return to base, his

wingmen, either unaware of or misreading his flare signal,

dutifully accompanied him all the way home.5

" Since massed

fire from the observers' Lewis guns somewhat discouraged

close-range attacks on the formation, the six-ship wedge also

afforded protection against attacks by enemy planes. In daylight raiding, survival and accurate bombing depended upon

formation flying.

By contrast, night operations used machines of relatively

low performance that operated singly after takeoff. Aircrew

skill and judgment determined the aggregate success of the

squadron's particular mission. Navigational difficulties offset

the decreased risk of enemy countermeasures during darkness; mass raids, owing to the danger of midair collisions,

were seldom attempted. However, the 1,500-pound payload of

the Handley Page made its offensive power roughly equal to

that of an entire formation of smaller FE2bs. Bombing altitudes ranged between four thousand feet and chimney level, a

tactic which substantially assisted accuracy. 52 Overall, the pilot of each night bombing machine had to exercise the same

skills expected of a flight commander/raid leader in a daylight

unit.

From its arrival in France on 21 March 1917, No. 100

Squadron flew lattice-tailed FE2bs until it converted to Handley Pages in August 1918. The "Fee," a type with the RFC

84
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

since the initial weeks of war, was relegated to night operations.

The F.E.2b proved to be, by the standards of its time, effective as a

night bomber. It gave its crew exceptionally good forward vision, could

lift a fair load of bombs, and under cover of darkness its lack of

performance mattered little. Thus when the first British squadrons to

be formed as a night bombing unit came into being in February 1917

its aircraft were to be F.E.2b's. 53

An undercarriage modification permitted the machine to

carry both the standard 230-pound aerial bomb and the 112-

pound model. In November 1917, HQ RFC ordered that all

FE2bs issued to No. 100 have the original 24-gallon petrol

tank replaced by a 36-gallon tank. The machine's airborne

endurance increased from three hours to four and one-half

hours.' Since the FE2b cruised at speeds under 70 miles per

hour with bomb load, its maximum tactical range, even with

the larger tank, was roughly 110 miles, allowing 30 percent

fuel reserve for contingencies. Even with this constraint, the

aircraft could reach all the rail targets designated as critical in

the French air plans of October and November 1917. The

performance of the FE2b suited it for inter-Allied operations,

particularly the bombing program envisioned by the War Cabinet and Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters.

Conversely, the Handley Page night bomber had been designed expressly for long-range bombing missions. Spanning

exactly 100 feet, it stood 22-feet high, huge in its time. The

Handley Page 0/400, which began to replace the 0/100 in

early 1918, differed mainly in having its fuel tanks within the

fuselage rather than in the engine nacelles.55 Although it flew

lower (7,000-foot service ceiling) and slower (under 80 miles

per hour at 6,500 feet) than its daylight counterparts, the

Handley Page typically carried sixteen 112-pound bombs,

roughly five times the payload capacity of the DH4.56 Both

Handley Page models required one pilot and two observers.

One observer manned the front .303 Lewis gun and served as

bomb-aimer; the other attended to maps, and to the bombs,

which were carried within a small cabin called the "engine

room." 57

85
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

With an eight-hour airborne endurance, the Handley Page

possessed a combat radius of over 220 miles. Allowing for 30

percent reserve of fuel, it could carry over thirteen hundred

pounds of bombs to Frankfurt or Cologne. With its FE2b companions in No. 100 Squadron, the Handley Pages of "A" Naval

Squadron provided 41st Wing with a complementary pair of

night-bombing aeroplanes. Newall had the potential to implement not only the British bombing scheme but also to work

closely with the French program.

Aircrew opinions indicate that they were generally satisfied

with their machines. Lt Leonard "L. M." Miller, author of the

unofficial history of No. 55 Squadron, characterized the DeHavilland aircraft: "It can be safely said that the D.H.4 was a

success."5 8 A squadron song, "In Formation" extolled the virtues of the machine.5 9 Of the little FE2b, Maj C. Gordon

Burge, commander of No. 100 Squadron at the Armistice,

declared the Fee "a most excellent machine for night bombing," and spoke of the "magnificent work it performed."6"

Burge evidently voiced his crews' collective assessment, since

RFC/RAF policy did not permit his flying missions over the

lines. One of his pilots, Lt A. R. Kingsford, expressed a qualified affection, noting that "these old Fees did some great showing." When No. 100 traded their "good old friends" for Handley

Pages in 1918, Kingsford described the transition to be "like

driving a motor lorry after a Baby Austin."" Soon after, he

recorded that he and his colleagues were very happy with the

new machines and happier still that everyone had survived

the conversion training without mishap. Though the ponderous Handley Pages could be "devils" when caught in enemy

searchlights, they were otherwise "great."62 Given their own

training and tactical experience, 41st Wing aircrews found

little to criticize in their machines.

As had been the case with No. 3 Wing, weather largely

determined the tempo of 41st Wing bombardment. Though

Newall's force of one day squadron (No. 55, DH4) and two

night squadrons (No. 100, FE2b; "A," Handley Page) was constituted on 11 October 1917 at Bainville-sur-Madon, poor flying conditions prevented operations for nearly a week.6 3 After

an inaugural mission to the Burbach works at Saarbrfacken

86
4 1ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

on 17 October 1917, adverse weather did not permit subsequent raids until 21 October. (No. 55 attempted to launch

two missions on the nineteenth.) At four o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st, No. 55 dropped 2,464 pounds of bombs on

Bous and Wadgassen, losing one DH4. "A" Naval and No. 100

Squadrons launched their first missions on the night of 24/25

October, when they bombed factory and railway targets in the

vicinity of Saarbrficken.

In all, Newall's squadrons were able to fly on 20 occasions,

launching 10 squadron-sized daylight missions (all by No. 55

Squadron, the sole day unit) and 14 night raids (10 by No.

100 in FE2bs and four by the Handley Pages of "A" Naval

Squadron) .64

On 24 December, more than two months after active operations had begun, 10 DH4s from No. 55 Squadron visited

Mannheim (actually, Ludwigshafen) with 2,252 pounds of

bombs. Three weeks later, on 14 January 1918, 12 machines

from the same unit dropped 2,752 pounds of bombs on the

munition works and railways around Karlsruhe in a four-hour

mission (takeoff, 1015-1020; land, 1410+).65 Only one raid had

been mounted in November-to Kaiserslautern on the first of

the month. More than a month elapsed before the next operation.

During the three-day period in which conditions were favorable (between 29 October and 1 November 1917), four missions were flown: two by day and two by night. However, 41st

Wing planners did not attempt to achieve a concentration of

effort or even minimal day-night coordination. Of the targets

struck, Saarbrficken, Pirmasens, V61klingen and Kaiserslautern, the two nearest (Saarbri~cken and Vblklingen) are six

miles apart and were bombed on the nights of 29 and 30

October. Pirmasens and Kaiserslautern lie 24 miles and 33

miles, respectively, from the center of Saarbrficken. Six DH4s

(half of the force) on the Kaiserslautern mission of 1 November

were turned back by enemy action; they dropped their payloads into adjacent woods. 66 Performance fell short of expectations through January 1918, largely due to poor flying

weather and organizational inexperience.

87
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

The fortunes of the two night-flying squadrons indicate the

impact of time. "A" Naval Squadron, a conglomeration of machines and aircrew hastily assembled and dispatched to

Ochey, had relatively more difficulties than No. 100 Squadron,

which had been flying FE2bs on active service with the RFC

since April 1917.

The naval aviators, flying long-endurance Handley Page machines, were especially susceptible to adverse weather. After

"A" Naval Squadron's maiden mission (nine machines) to

Saarbrficken on the night of 24/25 October, they did not fly

again till 5/6 January 1918, when a single aeroplane dropped

one-half ton of bombs on railways near Courcelles. The Handley Page crew bombed Courcelles because poor visibility over

Maizieres-les-Metz, their assigned objective, forced an in-flight

diversion. Neither Saarbrficken nor Courcelles lay more than

38 miles over the lines, and Maizieres-les-Metz was just 18

miles behind the trenches. Only two missions flown in 10

weeks, stretching the Handley Pages to less than a quarter of

their combat radius, is a pace indicative of chronic difficulties.

During this period (24/25 October 1917 to 5/6 January

1918), the short-legged FE2bs of No. 100 Squadron managed

to conduct six raids, including three as far afield as Saarbrficken (24/25 October and 29/30 October) and V6lklingen

(30/31 October).

The Admiralty squadron's inexperience also led to high initial wastage. After just two weeks and only one mission with

41st Wing, "A" Naval Squadron had five Handley Pages (of 10)

out of action. By the end of October, two had been lost on the

unit's first operation and three had been lost in accidents. The

commander of the Admiralty's Dunkirk squadrons, following

an inspection visit to "A" Naval, deplored the policy of hurriedly collecting machines, aircrews, and personnel to use immediately on active service.

After two years experience, I feel convinced that to obtain good results

with a minimum of loss it is absolutely necessary for a squadron to be

thoroughly trained. 67

"A" Naval launched four Handley Pages to attack Mannheim

on the night No. 100 bombed V61klingen, but deteriorating

weather forced the "A" mission to be abandoned-and one

88
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

machine went missing. Thereafter, the naval aviators adopted

a more conservative policy. From January to August 1918, the

unit lost but two Handley Pages to enemy action. During their

entire wartime service with the long-range bombing force, "A"

aviators lost a total of six planes over the lines.68

Weather, the most significant factor affecting 41 st Wing activities, prohibited the bombing force from conducting the

crushing offensive desired by the War Cabinet. During the

1917-18 winter, 41st Wing canceled seven attempted raids

after losing one Handley Page and one DH4. Of missions that

crossed the lines, six had to be diverted, wholly or partially, to

targets other than their assigned objectives because of poor

flying conditions. In the absence of a feasible contingency

plan, Newall's force improvised as best it could under the

circumstances. Conscientious efforts, however, have never

guaranteed worthwhile results.

Wastage through accident, as well as enemy action, remained an inescapable fact of life during training and operational flying. It affected the availability of experienced personnel within line squadrons; bombing effectiveness

depended upon the skills of a few highly qualified and experienced officers. Because of the demand for replacements,

the consequence of RFC's policy of incessant offensive action, both the home training establishment and units overseas found themselves hard pressed to keep the pipeline

and mess chairs filled. Personnel turbulence required neophyte aircrews to learn fundamental skills under fire during

active operations.

According to official files, more British pilots were killed

during training in the United Kingdom than were killed in

action: eight thousand fatalities to 6,166.69 The US Air Service,

which admittedly had the latitude to train replacements in a

less urgent environment, experienced these results:

1 fatality to 90 graduates in preliminary work, 1 fatality to 9.2

graduates in pursuit training, and an average of about 1 fatality to 50

graduations in observation and bombardment. The total average

appears to be one fatality for every 18 completely trained flying officers

available for service.70

89
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

British casualties for each phase of training were proportionately higher; nor did the problem confine itself solely to the

home establishment.

In late 1917 and throughout most of 1918, inexperienced

pilots had to be shipped to France to fill operational billets.

For example, when Lt C. E. V. Wilkins, RNAS, joined No. 16

Squadron (formerly "A" Naval Squadron) on 22 March 1918 to

fly Handley Page night bombers, he had amassed nine hours,

38 minutes total solo flying time on that aircraft. His night

flying experience totaled just six hours, 30 minutes.7' Not unexpectedly, during its tenure from October 1917 to the Armistice, the British strategic bombing force lost roughly three

times as many aircraft to accidents as to enemy action.7 2 In

the worst case, No. 100 Squadron wrecked 56 FE2bs while

losing only 11 over the lines.

According to the official history, a typical DH4 squadron of

18 planes would need 56 replacement machines annually.7 3

During two months of summer, 1918, the overall accident rate

in the RAF per hundred flying hours for Handley Pages was

1.55; for DH4s, 1.89; and for FE2s, 1.93.74 Generally, an adequate equipment reserve for a squadron ready to deploy overseas included six aircraft to make up "wastage during mobilization and transit to France," six machines overseas within

the RFC logistical system and six planes to organizational

training units in the home establishment to produce follow-on

pilots and aircrews.7 s

Soon after the war, Air Commodore Brooke-Popham, newly

appointed head of the Research Department of the Air Ministry, discussed the consequences of losses upon unit performance. In a lecture delivered before the Royal United Services

Institute in December 1919, Air Commodore Brooke-Popham

reviewed the effects of wastage.

During the last eighteen months of the war, the average wastage was

51 per cent per month, i.e., all the machines with squadrons in France

had to be replaced once every two months or six times a year. In other

words, each machine only lasted an average of sixty days, which

would mean a little over sixty hours' flying time per machine.

As regards the causes of wastage, that known to be due directly to

enemy action never reached 25 per cent. To that should be added a

proportion of the missing machines, but even adding these in, it is

90
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

very doubtful if the wastage due to enemy action ever amounted to

more than a third of the total losses. The wastage due to errors of

pilots varied. Whenever we had heavy casualties in pilots it meant that

a large batch of new pilots came out from England, who were unused

to the country and lacking in experience; consequently a heavy

casualty list was generally followed by a large increase in the number

of aeroplane casualties due to errors of pilots.7 6

As described by the air commodore, the situation would

be self-perpetuating. Newly arrived pilots would likely be

shot down and their replacements would also become casualties, requiring replacement in their turn. Under such conditions, squadron commanders and higher officers had to be

grounded simply to guarantee a minimum of organizational

continuity.

Rather than reexamine their offensive policy, the RFC

adopted the expedient course of disguising the extent of

their losses. RAF Routine Orders of 27 June 1918 complicated casualty reporting by eliminating the previous category of losses due to accidents: "In future strictly flying

accidents resulting in death will be reported as death in

action. Injury resulting from accidents will be reported as

'sick.'117 Such administrative obfuscation makes a subsequent classification of casualties difficult. In the case of

No. 100 Squadron, the "Roll of Honour" provides sufficient

detail to make this determination possible, using the squadron's unofficial history. During service with the long-range

bombing force, three aircrew were killed in action, compared

to 10 who died in aircraft accidents.78 This ratio is consistent with the wastage statistics of the official history and Air

Commodore Brooke-Popham. As another investigator of the

subject has observed, "By this means the inexperience of

pilots and the unreliability of aeroplanes was disguised." 79

Casualty return forms used by the strategic bombing force

in 1918 bore the preprinted caveat, under the heading "Accidental Casualties," that this category "does not include officers killed or injured by accident who have crossed the line

and are reported as battle casualties."80 Whether combat

damage or inexperience was the proximate cause, casualties

in machines wrecked returning from a raid were attributed

to enemy action. Some undoubtedly were, but most resulted

91
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

from pilot error. To ascribe nearly all flying casualties to enemy action masked the shortcomings of RFC training even as

it justified the demand for even more new pilots and inflated

the effectiveness of German air defenses.

Under the same rationale, combat losses of machines

were minimized in records and bulletins. Aircraft damaged

or destroyed by enemy action but which crashed on the

Allied side of the lines were not reported. In his postwar

article in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute,

squadron leader B. E. Sutton characterized the situation in

1918.

Such figures as 45 enemy destroyed, 22 driven down, 10 of our

aircraft missing, are misleading, because the word "missing" is

deceptive. Casualties on our side of the lines were not reported. 8'

The 41st Wing and its successors consistently omitted

from their reports aircraft losses due to forced landings and

crashes."2 These official attempts to manipulate loss data, in

conjunction with other statistical and narrative evidence,

reveal the extent to which training and operational wastage,

of aircrews as well as machines, affected the British air

service.

At squadron level, personnel turbulence led to the policy of

restricting participation of key officers in active operations.

The senior officer with firsthand experience in flying over the

lines was, with a few exceptions, the flight commander-generally a captain. This fact was not lost upon aircrews.

Flying for inspection duties is something, but not enough; an

occasional war flight does more to engender respect and raise morale

of the junior pilots than the most eloquent casuistry.

The idea that the senior officer is too valuable ever to risk his life does

not find any adherents among his juniors; in fact the possibility of

more rapid promotion is not unpleasing to them. The policy of

confining commanders to ground duties may overlook the fact that if

they did fly, they would be still more valuable; if they are only capable

of conducting an Avro (i.e., Avro 504, a basic training aeroplane)

round the aerodrome, they should not be placed in an executive

capacity.83

This RFC policy ensured that no rated officer in 41st Wing

above the rank of captain could reliably evaluate the validity

of postraid aircrew reports. Since commanders did not accom92
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

pany their flyers, they lacked the operational experience to

assess raid results knowledgeably. James Clay Thompson's

point about the US Air Force's Vietnam program seems applicable here: "modem organizations are characterized by a

growing gap between the right to decide on the basis of hierarchical position and the ability to decide on the basis of technical competence."8 4 Ministers and commanders, responsible for

the success of British bombing, likewise had to rely on postraid reports from young airmen. A tendency existed for each

link in the chain of command to accept uncritically these

after-action claims, since they shored up the assessments of

everyone involved in the bombing effort.8"

Evidence suggests that 41st Wing and its squadrons in the

field felt themselves under considerable pressure to produce

worthwhile results. The numerous occasions on which missions had to be abandoned or diverted after takeoff, and the

varying ratios of unserviceable to serviceable machines indicate that Newall's force operated at full stretch.

As an RFC unit whose commander had previously been in

charge of Trenchard's headquarters wing, 41st Wing exemplified the policy of carrying the air war to the enemy whenever

possible. Altogether, seven squadron-sized raids had to be

abandoned after takeoff while 24 missions bombed targets

over the lines. The high proportion of aborted to successful

raids (29 percent) suggests a command emphasis upon conducting active operations even under marginal conditions. All

raids that aborted did so because of poor weather. In this

regard, the conservative approach of "A" Naval Squadron provided a marked contrast to the aggressive attitude of the rest

of 41st Wing. Maj W. R. Read, the RFC officer who later commanded the Handley Page unit, summarized these philosophies a few days before he took over the unit.

I shall have to exercise a good deal of patience in working this Sqdn. at

first. I can see that they have R.N.A.S. ideas deeply rooted in them.

Personally (although it's against all R.A.F. principles) I think the

R.N.A.S. methods of work are better than the R.A.F. The R.N.A.S.

methods are slow and sure. Their motto is "fly if the weather is good

but if it is doubtful don't." The R.A.F. methods are 'Try and do the

work at all costs in any weather within reason." Personally I am going

to adopt a medium course in this Sqdn. I shall ginger them up a little

93
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

more than they are but I shall not go to the extreme R.A.F. methods.

What now are the results of the two methods in practice.

This sqdn. has been working on this front now for 10 months and they

have lost 2 machines over the lines in that time. They have perhaps

(and H.Q. certainly think so) erred on the side of being too cautious

about only flying in good weather. 86

Major Read was an experienced aviator who had commanded RFC units since 1915; contrary to policy, he habitually took part in combat operations.8 In this context, his views

can be taken as an accurate reflection of the state of affairs in

the bombing force.

Information extracted from aircraft status returns likewise

indicates that 41st Wing geared its operations to a tempo that

often proved unsustainable. Data on ratios of machines

launched to those that managed to bomb support this suspicion.

The serviceability returns for 24 December 1917 seem unreliable, in light of preceding and succeeding figures. Reporting

45 aeroplanes ready for combat might have seemed a good

way for 41st Wing to conclude its first calendar year of operations. Just two weeks later, on 4 January 1918, 18 machines

were unserviceable; yet, only two mission attempts (five machines total) had been launched in the interim. Similarly, on

the next mission after 17 January, five FE2bs were forced to

abandon the raid because of engine trouble.

Nor were all "serviceable" machines necessarily so. Of 118

aeroplanes launched on day missions, 95 proceeded to fly

complete missions, a success rate of 80.5 percent. By night,

90 of 125 aircraft launched, or 72 percent, flew complete

raids. Mechanical difficulties accounted for virtually all

aborted missions; only eight machines went missing through

January 1918. As Air Commodore Brooke-Popham noted earlier, fewer than a third of those losses could be attributed to

enemy action.

During those intervals in which Newall's force mounted successive missions, such as 30-31 October, 5-6 December, and

4-5 January, numbers of unserviceable aircraft rose in consequence. No aircraft was lost or missing due to enemy action

during any of these three periods. The strain alone-of con94
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

ducting active operations-caused unserviceable rates to rise

sharply. This trend brings into question 41st Wing's ability to

conduct a sustained campaign. In attacks against lightly defended targets at short range (the sort of objectives envisaged

by their French counterparts), Newall's forces were tinable to

mount a systematic bombing offensive without significant

wastage.

Finally, in mid-January 1918, after Trenchard had become

Chief of Air Staff, HQ RFC notified 41st Wing that they no

longer needed to forward aircraft serviceability information. 88

Command authorities preferred to read of successes, rather

than problems, in reports from 41st Wing in the field.

Whitehall, for its part, provided maximum publicity to the

activities of 41st Wing. For example, No. 55 Squadron flew the

Wing's maiden mission on 17 October 1917-a day raid on the

Burbach Works at Saarbrficken. The 41st Wing war diary

summarized the attack.

17/10:-Weather - Misty, morning, clearing up later in the day. No. 55

Squadron carried out two bomb raids (11 De Havilland 4 machines),

and dropped 16 - 112 lb. bombs = 1,792 lbs. on the Factories and

Works around SAARBRUCKEN. Eight bombs were seen to burst on

the BURBBACK [sic] FACTORY, causing considerable damage and

several fires. 89

Haig at GHQ received the report the same day, via Trenchard's staff at HQ RFC in the field, and transmitted it to

the CIGS at the War Office, for dissemination to the War

Cabinet. Within the day, the government and the public

knew nearly all the details of the attacks that initiated the

aerial offensive. Periodicals at home reproduced the GHQ

bulletin verbatim:

British squadrons carried out a successful bombing raid this

afternoon into German territory. A factory of Saarbrucken, some 40

miles beyond the German frontier, were [sic] attacked. Many bombs

were dropped with good effect, and fires were seen to break out in the

factory. All of our machines returned safely. 90

Interestingly, this heartening news was released to the public

even beTore the 41st Wing intelligence officer, Major Paul, had

compiled and submitted his final assessment of raid results

on 19 October 1917.91 In fact, GHQ's practice of publicizing

95
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

information concerning the bombing campaign gained momentum throughout the winter. 2

Date of GHQ Bulletin Extract

21 October 1917: In spite of very misty weather, a further attack into Germany was carried out by our aeroplanes.

30 October 1917: On the night of 29th-30th inst. Our

machines again attacked the railway: station and lines around Saarbracken in Germany.

31 October 1917: Following on those of the night of

the 29th-30th inst., and of yesterday

morning, another raid into Germany

was carried out.

1 November 1917: To-day another successful raid was

carried out by our aeroplanes into

Germany.

6 December 1917: To-day another successful raid was

carried out by our aeroplanes into

Germany.

25 December 1917: In daylight on the 24th inst. one of

our squadrons visited Mannheirmon-the-Rhine with excellent results.

15 January1918: Following on the very successful

daylight raid into Germany on the

14th inst., another was carried out

during the night of the 14th-15th

inst.

Public releases gleaned from official channels also stressed

the continuity and intensity of the bombing effort. The tone of

these extracts led readers to understand that an aerial offensive against targets deep in the enemy homeland was finally

underway. Details of targets, bomb poundage totals, and observed results lent to these bulletins a considerable aura of

authority.

96
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

Date of GHQ Bulletin News Release

21 October 1917: A foundry and railway station ten

miles north-west of Saarbrficken

were bombed, over a ton of bombs

being dropped. Very good results

were obtained, and bursts were seen

on the foundry and railway station.

A big explosion took place.

30 October 1917: This morning, at 11 a.m., 12 of our

machines went further afield, and

attacked the muni tions works and

gasworks at Pirmasens, 20 miles beyond Saarbriicken. Bombs were

seen to burst on the factories and on

the gasworks with excellent results.

31 October 1917: On this occasion the steel works and

stations of Volklingen (northwest of

Saarbr-icken) were attacked with excellent results. Direct hits were observed on the furnace and powerhouse, and on a train.

15 January 1918: The objective in this case was the

steelworks of Thionville, midway between Luxembourg and Metz, where

a ton of bombs was dropped. A further half-ton was dropped on two

large railway junctions in the neighbourhood of Metz.

Comparison of dates of GHQ bulletins with their dates of

public release reveals that an interval of less than a day between official release and subsequent printing was commonplace. 93 Missions of special interest, such as raids by No. 100

or No. 55's day attack on Mannheim on 24 December, often

provided the basis for more than one bulletin.9 4 Subsequent

releases amplified successes; material covering the Mannheim

mission illustrates this practice:

(GHQ Bulletin, 24 December 1917) In daylight on the 24th inst. one of

our squadrons bombed Mannheim-on-the-Rhine with excellent

results. A ton of bombs were dropped, and bursts were observed in the

large main station, in the works, and also in the town, where fires

were started. Very heavy anti-aircraft gunfire was directed against our

97
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

aeroplanes when over the objective, and one of our machines was

damaged and forced to land.

(War Office Bulletin, 29 December) The following further information

about the bombing raid on Mannheim carried out on December 24th

has now been received:-Two of our formations, totalling 10 machines,

crossed the line at a height of 9,000 feet between 10 and 10.15 a.m.

The two formations arrived over the objective almost simultaneously,

and, in spite of heavy and accurate anti-aircraft fire, dropped their

bombs from a height of over 13,000 ft. Sixteen 112-lb. bombs and two

230-lb. bombs were dropped in all, four bursts being observed in the

main station, several in the Lanz works, two in Ludwigshafen, and

several in the munitions factory between Mundenheim and

Rheingonnheim. 95

The same periodical listed the pilot of the forced-down aircraft

as "2nd Lieut. C. F. Turner," but did not mention his observer,

2d Lt A. F. Castle.9

" From the public perspective, such timely

and specific information, disseminated under official imprimatur, attested to the success of the strategic bombing campaign.

Newspapers cooperated, habitually reprinting in their entirety dispatches from GHQ, which had forwarded them to

Fleet Street in time for inclusion in the next day's issues.97

French editions likewise promptly received bulletins outlining

British aerial successes over Germany. 98 For the initial attack

on Saarbrficken, The 7Tmes published the GHQ dispatch under its own headlines: "BRITISH AIR RAID INTO GERMANY;

BOMBS DROPPED ON SAARBRUCKEN; FACTORY SET ON

FIRE." 99

When 41st Wing machines finally reached the Rhine towns

of Mannheim-Ludwigshafen and Karlsruhe, the newspaper included not only headlines, but also a sketch map of 41st

Wing's operating area. A short summary explaining the military importance of these objectives accompanied each story,."°

Daily and weekly periodicals faithfully reproduced variant

spellings of geographic locations ("Oberbilig"--"Operbihlig") and

factual errors (such as transmitting Pirmasen's tanneries into

munition works) that distinguished GHQ dispatches from 4 1st

Wing reports.' 0' As Lloyd George had requested, the Royal

Flying Corps, with the assistance and endorsement of Haig's

staff, ensured that only optimistic reports of 41st Wing successes reached the British public.

98
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

Underpinning this favorable publicity was the network of

official reports and assessments that originated with 41st

Wing. For domestic audiences, one would expect information

to be released selectively in order to inflate somewhat the

bombing force's accomplishments. Conversely, command

authorities ex officio required access to every detail of 41st

Wing in order to gauge its work. As indicated by its cautionary

note of 27 October 1917, transmitted through the CIGS and

GHQ to Trenchard and Newall, the War Cabinet was acutely

concerned with all limitations, shortcomings, and constraints

that affected the strategic bombing campaign. 102

The RFC chain of command had responsibility for keeping

Whitehall informed, promptly and fully, particularly of bad

news. However, 41st Wing records for October 1917 to January 1918 routinely omitted information concerning recurrent

difficulties and shortcomings. Of special interest is the information that each organizational level collected and evaluated

before submitting to higher echelons.

The fundamental source of information about any military

unit is normally its war diary (for the RFC, Army Form

C.2118), a summary of daily activities completed in accordance with Field Service regulations.103 To reflect operational

results accurately, the war diary of 41 st Wing depended upon

data forwarded from the line squadrons. Postmission debriefings conducted by squadron commanders of returning aircrews provided the raw material; the firsthand observations of

pilots and observers would determine the reliability of the

entire intelligence effort. In winter 1917-18, 41st Wing intelligence staff had little choice but to accept at face value raid

summaries forwarded from the squadrons. As its name implies, the war diary condensed these raid reports for transmission further up the chain of command.

Within 41st Wing and its successor (Eighth Brigade), the

flow of operational data to the authorities followed usual administrative practices. The official pipeline led from the wing

to HQ RFC and on to Haig at GHQ. Reports then crossed the

channel to the CIGS at the War Office and, finally, reached the

War Cabinet. ' 0 4 This routing provided material for public news

releases, as summarized above.

99
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

For missions of particular interest, squadron commanders

submitted a comprehensive account to Wing HQ as soon as

possible, usually within 24 hours. This amplifying information

was used at HQ to compose the "detailed raid report," a restricted-access, detailed summary of mission results.'05 These

reports, circulated to the War Cabinet, were also forwarded to

Allied headquarters for De Castelnau's and John J. "Black

Jack" Pershing's information."°6 Their distribution lagged a

day or two behind the postmission bulletins that GHQ released to the British public.

While postmission bulletins and detailed raid reports were

forwarded to Whitehall, two other evaluations prepared by

41st Wing remained within RFC and, later, Air Ministry, circles. Intelligence reports prepared by Major Paul, the Wing

intelligence officer, supplemented post-mission bulletins and

detailed raid reports, occasionally referring to remarks that

Newall had included in the latter.'0° Paul's assessments drew

upon reconnaissance data and photo interpretation of plates

exposed during the raid.

Although it is impossible to say whether the bomb holes shown on the

photographs are the result of the bombs dropped by No. 55 Squadron

or the French it is more than probable from the interrogation of

observers that these are the results of previous raids. It can therefore

be safely assumed that all bombs burst in the Town of

SAARBRUCKEN or on the BURBACH WORKS. The photographs show

two good bursts on Laminoir. (See sketch and photographs already

forwarded.) A fire appears to have been started which is visible on the

two aeroplane photographs (wide smoke of great density and

spreading.) From reports it is understood that these bombs were the

first two dropped.' 0 8

These intelligence reports also contained routes flown to

and from the objective, as well as the location, intensity, and

effectiveness of any enemy countermeasures encountered. Information concerning casualties, wastage, and weight of

bombs dropped was not normally included, since previous

bulletins had forwarded these numbers.

The Air Ministry Directorate of Air Intelligence, Section

A.I.la, responsible for "compilation of Daily Air Intelligence

Summaries," received five final copies of Paul's field reports.'09

Section A.I.la occasionally included 41st Wing intelligence in100
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

formation in the "Summary of Air Intelligence," a confidential

document published daily and circulated to the King as well

as to leading political and military authorities."' Since the

raids had been public knowledge for several days, the classified conclusions that the Air Ministry distributed to key leaders would be taken as authoritative. Few of Paul's specific

observations found their way into the Directorate of Air Intelligence daily summary, which tended to confine itself to statistics and general results available in other, faster field returns.

However, the full report was available in Air Ministry fies.

Within 41st Wing, the operational counterpart to Paul's intelligence report was the "approximate results," a mimeographed summary containing information of interest to the

RFC chain of command."' In addition to the copy forwarded to

HQ RFC, copies of approximate results were distributed to the

Wing's line squadrons. Apparently this "downward" circulation

provided a check on the accuracy of included statistics and

narrative. Occasionally, data were corrected or amended.'1 2

The approximate results initially contained such useful information as aircraft serviceability ratios, numbers of machines

that started the mission and whether they aborted, bombed

the assigned objectives, or diverted to another target. Later, in

the spring of 1918, changes to the categories and extent of the

information they contained circumscribed their utility. However, for the period in which 41st Wing operated as a separate

agency, approximate results and intelligence reports compiled

from aerial photographs and aircrew observations provide detailed descriptions of the conduct and claims of 41st Wing

operations.

However, these official reports and records, war diaries,

squadron mission summaries, detailed raid reports, intelligence reports, and approximate results, all originating in the

field and all summarizing 41st Wing operations, often differ on

very basic items of information. Data concerning numbers of

machines launched and their intended targets, adverse effects

of weather, mechanical failures, enemy countermeasures, and

wastage vary from document to document. It would seem that

the interests of 41st Wing would best be served by making its

difficulties known to those who oversaw the bombing program.

101
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Instead, almost without exception, the wing chose to downplay

those shortcomings.

The thread binding all of 41st Wing's official returns is the

.selective omission of any adverse data. For example, if information concerning operations during December 1917 are

compared, a number of discrepancies emerge. War diary accounts and other records (primarily detailed raid reports) differ significantly with respect to obstacles imposed by mechanical difficulties, aircrew inexperience, and poor weather.

About 1.40 p.m. No. 55 Squadron (11 machines) successfully carried

out 2 bomb raids. 12 - 112 lb. bombs were dropped on the Railway

Station and Sidings at ZWEIBRUCKEN. 8 - 112 lb. and 8 - 25 lb.

bombs were dropped on the factories immediately West of

SAARBRUCKEN. A-A fire was accurate. All machines returned safely.

Total explosive dropped 2.400 lbs. 113

This entry, by virtue of specific figures connoting a high

degree of precision, coupled with its concise, matter-of-fact

narrative, conveys a definite, unambiguous impression of the

day's events. By contrast, extracts from the Detail Raid Report

reveal considerable improvisation underlying this 5 December

mission.

Two formations of six De Havilland 4s. each started at 1.35 and 10.40

a.m. respectively to bomb the Chemical Works at LUDWIGSHAFEN

(MANNHEIM). One machine was forced to return to its Aerodrome

owing to petrol stoppage.

Owing to a very strong wind high up the two formations took three

hours to reach a point approximately 5 miles south of

KAISERSLAUTERN. The leader then decided that it was not possible to

reach the ordered objective, as, in addition to the strength of the wind,

weather conditions became very cloudy and the Rhine Valley was seen

to be obscured by a thick mist. The two formations then turned South

West.

One formation attacked the Railway Station and Sidings at

ZWEIBRUCKEN, dropping 12-112 lb. bombs from a height of 13,500

feet. Four bursts were observed in the Town and a fifth on the

outskirts.

The Second formation attacked the Factories immediately West of

SAARBRUCKEN, dropping 8-112 lb. and 8-25 lb. bombs from a height

of 12,000 feet. Four bursts were observed in the Town and one

amongst the Railway Sidings. Two fires were also observed

immediately South of the River. 1 1 4

102
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

This excerpt from the detailed raid report differs considerably

from the condensed narrative of the war diary. The latter's

selective omissions and objective tone seriously mislead the

reader.

While the war diary implied that superior aerial coordination enabled No. 55 Squadron to successfully carry out two

bomb raids, the detailed raid report stated that bombs from

two scattered flights of homeward-bound machines fell somewhere within the city limits of two German towns. Of two

formations of DH4s, one had to abandon the mission due to

engine trouble. Strong winds and deteriorating visibility forced

the remaining aircraft to attack unbriefed targets. The formation became separated and one gaggle hit Zweibrflcken from

13,500 feet while the lead flight of DH4s bombed Saarbrficken-15 miles away-from 12,000 feet. Except for one

bomb "amongst the Railway Sidings" in Saarbrficken, all observed explosions occurred in the towns themselves. The detailed raid report, unlike the war diary, identified and assessed the impact of factors such as mechanical shortcomings

and adverse weather-information that would have been of

considerable interest to those directing the bombing campaign.

Not unexpectedly, the GHQ dispatch which appeared in

London papers the next day inflated even the war diary account.

On the afternoon of the 5th inst. two raids were carried out by our,

aeroplanes into Germany. These are the first that have been possible

for over a month owing to incessant bad weather. One raid was carried

out on the large railway junction and sidings at Zweibrucken (17 miles

east of Saarbrucken) and the other on the works at Saarbrucken.

Many direct hits were observed in both cases, and two large fires were

started. 115

According to German records available after theArmistice,

however, no bombs fell into the Burbach Works at Saarbrficken, though six townspeople were killed and nine

wounded on 5 December 1917.1"

Authorities in the town of Zweibrficken also recorded the

raid.

Dec. 5, 1917. Raid announced at 2.05 P.M. All clear signal given at

2.43 P.M. Time, 38 minutes. Total number of bombs dropped, 9; Cost

103
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

of damages, 13,743 marks The railroads were not bombed in this

town.11 7

While one accepts that news releases composed for the

home front should boost morale and that during wartime the

RFC did not enjoy access to enemy reports, these two excerpts

nevertheless highlight the disparity between public expectation and actuality.

On 6 December 1917, No. 55 Squadron again visited Saarbrficken. As on the previous day, poor weather conditions

hampered the operation and one machine returned home with

mechanical difficulties. These points were included in the detailed raid report but not in the war diary.118 The latter reported that two formations "bombed the factories and Railways in and around SAARBRUCKEN," but postwar German

records showed bursts only in the town, killing one person

and injuring four others.119

After five days of stand-down for poor weather, No. 55 flew

again on 11 December 1917. That day's entry in the war diary

included these two paragraphs:

Bomb Raid by 55 Squadron. At 1.20 p.m. on the 1 lth inst. machines

bombed the Railway Junction N.E of PIRMASENS. 12 - 112 lb. and 10

- 25 lb. bombs were dropped from a height of 13,500 feet.

At first weather conditions were good, but became very bad later and

prevented Observers from seeing the effect of their bombs.

Anti-aircraft fire was light. E.A. seen-Nil. All our machines returned

safely. 120

The detailed raid report narrative, given in full here, impeaches the impressions fostered by the War Diary.

At 11 a.m. 12 De Havilland 4s. left in two formations of 6 to bomb the

Railway Station and Factories at PIRMASENS.

The leader of No. 2 raid experienced engine trouble, and owing to his

signal not having been clearly seen, 4 other machines continued to

follow him, and returned to the Aerodrome at 12.40 p.m.

The remaining machines joined up with No. 1 raid.

The formation of 7 then proceeded to its objective, but on approaching

BITCHE, a thick bank of clouds was encountered, and the formation

proceeded along the VOSGES by compass course to the objective, but

on reaching this, it was found to be covered with clouds. There was a

gap about 3 miles to the North, through which the important railway

junction in the ERB valley could be seen, and the following bombs

104
4 IST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

were dropped from a height of 13,500 feet:-

10 112 lb. bombs

10 25 lb. bombs

It was impossible to take any photographs owing to the clouds, and

the gap was covered before the Observers could see the effect of their

bombs.

The weather conditions, which were exceptionally good at the start,

had been becoming rapidly worse, and the whole country was under

clouds when the formation returned.

All our machines returned safely. Owing to the clouds extending from

6,000 feet to 600, the formation became dispersed in descending.

Then the leader landed safely at the Aerodrome at 3 p.m.

5 machines landed in a field near MARTIGNY to await improvement in

the weather conditions. 1

2 1

This mission was considerably more hectic than the War

Diary admitted. Mechanical difficulties and aircrew inexperience conspired to cause the loss of nearly half the effective

bombing force at the onset. The formation's navigation above

the cloud layer also seems questionable, since German records indicate that no bombs fell in the vicinity of Pirmasens

on 11 December 1917.122 On their return trip, five machines

descended through fog-luckily, without any midair collisions-to force-land in open country. Only the flight commander was able to locate the home aerodrome and land

safely-after having been airborne four hours, a quarter-hour

longer than his machine's normal flight endurance. 1

2 3

Unfortunately, even the detailed raid reports exhibit the

same biases as their more widely distributed companion. This

distortion emerges when they are compared with the mission

summaries that squadrons submitted to 41st Wing. For example, the final paragraphs of the detailed raid report for 11

December (the Pirmasens raid) candidly state that all machines eventually returned safely, though five DH4s landed

elsewhere momentarily. The mission summary forwarded by

No. 55 Squadron presented a less organized chronology:

At the time of writing five machines have been located, these have all

landed near MARTIGNEY. One machine broke a vee piece of the

undercarriage on landing, the remaining machine, one of No, 2 raid

which joined No. 1 raid, force landed and crashed at GIRONCOURT.

105
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

The pilot and observer were unhurt, but the machine is probably a

"write off."

Twelve 112 lb and ten 25 lb bombs were dropped. It was impossible to

take any photographs. 124

Five bombers on this raid, landing "in a field near MARTIGNEY to await improvement in the weather conditions," (detailed raid report) actually seem to have been missing for a

considerable period. Also, only three of the five were able to

take off safely for return to base, according to the commanding officer of 55 Squadron.

In contrast to the war diary account, the 11 December mission to Pirmasens in reality turned into a salvage operation.

Five machines abandoned the raid, four unnecessarily, within

an hour of launch. The remainder of the force proceeded by

dead reckoning to a rail junction, which they bombed without

perceptible results. On the return journey, five DH4s forcelanded, unable to locate their home aerodrome in friendly,

relatively familiar territory; two of them sustained damage.

Unidentified further in Maj J. E. A. Baldwin's detailed raid

report or the squadron summary, "Martiguy" is either Martigny-les-Gerbonvaux, 25 miles southwest of Nancy, or Martigny-les-Bains, 44 miles south-southwest. This level of navigational proficiency cast doubt on their claim to have located

and bombed their assigned objective in Germany, some 65

miles from No. 55 Squadron's base area. While the detailed

raid report asserted that "All our machines returned safely,"

the squadron summary indicates that their whereabouts and

circumstances were unknown. This information concerning

41st Wing's sole daylight bombing unit warranted inclusion in

at least the detailed raid report. Luckily, the next day proved

unsuitable for service flying, which allowed the DH4 squadron

time to regroup and refit. The chain of command above wing

level remained ignorant of the extent to which weather conditions had influenced the course of the mission. The operation

held considerably less drama on official returns than it actually had.

Nor were the interests of RFC officials above wing level furthered by rigorous analyses of 41st Wing activities. They, too,

were interested in publicizing bombing successes. The classi106
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

fled "Summary of Work carried out by the Royal Flying Corps

in the field during the month of October, 1917," prepared by

Headquarters RFC for the War Cabinet, illustrates this attitude.

Besides this, raids were carried out in Germany. It is these raids

which perhaps constitute the most notable feature of the month.

The raids were carried out by three squadrons which were sent down

for this purpose to an aerodrome not far from Nancy.

The squadrons were at their new base ready for operations on the

16th October and from that date until the end of the month there was

only one really fine day in that part of the country, when it was clear

throughout the day, and besides this only one other day reported as

"favourable for operations." On the remaining days, rain, snow, haze,

mist, fog, heavy winds and banks of clouds were all experienced.

In spite of these circumstances, which could scarcely have been more

adverse, raids were carried out against the factories of Burbach (3),

those of Boos (2), on Saarbrucken Furnaces and station (2), on

Marlenbach junction, Falkenbert Station, St. Avold Station, on the

Pirmasens Boot Factory and Gas Works, and on the Volklingen Steel

Factories.

In all 11 raids were attempted, 10 were carried out successfully and

12 tons of explosives were dropped. 125

Without recourse to other documentation, one would accept

this narrative and its statistics as an authoritative account of

41st Wing's work.

Examining the 41st Wing War Diary, itself a demonstrably

incomplete record, reveals several significant points of variation with the staff summary prepared for the War Cabinet.

Forty-first Wing was officially formed on 11 October, not "16th

October," as claimed in the HQ RFC account. Instead of commencing active operations the next day, the impression fostered by the Headquarters summary, nearly a week intervened

before the first mission.

HQ RFC also asserted that "there was only one really fine

day in that part of the country" and "only one other day

reported as favourable for operations."' The war diary by contrast noted that on 29 October the weather was "bright and

fine all day," and 30 October was likewise a "bright and fine

day." At least four other days in this two-week period also

seem to have been more promising than Headquarters admit107
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

ted: the 17th and 21st each had "misty morning, clearing up

later in the day," the 19th had "fine but low clouds," and the

24th had "low clouds and rain during the day, but clearing up

towards the evening." Considering these meteorological "windows" later in the month, it seems unlikely that weather per

se during the period 11-16 October precluded active operations. The war diary merely noted that "no Service Flying"

occurred, without stating particular reasons."2 ' Headquarters

seemed to consider poor weather, a condition beyond human

control, a major contributory factor in limiting 41st Wing operations. However, its cumulative effects upon missions already underway were never analyzed and seldom mentioned.

Also of interest in the HQ RFC summary is the method of

determining the total number of raids flown or attempted during October 1917. For daylight missions, in which the machines of No. 55 Squadron sallied forth in formation to bomb a

particular target such as the Burbach Works at Saarbrficken

(17 October) or Pirmasens (30 October), each unit-sized effort

can be counted as one raid. This criterion should also apply to

night operations by the "Fees" of No. 100 Squadron or the

Handley Pages of "A" Naval Squadron, even if individual aircrews became disoriented and struck targets in the general

neighborhood of their assigned objective.

Railway attacks by No. 100 offer a case in point. On the

evening of 29/30 October, nine FE2bs were launched to bomb

the railways and buildings of Saarbrifcken. "Owing to mist six

pilots lost their bearing and returned without dropping their

bombs"; the remainder dropped 865 pounds of bombs on

Saarbrticken and 25 pounds each on St. Avold and Falkenberg, stations along the Metz-Saarbriicken rail link.12

" This

operation should count as one raid, despite the enumeration

of three targets .in official reports. Likewise, on an earlier mission by No. 100 to the same vicinity, on 24/25 October, three

aircraft bombed the Saarbrficken railway junction; five machines hit Merlenbach junction, on the line between Saarbrficken and St. Avoid; and four other crews struck trains or

stations near Willesburg, Falkenberg, St. Avold, and Homburg. Two aircraft went missing.'28 Despite the number of targets, this activity seems logically to constitute just one raid,

108
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

especially when the relatively small (approximately 300

pounds) payload of the FE2b is considered. These two efforts,

on 24/25 and 29/30 October, were No. 100 Squadron's only

visits to Saarbrficken during the month. Yet the HQ RFC

summary credits 41st Wing with one raid "on Merlenbach

junction, Falkenberg station, St. Avold station," a tabulation

that inflated the monthly mission total even as it disguised

operational difficulties.

Similarly, the war diary recorded only four visits to objectives near Saarbrficken by elements of 41st Wing. The Headquarters summary claims five attacks, three against "the factories of Burback" and two on "Saarbrucken Furnaces and

station," a generous total that also obscures the fact that the

Burbach Works and the Saarbrficken Furnaces are identical.

Such errors seem out of place in a summary prepared for the

War Cabinet.

Counting one unit-sized effort to targets in a particular area

as one raid, 41st Wing launched a total of seven completed

raids during October 1917. In the same period, Newall's force

attempted three unsuccessful missions, two by No. 55 Squadron on 19 October and one by "A" Naval to Mannheim the

night of 30/31 October, when one Handley Page went missing

in action. HQ RFC nevertheless reported to the War Cabinet

that "In all 11 raids were attempted, 10 were carried out

successfully." As controlling headquarters, Trenchard and his

RFC staff had access to other 41 st Wing operational returns in

addition to the war diary. However, the diary's abbreviated,

incomplete entries by themselves contradict the October

"Summary of Work" report and undercut its credibility.

Similar instances of inexact terminology are also apparent

in the "Summary of Work" for November 1917, during which a

daylight raid on the first of the month to Kaiserslautern constituted the sole operation of 41 st Wing.

At Ochey, in the southern area, the weather was still worse than in

the west, and during the month only one bomb raid was carried out by

12 machines of No. 55 Squadron against the works at

KAISERSLAUTERN, a distance of 100 miles from the aerodrome. Three

230 lb. bombs and six 112 lb. bombs were dropped from a height of

15,000 feet. The results were not observed owing to the clouds in

109
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

which there were only a few gaps. One hostile machine was shot to

pieces during the operation. All our machines returned safely. 129

Kaiserslautern, located some 75 miles behind the lines, contained several large iron and steel works, including four factories producing ammunition and weapon components.'3

" Newall's detailed raid report, however, indicates a less tangible

objective that day.

KAISERSLAUTERN was only seen through a small hole in the clouds,

and 3 - 230 lb. and 6 - 112 lb. bombs were dropped. Owing to the

clouds no actual bursts were observed, but the bombs undoubtedly

fell well into the Town. The moral effect should be good as the 1st

November was a Fete Day and a general holiday. 131

Despite the optimism of the 41st Wing's commanding officer, the raid inflicted very little damage of any sort. German

records reveal that only three aerial bombs fell within the city

limits that day, causing no casualties and damage totaling no

more than 100 marks.' 32 The "Summary of Work" omitted

Newall's hope that poorly aimed ordnance had moral effect,

even if results were unobserved.

HQ RFC also deleted from its report any information showing the strength and effect of German countermeasures upon

the Kaiserslautern mission, data of potential interest to Whitehall. The 41st Wing war diary had admitted that, of 12 DH4s

launched on 1 November, 'The second Raid of 6 machines did

not reach its objective owing to heavy engagement with 7 E.A.

[enemy aircraft] Scouts."'33 The detailed raid report illuminated the full extent of this misadventure. "Five pilots released

their bombs in the open country in order that they might be

better able to maneuver. The majority of these bombs fell in

the Lakes and woods near DIEUZE."134 Dieuze, over 55 miles

southwest of Kaiserslautern, was less than 10 miles over the

lines. No. 55 Squadron was turned back by enemy action

within sight of their home aerodrome.

In its November summary, HQ RFC also failed to mention

the attempted mission on the 14th, by 16 aircraft of No. 55

Squadron. After the mission had been abandoned due to poor

weather, a pilot was killed and one observer "in a flying accident over Aerodrome."135 To withhold such unpalatable information as this and the Kaiserslautern operation meant that

110
4 IST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

the War Cabinet received a seriously flawed impression of 41st

Wing and its potential, much as news releases fostered the

same views among the public.

As had been the case with No. 3 Wing and the Admiralty, all

levels in the command eventually assumed a direct, inevitable

correlation between intensity of operational effort and desired

results. Wishful thinking and selectively interpreting some of

the few available indicators while ignoring others compounded

the problem of determining progress. The absence of required

information for judging relative success encouraged this approach.

The authorities instead tended to focus upon standards of

unit performance they could influence and measure. Although

official records and summaries differ with respect to wastage,

numbers of machines, numbers of raids, and even weather

conditions, they invariably agree on the total weight of bombs

dropped on a given operation. Forty-first Wing staff recorded

total time flown daily, sometimes less than five minutes, in the

war diary.1"6 Such statistics documenting activity implied concomitant results.

Also symptomatic of this organizational confusion of means

and ends is the questionable method by which HQ RFC manipulated data in order to amass the highest possible raid

total, discussed above. Nor would any link in the chain gain

by a skeptical approach to the data it forwarded. The network

responsible for British bombing of Germany also originated

the reports, bulletins, and press releases by which the success

of the campaign would be officially and publicly ascertained.

No institutional incentive to strive for objectivity existed; the

quest would be counterproductive. The prime minister's admonition to Trenchard on 2 October 1917, subsequently underlined by the publicity afforded GHQ raid dispatches, established the necessity of reporting a successful campaign.

Following the Armistice, intelligence teams of the British

and American air services were able to determine the extent of

the material and moral injuries inflicted upon Germany by

41st Wing ordnance. Using German records, it became possible to determine the general effects of the British offensive.

Earlier, missions, machines, and bomb poundage against five

111
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

categories of strategic objectives were enumerated. These categories can now be analyzed separately to ascertain the actual,

direct damages caused by 41st Wing raids. The moral effects

of the campaign will be assessed in a subsequent chapter.

Tangible results are easier to determine, given the extent of

German documentation.

The weight of British effort was directed against iron and

steel works. At Saarbriicken, blast furnaces were mainly concentrated in the western suburb of Burbach.137 Of four attacks

(three day, one night) on these factories and foundries, only

41st Wing's initial mission, by day on 17 October 1917,

caused sufficient damage to be logged by German industrial

managers.

No. of

Raid No. Date Bombs Place and Kind of Damage

7 17/10/17 3 Fell on a siding in rear of

coke grounds-West, near a

cooling tower, and in front

of the Foundry clubhouse,

thus destroying some rails

which were torn up from the

tracks just behind the cooling tower and damaging

badly the clubhouse building and the neighboring foundry officials residences.

17,500.00 Marks' 38

The equivalent contemporary cost of industrial damages in

pounds sterling would have been approximately £ 875.1"9 Of

sixteen 112-pound aerial bombs that No. 55 Squadron aimed

at Burbach, only three landed within the works, despite aircrew reports that "eight bombs were seen to burst on the

BURBACK FACTORY."' 40 However, this raid caused other

damage totaling 53,000 marks (£ 2,650), though no civilians

were killed or injured.'4 1 This mission, the only one to hit

objectives within the Burbach Works, caused roughly three

times more damage to nonindustrial sections of Saarbrficken.

Returning aircrews from three subsequent raids on the city

also claimed to have inflicted substantial damage. Observers

112
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

in seven Handley Pages that attacked the Burbach works the

night of 24/25 October, bombing from altitudes between 400

and 1,500 feet, reported direct hits. "84 - 112 lb. bombs on

BURBACK WORKS on the Western side of SAARBRUCKEN. All

direct hits."'42

Similar claims resulted from No. 55 Squadron's daylight

attacks on 5 and 6 December 1917.

5 December 8 - 112 lb. and 8 - 25 lb. bombs were dropped in the

Factories immediately West of SAARBRUCKEN.

6 December About 1.30 p.m. No. 55 Squadron (11 machines) bombed

the Factories and Railways in and around SAARBRUCKEN. Bombs as

under were dropped from 13,000 feet:-

1 - 230 lb.

18 - 112 lb.

8 - 20 lb. Total 2,406 lbs.

Many direct hits were obtained. Fires were started in BURBACH and

ST. JOHANN Factories and also in the Railway Station. 143

Detailed raid report narratives corroborated war diary descriptions of these raids.14 4 By contrast, German industrial

records from the Burbach complex indicate that none of these

attacks hit the intended target. Instead, ordnance within

Saarbrficken itself killed 13 citizens, wounded 20, and caused

279,000 marks (9 13,950) worth of property damage.145 In a

situation that invites comparison with No. 3 Wing efforts in

the same vicinity, only the first of four attacks by 41st Wing

against the Burbach works managed to place bombs within

the industrial perimeter.

Results at other blast furnace targets on the 41st Wing

mission list were similarly disappointing. American intelligence teams learned after the Armistice that bomb damage at

Bous and Wadgassen, for the entire war period, amounted to

8,261 marks (9 413), a total that exactly matched the figures

reported by the British survey party. 4' According to the latter, "no material damage from bombs was recorded at this place"

but "anti-aircraft dropping on the office of the factory" caused

3,000 marks (9 150) in damages.' 47 The 41st Wing had attacked the two localities by day on 21 October 1917, with 11

DH4s of No. 55 Squadron dropping 2,464 pounds of bombs.' 41

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BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Of four raids on the Carl Foundry at Thionville, only the

21/22 January 1918 attack caused notable damage. German

records show that only one of 17 bombs landed near the

target area. "One bomb thrown. The bomb apparently bursted

in front of a house in the foundry street on the telephone

wires. Glass damage."' 49 The remaining 16 British bombs apparently fell well outside any built-up areas; the local authorities did not record their existence in the column "No. of

Bombs Outside Foundry Grounds."'5 '

Overall, in its campaign against enemy iron and steel

works, 41st Wing made little headway. Major Paul, the air

intelligence officer for the strategic bombing program, conducted a postwar survey of the effects of bombing German

blast furnaces. "In no case can the material results achieved

by any one single raid on a blast furnace be said to have been

very striking. Indeed, with one or two exceptions, the amount

of material damage wrought has been decidedly disappointing." "Other raids carried out on the BURBACH Works give an

average result of about 8,000 Marks, or about £ 400 per

raid."'• 1

Major Paul's survey parties also conducted extensive interviews of plant managers. The opinions of these industrial executives proved to be consistent with Paul's conclusions.

Generally speaking, the Directors did not attach much importance to

air raids.

They were ready to admit the justifiability of bombing from a military

point of view, but condemned the Allies' principle of attacking

workmen's colonies.

With few exceptions, the Directors asserted that the material damage

had been insignificant and had not affected the war one way or the

other. Such damage had invariably been repaired at once without any

difficulty, and in very few cases had any stoppage of work resulted.

Our shooting, they considered, was very erratic both by day and night.

They were anxious to know what portion of the Works was aimed at;

the vital points, the buildings, the workmen's cottages or the Works as

a whole.'52

In a dozen day and night attacks, British aircrews flying 70

machines claimed to have dropped 26,553 pounds of bombs

(20,027 pounds by night) on enemy blast furnaces. This un114
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

dertaking represented 44.5 percent of the total bomb poundage delivered by 41st Wing between October 1917 and January 1918. In the considered opinions of air intelligence teams

and German officials, material results were incommensurate

with effort.

Nor did material results at German munitions and chemical

works entirely fulfill British expectations. Although aircrew

reports habitually refer to "Mannheim," their objectives, the

enormous "Badische Aniline und Soda Fabrik" (BASF) complex and its annex at Oppau, were in fact located across the

river in Ludwigshafen. Throughout the war, the Germans

made every effort to keep these works amply supplied with

raw materials, especially coal, "of which 1700 tons were used

daily."'53 Investigators noted that "the buildings of these two

Works are of the most massive type. The walls of some are

three feet thick.""5 4 In two attacks, by day on 24 December

1917 and on the night of 24/25 January 1918, 41st Wing

aircrews were unable to drop any ordnance within the

grounds of the BASF or Oppau factories.1' 5 Aircrews, however,

reported numerous observed bursts inside the industrial perimeters on both missions.156 American investigators were told

by local authorities that Ludwigshafen proper had incurred

damage from 41st Wing raids on the two occasions.

Dec. 24, 1917 Raid lasted from 12.50 A.M. to 1.20

A.M. 2 bombs were dropped in this

city, the balance in Mannheim.

Jan. 2, 1918 Raid lasted from 9.00 P.M. to 9.45

P.M. 3 bombs were dropped. One

bomb fell between Ludwigshafen

and Mannheim, damaging the telephone line which was repaired at a

cost of 42.84 Marks (approximately

£ 2). 157

At Kaiserslautern, after the 1 November 1917 raid, in which

enemy action turned back half the attacking force of 12 DH4s,

all military and industrial objectives survived untouched.

Bomb damage to civilian and municipal property amounted to

just 100 marks (9 5).*15 German authorities refused permis115
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

sion for British and American survey teams to enter

Karlsruhe, south of the "bridgeheads" of the Allied occupation

zone. Records of air raids on that city do not include the 41st

Wing day mission of 14 January 1918.159

Newall's force attacked enemy munitions and chemical targets on four occasions, with 29 machines dropping 7,710

pounds of bombs (6,366 pounds by No. 55 Squadron in daylight). At the BASF and Oppau works in Ludwigshafen and at

Kaiserslautern, the attacks did absolutely no damage of strategic significance. At Karlsruhe, lack of evidence precluded

definite conclusion.

Forty-first Wing directed over half its operational efforts

(57.4 percent of bomb poundage, 53.5 percent of sorties)

against blast furnaces and chemical/munition centers, two

categories of particular interest to the War Cabinet. Actual

results proved to be disappointing at best, far less than the

estimates in wartime evaluations and public releases.

With respect to 41st Wing attacks on the German railway

system, little data on specific targets is available. Railroad

targets, the favorite objective of night-flying "Fees" of No. 100

Squadron, accounted for 33 percent of the totals of bombs

dropped and sorties flown. 'The results of the bombing of

stations have been consistently moderate. On rare occasions

only can they be said to have [been] really satisfactory .... a

certain amount of success was achieved, but not so much as

might have been hoped." "Unfortunately, there is nothing on

record to show what the effects of bombs would have been on

railway bridges. Judging by the effects of bombs on solid

buildings, it is doubtful whether much damage would have

been done by any bomb of less weight than 1650 lb."160 One

must remember that, in this extract, Major Paul was summarizing the cumulative effects of the entire British campaign of

strategic bombardment between October 1917 and the Armistice. The 1,650-pound aerial bomb did not reach active service until October 1918; fewer than a dozen were dropped on

Germany before the end of hostilities.' 6'

Available information on a limited number of rail objectives

tends to support Paul's conclusions. German records indicate

that St. Avold and Bensdorf stations, reported by 41st Wing to

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41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

have been bombed on the nights of 24/25 and 29/30 October

1917 and again on 16/17 and 21/22 January 1918, in fact

sustained no damage of any sort on those dates.'62 At Zweibrticken, bombed on 5 December 1917 by one of two DH4

formations forced by weather to divert from Mannheim, British aircrews reported that at least 12 bombs hit "the Railway

Station and Sidings."'63 Local records show only that nine

bombs caused 13,743 marks' (9 687) worth of damage to civilian property within the town that day."64 In fact, railways in

the vicinity of Zweibrficken were never hit by Allied bombs.'65

According to the 41st Wing war diary, 16 bombs "were

dropped on the Factories immediately West of SAARBRUCKEN" (also hit on 5 December 1917 as a weather-divert

target).166 German records available to the British survey team

listed different results. "SAARBRUCKEN was attacked at 2.25

p.m. on Dec. 5th, 1917. About 11 bombs were dropped. A

house and drug store were seriously damaged. Two bombs fell

near a repair shop in SAARBRUCKEN Station, damaging telegraph and telephone wire."'67 Local authorities, basing their

opinion on the damage inflicted, concluded that British planes

had been trying to hit railways rather than blast furnaces at

Burbach. These examples of 41 st Wing rail attacks seem to be

typical for the period October 1917.-January 1918. Frequently,

night bombing tactics employed by No. 100 Squadron scattered ordnance in the vicinity of several stations without significantly disrupting rail traffic.

This geographical separation of railway targets attacked on

a single night also suggests that Newall's force did not seriously attempt a sustained, systematic offensive against them.

Despite assurances given by the French, by Haig, and by the

War Cabinet, 41st Wing never cooperated to any noticeable

extent in French bombing plans. The British consequently

bombed on an ad hoc basis.

The consensus of opinion of our bombing by the German officials is

summed up in the word "annoying." Judging from observations and

conversations with German officials, this statement is neither an

exaggeration nor an underestimate.

They considered our shooting was moderate, but pointed out that it

varied very much. As regards the stoppage and dislocation of traffic,

117
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

they maintained that damage had never been so great as to entirely

isolate a station for a period of long duration.

They stated that attacks on trains running on open lines between

stations had been frequent, but this was outside their own experience

and they professed not to know what effect it had.168

Opportunities rather than firm priorities appeared to govern

the actual targets of 41st Wing night-bombing aircrews, particularly when weather or inexperience made navigation difficult.

Three missions, the Pirmasens attack of 30 October 1917

and the night and day raids on Treves on 24/25 and 27

January 1918, merit comment. They exemplify the disparity

that existed, even under good conditions, between aircrew observations and the actual effects of bombing.

Major Baldwin, commander of No. 55 Squadron's raid on

the tanning factories at Pirmasens on 30 October, a "bright

and fine day," reported on the mission.

Two machines were damaged by A.A. fire which was more accurate

although not so heavy as usual. Observers in the first raid saw at least

two bursts in the centre of town close to factory No. 4, besides at least

six others in the town and outskirts .... Capt Stevens M.C. saw the

smoke rising from what he thought was fire at or near No. 4.... Lt

Mackay, Lt Marshall's observer, saw two bursts on railway sidings,

bracketing railway station, one burst on or near gas works near

factory No. 4 and claims they were his own bombs. 2/Lt Castle also

confirms one burst on factory and one on or near gas works. The

remaining bursts were seen in the outskirts to the northern end of the

town. 1

69

Captain Paul's intelligence report for this mission reiterated

these observations and noted that "No E.A. (enemy aircraft)

seen throughout operation."'70 At 41st Wing headquarters, Newall scribbled "Good effort" across Baldwin's summary and

forwarded its details up the chain of command. The next

morning, The Times printed the GHQ dispatch: 'This morning,

at 11 a.m., 12 of our machines went further afield, and attacked the munitions works and gasworks at Pirmasens, 20

miles beyond Saarbrucken. Bombs were seen to burst in the

factories and on the gasworks, with excellent results."'7 ' Since

other periodicals also reprinted the dispatch, with "munitions

works" rather than "boot factories" as the target, it is likely

118
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

that Haig's headquarters was responsible for the original error. 

172

After the war, the British survey team visited Pirmasens. On

the 30 October 1917 mission, when neither enemy aircraft nor

appreciable antiaircraft fire was present over the target, aircrew observers emphatically claimed at least eight hits within

the city limits, two in the center of town and others near the

railway gas works. In contrast, German bomb-plot diagrams

show two distinct bomb patterns that particular day, one a

mile southwest of town and the other scattered across the

outskirts and fields northwest of the city. No bombs fell in the

vicinity of the factories and gas works. American investigators

in Pirmasens learned also that on 30 October 1917, only nine

of 20 dropped bombs had detonated; one person was killed. 17 3

Unlike the Pirmasens operation, which took place on one of

the best flying days of the period, deteriorating meteorological

conditions influenced two 41st Wing raids on Treves. In the

first attack, 16 FE2bs of No. 100 Squadron took off at 5 P.M.

on 24 January 1918 to bomb Treves barracks and railway

station, as well as targets at Thionville. Engine trouble forced

five machines to abort, but four "Fees" persisted to claim these

results at Treves, a city of 50,000: "Very good bursts being

observed in the Northern portion and in the centre of Town,

and a very large fire being caused in the N.E. comer of the

Town, which was observed later by other pilots." 174

Three days later, two formations of six DH4s from No. 55

Squadron attacked Treves. Weather dictated the conduct of

the raid.

Although the sky was quite clear, the ground was obscured by a very

thick mist practically the whole way. In consequence both formations

passed the objective and flew about 15 miles North of it where there

was a gap in the clouds, in order to ascertain their whereabouts. On

returning the first formation passed over the objective and recognized

it by the River showing up through the mist. They dropped 1 - 230 lb.

and 8 - 112 lb. bombs, but could not observe the bursts as the mist

was so thick. Only one pilot of the second formation was able to

recognize the target, and he dropped 1 - 230 lb. bomb, the effects of

which were also unobserved, although he caught a glimpse of the

target for a very short period.

119
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

The first formation returned to the Aerodrome at 2.5 p.m. and the

second at 2.10 p.m., having encountered no E.A., and only

experiencing slight A.A. fire on crossing the lines.

9 photographs were exposed which, however, were useless owing to

the mist.

Total bombs dropped:

2 - 230 lb

8 - 112 lb =TOTAL 1,365 Ibs.175

The US Bombing Survey, however, reported different results

from these two raids. German records failed to support the

wartime reports:

German records of these two attacks differ from the wartime reports

submitted by 41st Wing. Jan. 24, 1918. Raid lasted from 7.35 P.M. to

8.35 P.M. 2 bombs fell in village of Seyen, just outside of Trier,

damaging fourteen houses and buildings, on which claims of

406.55M. about 20 were paid, of which amount 180M. was paid by

insurance companies. 1 man failed to report damage.

Jan. 27, 1918. There was no raid on Trier this day but anti-aircraft

fire damaged property of 46 people, on which claims to the extent of

994.56M. approximately 50 were paid, of which 917.35M. was paid by

insurance companies. 34 people who carried insurance failed to report

damage. '

7 6

The mayor of Ehrang, a town four miles north of Treves,

noted that at 1 P.M. on 27 January, "one bomb fell close to

the Russian prison camp but did no damage."'7 7 This projectile

probably belonged to the only pilot in the second formation to

bomb on that day; besides their proximity, Ehrang and Treves

lie in the Moselle valley, with little to distinguish between

them from the air.

Thus, under weather conditions varying from unlimited visibility to solid overcast, 41st Wing aircrews experienced difficulties in hitting targets smaller than a large town. This inability to bomb accurately, even when the proper objective had

been reached, plagued the British force throughout the war.

The question of accuracy has generally been investigated in

terms of apparatus rather than attitude. Considerable investigation has been done concerning different designs and tolerances of the mechanical and optical bombsights of the period.

Neville Jones devoted several sections of The Origins of Strategic Bombing to the development, description, and operation of

120
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

the Central Flying School (CFS) 4B bombsight, the Wimperis

"drift" sight, and the negative lens sight, all used by 41st Wing

or their successors. 

178

These various instruments represented different approaches

to the problem of accuracy in bombing under operating conditions. Less technically, in First of Many, Alan Morris asserts

that planners "knew" that bombs salvoed from a formation at

1,500 feet had a circular error probable (CEP) of 308 yards

radius on the ground. Similarly, "toggling" bombs individually

yielded a CEP of 425 yards.'7 9 Both analyses assume that the

degree of accuracy is imposed by design limitations of the

bombsight.

However, aircrew accounts-quite apart from evidence on

German bomb-plot diagrams-reveal that pilots and observers

developed their own techniques for bomb-aiming. In a paper

prepared for the first course at the new Royal Air Force Staff

College at Cranwell, Wing Commander Baldwin, who commanded No. 55 Squadron and succeeded Newall as commanding officer of 41st Wing in early 1918, said of bomb-aiming:

Simplicity in operation allied to reasonable accuracy is what is needed

in a two-seater bomber. In the last war the mirror sight was by far the

most useful and most popular. Even with this simple sight, pilots

worked out still simpler methods of their own. For example, it was

found that bombing down wind on a DH4 at a target such as a

munition factory, if one released the bombs as the centre of the target

disappeared under the leading edge of the bottom plane in line with

the port inside bay strut, this coincided with the moment when the

target appeared on the intersection of the wires of your mirror sight. 1o

Baldwin's approach to the problem enjoys the virtue of extreme simplicity; his narrative hints that other pilots evolved

their own solutions, undoubtedly of comparable accuracy, to

the bombing problem. Lt William Armstrong, a DH9A pilot in

No. 110 Squadron of the long-range bombing force, expressed

another common view of available bombsights.

Fellows who had been overseas told me they never used their

bomb-sights. And if my own experience counted for anything, they

were a waste of money. There were two kinds; the Farnsborough

model and the Aldis. The former was a simple thing of wires and a

spirit level. The Aldis was more complicated and had a large lens in

the aircraft floor. "It's no good," one of the men from France told me:

"all we used it for was to look through and be sure our bombs had

121
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

gone." And I am afraid that it came in for no more use than

this-anyway, so far as my own squadron was concerned. 18 1

A natural reluctance on the part of aircrews over enemy

territory to concentrate their attention on any device inside

the cockpit for more than a second or two obviated efficient

use of any bombsight. The wide cockpit separation of the DH4

made timely coordination difficult even for conscientious pilots

and observers. At night, reduced visibility generally offset the

advantages of lower bombing altitudes. Targets from almost

any height seem to be "impossible to miss." In the light of

such attitudes and tactical constraints, it seems pointless to

debate the technical merits of various bombsights.

Major Paul also investigated this matter of bombing accuracy under combat conditions in the final volume of his bombing survey. Considering the British campaign from October

1917 to November 1918, he advanced four hypotheses to account for the poor aiming demonstrated by bomber aircrews.

It is submitted that shooting, in so far as it was moderate, chiefly

owed its failure, in the case of day squadrons, to the high altitude and,

on occasion, to the heavy barrages put us by the enemy over vital

points. But the following causes may, perhaps, have also contributed

in a small degree towards making shooting less accurate than it might

have been:

Lack of interest on the part of many pilots since they were not

expected to aim independently when flying in formation.

Failure on the part of some squadron commanders and flight

commanders to grasp the importance of military, as apart from

material, damage.

In the case of night pilots it would appear, judging by results, that

there was a tendency at times to drop an odd bomb or two on

objectives of their own choosing. The night pilot has a considerable

advantage in altitude over the day pilot and, if visibility is good, can

probably pick out his objective with reasonable certainty; but this

advantage is entirely neutralized if, as happens on rare occasions, he

elects to aim at a theatre, or even at a cathedral, in preference to a

railway station or munition factory. 1

82

In his postwar lecture to the Royal United Services Institute,

Air Commodore Brooke-Popham also addressed the matter of

bombing performance. His explication, also spanning the en122
4 1ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

tire period of British strategic bombing, suggested several factors indicative of training deficiencies.

I should like to say one or two words about bombing. The first point is

that during the war, we really never got going with bombing on an

extensive scale, partly for lack of suitable bombs, but chiefly owing to

want of suitable machines. In addition to this, the bombs were not

always dropped in the most effective manner, partly owing to a lack of

time for training pilots and observers in the use of bomb sights, and

partly because the ground personnel were not sufficiently trained in

the handling of bombs, with the result that quite a large portion of

them were badly assembled as regards their detonating components

and failed to explode when dropped. Another reason was the lack of

military training of pilots and observers. This may seem rather far

fetched, but the effect was that they did not appreciate in many cases

the military significance of their particular mission, and were inclined

to drop their bombs on some neighbouring and more attractive target,

failing to realize its comparative unimportance compared to that of

their original objective. 183

Major Paul enumerated four shortcomings, each related to

the lack of training which Brooke-Popham blamed for mediocre bombing results during the war. Paul's "lack of confidence"

in bombsights and "lack of interest" in accuracy are the operational manifestations of the organizational "lack of time for

training pilots and observers" to which Brooke-Popham attributed such moderate results. Similarly, Brooke-Popham's second hypothesis, "the lack of military training of pilots and

observers," is congruent with Paul's complaint that aircrew

failed to "grasp the importance of military, as apart from material, damage." Finally, both comment at length on the tendency for aircrews to select their own targets despite having

assigned objectives. Significantly, Brooke-Popham referred to

lack of time, rather than lack of resources or techniques, as

the major constraint in instructing students in the skills and

attitudes required for active operations. The difference between Paul's and Brooke-Popham's assessments lies primarily

in their respective operational and organizational orientations;

they agree that aircrews were insufficiently trained for the

demands of active service flying.

In this regard, the policies of the Royal Flying Corps must

bear most of the responsibility. The offensive philosophy

meant the steady influx of replacements would be ill-prepared

123
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

for the demands of combat operations. Eventually, the vicious

cycle developed: casualties replaced by inexperienced crews

who became casualties. There wasn't enough time to train

aircrews to survivable standards. In the field, the consequences of the offensive policy meant that squadrons received

new pilots and observers lacking the tactical skill or organizational motivation to do a first-rate job consistently.

In mitigation, one must acknowledge that the political and

military chain of command responsible for long-range bombardment never clarified the goals of the campaign for the

commanders in the field. Despite Paul's and Brooke-Popham's

complaints that aircrew often ignored assigned targets, no

firm priorities or target lists were ever formulated, despite the

French example. This confusion, as well as the impetus to

present 41st Wing operations as indubitable successes, originated with the War Cabinet and Lloyd George.

The lack of required indicators for evaluating the campaign's progress, plus the pressure to report only victories,

reinforced the habit of selectively interpreting what little information about bombing results was available. Trenchard at HQ

RFC seemed particularly susceptible to optimism. As with No.

3 Wing, ambiguity and frustration encouraged all levels of

command to assume that bombing effects, though unknown,

could be estimated by the intensity of operational activity.

Hours flown, sorties launched, and bombs dropped were accepted as proof of worthwhile results. Very little indication to

the contrary existed, and no one in the chain of command had

anything to gain by adopting a skeptical stance.

This state of affairs eventually created an inflated expectation of the potential for strategic bombing. The purported

achievements of 41st Wing were widely publicized, with political approval. More significantly, official reports were edited to

convey the same impression to those responsible for supervising the bombing campaign. Whitehall developed an unwarranted confidence in the strategic efficacy of 41st Wing, as did

the British public. These high hopes would make it increasingly difficult in the future to reevaluate the concept of longrange bombardment as a significant or decisive weapon. The

124
4 IST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

air authorities in particular would find it extremely difficult to

examine their own wartime data critically.

Notes

1. H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in

the Great War by the Royal Air Force, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1937), 165.

2. Andrew P. Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962), 227-28.

3. Public Records Office (PRO), Air Ministry Records (AIR)

1/678/21/13/2102, Trenchard to Air Policy Committee, 28 November

1917.

4. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6, 172.

5. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the

Development of British Air Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918

(London: Eimber, 1973), 147.

6. Ibid., note 28, 227. N. Jones bases his opinion upon AIR 8/167,

"Private Interview with Lord Trenchard. Dictated Notes by H. A. Jones, 11

April 1934."

7. Ibid., 147-48; and Boyle, 227-28.

8. Cyril Falls, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917 (London:

Macmillian and Co., 1940-48), 504-5; and Brian Bond, War and Society in

Europe, 1870-1970 (Bungay, England: Richard Clay, 1984), 123-24.

9. N. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, 148-49.

10. Oddly, this Final Dispatch of 1 January 1919 did not appear in the

appendices volume of the official history. H. A. Jones quoted from it

selectively in War in the Air, vol. 6, 135-37. For its full text, see Aeroplane, 8

January 1919, 129-31.

11. AIR 1/1649/204/95/6, file, "Organisation Correspondence, VIII

Brigade, October 1917-December 1918," letter to HQ, RFC (CRFC

1937/55Q), 6 October 1917.

12. Ibid.

13. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, Newall Papers, B392; and Maurice

Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, 1914-1918 (London: Bell, 1920), 255.

14. War Diary of Eighth Brigade; and Baring, 255.

15. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 15 and 29 October 1917; and Baring,

255.

16. AIR 1/1649/204/95/6, Trenchard to Haig, 13 November 1917.

17. US Air Service aerodromes occupied mainly the Toul-Verdun rear

areas. Maurer Maurer, ed., The U.S. Air Service in World War I, vol. 1, The

Final Report and a Tactical History (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], AIa.: Air

Force Historical Research Agency [AFHRA], 1978), 29-32.

18. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 29 November and 4 December 1917.

19. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, November-December 1917.

20. PRO, AIR 1/1649/204/95/6, Trenchard to Haig, 4 December 1917;

and A. R. Kingsford, Night Raiders of the Air: Being the Experience of a Night

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BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Flying Pilot Who Raided Hunland on Many Dark Nights during the War

(London: Hamilton, 1930), 103, describes Ochey airfield as it appeared in

the winter of 1917-18. Ochey is presently a large French air base.

21. Leonard Miller, The Chronicles of 55 Squadron, R.F.C. and R.A.F.

(London: Unwin, 1919), 59.

22. AIR 1/1649/204/95/6, Trenchard to Haig, 4 December 1917.

23. Ibid., Trenchard to QMG, GHQ, 26 December 1917.

24. Maurer Maurer, ed., The U.S. Air Service in World War I, vol. 2, Early

Concepts of Military Aviation (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 1978), 141.

25. Ibid., 151. Colonel Gorrell fondly hoped that America could "take the

initiative in bringing about such a coordination" for Joint bombing program.

26. In Gorrell's "Early History of the Strategical Section," in "History of

the Air Service, AEF" (the so-called "Gorrell History" comprising 280

volumes), B-6, 371-401, January 1919. Reprinted in Maurer, Early

Concepts of Military Aviation, 152.

27. Ibid.

28. Gorrell's initial proposals for the American bombing program drew

heavily upon British estimates of German industrial vulnerabilities. See

Maurer, Early Concepts of Military Aviation, 143, 145.

29. Ibid. This personnel policy for aviation units was the antithesis of

Pershing's doctrinal refusals to permit piecemeal infusion of American

soldiers into understrength Allied armies as replacements for British and

French casualties.

30. Numerous American aviators gained their experience with RFC and

RAF squadrons before returning to the US Air Service. One, Capt. Charles

L. Heater, transferred from No. 55 Squadron, RAF to the American 11th

Aero Squadron to replace its commander, who had been lost on operations

on 18 September 1918. See The U.S. Air Service in World War I, vol.4,

Postwar Review, ed. Maurer Maurer (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 1979), 94;

and Miller, 77.

31. Maurer, Early Concepts of Military Aviation, 153.

32. Baring, 262.

33. Ibid., 272.

34. Trenchard, Final Dispatch, 1 January 1919.

35. '•The Independent Force," Draft of R.A.F. Staff College lecture, sent to

Brig-Gen C. L. N. Newall by Brooke-Popham, November 1923, Newall Papers

(B405), Royal Air Force Museum (RAFM), Hendon, England, 3.

36. PRO, AIR 1/2085/207/5/1, bound volume "I.F. H.Q. Communiques,

June-November 1918," has map of aerodrome areas in 1:600,000 scale,

dated 20 September 1918, apparently used by staff for planning purposes.

Tactical Pilotage Charts (TPC) E-2C and E-2D (1:500,000), Director of

Military Survey, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, Her Majesty's

Stationery Office (HMSO), 1979, have topographical information based on

500-ft contour intervals for the region. See "Carte Topographique" No. 23,

"Nancy, Bar-le-Duc" (1:100,000), Institut Geographique National (Paris),

1981, for area details based on 10-m. contour intervals. In May 1984 a

126
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

first-hand ground and aerial reconnaissance of the aerodrome area

confirmed the conclusions of map study.

37. Ibid.

38. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, Newall Papers, B392; and Philip J. R.

Moyes, Bomber Squadrons of the R.A.F. and their Aircraft (London:

Macdonald, 1964).

39. Bruce Robertson, The Army and Aviations: A Pictorial History

(London: Cassell, 1978), 18.

40. Ibid.

41. Miller, 61, 92-93, gives aviators' opinions of these nonflying

technicians.

42. C. Gordon Burge, Annals of 100 Squadron (London: Herbert Reach,

1919), 9; and W.R. Read Papers, private diary no. 7, entry for 2 September

1918, London: Imperial War Museum (IWM), 82/76/2.

43. W. R. Read Papers, 2 September 1918, IWM, 72/76/2.

44. J. E. A. Baldwin, "Experiences of Bombing with the Independent

Force in 1918," in A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of

Officers Attending the First Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College,

1922-1923 (London: HMSO, Air Ministry, December 1923), 2-5, details

these tactical responsibilities.

45. J. M. Bruce, The Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing)

(London: Putnam, 1982), 49-61; and W. M. Lamberton, Reconnaissance and

Bomber Aircraft of the 1914-1918 War (Warwick, England: Warwick

Printing, 1962), 36-37.

46. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, Appendix 27, between 130-31; and

Baldwin, 3.

47. George E. A. Reinburg (Commanding Officer [CO], 2d Day

Bombardment Group, US Air Service), "Lessons Learned," in Maurer, Early

Concepts of Military Aviation, 87.

48. Lamberton, 13.

49. Ibid.

50. Baldwin, 2-5.

51. War Diary of the Eighth Brigade, entry for mission to Pirmasens, 11

December 1917, Newall Papers, B392. Attacking force consequently

diminished from 12 aircraft to seven.

52. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, Newall Papers, B392; Kingsford; and

Burge.

53. Bruce, 414.

54. Ibid.

55. Lamberton, 64.

56. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, Appendix 27, 30-31.

57. Kingsford, 212.

58. Miller, 19.

59. Ibid., 117.

60. Burge, 50, 57.

61. Kingsford, 105, 122.

127
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

62. Ibid., 211-13.

63. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 11-17 October 1917.

64. No reliable, comprehensive operational summary exists for 41st

Wing activities. Data were compiled from a number of sources: R.A.F.

Hendon, B392 (Newall Papers), War Diary of Eighth Brigade; B393 (Newall

Papers), Detailed Raid Reports Submitted by Eighth Brigade R,C/RAF to

Independent Force Headquarters on Bombing Operations, October

1917-June 1918. Some of the latter are also in PRO AIR

1/2266/209/70/26, Reports of Bombing Operations of Ochey Squadrons.

See also AIR 1/1986/204/273/111, Intelligence Reports of Raids before 15

June 1918, Maj H. W. M. Paul (41st Wing, RFC) to Air Ministry; AIR

1/2085/207/5/3, Approximate Results, 41st Wing, RAF 17 October

1917-11 November 1918. Data from logbooks, diaries, and memoirs of

aircrew also provided useful cross-checks.

65. Take-off and landing times are in AIR 1/2085/207/5/3,

Approximate Results.

66. Detailed Raid Report for 1 November 1917, Newall Papers, B393.

67. "Report by Captain Lambe after Visit to "A" Naval Squadron at

Ochey," 31 October 1917, PRO, AIR 1/640.

68. W. R. Read Papers, unpublished autobiography, IWM, 72/76/1, 38;

W. R. Read Papers, private diary no. 7, entries for 17, 23, August 1918,

IWM, 72/76/2; E. D. Hardings et. al., History of Number 16 Squadron

(known as "A" Naval Squadron) Royal Naval Air Service Renumbered 216

Squadron Independent Force, Royal Air Force (London: H. W. Hill & Son,

1923), Appendix C, 65; and in draft at PR; and AIR 1/184/15/219/1.

69. Denis Winter, The First of the Few: Fighter Pilots of the First World

War (London: Allen Lane, 1982), 36.

70. Mason M. Patrick, "Final Report of Chief of Air Service, A.E.F.," Air

Service Information Circular (Aviation) 2, no. 180 (15 February 1921).

Reprinted in Postwar Review, ed. Maurer Maurer, 110.

71. Wilkins Papers, flying log book no. 2, 5 December 1917-February

1919, IWM, P394.

72. Aeroplane Diary, 1918, miscellaneous box 34, item 616, IWM,

contains daily tally of replacement machines shipped oversees.

73. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6, 92.

74. Robertson, 23.

75. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, vol. 6, 91.

76. H. R. Brooke-Popham, "The Air Force," Journal of the Royal United

Services Institute (JRUSI), February 1920, 49.

77. Alan Morris, First of the Many: The Story of the Independent Force,

RAF (London: Jarrolds, 1968), 168-69.

78. Burge, 182-84.

79. Morris, 169.

80. PRO, AIR 1/1972/204/273/1, "Casualty Statistics, June-November

1918," IF Form No. A-8.

128
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

81. B. E. Sutton, "Some Aspects of the Work of the Royal Air Force with

the B.E.F. in 1918," JRUSI 67, no. 46 (May 1922): 344.

82. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, B392.

83. B. E. Smythies, "Experiences during the War, 1914-1918," in A

Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of Officers Attending the First

Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College, 1922-1923 (London: HMSO, Air

Ministry, December 1923), 89.

84. James Clay Thompson, Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and

Program Failures (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1980), 95.

85. Robert B. Rhoads, "Lessons Learned," in Postwar Review, ed.

Maurer Maurer, 219: and Smythies, 88, complain that the tendency to

exaggerate in post-mission reports was widespread.

86. Private diary no. 7, entry for 23 August 1918, IWM, 72/76/2.

87. Ibid., entries for 16 September and 5 October 1918; and W. R. Read

Papers, unpublished autobiography, IWM, 72/76/1, 33, 28-40.

88. Last aircraft serviceability data is in Approximate Results dated 17

January 1918.

89. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, entry of 17 October 1917, B392.

90. Times, 18 October 1917, 6; and Flight, 25 October 1917, 1120. The

Times article noted that this was the first time in the war "on which the

objective in a raid into Germany has been specifically identified in the

reports of General Headquarters."

91. PRO, AiR 1/1986/204/273/111, "Further details of bombing raid

on BURBACH WORKS and SAARBRUCKEN carried out by No. 55

Squadron, R.F.C. 17/10/17," Capt H. W. M. Paul, 19 October 1917.

92. Times, 22 October 1917, 8; 31 October 1917, 6; 1 November 1917,

6; 2 November 1917, 6; 26 December 1917, 6-7; 15 January 1918, 6-7;

Flight, 25 October 1917, 1120; 8 November 1917, 1181; 13 December 1917,

1323; 3 January 1918, 21; and 24 January 1918, 107.

93. Times and Flight, dates cited.

94. Flight, 1 November 1917, 1148, reprinted GHQ Dispatches of 25 and

26 October 1917 on the Saarbrucken raid; 3 January 1918 issue, 21-22,

reprinted GHQ and War Office reports of 24 and 29 December, respectively.

95. Flight, 3 January 1918, 21-22.

96. Ibid, 13; War Diary of Eighth Brigade entry of 24 December 1917,

B392, lists aircrew losses.

97. Times, October 1917-January 1918. GHQ dispatches were generally

released between 9:30 and 11:30 P.M. on the day of the raid.

98. Miller, 48, reprints excerpt from French news article that appeared

on 18 October 1917, giving details of 41st Wing's mission to Saarbrficken

the day before.

99. Times, 18 October 1917, 6.

100. Ibid.; 26 December 1917; and 15 January 1918, 6-7.

101. "Oberbillig" in Times, 26 January 1918, 6; and Flight, 31 January

1918, 133, versus "Oberbilig" In 41st Wing War Diary, 24 January 1918;

"Munitions works" in Times, 31 October 1917, 6; and Flight, 8 November

129
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

1917, 1181, versus "tanning industries" in 41st Wing War Diary, 30

October 1917.

102. PRO, AIR 1/1649/204/95/6, Robertson, CIGS, War Office to Haig,

letter, 27 October 1917.

103. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, B393, preprinted instructions on each

sheet of form.

104. AIR 1/2266/209/70/26, file, "Reports of Bombing Operations of

Ochey Squadrons, Nancy area," correspondence on Kaiserslautern raid, 1

November 1917, shows this routing.

105. Ibid.; Trenchard at HQ RFC to Newall, letters, 29 and 30 October

1917.

106. Detailed Raid Reports, copy no. 2., 26 June 1918, Newall Papers,

B393.

107. AIR 1/1968/204/273/111, "Intelligence Reports of Bombing Raids

on German Towns, Aerodromes, etc. Raids before 15th June 1918," Maj H.

W. M. Paul.

108. Ibid., "Further Details," Capt H. W. M. Paul, 19 October 1917.

109. Ibid.; PRO, AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, "AIr Ministry Office Memos

Issued Periodically by Secretary Air Ministry." Memo No. 37 has

organizational chart with names, duties, room, and telephone numbers for

the various directorates.

110. Bodleian Library, Oxford, "Summary of Air Intelligence," with

Supplements (London: HMSO, Air Ministry, 1918), serials 1-8.

111. AIR 1/2085/207/5/3, "Approximate Results, 41st Wing, R.A.F., 17

October 1917-11 November 1918."

112. Ibid. Report dated 12/13 April contains distribution list. For

corrections, see Report of 24/25 March 1918.

113. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 5 December 1917, B392.

114. Detailed Raid Report, 5 December 1917, Newall Papers, 393.

115. Times, 6 December 1917, 6; and Flight, 13 December 1917, 1323.

116. "U.S. Bombing Survey," in Postwar Review, ed. Maurer Maurer.

Hereafter cited as US Bombing Survey.

117. Ibid., 454.

118. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, Newall Papers, B392; and Detailed

Raid Report, 6 December 1917, Newall Papers, B393 entries. Hereafter cited

as Detailed Raid Report.

119. US Bombing Survey, 438-39.

120. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 11 December 1917, Newall Papers,

B392.

121. Detailed Raid Report, II December 1917.

122. US Bombing Survey, 455-56; and AIR 1/1998/204/273/266,

"Reports as to the Effect of Various Types of Bombs on Buildings, Streets,

etc., and General Conclusion," Maj H. W. M. Paul, 26 February 1919.

123. H. A. Jones, War in the Air, Appendix 27, between 30-31.

124. Detailed Raid Report, Capt. A. Gray, commanding No. 55

Squadron, to Headquarters, 41st Wing, 11 December 1917.

130
41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS

125. AIR 1/2266/209/70/26, "Summary of Work Carried out by the

Royal Flying Corps in the Field during the Month of October 1917," HQ RFC

to the War Cabinet, 5 November 1917.

126. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, entries for October 1917.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid., 24 October 1917.

129. AIR 1/2266/209/209/70/26, "Summary of Work Carried out by

the Royal Flying Corps in the Field during the Month of November 1917,"

HQ RFC to the War Cabinet, 4 December 1917.

130. US Bombing Survey, 457-59.

131. Detailed Raid Report, 2 November 1917.

132. US Bombing Survey, 456.

133. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 1 November 1917.

134. Detailed Raid Report, 2 November 1917.

135. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 14 November 1917.

136. Ibid., 31 October 1917.

137. US Bombing Survey, 437.

138. Ibid., 439.

139. AIR 1/1999/204/273/269, "Report on the Effects of Bombing

German Blast Furnaces," Maj H. W. M. Paul, 26 February 1919.

140. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 17 October 1917.

141. US Bombing Survey, 438.

142. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 24 October 1917.

143. Ibid., 5 and 6 December 1917.

144. Detailed Raid Reports. 5 and 6 December 1917.

145. US Bombing Survey, 438-39.

146. AIR 1/1999/204/273/269, "Blast Furnaces," Maj H. W. M. Paul,

26 February 1919.

147. US Bombing Survey, 445.

148. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 21 October 1917.

149. US Bombing Survey, 403, 406.

150. Ibid., 406.

151. AIR 1/1999/204/273/269, "Blast Furnaces," Maj H. W. M. Paul,

26 February 1917.

152. Ibid.

153. AIR 1/1999/204/273/268, "Report on the Results and Effects of

Bombing German Chemical and Munition Factories, 1917-1918," Maj H. W.

M. Paul, 26 February 1919.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. War Diary of Eighth Brigade and Detailed Raid Reports, 24

December 1917 and 25 January 1918.

157. US Bombing Survey, 463, 466.

158. Ibid., 456.

159. Ibid., 460; and AIR 1/1999/204/273/268, "Chemical and

Munitions Factories," Maj H. W. M. Paul, 26 February 1919.

131
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

160. AIR 1/1998/204/273/262, "Reports of British Bombing Raids on

German Railways, Railway Stations and Railway Objectives, 1918," Maj H.

W. M. Paul, 26 February 1919.

161. "Card Index of I.A.F. Raids into Germany, giving Units, Aircraft

Type, Targets, Number of Raids, Casualties and Weight of Bombs Dropped,

October 1917-November 1918," Newall Papers, 391.

162. US Bombing Survey, 446-47.

163. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 5 December 1917.

164. US Bombing Survey, 454.

165. Ibid.

166. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, 5 December 1917.

167. AIR 1/1998/204/273/261, "Raids on German Railways," Maj H.

W. M. Paul, 26 February 1919.

168. Ibid.

169. Detailed Raid Report, Maj J. E. A. Baldwin, commanding No. 55

Squadron, to Headquarters, 41st Wing, 30 October 1917.

170. AIR 1/1986/204/273/11, "Further Details," Capt H. W. M. Paul,

19 October 1917.

171. Times, 31 October 1917, 6.

172. Flight, 8 November 1917, 1181.

173. AIR 1/1998/204/273/266, "Effects of Bombs," Maj H. W. M. Paul,

26 February 1919; and US Bombing Survey, 456.

174. Detailed Raid Report, 25 January 1918.

175. Ibid., 27 January 1918.

176. US Bombing Survey, 421-22.

177. Ibid., 432.

178. N. Jones, Origins of Strategic Bombing, 72-77, 166-69.

179. Morris, 132.

180. Baldwin, 10.

181. William Armstrong, Pioneer Pilot (London: Blandford Press, 1952),

36-37.

182. AIR 1/1998/204/273/266, "Effects of Bombs," Maj H. W. M. Paul,

26 February 1919.

183. Brooke-Popham, 54-55.

132
Chapter 4

Eighth Brigade and Independent Force

(February-November 1918)

Under newly promoted Brig Gen C. L. N. Newall, 41st Wing

continued operations in 1918 much as it had since October

1917. Renamed Eighth Brigade on 1 February, with no appreciable increase in combat strength, the 41st constituted the

nucleus of Independent Force RAF in early June 1918. Service

flying and aerodrome development proceeded throughout the

spring and summer. M. J. D. Cooper summarized the activities of Newall's units in the first half of 1918.

With the influence of the parent service still strong, VIII Brigade

tended at times to favour targets more in line with army bombing

policy (such as railways and aerodromes near the front) than the more

distant munitions and population centres originally intended as its

objectives. 1

Owing largely to an absence of realistic guidance from Whitehall, the British air command in France controlled the daily

prosecution of the aerial offensive-including long-range bombardment-as it had done since 1916.

In London, authorities tended to dwell upon the future potential of the British bombing fleet rather than on rectifying its

difficulties. They paid only sporadic attention to Newall's

Ochey squadrons-at the end of a communication line that

included GHQ and HQ RFC. The War Cabinet felt it had persuaded the military hierarchy in France that civilians exercised ultimate control over the long-range bombing program.

During the last year of the war, a compromise developed.

The military continued to oversee daily activities of the bombardment force while the War Cabinet occupied itself with

programs of expansion and strategy. Within this polarity, the

new Air Ministry exerted negligible influence. Despite the

Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service being

combined into the Royal Air Force in April, British direction of

the air war did not cohere during 1918.

133
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

With the benefit of hindsight, one can identify three competitive forces shaping British bombing policy and strategy

during the last year of the war: the War Cabinet's continued

wish to exert effective control; the Air Ministry's creation to

assist this political direction (among other considerations);

and Trenchard's influence (first as chief of the Air Staff from

18 January to 12 April, then as GOC, Independent Force, from

6 June until the Armistice).

Using War Cabinet direction, the government wished to

translate schemes into action in implementing Smuts's recommendations. Already, classified reports seemed to indicate

that the accomplishments of Newall's three squadrons merely

foreshadowed the achievements of the projected force of 60

squadrons. Public opinion reinforced this political optimism,

and the War Cabinet cultivated Franco-American goodwill for

the bombing fleet it hoped to create. The secretary of state for

War, Lord Milner, concerned himself with all aspects of the

newly founded Air Ministry and Royal Air Force.

From the outset, Milner had paid particular attention to

proposals for attacking Germany from the air. In October

1917, Rear Adm Mark Kerr submitted a memorandum to the

Air Board warning of the need to preempt enemy long-range

aerial supremacy.2 Though exaggerated and alarmist, Kerr's

warnings were underscored by the German "Harvest Moon"

raids that month.3 On 11 October, in a "private and confidential" letter to Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil advocated the

formation of an Air Ministry and recommended Lord Weir to

be its Secretary of State.4 The minister's reply two days later

expressed his agreement on both points. He later concurred in

the arguments of Winston Churchill, the Secretary of Munitions, calling for an independent aerial arm and outlining the

grave effects of German bombs on the output of munitions.5

By virtue of his position, Milner could play a key role in overcoming any lingering doubts among his colleagues about the

urgency for large-scale strategic bombing.

Once the decision had been taken to create a unified air

service, Milner kept in touch with its principal architects. His

aide memoir of 11 November 1917 detailed the bombing proposals of Lord Weir and Maj J. C. Baird, the parliamentary

134
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

undersecretary: "there seems at present to be no answer to

the heavy night-flying bombers except retaliation."6 Milner

monitored the emergent Air Ministry very carefully; most

likely, he instigated most of the War Cabinet's requests for

information on 41st Wing operations during the winter of

1917.

Milner's queries, however, were not always welcomed by the

military chain of command. On 17 December 1917, Lord

Rothermere, the ministerial appointee for the Air Force, wrote

to Trenchard, his newly selected chief of Air Staff:

Yesterday morning, after you had left, Lord Milner came to see me and

said that he felt great anxiety about the adequacy of the preparations

for the long range bombing offensive. He considered it a matter of vital

importance, and he felt that the War Cabinet should be kept fully

informed of the situation. 7

Trenchard's reply, from HQ RFC in France on 20 December,

illuminated his attitude toward independent aerial operations

and his reluctance to leave his field command for a staff billet:

I am uneasy about other people being uneasy about the adequacy of

preparations for long range bombing. I am responsible for it, and of

course you will be, but if they cannot trust me, then I cannot see any

object in your asking me to come as C.I.G.S. Lsi, C.A.S.].8

As Trenchard's peevish tone attests, the new CAS felt at odds

with his civilian superiors, particularly Lord Rothermere.

As Secretary of State for War, Lord Milner did not rely solely

upon the established hierarchy. He sought his own sources of

information, a shrewd habit which must have been disquieting

to the chain of command. One week after his visit to Lord

Rothermere, Milner interviewed Major Lord Tiverton, a staff

officer who had just completed a second inspection tour of the

41st Wing base area.

He (Tiverton) has just come from Ochey, where he has been visiting

our aerodromes with Paine (Fifth Sea Lord, responsible for naval

aeronautical).

The position is that 5 aerodromes are being prepared for 5 squadrons

each-all bombing machines. Aerodromes roughly about 1,000 yards

by 1,000 yards. Coolie labour being employed, almost 2,500 at

present. It is intended to bring the number up to 10,000 and expect to

have the aerodromes ready by March 1918.* (*3 other sites have been

135
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

chosen, but no work had yet been done. Ultimate number

contemplated, 40 squadrons!)

As compared with what he found on his last visit (27th November),

Tiverton says that there is now much greater activity. He also thinks

that our aerodromes are too far forward. The French have lately been

drawing theirs further back.

The commander of our Cmd is Colonel Newall. It is still under

Trenchard at G.H.Q. Newall is well thought of.

Tiverton still thinks that the contemplated number of squadrons is

inadequate for an attack on Germany on a great scale. He says that it

is quite inaccurate-and that Paine admitted this-that there is plenty

of room for aerodromes for 5,000 machines in this neighbourhood.

The base chosen for our aerodromes is Troyes. The number of men

required to serve each machine in the field T. estimates as low as 71⁄2,

i.e., 15,000 men for 2,000 machines.

The machines wh. it is contemplated to place in the 25 squadrons are

partly Handley Pages and partly D.H.

Tiverton's address in Paris is 16 Avenue K1Wber. Liaision between

English and French for all technical work is "fair."9

On several other occasions, Tiverton communicated directly

with Lord Milner. The cabinet minister did not discourage this

correspondence.

Tiverton was ideally placed and qualified to comment on the

bombing program. A barrister since 1906, Lord Tiverton had

begun his war service on 1 August 1915 as a lieutenant

aboard HMS Revenge off the Belgian coast. 10

His considerable knowledge of mathematics and scientific principles

• . . enabled him to undertake a detailed and systematic study of

strategic bombing and the problems which it involved."I

In early 1916, as armament training officer in the Air Department of the Admiralty, Tiverton investigated ballistics and its

application to bomb-aiming accuracy. In May 1916, while armament officer of No. 3 Wing at Luxeuil, he qualified sufficiently as a pilot (at age 36) to carry out practical work in

fitting the Sopwith 11/2 Strutter with a suitable bombsight.

When the Luxeuil wing was disbanded, Tiverton returned to

England. By October 1917 he was back in France as the

technical member of the British Aviation Mission in Paris.

Early in that month he had alerted Rear Admiral Kerr that

136
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

"nothing has been done to prepare for the reception of the

bomber force in the Verdun-Toul district.""2 This news

prompted Kerr's complaint to the Air Board on 11 October

1917.

In early 1918, Major Lord Tiverton headed F03a Section in

room 223, F03 Branch of the Directorate of Flying Operations,

at the Air Ministry. He was responsible for "all detail questions

of strategic bombing and liaison with Technical and Training

Directorates in relation thereto," including the collection of

target data and information on "the strength, composition,

and development" of the British strategic bombing force.'" Until the Armistice, he submitted reports and memoranda to his

superiors inside and outside the Air Ministry; most of these

were highly critical of the aerial offensive. Lord Tiverton's position and expertise thus made him a useful conduit to Milner.

Milner also solicited other opinions on long-range bombardment, particularly after it became apparent that force deployments would not meet projections. His 7 March 1918 request

to members of the Air Council for "independent summary"

concerning "our situation and prospects" on strategic bombing

prompted an extensive response from Sir Henry Norman, a

member of Parliament, on 25 March.

Sir Henry Norman's analysis can be taken as a contemporary political appraisal of the bombing effort. In contrast to the

military view, Norman did not suggest that the campaign be

scaled to match the available forces; instead, he argued that

increased output of bombing machines had to receive the

highest priority: 'The future of our race and Empire may depend upon whether or not we rise now-though it be at the

eleventh hour-to this conception."1 4

Once Cowdray's surplus air fleet materialized, Norman advocated its use in overwhelming incendiary attacks upon Essen, Cologne, Frankfurt, Duisseldorf, Stuttgart, and

Mannheim. He calculated that such a force could deliver 20

tons of bombs hourly on each of two targets for 10 consecutive

hours, so that "our victory in the war would be in sight" within

a month.'5 However, Norman conceded that at present this

scheme was unrealistic, since 41st Wing had taken five

months to drop just 48 tons of bombs on German objectives,

137
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

less than the quantity he wanted to "have been able to drop in

one houri"16 The government, in his view, had grossly underestimated the force required to inflict significant damage. Furthermore, moral effect could be a two-edged sword.

A brief consideration of the subject appeared to show that, contrary to

confident public expectation, we shall not be in a position to carry out

bombing operations in Germany upon a scale likely to have an

appreciable influence upon the course of the war before next Autumn

(i.e., fall of 1919), if even then.

Public expectation of great reprisals against German towns this spring

and summer is doomed to disappointment, for the simple reason that

we shall have no machines to execute great reprisals with. 1

7

Clearly, public opinion represented a very sensitive factor in

any political decision to curtail or abandon bombing. The government found itself constrained by its previously reported

successes and a conditioned citizenry.

On the question of effective command and control, Norman

argued for a "Supreme Strategical Council" to formulate a

coherent program. Though the Air Ministry and the Royal Air

Force had been created expressly for those purposes, Norman

felt that they had yet to exercise effective supervision over

aerial matters.

He then analyzed the actual effort of 41st Wing during its

first three months (through January 1918), using data provided by the military. The discrepancies between his figures

and the actual state of affairs illuminate the extent to which

civilian policy makers were misled. Norman noted that Newall's force had launched a total of 31 raids, with the following

outcomes by aircraft type:

Sorties flown/Machines missing Machines with engine trouble

D.H.4: 107/5 1

F.E.2.b: 84/4 13

H.P. 10/0 3

Totals: 201/9 17

He noted that 59,585 pounds of bombs dropped in 173 successful sorties implied that each 41st Wing sortie dropped an

average of 344 pounds of bombs,"8 and he criticized the short

distance of these raids: "none being nearly so far as the German raids on London." He also criticized the "trifling average

138
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

weight of bombs carried per machine" and concluded that

these raids "do not even approach an offensive sufficient to

have an appreciable effect upon the duration of the war."'9

Norman's conclusions would have been even more pessimistic

had he enjoyed access to other information.

Norman either overlooked or never learned of the two Handley Pages that went missing on "A" Naval Squadron's maiden

mission to Saarbriucken on 24/25 October 1917 or of the

Handley Page "completely wrecked" in a landing accident upon

its return from the same raid.20 Similarly, Norman recorded

one DH4 from No. 55 Squadron forced to abandon their mission owing to engine trouble in December 1917; the actual

count was five. Engine trouble resulted in a total of nine DH4s

failing to complete their sorties, a fact of which the Air Council

was apparently never informed. Likewise, Norman recorded 13

FE2bs of No. 100 Squadron aborting their sorties in January

1918 owing to engine problems; the actual number was 20.

Nor did Norman's analysis fully appreciate the adverse effects of weather and other limitations. Only 95 of 118 DH4s

setting out on missions during this period managed to bomb

successfully-an 80.5 percent success rate. Equivalent figures

for night operations are 90 of 125 for a 72.0 percent success

rate. Overall, 185 aircraft of 41st Wing (of 243 launched)

dropped 59,678 pounds of bombs on assigned targets, secondary targets, and targets of opportunity. Thus, 58 machines

failed to complete their missions-more than twice the

number (26: 9 missing, 17 aborted) reported to Sir Henry. On

the other hand, bomb totals gleaned from official records agree

within one-tenth of 1 percent with the figure supplied to Sir

Henry (59,678 actual pounds versus 59,585 reported).

Sir Henry Norman concluded that new types of aircraft were

necessary. They should be capable of mounting mass raids to

deliver one hundred tons of bombs, and they should be able to

sustain that pace week after week. He argued for priority production of these new types of aircraft: "Our situation and

prospects appear to require immediate reconsideration. "21

Milner and the War Cabinet were clearly concerned with the

conduct and magnitude of the air war against Germany. But

as before, the political direction clashed with the priorities and

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BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

concerns of the field commanders. These fundamentally incompatible outlooks also collided within the new Air Ministry,

in the persons of Lord Rothermere, secretary of state for the

Air Force ("Royal Air Force" after March 1918), and his chief of

Air Staff, General Trenchard.

Lord Rothermere aggressively supported the augmented

bombing campaign. In this, he enjoyed public support and

encouragement. Responding to a toast in his honor as the Air

Minister in December 1917, Rothermere presented his philosophy unambiguously.

At the Air Board we are wholeheartedly in favour of air reprisals. It is

our duty to avenge the murder of innocent women and children. As

the enemy elects, so it will be the case of "eye for an eye, and a tooth

for a tooth," and in this respect we shall slave for complete and

satisfying retaliation. . . . We are determined, in other words, that

whatever outrages are committed on the civilian population of this

country will be met by similar treatment on his own people. 22

The editor of Flight hailed this outlook as an "admirably

clear explanation" of the air policy to be expected in the near

future.23 His editorial, entitled "Our Own Policy of Reprisals,"

called for massive bombing, linking Rothermere's assault on

German morale with the military necessity to defend Britain.24

He conceded that it was tempting to agree with the Air Minister.

[We should] place our policy of counter raids on no higher a plane

than that of avenging the murders of our defenseless civilians. But we

think the matter goes far beyond that. In the first place, the duty is

laid upon our authorities of defending our shores, and if that can only

be done-as we believe to be the case-by raiding the enemy's towns

from the air until he cries for mercy, then let us raid them as often

and as heavily as need be .... We regret the necessity, but we cannot

get away from the fact that the necessity has been forced upon us by

the prior action of an enemy who has adopted frightfulness as his

creed in the belief that he was the only one with a stomach for it.25

In this fusion of moral and strategic effects, reprisals became acceptable for two reasons: Germany, the first to adopt

terror tactics, deserved punishment; further, such a counteroffensive handily complemented the related issue of home defense.

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

Rothermere forcefully voiced the same sentiments in private. Sir Almeric Fitzroy, following his conversation with the

Air Minister, recorded Rothermere's thoughts in his diary.

December 28th.- Lord Rothermere's ideas on air reprisals are not

lacking in force or comprehensiveness; he is satisfied that no adequate

effect will be produced in Germany unless the thing is done on a scale

which, in point of thoroughness and terror, has not hitherto been

dreamed of. His intention is, for every raid upon London, absolutely to

wipe out one or two large Germantowns, either on the Rhine or in its

affluent valleys. Frankfort itself does not lie beyond the bourne of his

imaginings. For this purpose he contemplates the possibility of an

attack in three divisions comprising each from 100 to 150 aeroplanes

and carrying bombs enough to lay the place attacked level with

ground in the course of a few hours. In favourable circumstances a

sufficient number of machines may be at his disposal by the month of

June. It is estimated that, among a people ravaged by hunger and

despair, the panic will be instantaneous and complete. 26

In this regard, Rothermere merely echoed the demands of the

population and the government for immediate and overwhelming retaliation. However, the chief of Air Staff did not share his

outlook.

Trenchard, a reluctant CAS, did not get on well with his

minister, either personally or professionally. He felt that he

had been forced by Rothermere and Lord Northcliffe into accepting the staff post to protect Haig. 27 He complained to the

field marshal that Rothermere habitually took advice from

other than his "professional advisers" while ignoring problems

of less appeal but greater immediacy to concentrate on reprisals.28 Trenchard fulminated in a post he did not want under a

superior whom he did not respect or trust.

On 13 January 1918, the impatient CAS handed a memorandum on bombing directly to the Prime Minister, bypassing

Rothermere. 29 Trenchard emphasized the disjunction between

the aspirations of the new Air Staff and Newall's small force at

Ochey.

It is worth noting that the bombing of Germany which has taken place

in 1917, involving the dropping of about 20 tons of bombs in a few

weeks in winter, has been done by this limited force, for though the

figures of additional bombers about to be set out are meagre and

disappointing, they represent some power of doing substantial

mischief.30

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BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Planners, claimed Trenchard, had lost sight of the fact that

Germany was being bombed by only a single day squadron

and two night squadrons, one of which could do "short-distance night flying only." Although aerodrome accommodations

for 40 squadrons would be complete by July 1918, Trenchard

estimated that only nine squadrons "will be actually at work"

by that date2. He urged goals commensurate with the force.

This memorandum does not attempt to discuss why the figures are

not larger, but the figures themselves cannot be successfully

challenged. It is far better to know what can really be done so as to be

able to count on it than to indulge in more generous estimates which

cannot be realized. 32

This pragmatic analysis ran counter to widespread political

and public assumptions that a strategic bombing force could

be quickly expanded to any desired size. Trenchard's proposal

more closely matched the abilities of the fleet in being; however, it also rested upon several key assumptions:

It is intended to attack, with as large a force as is available, the big

industrial centres on the Rhine and in its vicinity, in accordance with

an organized plan. If the French do any long-distance bombing I am

hopeful they will attack the targets we suggest.

It is intended, when the weather is unfit for long-distance bombing, to

attack nearer targets such as the big steel works near Briey,

Saarbrucken, &c. This will be a development on a larger scale of work

already successfully undertaken. It will be carried out under the

orders of the French who will select, from time to time, the particular

objective.33

The doubtful ability of 41st Wing to penetrate Germany to

the Rhine valley has already been analyzed, as well as the

wing's barely discernible cooperation in the French bombing

program. Trenchard did not address these two points in detail,

but his narrative minimized them as operational obstacles. In

these matters, the CAS was less than candid with his prime

minister. While Trenchard's memorandum to Lloyd George appeared to outline a more plausible concept than huge reprisals, its propositions were likewise undercut by the results of

41st Wing efforts.

During Trenchard's stormy tenure at the Air Ministry, little

was done to implement even his proposed policy. Personal

antagonisms and professional differences between him and

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

his air minister made failure inevitable. S. F. Wise summarized the turbulence.

Controversy surrounded the first appointments to the Air Ministry,

including that of the first Air Minister, Lord Rothermere. An Air

Council under his presidency was established on 3 January 1918; its

vice-president was Sir David Henderson. Trenchard was prevailed

upon to become Chief of the Air Staff and was given Rear-Admiral

Mark Kerr as his deputy. Within a few weeks of the official birth of the

Royal Air Force, on 1 April 1918, not one of these men remained at his

original post. Kerr had disagreed with Trenchard, and

Brigadier-General R. M. Groves had been appointed in his place.

Rothermere had given way to Sir William Weir; Trenchard had

resigned, to be replaced by his old rival Major-General Fredrick Sykes;

Henderson had left, finding it impossible to work with Sykes. 34

Personalities aside, much of the difficulty and paralysis at

the new ministry arose from its organizational and staff arrangements. These shortcomings contributed significantly to

its general ineffectiveness. Based on years of experience, the

two senior services had developed staff systems that united

the crucial functions of operations and intelligence. For example, the deputy chief of Naval Staff (DCNS), who was in charge

of both the Division of Naval Intelligence and the Operations

Division, constituted the unifying link in the Admiralty chain

upward to the chief of Naval Staff (CNS) and the First Sea

Lord.35 In the army's case, the two responsibilities were combined within the War Office in the Military Operations and

Intelligence Directorate, whose head was directly responsible

to the chief of the Imperial General Staff.3 6 Both older services

concentrated intelligence and command within a single staff

position subordinate to the service chief. Compared to these

departmental establishments, command and staff relationships within the new Air Ministry suffered from structural

disunity.

Within the Air Ministry, control of the interlocking functions

of intelligence and aerial operations were split between the

Directorate of Flying Operations (DFO) and the Directorate of

Air Intelligence (DAI). These discrete staffs coalesced only at

the highest military echelon: chief of the Air Staff.3 7

This bifurcation contributed significantly to Air Ministry disjointedness throughout 1918. After June 1918, it hindered Air

Staff in its supervision of Trenchard, the strong-willed GOC of

143
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

the Independent Force, when he ignored or altered directives

to conform to his own notions of how the bombardment

should be waged. Ironically, the institutional and working relationships that caused these difficulties were initially formulated during Trenchard's brief tenure as the first chief of Air

Staff (18 January-12 April 1918).31 A combined Operations

and Intelligence Directorate emerged after the Armistice, reflecting a belated acknowledgment of previous shortcomings.39

Under Trenchard, an energetic and forthright CAS, these

structural flaws were comparatively unimportant. His vigor

and personality-his "command presence"-cut across paper

boundaries to dominate staff machinery; he personified the

nexus of control.40 When he abruptly vacated his position on

12 April 1918 (the result of a last-straw squabble with

Rothermere), effective control departed with him.

For his part, the unfortunate Rothermere never enjoyed

widespread support or sympathy within his ministry. It appears that he was at odds with the institution from the beginning. On the day prior to his becoming air minister,

Rothermere visited Sir Almeric Fitzroy, who noted that he "had

much to say on the swollen staff he had found at the Hotel

Cecil, where 4,000 men and women are engaged, including

600 commissioned officersl"4' Rothermere "resolved to apply

drastic measures" to relieve this "biggest scandal"; he attributed staff size to "petticoat influence," asserting to Sir Almeric

that there were "only four trained civil servants in direction of

this huge staff."42 Rothermere's management problems were

compounded by lack of active support from his CAS. He resigned on 26 April 1918, barely a fortnight after Trenchard's

departure, to be succeeded by William D. Weir. Amidst the

German Lys offensive and Haig's "backs to the wall" order,

Britain had to replace the top men in its air establishment.

Maj Gen Fredrick Sykes, the new CAS, lacked the overbearing but charismatic temperament of his predecessor; he inspired neither the confidence nor the respect which had characterized Trenchard's relationships. The two, longtime rivals,

represented the antipodes of leadership: while Trenchard exemplified the warrior who inspired by example, Sykes epitomized the calculating manager who valued logic above loyalty.

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

Trenchard loathed Sykes, whom he regarded as an opportunist.43 What's more, most of the Royal Air Force agreed with

Trenchard's harsh opinion." Sykes had inherited a "one-man"

department in terms of effective management; however, Sykes

never became that man.

Sir William D. Weir, the new secretary of state for the Royal

Air Force, assumed his position on 27 April 1918 and remained in office until 14 January 1919. A shrewd Scots businessman, he convinced Trenchard to accept the position of

GOC, Independent Force.45 Haig intended to have Trenchard

back in France, either as his "advisor on all matters relating to

the employment of aircraft," or "to command an Infantry Brigade."46

Weir, however, had no intention of losing Trenchard. On 30

April 1918, he offered Trenchard a choice of three positions:

1. The Bombing Command in the South of France.

2. Settling our relations and our policy with America, particularly

with reference to a long range bombing enterprise from an English

base.

3. Co-ordinator of air forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East

with land and naval work and anti-submarine operations.47

With respect to choice number 1, Weir pointed out that it

possessed "the advantages of independent Command, wherein

the man in charge devotes his entire energies to the development of bombing."48 In his reply, Trenchard pointed out that

number 2 and number 3 could be handled quickly and easily

by officers already in position. He objected to number 1 on the

grounds that Newall was already in charge: "the whole point is

whether he should work under Salmond (i.e., H.Q., R.A.F. in

the Field, the present command arrangement) or under the Air

Ministry."49 Trenchard asserted that Air Ministry supervision

"will mean a great waste of man power, overlapping of work in

workshops, etc., etc."5 0

Weir then offered Trenchard the post of Inspector General

Overseas of the RAF, overseeing all air work except operations.

When Trenchard rejected this post too, Weir's patience wore

thin.5 ' On 6 May 1918, he made his exasperation evident and

called for a prompt decision.

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BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

I am really at a loss to understand your view that such work is not of "real value." However, since our last talk, I appreciate more fully your

desire to have a position as a Commander rather than to act in a

supervisory or advisory capacity.5 2

The Air Ministry then offered four positions, including Inspector General Overseas or in the Home Establishment and

"command of all Air Force units in the Middle East," as well as

"independent command of long range bombing forces in

France."53

Now, I trust I have made it clear that I will not create a position

specially for you. The above are positions requiring men, and I want

you to accept one of them so that your experience may contribute to

the success of the Royal Air Force, and not on any ground of quelling

what you term "the agitation."5 4

Trenchard replied two days later. He summarized his objections to the post but concluded, "I can only say I will accept

command of the long distance bombing force and do my best

to make it a success as far as possible.""5

On 13 May 1918, Bonar Law announced to the Commons

that General Trenchard "has been offered and has accepted

the command of a very important part of the British Air Force

in France."56 The Air Ministry then notified the War Cabinet:

I am commanded by the Air Council to inform you that they are of the

opinion that the time has arrived to constitute an Independent Force,

Royal Air Force, for the purpose of carrying out bombing raids on

Germany on a large scale. This will be organized as a separate

command of the British Royal Air Force under Major-General Sir Hugh

Trenchard, who will work directly under the Air Ministry. 57

The message also asked that arrangements be made so that

Trenchard "should be able to deal direct in this subject with

the necessary French military authorities."5 " On 17 May, Trenchard crossed to France. After visits with Haig at GHQ and

Salmond at HQ RAF, he assumed tactical command of the

Eighth Brigade, renamed Independent Force, on 6 June

1918.

In negotiating for the position, Trenchard had stipulated

that as commander of the Independent Force he would work

directly for-and take orders solely from-Weir. He explicitly

confirmed this agreement in a telegram to Weir.

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

We have notified H.Q., R.A.F. I am prepared to take over

administration of all R.A.F. units in Independent Force today. From

this date Independent Force will deal direct with you on all matters.

I.F. R.A.F. 1020 pm.

60

This deviation would have serious repercussions for the command that Sykes (as CAS) nominally exercised over the Royal

Air Force.

In practical terms, the agreement between Trenchard and

Weir bypassed the chief of air staff. Trenchard, if he wished,

need not consult Sykes concerning Independent Force bombing policy. Weir, Sykes' superior in the Air Ministry, ensured

that Trenchard enjoyed autonomy. The Air Council, whose

members devoted more of their 1918 agenda to selecting uniforms for the new service than to Independent Force operations against Germany, paid only fitful attention to the aerial

offensive."

[There was no] substantial flow of correspondence between the

Independent Force staff and the Air Staff in London. Instead,

Trenchard chose to report directly to Weir on a monthly basis. Sykes'

staff chafed over this situation, but the Chief of Air Staff did not elect

to assert his authority.6 2

Trenchard, 'as GOC of the bombing force in the field, did not

intend to let "any officer in London" direct its operations.

While Trenchard's pact with his Air Minister invalidated

Sykes' authority, it also deprived the GOC IF of expert assistance from others within the CAS Department. To maintain

bureaucratic independence, Trenchard had to assemble his

own counterpart of the Air Staff organization at IF Headquarters at Autigny-la-Tour, four miles northeast of Neufchfteau.

This self-imposed duplication of effort constituted a significant

portion of the "great unnecessary waste of man power, time

and energy" of which Trenchard periodically complained in his

private diary.6 3

The Department of the Chief of Air Staff represented a considerable pool of technical ability and combat experience upon

which the GOC IF could profitably have drawn. 64 Some of the

staff officers had been selected and appointed during Trenchard's tenure as CAS. Two staff groups had been established

solely to support strategic bombing:

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BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

1. F03 Branch, Strategic Bombing and Independent Force

Operations, within the Directorate of Flying Operations.

2. AIIB Section, Bomb Raids and Targets, All Branch, Receipt and Distribution of Intelligence, within the Directorate of Air Intelligence.

On 27 May 1918 the head of F03, Lt Col R. J. Armes,

suggested to Brig Gen P. R. C. Groves, the director of Flying

Operations, that he add another officer to the branch.

A most useful officer as S.0.3 in F.O.3 section would be Captain H.

McClelland, D.S.C.

Has been with 8th Brigade at Ochey, since its inception.

Before that Eastern Mediterranean and took part in the raids on

Constantinople.

In the first part of the war was night flying in England, and flying

instructor.6 5

Captain McClelland joined F03 soon after this request and

remained there until the Armistice."6 Among his tasks were "analysis and filing of all reports and records. Circulation and

summaries &c., of operations of Independent Force. War Diary

of Independent Force."6 "

Upon his arrival at the Hotel Cecil, McClelland probably had

more long-range night bombing experience than anyone in the

building. He had been in charge of the first group to proceed

to France as part of Newall's hastily formed 41st Wing in

October 1917. He flew the unit's first mission to the Burbach

Works on 24/25 October 1917. On 24/25 March 1918,

McClelland commanded one of two Handley Pages assigned to

raid Cologne.

Having crossed the lines his engines boiled and he was forced to

return. A second start was made and when near Metz one of the

engines cut out entirely. He dropped his bombs at Courcelles and

returned on one engine.68

(The other pilot, Flight Commander F. T. Digby, DSC, managed to reach Cologne and earned the DSO for his achievement.)6 9

McClelland flew nine raids with Newall's force-a considerable accomplishment that gained him a niche in the unit's

unofficial history as one of the aviators who completed the

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

most missions during the war."° His arrival increased F03 to

three officers, of whom he was the junior.

His colleagues and their duties in F03 also deserve comment. Major Lord Tiverton, the S02, was the Air Ministry expert on target selection and related technical questions. He

had the experience and background to act as a useful interface between HQ IF and establishments in England, but Trenchard never requested such assistance. Like McClelland,

Tiverton remained for the duration, resigning from active service three months after the end of the war.7

" Lt Col J. A. H.

Gammell replaced Lt Col R. J. Armes sometime after 3 June,

very likely in August.7 2

[F03 was responsible for] allocation of aircraft to Independent Forces.

Policy as regards the conduct of all aerial operations by these Forces

and all general questions relating thereto. Formulation of plans for

future operations by Independent Forces. . . . Policy with regards to

the selection of bomb targets. Preparation in so far as concerns

operations by Independent* Forces of all information and operation

papers for the War Cabinet and of periodical summaries and

comments for issue through D.D.A.I. to Press Bureau. .... Liaison with

Independent Forces and with the Allies in regard to their

development. 73

In short, F03 was responsible for plans and support of the

strategic bombardment program. In this respect, it was coequal with F01 and F02, which were charged with supervising

air forces assigned to the army and navy.

Besides F03, one other group at Air Staff level was concerned with the bombing campaign. Section AIIB of Branch

All, Bomb Raids and Targets, had responsibility for collecting

and evaluating information about possible targets and enemy

countermeasures, active and passive, in the IF area of operations. Even though Tiverton had the specific task of "liaison

with DDAI regarding bomb targets," no one in the Directorate

of Air Intelligence was charged with the reciprocal duty to

coordinate with him.7 " However, surviving documentation

shows that Tiverton kept in close touch with AII B.7 5

Except for such initiatives between subordinate staff officers

two floors apart in the Hotel Cecil, no organizational provision

for coordination of operations and intelligence existed below

the level of Sykes himself. To a large extent this disjointedness

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BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

contributed to the frustration that followed upon the command arrangement between Weir and Trenchard. The Department of the Chief of Air Staff could not act unless the IF

specifically requested assistance. The initiative lay completely

in the field.

Returning to Section AlIIB, it was a constituent staff of

Branch Al 1, one of seven branches in the Directorate of Air

Intelligence. They looked after tasks ranging from analysis of

foreign aviation (AI2) to control of RAF propaganda and censorship (A16).11

[AIIB was responsible for] compilation of all information regarding

Bomb Targets in all enemy countries. Information regarding location of

enemy A.A. [i.e., anti-aircraft] defences of all types. Records of results

of Bomb Raids. Records of location of P. of W. [Prisoner of War] camps

in districts coming within the scope of allied Bomb Raids. 77

This office consisted of three officers: Capt A. R. (Archibald

Robert) Boyle, M. C., 2Lt G. H. Carbutt, and Maj W. de L.

Willis. Capts C. W. Curd and F. D. Taylor joined them prior to

October 1917, 7 and these five intelligence officers remained in

the AIIB until the end of the war.

Soon after the Armistice, the section was redesignated as

Section AI3C, Bomb Targets, Results of Raids, and AA Defenses. Capt W. J. Salaman and Lt M. C. Caley were added

while Major Willis resigned from the RAF." AI3C came under

the jurisdiction of Branch A13, responsible for "Relations with

Foreign Countries." These facts strongly indicate that these six

staff officers were responsible for analyzing postwar evidence

from occupied Germany on the effects of British aerial bombardment.

By June 1919, all AIIB/AI3C officers except A. R. Boyle had

departed active service. Boyle, who had been promoted to major and S02, advanced to the head of All. He remained in the

intelligence network of the Air Ministry throughout Trenchard's second stint as CAS, eventually retiring as an air

commodore in 1940. He retained his post during the change of

regimes at the Air Ministry as well as the reductions in force

imposed upon the peacetime Royal Air Force.80 Of all the officers who had served in F03 or Al1B during the existence of

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

Trenchard's Independent Force in 1918, A. R. Boyle was the

sole survivor on active service at the beginning of 1920.81

The creation and purposes of the CAS Department's propaganda office, Section AI6B, testify to the new service's preoccupation with its public image and prestige. Less than two

weeks after Sykes had become chief of Air Staff, Col E. H.

Davidson, the deputy director of air intelligence (DDAI), wrote

to him concerning a proposal for a new group within the DAI.

Attached are the broad instructions upon which I propose conducting

Air Propaganda.

Will you please see if you approve.

If approved I propose informing Directorates of this scheme and

asking them to notify me of any subjects which they may wish taken

up from time to time. This will ensure that our propaganda is

comprehensive. 82

This project, though initiated during Trenchard's term as CAS,

had to be brought to his successor's attention for final approval. 83

Davidson enumerated the duties of his proposed group and

also foreshadowed its future utility, arguing that "propaganda

must not only deal with the present war conditions but must

be to a certain extent in retrospect and more important still,

must deal with the future."84 Therefore, he asserted, the "education" of the public about aviation was a major concern, and

propaganda for "home consumption" (via the media of "cinematograph, photographs and exhibitions") had to be produced.85 As specific objectives of this public indoctrination, the

DAT included "questions of bombing policy," "strategy of the

air" and the "forthcoming fight for commercial supremacy in

the air," concluding prophetically that "Command of the Air"

will be as essential to this country after the war as "Command

of the Sea."8" Davidson's comprehensive proposal foreshadowed most of the issues and techniques of RAF publicists after

the Armistice.

After Sykes' approval, Section A16 moved into two rooms on

the fifth floor of the Air Ministry. Consistent with the DDAI's

original scheme, their assigned tasks included "Educational

publicity. Liaison with Ministry of Information... Production

and issue of matter for the Press . . . Articles of propaganda

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BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

value and Lecture organisation."8 7 A Captain Dawson was in

charge of AI6B; Crichton moved up a rung to become chief of

the Censorship and Propaganda Branch.88 In essence, the organization functioned as the first public relations bureau of

the Royal Air Force.

This apparent digression into the organization of the Air

Ministry, particularly its CAS Department, clarifies some of

the command and staff relations underlying London's supervision of Trenchard. The apparatus existed at the Air Ministry,

on charts and in fact, to enable Sykes, as chief of the Air Staff,

to oversee the Independent Force in the field. His Department,

staffed by competent officers, diligently carried out their duties

within DFO and DAI.

On the other hand, Sykes' executive control over Trenchard's IF suffered because staff channels to formulate and

coordinate policies merged only within his own office. Although both War Office and Admiralty provided models, the

advantages of unifying operations and intelligence below the

desk of the CAS escaped the Air Ministry planners. Sykes'

relatively low stature among political superiors and military

subordinates, who generally did not like, respect, or trust him,

multiplied his difficulties. Ineffective staff work, at times preoccupied with peripheral details or unrealizable schemes,

characterized this organization.

The largest obstacle to CAS control of strategic bombing was

the agreement between Weir and Trenchard, which simply

obviated Air Staff supervision. Sykes became extraneous to

the British bombing offensive. Trenchard was neither professionally nor personally inclined to consult his rival on matters

touching his field command.

Though rendered powerless by this situation, the midlevel

staff officers in DFO and DAI performed to the best of their

abilities. The paucity of information forwarded by their IF

counterparts limited them severely. Nonetheless, their reports

and analyses are extremely valuable as contemporary critiques of Trenchard's independent command.

After he became chief of the Air Staff, Sykes initiated the

Strategic Council to oversee details of the government's bombing plan. The new CAS wished to develop a system to "con152
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

sider questions of policy in their strategic aspect and the best

utilization of aerial resources," though on a less grand scale

under Weir than under Rothermere.89 On 22 April 1918, at its

inaugural session, this Strategic Council considered the future of the bombing offensive. 90 At the time, General Newall's

Eighth Brigade fell under the supervision of Haig's GHQ and

Salmond's HQ RAF in the field; Trenchard had not yet accepted command of the Independent Force.

The Strategic Council represented the first definite organizational attempt to translate policy into achievable goals. In this

regard, as Neville Jones has observed, this Air Ministry group

necessarily maintained a close liaison with the Air Council:

The Air Council might lay down the policy of bombing a German Key

Industry; the Strategic Council would settle what number of bombs

were necessary to obliterate any particular factory, the force necessary

to obtain this number of direct hits and hence the order in which such

factories should be destroyed, having regard to the force available at

the time, and with what number of machines, and what system, this

should be carried out.9 1

Such a charter allowed the Strategic Council to fill the gaps

between sweeping directives and particular objectives; however, it was not always possible for the Air Staff to avoid

becoming bogged down in trivia at times. Rather than attempting to obliterate enemy cities wholesale, as Rothermere

and Norman had urged, the Strategic Council held that the

proper object of bombing should be the selective destruction of

key German war industries.

In two memoranda to the War Cabinet, Sir William Weir

endorsed the diminution of the schemes of his predecessor.

He also established the independent existence of the Air Ministry and its right to allocate all aerial resources.

His first document, outlining main policies of the Air Ministry, acknowledged legitimate claims by the army and navy

upon some portion of aircraft production. 92 However, the new

Air Minister cautioned against losing the advantages of bombing raids.

The continuous bombing of German industrial centres presents very

important possibilities, and valuable results may be achieved by its

rapid progressive development. 93

153
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

He asserted that, upon request from the other services, the Air

Ministry "will detach temporally sufficient resources to carry

out the operation required, but such Forces will be under the

control of the Air Ministry for re-allocation."94 In other words

the Air Ministry planned to conduct an independent aerial

offensive.

Weir soon found himself obliged to defend this policy in the

face of War Office and Admiralty objections. In mid-August

1918, he cut their proposed air program, "owing to the demands made by the several branches of the service."91 His

plan, the "Amended Provisional Programme of Development to

September 30th 1919," provided a total increment to the army

and navy of just 56 1/3 squadrons; in the same period, the

Independent Force alone would increase in size from five

squadrons to 58 squadrons.96 RAF's sister services requested

detailed justification of this proposal.

In a subsequent session of the Air Policy Committee, the Air

Minister disclaimed "any intention of criticizing the submarine

strategy" of the navy by reducing their request. He also reminded the CIGS that squadrons assigned to Trenchard's IF

lay outside Foch's control, while those with Haig could come

under the Generalissimo's orders.

Lord Weir called attention to the following paragraph of G.T. 5495, the

C.I.G.S. Memorandum: "The Effect of the Air Ministry's proposal to

increase the Independent Air Force will be able to give General Foch

control of a number of squadrons at the expense of the British Army

in France" and pointed out that Marshal Foch does at present control

all aviation, except the I.A.F. in France and could, subject to the

concurrence of Sir Douglas Haig, at any time move British Flying

Squadron from the British to the French line if he thought it

necessary. On the other hand the I.A.F. could be removed from France

and would not then be under Marshal Foch's orders.97

Weir assured his colleagues that in the current situation it

seemed likely that Monsieur Georges Clemenceau would agree

to leave the Independent Force as "an independent command."9 6 Bombers allocated to Trenchard would remain British in any case. The Air Ministry sought to defend the IF from

the predations of Allied claims for support as well as from

demands from its sister services for scarce aviation assets.

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

Weir also defended reductions in the overall allocations by

using a statistical consideration of wastage effects. Such

losses normally averaged between 33 percent and 50 percent

monthly in each unit.

Lord Weir reminded the Committee that these figures were

made out on the basis of not only maintenance of squadrons

but also allowing for wastage which basis has never been

taken into consideration before and which made, undoubtedly,

a very considerable difference in the total strength allocated to

the two Services.99

Surprisingly, no one remarked on the fact that wastage had

at last been acknowledged in force projections. (It had been

the largest single factor eroding aerial strength in three years

of war.) The Air Policy Committee approved the Air Minister's

allocations.

The accompanying document for Milner on 23 May 1918

presented Weir's concept of strategic bombardment. With an

eye toward Allied involvement, the Air Minister requested the

"support and assistance" of his colleagues in ensuring the

"progressive development of long range bombing of Germany,"

stressing the need to "obtain as much preliminary experience

as possible" in this sphere.'0

° Weir acknowledged that Trenchard's new command at present consisted of only four

squadrons.

Arrangements are well in hand to bring this Force up to at least 24

["30" was lined out in the original] squadrons by the end of October,

and the most energetic steps are now being taken to assure this

strength.

When the force has reached the strength indicated, it will be possible,

apart from weather limitations, to carry on continuous day and night

bombing.

I desire to emphasize the definite character of these proposals and the

heaviness of the blow which may be anticipated. At the same time,

such a proposal, to achieve success, would entail the complete and

thorough co-operation of America and France, together with their full

sympathy and support. 10o

Accordingly, Weir asked the War Cabinet to obtain from the

Supreme War Council a "confirmation" of the independent

status of Trenchard's bombing command and its "ultimate

development" into an inter-Allied force under a British GOC.

155
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

He concluded by asking that Clemenceau be requested "to

obtain the support of the French Army Authorities to this

scheme"-an attempt on the Air Minister's part to guarantee

future cooperation of the French despite their past ambivalence. 102

As Weir had requested, the War Cabinet discussed the Independent Force at Versailles. Sykes, who was at the conference,

informed Trenchard that Clemenceau had agreed to provide

assistance.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he had spoken to Mr. Clemenceau with

reference to the numerous difficulties which might be encountered by

General Trenchard and the Independent Force, and had asked for all

possible assistance from the French; that M. Clemenceau had agreed

and had told General Duval that everything should be done by the

French to assist the Independent Force.

M. Clemenceau heartily endorsed this statement, and added that, if

any difficulty were to arise, I was to go and see him on the subject. 1

0 3

It should be noted that French logistical support to British

bombing units in the field had already been substantial.

The French, in fact, continued to assist the new independent bombing command just as they had previously done

for Newall's 41st Wing and Eighth Brigade. Trenchard himself

seems initially to have secured qualified approval from his

Gallic counterparts, thus confirming the amicable relationship

that had developed in late 1917:

You may like to know that I got on very well with my interview with

the French yesterday on the bombing programme. They are quite

prepared to help me in practically everything I ask for, but it takes a

little tact to get it all done. 104

This material support continued, though the French began

increasingly to express reservations about the wisdom of a

strategic bombing force operating independently of Allied control.

French authorities interpreted the Clemenceau-Lloyd

George agreement to cover logistical assistance exclusively,

not as a blanket endorsement of the Independent Force.

Within those limits, they were willing to cooperate. Trenchard

recorded the heartening outcomes of his conferences with

French military commanders in his official diary.

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

25 June 1918: Lunched with General Castelnau. Had a very

interesting lunch with him and General Hello his Chief of Staff. They

were most anxious to help in every way. They had sent on my letters

asking for more aerodromes to G.H.Q. and were pressing very hard for

it. They were very keen to help and to bomb Germany. 1

05

The following day, after a luncheon with General Petain at

French General Headquarters, the French commander "said

he would help the I.F. all he could."'06 However, command and

control of British forces was quite another matter.

In this matter of unity of command, Allied goodwill generated by the Admiralty's No. 3 Wing under operational control

of the French Air Service had largely vanished. Further, and

ironically, Trenchard discovered that his earlier insistence

that all bombing be under one responsible agency now recoiled upon him.

In May Sykes had drafted a proposal to give Trenchard command of an

inter-allied independent bombing force to include French and

American as well as British units. Presented to the Supreme War

Council in June, the proposal met from Foch almost precisely the

same arguments previously employed by Haig and Trenchard when

they had attacked the idea of independent air operations. Not until 24

September was agreement reached to establish an inter-Allied

Independent Air Force. Even then the Supreme War Council laid down

that the IAIAF was to engage in independent operations only after "the

requirements of battle" had been met; during periods of "active

operations" of the armies its prime function was to supply bombing

support for the ground battle. Trenchard was not finally confirmed as

its commander until 29 October 1918.107

No effective coordination of Allied bombing proved possible

before the Armistice, despite the energy and memoranda dedicated to achieving unity of command.

Why, then, did the British eventually accept an inter-Allied

bombing force controlled from Foch's headquarters? As GOC of

such a force, Trenchard would have been able to employ the

combined national bombing fleets legitimately, and autonomously, against targets selected by his IF planning staff. However, Lord Tiverton, in a letter to Milner, identified a less

altruistic rationale.

If the matter was a simple above board transaction one would

understand this view (i.e., "to let the I.F. come under Foch"). It is,

however, a typical "wrangle" of the worst and stupidest character. It is

hoped by this move to get an inter-allied I. F. under Trenchard

157
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

consisting of British, Americans and Italians. It is then thought that

Foch can be put off when he asks for squadrons by giving them

Americans and Italians, thus reserving the British intact for Sykes'

long distance bombing schemes, while apparently giving way. This can

only lead to very bad feeling without any results. It is not a time to be

frightened of speaking out and the truth is that no one has the

courage to stand up to Trenchard who is over here and is simply doing

things as he wants them. 10 8

Finally, the development of 27 Group, RAF at Norfolk, a unit

of the Independent Force flying the gigantic new Handley Page

V1500, promised to give Britain an independent strategic

bombing capability from its home soil. Weir had intimated as

much in countering CIGS objections to a French-based IF at

the Air Policy Committee session on 23 May 1918. With such

reservations, it is doubtful that effective, harmonious control

of an inter-Allied force would have emerged, even had the war

lasted into 1919. Certainly, Trenchard encountered considerable obstacles as GOC IF in soliciting Allied cooperation-or at

least noninterference-in his bombing operations.

Trenchard met General Duval, chief of the French Air

Service, on 18 June, two weeks after the Lloyd GeorgeClemenceau agreement at Versailles. His privately recorded

assessment was that Duval "was very difficult to deal with as

he openly said to me 'what would you have said a year ago?"'

The question was a pointed reference to Trenchard's earlier

opposition as GOC, RFC in the field, to all independent operations.10 9 When Trenchard visited the US Air Service at their

headquarters two days later, he met the same skepticism. His

reply on that occasion revealed deep reservations about his

own independent force.

I pointed out to them that the difficulty was to reconcile that

irresponsible newspapers had forced our Government into adopting an

unsound organization and that my task was to carry out the sound

policy of bombing Germany on an unsound organization. "0

To undercut French and American objections, Trenchard

sought to convince his counterparts that the freedom of action

he enjoyed would enhance, rather than disrupt, their own

plans.

158
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

He carefully distanced himself from any vestige of crosschannel accountability and complained when his position was

undermined.

3 July 1918. The Air Ministry are starting to publish our

communiques as from the Air Ministry and not from the Independent

Force. This of course will lead to the very thing the Air Ministry want

to avoid, that is, to make it appear as if the Independent Force is

directly under the Air Ministry which will stop the Americans and

French joining in. 1 1

I

His success in this delicate role can be ascertained from the

comments of Brig Gen Benjamin D. Foulois, assistant chief of

the US Air Service.

Fortunately, for the operations of this Independent Air Force, it was

placed under the command of Major General Hugh Trenchard, an

officer of the highest practical knowledge and experience, not only as

regards Air Service operations, but military operations in general, and

an officer who was well known and liked by all American officers with

whom he had associated. In my opinion the success of the operations

of this force, during its period of service, was due entirely to the

personality and judgment of General Trenchard, and not to the policy

which created this force and placed it under the direct control and

orders of the British Air Ministry. 112

Trenchard's reputation and prestige overcame American and

French doubts and allayed their suspicions concerning management of British strategic bombing. In this matter, he

proved relatively more successful than his government's ministers.1 3

To reinforce this independent stance, Trenchard duplicated

the Department of the Chief of the Air Staff under Sykes. This

organization mirrored almost exactly its London parent.

Known officially as the "Air Staff Branch, H.Q., I.F.," it consisted of four staff groups, including operations and intelligence sections.114 While self-sufficiency allowed HQ IF to function without recourse to Sykes and convinced skeptical Allied

commanders of Trenchard's autonomy, it also isolated him

from expert staff groups at the Air Ministry. Considerable disjointedness, inefficiency, and ill will resulted.

Their isolation forced IF staff officers at Autigny-la-Tour to

relearn lessons (such as the impact of weather and the need

for training) already absorbed by their Air Ministry counterparts. Finally, their autonomy made them liable. An under159
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

tone of frustration came to characterize Air Staff memoranda

dealing with Independent Force affairs during this period,

largely in response to Trenchard's cavalier treatment of DFO

and DAI staffs.

In May 1918, when joint Allied bombing operations had

seemed feasible, Tiverton circulated a paper citing the technical difficulties of such undertakings. He emphasized the urgent need to begin contingency planning.

Sufficient data have been obtained to make a comparison between

various targets on the question of their vulnerability. However, such

factors as the number of bombs necessary, the effect of formation

flying on the error curve . . . the actual choice of targets, the type of

machine, are so intimately connected with this question and with one

another that the whole matter must be treated as one large and

complex question. It must of necessity take some time to solve and

therefore cannot be taken up too soon. 1"5

As the joint scheme was predicated upon mistaken forecasts

for aircraft production, it had to be altered when those projections proved specious.

The Air Staff accordingly produced yet another bombing

program, using Tiverton's estimates; as N. Jones noted, this

new plan "could be put into operation by a force of aircraft

considerably smaller than that originally planned for.""' Tiverton's memorandum of June 1918 (Notes on Targets) in fact set

target priorities that Sykes later incorporated into his own

futile guidance to the Independent Force."' These strategic

schemes illustrate Air Staff views on strategic bombing.

Soon after the war, Sykes was to summarize the targets of

this offensive as the chemical bottlenecks of the German warmaking industry.

[They were] the centre of the chemical industry at Mannheim and

Frankfurt: the iron and steel works at Brley and Longwy and the Saar

Basin; the machine shops in the Westphalian district and the magneto

works at Stuttgart; the submarine bases at Wilhelmshaven,

Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, and Hamburg, and the accumulator

factories at Hagen and Berlin." 18

Sykes had presented this scheme, in considerably more detail, to the War Cabinet on 28 June 1918 as "the policy of the

new Air Staff' for bombing Germany's "root industries.""9 With

respect to forces available and operating areas, the new CAS

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

noted that submarine bases and factories which supplied Uboat accumulators could be reached by No. 27 Group operating from English airfields.

It will be seen from a map that three of the main industrial centres

were situated near the west frontier of Germany; and, therefore, one

portion of the striking force was based at Ochey, which lies within a

few miles of the Saar Basin, within 180 miles of Essen, and within 150

miles of Frankfurt. Another portion was based on Norfolk, where a

group of super-Handley Page machines were established for the

specific purpose of attacking Berlin, a distance of 540 miles, and the

naval bases within 400 miles. It was obvious that though aircraft from

England would have to cover greater distances, they would not expose

themselves to the strong hostile defences in the rear of the battle

front. 120

Trenchard was specifically prohibited by the Air Staff

scheme from activities such as reconnaissance or attacks on

enemy aerodromes and railways. Though Sykes did not expect

long-range bombing to "be in really effective operation" until

June 1919, "it is urged that much may and must be done this

year."121 The German chemical industry constituted Sykes' primary objective for the Independent Force.

Upon War Cabinet approval, the Air Staff plan was forwarded to HQ IF. Sykes ordered that no other targets be attacked until enemy chemical plants (suppliers of raw materials for explosives, propellants, and poison gas) could be

"completely crippled."122 The Lorraine steel works could be

raided only when poor weather precluded attacks further into

Germany. Understandably, the CAS was concerned with Trenchard's possible deviations from this plan. In the meantime,

his Air Staff continued to refine this scheme.

Tiverton, again in the forefront of strategic planning at Hotel

Cecil, appended a caveat to the plan that Sykes had transmitted to the GOC IF. Given the present size of Trenchard's force,

he cautioned that it should adhere strictly to Air Staff priorities and concentrate solely on German chemical plants. Attacks upon such attractive targets as magneto and aeroengine factories (which the enemy could duplicate beyond

bomber range) should be postponed until the IF was large

enough to destroy them in one or two raids.

161
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

If it were possible a very much larger force than is at present available

should be allocated to carry out this policy .... The desired result can

therefore only be obtained by employing the Independent Force strictly

for the purpose which is in view and resolutely refusing its services in

other directions however desirable they may appear in themselves.123

Tiverton was acutely aware of the need for realistic targeting

priorities.

Evidence of a divergence between Air Staff plans and Independent Force operations soon became apparent. As early as

mid-June, less than two weeks after Trenchard had taken over

the IF, a memorandum to the DFO from F03 Branch protested

against the practice of HQ IF issuing daily press releases containing details of IF raids and their results.

I have carefully read all the Minutes from the War Office and I have

considered D.D.A.I. Minutes to you on the matter.

I reluctantly come to the conclusion that I see no excuse whatever for

giving publicity to the particular targets at which we are aiming. I do

not see in the least any use in telling the public of what we are

intending to do, and I see every reason from a military point of view in

keeping this information to ourselves .... It would be of the greatest

value to the Germans to have a certain knowledge of what we were

aiming at.

If it once becomes a question of giving information in some cases and

withholding it in others it will not please the public and it will still be

giving a hint to Germany that there is something we wish to conceal.

For these reasons I am most strongly of the opinion that the public

should not be told of the particular target which we were attacking on

any particular date. 1

24

The ubiquitous press releases that so concerned the Air Staff

had characterized all British strategic bombing campaigns

since No. 3 Wing in 1916 and 1917. However, publicizing the

Independent Force's activities far outstripped these earlier endeavors. Within two hours of assuming command, the GOC IF

sent his first release, containing details on objectives, bombs

dropped, and results.

For Press Communique aaa Night of 5th 6th June 5 tons of bombs

dropped on Metz Sablon Railway Station and Triangle and in the

Railway Siding at Thionville with good results although visibility was

indifferent aaa In the morning of the 6th the Railway Station at

Coblentz was heavily attacked by our machines and good bursts were

observed on the Railway line aaa All our machines returned safely.

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

repeated GHQ France and GHQ RAF

GOC Independent Force RAF1 25

As a matter of historical interest, this communication preceded Trenchard's telegram to the Air Ministry in which he

announced that he had officially taken charge of the Independent Force.

I established my Headquarters today at AUTIGNY-LA-TOUR, 4 miles

N.E. of NEUFCHATEAU and sent my first press communique at 4.30

pm. I would be obliged if you would inform me what time you received

this telegram so that I can see if it gets home in time to get into the

next morning's press.

/s/Trenchard12 6

In subsequent correspondence with London, Trenchard

complained whenever his press releases had not been followed

verbatim, or not printed at all, in major English newspapers.

All this exchange indicates that publicity extolling his new

command held significant and continuing interest for Trenchard. Tiverton's memorandum reveals it was also an issue

from the perspective of the Air Staff.

As Trenchard continued to wage his news campaign, the

Air Staffs misgivings over IF press returns mounted. In midSeptember 1918, when the aerial offensive was well underway,

the head of F03, Colonel Gammell, complained to General

Groves, the DFO.

Everything should be done to foster in all units in the Independent

Force the idea of the importance of direct hits on objectives as opposed

to the policy of merely dropping so many tons of bombs on the

German side of the lines .... Would it be possible to alter the form of

the communication to the Press into terms of actual number of hits

scored as opposed to the amount of bombs dropped .... Should not

the Independent Force give the lead by adopting the only system of

reports which gives the real value of results achieved.

Even if it were inadvisable to adopt this policy in reports for the Press

would it not be desirable to omit all references to weight of bombs

dropped by individual squadrons or other units in all R.A.F.

communiques. In this way the importance of actually hitting objective

would be emphasised. 127

However, as with conduct of operations, the initiative lay with

HQ IF at Autigny-la-Tour; the Air Staff lacked the ability to

influence the matter.

163
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

This disagreement over press releases was symptomatic of

fundamental differences in philosophy between London and

the field. Working relationships between Sykes' subordinates

and their counterparts in the IF continued to deteriorate

throughout 1918.

By July 1918, less than one month after the creation of the

Independent Force, a "we-they" state of affairs had developed

between the two staffs. Tiverton was particularly disturbed.

1. The somewhat disquieting analysis of last week's bombing raids

has led me to analyse the work of the 8th Brigade since its

inception. The accompanying chart [not included] shows that a

definite class of targets has been selected by this Brigade which

confirms:

(a) Neither the class of target against which the Independent Force

was created.

(b) Nor to any class of target from which reasonable results may be

expected.

2. Before going into any further criticisms it will be as well to face

actual facts.

There was a reconstruction of the staff, of which everyone is aware,

and, however unpalatable it may be to read, the sole result has been

up to date that:

(a) The 8th Brigade has continued to attack what the new staff

believes to be wrong and useless objectives, and the new staff

have taken no action.

(b) There is no official systematic list of objectives giving their

priority and the new staff have not insisted upon any such list

being prepared.

(c) On paper an immense amount of work has been done. In fact,

nothing has been accomplished. 128

Tiverton concluded his critical brief with an implicit reference

to Trenchard and a warning of future hazards.

It may be advisable up to a point to sacrifice personnel, material,

policy and personal good name in order to obtain the good will of one

officer, but it must be remembered that the good will of many others

will be alienated in the process and it therefore logically follows that

the success of such policy may be too dearly bought. 1

29

Tiverton's acerbic evaluations of Independent Force policy and

targeting priorities reveal the extent to which Trenchard departed from the spirit and letter of Sykes' directive.

In early August Tiverton handed General Groves an eightpage study of bombing policy and the prospects for gaining

164
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

Allied participation. Lord Milner, secretary of state for war,

also received a copy of Tiverton's paper.130 The Air Staff expert

summarized the approved policy of the "new staff."

[The policy is] the systematic obliteration (afterwards modified to

"dislocation") of the German industrial and munition works by

(1) The creation of an Independent Force.

(2) Increasing the force allocated for long distance bombing.

(3) The systematic choice of targets according to their effect upon

Key industries.

(4) The systematic use of bombs, sights, etc. having regard to the

nature of the target, all of which necessarily involved an

intensive training in the knowledge of targets, navigation, and

the knowledge of the essential districts.13 1

Tiverton then explained that two forces had been dedicated to

this policy. One force, developed from the 41st Wing, RFC, and

Eighth Brigade, RAF, was based in eastern France; the other,

No. 27 Group flying the "V-Type Handley Page," was based in

Norfolk. The latter had already fallen well behind schedule,

owing to strikes, crashes, and general mismanagement.

A systematic choice of key industries was begun upon paper and the

chemical targets definitely chosen for priority. In fact the I.F. have not

systematically attacked them, or even attempted to do so. No

systematic use has been made of the right type of bomb so that both

the Technical Department and the technical officers of the

Independent Force are in despair. Although models of all targets have

been offered by the War Trades Intelligence, no intensive training in

knowledge of such targets has been undertaken. In fact, therefore.

nothing has been done to carry out the promised policy more than

would have been done in any case. The policy put forward in April as

the essential policy of the new staff has not in fact been carried out in

any way. The very opposite policy has persistently been carried out

with all the material available. 132

Tiverton substantiated these accusations in detail. As he had

warned previously, "certain targets could not be bombed until

sufficient strength was collected to obliterate them." However,

one of these targets, the Bosch magneto works, had already

been attacked by the IF, even though "the miserably small

amount of aeroplanes which visited Stuttgart were not all employed against the works." Moreover, complained the Air Staff

officer, 'This was not done fortuitously, as the G.O.C. I.F.

made it one of the main objects of his July programme."1 33

165
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

The Independent Force had raided Stuttgart proper on the

last two nights of the month with four Handley Pages of No.

216 Squadron. Of eight launched on 29/30 July, one machine

claimed hits on a "factory" with half its payload (986 pounds

of bombs) from an altitude of 8,000 feet.13 4 Its companions

struck individual targets between Maizieres and the Rhine

valley. On the following evening, three Handley Pages (of four

launched) dropped 4,480 pounds of bombs on the city from

6,400 to 7,000 feet, with 2,912 pounds falling on the railway

station and the Bosch factory. 135 On these two nights, just four

of the 12 aircraft that bombed successfully claimed hits on the

magneto factory. Postwar survey teams were unable to assess

actual damage to the works or the city.'3 6 These bombing

returns substantiate Tiverton's assertion that the IF had ignored the government's directives.

He also complained about the quality of aerial intelligence

conducted by HQ IF and its implications for the bombing

campaign.

It has often been pointed out that the pilots must be trained to know

their targets, and yet on August 8th a raid was solemnly reported as

having taken place on the Rombach explosive works. A.I. 1.b. say that

they have no knowledge of any such works. Either some knowledge is

in the possession of the I.F. which ought to be in the possession of the

Intelligence, or the Intelligence of the I.F. is wholly wrong, or the pilots

cannot have known what target they really were attacking, in which

latter case it would be impossible for any pilot to pick out the vital

spot in the particular works.137

Raid returns from No. 55 Squadron show that the unit had

one of its more successful missions on the day in question.

Ten DH4s were launched, all bombed, and all returned without mishap. Aircrew listed their target as the "Wallingen Factory," northeast of town of Rombach; German documents examined after the war confirm that on 8 August 1918 a total of

24 bombs fell in the vicinity of the blast furnaces there. One

bomb was blind, one fell outside the plant perimeter, and the

remaining 22 fell on the works but caused no casualties

among the work force.'38 However, the target was a blast furnace complex, not a gunpowder factory, and crews undoubtedly identified it correctly. As with the earlier incident in

which GHQ transformed tanneries at Pirmasens into munition

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EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

factories, someone above squadron, wing, and even Eighth

Brigade level changed the description of this target before releasing it to the press.

Attached to the appendix was a map graphically representing three key target districts identified by the Air Staff and

the number of RAF raids on each during the period April-July

1918. Of 245 attacks, only 32 had been directed against these

objectives. Tiverton admitted that some raids had been diverted or "abandoned for weather conditions," but he argued

that the "vast majority were undertaken against railway sidings and enemy aerodromes.""'

Tiverton's map sheet was apparently in wide use for planning purposes. It shows distances to German objectives from

eastern England as well as from the Nancy-Ochey region. The

difficulty imposed by neutral Holland upon routes to targets is

made clear. From this perspective, the primary advantage to

basing units of the IF in Britain would be their freedom from

Allied interference.

Following this analysis, Tiverton examined the doctrinal basis for strategic operations. He concluded that the British had

little justification to present to the Supreme War Council (the

Allied forum deciding the issue). Quite apart from French arguments that "all operations should be under the Generalissimo in command of the Armies," the British had not used the

IF in a demonstrably independent role. 140 Trenchard's target

selection lay at the root of the difficulty.

[Employing thelIndependent Force for the dislocation of Army

transport and Enemy aerodromes which is clearly a policy that must

be in the province of the Generalissimo. We therefore approach the

Conference either from a wholly illogical standpoint or with the

inherent weakness of arguing from what we mean to do in the future,

but have never succeeded in doing in the past. 1

4 1

To such a position, Tiverton postulated the French reply.

Either you will continue in the future your present policy in which

case you should be under Marshal Foch, or you want independence to

do something which you don't know yet that you can do. 1

42

Until the IF demonstrated that it could conduct a strategic

campaign, arguments justifying its existence could not be tenable. Its machines would be better employed in a unified plan

167
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

under Foch, as its current targets largely overlapped those on

the Allied tactical lists. Tiverton also explicated the adverse

consequences of widespread publicity on this matter.

The "method of propaganda is equally instructive" in both

nations. In Britain, the result of extensive press coverage "has

been to leave an impression in the mind of the public that all

is going well with the bombardment of Germany, and that the

present authorities are satisfied."14

" Consequently, said Tiverton, the people were "more or less satisfied with what they

believe is being done," and would not object if Foch were to

assume overall control of the IF. In France, however, using

French names for towns in the operating area-at French request-has given "to their people the idea that England is

bombing French towns."144 Here again, he claimed, putting

Foch in charge seemed logical; "the French people undoubtedly have a spirit of irritation in the matter which would be set

at rest by such a policy."145

In concluding his memorandum, Tiverton asserted that the

authorities had lost sight of the whole point of strategic bombing.

The object must always be borne in mind. It is not the producing and

maintenance of so many squadrons. It is the systematic obliteration of

Key industries. And squadrons wrongly used because the pilots do not

know their targets, because wrong bombs are used, because wrong

targets are chosen, are wasted effort which does not damage Germany

in the way intended and discredits every effort to do so.

If there is not sufficient strength to carry out such a policy then there

can be no legitimate argument [against] handing over all command to

marshal Foch. 1

46

Tiverton would repeat this argument inside and outside the

Air Ministry until the Armistice.

The recent characterization of Tiverton as a "self-confessed

extremist" and "a devoted advocate of 'terror bombing' as an

Air Staff officer in 1918" seems not only harsh but misplaced.141 Preoccupied As he was with technical and experimental means of conducting an effective bombing campaign,

his criticisms about the character and capacity of IF operations, and about strategic policy and inter-Allied organization,

is undeniable.

168
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

But there were weaknesses in his position. He seems to

have underestimated the practical difficulties of dealing with a

dominant personality such as Trenchard. Either he was unaware of or discounted the special agreement between the

GOC IF and Weir. Had the Air Minister informed only Sykes

and no one else in his department of the command arrangement for the IF, Sykes' reluctance to confront Trenchard, his

apparent subordinate, becomes understandable. The frustration of his staff officers managing Independent Force affairs

would also increase accordingly. The Directorate of Flying Operations was particularly chafed by the situation.

Within the DFO, Tiverton continued to inveigh against Trenchard's command, and many of his memoranda found their

way into Milner's files. In a 20 August 1918 paper sent to both

DFO and Milner, Tiverton argued that the Versailles Council

afforded an "opportunity ... of laying down definitely a campaign against German munitions.., which can be used in the

future to stop once and for all the useless waste of effort

which is at present going on. "148 Against "all expert advice," he

said, the IF bombed German towns indiscriminately instead of

concentrating on "targets recommended by the trade experts." 149 The following day, he complained to the same

authorities that no one had yet empirically calculated the specific types or quantities required to "demobilize the German

Army by destroying a certain definite number of targets."15

"

The matter could not escape official notice. Tiverton's studies provided sufficient ammunition for the DFO to forward a

lengthy memorandum to the CAS on 11 September 1918.

General Groves contended that Air Staff policy approved by

the War Cabinet was in fact being ignored.

The DFO demonstrated that bomb payloads allocated to the

top classes of designated first-priority objectives (chemical factories and iron or steel works) had declined during June, July,

and August 1918. However, the tonnage dropped on enemy

aerodromes, targets favored by Newall as well as by Trenchard, had increased sharply:

The percentage of attacks carried out on Chemical Factories has

dropped from 14% in June to 9.5% in July and to 8% in August.

Similar attacks on steel and iron works show a decrease from 13.3%

in June to 9% in July and to 7% in August. Examination of the figures

169
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

show that this decrease has been caused chiefly by an increased

activity against hostile aerodromes, the number of attacks rising from

13.3% in June to 49.5% in August. '

5'

Groves conceded that the on-scene commander "must be the

judge of what counter-offensive against enemy flying establishment is. necessary to enable our own machines to work

without undue interference." He emphasized, however, that

this tactical contingency per se did not fully account for the

decreased effort directed against chemical, iron, and steel targets. 152

The DFO was also convinced that far too much ordnance

had been expended against enemy "railway objectives which

are placed by the Air Staff as third in order of importance on

the priority list of targets."

The percentages of attacks on railway targets were 55% in June, 46%

in July, and 31% in August. It is submitted that this percentage,

although decreasing, is still fau too high, and that every effort should

be made to concentrate upon root industries, since to carry out the

destruction of these industries is the object [for] which the

Independent Force was created. 1

53

Then the DFO appended a third argument to his memorandum (a point which did not appear in the draft). This addition

clarified his assertion that shifts in targeting policy resulted

from a deliberate decision by the GOC IF.

It may be argued that weather conditions have, on many occasions,

prevented attacks being carried out on factories, and that railways

and sidings have been given as alternative targets within easy reach.

In this connection I would point out that there are 24 iron and steel

works, 4 chemical and 2 munition factories and 9 important

miscellaneous industrial targets within a radius of 75 miles from

Nancy, and that of the total number of raids on railways 66% have

been carried out within this radius. 154

On 16 occasions, when a neighbourhood containing a railway

objective has been visited, bombs have been directed wholly or

partially against the railway target. It may be put forward that these

attacks on railways and other targets have some connection with

intended operations in the area in which the Independent Force is

working. It is considered that this contention cannot be advanced in

defence of a policy carried out over a period of three months. '

5 5

Finally, Groves concluded that Independent Force operations

contravened military and political guidelines for the campaign.

170
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

I would submit that the policy pursued at present amounts to the

diversion of maximum effort against targets of subsidiary importance.

Such a dissipation of Air Force is at variance with the policy laid down

by the Air Council in the above-mentioned letter (Secretarial Letter No.

11555/1918, 13 May 1918) and with the views put forward by you in

the declared policy of the Air Staff submitted to the War Cabinet in a

printed paper on June 17th (G.T. 4622).

Moreover, I consider that if the G.O.C., I.F. continues to pursue his

present policy it will be difficult to justify the allocation of Air Forces

as between the Army, Navy, and the Independent Force, in which the

War Cabinet has recently concurred. 1 5 6

To his paper, "I.F., R.A.F. 'Policy'," Groves attached a tabulation of raid returns and the relative percentage of effort devoted to each target category to support his conclusions. The

matter then cooled on the desk of the chief of the Air Staff.

Sykes, though sympathetic, was unwilling and unable to alter

the situation.

The Chief of the Air Staff supported General Groves' contention that

the bombing operations should be made to conform with the Air

Ministry plan, but it seems that he could do nothing to bring this

about. 157

Jones argues that Trenchard, though opposed in principle

to strategic bombardment and desiring independence from

British command structure, was quite willing to commit his

machines to support tactical requests from the French. However, such an argument appears self-contradictory. While IF

and Eighth Brigade units supported ground offensives by attacking designated tactical targets during the spring and fall

of 1918, such diversions were limited in scope and duration.

And aside from these undertakings, Trenchard functioned independently of everyone. Jones then hypothesizes that Trenchard believed French goodwill was essential to the continued

vitality of his command.'-" This, perhaps, is inferring too

much. The French did continue logistically to support the

campaign throughout the war, but they never ceased to have

doubts concerning the strategic supervision and orientation of

British bombing.

Jones' explanation does not give sufficient weight to the

institutional consequences that followed from the pact between Trenchard and Weir. Sykes was circumvented, thus

171
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

giving Trenchard maximum latitude. Air Staff contact with the

Independent Force continued to diminish even as the prestige

and reputation of the IF increased.

At the end of September, Tiverton prepared his last major

memorandum on bombing policy. He sent this paper, "The

Possibilities of Long Distance Bombing from the Present Date

until September 1919," to Colonel Gammell, head of F03, who

forwarded it to General Groves, DFO, on 1 October 1918.111

Tiverton also sent a copy, with cover letter, to Milner on 30

September, the dates indicating that he may have been in the

habit of writing to the War Minister whenever he sent reports

through the formal chain of command. 16 0

After an extended summary of Independent Force operations, which he felt "has not justified its original promise,"

Tiverton presented his "less ambitious programme" for the

next 12 months.16

' He did not alter former Air Staff target

priorities, retaining chemical and steel objectives as the top

two categories. However, due to the limited force available,

"the number must be cut down ruthlessly." Accordingly, just

five chemical plants and a dozen steel works were selected as

the "Essential Guts of the whole munition industry." To destroy this short list, Tiverton insisted that each attack be

carefully planned "by the joint brains of all those who know

the question from the commercial, the political, the flying, and

the technical points of view."'62 Furthermore, he pointed out

the critical importance of thoroughly briefing aircrews.

Until the pilots and observers know intimately every building in every

works and its value, and until they realise that bombs dropped

anywhere else are of no value, effort will continue to be wasted without

diminishing the risk of casualties. On the programme put forward

below, there are under 20 targets, this training therefore, is not an

impossibility. 1

63

Tiverton supported his scheme with estimates of the bombs

required to destroy each target. He also determined the

number of large raids possible per month between October

1918 and September 1919. Tiverton concluded that, through

April 1919, "the very moderate obliteration suggested should

be easily accomplished during the year."'64 His final bombing

172
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

plan represented a change in magnitude but not in direction

from his initial proposals to Sykes in May-June 1918.

So far as strategic planning in the field by Newall and Trenchard is concerned, very little documentation has survived.

What exists demonstrates that actual guidance of bombing

operations remained on an ad hoc basis throughout 1918.

Two sets of Eighth Brigade/IF documents, one dating from

May-June 1918 and the other from October 1918, confirm the

consistently low priority field headquarters gave to coherent

strategic policy.

The first set, two memoranda prepared by Newall as GOC,

Eighth Brigade on 12 and 27 May and one by Trenchard as

GOC IF on 23 June 1918, underscores the lack of substantive

thought which followed the stormy creation of the Independent Force. Careful comparison of these plans, written under different circumstances, reveals that they are virtually

identical. Each is merely a transcription of its predecessor.

In fact, Trenchard's "very secret" five-page paper for Lord

Weir, "Memorandum on the Tactics to be Adopted in Bombing

the Industrial Centres of Germany," was copied entirely from

Newall's report on 27 May, 'The Scientific and Methodical

Attack of Vital Industries."'65 Except for short paragraphs setting out personal views on bombing and moral effect, Trenchard's scheme mirrors Newall's memorandum to Sykes,

transmitted via Salmond at HQ RAF the previous month.16 6 In

its turn Newall's paper of 27 May was a minor revision of his

scheme of 12 May, 'The Scientific and Continuous Attack of

Vital Industries."167 These three documents are easily confused

or overlooked, particularly since they are scattered throughout

the official archives.

What unambiguously emerges is that Newall had formulated field policy guiding strategic bombing by mid-May 1918,

well before creation of the IF and the arrival of its GOC. Trenchard contributed nothing of substance to Newall's initial concept of operations.

Newall's original paper of 12 May was completed the day

before the Air Council announced creation of the Independent

Force. Trenchard, its GOC, had been unemployed since resigning as CAS on 12 April, although he had been, as dis173
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

cussed earlier, negotiating with Weir since 30 April for a suitable new assignment. On 8 May 1918, he had concluded his

special agreement with the Air Minister for the IF. He crossed

to France on 17 May, five days after Newall had prepared his

strategic scheme.

Trenchard arrived at Newall's headquarters on 20 May and

remained in the vicinity of Eighth Brigade Headquarters until

his departure on 6 June for Neufchateau to assume tactical

command of the Independent Force. At the time, the IF consisted of four squadrons (with supporting elements) from Newall's Eighth Brigade, plus the headquarters echelon that

Trenchard was assembling at Autigny-la-Tour, northeast of

Neufchateau. Trenchard therefore was in Newall's area on 27

May 1918 when Newall rewrote his previous memorandum,

slightly altering the title ("Scientific and Continuous Attack of

Vital Industries" became "Scientific and Methodical Attack"). It

is unthinkable that Newall would have transmitted this policy

statement without obtaining the approval of the GOC IF. Trenchard's nihil obstat is further indicated by his copying massive

sections of Newall's memorandum verbatim and forwarding

this "work" directly to Weir, representing it as his own program, on 23 June 1918.168

Thus the Air Ministry learned of the plans of its bomber

commanders from Newall to Sykes through usual channels on

27 May and from Trenchard's confidential memorandum to

Weir on 23 June. Significantly, despite events during the six

weeks following Newall's original report on 12 May, neither

London nor the field modified the originally proposed bombing

plan for Independent Force.

Newall's memorandum of 27 May 1918 constituted a comprehensive approach to the question of how best to attack

Germany. Largely copied from his 12 May paper, his proposal

seems to represent the Eighth Brigade's bid to secure institutional stability. Newall and his subordinates wished to establish acceptable criteria and priorities for their strategic activity. They worked, as usual, independently of the Air Staff.

As the memorandum's title suggests, Newall considered that

objectives for aerial assault had to be both vital ("being of

great importance, if not essential," to the enemy war effort)

174
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

and vulnerable ("being located within an area which will admit

of their being attacked more or less continuously").169 In his

estimation, "the line COLOGNE-FRANKFURT-STUTTGART,"

some 125 miles behind the trenches, marked the practical

limit for "systematic attacks" on these targets:

(a) The iron and coal mines.

(b) The iron ore "bassins," where most of the blast furnaces are to

be found, and where the iron ore is made into pig iron, which

forms the basis for steel.

(c) The chemical production.

(d) The explosive production.

(e) The miscellaneous production, viz. railway material, rolling

stock, aircraft, internal combustion engines, submarine parts,

magnetoes and tanning industries. 170

This plan, emphasizing iron and coal centers and including

"railway material, rolling stock . . . and tanning industries,"

had very little in common with Air Staff and War Cabinet

schemes. Chemical and ammunition factories in the Rhine

valley, of primary concern to London, stood third and fourth

on the Eighth Brigade target list. Newall's priorities also retroactively justified objectives that his squadrons had hit during

the first five months of 1918. He selected targets which he

knew from experience his aircrews could find.

Newall analyzed these bombing categories from the perspective of operational feasibility and material effects. In a passage

that flatly contradicted bombing priorities formulated in

Whitehall, he justified efforts directed against enemy railways.

It is generally known and admitted throughout GERMANY that her

principal danger lies in the lack of railway material and rolling stock.

As far as munitions are concerned GERMANY will always be able to

produce sufficient to enable her to carry on, but she will be unable to

produce the increasing needs in rolling stock and material. 171

At present numerous targets exist about which no information can be

got as to their manufactures.

As data is lacking it is difficult to determine which target, whether the

most important or not, should be attacked. Provided the target is not

too small and within range, it should be attacked continuously both

by day and by night. 1

72

When the memorandum reached London, Tiverton rebutted

Newall.

175
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

General Newall advocates the bombing of rolling stock where possible,

but I have grave doubts as to this being the most economical use of

bombing squadrons. The whole paper displays a strange lack of

information which is available from Intelligence. For instance,

apparently he has been given no information that the Bayer works,

Leverkussen [near Cologne], and Meister Lucius, at Hoeschst [near

Frankfurt] are both in the same order of importance as the Badische

Anilin & Soda Fabrik, at Mannheim. 173

Newall's 27 May memorandum presented his revised evaluation of what his squadrons could be expected to accomplish.

It reflected his original paper of 12 May 1918, but it differed

from his earlier plan in two additions. Here, one detects Trenchard's slight influence: the necessity to bomb enemy aerodromes in order to retain the initiative in the air war and a

brief examination of the "moral effect of bombing."17 4

Regarding the latter, the passage quoted below appeared in

the respective narratives of each commander.

The further an objective is located from the battle area the greater will

be the moral effect, of an attack on the industries.

The industrial population must be made to realise that they are not

immune from the effects of War owing to their being possibly

indespensible [sic] to the manufacture of munitions. If thoroughly

bombed they will become far more rapidly demoralized than those

working within the sound of the guns of the battle area. They must be

made to realise that they are subject to attack at any moment. The

anxiety as to whether an attack is likely to place is probably just as

demoralizing to the industrial population as the actual attack itself,

provided that they have previously been given the opportunity of

experiencing aerial bombardment.

So far as Newall was concerned, this adequately covered the

topic. Trenchard, however, in the only portion of his 23 June

1918 paper that did not copy Newall's concept word for word,

included four additional paragraphs on the importance of

moral effect.

The GOC IF also added moral effect to the list of reasons for

attacking vital German industries.

It must be remembered that the moral effect at present is far greater

than the material effect, so it is of the utmost importance to utilise to

the utmost both moral and material effect. It is more often the moral

effect that makes the enemy immobilize a large number of his means

of warfare such as Aeroplanes and Anti-Aircraft Guns than material

effect.175

176
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

Trenchard's belief in the primacy of enemy morale as a

target also emerged from his proposed method of attack. He

noted that if one town were to be continually attacked (the Air

Staff and War Cabinet concept), "all the other towns are feeling fairly safe." The GOC IF, dismissing this principle of concentration, decided to scatter his aerial assault in order to

reap maximum moral effect.

Therefore, it stands to reason that if attacks are spread out all over

Germany for a period and then perhaps concentrated on one objective

for three of four days, then scattered again and afterwards

concentrated, the whole of Germany will be uneasy as each town will

be expecting a three or four day of [sic] attack at any moment. 1

76

Contrary to his orders, and to most military thought, Trenchard intended to dissipate his scarce bombing machines in

an effort to undercut German morale. The scheme had two

advantages: (1) any claimed results could not readily be contradicted or criticized; and (2) the bombing of nearly any portion of enemy territory at any time was rationalized. Material

damage counted for less than moral effect, in the opinion of

the IF commander.

In the same light, Trenchard shuffled Newall's target categories, though without altering Newall's analysis; the first

classes became chemical works, iron/steel works, and

aero-engine/magneto works. He also added submarine and

shipbuilding works, large gun shops, and engine repair shops

to his list, objectives that Newall had included under "miscellaneous." For all of these latter categories, Trenchard merely

stated, "Details will be filled in later."'7 7 The depth of his evaluation for his "special long distance" objectives revealed simply

that large gun shops could be found in "Essen (home of the

Krupp Works) and Rhohr [sic] Valley Group," while the engine

repair shops he intended to bomb were "scatterd [sic] over

Germany. "18

Trenchard's strategic plan, as communicated to Weir, was

unworthy of his experience, reputation, and integrity as general officer commanding, Independent Force, RAF. Targets ostensibly selected because of their strategic importance in reality provided blanket justification for aerial assaults aimed at

German morale. In the case of Essen, this policy was to have

177
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

disastrous consequences for the IF on the evening of 16/17

September 1918. However, when Weir wrote to Trenchard on

29 June 1918, he offerred no objections to this superficial

program and commented only on the vulnerable construction

of most German industrial centers. 1

79

In point of fact, Trenchard's 23 June memorandum to Weir

also differed significantly from his "Operation Order No. I,"

issued to his subordinate commanders on 20 June, three days

before he wrote to Weir.'8 ° His field directive, "intended as a

guide in detailing operation orders to the units under your

command," dictated a different set of target categories.' 8'

20 June (Opn. Order 1) 23 June (Paver to Weir)

1. Chemical works. 1. Chemical works.

2. Iron and steel works. 2. Iron and steel works.

3. Railways. 3. Aero engine/Magneto works.

4. Aero engine/Magneto 4. Submarine/Shipbuilding

works. works.

5. Aerodromes. 5. Large gun shops.

6. Engine repair shops.

The targets Trenchard assured Weir that he planned to attack

were not the same objectives he ordered his commanders to

raid. The GOC IF concealed from his superior the fact that he

intended to assault tactical targets, enemy railways, and aerodromes. Trenchard ignored Sykes and the Air Staff, and was

less than candid with Weir.

Succeeding operation orders for June through August demonstrate the extent to which Trenchard operated in defiance of

Whitehall. For the period 29 June-2 July, he ordered his

squadrons to conduct strategic reconnaissance (an activity

which Sykes had prohibited) of the enemy rail network near

Thionville and Saarbrflcken. "For this purpose two machines

may be withdrawn from bombing operations."'8 2 Operation orders for the remainder of July, with one exception, designated

enemy aerodromes as primary objectives. Short-range FE2bs

in No. 100 Squadron were modified in the field to attack German airfields with incendiary bombs "on the first suitable

opportunity."81 3 Aerodromes and railways again constituted

the majority of assured targets during August.'8 4 On two occasions, long-distance objectives (Mannheim and Stuttgart on 7

178
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

July, Frankfurt on 6 August) were designated for attack once

conditions seemed favorable. At Frankfurt, consonant with

Trenchard's targeting of morale, specific aiming points included the "central portion of the city" on each side of the

bridge, as well as the main railroad and goods stations on the

outskirts. 1

85

As the DFO pointed out to Sykes in his memorandum of 11

September 1918, returns from the field betrayed Trenchard's

departure from Air Staff and War Cabinet bombing policy.

Further, two categories of targets (aerodromes and railways)

that Trenchard had not mentioned even in his confidential

paper to Weir, received the preponderance of IF attention between June and August 1918:

June July

Aerodromes 13.3% 28.0% 49.5%

Railways 55.0% 46.0% 31.0%

Total 68.3% 74.0% 80.5%186

In September, strikes against aerodromes and railways accounted for 84.6 percent of total IF bombing effort, verifying

that the upward trend continued into autumn. The GOC IF

did indeed set his own bombing policy.

By mid-October 1918, when negotiations were well under

way to organize an Inter-Allied Independent Bombing Force

under his control, Trenchard produced another paper embodying his latest target doctrine. The memorandum, "Order

of Importance and Types of Targets and Reasons for Importance," identified target categories without ever reaching any

firm conclusions.'8 7 Classes of objectives included "Chemical,

Poison Gas, Explosive, Munition, Powder Works, Aviation,

Blast Furnaces, and Railway Stations."

The GOC IF also betrayed his bias against independent aerial operations in favor of supporting the ground campaign.

The order of importance of the above targets depends on (a) The size of

works or Station (b) The output and the number of hands employed (c)

The locality (d) The temporary importance with regard to operations (e)

Paper importance.

The first three considerations simply mean that any large industrial complex within range could theoretically constitute a

179
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

worthwhile objective for the IF. The fourth criterion ties bombing priorities firmly to ground activity, as Trenchard's amplification made clear.

(d) By the temporary importance is meant: The Germans may be

making great use of Poison Gas shells or many troop trains may be

passing through a particular station during operations.

Hence by virtue of our positions, raids can be carried out on some of

the most important Chemical and railway centres with a view to, if

possible, reducing the output or hindering the traffic. 1

8 8

Trenchard's final point merely reasserted his independence

from London, particularly the Air Staff.

(e) Information and reports based on pre war knowledge enable the

Higher Command to decide on the relative importance of the military

objectives in Germany, but this only affects the policy in so far that it

gives the Commander of the Force some idea on which to base his

bombing programme. 1

89

A three-page list, giving "some of the most important obje6-

tives within range," though in no specific priority, closed this

extraordinary document. External agencies could only offer

advice, not influence IF policy. The fruits and costs of that

policy can now be assessed.

Notes

1. Malcolm Cooper, "British Air Policy on the Western Front, 1914-1918"

(PhD diss., Oxford University, 1982), 313-14.

2. Rear Adm M. E. F. Kerr, CB, MVO, memorandum to President, ]Air

Board, subject: War Cabinet, Air Policy, 11 October 1917, Milner Papers,'

Bodleian Library, Oxford, England, dep. 357, fols. 84-85.

3. S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War, vol. 1, 17W

Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto: Universit4r of

Toronto, 1980), 283n. Wise, official historian of the Royal Canadian' Air

Force, considered it "scarcely credible that such a memorandum should

have been written by a responsible staff officer." . 1 2

1 4. Milner Papers, Cecil to Milner, 11 October 1917, dep. 357, Wls.

98-102 -

5. Ibid., fols. 103, 115-16.

6. Milner Papers, dep. 357, fol. 73. - '

7. Trenchard Papers, correspondence with Lord Rothermere? 17

December 1917, Royal Air Force Museum (RAFM), Hendon, England, M`FC

76/1/89, sheet 1 of 2.

8. Ibid., 20 December 1917.

180
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

9. Milner Papers, dep. 357, "Note of Conversation with Tiverton,

25.12.17."

10. Public Record Office (PRO), Air Ministry Records

1/467/15/312/160, pt. II, Tiverton's request for Award of the 1915 Star.

11. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the

Development of British Air Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918

(London: Eimber, 1973), 112.

12. Lord Tiverton to Rear Adm Mark Kerr, 8 October 1917. Cited in

Jones, 152.

13. Ibid., 175; AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Secretary Air Ministry, Air

Ministry Office, memorandum, subject: Matters relating to Air Ministry

Staff, Office Memorandum No. 37, 3 June 1918 and List of Staff and

Distribution of Duties, October 1918.

14. Milner Papers, "Long Range Bombing," Sir Henry Norman, MP, 25

March 1918, dep. 358, fols. 191-220 (also in PRO, AIR

1/2422/305/18/17).

15. Ibid., fol. 196.

16. Ibid., fol. 197. Norman's data are consistent with Commons reply to

William Joynson-Hicks by Mr. MacPherson, Under-Secretary for War, on 20

March 1918. MacPherson stated that Newall's bombing force had dropped

48 tons of bombs while losing just 10 machines on 250 sorties during the

preceding five-month period. He also announced that the "accuracy . ..

beyond all shadow of a doubt" of aircrew reports had been confirmed by

aerial photographs. Aeroplane, 27 March 1918, 1152, 1154.

17. Milner Papers, dep. 358, fols. 191, 194, emphases added.

18. Milner Papers, dep. 358, fol. 198.

19. Ibid.

20. AIR 1/640, Capt Lambe to Admiralty, 31 October 1917.

,21. Milner Papers, Norman Report, dep. 358, fols. 201-6, 213.

22. Ibid.

23. Lord Rothermere at Gray's Inn, December 1917, quoted in Flight, 20

December 1917, 1325.

24. Ibid.

-25. Flight, 3 January 1918, 4.

26. Sir Almeric William Fitzroy, Memoirs, 2 vols. (London: Hutchinson,

1923), 667-68.

27. Andrew P. Boyle, Trenchard (London: Collins, 1962), 260.

28. Ibid., 261.

,29. AIR 1/522/16/12/5, "The BoMbing of Germany," Trenchard to

Lloyd George, 13 January 1918. Reprinted in H. A. Jones, War in the Air:

Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), Appendix 5, 22-24.

30. Ibid., 22.

- '3ý. ;Jones, War in the Air, Appendix 5, 23.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 23-24.

181
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

34. Wise, 284.

35. Admiralty (Naval Staff), Cmd. 1343, Distribution and Duties of the

Naval Staff, June 1921.

36. Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), Appendix 2, 398; and F. H. Hinsley, British

Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and

Operations, 3 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 1979),

vol. 1, 9.

37. AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Secretary, Air Ministry, Air Ministry Office,

memoranda, issued periodically for 3 June 1918 and October 1918.

38. Air Ministry, Air Historical Branch, Members of the Air Council and

Air Force Board of Defence Council, 1918 (London: HMSO, September 1973),

5A. Dates of office are in Ministry of Defence.

39. AIR 1/2087/207/8/3, Air Ministry Office Memorandum No. 105, 20

June 1919; and C. G. Grey, A History of the Air Ministry (London: G. Allen &

Unwin, 1940), facing 304, depicts the combined Directorate and Air

Ministry reorganization as of 1921. In this resepect F. H. Hinsley (British

Intelligence in the Second War) errs when he claims that "when the Air Staff

was set up in 1918... the Air Intelligence Branch was made a subordinate

part of the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence," 9.

40. Maurice Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, 1914-1918 (London:

Bell, 1920), Illustrates Trenchard's temperament and style of staff

management.

41. Fitzroy, 666.

42. Ibid., 666-67.

43. Trenchard's antipathy did not abate with time. See comments in

MFC 76-1-542, "Note by Lord Trenchard on Reading From Many Angles by

General Sir Fredrick Sykes, 1943," 19 January 1943.

44. Sykes suffered by his professional proximity to Trenchard. For

differing evaluations, see Boyle; H. R. Allen, The Legacy of Lord Trenchard

(London: Cassell, 1972); and F. H. Sykes, From Many Angles: An

Autobiography (London: Harrap, 1942). i I

45. King George V sent Lord Stamfordham to Lloyd George "to protest pn

behalf of the King about Trenchard being superseded," Stephen W. Roskill,

Hankey, Man of Secrets, vol. 1, 1877-1918 (London: Collins, 1970), 519. For

debates on the Air Ministry, Rothermere and a new position for Trenchard,

see Hansard, 1918, cv. 1306-1368 (29 April), 1710 (2 May), 1978 (7 May)

and cvi. 30 (13 May). Reprinted verbatim the Parliamentary "Air Force

Debate: of 29 April 1918," Aeroplane, 1 May 1918, 1588-1596.

46. PRO, AIR 1/433/16/12/121, Haig to Trenchard, 17 and 25 April

1918.

47. MFC 76/1/20, Trenchard Papers, Weir to Trenchard, 30 April 1918.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., Trenchard to Weir, 1 May 1918.

50. MFC 76/1/20, Trenchard to Weir, 1 May 1918.

51. Ibid., Trenchard-Weir exchange, 3, 5 May 1918.

182
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

52. Ibid., Weir to Trenchard, 6 May 1918.

53. Ibid., Weir to Trenchard, emphasis added.

54. MFC 76/1/20, Weir to Trenchard, emphasis added.

55. Ibid., Trenchard to Weir, 8 May 1918. An official summary prepared

by the Air Ministry in September 1929, A Short History of the Royal Air Force

(AP 125), does not mention Trenchard's first tenure as CAS. It leads one to

believe that he went directly from GOC, RFC to GOC, IF on 6 June 1918

(383).

.56. Hansard, 1918, cvi, 30.

57. PRO, Cabinet Office Records (CAB) 24/51, GT 4553, Constitution of

Independent Force, RAF for carrying out bombing raids on Germany, 13

May 1918.

58. CAB 24/51.

59. Boyle, 329-30: Wise, 296-97; and Newall Papers, War Diary of

Eighth Brigade, B392.

60. PRO, AIR 1/461/15/312/104, Trenchard to Weir, letter C4/10,

"Miscellaneous Correspondence: Independent Air Force," 3 July 1918.

61. PRO, AIR 2/12, 13,17,18 contain Air Council minutes for this

period. Approximately twice as much time was devoted to uniforms and

rank titles for the new RAF as to its strategic bombing role.

62. Wise, 298.

63. MFC 76/1/32 Trenchard Papers, Private Diary, June-November

1918, entry for 10 June.

64. PRO, AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Air Ministry Office Memoranda issued

periodically by Secretary, Air Ministry, 3 June 1918, October 1918.

65. PRO, AIR 1/461/15/312/107, file 130, Gammell to P. R. C. Groves,

27 May 1918.

66. Air Ministry, The Monthly Air Force List, October-December 1918.

67. PRO, AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Air Ministry Office Memorandum No.

37, June 1918; and List of Staff and Distribution of Duties, October 1918. " 68. E. D. Harding et al., A History of Number 16 Squadron (known as "A"

Naval Squadron) Royal Naval Air Service Renumbered 216 Squadron

Independent Force Royal Air Force (London: H. W. Hill & Son, 1923), 5-6, 9.

"69. Ibid., 16, 24.

'70. Ibid., 64.

71. Air Ministry, "Monthly Air Force List" for February 1919 does not

show them on active service.

72. PRO, AIR 1/460/15/312/97, letter 14/44 to Gammell as F03 head,

I 5October 1918.

73. PRO, AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Air Ministry Office Memorandum No.

••)7 3 June 1918.

74. PRO, AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Air Ministry List of Staff and

Distribution of Duties, October 1918.

75. PRO, AIR 1/452/15/312/24'and AIR 1/461/15/312/107, contains

details of such interoffice coordination.

. 183
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

76. PRO, AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Air Ministry List of Staff and

Distribution of Duties, October 1918.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., June 1918, October 1918.

79. Ibid., June 1918, October 1918, November 1918. Air Ministry,

"Monthly Air Force List," February 1919.

80. Air Ministry, "Monthly Air Force List," July 1920.

81. Ibid., January 1920.

82. PRO, AIR 1/31/15/1/60, Propaganda Section Formation in Air

Intelligence Directorate and Policy of, DDAI to CAS, letter, 22 April 1918.

83. PRO, AIR 1/31/15/60. Trenchard's resignation as CAS (tendered to

Rothermere in March) was not accepted till 12 April 1918. Correspondence

on the proposed Propaganda Section was initiated on 5 March 1918.

84. PRO, AIR 1/13/15/1/60, Propaganda Section Formation in Air

Intelligence Directorate and Policy of, DDAI to CAS, letter, 22 April 1918.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. PRO, AIR 1/208/207/8/37, Air Ministry List of Staff and

Distribution of Duties, June 1918, October 1918.

88. Ibid.

89. PRO, AIR 1/450/15/312/4, "Proposed Minute on the formation of a

Strategic Committee Dealing with Air Matters," 19 April 1918.

90. PRO, AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Air Ministry List of Staff and

Distribution of Duties, October 1918. Later the Strategic Council, with the

same membership, was known as the Strategic Committee.

91. PRO, AIR 1/450/15/312/4, Documents relating to the Strategic

Council in Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing, 174.

92. Milner Papers, dep. 357, fols. 142-46, Weir, memorandum to Milner,

subject: Certain Lines of Policy Regulating the Conduct of the Air Ministry.

23 May 1918. Reprinted in H. A. Jones, War in the Air, Appendix 7, 26-28.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Milner Papers, dep 357, fols. 164-69 (GT 5425), Lord Weir,

memorandum, subject: War Cabinet Allocation for Royal Air Force, 13

August 1918.

96. Ibid. Enclosure to G.T. 5424, 13 August 1918.

97. Milner Papers, dep. 357, fols. 164-69, enclosure to GT 5424.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid. Emphasis added.

100. Milner Papers, dep. 357, fols. 147-49, Weir, memorandum to

Milner, subject: Independent Air Force Command for Long Range bombing

of Germany, 23 May 1918.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. MFC 76/1/68, Trenchard Papers, Major-General Sykes,

memorandum to Trenchard, subject: Conversation between Mr. Lloyd

184
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

George, M. Clemenceau, and Himself, at Versailles on Monday, 3rd June

1918, sheet 2 of 2.

104. MFC 76/1/89, Trenchard Papers, Trenchard, HQ RFC in the field,

to Rothermere, Air Ministry, 23 December 1917, sheet 1 of 2.

105. MFC 76/1/30, Trenchard Papers; and PRO, AIR 1/1985/273/107.

106. Ibid.

107. Wise, 308; PRO, AIR 1/1997/204/273/251, "Formation of the

Inter-Allied Independent Air force" file, contains correspondence with Allied

political authorities and their military chiefs; and H. A. Jones, War in the

Air, Appendices, 8-11; Sykes to War Cabinet, "Notes by the Chief of the Air

Staff on the Independent Royal Air Force, and the Proposed Inter-Allied

Strategic Bombing Force," 7 August 1918.

108. Milner Papers, dep. 357, fols. 217-18, Tiverton to Milner, 30

September 1918.

109. MFC 76/1/32, Trenchard Papers, Private Diary, June-November

1918, entry for 18 June 1918.

110. Ibid., entry for 20 June 1918.

111. Ibid., entry for3 July 1918.

112. "Air Service lessons learned during the present war," postwar

report of Foulois to Pershing, commander in Chief, AEF, 20 January 1919,

par. 128. Reprinted in Maurer Maurer, ed., The U.S. Air Service in World

War I, vol. 4, Postwar Review (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 1979), 27.

1'13. The Air Council was particularly tactless in notifying Haig about

the Independent Force. On 11 June 1918 they announced that IF would be

"administered direct by the Air Ministry." Specifically, "The Field Marshal C.

in C. British Armies in France will exercise no control over the Independent

Force, R.A.F." Quoted in Air Commodore R. W. Brooke-Popham, 'The

Independent Force," lecture, RAF Staff College, November 1923, Newall

Papers, B405.

114. MFC 76/1/68, Trenchard Papers, "Composition of Headquarters,

Independent Force, Royal Air Force. Corrected to 8th October 1918.

Confidential." This detailed booklet, at the Air Historical Branch (AHD No.

204/273/258) while the RAF official history was written, was not

frangferred to the Air Ministry files at the Kew PRO.

115. PRO, AIR 1460/15/312/101, "The Urgency of Decisions for the

1918 Programme," Tiverton to CAS through DFO, 22 May 1918; and AC/2,

Halsbury Papers, box 3, 16a.

116. N. Jones, Origins, 181.

117. AIR 1/460/15/312/97, "A List of Targets in Germany," Tiverton to

DVO, 2 July 1918; and AC 73/2, Halsbury Papers, box 3, 24.a. In Origins,

N-- 5j;nes discusses Tiverton's plans in'detail, 181-83.

118. F. H. Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War by Major-General Sir F.: J

Sykes (London: Edward Arnold, 1922), 90.

119. "Review of Air Situation and Strategy for the Information of the

Imp6rial War Cabinet," Sykes to War Cabinet, 28 June 1918. Reprinted in

gykbg, From Many Angles, Appendix 5, 550-54.

185
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

120. Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War, 90-91.

121. Sykes, "Review of Air Situation and Strategy," 28 June 1918.

122. PRO, AIR 1/462/312/16, "Operation Order for the Guidance of the

Independent Force," n.d., probably early July 1918.

123. AIR 1/460/15/312/97, "Paper on Targets within Easy Reach of

Ochey," Tiverton to DFO, 3 July 1918; and AC 73/2, Halsbury Papers, box

3, 24c.

124. AIR 1/461/312/107, "On the Inadvisability of Giving Publicity to

Particular Targets," Tiverton to DFO, 18 June 1918; and AC 73/2 Halsbury

Papers, box 3, 22c.

125. PRO, AIR 1/461/15/312/104, file C4/5, Trenchard to Air Ministry,

telegram 4:45 P.M., 6 June 1918.

126. Ibid., Trenchard to Air Ministry, 6 June 1918; and Official Diary of

IF, entry for 6 June 1918, MFC 76/1/30, Trenchard Papers. This latter

source also records that, on the day after drafting his first press release,

Trenchard "drew up the organization for the Independent Force" (entry for 7

June 1918).

127. AIR 1/461/15/312/107, file 08/90B, F03 to DFO, 18 September

1918.

128. AIR 1/461/15/312/107, "An Analysis of One Week's Bombing

Raids," Tiverton to DFO, 4 July 1918; and AC73/2, Halsbury Papers, box 3,

25.a.

129. Ibid.

130. Milner Papers, dep. 357, fols. 179-87; and "Review of Operations

(April to July, 1918)," Tiverton to D.F.O., n.d., probably mid-August 1918,

AC 73/2, Halsbury Papers, box 3, 27.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, entries for July 1918, B392, Newall

Papers.

135. Ibid.

136. US Bombing Survey, in Maurer, Postwar Review, 365.

137. "Review of Operations (April to July 1918)," Tiverton to DFO, n.d.

138. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, entry for 8 August 1918, B392,

Newall Papers; AIR 1/1999/204/273/269, Report on the Effects of

Bombing German Blast Furnaces, Maj H. W. M. Paul to Air Ministry, 26

February 1919; and US Bombing Survey, in Maurer, Postwar Review, 494.

139. "Review of Operations (April to July 1918)," Tiverton to DFO, n.d.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.

186
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE

147. Wise, 307 and photo caption between 229-30. Wise seems to have

misinterpreted Tiverton's memorandum to the DFO, "On the Advantages to

F.O.3 of a Personal Bombing of Germany," 21 June 1918, AC 73/2,

Halsbury Papers, box 3, 23.b.

148. Milner Papers, Tiverton to P. R. C. Groves, 20 August 1918, dep.

357, fols. 190-92.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid., fol. 189, 21 August 1918.

151. AIR 1/460/15/312/97, file 14/39, "I.F., R.A.F. 'Policy,'" DFO to

CAS, 11 September 1918.

152. Ibid.

153. AIR 1/460/15/312/97. Underlined portions indicate differences

between Groves' draft and final versions. In the draft "far" was omitted, and

"that every effort... was created" was originally rendered as "that is should

be still further decreased and effort directed more against chemical works

and steel factories." Groves' final narrative emphasizes the assigned duties

of the IF to a greater degree than his first draft. N. Jones, Origins, 189-90,

cites the draft version.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. AIR 1/460/15/312/97.

157. N. Jones, Origins, 190.

158. Ibid., 190-91.

159. AIR 1/460/15/312/101, file PL2/23, Tiverton to DFO, 1 October

1918; and AC 73/2, Halsbury Papers, box 3, 10a.

160. Milner Papers, Tiverton to Milner, cover letter, 30 September 1918,

dep. 357, fols., 218-22.

161. Ibid.

162. Milner Papers, dep. 357, fols., 218-22.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. PRO, AIR 1/2422/305/18/11, Trenchard to Weir, 23 June 1918;

and AIR 1/460/15/312/101, Newall to Sykes, 27 May 1918.

166. AIR 1/460/15/312/101, Salmond's cover letter, 27 May 1918, for

Newall's memorandum to the CAS.

167. PRO, AIR 1/1986/204/273/114, GOC, Eighth Brigade, 12 May

1918.

168. In his accompanying memorandum Trenchard stated, "On the next

paper I have discussed the tactics to be adopted in the bombing of those

industrial centres in Germany." AIR 1/2422/305/18/11, Trenchard,

memorandum to Weir, subject: Memorandum on the Bombing of Germany,

23 June 1918.

169. AIR 1/460/15/312/101, Newall to CAS, 27 May 1918.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.

172. Ibid.

187
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

173. AIR 1/460/15/312/101, "Criticism of a Paper by General Newall,"

Tiverton to DFO, 6 June 1918; and AC 73/2, Halsbury Papers, box 3, 19b.

174. AIR 1/460/15/312/101, Newall to CAS, 27 May 1918.

175. AIR 1/2422/305/18/11, Trenchard to Weir, 23 June 1918.

176. Ibid.

177. Ibid.

178. Ibid. The GOC, IF's phrasing ("scattered over Germany") and

spelling "Rohr" for "Ruhr") duplicate that in Tiverton's paper to the DFO,

"Strategic Bombing: Objectives in Order of Importance," May 1918, AC

73/2, Halsbury Papers, box 3, 9b.

179. AIR 1/2422/305/18/11, Weir to Trenchard ("secret and

confidential"), 29 June 1918.

180. AIR 1/1649/204/95/3, "Operation Order No. 1 by Major General

Sir H. M. Trenchard, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Independent Force,

Royal Air Force," 29 June 1918.

181. AIR 1/2422/305/18/11, 23 June 1918.

182. AIR 1/1649/204/95/3, IF Operation Order No. 2, June-2 July

1918.

183. Ibid.; and IF Operations Orders No.'s 3, 5-7, 7-27, July 1918.

184. Ibid.; IF Operation Orders No.'s 12, 16-18, 6-24 August 1918.

185. Ibid.; IF Operation Order No. 12, 6 August 1918.

186. AIR 1/460/15/312/97, DFO to CAS, 11 September 1918.

Percentages for June-August based on data in the Tabular Summary

(discussed earlier) are somewhat higher: 83.5 percent in June, 80.9 percent

in July, and 88.9 percent in August.

187. AIR 1/1986/204/273/5, GOC, IF, 15 October 1918.

188. Ibid.

189. Ibid.

188
Chapter 5

Eighth Brigade and

Independent Force Operations

The magnitude of Eighth Brigade and Independent Force

operations between 11 February and November 1918 increased substantially as new bombing units augmented the

force. During May and late August, three DH9/9A daylight

squadrons reinforced No. 55 Squadron. In August also, three

Handley Page squadrons joined the long-range night effort as

No. 100 Squadron converted to Handley Pages from the agile

but obsolescent FEs. By September, Trenchard's command

totaled nine active bombing squadrons-a level maintained

until the Armistice.

The magnitude of strategic bombing activity during the last

year of the war is best evaluated in the aggregate. Trends and

conclusions drawn from cumulative results yield considerably

more insight than a descriptive summary of daily raids. Data

extracted from chronological records help provide raw materials for further evaluation. Target categories developed earlier

(blast furnaces, munition/chemical works, aerodromes, the

rail system, and miscellaneous) are particularly illuminating

in this context. They provide the indices to measure the full

discrepancies between policy and reality as the British independent bombing campaign continued into 1918. The belated

expansion of Independent Force inexorably determined the

scope and pace of its active operations.

During the spring and summer of 1918, three daytime bombardment squadrons equipped with DeHavilland 9 and 9A

machines arrived in the Nancy-Ochey area. Externally, the

DH9 resembled the dependable but aging DH4. Compared to

its predecessor, the DH9 shifted the pilot's cockpit rearward,

sandwiching the two main fuel tanks between the engine and

an internal compartment in which bombs were hung vertically. Its wings, rear fuselage, landing gear, and tail unit were

identical to those of the DH4.1 In the air, the DH9 represented

a regression in performance: a service ceiling of 17,500 feet

189
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

versus 23,000 feet for the DH4, and a cruising speed at altitude of 91 miles per hour versus 122.5 miles per hour for the

DH4.2 Although the DH9 relocated the pressurized fuselage

fuel tank that had bedeviled the pilot and observer in the

DH4, the low power and unreliability of its liquid-cooled 230-

horsepower Siddeley Puma engine hampered it tactically.

The Siddeley-Deasy Motor Company of Coventry had modified the Beardmore-Halford-Pullinger (BHP) six-cylinder engine for mass production. It also featured an adjustable underslung radiator that could be lowered into the slipstream

beneath the machine for cooling.3

This feature contributed to a number of DH9 losses; Germans attacking DH9 formations tended to fire low, whether by

accident or design, so that the extended radiator was frequently holed.4 Coolant leakage caused the engine to seize and

forced the crew to land behind enemy lines. As one pilot

noted, low temperatures at altitude sometimes had the same

results as enemy fire.

Engines were however very unreliable things then, and this (Siddeley

Puma) was no exception; it was always giving trouble; and if not the

engine itself, then the installation or the water-cooling system. The

exposed part of the radiator sometimes froze up and ruptured during

high flying in very low temperatures. Then we came lower, the ice

would melt, we would lose the water, and there would be a seize-up of

the whole engine soon afterwards. 5

Altogether, the DH9 did not provide the improved performance for which the air arm had hoped. It had been ordered in

quantity when, partially in response to the German daylight

raid on London on 13 June 1917, the War Office decided to

enlarge the size of the Royal Flying Corps by 92 squadrons

(from 108 to 200), mostly bombing units. Its numerous shortcomings did not appear until the type came into large-scale

production. As one aviation historian has observed, the DH9

"was rashly substituted for the 'Four' in the contracts."6

By November 1917, when both Haig and Trenchard bitterly

inveighed against further production of the DH9, the logistic

situation was such that they had to make do with the "Nine"

or nothing at all.7 No. 99 and No. 104 Squadrons joined the

Eighth Brigade on 3 May and 20 May respectively, and flew

the DH9 almost for the duration.8

190
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

The chronic problems experienced with the Siddeley Puma

version of the 230-horsepower BHP engine apparently

stemmed from fundamental design flaws. To simplify construction, J. D. Siddeley had altered some basic structural

features of Frank Halford's power plant, which had been derived from a contemporary Hispano-Suiza model.9 In July

1917, early in the program, it was discovered that 90 percent

of the aluminum cylinder blocks were defective. Later, problems arose with the exhaust valves.1 0

Such continuing difficulties with the DH9 power plant seriously degraded the tactical effort of No. 99 and No. 104

Squadrons. Mechanical problems throughout 1918 constituted a significant handicap to their participation in the longrange daylight bombing campaign. In its first two missions to the railway triangle at

Metz-Sablon on 21 and 22 May, No. 99 Squadron launched

six DH9s each day; all six managed to bomb successfully.11

For the remainder of May, the squadron suffered aircraft

aborts for engine trouble on every mission, except for an operation diverted by weather from Thionville to Metz-Sablon on

the last day of the month. On six missions, 14 DH9s (of 60

launched) were unable to bomb owing to engine problems.

Nine other planes aborted because of adverse weather.

During May, 23 of 77 aircraft launched by No. 99 Squadron

proved unable to bomb their primary targets, alternate targets, or targets of opportunity-an abort/launch ratio of 29.9

percent. Inexperience partially accounts for this high failure

rate, but it never became negligible.

:Thirty-one of 161 DH9s launched by No. 99 Squadron during.June 1918 aborted with engine difficulties; on just three

missions did every machine that took off manage to complete

the operation. In July, on 11 missions for which data are

available, 14 of 109 DH9s dropped out of formation with engine problems. On only two missions during the month did

the squadron launch 12 planes and suffer no mechanical

troubles. In August 1918, 16 of 64 machines launched by No.

99 Squadron had to abort because of engine problems.

No. 104 Squadron, also operating with Siddeley Pumaequipped DH9s, suffered the same sort of mechanical prob191
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

lems after their arrival in the Nancy-Ochey area on 20 May

1918. In No. 104's maiden mission, to the Metz-Sablon railway triangle on 8 June, two of the 12 machines had to abort

because of malfunctioning engines. A third aircraft, which

spun out and lost formation, was unable to bomb. The next

day, engine problems forced five of 12 DH9s to abandon a raid

on Hagendingen. For the remainder of June, No. 104 flew

eight missions for which analysis is possible; on all eight,

aircraft dropped out with mechanical difficulties. Of 89 DH9s

launched, 17 returned to base with bad engines.

Tactical inexperience also contributed to No. 104 Squadron's difficulties in their first month of service flying. On 24

June, the raid leader aborted with engine trouble and two

aircraft mistakenly followed him home. Twelve 104 machines

left their aerodrome on 26 June to raid the railway station at

Karlsruhe; three returned with engine trouble, and four aircraft failed to rendezvous with the formation before it crossed

the lines. Of the five aircraft that proceeded, one went missing

and one crashed in Switzerland. Only three of the dozen ships

launched managed to bomb their objective.

Returns for July are incomplete, but No. 104 Squadron

seems to have established a learning curve; that is, their engine situation improved somewhat. Two six-ship raids bombed

without any mechanical aborts on 6 and 7 July. On 1 July,

two DH9s with engine trouble dropped out of a 10-ship mission to Metz-Sablon. The next day, on a six-aircraft mission,

the raid leader's machine and one other had mechanical problems. The leader's flare signal to the formation was misunderstood, and the remaining four aeroplanes mistakenly dropped

their bombs early. Inexperience and mechanical unreliability

continued to plague the Independent Force throughout 1918.

On 31 August, No. 110 "Hyderabad" Squadron joined the

Independent Force. The only daylight unit to be equipped from

the outset with DH9As, all its aeroplanes had been donated by

the Nizam of Hyderabad.' 2 The 9A's wing area was about 11

percent greater than that of the DH4 and DH9.11 It had been

developed to rectify the flaws of the DH9 and the BHP power

plant, replacing the latter with either the 400-horsepower 12-

cylinder American Liberty engine or the 375-horsepower Rolls

192
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

Royce Eagle VIII. Production of the Liberty proved disappointing; only one-third of the anticipated total delivery reached

Britain.14 Performance with the Rolls Royce power plant at

best made the DH9A roughly equivalent to the DH4, the ship

the DH9 originally was to supplant.15

So far as Trenchard's command in 1918 was concerned,

each of his new daylight units had a performance roughly

equal to that of No. 55 Squadron, the original day squadron in

Newall's 41st Wing, in DH4s-a type first flown at Hendon in

August 1916.16

Tactics for day bombing never evolved appreciably from the

six-ship wedge and "follow the leader" procedures common in

late 1917.11 A standard mission for a single day squadron

consisted of 12 planes, arranged in two formations, assembled

from the unit's complement of 18 machines. This 67 percent

operational commitment reflected the expected wastage and

serviceability rates discussed previously. Although payload

.varied with distance to target, returns indicate that an individual aeroplane carried approximately 250 pounds of bombs on

an average long-range sortie in daylight. Thus a typical squadron could deliver approximately 3,000 pounds of bombs on a

single mission. By September, the day component of the Independent Force had the capacity to lift 12,000 pounds of

bombs under average conditions.

,..Records of Trenchard's command during summer 1918 only

indirectly detail the extent to which aircrew casualties curtailed the daylight bombing campaign. The official history,

squadron publications, and postwar memoirs provide addi-

,tional but incomplete information on casualties to supplement

,IF wartime returns. However, a comprehensive analysis of the

impact of casualty rates upon the long-range bombing campaign has yet to be published.

I,,H. A. Jones' statistics in the official history, claiming to

-,provide the "detail of personnel casualties" between June and

November 1918, are incomplete and somewhat misleading. 18

Listing operational squadrons in numerical order, rather than

prganizational or chronological order, Jones simply enumerated. total losses to flying personnel: "K," "W," or "M" in each

pnitL His totals in each category are 29 killed, 64 wounded,

193
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

and 235 missing; he did not further elaborate.' 9 The official

historian fails to provide data on aircrew killed or injured in

aircraft accidents and those taken ill or otherwise unavailable

for operations.

The Independent Force itself maintained daily casualty returns by squadron and submitted weekly summaries of aircrew casualties.2" Independent Force Form IF A8 provided returns on casualties among pilots and observers between June

1918 and the Armistice, beginning every Sunday and ending

the following Saturday.2

" Reports for this period, the same

interval tabulated in the official history, use these detailed

loss classifications:

BATTLE CASUALTIES OTHER PERSONNEL LOSSES

1. Killed 6. Sick

2. Wounded 7. Home Establishment for rest

3. Missing 8. Home Establishment for further

training

ACCIDENTAL CASUALTIES 9. Home Establishment for train4. Killed ing, Pilot

5. Injured 10. Reclassified

11. Return to Unit

The category of "Accidental Casualties" did not include officers

who had crossed the lines and then been accidentally killed or

injured; such losses were reported as "battle casualties."22

Data from IF returns (29 killed, 66 wounded, 229 missing)

accord fairly well with the totals compiled in the official history (29, 64, and 235). However, H. A. Jones, by omitting eight

other casualty categories that depleted aircrew strength,

downplayed the magnitude and significance of operational

losses.

Night operations were more demanding and dangerous than

flights by day. As the wisdom of the time stated, "Flying at

night is no different from flying in the daytime, except you

can't see."23 Replacement pilots or observers joining Handley'

Page night squadrons of the British long-range bombing campaign in 1918 ran approximately twice the risk of becoming

accidental casualties as their day colleagues. However, they

were four to five times less likely to become battle casualties.

Sick rates, which tend to vary directly with the intensity of

194
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

active operations, bear out these general conclusions. Handley

Page squadrons, with roughly the same number of aircrew

members per squadron as the day units (10 three-man crews

versus 18 two-man crews) and outnumbering the day component by five squadrons to four, had less than one-third the

number reporting sick between June and November 1918.

These cumulative returns justify further investigation of the

losses suffered by the IF's day squadrons. Trenchard noted in

his private diary that, "None of the day bombing squadrons

are working at present owing to the shortage of pilots and

machines."24 It was his offensive policy, however, that precipitated these shortages between June and November 1918.

Only the original IF squadron, No. 55 in the DH4, was able

to continue without prolonged interruptions during the summer and fall of 1918. All of the others (99, 104, and 110) were

forced repeatedly to stand down at various times owing to

heavy aircrew losses. These four squadrons joined the Independent Force (or its predecessors) between 11 October 1917

and 31 August 1918. Predictably, the less tactical experience

a squadron had, the higher its casualty rates in both combat

and accident.

No. 55 Squadron had amassed nearly eight months of experience in long-range bombing before the Independent Force

was created on 6 June 1918. At full strength, No. 55 would

have approximately 36 pilots and observers to man its 18

two-seater planes. During the six-month period from June

through November, No. 55 Squadron also lost two aircrewmen

killed and four injured in aircraft accidents. The unit's highest

sick rate (seven) occurred in August-the month in which the

squadron suffered its highest battle losses. Altogether, 20 aircrewmen reported sick in No. 55 Squadron between June and

the Armistice.25 Between July and September, despite aircrew

losses totaling 125 percent, No. 55 continued to fly missions.

A colleague in No. 100 Squadron noted that No. 55 was greatly

in need of escorts.

55 had been having a bad spin, losing machines day after day, but

they never wavered.... They were flying D.H.4's and really needed

escorts, for the Hun scouts gave them a bad time. 26

195
.BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

In those months, a total of 19 replacement DH4s (6 in July, 10

in August, 3 in September) were delivered to the IF so it could

continue operations without interruptions.27

The second day unit, No. 99, flying DH9s, joined the British bombing

campaign on 3 May 1918. Its first mission, a raid on the Metz-Sablon

railway triangle on 21 May, was completed with no losses.28

As with No. 55 Squadron, No. 99's sick rates fluctuated with

operational losses: Five aircrewmen reported sick in July, four

in August, eleven in September, nine in October.29

Casualties owing to medical unfitness for high-altitude flying, as well as influenza, plagued No. 99's pilots and observers

from the outset.30 On 23 May, three days after the squadron

entered active service, a young lieutenant was pronounced

"medically unfit for high flying" after a raid on Metz-Sablon

from altitudes between 13,500 and 14,000 feet.3

" On 9 June,

two officers returned from a mission to Dillingen at 14,000

feet complaining of "breathing difficulty." Another lieutenant

suffered "faintness in the air," while the commander of "B"

Flight was medically judged "unfit for high flying" owing to an

old lung wound.32 Later in June, two lieutenants were "lost to

Squadron owing to sickness," and one dropped out of a mission, "having fainted in the air."33 By 3 July, one observer in

No. 99 had passed out in the air with appendicitis, and five

other aircrewmen had been admitted to hospital with "influenza, which was raging at the time."34 Losses to illness compounded casualties from enemy action during July.

SAircrew shortages forced No. 99 Squadron to cease operations at the end of July. On 30 July, a US Air Service pilot and

his observer, flying with the RAF, died when their DH9 broke

up in the air. Another machine landed at Azelot with the pilot

shot through the foot and his observer dead in the cockpit. 35

These demoralizing incidents presaged the next day's losses.

On 31 July, 12 DH9s took off from Azelot aerodrome on a

mission to bomb Mainz. Three machines aborted with engine

trouble shortly after takeoff and the remaining nine ships were

attacked by approximately 40 hostile scouts near Saarb.rcken. Seeing that it would be impossible to reach Mainz in

the face of such odds, the flight leader decided to bomb Saar196
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

bricken. Even with this new objective, four more aeroplanes

were shot down prior to bombing.

On the return journey, three more of the five remaining machines in

the formation were put out of action, and it was probably due to the

appearance of two formations of 104 Squadron, which had just

crossed the lines, that the two surviving D.H.9's of No. 99 . . . were

able to regain the aerodrome. 36

On the last two days of July, No. 99 Squadron lost eight

aircrewmen killed, one wounded, and nine missing in action-exactly half its total operational strength.

Comparison of aircrew rosters for "A," "B," and "C" Flights

shows that the unit had 42 pilots and observers available for

duty on 21 May 1918. Eight weeks later, on 25 July, 20 pilots

and observers remained; after the losses on 30 and 31 July,

11 remained of the original group. 7

These severe losses made it impossible for the Squadron to muster

enough pilots and observers for a raid till reinforcements had been

trained up to the necessary standard in formation flying.38

No. 99 Squadron did not participate in any active air operations between 1 August and 15 August, confining itself to

formation practices. During this time, 27 DH9s were delivered

to the Independent Force. 9

On 15 August, the two daylight units attempted a joint raid

against Boulay aerodrome, just 32 miles over the lines. The

"C" Flight commander, in a commendable display of leadership on his first: operation with his squadron, participated.

However, No. 99's tactical fortunes did not improve significantly.

Fourteen machines left the ground at about 2.30 p.m. Owing to very

hot weather, and the inexperience of the new pilots in climbing their

machines, only four actually bombed the objective, obtaining a

number of hits on the edge of the aerodrome, but clear of the

hangars.40

Bombing altitude that day was 11,000 feet, well below the

theoretical service ceiling for the DH9.4' Pattinson's narrative

underscores the organizational difficulties caused by mediocre

planes flown by replacements, even to an objective just 44

miles from No. 99's aerodrome.

197
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Throughout the remainder of August, No. 99 launched only

six missions, including two single-ship sorties above the cloud

blanket to raid the blast furnaces near Dillingen. Major Pattinson and his observer had to abort their first sortie when they

"found the weather unsuitable over the lines." On their second

attempt, they dropped two 112-pound bombs fitted with 15-

second delay fuses on Dillingen.

One . . . was reported by the observer as having burst on a blast

furnace, and caused a very large flash of flame, and the other having

hit the railway line which runs round outside the factory. 42

The D.H.9 used for this raid was fitted with a standard 5/17

Creagh-Osborne compass, and no turn indicator was used.

This was the only single machine daylight raid carried out on

Germany by a unit of the Independent Force, and also the only

daylight raid successfully accomplished by navigation without any

sight of landmarks on the route. A telegram of congratulations was

received by Major Pattinson from General Trenchard. 43

This feat of airmanship, carried out by a squadron commander who had first flown with his unit less than a week

before, attests to Pattinson's character and leadership. At a

time when his men were in low spirits, his example must have

perceptibly boosted aircrew morale and confidence.

The German bomb-plot diagram of Dillingen confirms that

two bombs fell into the city between 1540 and 1545 on 20

August. One bomb detonated well north of the furnace complex; the other failed to explode."

Despite the relatively slow pace of active operations, losses

continued through August and into September. On 13 and 15

September, four of No. 99's original aircrewmen were admitted

to hospital and "finally transferred to the Home Establishment."45

All had been unwell for several weeks, but had continued their flying

duties, and avoided the Medical Officer, till the younger pilots and

observers had been trained to take their places.46

Toward the end of September, No. 99 Squadron also experienced several changes in its chain of command. Major Pattinson moved out to take over command of 41st Wing when Lt

Col J. E. A. Baldwin was transferred to Home Establishment.4

Capt P. E. Welchman then became commander of No. 99. On

198
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

26 September, Welchman, emulating Pattinson's habit of leading from the front, was shot down and captured.48 Capt W. D.

Thorn became the third commanding officer (CO) of No. 99

Squadron in less than a week.

The mission on which Captain Welchman was lost marked

the beginning of a second stand-down period for No. 99

Squadron. That day, three of ten aircraft aborted almost immediately-two with engine problems and one because he

"could not get into position."49

Capt. Welchman perceived that it would be quite impossible to reach

Thionville, and gave the signal for bombs to be dropped in

Metz-Sablon. (Both objectives lay almost due north of Azelot, No. 99's

airfield. Metz-Sablon is approximately 40 miles distant, Thionville 19

miles further north.)

Of the seven D.H.9's which crossed the Lines, only one, piloted by

Lieut. West, actually returned to Azelot, carrying the body of the

observer, Lieut. Howard, who had been killed by a machine-gun

bullet.50

On the next day, the sole survivor of this operation, Lieutenant West, received a "transfer to the Home Establishment for a

change of duty."51 No. 99 did not bomb again until 9 October,

when eleven DH9s raided Metz-Sablon. No planes were lost,

though one machine aborted the mission with engine problems.

That the Independent Force enjoyed a priority in logistic

support is apparent from the replacement rates and aircraft

types which Trenchard's command received. The IF received

14 replacement DH9s and 55 DH9As between 16 August and

the end of October, the interval of highest wastage in the day

squadrons.52 During September, the Independent Force received just nine of the generally unsatisfactory-and unwanted-DH9 machines while Salmond's units found themselves with 87 of them.5 a The IF also gained 38 of the newer

DH9As that month as the rest of the Royal Air Force received

a total of 20.41

-Trenchard's organization, which fielded approximately 10

percent of the total British air strength in the field, received

nearly twice as many of the new DeHavilland planes as the

rest of the air arm. Put another way, the IF received more than

four DH9As for every DH9 they received as replacements in

199
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

September while Salmond's RAF had a reverse ratio-more

than four DH9s for every DH9A.

October data confirm a priority of support to the Independent Force. That month, the IF received 17 DH9As and

only one DH9 while Salmond's forces gained 28 DH9As and 66

DH9s.55 Subject only to the vagaries of aircraft production,

Trenchard's command unquestionably had first call on replacement machines in the last six months of the war.

Considering losses across all seven categories detailed on

the IF A8 returns, No. 99 Squadron suffered 114 aircrew casualties in fewer than six months of combat flying. These losses

amounted to 317 percent of the unit's normal operational

complement-despite two stand-downs to gain and train replacements. In this grim regard, however, No. 99 fared somewhat better than No. 104 Squadron, which arrived in the IF

sector on 20 May 1918 and flew its first mission on 8 June.

No. 104 suffered 134 aircrew casualties in five months.

A total of 33 aircrewmen reported sick in No. 104, with 20

reporting ill between July and September. Ten reported sick in

August, the month with the most severe battle casualties. 56

No. 104 Squadron was forced to stand-down three times because of losses, the first coming within a month of the unit's

entering active service. Between 8 and 31 July, the squadron

participated in no raids; over half its members had been lost

in the previous four weeks.5

"

No. 104 flew five missions in the first half of August, losing

machines to enemy action (seven) or to crashes (one) on every

operation. On a mission to Mannheim on 22 August, seven of

12 DH9s were shot down, forcing No. 104 to stand-down for

the second time. The squadron flew again on 3 September,

when 12 planes took off in a joint mission with 11 aircraft

from No. 99 Squadron. They bombed Morhange aerodrome

and returned safely.

No. 104 was grounded for the third time in late September.

On 7 September, 12 machines took off in a second attempt to

reach Mannheim; three were shot down and two aborted with

engine trouble. Between 12 and 15 September, in daily missions to the vicinity of Metz-Sablon, No. 104 suffered losses,

weather diversions, or aborts on each one. Altogether, five

200
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

DH9s went missing and 10 were forced to return with engine

trouble in this four-day period. Between 15 September and 15

October, the unit lost one machine in just two missions it

managed to fly over the lines.

Details other than those available in official returns for No.

104's operations are scarce; the squadron produced no unit

history or volumes of postwar memoirs. From the similarities

between their casualty statistics and those of the other day

squadrons in the Independent Force, one can assume that No.

104's operational fortunes were similar to those of her sister

units.

No. 110 (Hyderabad) Squadron, the last day squadron to

augment the IF, flew its first mission on 14 September 1918.

This DH9A unit, whose aircraft were the gift of His Serene

Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad, participated in active air

operations for less than two months. During this brief period,

the squadron was forced to stand-down twice because of aircrew losses.

SThe Hyderabad experienced 21 sick calls for this period;

again, the month of highest battle casualties (October) also

had •the highest number of sick calls.5" Altitude affected both

aircrew and machine.

Due to the fairly high altitude (between fifteen and seventeen

thousand feet) at which the D.H.9's bombed, frostbite caused more

casualties than the enemy and the low temperatures resulted in the

wf w-ind-driven petrol pump to freeze up. As these were mounted on the

lower wing, observers had to engage in some dangerous acrobatics to

free them and get fuel [to] the engine again before an involuntary

descent in enemy territory took place. 59

,No. 110 Squadron flew only nine missions with the British

strategic bombing force before the end of hostilities. Four of

these raids, directed against short-range aerodrome targets,

resulted in no casualties. On the other five missions, intended

to ,ýhit Mannheim, Frankfurt, and Cologne, the Hyderabad

Squadron lost 17 machines to enemy action. Also, five DH9s

aborted due to mechanical difficulties and four abandoned

thlir missions because of adverse weather.60 Even with a fairly

reliable aircraft, the squadron proved unable to reach strategic

objectives consistently without suffering unacceptable losses.

201
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Two consecutive attempts by No. 110 (on 1 and 5 October)

to bomb Cologne were stymied by bad weather; in the latter

operation, the squadron lost four DH9As after they diverted to

strike targets of opportunity at Kaiserslautern and Pirmasens.

The unit did not fly again until 21 October, when 13 machines

took off to raid Frankfurt. On that unfortunate mission, one

machine aborted with engine trouble and seven failed to return. No. 110 squadron took part in only two more raids

(short runs to Morhange aerodrome in the first week of November) before the Armistice. The history of this DH9A unit

raises serious questions about the wisdom of the daylight

bombing campaign against the Rhine cities.

No. 110 Squadron joined the Independent Force in late August 1918, a time when the bombing capacity of the command

had approximately tripled, due largely to the arrival of three

Handley Page night squadrons that month. Since June, as

discussed earlier, Trenchard had been preoccupied with the

moral effect supposedly gained by hitting "special long distance" objectives, such as the "large gun shops" (i.e., Krupp)

located at "Essen and Ruhr Valley Groups."6' Essen itself lay

nearly 40 miles beyond the city of Cologne, which was 150

miles north of No. 110's home aerodrome at Bettoncourt. A

pilot with No. 110 Squadron recalled a summer evening when

Major Nicholl, the commander, outlined what the IF chain of

command expected.

Major Nicholl began to talk-to talk of Cologne.

Cologne was a long way off; beyond what we had assumed to be the

range of our machines. So we made our calculation, each of us; and

we felt reassured-if we were very careful.

We encouraged Nicholl to go on talking. He told us his great secret; we

were to bomb the Krupp factory at Essen.

This was going too farl We could not see how we were going to get

there and back on the petrol we carried. So there was some anxious

speculation, and we felt the edge of our knees wear a little thin.6 2

This bombing policy was reaffirmed a few days later, when

General Trenchard visited Bettoncourt aerodrome.

Soon we were to have a visit from H.Q., and who should come to

inspect us but Boom himself. We stood smartly to attention while the

202
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

"Voice" told us that we would be bombing Essen. "Of course some of

you may not get back," he said.

This did not go down well; back came our fears; we all felt that to go to

Essen meant we should not have the petrol to return.

This was our only visit from H.Q., and we went back to our happy,

carefree life at once. 63

No. 110 Squadron did not penetrate as far as Cologne, let

alone Essen and the Ruhr, and the squadron's casualty rates

demonstrated that sustained attacks by daylight on "special

long range" objectives would be an expensive proposition for

the Independent Force. Cipher wires from the GOC IF to the

Air Ministry requesting replacements attest to the impact of

casualties and wastage.

I.F.G. 116, 22 July 1918: In continuation of my I.F.G. 115 July 22nd.

Weather perfect. More work would have been done but for following.

One squadron B.H.P. D.H.9 and one squadron Rolls Royce D.H.4 on

half work owing to shortage of machines. One squadron B.H.P. D.H.9

still out of action owing to shortage of machines.

I.F.G. 136, 31 July 1918: Regret to inform you that No. 99 Squadron

(B.H.P. D.H.9) ... lost seven machines. Only two returned.... Utmost

importance to make this Squadron up to strength. Can special effort

be made.

I.F.G. 180, 12 August 1918: ... The fighting has been very heavy the

last two days. The objective of the Squadron which bombed HAGENAU

this morning was MANNHEIM; but owing to heavy fighting they were

unable to get there.

I.F.G. 198, 16 August 1918: Regret to report have had to suspend

operations by 104 Squadron owing to shortage of pilots.64

These confidential messages underscore the continuous disruption the Independent Force experienced whenever it attempted to raid targets in Germany.

Daylight losses were so serious that the GOC IF wrote to

General Sykes on the matter in early August 1918.65 The ubiquitous Major Lord Tiverton, a staff officer in F03, analyzed the

issue and proposed two solutions:

(1) The employment of escorting fighting machines.

(2) The adoption of large formations.66

In Tiverton's view, massed attacks appeared more desirable

because the German counter to such large raids would in time

203
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

require that "a constant supply of these enemy machines

must flow into the area."6" These German reinforcements

would not then be available for use elsewhere. But the reverse

was also true; that is, the first proposal (to supply escort

planes for IF day attacks) would mean that British "machines

and personnel must be diverted from other and possibly more

useful work."68 On long-range escort missions it would be "necessary to alter or redesign the fighters allocated, with possible interference with production or loss of efficiency. "69 Trenchard, however, never marshaled the forces necessary to

mount formations on such a scale.

Some have argued that IF day attacks, despite their losses,

did in fact force the Germans to divert valuable fighter

strength from frontline duties to home defense. The validity of

this claim, however, rests on the questionable accuracy of

wartime intelligence estimates of German scout units that opposed IF operations.

In an earlier discussion, No. 3 Naval Wing's activities were

cited as an example of how bombing results had to be measured indirectly. Results were gauged from efforts; that is, total

sorties flown and bombs hauled supposedly provided a reliable index of the damage inflicted. Much the same phenomenon occurred in 1918, with respect to the somewhat grimmer

parameters of aircrew casualties and enemy countermeasures.

Mounting British losses were attributed to increased diversion

of German aviation assets from the front to home defense. ,

Trenchard himself was convinced that such was the case. In

his diary, he asserted that "British attacks forced the redistribution of a disproportionate part of German air strength to

home defence duties."7" Likewise, the official history concluded

that one of the major effects of bombing was that it caused

diversion of German assets.

[The bombing caused] a diversion of fighting squadrons, anti-aircraft

guns and searchlights, and of a great amount of material and labor, to

active and passive schemes of defense. 71

This cause-and-effect assumption has never been seriougly

questioned. Neville Jones, writing in 1973, repeats the clainit7 P

Historians have tended to accept the notion that casualties In

the IF were due primarily to a comprehensive German fif

204
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

defense system and that maintenance of the system diverted

scarce resources from the front.

In fact, however, German response to IF operations did not

require the massive reallocation of valuable assets that wartime estimates assumed and historians accepted. M. J. D.

Cooper, who has investigated this issue in considerable depth

using German documents, concludes that the German

buildup of air defenses received neither the priority nor the

materials that British sources have postulated.

In fact, the "330 first-class fighting aircraft" he [Neville Jones] and his

predecessors have ranged against the 120 bombers of Trenchard's

squadrons were originally the product of inflated R.A.F. intelligence

summaries in 1918. These estimates placed the total number of home

defence fighter units at 16, and vested each with a strength of 15

aircraft. German sources show that there were only 9

Kampfeinsitzerstaffelen in existence throughout the entire period (2 of

them split into 2 independent sub-flights) with an average strength

one quarter to one third under the British estimates. Until the last few

months of the war, these units had to make do with an assortment of

aging aircraft discarded by front-line fighter units. Only in September

and October did the overstrained German aviation industry begin to

meet the low-priority demand for modem home defence equipment.

Finally, it must be pointed out that any large transfer of front-line

fighter units southwards was undertaken primarily to meet the

build-up of American air strength on the Western Front.73

Other studies confirm that German home defense needs

never received particularly high priority at any time during

hostilities. Consider, for example, this excerpt from a German

authority's summarization of the relative importance of home

defense versus frontline allocations.

The number of "Kest" (Kampfeinsitzerstaffel single seater fighter

squadrons employed in home air defence could unfortunately be

increased no further. Some of the squadrons in fact had to be sent to

the front. 74

While it is true that the German air arm, the Kogenluft

(Kommandierenden General der Luftstreitkrafte), was reorganized during the war to include a unified command (Heimatluftschutz) dedicated to the aerial defense of the homeland, this

adjjustment occurred in October 1916, well before British longrange bombing efforts had coalesced.7 5 When the German general staff determined their total military aviation requirements

205
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

for the 1918 offensives, home defense needs were not a significant consideration; in fact they were scarcely mentioned.7 6

Apparently most of the increased German emphasis resulted

from America's imminent entry into the fray. On 25 June

1917, Ludendorff reviewed the Kogenluft's proposals for aerial

expansion and forwarded them to the Prussian War Ministry.

America's entry into the war compels a considerable strengthening of

the air force by 1 March 1918. In order to be somewhat equal to the

combined English-French-American air fleet, I order the formation of

an absolute minimum of forty new fighter groups and seventeen new

flight units.77

The prospect of bombardment by the RAF never constituted

much impetus for strengthening the aviation component of

Germany's Amerika program. Neither attrition nor the necessity for redeployment to counter the British strategic air threat

underlay German wartime aerial reorganization.

Aircrew inexperience, unreliable aircraft, and adverse

weather combined with enemy countermeasures to frustrate

the British long-range daylight bombing effort. These limiting

considerations of late 1918 correlate very closely with factors

that Noble Frankland and Sir Charles Webster identified as

constraints upon Bomber Command in the Second World War.

Thus, the principal. operational elements in the strategic air offensive

are: first, the calibre of the crews, which is a question of selection,

training, experience, leadership, and fighting spirit; secondly,

performance of the aircraft and of the equipment and bases upon

which they depend; thirdly, the weather, fourthly, the tactical methods

adopted and fifthly, the nature of the enemy opposition.78

Analysis of Independent Force records would have led observers to the same conclusion 20 years earlier.

The impact of losses and wastage upon the activities of

Trenchard's command has not been previously studied in

much' depth. For the most part, H. A. Jones' judgments in! the

official history have been accepted as authoritative: "Of all

aeroplanes which set out, 3.9 percent never returned to their

aerodromes."79 (This assertion is quite at odds with the' re-

.'cord.) Webster and Frankland at one point consider that

losses in the daylight squadrons "were on the whole surlprisingly small," citing them as only "3.9 per cent of the number

despatched."'8 ° These and other verdicts on IF operationý, in

206
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

the sixth volume of the official history, even with its 19-year

hindsight, are too uncritical to be reliable. The official version

ascribes to the bombing campaign a systematic, methodical

guidance and strategic vision which did not in fact exist.

In the light of our later knowledge it would be difficult to suggest how

the few independent bombing squadrons might have been more

effectively employed.

After weighing all the contemporary factors Major-General Trenchard

had to be sure that what he asked of his pilots and observers was

something they could do and keep going. His aim was to avoid

spectacular attacks with the danger or uncertainty that periods of

inactivity during recovery would follow.... In this he was surely right,

and his policy, judged by results was well suited to his belief.8 1

Careful analysis of the available documentation leads one to

conclude exactly the opposite; that is, losses to the DH4 and

DH9/9A squadrons of Trenchard's command demonstrated

that sustained long-range day bombardment was manifestly

an unrealizable goal.

The day component of the IF lost 257 aircrewmen in battle

casualties alone between June and November 1918, 178 percent of total assigned strength at the Armistice. Total losses to

these squadrons amounted to 407 flyers, the equivalent of

nearly 12 full squadrons.82

Jones himself puts the total "wastage in missing aeroplanes" for daylight units between June and November 1918

at 89 machines: 18 DH4s, 54 DH9s, and 17 DH9As. He also

tabulates 173 machines as wrecked: 51 DH4s, 94 DH9s, and

.28 DH9As. Considering that the day arm of the Independent

Force accumulated approximately 21 squadron-months of operations during its existence, the average squadron wastage in

mpachines amounted to 12.5 planes per month (262 machines/21 squadron-months of operation). At 18 planes per

sqquýadron at full complement, monthly wastage then averaged

just under 70 percent. This loss rate eclipsed that of many

hard-pressed scout squadrons on the Western Front.84 The

I's daylight bombing campaign definitely cost dearly, in blood

jan in treasure.

1jIay bombing increased four-fold during 1918; yet the day

effqrt diminished- in comparison with night bombing. By Sep207
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

tember 1918, the Independent Force's night units had the

potential to deliver 48,000 pounds of bombs in a single night.

The giant Handley Pages made the difference. Of the 10

assigned to each squadron, six were usually committed. With

an average payload of 1,600 pounds, the six machines could

lift a total of 9,600 pounds of bombs. By the end of August,

with the upgrading of No. 100 Squadron, the night flyers

could deliver four times the bombs their daylight colleagues

could deliver.

During the first half of 1918, the single Handley Page

squadron in the Nancy-Ochey sector, known first as "A" Naval, then No. 16, and finally as No. 216 Squadron, interpreted

its offensive mission conservatively, not flying at all if conditions seemed doubtful.

We used to bomb targets on the Rhine-but only on very fine nights as

the Naval Air Wing only chose very fine cloudless nights for their

raids.85

This outlook, which reflected No. 216's RNAS origins, conflicted with the RFC/RAF habit of flying whenever possible,

taking risks, expecting losses, and hoping for the best. The

Handley Page unit, the only night flying squadron capable of

hauling substantial payloads on long-duration missions,

sought to minimize tactical uncertainty.

No. 216's idiosyncratic attitude did not endear the squadron

to the IF chain of command. Trenchard himself admonished

Maj W. R. Read, who was preparing to take over No. 216

Squadron.

"Well," he [Trenchard] said, "I have got you out here to take over 216

Squadron from Buss. They have got Naval ideas. They think they

cannot fly at night if there is a cloud in the sky and they think they'

cannot do more than one raid in a night. You have got to get them out

of those ideas."86

A week after taking over 216 Squadron, Read confided his

philosophy to his diary:

I think the question of moral[e] in a squadron is very important and if

a squadron does a great deal of work without losing many machines it

is doing as good work as a Sqdn. which is doing slightly better work'

but at a high cost of machines and personnel and consequently

moral[el.

208
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

So my motto will be "be cautious without being faint hearted." And

that put into practice will be a line of action which runs between

R.A.F. and R.N.A.S. methods.87

Through July, the operational record of the Handley Page

squadron during its tenure with Eighth Brigade and the Independent Force reflects this conservative perspective. Between

1 February and 30 June, No. 216 Squadron flew on 20 nights,

compared to 31 occasions when their colleagues in No. 100

Squadron, flying shorter-ranged FEs, launched missions. During this five-month period, No. 216 received only three new

Handley Pages-to replace one wrecked and two missing machines. No. 100 Squadron needed a total of 29 replacement

FEs to replace six missing and 23 wrecked planes in the same

interval."8

During July, when Trenchard's influence had begun to permeate the Independent Force, night flying began to increase,

first in No. 216 and later in the three Handley'Page squadrons

that arrived in August. In July," No. 216 matched No. 100

Squadron, each unit flying on 12 nights. N6. 216 lagged by'

just one night in August.

`No. 97, a Handley Page unift fhat joined 'the IF in eariy

August, managed to fly six missions from 19/20 August to the

endq of the month. A second new- squadron, No. 215, which

first flew with the IF on 22/23 August, launched four opera-,

tions before month's end. Significantly, No. 216 was the only

night squadron that did not participate in operations on the

night of 22/23 August-a situation that seems to have been

the motive for Trenchard's admonition to Read.8 9 B he end'of

August, new Handley Pages hadcbeen sent to replace lost and

wrecked machines.90 Fourteen aircrewmen had 'been killed, or

wounded, or were missing, in, ,ight operations during the

month; No. 216 had suffered no battle casualt ies.• ;

IF night squadrons sustained losses, but never' at the rate'

thAt their day colleagues suffered.; None of the Handle, Page

units was ever forced to stand down because of unacceptable

losses. Table 1 gives the June-NQyember battle casualties for

the night squadrons.

209W
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Table 1

Battle Casualties, Night Squadrons, June-November 1918

A. No. 100 Squadron Battle Casualties Percentage of Unit

Month KIA WIA MIA Total Strength

June 0 1 0 1 3.3%

July 0 0 0 0 0

August 0 0 0 0 0

September 0 0 2 2 6.7%

October 1 2 0 3 10.0%

November _I_ ._0. _0_ a 0

Totals 1 3 2 6 20.0%

B. No. 216 Squadron Battle Casualties Percentage of Unit

Month KIA WIA MIA Total Strength

June 0 0 0 0 0

July 0 0 3 3 10.0%

August 0 0 0 0 0

September 0 3 3 6 20.0%

October 0 0 0 0 0

November ._0 0 0

Totals 0 3 6 9 30.0%

C. No. 97 Squadron Battle Casualties Percentage of Unit

Month KIA WIA MIA Total Strength

August 1 0 9 10 33.3%

September 1 1 0 2 6.7%

October 0 0 0 0 0

November .(L _0 .. _ .._ __ 0

Totals 2 1 9 12 40.0%

D. No. 215 Squadron Battle Casualties Percentage of Unit

Month KIA WIA MIA Total Strength

August 0 1 3 4 13.3%

September 2 1 25 28 93.3%

October 0 1 3 4 13.3%

November _(_ _ .. __0_

Totals 2 3 31 36 120.0%

E. No. 115 Squadron Battle Casualties Percentage of Unit

Month KIA WIA MIA Total Strength

September 0 1 3 4 13.3%

October 0 0 0 00 0

November .. .__ ._( _ fl-. 0

Totals 0 1 3 4 13.3%

210
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

The operational strength of Independent Force more than

tripled during August-a significant accomplishment. After

the frustrations engendered by overly optimistic expansion

schemes and aerodrome construction throughout the winter

and spring, the arrival of these squadrons must have been

most heartening. They appeared to be the harbinger of the

long-anticipated massive bombing fleets. IF's operational capability ballooned from 21,600 pounds to 60,000 pounds in

less than four weeks, and the temptation to quickly employ

this armada proved to be irresistible. September's casualty

rates illustrate the consequences of such precipitate action.

(No. 215 Squadron, the hardest hit, lost 93.3 percent of its

assigned strength that month.)

A detailed examination of night bombardment during September, the period in which the Independent Force realized its

peak strength, shows not only the peculiar hazards of night

operations but also their impact upon organizational policies

and expectations. An increased force structure per se would

not automatically translate into increased results, as IF planners learned from costly hindsight.

As September began, the long-range bomber force appeared

to lack only a suitable opportunity. However, immediate employment of this newly enlarged force was delayed by two

factors: (1) the requirement to support Allied offensives and (2)

poor flying weather.

Being attached to ground commands was not a unique experience for the British long-range squadrons. From 1 April to

9 May 1918, No. 100 and No. 216, the night-flying units of

Newall's Eighth Brigade, had deployed to the Villeseneux aerodrome (near Rheims). To help forestall any German offensive,

the two squadrons had raided railway targets in the vicinity of

Juniville, Amagne-Lucquy, and Asfeld, when weather permitted.92 No. 55 Squadron, Newell's day unit, also supported the

French ground plan by attacking railway targets in the area

bordered by Metz-Sablon, Luxembourg, and Thionville.

In early September, the British bombing force was once

again diverted to an army cooperation role. Trenchard's bombers supported the American offensive in the St. Mihiel Salient

with aerodrome and rail attacks, mainly directed against the

211
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Metz-Sablon railway triangle, between 12 and 17 September.93

As with earlier efforts by Eighth Brigade, unfavorable weather

limited the range and frequency of sorties. Later (23 to 26/27

September), IF raids would support the French and American

offensive between Rheims and Verdun.

Weather likewise delayed significant long-range bombing efforts through the second week of September. The Independent

Force preferred to raid by night during the week-long periods

of full moons. September's moon would wax on 16/17 September, with 50 percent of full-moon brightness, and end on

the evening of 23/24 September.9 4 However, the RAF Summary of Air Intelligence lists no sorties between 8 and 11

September, owing to "unfavourable weather conditions." IF reports confirm the stand-down.95 No. 216's commanding officer,

Maj W. R. Read, details this spell of poor weather and provides

insight into the mounting frustrations of his Handley Page

crews.

Sunday, 8 Sept. 1918: We are raiding Essen during the next moon.... I

would like to be the first to get there, but Holley (a Flight Commander

in No.216) has fixed his heart on getting there first and he jolly well

deserves it. So I shall go later on.

Tuesday, 10 Sept. 1918: General Trenchard is going to let Holley be

the first one to get to Essen. Weather impossible. We have had rain

high wind and low clouds all day.

Wednesday, 11 Sept. 1918: A very bad day of strong wind and rain. No

work was possible tonight.

Thursday, 12 Sept. 1918: It rained a good deal of the time. Gen.

Trenchard was very keen for a show to come off tonight if possible to

help in the attack.96

In an attempted raid that Thursday evening, Read noted that

"although wind was 10 to 15 m.p.h. on the ground," it reached

"50 m.p.h. up aloft. It was also very gusty near the ground."

Of 14 Handley Pages launched that evening, four could not

locate any targets and two aborted-with engine trouble and

an "observer coming over queer in the air."9 7 Owing to adverse

weather and one instance of engine trouble, none of the seven

machines dispatched by No. 216 on 13/14 September managed to bomb assigned targets.9

"

212
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

The other night squadrons had similar luck. No. 215

Squadron lost two Handley Pages and had four machines

abort with engine trouble on the 13th. On the 14th, Read

noted that Holley had been confined to bed.

Holley has influenza. He was sent to bed yesterday morning. He is

feeling no better this morning. Jolly bad luck if he is feeling not fit for

the Essen raid as Gen. Trenchard has promised that he shall be the

first to get there.99

After a "very fine night's work" on the night of 15/16 September (four of No. 216's Handley Pages reached Karlsruhe

and one flew two sorties against Morhange aerodrome and

Metz-Sablon), the September moon period commenced. All five

night squadrons prepared to take full advantage of the impending week of illumination.

W. R. Read's comments about Essen, reinforced by daylight

squadron comments, leave little doubt that the impetus to

launch maximum-strength attacks deep into Germany originated with Independent Force. Indeed, IF activities seem to

have generated interest at all levels of the civil and military

command. Trenchard's bombing force continued to receive its

accustomed priority of support. On 6 August 1918, the War

Office notified Field Marshal Haig, by "urgent and secret" letter, to transfer control of a Handley Page squadron to the

Independent Force.

With reference to War Office letter of the above number (O.B./1826)

dated June 17th, 1918, I am commanded by the Army Council to say

that the Air Ministry have now asked that No. 215 Squadron, Royal

Air Force, which was temporarily placed at your disposal shall now be

sent to the formation to which it was originally allotted, i.e. the

Independent Force.

In view of the value of the operations of this letter, in withdrawing

enemy aircraft from the front as evidenced by the concentration of 40

machines against one of our raiding parties on July 31st (i.e., the

mission in which No. 99 Squadron lost 7 of 12 machines to enemy

action), I am to say that the Council propose to accede to this request,

unless you have any strong objection to urge. 1oo

No. 215 Squadron reached the IF base area on 19 August

1918.111 Significantly, the unchallenged assumption that

heavy friendly losses indicated a strongly reinforced German

home defense system provided the rationale for this War Office

213
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

directive. Rather than analyze Trenchard's casualty rates,

authorities in London accepted his assertions that his forces

could influence the overall course of the war.

That this misperception was not confined to the War Office

emerges from a Foreign Office communication dated 10 September 1918, a time when IF aircraft were grounded by continued poor weather.

The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his

compliments to the Secretary of the Air Ministry and is directed by Mr.

Secretary Balfour to state, for the information of the Air Council, that

His Majesty's Minister at the Hague has reported that according to

various sources the despondency in Germany is at the present

moment intense: and that this would be greatly increased by air raids

on German towns and that the moment would appear to demand the

exercise of this method of warfare to its utmost extent, 10 2

Copies of this communication were forwarded to Salmond and

to Trenchard on 13 September 1918.103

Little doubt exists that Trenchard and the IF staff encouraged such widespread governmental and public faith in the

efficacy of strategic bombing. In addition to news releases and

official reports of No. 3 Naval Wing, 41st Wing, and Eighth

Brigade, HQ IF devoted considerable attention and manpower

to extolling its own activities. For example, HQ IF developed

direct telephonic and telegraphic contacts with London. And

in early July 1918, a lieutenant colonel in charge of "A.D.

Signals, I.F., R.A.F." planned several enhancements to the

patchwork system.1" Initially, all IF signal circuits passed

through a communications center at Chaumont. From there,

telephone conversations were transmitted to London via

American and British switchboards in Paris; telegraph messages were also routed to London through use of American

facilities. Eventually, all telegrams passed directly from HQ IF

to London. Telephone lines reserved for IF-London traffic were

also established, with relay amplifiers sited at Paris, Haig's

GHQ, and Calais. By late summer 1918, HQ IF enjoyed a

communications system capability nearly equal to that of

Haig's own headquarters.

Trenchard had an Army Printing and Stationery Service

(APSS) unit assigned to his headquarters within three weeks

of assuming control of the Independent Force.1°' This APSS

214
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

organization comprised two officers, two noncommissioned officers, and 22 other ranks. In August 1918, an army major

was assigned to this unit as deputy assistant director.10 6

Trenchard's initiatives to publicize his command succeeded.

His dispatches and communiqu6s were well received in London, and were given widespread circulation. On 8 August

1918, the question of "action as to dispatches recording operations of the Independent Force, R.A.F. in France," was discussed at an Air Council session.

The Secretary of State explained that despatches of this nature were a

novel feature in the R.A.F. and that he desired to take the views of the

Council as to how they should be handled in future, what the extent of

the circulation should be, and how far they could be made public.

It was decided that the reports should be circulated

(i) to all members of the Air Council.

(ii) to the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

(iii) that circulation to Marshal Foch and other French generals should

stand over till the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme War Council at

Versailles, and

(iv) that C.A.S. [i.e., Chief of the Air Staff! should revise the reports so

that they could be published as a monthly communiqu6 without

conveying any undesirable information to the enemy. 107

On the day following this meeting, Lt Col J. A. H. Gammell,

head of F03, wrote to Lt Col E. B. Gordon, on Trenchard's staff

at Autigny-la-Tour, with a proposed scheme of distribution for

IF dispatches. In addition to the addresses suggested by the

Air Council, Gammell included the King and the War Cabinet.

We are out to binge the Independent Force for all we are worth, the

opposition both inside and outside the building is considerable. I

think a wide distribution of the despatches will help. 108

Trenchard carefully monitored the extent to which IF operations remained in the public eye. In late August 1918, he

requested notification if his "press communiqu6s" were not

received.

I should be glad if you would make arrangements that, in the event of

the Press Communiqu6 not being received, a telegram is sent to me.

Press Communiqu6 telegram No. I.F.G.220 of the 21st inst. reporting

raid by one machine on DILLINGEN [Pattinson's above-cloud sortie]

and night raids on three aerodromes did not appear to have been

published in the "Times" of either the 22nd or 23rd. 109

215
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

The strength of Trenchard's Independent Force grew significantly in the wake of his publicity campaign, and pressure for

long-range attacks into Germany increased. Consequently,

Trenchard directed his night squadrons to make the most of

the September moon period. The flying activities of 16/17

September, and their aftermath, should be highlighted against

this background.

For the period 6-12 September, Order No. 21 directed "Handley Pages to go to B.A.S.F. LUDWIGSHAVEN, MANNHEIM,

and MAINZ," with Kaiserslautern designated as the alternate

target for "the long-distance bombers.""' The same order further stipulated that "the orders for long-distance bombing will

also hold good until further notice." Weather, however, prevented implementation of this directive. IF operation orders for

12-14 September assigned close-in railway and aerodrome

targets, but cautioned subordinate squadrons:

These orders will not interfere with the special mission to

SPEYERDORF. Pilots earmarked for this mission, and for the

long-distance raid to ESSEN will be reserved as far as possible. (Order

No. 23, 12 Sept. 1918)

The above order will not interfere with the Special Mission to

SPEYERDORF. Pilots earmarked for this, and for the long-distance

raids to ESSEN, will be reserved as far as possible. (Order No. 24, 13

September 1918)" '1

HQ IF wished to have machines and aircrews available for

special projects if conditions should improve. At Speyerdorf,

specially equipped Handley Pages were to land on the enemy

aerodrome, destroy German aircraft and field facilities with

machine-gun fire, and then quickly depart. The operation order for 14 September directed that "the machines of No. 215

Squadron detailed for the SPEYERDORF operation will carry

out their special reconnaissance.""1 2 These official extracts

leave little doubt that missions to Speyerdorf and Essen would

be carried out during the forthcoming moon.

Earlier in September, No. 216 Squadron's Handley Pages

had had "additional petrol tanks to increase range" installed. 113

The increase of this latter meant that Essen could be attacked. Essen

was always looked upon as the blue ribbon of bombing objectives.

216
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

Time and again there was a "Stand by" for Essen and as often the

operation had to be cancelled owing to the treachery of the elements.

The machines even started, and in one case a machine reached Treves

on its journey. 114

The squadron history also noted that reaching Essen was the

object of "much secret competition" among the Handley Page

crews.

When weather began to improve on 15 September, two day

squadrons were directed to launch long-distance raids to the

Rhine valley and beyond. No. 110 Squadron was to hit

Mannheim; No. 55, Frankfurt.'15 However, No. 110 managed to

penetrate only to Buhl while No. 55 bombed Stuttgart, well

south of Frankfurt. Compared to the past week's conditions,

the clearing weather presaged an intensive night-bombing effort.

Unfortunately, operation order files no longer contain HQ

IF's assigned targets for night raids on 16/17 September, the

first night scheduled to have 50 percent of full moon illumination. Order No. 31 for 16/17 September is missing, though 30

and 32 have survived." 6

Approximate Results No. 84, covering 0400 16 September to

0400 17 September, prepared by Capt R. B. Bivar, the S03 of

the operations section of HQ IF Air Staff Branch, stated that

four of the five night squadrons flew that night."' Nos. 97,

100, 115, and 216 Squadrons were listed; No. 215 Squadron

was not mentioned. The Approximate Results provided this

ancillary information:

1. WEATHER.

Day-Weather fine, strong wind with certain amount of haze.

Night-Visibility fair at first, but thick haze rising later, making

visibility difficult.

2. MACHINES MISSING.

Ten of our machines are missing."8

The loss of 10 Handley Pages, the equivalent of an entire

squadron, received no further explication in this report; it is

likely that no definite information was available at the time.

Furthermore, this report marked the only time when that

number of aircraft losses from this operation was ever admitted on an official IF return.

217
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

The intelligence summary transmitted to the Air Ministry on

19 September did not include loss data.11 9 Concerning the

weather on 16/17 September, the summary noted that visibility was "fairly good."

Sky clear till about 4 a.m. Visibility fairly good. Strong westerly wind

came up during the night. 120

This unforeseen wind was to assume considerable significance

in post-raid analyses and correspondence between HQ IF and

London.

The weekly report from HQ IF, "Independent Force Communiqu6 No. 7," completed 21 September for 12-18 September

1918, amplified the night's events, somewhat altering meteorological conditions in the process.

N•ghLt..1/L7th. - During the early part of the night it was very calm

and clear, but high winds got up very quickly in the night.

Machines of No. 97 Squadron bombed Lorquin and Frescaty.

Machines of No. 115 Squadron bombed Metz-Sablon, dropping three

and three-quarters tons of bombs on the railways.

One machine of No. 100 Squadron made two trips to Frescaty

Aerodrome.

Machines of No. 216 Squadron bombed Frescaty and Boulay

Aerodromes, and the railways at Mets, Merzig, and Treves. 121

Neither the daily report nor this weekly return indicated that

No. 215 Squadron had flown that night. Further, this weekly

communiqu6 did not mention losses from night bombing on

16/17 September, though it noted that "two of our machines

are missing" from the daylight mission on the 17th.122 Much of

this reticence concerning nighttime casualties undoubtedly

stemmed from initial uncertainty, but there is also a perceptible undertone of official embarrassment.

Only seven Handley Pages were acknowledged lost in official

channels, a figure that has been accepted ever since. The

summary of air intelligence that was circulated to the King

and the War Cabinet reported "seven of our machines failed to

return." 23 Also of interest is the Air Ministry's fortnightly report to the War Cabinet concerning this particular mission:

Three aerodromes./ Our machines attacked with bombs and machine

gun fire. Good results were obtained.

218
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

METZ SABLON railways./ This target was very heavily attacked. Three

fires were started.

TREVES railways./ Bombs were dropped all around the station.

FRANKFURT station./ This was also heavily attacked and bombs were

dropped with good effect.

The night at first was calm but later high winds got up. 60 tons of

bombs have been dropped in the last 3 days.

At present 7 of our machines have not been located.12 4

On 26 September 1918, in "Aircraft Work at the Front. Official Information," Flight Magazine presented an almost verbatim copy of the Air Ministry fortnightly report.

Headquarters. R.A.F. Independent Force. September 17th.

On the night 16th-17th our machines attacked three hostile

aerodromes with bombs and machine-gun fire. Good results were

obtained. The railways at Metz-Sablon and Treves were very heavily

attacked, and three fires were started at Metz-Sablon. Bombs were

dropped all round Treves station. The station at Frankfurt was also

heavily attacked, and bombs were dropped with good effect. The night

at first was calm, but later high winds got up. At present, seven of our

machines have not been located. Sixty tons of bombs have been

dropped in the last three days.125

Later, Trenchard's monthly dispatch to the Air Ministry discussed the 16/17 September missions under its "long distance raids" section, elaborating only slightly on the narratives

previously disseminated.

(1) COLOGNE and BONN. On the night of the 16/17th September we

lost 7 Handley Pages. Five of these, detailed for COLOGNE and

MANNHEIM, were probably unable to return to our lines in the face of

a strong south westerly wind which increased in velocity after the

machines had left their aerodrome. One of these missing machines,

with engine trouble, landed in Holland, having dropped his bombs at

BONN. Unofficial German reports mention COLOGNE as being

bombed during the night and of our machines being heard in the

neighbourhood of DUSSELDORF.' 26

What Trenchard omitted from this report to the government

was the fact that No. 215 Squadron, the Handley Page unit

Haig had relinquished to the IF the month before, had also

flown on 16/17 September. Of five No. 215 machines that left

the ground at Xaffevillers aerodrome that evening, one aborted

219
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

with engine trouble shortly after takeoff; the other four never

returned.

No. 215 S~dn,

5 machines left on operations. 1 Machine returned E.T., the other 4

machines failed to return. 127

Interestingly, the typescript history of No. 215 Squadron

does not cover the 16/17 September operation or its intended

targets. The brief volume includes honors awarded and short

biographies of key squadron personnel, but no casualty

lists. 1281

However, a separate file of the unit's bomb raid reports,

summaries, and intelligence reports contains the "Raid Orders

Issued by 0.0." for this particular mission.'12' This squadron

raid summary confirms that assigned objectives included one

machine each to Mannheim and Frescaty, and three Handley

Pages tasked to hit Cologne.

DETAILS

3 machines left between 7.46 and 7.49 p.m. for Bombing Raid on

Cologne, 2 machines failed to return. One machine experienced engine

trouble, petrol leaking from rear tank in great quantities, and, after

endeavouring for an hour to gain height, returned landing with bombs

intact.

One machine left 7.50 p.m. for Bombing Raid on Frescaty, but failed

to return.

One machine left 7.35 p.m. for Bombing Raid on Mannheim but failed

to return. 130

No. 215 Squadron lost 12 flyers the night of 16/17 September

1918.

Since HQ IF generally attempted to ascertain the fates of

missing aviators, it is possible to establish overall casualties

for 16/17 September.'13 1 No. 215 Squadron in fact had four

aircraft go missing that night; tail numbers, names, ranks,

and crew positions were all noted. Two aircrews became German prisoners of war while a third crew managed to crashland on the friendly side of the lines. The fourth Handley Page

(C.9727) had engine trouble and landed in Holland, where the

crew were interned.'112 In a letter forwarded to the Air Ministry,

the crew claimed that, though their assigned target had been

Cologne, they had bombed the northwest section of Bonn;

220
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

they confirmed that the strong southwesterly wind had increased after takeoff. They "altered course for Holland" when

they discovered that their "headway against the wind was very

small, landing near Breda (25 miles southeast of Rotterdam)

at 0130 17 September."133

Data gathered by the Air Intelligence staff at the Air Ministry during October included extracts from German newspapers of British air activity on 16/17 September. Aircraft had

been heard southwest of Dusseldorf (north of Cologne), at

Aachen (west of Cologne) and at Coblentz earlier in the evening.1 34 Major Paul's notes show that he attributed all these

incidents to machines from No. 215,131 which strongly implies

that No. 215's targets lay at least as deep as Cologne.

At least one Handley Page was heard near Dusseldorf,

roughly midway between Cologne and Essen, the prize objective of the IF night squadrons. The official history notes simply

that No. 215 Squadron lost two machines assigned to bomb

Cologne, one tasked to hit Frescaty aerodrome, and one assigned to Mannheim.'36 Since Breda, where one Handley Page

landed, lies north of Essen, it seems likely that many of the

missing Handley Pages attempted to reach either Cologne or

Essen that night.

Despite IF's selective narratives, all five of its night units

flew on 16/17 September. Except for No. 97 Squadron, which

had two machines abort with engine trouble, every Handley

Page squadron suffered combat losses.1 37 Because crashes on

the friendly side of the lines and accidents were not included,

actual aircraft wastage was considerably higher than the

seven Handley Pages Trenchard chose to acknowledge.13 8

Trenchard's three cipher wires to the Air Ministry on 17

September, the day after the ill-starred operation, illuminate

the means by which such unacceptable wastage can be reduced by administrative subterfuge.

G.O.C./172, 9 a.m. Regret to inform you that eight Handley Pages are

missing on last night's raiding and two were wrecked. Can you

possibly fill me up with machines and good pilots In time for this

moon. Wire reply urgent.

I.F.C.326, afternoon. In continuation of Press Communique of to-day's

date and my cipher wire of this morning. Of the eight machines

221
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

reported missing one has been located completely wrecked on the side

of the lines.

G.O.C./176, 9.05 p.m. It is possible that some of the seven missing

machines have landed in HOLLAND. Five went to bomb COLOGNE

and a very strong southerly wind got up. Please enquire and let me

know. 1

39

An independent check on these figures is possible, using

the diary of Major Read, commanding No. 216 Squadron, who

also flew that evening. His perspective of the operation and its

aftermath differs considerably from the official version.

Read records that his squadron was tasked to send five

Handley Pages to bomb Cologne and one to raid Frescaty

aerodrome on 16/17 September.'40 Read left the ground at

2015 en route to Cologne, carrying one 550-pound bomb,

eight 112-pound bombs, and eight and one-half hours of petrol. Read quickly realized that this condition would force a

change in his objective.

Sgt. Keen [Read's observer] was not for going further than Mets on

account of strong wind. However, I thought we could get to Treves in

Germany and back on our petrol and so we went. 141

Read's in-flight decision deserves amplification. Since a fully

laden Handley Page cruised at somewhat less than 80 MPH, a

40 MPH southerly wind would considerably affect range calculations to targets north of IF aerodromes. 4 2 Cologne lay approximately 180 miles away, so a Handley Page boosted by a

40-MPH tail wind could reach the city within one and one-half

hours, compared to two and one-fourth hours on a calm

night. The homeward journey into the wind, however, would

require three times as long, or four and one-half hours. Assuming perfect navigation, the round trip to Cologne on 16/17

September would require at least six hours-in a machine

capable of flying a maximum of eight and one-half hours.

Tactical consideration and human error would extend the

time aloft. Read, an experienced aviator, took nearly six hours

for his round trip to Treves, a city located just halfway to

Cologne.'4 ' His observer had misgivings over even that truncated journey. Under the prevailing circumstances, one can

safely conclude that it would have been virtually impossible

for any Handley Page to reach Cologne and return safely on

222
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

16/17 September. In fact, none of No. 216's five machines

assigned to bomb Cologne had managed to do so; one was

missing in action and one, which bombed Metz, crashed on

landing back at Autreville. "I

Last night was disastrous for the Wing. Seven machines from the

squadrons at Xaffevillers are missing and three machines were

"write-offs" on landing through crashing.

Counting our one missing and one crash it makes 12 Handley Pages

lost ... to say nothing of personnel.

It was all caused through the bad night. The sky was clear enough but

wind was very strong. 145

Last Sunday, when 8 machines were missing and three written off was

the most disastrous day that the I.F. have had so far. It has steadied

Wing's and Brigade's enthusiasm for flying on nights when weather is

obviously doubtful. 146

On 24 September, at the end of the moon period, Read

wrote, 'Tonight if it had looked fine we were sending 3 machines to Essen and 3 to Cologn6." 14

' The Handley Pages in

fact never left the ground that night.

On 23 September, HQ IF, tempering its enthusiasm for

long-range objectives, cautioned the line squadrons:

3. No attempt should be made to reach ESSEN by day unless the

weather conditions are particularly favourable, and No's. 55 and

110 Squadrons can undertake the operation, flying at a good

height.

4. It is possible that the projected attack on SPEYERDORF aerodrome

may have to be postponed until the next full moon.48

The tone of this operation order stands in marked contrast to

those promulgated just a few days earlier.

The prohibitive losses on 16/17 September seemed to

dampen HQ IF's ardor for encouraging its Handley Pages to fly

as far and as often as possible. For the rest of the month, the

night squadrons were confined to targets considerably closer

than the Rhine towns. Not until the last half of October (coinciding with the full moon of 18/19 October) did IF again

schedule Essen as an assigned objective.149 Weather, however,

continued its dominance, forestalling these projected attacks;

British bombers never reached the Krupp Works.

223
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

As the number and range of bombing sorties increased,

losses rose proportionately. Unskilled aircrewmen, unreliable

machines, adverse weather, and enemy countermeasures

combined to severely limit the long-range bombing offensive. It

seems very likely that these factors would have continued to

constrain Trenchard's force, whether it eventually numbered

nine squadrons or 90. Evaluation of the costs and accomplishments of the British long-range bombing campaign during 1918 requires, first of all, a reliable operational baseline.

No complete chronological summary has been available of

Eighth Brigade and Independent Force between 1 February

1918 and the Armistice. The official history catalogs industrial

targets primarily, and does not include weights of bombs

dropped.'50 Further, it fails to list raids on German aerodromes, which accounted for nearly half the sorties flown by

the Eighth Brigade and Independent Force during the last six

months of hostilities.' 5'

Compiling a more complete record of bombing activity has

required data from numerous sources, cross-checked and collated. Records from Eighth Brigade and Independent Force, as

well as returns from their subordinate units, intelligence summaries, and after-action reports, form the data skeleton; materials contained in Air Ministry staff files, unit histories, memoirs, and Cabinet records flesh out the chronology. Where

possible, and in instances of ambiguity or conflict, information

from the primary source (based on proximity or first-hand

knowledge of the event) has been taken as authoritative.

The Rhine targets were of considerable interest to the War

Cabinet and the Air Staff as "strategic objectives" throughout

the campaign. Also in this group were the poison gas factories

at "Mannheim." Blast furnaces ranked high in the bombing

priorities of the French Air Service. "Miscellaneous" targets

included industrial centers and urban areas, which later were

to receive such prominent attention in the Air Ministry's final

bombing report of January 1920.

It would appear that Trenchard's assumption of command

did not inaugurate a significantly greater allocation of effort

against any of these strategic targets. Despite the massive

three-fold increase in Independent Force strength in the sum224
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

mer of 1918, the bomb total directed against these strategic

targets in August actually decreased, reversing an upward

trend evident since April. Part of this decline has usually been

attributed to organizational turbulence as new units arrived in

the IF area.

During August No.100 Squadron, which was equipped with F.E.2b

short-distance machines, commenced re-equipping with Handley

Pages. While it was being re-equipped-which process took nearly the

whole month-scarcely any work could be carried out by the

squadron. 1

52

Trenchard's apologia for the diminished effort directed

against targets of strategic interest during August is somewhat inaccurate. In fact, No. 100 Squadron, which did not

begin to convert to Handley Pages until 13 August, launched

multiple-ship aerodrome raids, averaging approximately six

machines each, on 14 successive nights between 11/12 and

30/31 August. 153 During the period in which the GOC IF

claimed they had stood down to reequip, No. 100 Squadron

had actually sustained a pace of operations unmatched by

any other IF night unit.

For September, after No. 100 Squadron aircrews had completed their transition from FE2s to Handley Pages, and Nos.

92, 215, and 115 Squadrons had been established on station,

the bomb total devoted to these key objectives barely surpassed what it had been in July. This strategic effort dropped

steadily from September until the Armistice.

In any event, determining the size and importance of German industrial centers as bombing objectives did not greatly

exercise HQ IF, despite Trenchard's assurances to Weir:

My Intelligence Department provided me with the most thorough

information on all targets such as gun factories, aeroplane factories,

engine factories, poison-gas factories, etc., each target having a

complete detailed and illustrated plan, and maps were prepared of

every target that was within reach. 1

54

Had such timely intelligence data been readily at hand at

HQ IF, a request from the Air Intelligence Branch of the

American Expeditionary Force, dated 18 October 1918, could

have been promptly satisfied in the field. Asking for "information on German industries," the AEF G-2 sought "some data

225
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

that will establish the relative size and importance of any

industrial establishment," particularly "maps, general or detail, which will indicate the location of industries."'15 Instead

of responding, Trenchard forwarded the request to Branch

AI l a at the Air Ministry. 56

It is probable that this information may not exist in the form required.

If such be the case, any publications or reports that are at present in

existence and which may give the desired data for any subject, or

group of subjects, would be sufficient for the purpose.

Can this information be forwarded to these Headquarters as soon as

possible. 157

Coming less than a month before the Armistice, this profession of ignorance concerning strategic objectives he had been

explicitly directed to bomb suggests the minimal effort actually launched against such targets. Instead, Eighth Brigade

and Independent Force devoted the bulk of their attention to

enemy railways and aerodromes.

The final dispatch of the GOC IF noted that, "when it was

impossible for squadrons to reach their objectives well in the

interior of Germany," railways were first in order of importance."' 5 Asserting that "the Germans were extremely short of

rolling stock," Trenchard stated that such targets "were also

fairly easy to find at night."' 59

On several occasions, French control of British bombing

assets reinforced this aspect of the long-range campaign.

Throughout April and the first third of May, Newall's squadrons operated against rail targets in support of the French

offensive. In April, all Eighth Brigade bombs fell on the German railway system. Similar situations occurred again in September, when Trenchard's Independent Force cooperated in

direct support of two Allied ground offensives by bombing

enemy railways.

Neither Newall nor Trenchard was particularly reluctant to

commit his squadron to ground cooperation missions of this

sort. In fact, the GOC IF had repeatedly advocated such operations as the primary role of air forces. Concentration upon

enemy railways also held other advantages, which will become

evident later.

226
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

With respect to enemy aerodromes, German airfields received the overwhelming proportion of British attention and

constituted the number one priority for the Independent Force

during the campaign. That the abrupt surge and peak of this

activity correspond almost exactly with Trenchard's tenure as

GOC IF seems particularly significant.

Trenchard outlined his rationale for attacks on enemy aerodromes in his Final Dispatch to Weir on 1 January 1919. He

based the decision on two points: "to prevent his [the enemy]

attacking our aerodromes at night and by destroying his machines to render his attacks by day less efficacious.""' 6 As field

commander, Trenchard would be naturally bound to protect

his forces even if such protection might disrupt his assigned

priorities. He defended his aerodrome campaign by citing the

security his own airfields subsequently enjoyed.

Of this amount (550 tons total) no less than 220-1/ tons were dropped

on aerodromes. This large percentage was due to the necessity of

preventing the enemy's bombing machines attacking our aerodromes

and in order to destroy large numbers of the enemy's scouts on their

aerodromes, and it was impracticable to deal with them on equal

terms in the air. I think this large amount of bombing was thoroughly

justified when it is taken into consideration that the enemy's attacks

on our aerodromes were practically negligible, and not a single

machine was destroyed by bombing during the period June 5th to

Nov. 1 Ith.161

By elaborating only upon the protection of IF airfields, Trenchard implies that the security of his rear area was of considerably greater concern than his loss rates. The official history

endorses and amplifies this logic:

When all is said, what remains true is that Major-General Trenchard's

object was achieved. The aerodromes of the Independent Force day

and night bombers were not seriously molested-of moral as well as of

material importance-and the German defensive fighters, with some

exceptions were unable to prevent the day bombers from attacking

their distant objectives. 162

A footnote on the same page as this quotation put IF losses

from all causes at just 3.9 percent, a misleading statistic.'6

Given this unchallenged casualty claim and Trenchard's own

refusal ever to discuss aircrew losses, securing his own aero227
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

dromes against German raids would emerge by default as the

issue of greater import. 1

6 4

Trenchard is correct when he asserts that his own airfields

were seldom raided and little damaged during 1918. They

were attacked just eight times between 12 July and 26 September, with negligible material damage and personnel losses

of one killed and four wounded."6 ' However, to ascribe this

result solely to IF's campaign against German aerodromes

begs the question.

British intelligence estimates consistently overrated the

strengths and capabilities of German home defense units arrayed against Eighth Brigade and Independent Force. Further,

when Major Paul's survey teams investigated the effects of

bombing German airfields after the Armistice, findings were

inconclusive at best.

Unfortunately, the aerodromes situated in reconquered LORRAINE

had been almost entirely dismantled by the resident civilians, and

therefore little material damage was visible.

On the whole one is forced to believe that, except on rare occasions,

the actual destruction of hangars and installations has been

moderate. 1

66

The RAF field teams also discovered that, compared to wartime claims, material damages to all types of bombing targets

were considerably less.

[Damages] prove upon inspection to have been considerably less

devastating than the photographs had led to believe. Similarly, bursts

on aerodromes are difficult to gauge. A group of bombs close to a

permanent hangar at HAGENAU were found to have caused much less

damage than reports and photographs had seemed to indicate. 167

Finally, as the Royal Canadian Air Force official historian concluded after examining German aerial archives, "nowhere in

postwar German accounts of the air battle do losses from

aerodrome bombing figure as a problem." 168 Trenchard's justification for bombing enemy aerodromes-that his own airfields

were in consequence seldom attacked-smacks strongly of

post hoc argument.

A much stronger case for concentrating on German aerodromes can be made for Trenchard's second point: to reduce

the severity of enemy fighter attacks on his day bombers.

228
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

German countermeasures frequently stalled the British daylight offensive, inflicting losses that jeopardized the campaign's momentum. These casualties unquestionably constituted a more immediate and persistent problem than enemy

raids on the IF base area. The relationship between mounting

losses and frequent raids on German aerodromes is unmistakably evident. The GOC IF himself linked the two phenomena

when he concluded a congratulatory telegram to the Handley

Page crews on No. 216 Squadron with this exhortation:

If mist not interfere with your operations, I hope that by bombing the

enemy's Scout Aerodromes you will be able to exact due compensation

for losses sustained by No. 99 Squadron today.169

Given the prohibitive casualties sustained by Trenchard's daylight component and the impressive poundage correspondingly dropped by his night-flying machines on enemy airfields,

one must conclude that Trenchard was forced to resort to

these airfield attacks in an attempt to reduce unacceptable IF

losses in the air-not on the ground.

As bombing targets, aerodromes and railways alike possessed several attractive features. They were easily identifiable

from the air, and they were not particularly heavily defended."7 ' During 1918, Eighth Brigade and Independent

Force squadrons attacked a total of 16 different enemy aerodromes. Of these, only three lay more than 30 miles from the

front lines-the deepest not 45 miles behind the

trenches-and they were raided fewer than 15 times. ' 7 '

Owing to the fact that many of them were situated within 40 miles of

the lines, they formed useful instructional raids for young pilots; in

spite of this fact, very few casualties were incurred on the raids.

Roughly it took five machines to destroy one German aircraft on the

ground .... We lost, on an average, one machine in three raids.' 72

Railways appealed for much the same reasons. The huge

Metz-Sablon rail triangle lay just 12 miles behind the

trenches.' 73 Inexperienced aircrews could locate and identify

such objectives without penetrating the German air defense

system to any depth.

Even with this foreshortened targeting program, the pace of

the British bombing campaign did not slacken. Several

229
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

sources indicate that IF resources and personnel were continually pushed to their maximum.

In mid-September, Capt H. McClelland, the veteran Handley

Page pilot reassigned to the Directorate of Flying Operations,

forwarded a disturbing memorandum. Using figures from

Trenchard's own monthly dispatches, McClelland demonstrated that, although the IF flying hour total for July exceeded that for June by 33 percent, the number of machines

wrecked jumped by 67 percent-twice the flying rate. 74 Analyses for July and August revealed that, while flying hours had

increased by just 13 percent, the rate of machines wrecked

went up by 31 percent."7 '

The increase in flying time to the increase of machines wrecked is

altogether disproportionate and apparently would point to lack of

organization in some respects. ' 76

The following month, McClelland's chief informed the Director

of Flying Operations, General Groves, that the Independent

Force had wrecked 44 percent of its assigned machines in

crashes during September and that a further 37 percent had

gone missing in action.1 77 (No. 5 Group, RAF, similarly

equipped, had engaged in long raids from Dunkirk during the

same month and lost just one DH9 and no Handley Pages.)178

In light of the marginal proficiency of his aircrews and the

effectiveness of German air defenses, aerodromes and railways

represented the only classes of targets Trenchard could hope

to raid on a sustained basis. Targets just over the lines became increasingly attractive to replacement aircrews, inexperienced at navigation and facing natural hazards as well as

enemy countermeasures. Daylight losses were such that the

largest proportion of his night effort also had to be diverted to

attack German aerodromes. Casualty rates became critical;

losses dictated the types of objectives the Independent Force

found itself able to raid effectively. Bomber aircrews did what

they could, but it was generally a far cry from what HQ IF

claimed they did.

Against these costs must be balanced the results actually

achieved by the British bombing campaign during 1918.

230
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

Notes

1. J. M. Bruce, The Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing)

(London: Putnum, 1982), 74.

2. H. A. Jones, War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the

Great War by the Royal Air Force, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937),

Appendix 18, between 130-31. By contrast, Bruce puts the Puma-powered

DH9 service ceiling at 15,500 feet, two thousand feet below Jones' figure.

See also Bruce, 77.

3. Bruce, 72.

4. J. E. A. Baldwin, "Experiences of Bombing with the Independent

Force in 1918," in A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of

Officers Attending the First Course at the Royal Air Force Staff College,

1921-1923 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], Air Ministry,

December 1923), 11.

5. William Armstrong, Pioneer Pilot (London: Blandford Press, 1952), 34.

6. W. M. Lamberton, Reconnaissance and Bomber Aircraft of the

1914-1918 War (Warwick, England: Warwick Printing, 1962), 38.

7. Ibid., 74-75, 79.

8. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, Newall Papers, B392, Royal Air Force

Museum (RAFM), Hendon, England.

9. Bruce, 72.

10. Ibid., 73.

11. As noted of 41st Wing, RFC operations, no reliable comprehensive

chronological summary exists for the bombing campaign during 1918.

Consequently, information has been compiled from a number of sources.

12. Lamberton, 40.

13. Bruce, 79.

14. Lamberton, 40; and Bruce, 81.

15. Jones, Appendix 27.

16. Lamberton, 36; Bruce, 49.

17. Baldwin, 2-4, 8, 10.

18. Jones, Appendix 12, facing 41.

19. Ibid.

20. Public Record Office (PRO), Air Ministry Records (AIR)

1/1972/204/273/1, Casualty Statistics, June-November 1918, IF Form A8

(Rew, England: Independent Force Press).

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. Notation preprinted on IF Form A.8.

23. Quoted in Ralph R. Williams, "Navigation: From Dead Reckoning to

Navstar GPS," Air Force Magazine 67, no. 12 (December 1984): 63.

24. 1 MFC 76/1/32, Trenchard Papers, Private Diary entry for 18

August 1918.

25. AIR 1/1972/204/273/1, data for No. 55 Squadron compiled from IF

Form A.8 returns.

26. A. R. Kingsford, Night Raiders of the Air: Being the Experience of a

Night Flying Pilot Who Raided Hunland on Many dark Nights during the War

231
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

(London: Hamilton, 1930), 170. One notable casualty was Capt W. E. Johns

(author of the Biggles series) and his observer, 2d Lt A. E. Army, who were

shot down on the raid to Hagenau aerodrome on 16 September 1918. See

Peter Berresford Ellis and Piers Williams, By Jove, Bigglesl The Life of

Captain W. E. Johns (London: W. H. Allen, 1981), 86-87.

27. Imperial War Museum (IWM), "Miscellaneous," box 34, item 616,

Aeroplane Diary, 1918, lists types and numbers of replacement machines.

28. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, date cited; and L. A. Pattinson, History

of 99 Squadron, Independent Force, Royal Air Force, March 1918-November

1918 (Cambridge, England: W. Heifer & Sons, 1920), 7.

29. AIR 1/1972/204/273/1, data for No. 99 Squadron compiled from IF

Form A.8 returns.

30. Pattinson.

31. Ibid., 8.

32. Ibid., 13.

33. Ibid., 16-18.

34. Ibid., 19-24.

35. Ibid., 29.

36. Ibid., 29-30.

37. Alan Morris, First of the Many: The Story of the Independent Force,

RAF (London: Jarrolds, 1968), 169-71.

38. Pattinson, 30.

39. IWM, box 34, item 616, Aeroplane Diary, dates cited.

40. Pattinson, 32.

41. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, entry for 15 August 1918.

42. Pattinson, 34.

43. Ibid.

44. AIR 1/1999/204/273/269, Report on the effects of Bombing

German Blast Furnaces, MaJ H. W. M. Paul, 26 February 1919, bomb-plot

diagram facing p. 27.

45. Ibid., 52-53.

46. Ibid., 53.

47. Ibid., 54.

48. Pattinson, 56; and Jones, Appendix 15, 87.

49. Jones, Appendix 15, 55; and War diary of Eighth Brigade, date cited.

50. Pattinson, 55.

51. Ibid., 56.

52. IWM, box 34, item 616, Aeroplane Diary.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. AIR 1/1972/204/273/1, date for No. 104 Squadron compiled from

IF form A.8 returns.

57. Ibid.

58. AIR 1/1982/204/273/1, data for No. 110 Squadron compiled from

IF Form A.8 returns.

232
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

59. Elwyn D. Bell, Hyderabad Squadron: The Story of No. 110

(Hyderabad) Squadron, Royal Air Force (London: Air Britain, 1972), 1.

60. Ibid., i, Ui, and Appendix 4, list tail numbers and aircrew of missing

machines.

61. AIR 1/2422/305/18/11, Trenchard to Weir, 23 June 1918.

62. Armstrong, 45.

63. Ibid., 46.

64. PRO, AIR 1/1997/204/273/252, GOC, IF to Air Ministry, Cipher

Wires, 22 July-16 August 1918.

65. PRO, AIR 1/460/15/312/100, Trenchard to Sykes, 4 August 1918.

66. PRO, AIR 1/460/15/312/98, Notes on Defence of Bombing

Squadrons Operating with Independent Force, 8 August 1918, folio 2.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. MFC 76/1/32, Trenchard Papers, private diary, June-November

1918.

71. Jones, vol. 6, 153.

72. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the

Development of British Air Strategic Thought and Practice Up to 1918

(London: Eimber, 1973), 197.

73. Malcolm Cooper, "British Air Policy on the Western Front,

1914-1918" (PhD diss., Oxford University, 1982), 332-33.

74. AIR 1/711/27/13/2214, "Die Luftwacht" (October 1928), 54.

Translated by Air Ministry A.7 M Section.

75. Alex Imrie, Pictorial History of the German Army Service, 1914-1918

(London: Ian Allan, 1971), 39.

76. Ibid., 52-53.

77. Ludendorff to KM (War Ministry), no. 59034, 25 June 1917, in II no.

31576, 13 July 1917, IL 41/1 Military Archive, German Federal Republic,

Freiburg. Quoted in John H. Morrow Jr., German Air Power in World War I

(Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska, 1982), 95.

78. Sir Charles Webster and A. Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air

Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, vol. 1, Preparation (London: HMSO,

1961), 19.

79. H. A. Jones, vol. 6, 163n.

80. Webster and Frankland, 41, 44.

81. H. A. Jones, vol. 6, as cited.

82. AIR 1/1072/204/273/1, data compiled from IF Form A.8 returns.

83. H. A. Jones, Appendix 12, facing p. 41.

84. H. R. Brooke-Popham, "The Air Force," Journal of the Royal United

Services Institute (JRUSI), February 1920, 49.

85. IWM, 72/76/1, W. R. Read Papers, private diary no. 6, 36.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. IWM, box 34, item 616, Aeroplane Diary, February-June 1918 data.

233
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

89. IWM, W. R. Read private diary no. 7, entry for 23 August 1918, notes

that, "No. 216 should have gone to Cologne and Frankfurt last night but did

not."

90. IWM, box 34, item 616, Aeroplane Diary, August 1918.

91. AIR 1/1972/204/273/1, data on losses compiled from IF Form A.8

returns.

92. Neville Jones, 191; and H. A. Jones, vol. 6, 134.

93. Neville Jones, 191; H. A. Jones, vol. 6, 148-49; Wise, 310-11; and

Maurer Maurer, ed., The U.S. Air Service in World War I, vol. 3, The Battle of

St. Mihiel (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air Force Historical Research

Agency, 1979), is devoted entirely to this five-day period; 717 lists the order

of battle for participating Independent Force squadrons.

94. One must note how narrow In time this moonlight bombing window

can be. Four days either side of the full moon, the approximate brightness

falls to only one-third that for the full moon; at one week either side, to

one-tenth or less. PRO, AIR 1/1997/204/273/257, Hydrographic

Department of the Admiralty Moonlight Charts for Latitude 500 30'N,

Greenwich mean time, June-November 1918.

95. Summary of Air Intelligence, 6th series, A.I.l.a, Air Ministry,

Bodleian Library, Oxford, dates cited.

96. IWM, W. R. Read private diary no. 7, dates cited.

97. Ibid., date cited.

98. Ibid., dates cited.

99. Ibid., date cited.

100. PRO, AIR 1/912/204/5/848, War Office to Haig, 6 August 1918.

101. Ibid., Haig to War Office, 10 August 1918.

102. AIR 1/912/204/5/848, Foreign Office, to Air Ministry, letter

153287/WG, 10 September 1918.

103. Ibid.; and Air Ministry to GOCs, RAF, and IF, 13 September 1918.

104. PRO, AIR 1/1997/204/273/255, Diagrams of Existing and

Prospective Lines and Communications, IAF, Azelot Aerodrome, Air Depot

Courban, and Note of Communications, IF and London, 23 July 1918.

105. PRO, AIR 1/1974/204/273/4, Haig, to War Office, letter

OB/1873B, 30 June 1918.

106. Ibid.; and War Office, to Haig, letter 24 August 1918.

107. PRO, AIR 6/13, B.3199, Minutes of Air Council Meeting, Thursday,

8 August 1918.

108. AIR 1/416/15/312/104, Gammell, to Gordon, letter C4/38, 9

August 1918. "Binge" means "to enliven or pep up," as well as "to soak (a

wooden vessel) so as to swell the wood and prevent leakage." Supplement to

the OED, 1972, Webster's Dictionary, Third Edition, 1972.

109. AIR 1/461/15/212/104, Trenchard, to Air Ministry, letter C4/35,

27 August 1918.

110. PRO, AIR 1/1649/204/95/3, HQ, IF Operation Order No. 21.

111. Ibid., orders and dates cited.

112. AIR 1/1649/204/95/3, orders and dates as cited.

234
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

113. E. D. Harding et al., History of Number 16 Squadron (known as "A"

Naval Squadron) Royal Naval Air Service Renumbered 216 Squadron

Independent Force Royal Air Force (London: H. W. Hill & Son, 1923).

114. Ibid.

115. AIR 1/1649/204/95/3, HQ, IF Operation Order No. 30, 15

September 1918.

116. Ibid.

117. AIR 1/2085/207/5/2, Approximate Results No. 84, HQ, IF to Air

Ministry, 17 September 1918. For Bivar's position see MFC 76/1/68 (Sheet

1 of 2), "Composition of Headquarters, Independent Force, Royal Air Force,

Corrected to 8th October 1918. Confidential." Royal Air Force Museum,

Hendon, HQ, IF, October 1918.

118. Ibid.

119. AIR 1/1986/204/273/112, Paul to Air Ministry, 19 September

1918.

120. Ibid.

121. AIR 1/2085/207/5/1, H. 1., IF to Air Ministry, 21 September 1918.

122. Ibid.

123. Summary of Air Intelligence, 6th series, no. 16, 19 September

1918.

124. PRO, CAB 24/65, GT 5835, Air Ministry to War Cabinet, Report No.

7 for Fortnight Ended 28 September 1918.

125. Flight, 26 September 1918, 1099.

126. AIR 1/2085/207/5/1, Monthly Dispatch (IFG 79/5), Trenchard to

Weir, 1 October 1918. Also available in CAB 24/69, GT 6234.

127. War Diary of Eighth Brigade, entry for 16/17 September 1918,

Newall Papers, B392.

128. PRO, AIR 1/184/15/218/1, "History of No. 215 Squadron Royal

Air Force (Late of No. 15 Squadron Royal Navy Air Service)."

129. PRO, AIR 1/1947/204/295/5, "No. 215 Sqdn. R.A.F. Bomb Raid

Reports, Summaries, Intelligence Reports and Raid Orders Issued by O.C.,

April-November 1918," raid order for 16/17 September 1918.

130. Ibid.

131. PRO, AIR 1/1649/204/95/9, "VIII Brigade R.A.F. Correspondence

and Reports on Casualties, September 1918 to February 1919."

132. Ibid.

133. PRO, AIR 1/1976/204/273/44, Handley Page which landed near

Breda to Naval Attache, British Legation, The Hague, letter, 1 October 1918.

134. Ibid., AIlb, Air Ministry, to HQ, IF(I), letter, 14 October 1918.

135. Ibid.

136. H. A. Jones, Appendix 13, 73-74.

137. AIR 1/1649/204/95/9, date cited.

138. Aeroplane, 8 January 1919, reprints this portion of Trenchard's

Final Dispatch on p. 131; and H. A. Jones, vol. 6, 147.

139. AIR 1/1997/204/273/252, GOC, IF, to Air Ministry, cipher wires,

17 September 1918.

235
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

140. IWM, 72/76/2, W. R. Read private diary no. 7, entry for 17

September 1918.

141. Ibid., PRO, AIR 1/2104/207/36, Results of Air Raids on Germany,

3d ed., Directorate of Air Intelligence (DAI), no. 5, January 1920, 41 and

map facing 40, indicate that six of Read's bombs hit the Hoff Brandy

Distillery and straddled the rail line near the station in the western part of

the city, without causing "much damage."

142. H. A. Jones, Appendix 27, 130-31, gives cruising speed of the

Handley Page 0400 as 79.5 miles per hour, with bomb load.

143. IWM, 72/76/2, W.R. Read Papers, private diary no. 7, entry for 17

September 1918.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid., date cited.

147. Ibid., date cited.

148. AIR 1/1649/204/95/3, HQ, IF Operation Order No. 32, 23

September 1918.

149. H. A. Jones, Appendix 13, 79, 81.

150. H. A. Jones, Appendix 13, "Industrial Targets Bombed by

Squadrons of the 41st Wing and the Independent Force, October

1917-November 1918," 42-84.

151. Ibid.

152. Trenchard's Final Dispatch is reprinted in C. Gordon Burge, The

Annals of 100 Squadron (London: Herbert Reach, 1919), 155-59; and

Aeroplane, vol. 16, 8 January 1919, 129-31.

153. Burge, 13.

154. Burge, 157; and Aeroplane, 129.

155. PRO, AIR 1/1976/204/273/39, 18 October 1918.

156. Ibid., Trenchard to AIla, 28 October 1918.

157. Ibid.

158. Burge, 158; and Aeroplane, 130. A study of the British program,

conducted by the US Air Service in June 1918, concluded, "The great

strategical importance of railway lines is indicated by the fact that about

half of all bombing raids and nearly three-fourths of the long distance raids

were directed against railways," Statistical Analysis of Aerial Bombardment,

USAF Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, file L3-AA.

159. Burge, 158; and Aeroplane, 130.

160. Burge, Squadron, 157; and Aeroplane, 129-30.

161. Burge, Squadron, 158; and Aeroplane, 129-30.

162. H. A. Jones, vol. 6. 163.

163. Ibid.

164. On Trenchard's reticence, see Wise, 325-26.

165. PRO, AIR 1/1649/204/95/7, Report of Lt-Col commanding IF AA

defences, n.d.

236
EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS

166. PRO, AIR 1/1998/204/273/263, MaJ H. W. M. Paul to Air Ministry,

Report of Allied Bombing Raids on Germany: Aerodromes and their Results,

26 February 1919.

167. RAF Hendon, Newall Papers, B395, Maj H. W. M. Paul to Air

Ministry, Report of Allied bombing Raids on Germany: Railways, "Estimate

of Material Results from the Reports of Pilots and Observers, and from Air

Photographs," 26 February 1919. Paul's "Estimate" is not included in the

PRO copy of this report (AIR 1/1998/204/273/262).

168. Wise, vol. 1, 325.

169. Trenchard to Maj W. R. Read, 31 July 1918. Quoted in PRO, AIR

1/184/15/219/1, typescript of No. 216 Squadron History. French raids on

Germany aerodromes during this period had the same rationale.

Concerning attacks on three enemy airfields on 25/26 September 1918,

"These nighttime suppression raids made the ensuing daytime raids much

safer by virtue of enemy aircraft eliminated on the ground." Peter Kilduff,

"The History of Groupes de Bombardement 4 and 9," Cross and Cockade

Journal 15, no.1 (Spring 1974): 21-22.

170. Kingsford; and Sqdn-Ldr W. A. McLaughy, "A Lecture on Night

Flying," in A Selection of Lectures and Essays from the Work of Officers

Attending the First Course of the Royal Air Force Staff College, Cranwell,

1922-1923 (London: HMSO, AP 956, Air Ministry, December 1923), 34-36.

171. Wise, vol. 1, 288 (map).

172. Baldwin, 7.

173. Ibid.

174. AIR 1/461/15/312/107, S03 to F03, 17 September 1918.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

177. AIR 1/461/15/312/107, F03 to DFO, 15 October 1918.

178. Ibid.

237

Chapter 6

Postwar Assessments

Three broad themes characterized the British experience in

planning and developing long-range bombing campaigns

through 1917. Germany had held the early bombing initiative

and the British were under considerable pressure to retaliate.

Their response, however, was complicated by doctrinal differences between the War Office and the Admiralty; the War

Office saw no need to build long-range bombers until adequate air support of ground forces had been provided.' Finally,

interservice cooperation had been hampered for years by competition for aviation resources.

On 4 April 1916, the Admiralty presented to the War Cabinet a memorandum in which Rear Adm C. L. Vaughn-Lee

claimed that Germany's Zeppelin raids against England demanded more than a purely defensive posture. He argued for a

systematic attack to regain the initiative and inflict both direct

and indirect damages on Germany.2 A month later, having

secured French cooperation in principle, the Admiralty began

basing warplanes and aircrews near Luxeuil in southeastern

France. This British unit-No. 3 Wing, Royal Naval Air Service-was to raid German munition works near the Rhine.

These efforts, sporadic from the start, were discontinued in

the spring of 1917 in order to reinforce the Royal Flying Corps

on the Somme.'

Also from the start, determining the results of long-range

bombing raids was difficult at best. The documentation

sources were fragmentary and, often, contradictory. Such

qualitative sources as aircrew observations, agents' reports,

captured letters, and German newspaper articles necessitated

caution in evaluation.4

References to "moral effect" began to appear in early spring

1917, before No. 3 Wing was disbanded. Admiralty bulletins

devoted increasing attention to this concept of indirect damage: "It is reliably reported that the Allies' recent frequent

aerial bombardments of objectives in the Saar Valley have

239
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

caused panic among the workmen, and they refuse to carry on

their work." This heartening information, published by the

Admiralty, came just as severe pressure was being applied to

transfer No. 3 Wing's assets to the RFC.5

The notion of indirect, or "moral," effects of the British

bombing campaign picked up steam and speed thereafter,

even within the Royal Flying Corps. By November 1917, General Trenchard was carrying the moral effect banner. His

memorandum to the British Air Policy Committee that month

formed the basis of the committee's own memorandum to the

Supreme War Council.' The following passage was included,

almost verbatim, in the Committee's report to the War Council:

Long distance bombing will produce its maximum moral effect only if

the visits are constantly repeated at short intervals so as to produce in

each area bombed a sustained anxiety. It is this recurrent bombing, as

opposed to isolated and spasmodic attacks, which interrupts

industrial production and undermines public confidence. On the other

hand, if the enemy were to succeed in destroying large numbers of our

bombing machines, and above all. if they could interrupt the

continuity of our bombing operations, their achievement (as the Allies'

success against Zeppelins shows) would be an immense

encouragement to them which would operate almost like a military

victory.7

The United States had entered the war by this time, and

Colonel Gorrell, chief of the Strategic Aviation Branch of the

US Air Service in France, had also picked up the moral effect

theme.' The Allies' considerations of moral effect helped to

render their bombing efforts cost-effective and psychologically

satisfying. Moral effect diminished uncertainty by making

every bomb count, whether or not any material damage resulted.

SThe British seemed to project their own outrage under German air attack onto the German population. Any damage done

to German morale was highly valued in England. Favorable

public opinion on the home front was bolstered by claims of

moral effect; these claims were therefore carefully nurtured by

British air authorities. Few considered the opposite effect; that

is, that the German populace would become habituated to the

bombing threat.'

240
POSTWARASSESSMENTS

Let us now evaluate the claims put forth by the advocates of

long-range bombing. The German collapse afforded Allied observers the opportunity to examine and analyze the results of

RAF ordnance on enemy targets. To this end, the Air Ministry

dispatched a group of experienced intelligence officers from

the Independent Force into occupied territory west of the

Rhine.

On 7 December 1918, less than a month after the Armistice,

Major Paul and Lt W. J. T. Wright, Eighth Brigade and 83d

Wing intelligence officers respectively, plus three other ranks,

proceeded on this survey. A week later, Capt A. R. Ovens,

another IF intelligence officer, joined the party.'° They returned from this temporary duty on 20 January 1919, having

spent six weeks gathering data on all targets up to the east

bank of the Rhine. Major Paul's final report, submitted on 26

February 1919, contained some unexpected conclusions.

As submitted to the Air Ministry, the RAF field report ran to

seven volumes. The first six, organized according to categories

of targets, included a study of the development of German

countermeasures to Allied bombing." The last volume assessed the effects of British bombs and contained Paul's overall conclusions. Major Paul and his colleagues seem not to

have made a systematic comparison of the dates of British

missions to each target with corresponding German records

showing the extent of bomb damage. However, considering the

limitations imposed by lack of time and personnel, this RAF

survey is remarkably complete.

As an experienced and capable intelligence officer who had

served on Newall's staff since November 1917, Paul very likely

touched a bureaucratic nerve when he submitted his findings

in late February 1919. At any rate, his assessments were

severely edited in the Air Ministry's final bombing report, "Results of Air Raids on Germany Carried out by the 8th Brigade

and Independent Force, Royal Air Force," which appeared in

January 1920 as the institutional judgment on the British

bombing campaign.

Luckily, the Americans, though relative latecomers to the

field, also conducted an extensive postwar survey on the effects of aerial bombardment. Twelve teams, each headed by a

241
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

US Air Service officer with two enlisted troops (photographer

and chauffeur), visited 140 towns in occupied territory between early March and 20 May 1919. Like the RAF teams, the

Americans sought information on these topics:

(1) Basic facts such as times, names of factories and their

products, and whether the places were always bombed during

each raid alert period.

(2) Material damage.

(3) Bombing of railways, including the lengths of time that trains

had been delayed.

(4) Countermeasures.

(5) Moral effects, if any, of the raids. 12

Except for the low priority given moral effect, the charter of

the American teams paralleled that of their RAF counterparts

who had traversed the same ground a few weeks earlier. Since

only eight of the locations they visited had been bombed exclusively by the US Air Service, the Americans were in effect

conducting their own inquiries into the strategic and tactical

results of the Eighth Brigade and Independent Force.

Ironically, the completed American bombing survey, comprising two volumes, arrived at Tours too late to be included in

the comprehensive index that the US Air Service had prepared

for the 280-volume history of American wartime aviation that

had been compiled."3 Consequently, this bombing assessment

has been overlooked for nearly half a century. One historian/editor used the history for more than 15 years before he

unearthed the unindexed US Air Service bombing survey in

July 1974.14 It has since been consulted more frequently,

though mostly as the predecessor of the US Strategic Bombing

Survey conducted after World War II.

The value of the American survey as a supplementary

authority to the evidence contained in the Paul report is obvious. In general, the two Allied field reports agree very closely.

Like the RAF report, the American bombing survey provides

an independent counterpoise to the Air Ministry's claims in its

final bombing report of January 1920. In conjunction with the

RAF survey, the US report comprises a powerful instrument

for dissecting this official evaluation.

A structure of optimistic assumptions concerning the capabilities of strategic bombing had been erected during the war;

242
-7

POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

by mid-1918, most skeptics had acknowledged its potential.

The impact of such contradictory information as that collected

by RAF and US intelligence survey teams must be measured

against this buffer of ingrained bureaucratic optimism.

The third edition of the Air Ministry's classified report, "Results of Air Raids on Germany Carried out by British Aircraft"

(known also as AP 1225), which appeared in January 1920,

has been generally accepted as the authoritative assessment

of the bombing campaign.15 However, the accuracy and objectivity of this postwar verdict must be considered with respect

to its predecessors, the first and second editions of AP 1225.

Major Boyle, the Air Intelligence staff officer who had analyzed

strategic bombing during hostilities, supervised its evaluation

after the war, even as he controlled access to the classified

materials upon which the Air Ministry judgment was ultimately based. The wartime editions of AP 1225, produced by

the same Air Staff directorate that compiled the final report,

had firmly established an analytical precedent for the widely

cited third edition.

Air Staff interest in determining and disseminating the results of strategic bombing first arose in mid-1918, after Trenchard had departed to command the Independent Force. On

28 June, General Groves, director of Flying Operations, wrote

to General Sykes, the new chief of Air Staff:

I have asked D.D.A.I. to make out a brief summary each month of the

results obtained by strategic bomb attacks. This summary to be

compiled under the heading of:

(1) Moral effects.

(2) Material effects.

I think a summary of those lines will be of use as a guide for future

action as strategic bombing develops, and also as a handy reference

for furnishing information and reports. 1

6

Sykes agreed, and the Directorate of Air Intelligence henceforth assumed responsibility for cataloging the effects of British bombing.

During 1918, two editions of AP 1225 appeared. Prepared

by Section AI1B under Captain Boyle and printed in August

and October, these wartime assessments relied heavily upon

captured letters and agents' reports for details. The introduc243
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

tion to the second edition included a caution: "It should be

remembered that the German censorship is very strict and

that newspaper references to air raids are very scarce and

incomplete.""7 Nonetheless, the wartime AP 1225 editions asserted that "the morale of the German population becomes

lower as the range and power of our bombing squadrons increase." This positive tone echoed and reinforced the claims of

other news releases, communiques, and dispatches disseminated by London and HQ IF.

The RAF intelligence teams transmitted their findings to the

Air Ministry, via Salmond's HQ, RAF in the field, on 26 February 1919.18 The Air Ministry's AI1 Branch of the Directorate of

Air Intelligence (DAI) then produced the third and final volume

of AP 1225, purportedly based upon an evaluation of these

firsthand findings. Most of the Directorate's efforts, however,

appear to have been devoted to advocacy rather than accuracy.

Captain Boyle, head of Section AIIB, took over newly

formed Section AI3C in November 1918. His six-man section,

subordinate to the A13 Branch ("Relations with Foreign Countries"), was responsible for collecting postwar data on "bomb

targets," "results of raids," and "A.A. defences" for the Air

Intelligence Directorate."9 In June 1919, after Trenchard had

again become chief of Air Staff, Boyle, now a major, headed

the entire All Branch, charged with "receipt and custody of

intelligence papers," "all general intelligence questions," and

"censorship."20

His Air Ministry staff assignments clearly indicate that

Boyle oversaw the two wartime printings of AP 1225. He also

headed the staff groups that sifted the RAF field survey after

the Armistice to produce the third edition of the Air Ministry

report in January 1920. His additional responsibility for postwar censorship, formerly entrusted to Branch A16, "Censorship and Propaganda," also seems significant.

In contrast to the seven-volume RAF field survey, which

grouped information by target category, the final report lists

objectives alphabetically.2

" Its arrangement is useful to the

civil servant or staff officer interested only in a particular

target, but it hinders analysis of bombing effects upon classes

244
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

of objectives; for example, railway systems, the chemical/munitions industry, or enemy blast furnace complexes. A fourpage introduction, "Effects of Air Raids," precedes the table of

contents listing specific targets.22 This brief narrative, excerpted from RAF survey conclusions on the material and

moral effects of British bombing, does not constitute a comprehensive assessment. In fact, very little substantive analysis

of captured materials or cross-checking against RAF wartime

records was undertaken prior to release of the final report.

Of seven appendices to the Air Ministry volume, six are

simply edited portions of the RAF survey. They are primarily

concerned with German active and passive countermeasures

to British bombing. The last appendix, "Comparative Charts,"

details the scope of Eighth Brigade and Independent Force

operations, down to the numbers of each type of bomb

dropped per month.23 The correlation between RAF effort and

bombing results, based upon German documents and operational studies, or intelligence assessments compiled by RAF

staff, appears somewhat sketchy.

All parties acknowledged that the limited capabilities of the

British bombing squadrons precluded any hope of widespread

or significant material results. Trenchard admitted as much in

the final dispatch, citing the small size of his forces and "the

limitations imported on long-range bombing by the weather"

as his two major constraints.24

Privately, he had already concluded that IF's efforts were

less than had been hoped for: "I am certain the damage done

both to buildings and personnel is very small compared to any

other form of war and the energy expended."25 He also complained about IF's staff size.

The more I think of it the more I think that if the Independent Force

has glamour about it everybody thinks it is responsible for doing

greater deeds than it has done, but at present the total result is an

enormous increase of staff, personnel and work to carry it out.26

The findings of RAF and US Air Service bombing survey teams

confirm this view.

Apart from isolated incidents that caused unexpectedly

great damage (and received correspondingly greater coverage

in AP 1225), the material results of Eighth Brigade and Inde245
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

pendent Force air raids are unremarkable. The 17 May raid on

Metz-Sablon, which caught a Kaiser honor guard in the open,

and the 16 July raid on Thionville, which detonated an ammunition train, are notable exceptions."

Site inspections by the RAF survey teams brought to light

significant differences between even the moderate degree of

damages expected and actual results. And Major Paul had

pointed out the difficulties in assessing probable damage in

daylight raids.

The utmost a pilot or observer can do is to record where a bomb fell. If

a large fire or explosion should result, this can be seen from the air,

and is reported, but otherwise no estimate of the amount of damage is

possible.

For night raids, Paul identified navigational imprecision as a

contributing factor.

How easy it is to mistake one locality for another in the dark, when

operating over a large area, is proved by the number of cases which

have come to light in which bombs were dropped on towns or railways

miles away from the assigned objective, which escaped attack

altogether .... It is manifestly impossible to attach much importance

to reports unless it is reasonably certain that no mistake has been

made in locating the objective. . . . Experience in the Independent

Force would seem to indicate an invariable tendency to optimism both

on the part of those reporting results from observation and of those

estimating results from photographs. 28

Major Paul reinforced his view that British estimates of damage caused by RAF bombs were overly optimistic in the "General Opinion of the Allied Bombs" section of the RAF field

survey.

In view of the above, and of what has previously been stated, under

Railways, Blast Furnaces, Aerodromes and Industrial Centres, it

cannot be said that our bombs have proved of more than moderate

efficiency.

Speaking generally, shooting has been moderate on the part of all.29

The US Air Service survey reached similar conclusions, including a tabular summary of the costs of direct and indirect

material damage to each location in their final report. Their

figures are almost identical to those in the RAF survey.3 0

In monetary terms, a recent appraisal estimates that the

results of Allied bombing during 1918 inflicted damages to the

246
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

value of less than one-tenth of 1 percent of German war expenditures. 3

' AP 1225, the Air Ministry report of January

1920, presents detailed tables to verify that the Roechling

works at Vblklingen suffered a production shortfall of 15,803

tons of steel in 1918, owing mainly to air raid alarms. While

considerable, this deficit represented less than 5 percent of

the plant's 1913 production (over 340,000 tons)-a perspective the Air Ministry does not provide.32 Material effects did

not, however, constitute the main objective for the GOC IF.

By attacking as many centres as could be reached, the moral effect

was first of all very much greater, as no town felt safe, and it

necessitated continued and thorough defensive measures on the part

of the enemy to protect the many different localities over which my

Force was operating.

At present the moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the

material in proportion of 20 to 1, and therefore it was necessary to

create the greatest moral effect possible.33

This emphasis on moral effect needs to be examined in detail.

Upon becoming GOC IF in June 1918, Trenchard took pains

to justify moral effect as a primary objective in his proposed

concept of operations. This notion was not peculiar to Trenchard, however; it seems to have enjoyed considerable support

within the Air Ministry from mid-1918 to the Armistice.

The importance of moral effect figures prominently in the

two wartime editions of AP 1225. In August 1918, the introduction to the first edition noted that the German populace

was unsettled and terrified.

Letters captured on German prisoners show how unsettled and

terrified is the German populace, and presumably the receipt of such

letters has a demoralizing effect on the fighting value of the recipients.

Though information as to results is increasingly hard to obtain, it is

certain that the moral [sic] of the German population becomes lower

as the range and power of our bombing squadrons increase.

The accumulation of evidence from all quarters of Germany provide

indisputable proof of the efficacy of air raids during the period under

review. 3 4

The second edition noted a similar "moral" effect in October

1918.

247
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

In the period August-October, evidence has accumulated as to the

immense moral effect of our air raids into Germany. To this a large

number of letters found on captured prisoners bears witness ...

Further, it should be remembered that the necessity of providing large

numbers of anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, balloons, and home

defence squadrons must prove a serious drain on Germany's

resources.

Though material damage is as yet slight when compared with moral

effect, it is certain that the destruction of factories, and, consequently,

loss of production will precede material damage. 35

Boyle himself, in a four-page summary prepared after the

Armistice but before publication of the third edition of AP

1225, contended that the British claims of damage were supported by photographs.

In addition to captured letters, German press reports, and information

from other reliable sources, a large number of photographs taken

during and after raids show how effective the bomb dropping had been

and give ample evidence of the damage done during both day and

night raids.

Apart from the material damage caused, the moral effect on munition

workers, railway employees, and on the civilian population generally,

has been enormous, an effect which, judging by captured letters, has

made itself felt at the front.

The loss of production caused by sleepless nights, terror of daylight

raids, false air raid warnings, etc., is known to have been very great.36

From these Air Ministry analyses, the ascendancy of moral

effect as the primary goal of the British bombing campaign

becomes unmistakably evident.

Because of the lack of friendly intelligence available during

wartime, the Air Ministry had to rely on enemy indicators to

support their assertions. Boyle's staff habitually exploited

agents' reports and captured letters as indices of enemy morale without ever questioning the reliability of such criteria.

Extracts from civilian letters were assumed to represent accurately the extent to which air raids depressed morale within

Germany. S. F. Wise, the RCAF official historian, noted the

lack of follow-up.

There seems to have been no follow-up. Since wartime intelligence is

of necessity built up from such shreds of evidence, it is

understandable that some weight-perhaps undue weight-was given

248
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

to this tiny sampling by those that were most concerned with the

bombing offensive.3 7

After the Armistice, RAF survey teams failed to conclusively

substantiate the depth of depression that had been ascribed

to the German populace. Nevertheless, the third edition of AP

1225 subsequently reprinted, without further amplification or

qualification, the assertions of its two wartime predecessors

concerning the moral effects of bombing.

The Air Ministry group compiling the classified final report

had little choice, however, since the IF survey teams confined

their sources of evidence to materials from official German

files."8 The British teams viewed the opinions of German plant

managers and civil officials with considerable skepticism. In

nearly all cases, the Germans contended that air raids had

had only minor impact upon civilian morale and productivity.39

A similar RAF survey team investigating the effects of bombing in the operational area of No. 5 Group, RAF, along the

Belgian coast, adopted the same cautious approach. In its 12

March 1919 report to the Air Ministry, this group explicitly

excluded the sorts of material upon which the January 1920

edition of AP 1225 was to rely so heavily: "Unverified reports of

Agents during the war have not been accepted as evidence."4

"

The German citizenry in fact fretted about bombing effects

more in terms of their individual pocketbooks than in terms of

collective morale. In September 1918, an Air Ministry intelligence summary featured an extract from a recent issue of

Trierische Landeezeitung.

We, a city which has been the specially selected target of hostile

aircraft, finally demand a definite statement that there does exist a

legal claim to compensation for damage.

Either let it be seen that the criminal barbarity of these aerial attacks on the defenseless civil population ceases once and for all; Or: let the

Government state that we can recover for all damage damage done to

property, and (which is the main thing) damage to life and limb. 41

This aggrieved tone echoes that of any citizen confronting bureaucratic inefficiency. A month later, the intelligence summary printed a similar extract from a Frankfurt newspaper.42

249
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

These and other documents contradict the Air Ministry assertion that in Germany "the public generally remained calm,

but as soon as casualties were caused, panic became general."43 Demands for financial compensation impelled most of

the outbursts from German civilians; IF ordnance did not seriously erode their will to resist. What the Air Ministry characterized as panic was mainly a demand for prompt payment of

insurance claims.

Overall, the moral effect of Independent Force bombs was

far less than the Air Ministry had assumed. The German experience paralleled that of British civilians facing Zeppelins and

Gothas earlier in the war.

As in Britain, there was considerable early unease among industrial

workers because of bombing, but . . . ultimately most workers were

able to build up mental defences against it.44

Trenchard made a similar linkage in his private diary.

The moral effect is great-very great-but it gets less as the little

material effect is seen. The chief moral effect is apparently to give the

newspapers copy to say how wonderful we are, though it really does

not affect the enemy as much as it affects our own people. 45

In other words, raiding Germany raised British home-front

morale proportionately more than it lowered the spirits of the

enemy's civil population.

The chief practitioner of strategic bombing during 1918

thus concluded that moral effect, while useful, could not be

logically touted as a decisive, or even significant, military result of his bombing campaign. When he was chief of the Air

Staff once again between 1919 and 1929, Trenchard either

forgot or chose to ignore this fundamental point.

The conclusions reached by the US Air Service bombing

survey merit consideration. The evaluations provide a strong

counterpoint to the Air Ministry's assessment.

The greatest criticism to be brought against aerial bombardment

(British-America did not have enough bombing aviation to warrant its

employment other than without ground forces-France did not

approve of this use of its bombing aviation) as carried out in the war of

1914-1918 is the lack of a predetermined program carefully calculated

to destroy by successive raids those industries most vital in

maintaining Germany's fighting forces. The evidence of this is seen in

the wide area over which the bombing took place as well as the failure

250
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

of crippling, beyond a limited extent, any one factory or industry. (It

might be well to add that in many conversations with officers of the

British Independent Air Force there was a growing feeling of

dissatisfaction against their bombing policy. It was the statement of

these officers that they did not believe they were getting the best

results possible and that while the wish and later the decision to

"bomb something up there" might have appealed to one's sporting

blood, it did not work with greatest efficiency against the German

fighting machine. It was on the return of an American officer from a

three day visit with the British that it was learned of the disgust held

by a British bombing expert-who had achieved very good results in

bombing submarines-of the inaccuracy of bombing by the British

Independent Air Force and the unintelligent choice of targets.)

This investigation has decidedly shown that the enemy's morale was

not sufficiently affected to handicap the enemy's fighting forces in the

field. The policy as followed by the British and French in the present

war of bombing a target once or twice and then skipping to another

target is erroneous.

Bombing for moral effect alone such as took place over Cologne,

Frankfurt, Bonn, and Wiesbaden, and which was probably the excuse

for the wide spread of bombs over a town rather than their

concentration on a factory, is not a productive means of bombing. The

effect is legitimate and just as considerable when attained indirectly

through the bombing of a factory. 46

This independent assessment corroborates many of the criticisms presented earlier of organizational confusion and operational shortcomings in Eighth Brigade and Independent Force

employment during 1918.

Against this general summary, a closer examination of the

specific effects of the British long-range bombing campaign

can proceed. This analysis will focus primarily upon the reliability of the postwar third edition of AP 1225, the classified

final bombing report published by the Air Ministry in January

1920.

The Air Ministry's final report of January 1920 provides

detailed information on 33 objectives raided by the British

long-range force in 1918. The report includes brief extracts

from British and German communiques, aircrew reports, German bomb-plot plans, and photographs taken during and after the operation. Targets of considerable interest during hostilities, such as Cologne and the BASF/Oppau chemical and

munitions complex at "Mannheim" (actually in Ludwigshafen),

received proportionate coverage in AP 1225.11 Information

251
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

about raids on industrial centers made up the bulk of the Air

Ministry's postwar publication.

On balance, the Air Ministry publication is sadly wanting.

Serious discrepancies exist between the Air Ministry document and other records, primarily the RAF and US Air Service

surveys and wartime returns from the field.

AP 1225 coverage of industrial centers, the largest target

category, exemplifies these many factual inaccuracies. These

objectives fall into one of two groups, determined by whether

Allied postwar survey teams were able to visit the location in

question.

The Air Ministry final report summarizes information on

several industrial centers bombed by Eighth Brigade and Independent Force in 1918. RAF and US Air Service intelligence

teams had visited nine centers immediately after the Armistice, and had independently assessed raid effects at those

locations.

Bonn Duren Main (Mayence)

Coblenz Kaiserslautern Pirrnasens

Cologne Landau Wiesbaden

AP 1225 includes a brief narrative on each target, based on

wartime aircrew claims or German sources such as agents'

reports, captured letters or news releases; aerial photographs;

and bomb-plot plans derived from German records unearthed

by the RAF survey teams.

The AP 1225 coverage of Cologne is typical for industrial

objectives. Cologne, the report says, was raided on three occasions in 1918. It cites reports, aerial photographs, and bombplot plans in detailing these attacks. For the first raid (24/25

March), AP 1225 reprints a British wartime bulletin noting

that "Half a ton of bombs were dropped by us on the railway

station at Cologne, where a fire was started."48 According to

the Germans, however, no bomb damage occurred anywhere

in the city on 24/25 March 1918.41 Eighth Brigade wartime

records for this mission related that the Handley Page crewmen encountered "mist and drifting fog banks" and twice lost

their way."° The US Air Service survey team found that the

Handley Page bombs fell on a pile of lumber in Deutz, across

the Rhine from Cologne.5 '

252
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

Two raids on Kaiserslautern during October 1918 illustrate

the same phenomenon: Local German authorities recorded no

damage to targets that RAF crews claimed to have bombed.

On 5 October, returning aircrews reported unobserved results;

later in the month, they claimed significant results at their

designated target. On the first raid, a formation of No. 110

Squadron DH9As, diverted from Cologne, bombed Kaiserslautern but could not observe the results. The squadron lost four

machines to enemy action.52

The German bomb-plot plan of Kaiserslautern shows no

bombs within its map coverage, which extends approximately

two kilometers beyond the built-up area.5

, The US Air Service

survey likewise lists no raids on Kaiserslautern between 25

September and 21 October 1918.54

Less than three weeks later, on the night of 23/24 October,

No. 215 Squadron aircrews claimed to have dropped 3,748

pounds of bombs on Kaiserslautern. They claimed two direct

hits on railway bridges.55 Again, neither the RAF survey nor

the US Air Service survey reveals any bomb damage. 56

The Air Ministry report is also afflicted with a second type of

discrepancy, revealed in its coverage of Cologne: Damage acknowledged by the Germans was not covered. On 16/17 September 1918, the night in which the IF lost an unprecedented

number of Handley Pages, some of the missing aircraft had

been ordered to raid Cologne.5 7 The Air Ministry final report

does not allude to this date, even though the German bombplot plan in the RAF survey clearly shows that one bomb or

cluster of bombs hit the western outskirts of the city.5

" The Air

Ministry All Branch selectively transcribed the bomb-plot

data onto another municipal map of Cologne, altering both

scale and coverage in the process.5 9

This questionable technique recurs throughout AP 1225. In

every one of 20 instances, despite the availability of German

bomb-plot plans, the Air Ministry composed and substituted

its own maps. In some instances, the report did not even

provide revised versions.60

Other captured materials, however, are photographically reproduced from the RAF survey and included in AP 1225; for

example, German photographs of bomb damage and IF dia253
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

grams of enemy air defenses. Clearly, the Air Ministry had the

technical means to treat captured bomb-plot plans in a similar manner.

The scale and coverage of the revised maps in AP 1225 are

oriented to exclude bombs that fell inaccurately. Blinds (unexploded ordnance) are neither indicated on these maps nor

alluded to in the report, even though the Germans frequently

referred to them and the RAF survey discussed them in detail.' For the Wiesbaden entry, the German bomb-plot plan is

not reprinted, even in revised form; however, captured photographs dramatically portraying the effects of a 1,650-pound

bomb are included.

AP 1225 coverage of raid results at Pirmasens typifies the

third category of discrepancy in the Air Ministry report. Here,

the final report includes the results of two raids in which

Pirmasens was neither the assigned objective nor the target

that IF aircrews claimed to have bombed. On 21/22 August

1918, No. 216 Squadron dispatched two Handley Pages to raid

the railways at Treves.63 Though the aircrews reported bombing Treves from 7,000 feet on a clear night, German records in

the RAF and US Air Service surveys show no damage in the

vicinity of the city.64 At Pirmasens, however, a cluster of six

bombs fell on the southwest edge of town.65 AP 1225 included

these raid results in its revised bomb-plot plan.

On 30/31 October, No. 100 Squadron sent a Handley Page

to raid the Burbach Works at Saarbrficken; No. 115 also

launched a single machine, this one to bomb Baden.66 Both

aircrews reported unobserved results, owing to "thick mist

and fog."67 German bomb-plot plans indicate that neither the

Burbach steel works nor the adjacent town of Saarbrficken

suffered any damage on this night.6 Since neither survey

team visited Baden, possible results there remain unknown.

Six bombs fell into the northeast part of Pirmasens, killing six

people and causing 175,000 Marks damage.69 The Air Ministry

final report included this raid in its bomb-plot plan of Pirmasens.

On 5 October, a single machine of No. 110 Squadron

claimed to have bombed Pirmasens as a target of opportunity,

though with unobserved results.70 The German bomb-plot

254
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

plan and other records indicate that no bombs fell within

three kilometers of the town that day."' The Air Ministry final

report does not depict or summarize any aspect of this singleship raid.72

The 20 February 1918 operation by No. 55 Squadron, in

which Pirmasens was indeed the assigned target, is briefly

summarized in the Air Ministry final report.7 3 This summary

virtually duplicates the description of the material and moral

effects visited upon Pirmasens in the October 1918 edition of

AP 1225.11 In fact, this mission represents the only raid on

Pirmasens for which AP 1225 included a narrative extract to

supplement bomb-plot plan information.

In summary, the AP 1225 entries that evaluate raid results

at these nine industrial centers exhibit serious deficiencies.

The extent to which the Air Ministry classified report of January 1920 can be misleading is revealed in the failure of staff

officers in the Air Intelligence Directorate to perform even the

most rudimentary cross-checks with other pertinent data.

Although RAF bombing survey teams were unable to visit

the following 11 industrial centers in Germany, the Air Ministry report covers them in some detail.

Darmstadt Lahr Stuttgart

Frankfurt Obemdorf Worms

Freiburg Offenburg Zweibrlicken

Karlsruhe Rottweil

At eight of these localities (all but Darmstadt, Frankfurt, and

Karlsruhe), the Air Ministry final report cautions that "this

town was not visited by the Commission and the only information available is that received during hostilities."75

No British survey records exist to challenge or verify the

wartime claims reprinted in the Air Ministry assessment.

However, US survey teams were able to evaluate damage at

Worms and Zweibrficken. The German materials they unearthed undercut Air Ministry conclusions at several points.

The Air Ministry's final report indicated only a single raid at

Worms, that of 29/30 October 1918.76 However, the Germans

reported bomb damage on 15/16 August and 28/29 October.77 In the first incident, six machines from No. 216 Squadron had been assigned objectives at Mannheim and Saar255
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

brfcken; according to the Germans, neither location sustained damage that night."8 At Worms, the US Air Service

investigators learned that two bombs "fell in the Rhine."7 9

On 28/29 October, two Handley Pages, each carrying a

1,650-pound bomb, claimed to have bombed Mannheim and

Treves.A0 Neither city was hit on that date, according to German records; however, one bomb fell on a rail junction at

Worms."'

On two of the three dates for which the Air Ministry report

reprinted wartime damage claims at Zweibrficken, German

records listed no damage anywhere in the town.8 2 Further, on

19 February, when 11 DH4s of No. 55 Squadron claimed to

have bombed Treves after being diverted by weather from

Mannheim, eight bombs dropped on the hills outside Zweibrficken.8 3

These discrepancies, which can be discovered only by recourse to sources other than British records, are consistent

with the type and magnitude of contradictions revealed in

studies of targets for which postwar documentation is available. It seems safe to conclude that similar errors of fact exist

in the final report's coverage of German industrial centers that

were never visited by either survey group. The motives for

including such uncorroborated analyses in the official evaluation are open to question, particularly in light of the final

report's equivocal entries for Darmstadt, Frankfurt, and

Karlsruhe.

As all three of these cities lay east of the Rhine and thus

beyond the zone of Allied occupation, they were not inspected

by the bombing surveys. The Americans noted that it was

"impossible to go directly to Karlsruhe" and that "Frankfurt

A.M. at the time investigated was not occupied by Allied

troops."84 AP 1225 does not mention the fact, though it had for

other industrial targets, that confirmation was impossible to

obtain. Its coverage, which includes numerous aerial photographs of these cities, conveys the impression that its evaluations can be taken as authoritative.

Further, for Frankfurt and Karlsruhe, the Air Ministry report not only omits the "not visited" disclaimer but also includes bomb-plot plans to accompany the narratives and aer256
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

ial photographs."s These plans may have been imaginatively

compiled from raid photographs and wartime claims; the diagram for Frankfurt depicts suspiciously tidy clusters of ordnance that contrast markedly with actual patterns of dispersion on authentic German bomb-plot plans.8 6

Air Ministry coverage of these 11 industrial targets relies

entirely upon reprinted wartime claims. Such official conclusions are at best dubious, as is clear when one compares their

versions of Worms and Zweibrfucken with American survey

findings.

Further, the slanted coverage of Darmstadt, Frankfurt, and

Karlsruhe would lead one to believe that RAF survey parties

did in fact obtain information that confirmed the Air Ministry

final report. The origins and reliability of the official bomb-plot

plans for the latter two targets are especially questionable,

however, and one doubts that Eighth Brigade and Independent Force damage claims against the remaining targets in

this unsurveyed group can be any more accurate.

In effect, the Air Intelligence Directorate's final report includes entries for more industrial targets (eleven) for which

postwar information was unavailable than for locations (nine)

actually visited by RAF survey teams after the Armistice. And

data on these nine targets were not cross-checked or subjected to critical scrutiny, even though the materials were

readily at hand. These 20 urban targets comprised nearly

two-thirds of the total number of objectives covered individually in the Air Ministry classified report.

For other categories of bombing targets, the detailed explication of the discrepancies revealed in the Air Ministry accounts of industrial objectives is representative; that is, yielding appreciably neither more nor less errors than seem to

exist elsewhere in official coverage.

Several points are nonetheless worth noting. At the huge

BASF/Oppau chemical and munitions complex at Ludwigshafen, for example, the 10 raids enumerated in the Air Ministry final report are outnumbered by 11 occasions in which the

same objective was claimed to have been hit; German plant

managers recorded no bomb damage. The circumstances of

the Burbach blast furnaces at Saarbrficken further illustrate

257
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

this selective coverage. AP 1225 discusses six raids on Burbach while depicting only four on the accompanying bombplot plan-and other records indicate that on 12 occasions for

which Eighth Brigade and IF aircrews claimed hits, the Germans recorded absolutely no casualties or damage to the

works.87 The Thionville rail yards and stations are listed as

having been hit by British bombs on 21 occasions in the Air

Ministry's final report, but the report does not mention a further 15 raids for which aircrews claimed hits when no damage

was caused.88

The singular lack of results from the large bombs dropped

by IF Handley Pages in the last weeks of hostilities is also

illuminating, as is the final report's coverage of those attacks.

On three nights in October, night squadrons dropped a total of

eleven 1,650-pound bombs on enemy targets. At Kaiserslautern on 21/22 October and at Wiesbaden on 23/24 October,

one bomb on each city caused damage that was photographed

by local authorities. These photographs were prominently displayed in the Air Ministry's final report.8 9 The remaining nine

large bombs apparently caused no significant damage, as German records do not refer to any effects that would be expected

from ordnance of this size. In fact, at five targets for which

aircrews reported hits and damage, the Germans reported no

damage at all. Major Paul himself admitted that no evidence of

these hits could be found.

No trace of 1650 lbs. (bombs) having fallen on or near

METZ-SABLONS, SAARBRUCKEN, or TREVES Stations can be traced.

Judging from the colossal effects caused by these bombs at

KAISERSLAUTERN and WIESBADEN, no difficulty would have been

experienced in tracing those bombs had they fallen on the three

objectives mentioned above. 90

These incidents dramatically highlight the gap between actual

and claimed bombing effects.

The January 1920 final bombing report lists a total of 228

missions against enemy targets it catalogs; Air Ministry coverage of the Metz-Sablon railway triangle alone accounts for 45

raids. 9'

Against this selective coverage, the scope of discrepancies

becomes significant. On 66 occasions in which British air258
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

crews claimed to have hit particular locations in 1918, German records indicate that no damage was sustained. On 23

dates when particular locations were assigned or claimed

bombing targets, and German records substantiate damage,

the final report does not include raid results. Finally, on 38

occasions when particular locations were neither assigned nor

claimed as bombing targets but were in fact damaged, the

final report listed the date and took credit for the results.

These 127 discrepancies, which come to light only through

comparison of operational returns and Allied survey materials,

severely undercut acceptance of the Air Ministry final report

on January 1920 as an authoritative evaluation of the effects

of British strategic bombing.

Despite the availability of friendly and enemy materials after

the Armistice on which to base a comprehensive analysis, the

third edition of the official bombing report does not depart

from the uncritical tones of its two wartime predecessors. It

distorts the subject considerably, and must be approached

from that perspective, rather than an objective assessment. It

does little more than encapsulate and institutionalize the optimistic view of bombing that had been promoted during hostilities. Bureaucratic momentum and public confidence were

strengthened, but nothing was learned.

Despite AP 1225's shortcomings, the Air Ministry continued

to publicize its perspective after the Armistice. A Parliamentary paper, "Synopsis of British Air Effort during the War,"

reflects the official verdict.

On the 1st April, 1918, when the Royal Air Force came into being, the

Air Ministry immediately recognized the great possibilities of a policy

of strategic interception, as well as the opportunities for striking at the

noral [sic] of the German nation. Every effort was made to build up

and maintain in the field a powerful striking force to execute a series

of systematic raids on the key munition and chemical factories of

Germany. Accordingly, on the 8th June, 1918, the Independent Force,

Royal Air Force, was constituted, and the 3 squadrons of the original

8th Brigade, R.F.C., were gradually increased to 10.

The effect, both morally and materially, of the raids on German

territory carried out during the summer of 1918 can hardly be

over-estimated. The utterances of the German press and public bear

eloquent testimony to the results of the new policy, and it is known

that the German High Command were compelled to recall at least 20

259
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

fighting squadrons from the Western Front, and to immobilize a large

number of group troups [sic] to man anti-aircraft batteries and an

elaborate system of searchlights. In fact, the policy was so successful

that when the Armistice was signed on the 11th November, 1918, it

was intended to increase the Independent Force to a total of 48

squadrons by the end of May 1919.92

The seemingly unlimited potential of airpower was officially

beyond reproach. Trenchard himself secured a year's grace

from Admiral Beatty and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson in

which to lay the institutional foundations of his new service.93

The consequences of this self-delusion are significant. Had

the Air Ministry and the postwar Royal Air Force, once again

under Trenchard as chief of Air Staff, studied their own records, they could have determined the constraints that

weather, navigational precision, sighting accuracy, and aircrew proficiency impose upon long-range bombardment.

These limitations inhere quite apart from any complications

induced by enemy countermeasures.

Though this introspection would have been painful, such a

reappraisal presumably would have spurred efforts to minimize operational limitations through research, doctrine, and

training. Whatever the policy, "execution had to conform to

what was operationally possible . . . which in turn depended

on advances in tactics and technology."94 More importantly,

RAF policies would have more realistically reflected its actual

capabilities during the interwar years. Instead, the Royal Air

Force claimed to be capable of the impossible. Its planners

neglected basic programs; for example, training in long-range

navigation and bombing accuracy.

RAF survival was at risk after the Armistice, however, partly

as a result of cuts in military funding and partly to forestall

Admiralty and War Office efforts to return aviation to subordinate, "cooperative" roles. The Royal Air Force therefore had to

emphasize the importance of its unique role.

Strategic bombing, after all, is the heart of air power. It is strategic

bombing which distinguishes air power from military and naval power

by giving it a characteristic far beyond what it would otherwise have

been, a mere adjunct of armies and navies. 95

The Air Staff accordingly stressed that control of the air could

be significant, even decisive, in future conflicts; it repeatedly

260
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

argued that a fundamental reevaluation of the relative contributions of each fighting service was necessary.

Should an air attack coincide with an invasion, it will be met by the

close defensive air forces both regular and territorial.

This will not entail the provision of air forces on a stronger scale than

is normally required to resist air attack: as in order to counter air

attacks of the enemy it will be necessary to continuously attack his air

bases. The temporary diversion of this long range offensive to meet the

rare occasions when invasion or a raid is attempted will have little

effect on the attainment of general aerial supremacy. The power of the

Air Force in this respect Is sufficiently great to justify its use as the

chief weapon of defence and the transfer of the responsibility to the Air

Ministry.96

The Royal Air Force hamstrung its own development and

staked its institutional existence during the lean years on the

assertion that bombers could play a significant, if not decisive,

role in any future general conflict. Home defense gradually

became equated to this untested ability.

The material effect of an aiLr raid may be great; its moral effect is

undoubted. Continuous air raids, even in the form of a single hostile

aeroplane overhead, have a great and cumulative effect on the

national morale. Work over large areas is stopped or seriously

impeded by day and night, trains are brought to a standstill, and a

large proportion of the population takes refuge below ground. In short,

in view of the effects which can be produced by an aerial attack, it is

almost inconceivable that a nation in a position to undertake the same

should prefer the difficulties and risks attendant upon a landing raid:

the latter appears therefore to be a form of attack definitely less

probable now than in 1914. It seems therefore that if any single

control is to be adopted it should logically be vested in an Air

Commander responsible to the Air Ministry.97

The Salisbury Committee (of the Committee for Imperial Defence) met in 1923 to consider in detail the exact relations

between the three fighting services. One of its primary tasks

was to determine "the standard to be aimed at for defining the

strength of the Air Force for purposes of Home and Imperial

Defence."9 " Trenchard testified before the Balfour Subcommittee, a body of the Salisbury Committee, in May and June. He

again emphasized the concept that defensive forces should

consist largely of long-range bombers.

261
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

It is on the destruction of enemy industries and, above all, on the

lowering of the morale of enemy nations caused by offensive bombing,

that ultimate victory rests.99

To buttress his case, Trenchard asked the subcommittee to

ponder the political consequences for Britain if enemy bombers attacked in a future war.

In a democratic country like ours, power rests ultimately with the

people, and war cannot be continued unless the bulk of the people will

support it. If the people are subjected to sufficient bombing they will

compel the Government to sue for peace.

As the Air Staff have previously pointed out, not the least part of the

menace presented by overwhelming air attack, is the possibility that

forces of disorder may be loosed upon the country with consequences

which would be difficult to foretell and certainly unpleasant to

contemplate. 100

In August 1923, the Balfour Subcommittee recommended

establishing the Royal Air Force as an independent service.' 0'

The Chief of the Air Staff was to be placed on an equal footing

with his colleagues of the Army and Navy by the creation of

the Chiefs of Staff Committee. ' 0 2 These recommendations were

later incorporated, without significant alteration, into the final

report of the Salisbury Committee.

Classified Air Staff Memoranda (ASM) 11 and 1 1A soon appeared (August 1923 and March 1924) to promulgate the official philosophy concerning "Air Strategy and Home Defence,"

throughout the RAF. ASM 11 asserted that the main objective

for direct attack by the RAF was "the true objective of all

war-the moral [sic] of the enemy nation."10 3 ASM 1 1A, intended "as a Supplement to No. 11 with the objects of further

explaining the Air Staff views," analyzed the objective and

methods by which the strategic air offensive would be conducted.

The forces employed . .. can be used in two ways. They can either

bomb military objectives in populated areas from the beginning of the

war, with the object of obtaining a decision by the moral effect which

such attacks will produce, and by the serious dislocation of the

normal life of the country: or, alternatively, they can be used in the

first instance to attack enemy aerodromes with a view to gaining some

measure of "air superiority" and, when this has been gained, can be

changed over to the direct attack on the nation.

262
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

The latter alternative is the method which the lessons of military

history seem to recommend, but the Air Staff are convinced that the

former is the correct one. 104

The Air Staff acknowledged civilian demands for protection,

but stressed the need for bombers.

It may be stated as a principle that the bombing squadrons should be

numerous as possible and the fighters as few as popular opinion and

the necessity of defending vital objectives will permit. 1

05

Thus was civilian morale under aerial bombardment officially

established as the crucial objective of aerial warfare, an assertion that persisted well into the Second World War.106 Writing

in 1931, Squadron Leader John C. Slessor, summarized the

potential of airpower.

It has been borne in on us during the war that our own historical

security was in some measure a thing of the past, and in fact the

establishment of the R.A.F. as a single Service in 1918 was largely the

result of insistent demands by organized public opinion for adequate

protection against air attacks on centres of population and

industry. 1

0 7

The Air Staff took no active steps in the interwar years to

rectify this unsupported but almost universal misconception.

This government position represented merely a refinement

of popular assumptions dating from the Great War about the

efficacy and terrors of strategic bombing, assumptions engendered and reinforced by official reports, classified analyses,

and public bulletins in the years before the Second World

War.'°" Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor admitted in 1954 that the RAF had underestimated the tools required for airpower to fulfill its promise.

It is also quite true that, anyway until about the end of 1938, we very

much over-estimated what our own bombers of the day would be able

to do. We enormously underrated the number of bombs required to get

a hit, the numbers and weight of bombs required to do fatal damage

when we did get hits, the toughness and resilience of civilian moral

[sic] under bombing, our ability to bomb unescorted by day-with no

self-sealing tanks-the scientific and technical aids required, and all

that sort of thing .... Where we went wrong in those pre-war years

was not in our estimate of what air power could do when it had the

tools. but in our estimate of the tools required to do the job. 109

263
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

Such miscalculations meant that Royal Air Force flyers, especially those of Bomber Command, confronted virtually the

identical set of practical difficulties, equipment shortcomings,

and operational limitations in the first three years of World

War II that their predecessors had encountered in the Great

War-and with corresponding losses.

Notes

1. George K. Williams, "'The Shank of the Drill': Americans and

Strategical Aviation in the Great War," Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 3

(London: Frank Cass Journals, September 1996): 381-431.

2. Ibid., 386.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 387.

5. Ibid., 388.

6. Ibid., 418.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 420-21.

9. Ibid., 423-24.

10. War diary of Eighth Brigade, entry for 7 December 1918, Newall

Papers, B392.

11. Subjects of RAF bombing survey volumes and their PRO

classifications are: AIR 1/1998/204/273/262, Railways (B395); 263,

Aerodromes (B398); 264, Industrial Centers (B399); 266, Bombs and

Conclusions (B401); AIR 1/1999/204/273/268, Chemicals/Munitions

(B397); 296, Blast Furnaces (B396). RAF Hendon classifications follow

subjects. They are used hereafter.

12. US Air Service bombing survey is reprinted in Maurer Maurer, ed.,

The U.S. Air Services in World War I, vol. 4, Postwar Review (Maxwell Air

Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air Force Historical Research Agency [AFHRA],

1979), 364-65. Hereafter, "US Bombing Survey."

13. Maurer Maurer, ed., The U.S. Air Service in World War I, vol. 1, The

Final Report and a Tactical History (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AFHRA, 1978), 1-14,

summarizes the US Air Service history.

14. US Bombing Survey, 561.

15. PRO, AIR 1/2104/207/36, Results of Air Raids on Germany Carried

Out by the Eighth Brigade and the Independent Force, RAF, January

1st-November 11th, 1918, AP 1225, 3d ed., DAI No. 5, Air Ministry,

January 1920. Hereafter, "AP 1225, 3d ed."

16. PRO, AIR 1/460/15/312/99, DFO to CAS, 28 June 1918.

17. PRO, AIR 1/2104/107/36, AP 1225, 2d ed., DAI, Air Ministry,

October 1918.

18. PRO, AIR 1/1998/204/273/262, letter no. FI 1la/a (inside front

cover), HQ, RAF in the field to Air Ministry, 26 February 1919.

264
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

19. AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Air Ministry List of Staff and Distribution of

Duties, November 1918.

20. PRO, AIR 1/2087/207/8/37, Air Ministry Office Memorandum no.

105, 20 June 1919.

21. AP 1225, 3d ed.

22. Ibid., 1-4.

23. Ibid., fol. 65.

24. C. Gordon Burge, The Annals of 100 Squadron (London: Herbert

Reiach, 1919), 156-57; and Aeroplane, 8 January 1919, 129.

25. MFC 76/1/32, Trenchard Papers, private diary entry for 18 August

1918.

26. Ibid., entry for 13 July 1918.

27. AP 1225, 3d ed., entries cited.

28. B395 (Railways), "Estimate of Material Results."

29. B401 (Bombs and Conclusions).

30. US Bombing Survey, 492-94.

31. S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War: vol. 1 The

Offtcial History of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto: University of

Toronto, 1980), 321.

32. AP 1225, 3d., 2; and Wise, 323.

33. Burge, 157; and Aeroplane, 8 January 1919, 129.

34. Reprinted in AP 1225, 3d ed., 1.

35. Ibid.

36. PRO, AIR 1/451/15/312/19, n.d.

37. Wise, 332.

38. B395 (Railways).

39. B396 (Blast Furnaces); B397 (Chemical/Munitions).

40. PRO, AIR 1/2115/207/56/1, Report of the Aircraft Bombing

Committee Appointed by the Air Ministry to Inquire into the Effects of

Bombing in Belgium and the Defensive Measures Taken by the Enemy

Against It, 4.

41. Air Ministry, Summary of Air Intelligence, 6th series, no. 17 (London:

Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO], 20 September 1918).

42. Ibid., 7th series, no. 2, 1 October 1918.

43. AP 1225, 3d ed., 3.

44. Wise, 322.

45. MFC 76/1/32, Trenchard Papers, private diary entry for 18 August

1918.

46. US Bombing Survey, 501-2.

47. AP 1225, 3d ed., devotes 14 pages of text, maps, and photographs to

Mannheim/Ludwigshafen and 6 pages to Cologne.

48. AP 1225, 7.

49. B399 (Industrial Centres), map of Cologne.

50. B392 (War Diary); PRO, AIR 1/2005/207/5/3, Approximate Results;

and AIR 1/2266/209/70/26, Detailed Raid Reports, both at R.A.F. Hendon

in B393 (Newall Papers) for dates cited. Hereafter, AR and DRR.

265
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

51. US Bombing Survey, 485.

52. B392 (War Diary); AR, date cited.

53. B399 (Industrial Centres), map of Kalserslautern.

54. US Bombing Survey, 457.

55. B392 (War Diary); and AR, date cited.

56. B399 (Industrial Centers); and US Bombing Survey, 457.

57. B392 (War Diary).

58. B399 (Industrial Centers), map of Cologne.

59. Ibid. AP 1225, 3d ed., map of Cologne facing p. 8.

60. B396 (Blast Furnaces); AP 1225, 3d ed., 2-3.

61. B401 (Bombs and Conclusions).

62. AP 1225, 3d ed., p. 42 and facing page; B399 (Industrial Centers),

map of Wiesbaden.

63. B392 (War Diary).

64. PRO, AIR 1/2085/207/5/1, IF Communiqu6 No. 3, HQ, IF, 24

August 1918; B399 (Industrial Centers); and US Bombing Survey, 418-32.

65. B401 (Bombs and Conclusions), map of Pirmasens.

66. B392 (War Diary).

67. IF Communiqu6 No. 13, HQ, IF, 2 November 1918.

68. B395 (Railways); B396 (Blast Furnaces); and US Bombing Survey,

438, 440.

69. B401 (Bombs and Conclusions); and US Bombing Survey, 456.

70. B392 (War Diary); and AR.

71. B401 (Bombs and Conclusions); and US Bombing Survey, 456.

72. AP 1225, 3d ed., p. 32 and facing map.

73. Ibid.

74. AP 1225, 2d ed.

75. AP 1225, 3d ed., locations cited.

76. Ibid., 42.

77. US Bombing Survey, 467.

78. B392 (War Diary); B397 (Chemical/Munitions): B395 (Railways);

B396 (Blast Furnaces); B399 (Industrial Centers); and US Bombing Survey,

438-39.

79. US Bombing Survey, 467.

80. B392 (War Diary).

81. B395 (Railways); B397 (Chemical/Munitions); B399 (Industrial

Centers); and US Bombing Survey, 467.

82. B392 (War Diary); and US Bombing Survey, 454-55.

83. Ibid.

84. US Bombing Survey, 460, 465.

85. AP 1225, 3d ed., maps facing p. 12, 16.

86. Ibid.

87. German records show that only five bombs dropped on the Burbach

works during 1918 were "effective." The plant ran at half capacity (4 of 8

blast furnaces in operation) throughout hostilities. PRO, AIR

266
POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS

1/586/21/13/2240, Original German Reports on Raids in Germany,

1918-1919 (trans. Air Ministry All [TM, 24 April 1919).

88. Ibid.; at the Carlshuttle works, Thionville, "in the opinion of the

officials of the Works, the results obtained, both material and moral, were

not worth the expenditure of bombs."

89. AP 1225, 3d ed., photographs facing p. 15, 42.

90. B395 (Railways).

91. AP 1225, 3d ed.

92. Parliamentary Papers, 1919, xxxiii (589): Cmd. 100, "Synopsis of

British Air Effort during the War," Air Ministry, April 1919.

93. Harford Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars,

1918-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976), 65; and Parliamentary Papers,

1919, xxxiii (849): Cmd. 467, "Permanent Organization of the Royal Air

Force," Air Ministry, 25 November 1919.

94. Sir James Butler, "Foreward" in A. Noble Frankland, The Bombing

Offensive Against Germany: Outlines and Perspectives (London: Faber and

Faber, 1965), 7.

95. Ibid., Frankland, "Introduction," 16.

96. PRO, AIR 9/69, "The Responsibilities of the Royal Air Force of the

Future in the Defence of these Islands against Invasion," Air Staff, May

1921, folio 9.

97. Ibid.

98. Parliamentary Papers 1924, x (277): Cmd. 2029, "Report of the

Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on National and

Imperial Defence," January 1921.

99. PRO, AIR 8/67, "Elaboration of Air Staff Answers for CAS's Verbal

Statement before the Committee," Air Staff, June 1923, tab 24.

100. Ibid., "The French Air Situation and its Effect on British Air Policy,"

15 May 1923, tab 6.

101. Parliamentary Papers, 1923, xv (827): Cmd. 1938,

"Recommendations of the National and Imperial Defence Committee as

Approved by His Majesty's Government upon the Relations of the Army and

the Air Force and the Coordination of the Defence Forces," CID, August

1923.

102. Ibid.

103. Air Staff Memorandum No. 11, "Air Strategy in Home Defence,"

August 1923.

104. Air Staff Memorandum No. 1 1A, March 1924.

105. Ibid.

106. Uri Bailer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and

British Politics, 1932-1939 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1980),

assesses this mood for the years immediately preceding the Second World

War. However, this attitude developed during 1917-1918, was entrenched

by the Armistice and continued much in evidence during the twenties.

107. "The Development of the Royal Air Force," Journal of the Royal

United Services Institute (JRUSI), no. 502 (May 1931): 326.

267
BIPLANES AND BOMBSIGHTS

108. For example, see PRO, AIR 5/165, "The Future of the Air Force in

National and Imperial Defence," Air Staff, March 1921; Parliamentary

Papers, 1920, vii (299); and Cmd. 1157, "Proceedings of the Air Conference,

1920," for Trenchard's comments on "Aspects of Service Aviation," October

1920.

109. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, "Air Power and the

Future of War," JRUSI 99, no. 595 (August 1954): 345. Emphasis added.

268
APPENDIX

Operational Summary of Raids By British

Long-Range Bombing Units (41st Wing,

Eighth Brigade, Independent Forces,

17 October 1917 to 11 November 1918.

Compiled by

Steve Suddaby
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298
Index

27 Group, RAF at Norfolk: 158

41st Wing: 43, 47, 58, 65, 81, 89, 93, 137

and its successor (Eighth Brigade): 99

intelligence information: 101

War Diary: 107

RFC: 73

4th Groupe de Bombardment: 22

"A" Naval Squadron's maiden mission: 139

"A" Naval Squadrons: 81

"Harvest Moon"

attacks: 37

raids: 134

aborted missions: 94

absence of realistic guidance: 133

accident rate: 90

Accidental Casualties: 91

actual aircraft wastage: 221

actual damage: 23

Actual results: 116

additional petrol tanks to increase range: 216

Admiralty: 2, 35

adverse weather: 212

Aerial Intelligence Directorate: 21

A1IB Section: 148

AI3C came under the jurisdiction of Branch A13: 150

AI6B: 152

Air Board: 5

Air Department: 22

Air Ministry: 2, 51

AIl Branch selectively transcribed the bomb-plot data: 253

disjointedness: 143

final report: 251

Air Policy Committee: 52, 54

Air Staff Branch, H.Q., I.F.: 159

memoranda dealing with Independent Force affairs: 160

plans and Independent Force operations: 162

299
Aircrew shortages: 196

alleged redeployment of German fighter: 29

Allied bombing accuracy: 23

cooperation was a two-edged sword: 79

headquarters: 100

investigators: 23

occupation zone: 116

Zone of Occupation: 18

American Air Service: 25, 50

aviation units: 50

bombing survey: 242

Expeditionary Force: 225

Expeditionary Force (AEF): 77

intelligence personnel: 27

intelligence teams: 113

investigators: 119

offensive in the St. Mihiel Salient: 211

records: 77

survey: 19

Anglo-French

conference: 3

cooperation: 1

AP 1225: 243, 249, 255

Approximate Results No. 84: 217

Armes, Lt Col R. J.: 148-149

Arnaville: 11

Arnaville and Wavreille as last-chance targets.: 57

assessments were severely edited: 241

Asturias: 11

attacking the enemy's morale: 52

Azelot aerodromes: 80

Bacon, Vice Adm Sir Reginald: 35

Bainville-sur-Madon: 77, 82

Baird, Maj J. C.: 134

Balfour Subcommittee: 261

Baring, Maurice: 79

battle casualties: 201

Beardmore-Halford-Pullinger (BHP) six-cylinder engine: 190

Beatty, Admiral: 260

Belgian coast: 37

BEITEMBOURG: 57

300
Bettoncourt: 202

Bivar, Capt R. B.: 217

blinds: 24

Blinds (unexploded ordnance): 254

Bomb damage: 115

bomb-aiming accuracy: 136

bombing

accuracy: 122

as a practical undertaking: 42

performance: 122

survey: 122

surveys: 18

bombs failed to detonate: 24

Bonar Law: 146

Bosch magneto works: 165

Bous: 87

Boyle, A. P.: 74, 150

Breguets : 56

Briey: 57

Briey and Saarbr-icken areas: 54

British Admiralty: 4

aviation industry: 7

casualties: 90

daylight offensive: 229

Expeditionary Force: 2

intelligence estimates: 228

liaison with the French War Ministry: 55

survey party: 113

survey team: 119

Brooke-Popham, Air Commodore: 90, 122

Burbach: 19

works: 17, 95

works at Saarbrcken: 44

Burge, Maj C. Gordon: 86

casualties and wastage: 203

casualty rates: 211

Cecil, Lord Robert: 134

Chambley: 11

Chief of the Air Staff (CAS): 51

Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS): 15

Churchill, Winston: 134

301
civilian policy makers were misled: 138

Classified Air Staff Memoranda (ASM) 11 and 1 A: 262

Clemenceau, Georges: 154, 156

Clemenceau-Lloyd George agreement: 156

Cologne: 58, 86

Committee for Imperial Defence: 261

continuing difficulties with the DH9 power plant: 191

control of the air: 260

Cooper, M. J. D.: 133, 205

Courcelles: 88

Courcelles-sur-Neid: 57, 64

D.H.4: 86

data from numerous sources: 224

Davies, Wing Commander R. B.: 22

day effort diminished in comparison with night bombing: 207

daylight

losses: 203

raids on Britain: 36

De Castelnau, General: 56, 58, 62, 73, 75, 78

DeHavillands: 35, 43

design deficiencies in British ordnance: 24

Detail Raid Report: 102

DH4: 48, 83, 89, 103, 139, 190

day squadrons: 77

DH9: 189

DH9/9A daylight squadrons: 189

differences in philosophy between London and the field: 164

Digby, Flight Commander F. T.: 148

Dillingen: 9-10, 14, 25

Directorate of Aerial Intelligence: 17

Air Intelligence: 143, 243

Flying Operations: 143

disappointing results: 21

discrepancies: 258

discrepancy in the Air Ministry report: 254

disguised operational difficulties: 109

disjointedness, inefficiency, and ill will: 159

disparity between public expectation and actuality: 104

Division of Naval Intelligence: 143

doctrinal differences between the War Office and the Admiralty: 239

Dunkirk: 35

302
Duval, Gen Maurice, chief of French Aviation: 76, 78

effects of aerial bombardment: 18

Ehrang: 120

Eighth Brigade: 133, 189

renamed Independent Force: 146

Elder, Capt W. L.: 3, 4, 22

final report: 16

emphasis upon moral effects: 24

engine trouble: 213

equipment shortcomings: 264

F03 Branch: 148

Falkenberg : 108

Falls, Cyril: 74

FE2b: 63-65, 76, 84, 86, 94, 108

in No. 100 Squadron: 139, 178

ferriferous watershed: 64

FEs: 189, 209

First Sea Lord: 143

Fitzroy, Sir Almeric: 141, 144

Flight Magazine: 219

Foch: 168

Foreign Office: 214

formulating grandiose schemes: 55

Foulois, Brig Gen Benjamin D.: 77, 159

Frankfurt: 86

Frankland, Noble: 206

Freiburg: 11, 15

French

aid to Newall's 41st Wing: 75

Air Service: 55, 78

air staff: 25

and American offensive between Rheims. and Verdun:. 212

and British attacks: 23

aviation service: 36

bombing policy: 55

No. 115 Wing at Malzeville: 16

Gammell, Lt Col J. A. H.: 149, 163

Gen John J. Pershing's infantry: 50

general effects of the British offensive: 111

303
German aerial attacks on London: 43

archives: 30

bomb-plot plan and other records: 255

countermeasures: 229

documents: 23

emphasis resulted from America's imminent entry into the fray:

206

industrial records: 113

Lys offensive: 144

materials: 255

morale: 26, 52

naval bases: 35

plant managers recorded no bomb damage: 257

productivity along the Saar: 28

records: 116, 252, 256

war expenditures: 247

Gloucester Castle: 11

Gorrell, Lt Col Edgar S.: 77, 240

Gotha raid: 41

Gothas: 36-37

Groves concluded that Independent Force operations contravened

military and political guidelines: 170

Groves, Brig Gen P. R. C.: 148, 163-64, 243

Hagendingen: 9-11, 22, 192

Haig: 11, 47, 58, 61, 62, 78

and Trenchard bitterly inveighed against further production of

the DH9: 190

Field Marshal: 6, 14, 35, 213

Sir Douglas: 5, 12, 37, 46, 48, 51, 74

Haig-Petain correspondence: 67

Halford, Frank: 191

Handley Page: 10, 11, 35, 43, 65, 76, 84, 89, 108, 166, 208

night squadrons: 77

squadrons: 189

V1500: 158

Henderson, Brig Gen Sir David: 6, 35, 39

highest battle losses: 195

highest sick rate: 195

Hispano-Suiza model: 191

HQ RFC: 48

Hyderabad Squadron: 201

304
I.F., R.A.F. 'Policy': 171

idea of strategic bombing: 37

IF headquarters: 49

IF's efforts were less than had been hoped for: 245

Imperial General Staff: 143

impetus for developing moral effect: 25

importance of moral effect: 53

increased output of bombing machines: 137

Independent Force: 24, 49, 65, 133, 146, 189

Communiqu No. 7: 218

Ineffective staff work: 152

Inexperience and mechanical unreliability: 192

of pilots: 91

Intelligence reports: 100

inter-Allied coordination: 67

operations: 85

Jones, H. A.: 66

statistics in the official history: 193

version of airfield construction difficulties: 73

Jones, Neville: 28, 67, 74, 120, 204

Kaiserslautem: 48, 62, 87, 109

Karlsruhe: 63, 87, 116, 192

Kerr, Rear Adm Mark: 134

Kingsford, Lt A. R.: 86

lack of results from the large bombs: 258

linkage of bombs and moral effect: 26

little information about bombing results: 124

Lloyd George: 38

Lloyd George-Clemenceau agreement: 158

logistical assistance: 75

London: 3

preoccupation with home defense and retaliatory raids: 40

Longeville: 57

Longwy: 57

Longwy and Briey basins: 64

Lord Cowdray: 40

Lord Milner: 134, 165

Lord Rothermere: 135, 140

Lord Weir, Secretary, of State for Air: 80

305
Lorraine: 4, 9, 56

Lorraine foundries: 65

Ludwigshafen: 63, 87, 115

LUXEMBOURG: 4, 56, 57

Luxembourg-Lorraine basins: 57

Luxeuil: 3, 36, 56

long-range bombing force: 38

Mainz: 4

Maizieres: 166

Maizieres-les-Metz: 57, 63, 88

Major Boyle: 243

Lord Tiverton: 135, 149

Pattinson: 198

Paul enumerated four shortcomings: 123

Paul's final report: 241

Paul's notes: 221

Paul's survey: 228

Read: 94, 222

Malzeville: 20

Mannheim: 87, 97, 109, 115, 200, 224

Mannheim-Ludwigshafen: 4

material and moral effects: 245

damage: 18

results: 115

McClelland, Capt H.: 148, 230

Mechanical difficulties: 94

and aircrew inexperience: 105

mediocre planes flown by replacements: 197

method of propaganda: 168

METZ-LUXEMBOURG: 56

Metz-Saarbrficken rail link: 108

Metz-Sablon: 191, 200

Milner and the War Cabinet: 139

miscalculations: 264

misgivings over IF press returns: 163

misperception: 214

Missions of special interest: 97

moral effect: 12, 18, 24, 52, 239, 247

and material destruction seemed equal: 42

as the primary goal: 248

could be a two-edged sword: 138

306
was presumed: 26

Morhange aerodrome: 200

Morris, Alan: 121

Moselle: 62

Moselle valley: 120

mounting frustrations: 212

Nancy-Ochey vicinity: 58

Newall, Brig Gen C. L. N.: 46, 48, 58, 133

27 May memorandum: 176

hastily formed 41st Wing: 148

headquarters: 77

memorandum of 27 May 1918: 174

night bombing tactics: 117

night squadrons: 223

Nivelle offensive: 74

Nivelle, Robert-Georges: 74

Nizam of Hyderabad: 192

No effective coordination of Allied bombing: 157

No. 10 (Navy) Squadron: 6

No. 100 Squadron: 63, 189

No. 104 Squadron: 191

No. 110 "Hyderabad" Squadron: 192

No. 215 Squadron: 211

No. 216 Squadron: 208

No. 216's Handley Pages: 213

No. 27 Group: 165

No. 3 Naval Wing: 1

No. 3 Wing: 1-2, 5-6, 8, 10

No. 3 Wing, Royal Naval Air Service: 239

No. 5 Group, Royal Air Force: 35

No. 5 Wing, Royal Naval Air Service: 35

No. 55 Squadron: 44, 48, 62, 103, 189, 211

No. 55's DeHavilland 4s: 83

No. 99 and No. 104 Squadrons: 191

Norman, Sir Henry: 137, 139

Oberndorf: 56

Ochey: 1, 43, 48, 81

official historian, H. A. Jones: 28

reports were edited: 124

verdict: 259

307
omission of any adverse data: 102

operational limitations: 264

losses: 194

srength of Independent Force: 211

Operations Division: 143

Oppau: 115

Ovens, Capt A. R.: 241

overall casualties for 16/17 September: 220

pact between Trenchard and Weir: 171

Paine, Commodore Godfrey: 11

panic during Gotha raids: 43

Pattinson's narrative underscores the organizational difficulties: 197

Paul, Maj H. W. M.: 18, 241

Pearson, Weetman Dickinson (Lord Cowdray): 39

perceptible undertone of official embarrassment: 218

perception of No. 3 Wing aircrews: 30

Petain: 59, 61, 74, 78, 157

photo interpretation: 100

Pirmasens: 87, 108,

poison gas factories: 224

policies of the Royal Flying Corps: 123

post hoc argument: 228

post-Armistice survey materials: 29

postwar bombing surveys: 29

censorship: 244

data: 20, 244

German records: 21

survey: 19, 114, 241

survey teams: 22

practical difficulties: 264

preoccupation with morale: 28

presumption of moral effect: 26

priority of support to the Independent Force: 200

prohibitive losses: 223

questionable accuracy of wartime intelligence estimates: 204

RAF field survey: 244

had underestimated the tools required: 263

intelligence teams: 244

survey: 242

Raid returns from No. 55 Squadron: 166

308
raids from Belgian aerodromes: 36

rationale for attacks on enemy aerodromes: 227

Read, Maj W. R.: 82, 93, 208, 212

reconnaissance data: 100

References to moral effects: 25

relationship between bombs and morale: 26

relative importance of home defense versus frontline allocations: 205

replacement machines: 90

results of Allied bombs: 18

retaliatory raid on Mannheim: 39

RFC: 36

squadrons: 7

RFC-RNAS rivalries: 37

Rhine: 18, 58, 62

targets: 224

valley: 142, 166

RNAS: 1

Rombach: 166

Rothermere's management problems: 144

thoughts: 141

Royal Air Force: 12, 37, 133

as an independent flying service: 41

Royal Flying Corps: 1-2, 5-6, 190, 239

Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS): 1

Royal Navy: 13

Russian Windfall: 43

Saar industries: 11

region: 57

valley: 1, 5, 20, 25

Saarbrficken: 10, 17, 19, 62, 87, 95, 103, 108, 112, 139

and Lorraine basins: 62

area: 58

Saint-Privat: 63

Salisbury Committee: 261

Secretary of the Air Ministry: 18

Section A.I.la: 100

AIIB of Branch AIl: 149

AI3C: 150

AI6B: 151

selective coverage: 258

Serious discrepancies: 252

309
sick calls: 201

rates fluctuated with operational losses: 196

Siddeley, J. D.: 191

Siddeley-Deasy Motor Company: 190

significant points of variation: 107

slanted coverage: 257

Slessor, Sir John: 263

Smuts, Jan Christiaan: 39, 48

Somme: 5

Sopwith Strutter: 1, 5, 7, 10, 19, 36, 56, 83, 136

bombers: 22

two-seaters: 6

specially equipped Handley Pages: 216

St. Avold: 108

St. Ingbert: 20

Strategic Council: 153

Stuttgart: 166

success rate: 94

Surplus Air Fleet: 40

Sutton, B. E.: 92

Sykes, Maj Gen Fredrick: 144, 243

tactically feasible target area: 4

Tantonville: 81

The Times: 98, 118

THIONVILLE: 57, 114

Thom, Capt W. D.: 199

Thyssen steel works: 9, 22

Tiverton: 168

continued to inveigh against Trenchard's command: 169

prepared his last major memorandum on bombing policy: 172

rebutted Newall: 175

was particularly disturbed: 164

acerbic evaluations of Independent Force policy: 164

map sheet: 167

transition from FE2s to Handley Pages: 225

Trenchard: 5-6, 24, 37, 45, 47-48, 52, 61, 79, 135

enjoyed autonomy: 147

exemplified the warrior: 144

had been preoccupied with the moral effect: 202

intended to dissipate his scarce bombing machines: 177

operated in defiance of Whitehall: 178

310
weight of British effort: 112

Weir: 144, 153-154, 178

concept of strategic bombardment: 155

patience wore thin: 145

Welchman, Capt P. E.: 198

Western Front: 5-6, 13, 37

Westphalia: 62

What Trenchard omitted: 219

Whitehall: 45, 47, 51, 66

Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry: 260

Wise, S. F.: 143, 248

Woippy: 63

Wright, Lt W. J. T.: 241

Xaffevillers: 80

Ypres offensive: 40

Zeppelin raids: 239

Zweibrucken: 62, 103

312

¢ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1999-736-912100009
testified: 261

took pains to justify moral effect: 247

23 June memorandum to Weir: 178

"very secret" five-page paper for Lord Weir: 173

apologia: 225

departure from Air Staff and War Cabinet bombing policy: 179

final point: 180

fusion of moral effects and material results: 52

implicit intentions: 50

initiatives to publicize his command: 215

logic: 38

memorandum to Lloyd George: 142

misgivings: 45

preoccupation with moral effect: 54

proposal: 142

reasoning: 38

strategic plan: 177

target selection: 167

Treves: 120

unreliability of aeroplanes: 91

unserviceable rates: 95

US Air Service: 18, 81, 89, 158, 240, 242

bombing survey: 250

investigators: 27

US Bombing Survey: 120

utility of moral effect: 28

V-Type Handley Page: 165

vague hope that enemy morale would crumble: 44

value of the American survey: 242

Vaughn-Lee, Rear Adm C. L.: 2, 239

Volklingen: 9-10, 13, 87

W. R. Read's comments about Essen: 213

Wadgassen: 87

War Cabinet: 39, 45, 47, 79, 100

War Office: 1, 5, 7

wartime aircrew claims: 252

observation reports: 29

wastage in missing aeroplanes: 207

Webster, Sir Charles: 206

311
Biplanes and Bombsights

British Bombing in World War I

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Preston Bryant

Copy Editor

Peggy S. Smith

Book Design and Cover Illustration

Steven C. Garst

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson