Filed 8/29/13 Conservatorship of Clara P. CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Conservatorship of the Estate and Person of CLARA P.
MANUEL JIMENEZ, as Public Conservator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent,

v. CLARA P., Objector and Appellant. F065812 (Super. Ct. No. P26560)



### OPINION

THE COURT * APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Merced County. Brian L. McCabe, Judge. Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. James N. Fincher, County Counsel, David A. Olsen, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Detjen, J.2 Appellant, Clara P., challenges an order reappointing responden t Merced County Public Conservator (Public Conservator) as conservator of her person and estate under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) 1 Appellant contends (1) insufficient eviden ce supports the finding that she suffers from the sort of “grave disability” required fo r an LPS conservatorship (§ 5350); and (2) the trial court erred in restricting her from possessing firearms , holding a driver’s license, entering into contracts, entering into transactions over $ 50, and refusing or consenting to medical

treatment. We affirm the order reappo inting the Public Conservato r and imposing the special
disabilities set forth above.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND Physician Declarations
Evidence submitted included two form decl arations executed by Isabel Manuel, M.D. and Edward Benton, M.D. In her declaration, Dr. Manuel stated she had “determined that [appellant] is gravely disabled within the meaning of [section] 5008 (h),
as a result of a mental disord er.” She gave as the reasons for this determination the following: “[Appellant] is delusional. Parano id. Believes she still has an apartment. Has no viable plan for self-care.” In his declaration, Dr. Benton stated he had made the same de termination and gave the following reasons: “Due to residual sy mptoms of schizophrenia she is unable to formulate a viable plan to pr ovide for her basic needs.” In their declarations, each physician, for the same reasons given to support the opinion that appellant was gravely disabled , also opined that appellant should be prohibited from possessing a firearm, is not able to give inform ed consent to both

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 psychiatric and non-psychiatri c medical treatment, is not competent to enter into a contract, and should not be permitted to operate a motor vehicle. Testimony of Dr. Manuel 2 Appellant has been under conservatorship “for several years.” She lived “in her own residence several years ago,” but for the last two years “she has been in a placement[.]” Her current placeme nt is a board and care home. She is “not happy” with her current placement because she is under th e delusion “that the board and care is running a prostitution ring.” Appellant “is diagnosed with schizophrenia ....” Dr. Manuel, who is a psychiatrist, opined that appellant “at this time ... remain[s ] gravely disabled.” Dr. Manuel gave as the basis for this opinion the following: “[A ppellant] remains delusional. She has no adequate plan for self-care.” “She continues” to be under the “fixed delusion” that “she [has] an apartment that curren tly is being paid for by he r attorneys and is located ... somewhere on Loughborough.” Appellant “wou ld rather go there at this time.” Dr. Manuel was “[h]opeful[]” that “we can step [appellant] down to a room and board and then eventually get her to her ow n apartment,” but appellant was “opposed” to that plan because she is unde r the delusion that she alre ady has her own apartment. Appellant’s medications “won’t have any affect” on this delusion. Dr. Manuel further opined: Appellant woul d not be “a danger to herself or others at this time.” It was “possible” that at so me point she could live “on her own” again. However, at present she would not be able to “function adequately” “on her own.” Dr. Manuel based this latter opinion, in part, on appellant’s belief that she has an apartment that her attorneys are paying for.

2 Information in this section is taken from Dr. Manuel’s testimony at the reappointment hearing. The parties stipulated to her “expertise for the purposes of this hearing[.]”4 Appellant is “currently on a long-acting intramuscular injection” of Haldol Decanoate (Haldol). She receives these inject ions once per month. This medication regimen, which appellant has been on for tw o years, “stabilized” her and is currently “keeping her adequately stabilized .” The program of Haldol injections was instituted “in part, because of her non-compliance with the medications.” She “had to [be] switch[ed]
to Haldol ... to ensure that the me dication [was] in her system.” When asked why appellant “has been comp liant with the Haldol injections,” Dr. Manuel responded, “Because we bring her to he r appointments. We make sure that she gets to her appointments.” There had not been any “problem administ ering the Haldol to [appellant].” Dr. Manuel “[had not] heard [of] any resistan ce on [appellant’s] part to come to her appointments.” Appellant had not “expressed ... that she will stop [her Haldol regimen] if she were to go and live on her own some where.” Appellant has “been taking medications” for “maybe a decade or more.” Appellant’s Testimony Appellant testified to the following: She does not have “problems with the facilities they put [her] in in the beginning, but ... after the beginning is over ... things start happening.” She “disc overed a prostitution ring” at her current placement, “And now all they are trying to do is ... get rid of me.” “[T]hey use their cell phones to mark my clothes .... They ... are just trying to ch ase me out of there for some reason.” The night prior to the hearing “for no reason at all,” in her room, “they did surgery through [the] brainwave on my back. So I don’ t know what their next move is.”
DISCUSSION Sufficiency of the Evidence-Gravely Disabled Appellant argues that the ev idence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove that she requires a conservatorship. We disagree.5 Legal Background – “G ravely Disabled” Section 5350 provides for the establishment of a conserva torship of the person and estate of “any person who is gr avely disabled as a result of mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.” Section 5361 allows a conservator to petition the superior court at the end of a one-year LPS conservato rship for the reestablishment of the conservatorship where two ph ysicians or licensed psychol ogists agree the conservatee remains gravely disabled. The conservatee is then entitled to a court or jury trial to determine whether he or she is gravely disabl ed. (§ 5350, subd. (d ).) To establish or renew a conservatorship, grave disability must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Conservatorship of Pollock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1406, 1411.) As pertinent to this case, subdivision (h )(1)(A) of section 5008 defines the term “gravely disabled” to mean “[a] condition in which a pers on, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or he r basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” Thus, “in order to establish that a person is ‘gravely disabled,’ the evidence adduced must support an objec tive finding that the person, due to mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise provide for her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.” ( Conservatorship of
Smith (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 903, 909.) “Biz arre or eccentric behavior, even if it interferes with a person’s normal intercourse with society, does not rise to a level warranting conservatorship except where such behavior renders the individual helpless to fend for herself or destroys he r ability to meet those basic ne eds for survival . Only then
does the interest of the state override her individual liberty interests.” ( Ibid. ) Legal Background – Standard of Review “In reviewing a conservatorship, we a pply the substantial evidence standard to determine whether the record supports a finding of grave disability.” ( Conservatorship of
Carol K. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 123, 134 ( Carol K. ).) In applying this standard, we adhere to the following principles:6 “We review the record as a whole in the light most fa vorable to the trial court judgment to determine whether it discloses s ubstantial evidence. S ubstantial evidence ... is evidence that is reasonable, cr edible, and of solid value ....” ( Carol K. , supra , 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 134.) “Substantial eviden ce includes circumstanti al evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.” ( Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577 ( Walker ).) “The appellate court presumes in suppor t of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “‘“If the circumstances re asonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that th e circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does no t warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]”’” ( Id. at p. 1054.) We resolve neither credibility issu es nor evidentiary conflicts. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) “Reversal on this ground [i.e., in sufficiency of the evidence] is unwarranted unle ss it appears ‘that upon no hypo thesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evid ence to support [the challenged order].’” ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) “Even when there is a significa nt amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the standa rd is sufficient to uphold the finding.” ( People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) Analysis
Evidence adduced at the reappointment hearing includ ed the following: Appellant has been diagnosed with schi zophrenia. She wants to leav e her current placement in a
board and care home because she is under th e delusion that the home is running a prostitution ring. She is opposed to a gradual “step down” plan that would keep her in a restricted placement for the present but would work toward the goal of allowing her to live on her own in an apartment at some point in the future. Her pl an for providing for7 her own housing is to move, at this time, to an apartment that he r attorneys are paying for. The existence of this apartm ent, however, is a delusion. From this evidence, the court reasonabl y could have inferred appellant suffers from a mental disorder, as a result of which she had rejected reasonable plans for housing herself in favor of the obviously unfeasible plan, which she wants to put into operation at this time, of moving into a non-existent ap artment. Under the principles of judicial review summarized above, the evidence and in ferences reasonably drawn from it support the conclusion that appellant, due to a mental disorder, is unable to provide for her basic shelter needs and is therefore gravely disabled. In addition, evidence of th e following was adduced at the hearing: Appellant is currently receiving monthly injections of Ha ldol. She was prescribed this long-acting medication in part because she was not comply ing with the medication regimen in effect previously. The Haldol injecti ons stabilized her, and it is this medication that is currently keeping her “adequately stabilized .” When asked why appellant has been able to comply with the Haldol regimen, Dr. Manuel tes tified that “we”—presum ably her conservator and/or Merced County mental health person nel—have made sure appellant gets to her appointments by transporting her there. From this evidence the court reasonably could conclude that appellant stopped taking her medication in the past; compliance w ith the current regime n of monthly Haldol injections is keeping her condition stabilized ; she has remained in compliance because
her conservator and/or others make sure she gets to her appointments; and without this help she would not comply with the Haldol regimen. These inferences, in turn, su pport the conclusion that appellant needed Haldol to remain “stabilized,” i.e., in a condition in which she is able to provide for her basic needs, and that without supervision she would not receive this critical medication. This circumstance provides further support for the c onclusion that at the time of the hearing, appellant, because of a mental disorder, wa s unable to provide for her basic needs and8 was therefore gravely disabled. (See Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 442, 447 [“but for the medication, which [the conservatee] would not take without supervision, [the conservatee] was presently gravely disabled”].) Appellant argues there was no “speci fic evidence” that she “has been uncooperative with medication or is unwilling to continue taking medication.” We disagree. As indicated earlier, Dr. Manuel testified that appellant had been “noncomplian[t] with the medications,” and it was for this reason, in pa rt, that the Haldol regimen was instituted. Appellant also argues, “Nor is there any evidence that appellant would not cooperate with servi ces to help her obtain independ ent housing, even if she has a bizarre belief that she already has an apartm ent.” This circumstance, at most, creates a conflict which, under the principles of appe llate review summarized above, we resolve in favor of the judgment. When we consider the record as a whol e, as we are required to do,
we conclude substantial eviden ce supports the court’s finding that appellant was gravely
disabled. Sufficiency of the Evidence-Special Disabilities Appellant challenges the sufficiency of th e evidence supporting the trial court’s imposition of special disabilities on her driving privilege, her right to enter into contracts and transactions over $50, her right to possess firearms, and her right to consent or refuse
to consent to medical treatment. Section 5357 provides that the court ma y impose certain special disabilities on a conservatee, including those im posed by the court in the present case. (§ 5357, subds. (a), (b), (d)-(f).) That appellant is gravely disabled does not by itself satisfy the evidentiary requirements for the imposition of special disabilities under section 5357. ( Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 1572 at p. 1578; Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 165 ( George H .).) “A conservatee does not forfeit any legal right nor suffer legal disability by reason of the LPS commitment alone.” ( Walker , at p. 1578.)9 Substantial evidence must support the imposition of any disability. (See Conservatorship of Amanda B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1382.) Appellant contends the imposition of the disabilities in the instant case was not supported by substantial evidence . She asserts that no evidence specifically relating to her ability to enter into contracts or transactions over $50, her ability to drive, or her right to possess firearms was adduced at the h earing, and “The only evidence related to appellant’s ability to give consent to medical treatment was that appellant was completely cooperative with her medication.” This last point is incorrect. As discussed earlier, although there was evidence th at appellant cooperated with her Haldol regimen, there was also evidence that regimen was instituted because she had failed to take prescribed medication. And there is no requirement that the imposition of disabilities may be supported only by evid ence specifically relating to those disabilities. Rather, we apply “the usual rules” of appellate review and “‘presume in favor of the judgment every finding of fact necessary to support it warranted by th e evidence’ [citation].” ( George H. , supra , 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1 65.) For the reasons set forth below, we find that substantial evidence supported the c ourt’s imposition of the disabilities. Possession of Firearms To support a limitation on a conservatee’ s ability to possess a firearm, the court must find, and the court here found, “that possession of a firearm or any other deadly weapon by the person would present a danger to the safety of th e person or to others.” (§ 8103, subd. (e)(1).) There was evidence in the in stant case that appellant held the paranoid delusional belief that persons at the board and care hom e conducted unwanted “brainwave” surgery on her, and that she was unhappy with the board and care home
based on the delusional belief that the hom e was operating a prostitution ring. These delusional beliefs, and the resu lting antipathy they caused appella nt to feel toward others, supports the finding that appe llant would present a danger to others and therefore should be prohibited from possessing firearms.10 Holding a Driver’s License The evidence of appellant’s paranoid delusi ons also supports the restriction on her right to drive. The trial court reasonably could conclude that as a result of these delusions, appellant would be a danger to herself or others if she were allowed to operate a motor vehicle upon public roads. Entering into Contracts an d Transactions Over $50 Appellant was also under the delusion th at her attorneys were paying for an apartment for her. This unsupported belief th at she had resources she did not actually have indicates appellant did no t understand her financial situ ation, leaving her vulnerable to financial exploitation by ot hers, and supported the restric tions on appellant’s right to enter into contracts and transactions over $50. Consenting and Refusing Co nsent to Medical Care As demonstrated earlier, the court reas onably could conclude that appellant had refused to take medication in the past, medi cation was necessary to keep her stabilized, and she was currently complying with the Haldol regime n and remaining stabilized only because others were ensuring that she kept her Haldol injection appointments. This evidence supports a finding that appellant was not competent to make intelligent decisions regarding medical treatment.
DISPOSITION The order reappointing the conservator and the order im posing special disabilities
are affirmed.