THIS ARMS CONTROL DOG 

WON’T HUNT: THE PROPOSED 

FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF 

TREATY AT THE CONFERENCE 

ON DISARMAMENT 

Guy B. Roberts 

INSS Occasional Paper 36 

Arms Control Series 

January 2001 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

paper is approved for public release by the Department of the Navy; 

distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

The Clear and Present Danger of Fissile Material 

 Proliferation 4 

 Fissile Materials: Why Such a Proliferation 

 Concern? 4 

 The FMCT In Context: On-going Fissile Material 

 Nonproliferation Initiatives 10 

The Parameters of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 14 

 What the United States Proposes and Its Possible 

 Scope 14 

 The Negotiating History: The Elusive Dream 20 

Current Status: Paralysis in the Conference on 

 Disarmament 26 

 Verification and the Role of the IAEA 35 

Alternative Approaches: Potential Options in the Face of a 

 Deadlocked Conference on Disarmament 42 

Concluding Thoughts: Why This Dog Still Won’t Hunt and 

 What It Means to the Future of the Conference on 

 Disarmament 47 

Notes 51 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this thirtieth-sixth volume in the

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). This paper is particularly timely, as it addresses 

emerging issues based in the changing forms and norms of post-Cold 

War arms control. These issues confront United States strategic planners 

and the national security policy community today, and they promise to 

have increasing impact into the future. As traditional arms control—with 

its focus most centrally on limiting and then reducing fielded U.S. and 

Soviet/Russian strategic systems—evolves into multilateral and 

multidimensional efforts to stem the now-central threat of proliferation, 

the whole landscape of arms control changes. The players, the multiple 

agendas, the role of international organizations in addition to the 

traditional focus on states all increase the complexity of the game and the 

difficulties in forging successful and verifiable international agreement at 

the very time when the problems of proliferation rise to the top of 

national security calculations. Guy Roberts explains this complexity and 

its effects on arms control—placing process over product and forcing 

those serious about controlling fissile materials to go in search of varied 

avenues and approaches—to educate us all on the emerging “rules of the 

game.” 

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US 

Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF 

Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the 

Air Force's 39th and 23rd Information Operations Squadrons; the 

Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the 
viii

Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Army Environmental Policy 

Institute; and the Air Force long-range plans directorate (XPXP). The 

mission of the Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to 

support the Air Force national security education program.” Its research 

focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: 

arms control, proliferation, regional studies, Air Force policy, 

information operations, environmental security, and space policy. 

 INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects 

researchers from within the military academic community, and 

administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private 

and government organizations. INSS provides valuable, cost-effective 

research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We appreciate your 

continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director
ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The proliferation of fissile materials, the key ingredients to making 

nuclear weapons, is a major threat to international peace and security. 

The lack of adequate controls over such materials in the former Soviet 

Union, the growth of civilian produced fissile material inventories, the 

development of a nuclear weapons capability by states not members of 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and clandestine programs by 

rogue states have heightened the concern that these materials will be 

used in illicit new programs. To stem the flow of these materials, the 

United States has embarked on a number of bilateral and multilateral 

initiatives as part of its nonproliferation strategy. Since 1993, a key 

component of that strategy is the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff 

Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament. 

 The United States’ concept of an FMCT follows closely the 

outlines of such an agreement as contained in the 1993 UN resolution 

calling for a “nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and 

effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for 

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The proposed 

treaty would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons 

or other nuclear explosive devices. It would not address stockpiles 

(previously produced) of fissile materials. It would not apply to nonfissile materials, nor would it apply to exotic materials such as tritium or 

americium. Further, it would not apply to fissile materials not used for 

weapons purposes. This is particularly important with regards to naval 

propulsion systems. 

 The idea of restricting the production of fissile materials as an 

arms control measure dates from as early as 1946, and it has resurfaced 

numerous times since. A principal difference between those earlier 

proposals and the current proposal is that this version is packaged as a 

nonproliferation measure primarily designed to place a check on the 
x

weapons programs of the so-called “threshold” states; Israel, India, and 

Pakistan. It is also viewed as an arms control measure by engaging these 

nations in a limited, palatable process of capping expansion of their 

nuclear weapons programs and those of the Nuclear Weapons States 

(U.S., Russia, China, France, Great Britain). Absent the participation of 

the threshold states, the FMCT becomes essentially irrelevant since NPT 

parties are required to have safeguards agreements with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and not produce fissile materials for 

weapons purposes unless they one of the Nuclear Weapon States. 

 The negotiations for an FMCT have stalled in the Conference 

on Disarmament (CD) for over five years, and could easily be called a 

failure. There is no real agreement on the scope of the proposed FMCT, 

with some states insisting that existing stocks be included in the 

negotiations. There is no consensus on the duration of such an 

agreement, the materials to be covered, and transparency and verification 

measures. Verification of such an agreement is problematic as the 

experiences with Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated. 

Israel, while not objecting to the negotiations, will not accept an 

FMCT until a Middle East Peace Agreement is reached, and India and 

Pakistan remain lukewarm at best over the proposal, even after their 

nuclear weapons tests in 1998, because of perceived unfairness by 

preserving inequities between the nuclear weapons states (NWS) and the 

rest of the world. Subsequently, China (and then Russia) have held the 

talks hostage to agreement on negotiating nuclear disarmament, an 

agreement to prohibit arms in outer space, and the termination of the 

United States’ efforts at development of a national missile defense 

system. All efforts at reviving the talks have been futile. 

 A number of alternatives to the talks at the CD have merit. 

These include talks among the NWS and threshold states, initiating 

bilateral discussions similar to the U.S.-Russia agreements, more active 
xi

involvement of the IAEA, and pursuing other confidence building and 

transparency measures. However, all of these have little chance of 

success absent the political will of the parties concerned to pursue them. 

The futility of this effort raises anew concerns about the entire process 

and the viability of the CD. Pressure will continue to mount for the 

United States to provide concessions for the sake of agreement but at the 

expense of important national security considerations. Arms control 

measures will not resolve the reasons that have precipitated the 

proliferation of fissile materials. Consequently, the United States will be 

better able to pursue its nonproliferation objectives through bilateral 

diplomacy encouraging the development of democratic institutions and 

peaceful resolution of regional disputes. 
xii
THIS ARMS CONTROL DOG WON’T HUNT: THE 

PROPOSED FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY AT 

THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 

INTRODUCTION 

Nuclear nonproliferation has long been a principal security objective of the 

United States and most other countries. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty 

(NPT), which took effect in 1970, sought to limit nuclear weapons to the 

countries that then possessed them (the United States, the Soviet Union, the 

United Kingdom, France, and China)—the NPT acknowledged nuclear 

weapon states. Since then, India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and 

it is believed that both Israel and North Korea have nuclear weapons 

capabilities of varying degree. 

For years arms control proponents have advocated halting the 

production of fissile material (separated plutonium and highly enriched 

uranium)1

 as a means of capping the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon states 

(NWS). Since the 1970s, countries that have forsworn nuclear weapons have 

viewed a ban on fissile material production as an important way for the 

nuclear weapon states to show good faith toward nuclear disarmament—one of 

their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition 

to being perceived as a step towards ultimate nuclear disarmament, arms 

control advocates (and the United States) also see a fissile material production 

cutoff as an important nonproliferation measure, one that would for the first 

time bring the undeclared nuclear weapon states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—

and other states of proliferation concern into the international nonproliferation 

regime. Although these states have remained unwilling to sign the NPT, it is 

argued that they may be persuaded to sign up to a cutoff ban, which would 

ensure that their nuclear arsenals and material stocks would be frozen at 

relatively low levels. 

One of the stated objectives of the United States’ current 

nonproliferation policy is to cap and eventually reverse the nuclear-weapon 
2

programs in these undeclared nuclear-weapon states. Another is to prevent 

terrorist and other sub-national groups from gaining access to nuclear weapons 

or to the fissile materials necessary for such weapons. 

To help achieve these objectives, President Clinton outlined in 

September 1993 a "framework” to prevent the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction.2

 This framework included a proposed multilateral 

convention prohibiting the production of fissile materials except for purposes 

other than nuclear-weapon production and then only if it is done under 

international safeguards. The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the 

proposal and subsequently called for a "nondiscriminatory" treaty, one that 

applies to declared and undeclared nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclearweapon states alike, recognizing that such an agreement would be a 

“significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects.”3

 

 Fissile materials are the fundamental ingredients of all nuclear 

weapons and they also happen to be the most difficult and expensive part of a 

nuclear warhead to produce. There are obvious benefits for stopping or 

“cutting off” the production of fissile materials. As discussed in more detail 

later in this paper, it would limit the size of potential nuclear arsenals. It would 

make reductions irreversible if fissile materials were transferred from 

dismantled weapons and other unsafeguarded stocks to non-weapons use or 

disposal under international standards. It would strengthen the nonproliferation regime by opening nuclear facilities in all states to some form 

international inspection.4

Capping the amount of fissile material in the world is a major priority 

for the United States as it undertakes a variety of measures to reinforce the 

international nuclear nonproliferation regime and pursue its nonproliferation 

goals. While the focus of most of these initiatives have primarily been with the 

problem of lax security and the protection and safeguarding of materials in the 

former Soviet Union from becoming a proliferation concern, 5 the United 

States’ 1993 proposal for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) was the one 

initiative designed to capture and stop the proliferation of fissile materials in 
3

other countries who were suspected of or had admitted to nuclear weapons 

programs. Once in force, this FMCT would ostensibly create a norm that calls 

for the universal and non discriminatory capping of the production of all fissile 

materials, and, through an-as-yet-undefined verification regime, it would 

outlaw the production of these materials for any purpose, with the exception of 

possibly production under international safeguards if required for purposes 

other than weapons fabrication. 

 As a result of U.S. pressure and with the United Nations stamp of 

approval, the 66-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD)6

 agreed on a 

consensus-negotiating mandate for a fissile material cutoff treaty in March of 

1995. Unfortunately, despite initial promising progress and almost unanimous 

support, substantive negotiations on an FMCT have yet to begin and are 

unlikely to begin for the foreseeable future. Treaty negotiations have become 

hostage to other CD priorities, such as nuclear disarmament or prevention of 

an arms race in outer space, and blatant obstructionism by some key member 

states. An obviously important non-proliferation initiative is in danger of being 

irretrievably lost, and this failure has the potential to change the dynamics for 

future multilateral arms control initiatives. 

 This paper will review the history of fissile material cut-off efforts, 

examine why the current negotiations are at a standstill, describe the reasons 

for that failure, discuss the conduct of related initiatives elsewhere, review the 

attempts to deal with FMCT technical problems on the fringes of ongoing 

negotiations and consider the significance of the FMCT to the arms control 

process. Some possible alternatives will be examined including the feasibility 

of these proposals given the current political climate, and, in the face of a 

paralyzed negotiating forum, discuss the viability of these proposals. Finally, 

some observations about the process will be made and some comments and 

recommendations offered as to the utility of such negotiations for the future 

and their benefit to U.S. national security. 
4

THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF FISSILE MATERIAL 

PROLIFERATION 

As the new millennium approaches, the Untied States faces a 

heightened prospect that regional aggressors, third-rate 

armies, terrorist cells, and even religious cults will wield 

disproportionate power by using—or even threatening to 

use—nuclear weapons against our troops in the field and our 

people at home. 

 -- Secretary of Defense William Cohen7

Fissile Materials: Why Such a Proliferation Concern? 

The end of the Cold War and the development of civilian nuclear energy 

industry have led to the emergence of growing quantities of fissile materials. 

Stockpiles of these nuclear materials pose a danger to national and 

international security in the form of potential proliferation of nuclear or 

radiological weapons and potential environmental, safety and health 

consequences. They are the sine qua non of nuclear weapons, and as such are 

the primary technical barrier to acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. 

Consequently, there have been over the last ten to fifteen years a number of 

key developments that have exacerbated the situation, raising it to one of a 

national and international crisis. These include: 

1. Nuclear arms reductions. The United States and Russian 

nuclear arms reductions have led to the dismantlement of large 

numbers of weapons and a substantially reduced military need 

for fissile materials. At the same time, there is the corresponding 

need to account for and protect these materials, and to assure the 

world that they will never again be used for nuclear weapons. 

2. Disposition of fissile materials. As large quantities of 

plutonium and HEU become available from disarmament and 

dismantlement of nuclear weapons, decisions must be made as to 

the ultimate disposition of these materials. 

3. Stockpiling of civil plutonium. The development of the 

reprocessing industry and the delay in breeder and other 

plutonium use programs are leading to the accumulation of 

growing stockpiles of plutonium for which there is no near-term 

civil use. This is a significant proliferation risk requiring 
5

national efforts to prevent further accumulation of excess stocks 

and plan for their eventual reduction and elimination. 

4. Threat of theft, diversion and smuggling. States, like Russia, 

with large quantities of fissile materials have inadequate material 

control and accountancy and physical protection systems. These 

states are experiencing major economic and political upheaval, 

resulting in considerable concern that the theft of weapons-usable 

materials could occur. 

5. Continued production of unsafeguarded fissile materials. 

Enrichment or reprocessing facilities continue to operate that are 

not subject to international safeguards. The plutonium and HEU 

from these plants continue to be available for nuclear weapons. 

The dangers of nuclear proliferation are enormous. The availability of 

fissile materials makes it more likely that a leader such as Saddam Hussein or 

Kim Jong Il will soon have his finger on the nuclear button. And with nuclear 

weapons in the hands of small states involved in regional conflicts, the 

chances that nuclear weapons will actually be used in combat can be greater 

than the chance of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war ever was. There is also the 

possibility that the U.S. forces deployed to the next conflict or crisis will face 

the threat of nuclear weapons. 

Obtaining this fuel is often the greatest obstacle for a nation's nuclear 

program. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War may make nuclear fuel more 

abundant and easier to obtain. Once these materials are acquired, construction 

of nuclear weapons would be relatively straightforward for either sophisticated 

terrorists of proliferant states. With a few kilograms of fissile materials these 

illicit actors could make a crude but workable nuclear bomb in the 10-100 

kiloton range. A low-yield "dirty" nuclear weapon made from reactor-grade 

plutonium in a truck could easily serve a terrorist's purposes, demolishing a 

small city and spreading radioactive fall-out far and wide.8

 Little wonder the 

international community is so concerned and so determined to prevent the 

further spread of these materials. 

In the hands of irrational leaders, fissile materials can also be a horrid 

terror weapon. Plutonium, because of its radioactivity, is very carcinogenic if 
6

ingested. A pinpoint-sized piece of plutonium metal can lead to lung cancer, 

and only 150 kilograms, distributed appropriately, is enough to give lung 

cancer to every human being on the planet. Plutonium has the capacity to 

contaminate air, drinking water, or the land itself. If plutonium is dispersed 

into the atmosphere by a conventional explosive, it could be a dreadful antipersonnel weapon. 

Because of the difficulty of controlling nuclear proliferation, a 

tremendous danger is posed when the greatest technical barrier to developing 

nuclear weapons, the acquisition of fissile materials, is eroded. The existence 

of fissile materials is not a grave threat in itself. Fissile materials have been 

around as long as nuclear weapons. But, ironically, they were less of a 

proliferation threat while they were deep inside well-guarded nuclear 

warheads. Rather, the threat of fissile materials now stems from the current 

lack of adequate security for HEU and plutonium in storage. 

Severely underpaid personnel, some of whom are open to bribes, 

currently guard fissile materials from dismantled nuclear warheads in Russia. 

The expanding network of organized crime in Russia is also a grave concern, 

for organized crime could provide the infrastructure for successfully stealing, 

selling, and smuggling fissile materials, of even whole warheads.9

Additionally, there is no comprehensive system for accounting of fissile 

materials in Russia. Nobody is certain of exactly how much fissile material is 

in the Russian stockpile. Consequently, nobody will know for sure if some of 

it is missing. 

Russia is not the only source of fissile materials. Fissile materials 

from dismantled U.S. nuclear weapons are accumulating as well. U.S. storage 

facilities for fissile materials may be more secure than their Russian 

counterparts, but the U.S. Government will soon have more fissile material 

than it knows what to do with, and the Clinton Administration did not set out a 

plan for what the ultimate fate of these materials, especially plutonium, will 

be.10 Plutonium presents a special problem because, unlike HEU, it cannot be 

blended down, and other means must be used for making plutonium unsuitable 
7

for weapons.11 Currently, U.S. nuclear weapons are dismantled at the 

Department of Energy's Pantex facility near Amarillo, Texas. Pantex 

dismantles about 2000 warheads per year and the resulting plutonium is stored 

there in a special storage facility. But beyond this interim storage, there are no 

concrete plans for what to do with plutonium and there is not enough storage 

space for all the plutonium from warheads the U.S. plans to dismantle. How it 

chooses to handle this challenge will affect the credibility of the United States’ 

nonproliferation efforts. As President Clinton’s science advisor opined: 

 We must keep in mind that while our own excess 

plutonium poses little direct security risk, the actions we 

take in managing it will have a major impact on the 

international scene. What we do with our plutonium will 

inevitably affect what Russia does. And what we do with 

the basic building blocks of our Cold War nuclear arsenal 

will inevitably affect how other countries manage their 

plutonium, and how they view our seriousness about arms 

reduction and nonproliferation.12

Global security is threatened by the use of plutonium as fuel in civil 

reactors because though it requires processing tons of the material in a bulk 

form which is difficult to protect from theft—only a few kilograms is needed 

to make a Hiroshima size-bomb. Additionally, these risks, which are already 

substantial, will increase, as the countries of Japan, Britain, France, Russia and 

India proceed with plans to separate and store ever-larger amounts of 

weapons-usable plutonium.13 The stock of separated plutonium, which, in 

1995, stood at 110 tons, is likely to approach 200 tons early in the next 

century.14 Whether this surplus will rise or fall thereafter, and at which rate, 

will depend on the extent to which current reprocessing and plutonium 

recycling policies in Europe, Japan and Russia will be implemented.15

Reactor-grade plutonium produced for commercial nuclear power in 

many countries is not the best fuel for weapons, but experts agree that reactorgrade plutonium could be fashioned into a crude weapon. Thus, the growing 

surplus of reprocessed civilian plutonium could pose a substantial threat to 

non-proliferation if it is not well guarded.16 Unfortunately, civilian fissile 
8

materials are not entirely secure. Security measures at commercial 

reprocessing plants in Japan, England, and France are not without flaws, and 

since some plutonium is often "lost" because of such factors as residues in 

pipes and the like, not all plutonium can be accounted for. A threat also exists 

when plutonium is transported from one site to another. Currently, Japan ships 

plutonium a thousand kilograms at a time from Europe with only a Japanese 

Coast Guard escort, potentially making it vulnerable to attack by terrorists 

seeking fissile materials. 

 Just as fissile materials are difficult to obtain, they are difficult to 

dispose of as well, thus adding to the proliferation dilemma. Plutonium has a 

half-life of 24,000 years, which means that it will retain its hazardous 

radioactivity for thousands of years. Uranium remains radioactive even longer. 

The lasting radioactivity of these materials means that they will continue to be 

a proliferation threat as well as a danger to humans for generations to come. 

Since even reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make a nuclear 

weapon, plutonium produced for the civilian nuclear power industry is also a 

proliferation risk. The fact that most civilian plutonium is reactor grade rather 

than weapon grade provides small comfort. Indeed, as one expert warned, "the 

greatest long-term threat to. . . the world may yet lie in the production and use 

of nuclear explosive materials in civilian commerce."17 France, Great Britain 

(which together account for about 90% of global commercial plutonium 

separation—approximately 20 tons a year), Russia and India produce small 

amounts of plutonium.18 The IAEA estimates that in 1997 about 10,500 tons of 

spent fuel was discharged from nuclear power reactors worldwide; this amount 

contains about 75 tons of plutonium. It is estimated that the annual production 

figure will remain more or less the same until 2010. The cumulative amount of 

plutonium in spent fuel from nuclear power reactors worldwide is predicted to 

increase to about 1700 tons by 2010.19 This is enough to make thousands of 

nuclear weapons. 

The very large existing and proposed civilian programs under which 

reactor-grade plutonium is being separated and stockpiled will inevitably 
9

become an issue in negotiations over a FMCT and over reduction of the stocks 

of military fissile materials. Twenty-five years ago, India’s 1974 nuclear test 

demonstrated that a nominally civilian program could be used as a cover for 

the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. As the Department of 

Energy recently noted: 

At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential proliferating 

state or sub-national group using designs and technologies 

no more sophisticated than those used in first-generation 

nuclear weapons [e.g. the Nagasaki bomb] could build 

nuclear weapons from reactor-grade plutonium that would 

have an assured reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and 

probable yield significantly higher than that). At the other 

end of the spectrum, advanced NWS such as the United 

States and the Russian Federation, using modern designs, 

could produce weapons from reactor-grade plutonium 

having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other 

characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons 

made from weapon-grade plutonium....20

Further, both the U.S. and Russia have been dismantling most of their 

withdrawn nuclear warheads, in accordance with the START I and START II 

treaties, and placing fissile materials from these warheads into short-term 

storage. (Russia inherited the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons, as well as its 

treaty obligations.) These treaties are expected to shrink the number of 

deployed nuclear warheads to around 12,000 worldwide, with perhaps another 

10,000 in storage. However, neither treaty suggests what actions are to be 

taken once warheads are withdrawn from deployment. The amount of 

weapons-grade fissile materials to be recovered from them is staggering: over 

600 metric tons of HEU and between 100 and 200 metric tons of weaponsgrade plutonium. 

The enormity of the problem posed by huge stocks of fissile materials 

was recognized and the United States took the lead in declaring that it had 

stopped the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for 

weapons in 1964 and 1988 respectively. Realizing the threat from growing 

stocks of plutonium and HEU, the U.S. further declared that since March 
10

1992, it had suspended the reprocessing of plutonium for nuclear weapons. It 

had also agreed to permanently remove 200 tons of these materials from 

availability for future use in weapons.21 This was to encourage other NWS, 

especially Russia, to do the same. However, the Russian attitude towards 

plutonium stocks was different. It considered the stocks as "a national 

treasure" which needed to be preserved in order to produce energy for future 

generations. This attitude, although changing, coupled with severe control, 

accounting and physical protection deficiencies, heightens concern over 

Russia’s commitment to control, cap and ensure fissile materials are not 

diverted to its or some other nuclear weapons program. 

 Recognizing the threat is one thing; developing an integrated and 

cohesive strategy to deal with it has been exceedingly difficult in concept and 

execution. Although recognizing the enormous problem associated with the 

civilian reactor programs as sources of fissile materials, efforts to address that 

concern have been piecemeal and frustrating, in part because friends and allies 

have invested substantial amounts in these programs and are not, for the short 

term, willing to have them be captured under arms control or nonproliferation 

initiatives. Consequently, this is one of the major deficiencies of both bilateral 

agreements and multilateral negotiations such as those for an FMCT. 

 Nevertheless, there are a number of initiatives being undertaken that 

need to be considered in the context of potential FMCT negotiations if one is 

to appreciate the progress in ensuring fissile materials are safeguarded and the 

quantities of such materials available for weapons purposes diminishing. 

The FMCT in Context: On-going Fissile Material Nonproliferation 

Initiatives 

The FMCT is viewed by the United States as a key component in its nuclear 

nonproliferation strategy. Although one of its highest priorities, it should not 

be considered in isolation, particularly in view of the current paralysis in the 

CD, but rather in the context of the full range of on-going bilateral and 

multilateral initiatives to curb fissile material proliferation. 
11

 When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unraveled, it left a 

large amount of fissile materials dispersed throughout the former Republics 

(Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, for example). As previously noted, the 

efforts of reducing the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons created a serious 

concern over fissile material smuggling and growing incidences of nuclear 

theft. Additionally, U.S.-Russian bilateral agreements to dismantle surplus 

equipment have increased the volume of surplus nuclear materials.22 These 

materials need to be properly safeguarded and steps taken to ensure that they 

never again become part of a nuclear weapon. 

Consequently, a number of separate, but mutually reinforcing 

bilateral and multilateral steps have played a key role in ensuring the 

furtherance of our fissile material nonproliferation goals. These steps include: 

(1) freezing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; (2) 

reducing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads; (3) limiting the 

amount of fissile material available for use in nuclear weapons; and (4) 

ensuring that excess fissile material is never returned to nuclear weapons 

programs. These steps are being vigorously pursued through the START 

process, and various other bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral initiatives. For 

example, the U.S. has removed more than 225 metric tons of fissile material 

from its nuclear stockpile and has voluntarily pledged to place this excess 

fissile material under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards 

as soon as possible. This process—along with many other initiatives—is well 

underway.23 

Indeed, since the end of the Cold War an extraordinary amount of 

progress has been made toward agreement on a bilateral cut-off and bilateral 

reductions of stocks of weapons-usable fissile material. This is not an 

insignificant achievement. One expert estimate is that the fissile material from 

the warheads to be dismantled as a result of both the several missile-reduction 

treaties through START II, and the Bush-Gorbachev/Yeltsin reciprocal nuclear

weapon withdrawals, amounts to about 80 percent of the material deployed in 

weapons at the height of the Cold War.24 
12

 It has started and is implementing a number of unilateral, bilateral and 

multilateral initiatives in that regard. These include, but are not limited to,25

the following: 

1. In connection with pledges to make excess U.S. fissile material 

available for IAEA verification, the U.S. Department of Energy 

announced on December 1, 1997 the start of verification 

activities by the IAEA on U.S. HEU downblending operations 

The operation is being carried out under IAEA safeguards. 

2. In April 1996, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared that the 

fissile material storage facility being constructed in Mayak with 

U.S. assistance would be made subject to IAEA inspections. 

3. In September 1996, the U.S. joined with Russia and the IAEA in 

a “trilateral initiative” aimed at developing verification and 

monitoring methods that the IAEA could use in inspecting excess 

weapons-origin fissile materials. In September 1997, the Russian 

Federation announced its decision to withdraw from military use 

up to 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and up to 50 

metric tons of plutonium.26 

 

4. The United States and Russia have taken substantial steps 

concerning the disposition of excess separated plutonium from 

nuclear military programs. In 1998 the U.S. and Russia signed a 

number of agreements on the management and disposition of 

plutonium no longer needed for defense purposes outlining 

agreed principles for the disposition of plutonium and stated the 

commitment of the two countries to immediately initiate 

negotiations of a bilateral executive agreement to implement the 

program. An agreement was finally signed 1 September 2000.27 

 

5. In order to demonstrate the irreversibility of the nuclear 

disarmament process, the United States in 1994 and 1995 placed 

approximately 12 metric tons of excess HEU and plutonium, in 

nonsensitive forms, under international safeguards pursuant to 

the U.S.-IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreement. On March 

1, 1995, President Clinton announced the permanent withdrawal 

from the U.S. nuclear stockpile of approximately 200 metric tons 

of fissile material. In September 1996, the Department of Energy 

announced plans to bring 26 of these 200 tons under international 

inspection, in addition to the twelve tons already under IAEA 

safeguards at Department of Energy facilities. In September 

1997, the Secretary of Energy announced that another 52 metric 

tons of material—37 metric tons of HEU and 15 metric tons of 
13

plutonium—would be made available for IAEA verification over 

the next several years. This brings the total amount of U.S. 

excess fissile material to be made available for IAEA verification 

to 90 metric tons, including the 12 tons already under inspection 

and 13 tons of HEU already downblended to low enriched 

uranium (LEU) for use as fuel in civil power reactors. 

 

6. The dissolution of the Soviet Union left a vast nuclear arsenal 

and hundreds of tons of nuclear-weapons-usable materials in 

inadequately protected facilities in Russia and other states of the 

Former Soviet Union. Recognizing that these unsecured 

materials may pose a proliferation and nuclear terrorism risk, the 

United States, Russia, and other states, such as Ukraine and 

Kazakhstan, have been engaged in a partnership almost since the 

breakup of the Soviet Union in 1992 to prevent theft or loss of 

these nuclear materials.28

 

7. In 1997, the United States and Russia completed an agreement to 

cease production of weapons-grade plutonium for any purpose no 

later than the year 2000. The U.S. already shut down all of its 

plutonium production reactors as of 1989, and Russia has shut 

down all but three. The U.S. will work with Russia to help 

convert the three remaining production reactors so that they no 

longer produce weapons-grade plutonium. In addition, the 

plutonium produced by these reactors between the beginning of 

1995 and the time of their conversion will not be used in nuclear 

weapons. The agreement includes an extensive monitoring 

regime to provide confidence that these obligations are fulfilled. 

 

8. The U.S. signed a government-to-government HEU Purchase 

Agreement in February 1993, which provided for the purchase by 

the United States of 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled 

Russian nuclear weapons over a 20-year period, for 

approximately $12 billion. In March 1999 agreement was 

reached concerning the disposition of the natural uranium 

component of material delivered under the HEU Purchase 

Agreement. In 1999 implementation of enhanced transparency 

measures continued at Russian HEU-to-LEU blending facilities 

to increase U.S. confidence that uranium purchased under the 

HEU Agreement is weapon origin material. 

 

9. To combat the problem of unsecured and unaccounted for fissile 

materials, the United States is active in all phases of the IAEA’s 

activities in physical protection and material security. In 1999, 

the U.S. provided funding to the IAEA and worked with the 

agency and other donor states to improve security at nuclear sites 
14

in the states of the Former Soviet Union. This specialized work 

has been concentrated primarily on material protection control 

and accountancy (known as MPC&A) of fissile materials in 

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Latvia. Lithuania, Uzbekistan and 

Georgia. Since the start of this effort in 1995, the U.S. has 

provided MPC&A-related upgrades at thirteen sites at a cost to 

the United States of approximately $45 million, funds which 

otherwise would have been needed by the IAEA to effect similar 

improvements. 

10. Finally, a significant multilateral initiative that relates to stocks 

of weapons-usable material is the recent "Plutonium 

Management Guidelines." Nine countries negotiated and signed 

the new guidelines, including the five NPT nuclear weapon states 

plus Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. The guidelines 

require annual reports of their plutonium stocks to provide 

greater transparency, strengthened security standards to improve 

physical protection against theft or sabotage for fissile materials 

at home as well as those being exported, and placement under 

IAEA safeguards of plutonium belonging to the Five that is 

excess to their weapons needs as a result of their weapons 

reductions.29

 While the progress in these areas is substantial and noteworthy, they 

do not capture or include the participation of those states that are not members 

of the NPT and have unsafeguarded enrichment and reprocessing facilities. 

So, within the context of these unilateral steps by the United States, U.S.-

Russian bilateral initiatives, and the minor success of establishing the 

“Guidelines” for plutonium management, it was optimistically hoped that there 

would be an equivalent measure of progress on negotiating a treaty that would 

include these “threshold” states. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. 

The reasons include differing views on what an FMCT would encompass and 

a changing political dynamic brought on by linking progress on an FMCT to 

other arms control issues. 

THE PARAMETERS OF A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY 

What The United States Proposes and Its Possible Scope 

As one of the driving forces for an FMCT in the 1990's, and viewing it as an 

integral part of its nonproliferation strategy, the U.S. believes that a legally 
15

binding and effectively verifiable FMCT would contribute significantly to 

nuclear arms control, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation worldwide. 

In fact, a principal difference between previous cutoff proposals over the last 

forty years and the new proposal is that it is packages as a nuclear 

nonproliferation measure primarily designed to check the weapons program of 

Israel, India and Pakistan. Certainly, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would 

participate in any negotiation that did not include, at a minimum, India and 

Pakistan.30

 The United States’ concept of an FMCT follows closely the outlines 

of such an agreement as contained in the UN resolution. The proposed treaty 

would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 

nuclear explosive devices. It would not address stockpiles (previously 

produced) of fissile materials. It would not apply to non-fissile materials, like 

tritium,31 nor would it apply to exotic materials such as americium.32

 Further, it would not apply to fissile materials not used for weapons 

purposes. This is particularly important with regards to naval propulsion 

systems, which use HEU.33 The U.S. and Russia have extensive nuclear 

propulsion programs, representing by far the largest fleets globally, using HEU 

in the reactor cores. Some have argued that the U.S. proposal, since it does 

not prohibit the non-explosive use of fissile material for a military purpose 

such as the propulsion of a naval ship, thus leaves the door ajar to nuclear 

weapons acquisition. Nevertheless, the United States, and other NWS with 

nuclear powered vessels insist that the dangers of losing national security 

information are too great to warrant inclusion or greater transparency. 

Currently, the U.S. Navy HEU supplies are sufficient for many decades, but it 

still maintains its right to withdraw any fissile weapons-usable material put 

under international safeguards if it becomes necessary.34 

The proposal would reduce the "discriminatory" nature of the current 

nonproliferation regime (the NPT)35 by stripping both the weapon and 

threshold states of their exclusive right to produce unsafeguarded fissile 

material. It will make no distinction between nuclear weapons states and non-
16

nuclear weapon states. The FMCT would not bestow any new status on any 

state, but rather constrain all parties equally by banning any further production 

of fissile material for nuclear weapons on a global basis.36

However, the threshold states point out that, although 

nondiscriminatory in its prospective application, the fissile cutoff would in fact 

be highly discriminatory in locking in the huge disparities between their 

existing stockpiles. As some critics have suggested, “the only way to 

eliminate completely the discriminatory nature of the nuclear nonproliferation 

regime will be the elimination of all national stocks of nuclear warheads and 

unsafeguarded fissile materials.37 This has been one of the most frequently 

voiced objections to the current proposal, and it would be expected that some 

kind of collateral measures may have to be developed to address this problem. 

U.S. officials and arms control advocates have high expectations that 

an FMCT would achieve a number of important nonproliferation and 

disarmament goals in addition to the opportunity to engage India, Pakistan, 

and Israel in negotiations to limit the fissile material held by each.38 First, it 

would expand to the NWS and threshold states the international norm 

established by the NPT against production of fissile material for nuclear

weapons. The basic FMCT would only ban making weapons from newly 

produced plutonium or HEU, not from older stocks in reserve or from newly 

dismantled weapons. But as more nuclear weapons were dismantled pursuant 

to START and successor treaties, more fissile material from weapons would 

be placed irreversibly under IAEA safeguards, thus reducing the stocks 

available for weapons. 

Second, of great interest to the non-nuclear weapon states, an FMCT 

would reduce the discrimination in the application of IAEA safeguards 

between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The NPT permits the 

NWS to be free of safeguards but requires them of all other parties. While 

each of the NWS has accepted some safeguards to help reduce that 

discrimination, each of their agreements so far is a "voluntary offer" that can 

be withdrawn at will. The FMCT would impose mandatory safeguards or a 
17

similar type inspection regime on plants for separating plutonium and 

enriching uranium, and on other nuclear facilities using newly produced fissile 

materials. 

Third, an FMCT would continue the movement toward transparency 

and safeguards for all stocks of fissile materials similar to the bilateral 

initiatives and the Plutonium Management Guidelines, discussed, supra. 

Fourth, an FMCT should encourage higher standards for the physical 

protection of fissile material from theft or sabotage. Requiring international 

accountability and IAEA safeguards should encourage better security 

practices, which Russia, the United States, and the nine Plutonium 

Management Guidelines countries have agreed to pursue. The FMCT would 

provide the same incentives for India, Israel, and Pakistan, as well as nonnuclear weapon states with civil plutonium and HEU to protect. Fifth, an 

FMCT will satisfy the 1995 promise by the NWS to negotiate such a treaty in 

return for the agreement of the non-weapon NPT states to extend the NPT 

indefinitely.39 

Sixth, an FMCT would lay the foundation for further steps toward 

eventual nuclear disarmament. Total nuclear disarmament is clearly 

impractical until nuclear weapons and fissile materials can all be accounted 

for, protected from theft or sabotage, verified by an international organization 

and guaranteed against reversibility to weapons manufacture. To make nuclear

disarmament feasible, such verification and irreversibility must somehow be 

made effective. FMCT negotiations offer a realistic opportunity to learn how. 

As President Clinton said in his January 21, 1997 message to the Conference 

on Disarmament, "effectively cutting off the spigot for more nuclear weapons 

is a necessary step toward, and would greatly contribute to, the ultimate goal 

of nuclear disarmament."40 The FMCT would help foster the creation of a 

climate conducive to continued, long-term progress on reducing nuclearweapon stockpiles. Looking at post-START III negotiations, perhaps 

involving all the nuclear weapon states, it is difficult to imagine how nuclear 

arms reductions could go much deeper, unless there is a dependable limit on 
18

fissile material for weapons, as well as confidence clandestine production 

could be detected. 

Most nations in the CD strongly support the negotiation of an 

FMCT,41 but opinions differ even over the fundamental issue of the basic 

commitment under the FMCT. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the 

FMCT should prohibit production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or 

other nuclear explosive devices. Thus, one would think that it would be 

relatively easy for states to agree that upon entry into force to undertake not to 

produce fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 

devices; not to use any fissile material that is subject to the FMCT for nuclear 

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and• to accept international 

verification pursuant to the FMCT to provide assurance that fissile material, if 

being produced, is only for non-proscribed purposes. 

These undertakings alone would comprise a substantial step towards 

the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Though some states have sought 

inclusion of stocks of fissile material existing at the time of the FMCT's entry 

into force, in the face of strong objection by the Nuclear Weapon States, the 

only negotiable treaty is one that deals primarily with future production. 

Obviously, a treaty applying to future production would be a very considerable 

achievement, of substantial benefit to the security interests of all participants. 

However, it has become increasingly clear that negotiation for an 

FMCT raises a number of complicated choices and questions notwithstanding 

the political issues that have managed to currently stymie the negotiations. 

How these may be eventually resolved would influence the extent to which the 

treaty’s potential non-proliferation and arms control rewards are realized in 

practice. Among the more important of these questions are: 

1. Should the scope of a cutoff agreement be limited to a ban on 

future production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear explosive 

purposes? 

2. If no limits are placed on uses or stockpiles of previously 

produced materials, should stocks of such materials be declared? 
19

3. Should continued production of plutonium or HEU for nonweapons military purposes be permitted? 

4. Should providing assistance to other countries in the production 

of plutonium or HEU be banned outright, or only for nuclear 

explosive purposes? 

5. Should a more comprehensive or more streamlined approach be 

taken to cutoff verification? 

6. What should be the duration of a cutoff agreement? 

7. What steps, if any, can be taken to contain concern that a cutoff 

convention that excludes previously produced materials will 

"legitimize" the unacknowledged nuclear powers? 

8. Which countries' adherence should be considered critical for 

eventual entry-into-force?42 

 Additionally, in areas such as the Middle East, South Asia and East 

Asia the relatively permissive standard of the proposed FMCT could 

undermine the establishment of more restrictive regional arrangements simply 

by its precedential value. What kind of more restrictive arrangements? Those 

that seek to establish a higher level of security by barring national possession, 

even under safeguards, of plutonium separation and uranium enrichment 

capabilities. So, for example, it would be extremely unlikely that Israel would 

take much comfort from the operation of a uranium centrifuge enrichment 

plant in Iran, even though it is under safeguards. Or that China would agree to 

give up its nuclear weapons or even significantly reducing its nuclear weapons 

while Japan continues to accumulate large stocks of separated plutonium under 

safeguards. 

Further, since an FMCT would leave in place existing stocks of 

plutonium and HEU accumulated for weapon-related purposes, there is a 

residual risk associated with further production and stockpile accumulation 

carried out for nonweapon purposes—activities that would be allowed under 

the FMCT (with safeguards). Parties to the new treaty could clandestinely 

build facilities to convert stored plutonium, while simultaneously constructing 
20

the nonnuclear components of the weapons. And, with large flows of civilian 

fuel-cycle plutonium remaining, the threat of theft, as described earlier, 

remains. 

Further, a question arises about countries possibly switching from 

IAEA safeguards to those of an inspection regime specific to the FMCT. This 

is unlikely since lower technology countries will not switch since they will 

lose access to technology available to states accepting IAEA safeguards. For 

rogue nations, the question is moot; they can and will operate covertly as they 

choose. Advanced technology countries will also continue to accept IAEA 

safeguards since public acceptance within the international community 

depends on the presence of international safeguards. In the end, if technology 

remains export controlled, and the IAEA remains legitimate, exit from IAEA 

safeguards carries a high risk for little gain. 

An FMCT would thus increase the moral, legal, and to some extent, 

practical constraints on the production of nuclear weapons by non-NPT states, 

and it could decrease fissile material production by nuclear-weapon states. An 

FMCT is thus an important step toward nuclear disarmament for more reasons 

than that it would limit the quantity of weapons-usable fissile material. After 

the weapon tests in South Asia, FMCT negotiations were seen as a useful and 

important avenue to engage India and Pakistan in talks that would limit their 

stocks, which is, of course, the very reason the United States proposed the idea 

in the first place. 

Unfortunately, despite some positive signs of progress and a outward 

declaration of support for "negotiations" by India, neither India nor Pakistan is 

likely to enthusiastically support any negotiation for an FMCT without major 

compromises and resolution of the security conundrum facing India, Pakistan 

and China in Southeast Asia.43 

The Negotiating History: The Elusive Dream 

The intent of proposals banning the production of fissile material has always 

been to cap production of weapons material while allowing the use of nuclear 

energy for peaceful purposes. Three periods are distinguishable. First was a 
21

period prior to roughly about 1967 in which fissile cutoff proposals were 

actively promoted by the United States and debated internationally for a as 

part of broad disarmament proposals. Second, a period following this until the 

end of the Cold War in which weapons-related arms control initiatives took 

precedence. And finally, the post-Cold War era characterized by unilateral 

actions and the re-emergence of the cutoff concept. Post-Cold War initiatives 

differed from previous proposals in that they were viewed as nonproliferation 

policy tools, not just bilateral issues. Four issues recur throughout these eras: 

(1) whether cutoff is a viable stand-alone concept or whether it must be part of 

a more extensive disarmament approach; (2) whether cutoff is a valid means of 

controlling horizontal and vertical proliferation; (3) how verification measures 

might be structured; and (4) whether a cutoff can increase U.S. and 

international security.44

The first attempt at banning atomic fissile materials production was 

made in the aftermath of the dropping of atom bombs over Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki in August 1945, which ended World War II.45 It began with the 

Acheson-Lilenthal Report of 1946 (named after the U.S. Secretary of State and 

the future first Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission). In this 

report, U.S. President Harry S. Truman introduced the concept of controlling 

nuclear energy and fissionable material for either peaceful or military 

purposes. Though the report did not provide for measures to be taken against 

violators, the goal of the envisaged organization was only to sound a warning 

signal in the event of danger.46

At the inaugural meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, set up 

by the UN General Assembly to work out specific proposals for eliminating 

atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. delegate, 

Bernard Baruch, put forward a proposal (known as the Baruch Plan47) that 

envisaged the creation of an International Atomic Energy Control Agency 

which would be entrusted with managerial control of all atomic energy 

activities potentially dangerous to world activities. Its duty was also to foster 

the beneficial uses of atomic energy. It was also to possess the exclusive right 
22

to both conduct research in the field of atomic explosives and produce and 

own fissionable material. All countries were to be granted the freedom of 

inspection deemed necessary by the Agency. 

The Baruch Plan, which was based on the Acheson-Lilenthal Report, 

differed from the latter in that it stressed the importance of immediate 

punishment for infringement of the rights of the Agency and maintained that 

there must be no veto to protect those who violated the agreement not to 

develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. It was later explained 

by the U.S. that what it had in mind was the ownership and exclusive 

operation by an "international atomic development authority" of all facilities 

for the production of fissile materials worldwide. Once a system of control and 

sanctions was operating effectively, production of atomic weapons would 

cease, existing stocks would be destroyed, and all technological information 

would be transferred to the "authority."48

The Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan on the grounds that it 

would interfere with the national sovereignty and internal affairs of states and 

that the provision denying a permanent member of the Security Council the 

right of veto was contrary to the UN Charter. In turn, the Soviet Union 

submitted a draft convention, called the Gromyko Plan (after the Soviet 

delegate who later became Foreign Minister), which reversed the priorities put 

forward by the United States. The basic differences between the two positions 

concerned, first, the stage at which atomic weapons were to be prohibited, i.e., 

whether a convention outlawing these weapons and providing for their 

destruction should precede or follow the establishment of a control system; 

and second, the role of the UN Security Council in dealing with possible 

violations, i.e., whether the rule of veto would be applicable.49

 In 1954, India proposed a universal, non-discriminatory convention to 

end the production of fissile materials.50 The idea was revived by India again 

in 1982 when it called for a "Freeze on Nuclear Weapons" asking the NWS to 

stop production of nuclear weapons accompanied by a cut-off in production of 

fissile material for weapons purposes.51 This resolution was tabled 
23

subsequently every year without any response until in 1988 it merged with a 

Mexican resolution on the same proposal.52 No progress was achieved, these 

proposals coming at a time when the Cold War was continuing in all its 

intensity. 

As a consequence of the Baruch Plan, U.S. President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower made his famous "Atoms for Peace" speech in 1953, at the United 

Nations. His plan was to promote disarmament by an indirect approach—that 

of building up the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The atomic powers were to 

contribute fissionable material for such uses to an agency which would be set 

up under the aegis of the United Nations and which would help countries to 

obtain the benefits of atomic energy. He envisioned that "fissionable material 

would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind...mobilized to 

apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine...and provide 

abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world."53 This 

proposal led to the establishment, in 1956, of the IAEA that went into formal 

operation in 1957.54

In 1956, President Eisenhower first proposed a production cutoff as a 

U.S.-Soviet arms control measure, but this was rejected by Moscow which saw 

it as a tactic to freeze the Soviet Union into a quantitatively inferior status. The 

Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s saw different proposals discussed for 

progressive nuclear disarmament and cutoff of the production of fissile 

material. Due to the confrontation between the United States and Soviet 

Union, nuclear tests and fissile material production continued as the thensuperpowers played out their bipolar nuclear competition. The last official 

statement by the U.S. urging a fissile material production cutoff came in 1969 

at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The U.S. proposed that 

IAEA safeguards would apply to fissile material production and would include 

verification of continued shutdown of production facilities. Despite a lack of 

U.S. initiative the cutoff idea remained alive in the disarmament literature.55 

In 1989, the Soviet Union announced a cessation of highly enriched 

uranium production and the planned shutdown of all plutonium production 
24

facilities by the year 2000. They further proposed negotiating a multilateral 

agreement for a verified cutoff based on IAEA safeguards. In 1992 President 

Bush announced that the U.S. would no longer produce plutonium or HEU for 

nuclear weapons.56 This was followed in 1993 by President Clinton's UN 

General Assembly speech proposing a "multilateral convention prohibiting the 

production of HEU or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of 

international safeguards,"57 and a subsequent General Assembly resolution 

endorsing the beginning of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in 

Geneva in December 1993.58 

As a sign of a new era in cooperation between the former adversaries 

of the Cold War, and as a result of the growing concern for safety and security 

of the Russian nuclear stockpiles and assets, on January 14, 1994 Russian 

President Yeltsin and President Clinton issued a joint statement on the 

nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction what included support for a 

"verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and 

the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to this effect with the 

widest possible participation of states on a nondiscriminatory basis."59 Yeltsin 

then declared that 10 out of 13 Soviet reactors had already been shut down 

between 1987 and 1992, and subsequently committed, in an agreement with 

the United States on June 23, 1994 to shut down the remaining graphite 

moderated plutonium production reactors by 2000.60

Consensus was building among the nuclear weapons states as 

evidenced by a joint U.S.-China statement on October 4, 1994 promoting the 

"earliest possible achievement" of a cut-off treaty. Additional support came 

from Russia when it announced in December 1994 that it had stopped 

plutonium production for use in nuclear weapons from October 1, 1994. As 

per an earlier announcement of Mikhail Gorbachev on April 7, 1989,61

Moscow had already ceased the production of HEU for use in nuclear weapons 

that year. 

The UN resolution called for the negotiation of such a treaty in the 

CD and requested the IAEA to provide assistance in the examination of 
25

verification arrangements. There was a delay at the CD at the beginning of 

these negotiations because of an effort, which was principally led by Algeria, 

Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, to broaden the CD's mandate to include negotiations 

of reductions so that "unsafeguarded stocks are equalized at the lowest 

possible level,"62 a position totally unacceptable to the NWS. 

For implementation of the resolution, a Special CD Coordinator, 

Ambassador Shannon of Canada, was appointed. Eventually, a compromise 

was reached that preserved the focus of the negotiations on a production cutoff 

but allowed for discussion of existing stocks. Another contentious issue was 

the question of CD being the appropriate forum for such consultations. China, 

for unspecified reasons, opposed setting up an ad-hoc committee to negotiate a 

cut-off. Shannon ultimately was able to convince China to drop its opposition 

and patch over other differences by the CD delegates. On March 23, 1995 the 

CD agreed by consensus to establish an ad hoc committee and called for an 

appropriate negotiation of a mandate to "...ban the production of fissile 

material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices..." and 

concluded with a call for the negotiation of a final treaty.63 This was 

supposedly a key step toward substantive work. In August 1998, the CD 

finally re-established the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a cutoff treaty. The 

committee met twice and has not been re-established since. No substantive 

work on a treaty has started and the CD has been unable to re-establish a 

consensus to get negotiations started. Obviously, a five-year delay is hardly a 

legacy that the CD can be proud of. 

Meanwhile, at the May 1995 nuclear NPT Review and Extension 

Conference, there was agreement on an action plan on the "Principles and 

Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" which included 

the immediate commencement and early conclusion of cutoff negotiations in 

accordance with the 1995 CD mandate. The five NWS committed themselves 

to the "early conclusion" of negotiations on a cutoff. A group led by Pakistan 

(with Indian support) delayed negotiations, insisting that cutoff negotiations be 

linked to parallel talks on nuclear disarmament.64 Pakistan was not eager to 
26

sign an agreement that would lock in its inferiority relative to India, and India, 

now facing a nuclear Pakistan, was reluctant to cap their stockpile of weapons 

material at a level far less than that of China.65 There was broad agreement, 

however, on the role of the IAEA in implementing safeguards agreements and 

its continuing efforts to improve safeguards effectiveness and efficiency.66 

In order to break the impasse, President Clinton reiterated the 

importance of negotiating a treaty to freeze the production of fissile materials 

for use in nuclear weapons as he addressed the 51st UN General Assembly on 

September 24, 1996, calling upon the CD to take up the challenge of 

negotiating a fissile material production cut-off treaty "immediately."67 The 

CD's response was paralysis. 

So, despite the optimism engendered by the end of the Cold War, 

cutoff negotiations never got off the ground and became mired in a complex 

weave of other disarmament and international security issues. Why this 

occurred and potential alternatives will be discussed. But the fact remains that 

the failure to quickly negotiate a cutoff treaty banning the production of fissile 

materials is one reason the world community continues to face a growing 

proliferation threat. 

Current Status: Paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament 

Support for the FMCT is seemingly quite widespread; despite that, however, 

doubts persist on account of differing perceptions of the ban and hopes from 

such a ban. Variance in the interests and priorities of the countries is quite 

obvious. This is not typical of the haves and the have-nots as such. 

Differences continue to exist regarding the purpose, scope and verification of 

such a ban. Three tough issues remain stumbling blocks to a successfully 

negotiated FMCT. These are: 

1. Differences over the scope of a cut-off verification regime, 

including especially whether to use that regime as a means to 

equalize the safeguards burden between the NWS and NNWS 

parties to the NPT. 
27

2. Differences over how cut-off negotiations should handle past 

production and existing stocks of weapon useable fissile 

materials. 

3. Convincing key countries, including such critical countries as 

India, Pakistan and Israel as well as the five NWS, that a FMCT 

is in their political/security interests or, barring that, determining 

whether a cut-off must be universal from the start. 

Rebecca Johnson, writing in the September 1996 issue of 

Disarmament Diplomacy presciently warned that "there are fissile materials 

issues which should be discussed multilaterally, but the basic cutoff which the 

P-5 (the NWS) are prepared to consider at present would be neither an 

efficient use of CD time, nor could it deliver effective international agreement 

any time soon or guarantee India's early signature."68 Four years later the NWS 

and Threshold States are arguably even farther away from achieving a 

negotiating mandate. 

In the context of the current state of play, it is useful to examine the 

positions of other key countries in order to understand the lack of progress, 

why any future progress in the CD is unlikely, and why it is probably time to 

pursue other avenues for achieving our nonproliferation goal of capping fissile 

material production. 

The Other Nuclear Weapon States: Great Britain, France, China and 

Russia: Great Britain ended HEU production for weapons in 1963, in part 

because it obtained the material from the United States. Then, on April 18, 

1995, Britain announced an end to all fissile material production.69 Though it 

gives support to the concept of an FMCT, it does so hesitatingly, because it 

has reservations about intrusive verification measures. Both Britain and 

France, while they are prepared to support the mandate, do not want existing 

stocks to be considered, particularly because of the perceived high cost and 

trouble associate with placing their nuclear facilities under international 

safeguards. They also reject the practical notion of an interim cut-off 

agreement solely among the nuclear weapon powers. For them the primary 

benefit of an FMCT is to put the threshold states under full safeguards.70 
28

Plutonium production for France ended for military purposes in 1992 

while its military enrichment facilities were scheduled for closure in 1995. 

France announced that it no longer produced fissile material for use in nuclear 

weapons in February 1996.71 France is hesitant about the cutoff because of fear 

of intrusion. Consequently, to seek an immediate ban on civilian reprocessing 

as a part of a FMCT would be unrealistic since France, Britain, Russia and 

India would all adamantly oppose any such broadening. States with civilian 

plutonium activities should be pressed, however, to at least dispose of all but 

minimum working stocks of separated plutonium. This was one of the original 

objectives of the Vienna-based negotiations of International “Guidelines for 

the Management of Plutonium.” Unfortunately, these negotiations yielded 

only a vaguely worded, lowest-common-denominator commitment to “the 

importance of balancing supply and demand, including demand for reasonable 

working stocks for nuclear operations, as soon as practical.”72

HEU production in China for weapons reportedly ended in 1987. It 

objected to a cutoff in April 1994 but agreed to work with the United States 

for a cutoff ban in October 1994. Several factors will come into play in 

China's eventual decision, and it is a long road between beginning negotiations 

and final signing of a treaty. Experts believe that China is not producing fissile 

material for weapons currently and that it has converted its uraniumenrichment facilities from military to civilian production, both to provide fuel 

for its budding nuclear power industry and for export.73 If this is true, it 

indicates that China has a stockpile of fissile material on hand for weapons. 

Alternatively, others believe that China's current obstructionism in the CD is 

due in part to a desire to increase its current stockpile of fissile materials in 

order to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal.74 Arguably, China is the 

real key to the ability of the CD, or any other forum for that matter, to 

negotiate an FMCT. A major incentive for the declared nuclear weapon states 

to an FMCT is to obtain the participation of the undeclared states. But India 

will not sign unless China does, and Pakistan will not sign unless India does. 
29

So without China to bring in India and Pakistan, the cutoff may not get far off 

the ground. 

China's interest in a cutoff convention will depend in part on whether 

it judges its stockpile to be adequate for its current weapons and for potential 

future needs. China's perceived need for larger and/or more capable nuclear 

forces will in turn depend on the actions of the other nuclear weapon states. 

For example, the United States is developing missile defenses intended to 

intercept much longer-range missiles than current systems. In response, China 

has recently issued a number of strong public objections to U.S. intentions on 

building a national missile defense (and possibly abrogating the Anti-Ballistic 

Missile Defense (ABM) Treaty), saying that such defenses could render 

China's small arsenal of strategic missiles "completely ineffective" and leave 

China open to blackmail.75 If China continues to be concerned about U.S. (and 

possibly Russian) plans to deploy new missile defenses, it may want to 

maintain the option to expand and modernize its arsenal to be able to 

overwhelm such defenses; a fissile material production cutoff may then not be 

in China's interest. 

China may also be concerned that a cutoff convention would give 

unfair advantage to the United States and Russia. China may believe that a 

cutoff agreement would only be fair and of practical significance if the United 

States and Russia first greatly reduced their large existing military stocks of 

fissile materials, as well as their large numbers of deployed nuclear weapons. 

On the other hand, an FMCT would certainly benefit China with 

respect to the threat posed by India's nuclear weapons program. India's nuclear 

infrastructure is large enough that it could possibly out produce China in the 

future if it desired. This concern might provide an incentive for China to sign a 

cutoff deal that includes India, since India's signature on such an agreement 

would freeze that country's nuclear weapons program in an inferior position. 

Another deciding factor for China will be how compliance would be 

verified. Verification will necessarily include international monitoring 

measures that would require each state to establish an accounting system for 
30

its fissile material and to submit to on-site inspections to determine the 

accuracy of this system. Challenge inspections allowing inspectors to "go 

anywhere and anyplace" will also be a part of the verification scheme. China 

has traditionally been opposed to intrusive verification measures, but its 

attitude appears to be evolving. Although China repeatedly expressed concerns 

about the challenge inspections that were included in the Chemical Weapons 

Convention, for example, China did sign that accord. 

China's interest in signing a cutoff convention will also depend on the 

expectations of other countries. It has become increasingly important to China 

to be viewed as a responsible member of the "nuclear club." Indeed, in the last 

several years, China has signed on to a number of international arms control 

agreements that it previously avoided or even denounced, including the NPT. 

Although it may prefer that such agreements not require any sacrifice or 

impose constraints on its military programs, China does appear willing to 

accept such constraints when not doing so would seriously damage its 

international reputation. 

One of the major problems is that almost half of the CD delegations 

are pushing to start discussions on nuclear disarmament and outer space arms 

control,76 and China is leading the charge. China did not confirm that it 

considered FMCT as the next practical step on nuclear disarmament, a position 

it had agreed to at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Instead, 

China is now pressing hard on negotiating an arms control in outer space 

agreement, and it has received support from Russia on its position to establish 

an ad hoc committee to do so.77 Now in addition, China, primarily because of 

its stated concerns over a prospective American national missile defense, has 

harshly criticized the United States and its allies in the CD, and essentially 

threatened to hold FMCT talks hostage unless the U.S. foregoes its missile 

defense plans. 

In response, the U.S. reiterated that its "first priority remains the 

negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT)" and regretted that 

China "will not permit the CD to negotiate on FMCT unless there are parallel 
31

negotiations on nuclear arms reductions and outer space." Grey reminded the 

CD that China had subscribed to the 1995 NPT "Principles and Objectives" 

document that identified an FMCT as the next practical step in nuclear 

disarmament. "Here in the CD the United States has already shown 

considerable flexibility on important elements of our program of work.... If 

the CD does not get down to work, it will confirm my authorities' suspicions 

that this is because some governments do not want it to work."78 The Russians 

initially supported the early commencement of FMCT negotiations stating 

they were "convinced that that the next step in enhancing the international 

non-proliferation and disarmament regime should consist" of a FMCT,79 but 

later reversed themselves and supported the Chinese position that FMCT 

negotiations will not proceed unless there are parallel negotiations on nuclear 

disarmament and outer space. 

The Threshold States: Israel, India and Pakistan: Israel, long 

suspected of having or quickly capable of having nuclear weapons, continues 

plutonium production at its nuclear facility in Dimona. There has been no 

official statement/discussion on their views of a proposed cutoff agreement. 

However, the general Israeli view is that if the FMCT and related verification 

systems do not reveal past activities and capabilities, thereby leaving the 

Israeli capability ambiguous, it may be acceptable. Israel would probably 

accept a freeze on stockpiles if this was accepted by all the states in the region 

and if verification was serious, based on mutual inspection, and not by the 

IAEA or another international organization of doubtful effectiveness. 

However, if the version of the FMCT that emerges includes revelation or 

destruction of existing stockpiles, Israel will not accept it.80

Israel stated at the CD that it will not oppose the establishment of an 

ad hoc committee to begin negotiations of an FMCT.81 However, its general 

position has not wavered since 1993 where it stated at the UN that stopping or 

capping fissile material production is inextricably linked to the establishment 

of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. And such a Zone can 

only be achievable when a viable and stable peace agreement has been 
32

achieved among all nations in the region (including Iran and Iraq) and tested 

over time. Israel is clearly not interested in signing up to any proposal for an 

FMCT at this time. Since the primary purpose of this Treaty is to capture the 

threshold states, absent a fundamental change in the current climate in the 

Middle East, the FMCT will either be held hostage to the Middle East peace 

process or it will have to go forward without Israeli participation. 

Though it rejected a regional cutoff, India initially supported a global 

cutoff, without the inclusion of civilian stockpiles or production. Since India's 

production flows from its civilian program, it could be impossible to 

differentiate it from military production. Further, India has insisted on linking 

FMCT negotiations to a timetable for nuclear disarmament by the NWS. The 

Indian position was that the country might endorse the FMCT provided the CD 

stuck to the mandate as given by the UN General Assembly in 1993. New 

Delhi's reading of the UN mandate was that "the FMCT must not be seen in 

the retrospective sense. It has to be viewed as a prospective measure that 

prohibits the future production of unsafeguarded material."82

Seen from the standpoint of India, the FMCT although considered to 

be a non-discriminatory disarmament measure, global in its reach and 

universal in its application, is so only in intent. In real terms it does not change 

the status quo nor does it in any way reduce the gap between the haves and the 

have-nots. As a disarmament measure, it will in effect disarm the threshold 

states while the other NWS would have available to them significant numbers 

of nuclear weapons for decades to come even if they dismantle their nuclear 

weapons under the START I and START II Treaties. 

In 1997, India asserted it would not sign the FMCT and reiterated that 

though the country was totally committed to the use of nuclear power for 

peaceful purposes, it was not willing to close its nuclear options as the security 

of the country would continue to receive the topmost priority. India refused to 

sign the CTBT and NPT on the grounds they were one-sided and unfair to a 

developing country like India.83 This assertion marked a new phase in the 

country's nuclear policy as it is for the first time that India has taken a position 
33

on a proposed international treaty.84 In the case of the NPT and CTBT, India's 

objections came only after their provisions were known. It was pointed out by 

a retired Indian diplomat that India did participate in the negotiations for the 

NPT and the CTBT but "in the case of the FMCT, with the Prime Minister's 

categorical rejection, one is not sure whether India will join other nations 

during the negotiating stage itself."85 However, after the 1998 nuclear tests, 

India reversed itself and stated it now supported the establishment of an ad hoc 

committee in the CD for an FMCT. Nevertheless, it has demonstrated an 

obvious reluctance for the talks to get underway and has contented itself to let 

China, Pakistan and others lead the way in holding the FMCT hostage to other 

issues. 

Pakistan supports the cutoff regionally as part of a bilateral NPT 

regime, and globally. It agreed to a mandate without a reference to stockpiles 

as long as stockpiles could be addressed in the talks but may not agree to 

inspection. Pakistan, however, made a concession of sorts in its approach to 

the negotiating mandate by saying that it could support the UN language 

which referred only to a ban on future production of fissile material provided 

that "this language does not preclude any delegation from raising the issue of 

the scope of the convention during the actual negotiations" and will reserve the 

right to ensure that "the question of asymmetric stockpiles" is considered.86

Pakistan argues that whereas India's nuclear tests had destabilized the 

"existential deterrence" which had operated between the two countries for 

almost twenty years, Pakistan's tests served to re-establish balance and 

stability.87 During recent discussions, Pakistan and the United States agreed to 

support the immediate commencement of negotiations on a nondiscriminatory, universal and effectively verifiable treaty banning the 

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive 

devices.88 However, Pakistan continued to raise the issue of “unequal” 

stockpiles citing the wide disparity in fissile material stockpiles of India and 

Pakistan. Stockpile asymmetry will remain a stumbling block for Pakistan and 

will make it difficult for them to accept a ban on future production only. And, 
34

as evidenced by its delegation’s behavior in the CD, Pakistan is, for the most 

part, taking an obstructionist position stifling any chance for progress on an 

FMCT in the CD.89

Similar to Israel's attitude, resolving the dispute over Kashmir is the 

key to resolving the security crisis in South Asia. Kashmir was the 

fundamental issue influencing nuclear decision-making by both Pakistan and 

India, and it will weigh heavily on Pakistan during negotiations of the 

parameters of a possible FMCT. The solution to that problem will be the true 

first step towards Pakistan and India’s cooperation in agreeing to fissile 

material production cutoff and other nonproliferation measures. 

The "Non-Aligned Group of 21" (G-21): The G-21 has repeatedly 

emphasized that nuclear disarmament should be the highest priority for the 

Conference on Disarmament (CD) but has generally endorsed efforts to 

establish a FMCT negotiating committee. It has not tried to link talks on 

nuclear disarmament to the FMCT, as China has done, but has "insisted that 

the existing stocks should be part of the negotiating mandate."90 The Group 

also is noted for stating that the primary purpose of an FMCT should be 

disarmament, vice nuclear non-proliferation, since it will serve as an integral 

step leading to the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

The CD adopts its work program every year by consensus. This is a 

requirement that encourages all kinds of linkages and hostage taking. 

Sometimes the linkages are relevant, but the knowledge that the United States 

or another NWS will reject substantive work on an issue such as nuclear 

disarmament or outer space means that linkages can also be a convenient way 

of delaying substantive work. While requiring consensus before work can 

proceed protects U.S. interests from failing prey to the tyranny of the majority, 

it can also, as demonstrated in this case, block progress on substantive work 

that the vast majority are in agreement with. So it is now as the Chinese argue 

that the CD program of work must have a balance between the three issues of 

FMCT, outer space and nuclear disarmament with an outer space treaty being 

negotiated first before proceeding with FMCT. And further, the CD serves as 
35

a convenient grand stand for China, Russia and others to criticize the United 

States for developing a national missile defense and throwing further U.S. 

efforts in that regard as a block to negotiating an FMCT.91 

Despite the current deadlock in the CD, work has continued by the 

U.S. and other like-minded states with the IAEA on examining the issues and 

problems with establishing a verification regime for a future FMCT. Indeed, 

of all the substantive issues to be negotiated, this will easily prove to be the 

most difficult and contentious. 

Verification and the Role of the IAEA 

During full-fledged negotiations, the verification aspect of a fissile material 

cutoff agreement is very likely to prove one of the most politically difficult 

and, in varying degrees, technically complex issues. Two questions that 

immediately stand out, which are closely related but separate are: what should 

be the role of the IAEA in cutoff verification? And what overall verification 

approach or architecture should guide crafting of a cutoff verification regime? 

In deciding whether to follow a comprehensive or streamlined approach 

towards verification, efforts must be made to contain perceptions of unfair 

discrimination between non-nuclear and nuclear countries as well as to avoid 

major inconsistencies between traditional IAEA verification and that of a 

cutoff convention. 

One of the more difficult questions for any FMCT proposal will be 

the scope and extent of verification of compliance. Related is how such 

provisions will affect—and be affected by—existing control systems that also 

focus on the production and use of fissile materials. The most obvious is the 

application of IAEA safeguards. In particular, differences in the scope of 

coverage, the verification objectives, the measures and technology applied, 

and the evaluation methods and reporting may arise. Obviously, if the FMCT 

should become a reality, efforts to rationalize overlapping requirements will be 

necessary and implementation will have to be carried out in such a manner to 

assure that IAEA safeguards and the FMCT verification regime are mutually 
36

complementary, and that the final outcome assures that the totality of 

verification undertakings is effective and efficient. 

 The IAEA has, from its inception, been the instrument of 

governments to verify that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT 

are kept—performing what is known as its "safeguards" role. The Agency's 

mandate is to ensure that assistance provided by it or under its supervision or 

control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. For over 

forty years the IAEA has, for the most part, successfully served to provide a 

strong and impartial system to verify that countries are meeting their nonproliferation obligations. It is significant that no diversion of any significant 

quantity of nuclear material placed under safeguards has been detected. The 

discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq demonstrated, 

however, the serious limitation of the ability of the safeguards system to detect 

possible undeclared nuclear activities. This has resulted in the passage and 

implementation of an additional protocol to the safeguards agreement that 

provides for a number of intrusive measures and techniques to increase 

confidence that there is no diversion or an undetected illicit nuclear weapons 

program.92 

 Pursuant to the UN General Assembly Resolution, the IAEA was 

requested to provide technical assistance in developing "verification 

arrangements" for a proposed FMCT. While the IAEA has not been 

designated, nor is it likely to be so designated until a FMCT is being 

negotiated, the IAEA's experience and expertise will likely be put to use in 

developing a verification regime to supplement and complement the other 

bilateral and multilateral arms control and nonproliferation measures to store, 

safeguard, and ban the further production of fissile materials for weapons 

use.93

Verification of compliance with a proposed FMCT will not be 

without its difficulties. Fortunately, the IAEA has the vast experience and 

potential capability to serve as the verification instrument for an FMCT. The 

IAEA negotiates and implements "safeguards" agreements in which states 
37

undertake to submit all nuclear material to IAEA oversight and includes an 

undertaking not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear materials for weapons 

purposes. IAEA verification activities are directed at the detection of 

diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the 

manufacture of nuclear weapons (or for any other purpose) and to verify the 

correctness and completeness of the declarations made by states, to include the 

objective of detecting undeclared production of fissile materials anywhere on 

the territory of the state or under its control.94 The IAEA is continuing to 

pressure states with great success to sign the additional protocols. 95 

Obviously, a state's commitment to a safeguards agreement along with the 

additional protocol will be an important consideration in applying verification 

provisions of an FMCT to such a state. 

 The IAEA has a number of other relevant experiences that could be 

applicable to FMCT verification activities. These include the experiences 

gained in carrying out extended verification measures in Iraq under the 

provisions of UN Security Council resolution 687, monitoring a freeze on 

operations in facilities in the DPRK to include monitoring a freeze on 

operations at a reprocessing plant, and participation with the Russian 

Federation and the United States in developing a verification system for excess 

defense fissile materials in those states, including provisions for terminating 

verification of weapon-origin plutonium. The experiences gained in these 

situations may be of benefit in considering the rights and obligations of parties 

to a possible FMCT.96

It is important to highlight the fundamental difference between 

verification arrangements under the NPT and the FMCT. Full-scope NPT 

safeguards are designed for states in which all nuclear material is safeguarded 

and which have undertaken a comprehensive commitment not to receive, 

manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. The FMCT is designed to 

proscribe production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear 

explosive devices by states that already have or may have nuclear weapons; 
38

thus, not all nuclear material would need to be subject to safeguards in the 

NWS and the threshold states. 

Proponents of a more comprehensive verification regime argue that it 

would foster greater transparency among the five NWS, lessen mutual 

suspicions among them, and enhance wider confidence in their compliance. 

At root, however, their advocacy of this approach reflects a strong underlying 

political interest in equalizing the burden of safeguards. In effect, the regime 

would be designed not simply to monitor the shutdown of production activities 

related to nuclear weapons, but to bring under international inspection all nonmilitary nuclear activities in the NWS. It would monitor any residual 

production of plutonium and HEW as well as the status of former production 

plants and spent fuel. 

On the other hand, the rationale for applying less than comprehensive 

safeguards under a FMCT can be summarized as follows: the existence in the 

NWS (and threshold states) of unsafeguarded stocks, produced prior to entry 

into force, which rules out fully comprehensive safeguards; the practicalities 

that the cost in absolute terms would have to be increased at least threefold 

relative to current IAEA levels to apply comprehensive safeguards, and the 

need to keep the inspectorate to a manageable size; and cost-effectiveness (the 

cost in terms of strategic benefit gained); specifically, does a comprehensive 

approach yield significant additional benefits in proportion to the extra cost 

over a focused approach? 

At the other end of the spectrum to a comprehensive verification 

regime, some have proposed that the scope of the FMCT should be limited to 

weapon-grade material. The proponents consider this would be the most costeffective approach. It is not clear however that significantly fewer inspections 

would be needed at enrichment and reprocessing plants to determine that there 

had been no production of weapon-grade material, relative to verification of 

production of weapon-useable material (discussed below). More importantly, 

it is of major concern that such a limited scope would undermine the critical 

purpose of the FMCT and undercut long-standing international standards in 
39

safeguards. The barriers to possible breakout would be substantially reduced 

because of the possibility of rapid upgrading of weapon-useable material to 

weapon-grade, or even the use of such material in sub-optimal nuclear 

explosive devices. 

A more streamlined verification approach would concentrate on 

monitoring declared enrichment and plutonium production facilities, including 

shutdown facilities. Rather than monitoring the full fuel cycle, it would track 

any production of PU or HEU up to the point that such materials were used for 

permitted civilian nuclear purpose. It would rely on challenge inspections to 

detect undeclared facilities or diversion of materials from declared enrichment 

or reprocessing facilities producing materials for civilian purposes or nonproscribed military purposes, such as naval reactor fuels. This is similar to 

what the United States is proposing. 

The FMCT verification proposal preferred by the US has raised 

concern because it would apply much less stringent verification requirements 

to the civilian nuclear energy sectors of the NWS than are required of NNWS. 

The US favors a verification regime focused narrowly on: 

1. Uranium enrichment plants, to determine whether or not HEW is 

being produced; 

2. Spent fuel “reprocessing “ plants at which PU or other artificial 

fissile isotopes made by neutron absorption can be separated 

from highly radioactive fission products; and 

3. Fissile materials produced after FMCT comes into force and the 

facilities in which these materials are present.97

This regime would be supplemented by challenge inspections 

involving managed access to suspect sites.98 

Realistically, given the large number of facilities to which safeguards 

will have to be applied and the large number of expert personnel that will be 

required, international monitoring in the NWS will have to be implemented in 

stages. The narrow coverage favored by the US is an obvious first step, 

particularly when one considers the funding difficulties. Coverage could later 
40

be expanded as practicable until it is as comprehensive outside declared 

military nuclear facilities as the coverage accepted by the NNWSs. 

Conceivably, even declared military nuclear facilities will have to be eligible 

for challenge inspections to verify that they do not contain clandestine 

reprocessing or enrichment facilities. All facilities in the NNWS that have 

accepted the Additional Protocol are already subject to managed access 

challenge inspections by the IAEA. Managed access arrangements allow 

inspected countries to provide information required by international inspection 

teams while protecting sensitive military or proprietary information. 

Cost and who will pay the cost will be a complex and difficult issue. 

A 1995 IAEA comparison of the annual cost of full verification of separated 

fissile material and facilities capable of producing such materials was $90 

million, only one-third less than the estimate of $140 million per year for full 

safeguards on all civilian facilities in the NWS.99 While most agree that in the 

event there is an FMCT the IAEA is the ideal agency to serve as the 

verification instrument, unfortunately, the IAEA, in its present financial 

condition, will be unable to fulfill any such role unless the states parties agree 

to full funding to support these additional costs. The IAEA budget has 

remained at zero-growth for more than ten years, even as additional mandatory 

verification activities have arisen in South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, and in 

the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. All five nuclear 

weapon states have entered into limited scope voluntary safeguards 

agreements in order to provide more openness and transparency to their 

activities. 

The safeguards operations budget of the IAEA in 2000 was over $80 

million.100 It would be almost tripled to $200 million/year for the most costly 

comprehensive FMCT verification approach considered in the 1995 IAEA 

working paper. This $140 million increase would be tiny, however, in 

comparison with the operational cost savings realized by the NWS as a result 

of shutting down their fissile-material production complexes. From 1984 

through 1993, the United States alone spent about $2 billion per year on 
41

plutonium production for weapons. From 1954 through 1963, before the 

United States ended the production of HEU for weapons and began shutting 

down many of its plutonium-production reactors, the annual American rate of 

expenditure for the production of fissile materials for weapons averaged about 

$7.billion.101 If the IAEA is to serve as the instrument for verification, member 

states will have to commit additional funds to support taking on these 

additional responsibilities. As the Director General of the IAEA frankly 

observed, the IAEA's plate is full and it is incapable of taking on more 

missions without a funding to support those missions.102

However, experts readily acknowledge that, as the UN experience in 

Iraq after the Persian Gulf War has demonstrated, the ability to detect smallscale clandestine production programs will be extremely low.103 The primary 

emphasis of any verification, monitoring, and transparency regime should be 

on increasing the costs and raising the risks of non-compliance, thereby adding 

to deterrence, while limiting exposure to classified programs and proprietary 

information or existing nuclear weapons programs of the NWS. A key 

question in negotiating such a regime will be the degree to which the NWS are 

willing to accept the burdens associated with implementing a cutoff agreement 

in order to promote their nonproliferation objectives. 

The United Nations mandate calls for an effectively verifiable 

agreement. While not defined, this generally means there is a high degree of 

certainty that cheating would be detected. Unfortunately, while the technology 

continues to improve, it is unlikely that the IAEA or anyone else will be able 

to detect with high confidence the clandestine production of fissile materials 

either at an undeclared site or undeclared production at a declared site. The 

experience of the IAEA with Iraq and North Korea where two NPT parties 

with safeguards agreements where able to cheat despite being subject to IAEA 

inspections is telling. Despite technological improvements and a more 

intrusive safeguards regime, it is highly unlikely a clandestine program could 

be detected in states determined to cheat. In some regions, verifiability of the 

agreement could be crucial. For example, if a cutoff agreement were in effect, 
42

any country that secretly produced fissile materials could gain a substantial 

advantage over others. In both the Middle East and South Asia, it will be 

critical that countries have strong confidence that their neighbors are not 

clandestinely producing fissile materials. It is fair to say that currently any of 

the proposed verification regimes could not give such assurances, and a 

financially hamstrung IAEA certainly would not be able to certify 

convincingly that a FMCT state party is in compliance. 

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES: POTENTIAL OPTIONS IN THE 

FACE OF A DEADLOCKED CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 

Since there is no progress and no hope of any movement in the near future in 

the CD, there are a number of other possible alternatives worth examining in 

pursuit of our nonproliferation goals vis-à-vis fissile materials. 

Recently, in an attempt to break the deadlock, the CD hosted a 

conference where a number of ideas were put forth on the scope of a potential 

FMCT. The options presented to the conference included: 1) the basic FMCT, 

which would simply ban future production of plutonium and HEU for 

weapons; 2) the basic FMCT plus added requirements that any fissile materials 

declared excess to military needs be placed under irreversible IAEA 

safeguards, and 3) the FMCT plus option 2 with an added provision that all

fissile material from warheads removed from deployment by the several 

missile-reduction treaties, the Bush-Gorbachev/Yeltsin reciprocal cuts, and 

any future agreements be placed under IAEA safeguards.104 The technical 

requirements for verification would obviously vary depending on the scope of 

the prohibition. 

Most of the technical discussion focused on the basic FMCT ban. 

Even for that basic ban, there were important technical problems meriting 

discussion. These included how to safeguard HEU fuel for propulsion of naval 

vessels and how to safeguard old separation or enrichment plants not designed 

to be safeguarded.105 While no consensus was sought at this technical 

conference, there seemed to be general agreement that an FMCT would 

probably start with the basic ban.106
43

Absent any agreement in the CD, the U.S. should continue to focus 

on its bilateral initiatives with Russia (after all, Russia and the states of the 

former Soviet Union are our greatest proliferation concern) and continue to 

cooperate and provide financial support to Russia to adequately safeguard and 

manage her fissile materials. The numerous initiatives discussed, supra, should 

continue to be funded and politically supported. 

Second, no matter what happens with the FMCT, the U.S. and other 

countries with nuclear reactors need to develop a comprehensive strategy to 

deal with the proliferation risks associated with the growing use of plutonium 

as civilian reactor fuel. The U.S. should continue research on nuclear power 

technologies that are inherently more proliferation resistant and do not depend 

solely on safeguards to maintain security. 

Finally, the U.S. should not rely solely on technological barriers to 

stop nuclear proliferation. As technology advances, it becomes easier and 

easier for states to develop nuclear weapons. The U.S. might be wise to pursue 

more front-end solutions to non-proliferation and try to develop policies that 

reduce the military and political incentives for states to develop nuclear 

weapons. Ultimately, especially in light of what's happened in the CD, this is 

the best and most effective way to increase global security. 

Given the problematic nature of progress in the CD, the most 

effective way to make progress towards a fissile cutoff agreement in the 

foreseeable future will be most likely through incremental advances separate 

from the hopelessly deadlocked CD negotiations. The CD is probably, with 

now 66 members and counting, too unwieldy to be an appropriate forum for 

these negotiations. Rather, the better approach now would be to develop and 

pursue a series of confidence-building measures that would reinforce the 

commitments of those countries that have ceased production; increase 

transparency that these commitments are being met; and increase pressure on 

those states that do continue production. 

At a recent Japanese-sponsored technical conference, the Australian 

representatives proposed a "phased approach" with a "framework agreement" 
44

stating broad goals, but not legal obligations, for both the basic FMCT and for 

reductions in stocks that sounded promising.107 The FMCT, a legally binding 

treaty, could then be negotiated separately from the agreements on reductions 

in stocks, that is, from the weapon reduction, dismantlement, and disposition 

agreements, many of which are already being negotiated in bilateral form 

between Russia and the United States. It seems prudent that the negotiation of 

these agreements should continue as they are for the time being and expand 

beyond bilateral (or trilateral) to five-party or larger talks as more necessary 

parties participate. 

 Cessation of production of nuclear weapons-usable materials directly 

concerns only the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan 

and Israel. All other state parties to the NPT are already under the obligation 

not to produce the materials in question, and are subject to comprehensive 

IAEA safeguards; they are not expected to assume additional non-proliferation 

obligations. It might, therefore, be expedient to cease linking the fissile 

material cut-off measure with other arms control measures and to negotiate it 

in a forum composed of the eight countries specified above, rather than at the 

CD composed of 66 countries. Other states would be involved, through the 

IAEA, in verifying compliance with the reached agreement, but only states 

directly affected by the agreement should bear the additional costs. 

Another approach, suggested by Canada and others, argues for a broad 

spectrum of measures in which a ban of fissile material production would be 

only one element.108 These measures are varied but usually revolve around 

four general categories: 

1. Proposals to increase transparency; 

2. Declarations of excess fissile material; 

3. Verification measures to ensure fissile material cannot be 

diverted back into weapons; and 

4. Safe and secure disposition of all excess fissile material. 
45

The collection and release of information about the size of current 

fissile material inventories is necessary in addressing the issue of excess 

stocks. Aggregate quantities of stocks are needed as a baseline to measure the 

progress of establishing controls and disposition programs on these stocks. 

Accurate accounting of these stocks also serves an important disarmament and 

nonproliferation objective for each state possessing such stocks by ensuring 

that fissile materials have not been stolen or diverted. In that context, efforts to 

establish production histories will increase confidence that the measured 

inventories are correct. 

Both the United States and the UK have released data about their 

stocks, and have promised to release more. France's nuclear program is 

regarded as having as sophisticated a nuclear material accounting system as 

the United States and the UK, and should, with relative ease, be able to 

compile and release similar information about its stocks. Little is known about 

the accounting systems used by China. Whether the Russian Federation has 

compiled or is now compiling this information is unknown. Russia still needs 

to develop a modern, nation-wide system to account for its fissile materials; it 

may be several years before one is developed. So, one supporting transparency 

measure might be to reach agreement among the five nuclear-weapon states to 

create, regularly update and publish information about their fissile stocks. 

Another approach might be to not see a FMCT as a stand-alone 

instrument, but rather as a framework instrument which evolves over time into 

a comprehensive regime governing the production, stockpiling, management 

and disposition of fissile material. For this reason, the conclusion of a first 

treaty simply codifying a ban on the production of fissile material for use in 

nuclear weapons could be followed by a second agreement providing for 

greater transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually bringing 

fissile material stocks under strict and effective international control. This too 

should be an evolving instrument which tracks other nuclear disarmament 

measures and progressively brings direct-use fissile material into the scope of 

a fissile material regime. An important objective of this progressive approach 
46

will be to make disarmament measures irreversible by ensuring that fissile 

material no longer needed is not available for military use again. This fissile 

material regime will require an innovative, multifaceted approach involving a 

balance of bilateral, multilateral and appropriate international and possibly 

regional arrangements for nuclear material made excess to military 

requirements. 

 Another alternative worth pursuing is to use the "trilateral initiative" 

model. The U.S., Russia, and the IAEA, as previously discussed, have worked 

together to create a verification arrangement, soon to be approved by the 

IAEA, for the management of excess fissile materials. The U.S. could work in 

tandem with the IAEA to progressively work with one or more of the 

threshold states to arrive at a similar arrangement that would capture currently 

unsafeguarded fissile material production and possibly even some alreadyproduced stocks. 

As the CD increasingly demonstrates its inability to get negotiations 

on an FMCT underway, perhaps the NWS should all walk away from the CD 

and begin a limited negotiation to develop the groundwork for a verifiable 

treaty banning the production of fissile materials. Again, this would be highly 

controversial, put the CD adherents in disarray, and possibly break the logjam. 

If China balked, as would be expected, it would risk losing the international 

support it needs to rally against U.S. national missile defenses. Political self 

interest combined with leverage by the international community for all the 

weapon states to fulfil the 1995 NPT priorities would make it difficult for 

China to pull out if the other four were serious about going ahead. Of course, 

it is highly speculative and conjectural that Russia would be interested (it has 

enough on its hands coping with its own fissile material problems without 

signing up to more international obligations) or that Great Britain and France 

would have the desire to pursue such a side-bar negotiation. 

If the negotiations were non-polemical and low-key, it might provide 

a convenient forum for India and Pakistan to join and begin the tortuous 

process of working out their mutual national security concerns. Israel could 
47

also be invited to join or at least observe. This exclusive club would have its 

detractors but it could do no worse than what is happening now at the CD. If 

and when the CD shows itself ready to negotiate, the fruits of the five’s (plus 

three?) preparatory and technical negotiations could be transferred into the 

multilateral forum, although it would be very likely that these sidebar talks 

would continue in parallel, as during the CTBT negotiations. 

Of course, there is the question of how much diplomatic effort should 

be devoted to the cut-off, that is, the multilateral global cut-off, if in fact there 

is substantial diplomatic opposition to it. How many resources, how much 

time should be devoted to this or perhaps, if it can't be achieved quickly and 

simply, we might have to move on to other measures that will have to be more 

effective. Indeed, while the suggestions posited here may have merit, absent 

the clear political will to arrive at an agreement all of these proposals are 

doomed to the same trash heap where the FMCT currently resides. 

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: WHY THIS DOG STILL WON’T HUNT 

AND WHAT IT MEANS TO THE FUTURE OF THE CONFERENCE 

ON DISARMAMENT 

Perhaps the US expected too much from the CD given its success in 

negotiating a CWC and CTBT over the last ten years. Perhaps declaring an 

FMCT as its most important arms control priority in the CD gave others a 

reason to think that an FMCT was important enough that the U.S. would cave 

in its opposition to talks on nuclear disarmament, an arms race in outer space, 

and forego national missile defense. Given the vacillation of China, India and 

Pakistan it is hard to know for sure. As important as the nonproliferation 

agenda is, the FMCT never was of such import that the U.S. was willing to 

"pay any price or bear any burden" to ensure its genesis. 

 After five years of frustration both opponents and proponents of arms 

control have begun to question the viability of the CD.109 Undoubtedly, the 

Conference on Disarmament (CD) is in crisis. This crisis offers both danger 

and opportunity. Certainly, the CD has not started negotiating anything since 

finishing the CTBT in August 1996. But does this signify the brink of terminal 
48

decline, or a fallow time, when it is better that nothing be planted until the soil 

(political and structural conditions) has been replenished sufficiently to grow 

sturdy crops? Perhaps it would be best for the U.S. and other NWS to simply 

declare that no progress is possible and walk away from the CD. In the 

ensuing uproar, recalcitrant states may well find the political will to reenergize these talks. 

On the other hand, as a result of no discernable progress after five 

years, one could convincingly argue that the Conference on Disarmament has 

lost its importance as a multilateral mechanism negotiating global arms 

control. The widely diverging opinions regarding the agenda of the CD reflect 

the impotence of this body, which cannot be cured by mere procedural 

gimmicks 

 Since it is exceedingly unlikely that any progress will be made in 

Geneva, the question is why continue? The CD is the bastion of multilateral 

arms control but the price is often too steep a price for the U.S. to pay in terms 

of protecting and preserving its national security interests. Few nations have 

much to lose in participating in negotiations over which they have nothing to 

give up. On the other hand, the U.S. will be constantly pressured to make 

concessions in the interest of moving the process forward. While certainly 

capping the production of fissile materials, particularly with regard to the 

threshold states, is an important national interest, it is not of such import to 

agree to negotiate away our nuclear deterrent or limiting our technological 

advantages in space and elsewhere. Indeed, the dynamics of the CD are such 

that it has more often than not become a forum for bashing U.S. national 

security policies, providing a convenient outlet for member states to vent their 

anger and frustration over real or perceived complaints about U.S. actions 

around the world. Since the discussions focus inevitably and almost 

exclusively on what the nuclear weapon states will give up in order to achieve 

their nonproliferation goals, members from the so-called non-aligned "Group 

of 21" and China, the "Group of One," hold hostage real progress in limiting or 

rolling back the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Consider, for 
49

example, the recent statement of the Pakistani Ambassador to the CD where he 

stated that "The FMCT is not the highest priority for the Group [of 21]. The 

realization of nuclear disarmament enjoys the highest priority in our pantheon 

of the purposes of the CD."110 

Further, the CD, as the sole multilateral, continuously standing 

negotiating forum on disarmament, serves as a convenient stage to excoriate 

the West or highlight regional disputes. Invariably, in our desire to achieve an 

agreement in this forum, the costs may be too great to bear for the benefits to 

be gained. Consider the prescient warning issued this year by the U.S. 

Ambassador to the CD, Robert Grey: 

 What happens next is up to us. The CD will have 

no trouble maintaining its role as the world's single 

multilateral negotiating body if we do what is expected of 

us: negotiate multilateral arms control and disarmament 

agreements that contribute to the security and well being of 

humankind. We need to focus on what is possible now, not 

seek perfect, all-encompassing solutions to disarmament. 

We also need to resist the urge to score political debating 

points or involve the CD in issues it cannot address 

effectively. If we can do this, members of the CD will have 

no trouble keeping it relevant and engaged. If not, those 

who seek progress on disarmament will look elsewhere.111

While obtaining an agreement that creates an international norm 

proscribing the future production of fissile materials is a worthwhile 

nonproliferation goal, forcing the United States and its allies to give up or 

degrade its ability to deter or effectively respond to a proliferation threat to 

international peace and security is too large a price to pay. Indeed, as one 

observes the ongoings of the CD, it calls into question the efficacy of future 

multilateral arms control negotiations, particularly where it has little, if any, 

impact on reducing the danger under negotiation and increasing the risk of 

vulnerability based on the costs imposed.112 And, as we have discussed, 

despite the increasing sophistication of the IAEA's monitoring and verification 

capabilities, it is undeniable that a determined proliferator will be able to 
50

acquire fissile materials or even generate a clandestine program to produce 

such materials. 

Indeed, the shortcomings that plague this initiative, in conjunction 

with a changing global environment and rapidly developing technologies, call 

into question the ability of arms control to favorably influence the security 

environment and have drawn into question their value to U.S. interests. The 

attractions of disarmament seem obvious yet remain almost impossibly 

difficult to achieve. Hans Morgenthau, source of much of our internationalrelations wisdom, half a century ago taught that the focus on disarmament was 

misplaced; it was aimed at a symptom rather than a cause. "Men do not fight 

because they have arms," he wrote. "They have arms because they deem it 

necessary to fight." Solve the political problem that is tending toward war, and 

then disarmament becomes achievable. "Disarmament or at least regulation of 

armaments is an indispensable step in a general settlement of international 

conflicts," wrote Morgenthau. "It can, however, not be the first step."113 In 

fact, this is exactly the position the Threshold States have taken in describing 

their reluctance to give up or cap the production of fissile materials. 

Arms control can be no more than a tool of national strategy if it is to 

be effective. It is an alternative to the other tool, the deployment of weapons. 

But it must pursue the same goal of national security strategy: to enhance 

security at the lowest possible cost and risk. When arms control becomes an 

end in itself the consequences become manifest: increased costs and more risk. 

Our arms control and nonproliferation efforts must remain grounded in the 

single-minded purpose of enhancing the security of the United States and 

international peace and security generally. Otherwise we will have less 

security not more as we sign up to arms control or nonproliferation agreements 

for the sake of having such agreements even if they are unable to provide the 

security for which they were intended. 

If we are serious about stopping the spread of fissile materials to 

countries of proliferation concern, the U.S. should focus less on arms control 

and more on the underlying reasons for why countries want to acquire and use 
51

such materials. Instead of trying to find the right mix of arms control carrots 

and sticks, it would be more worthwhile to pursue policies that attempt to 

alleviate the political, economic, ethnic and religious differences and 

disparities from which these desires lie. These are often aggravated by 

governance-related deficiencies such as exclusionary and repressive policies, 

and lack of, or weaknesses in, democratic institutions, respect for the rule of 

law, and human rights observance. Once the reasons for these illicit programs 

disappear, the negotiations to end and roll back these programs, as was the 

case in South Africa, will become trivially easy. 

 The threat of fissile materials will end once countries give up 

bankrupt regimes with repressive policies and embrace the rule of law. 

Historically, democratic states do not fight each other and do not pose 

proliferation risks.114 National security decisions will conclude that 

disarmament is appropriate once perceived threats to national security recede 

and not before. Perhaps it’s time the CD focused on the disease of 

proliferation and less on its symptoms. Unfortunately, lacking a mandate to do 

so, the CD will remain an exercise in futility, albeit one that keeps a huge 

number of diplomats employed. In any event, a cutoff treaty must await a new 

political climate before the parties of proliferation concern ever agree to give 

up fissile materials, an important element to their perceptions of national 

security. 

NOTES 

 

1

 For the purposes of this discussion, the term “fissile materials” used here will 

refer to weapons grade HEU or plutonium. As such, fissile materials are those 

nuclear materials that could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 

other nuclear explosives without reprocessing or further enrichment, and 

material that would require irradiation or enrichment to make it suitable for 

use in nuclear weapons. Unlike uranium, plutonium of virtually any 

composition of isotopes can be used for a nuclear weapon. Weapons fueled by 

plutonium with lesser amounts of plutonium-239 (low grade or reactor grade 

plutonium) will not be as powerful as those fueled by weapons-grade 

plutonium, but they will still yield sizeable explosions. Interestingly, no 

definition of fissile material has yet to be proposed for the purposes of a fissile 
52

 

material cutoff treaty although it is commonly understood to minimally 

include plutonium and uranium that contains at least 90% of uranium 235. 

2

 General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), session 48, plenary mtg. 4th, 

September 27, 1993, 7. The term “weapons of mass destruction” is used here 

to describe nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of 

delivery. 

3

 UN General Assembly, 48th Session, Resolution 45/75L, adopted without a 

vote in December 1993. See also, USIS Fact Sheet, November 7, 1996, New 

Delhi. 

4

 Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, "A Step-by-Step Approach To a Global 

Fissile Materials Cutoff," Arms Control Today 25:8 (October 1995): 5. 

5

 These include the unilateral U.S. fissile material initiatives to submit fissile 

material excess to U.S. defense needs to International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) safeguards; the trilateral initiative with the IAEA and Russia to 

establish verification measures for nuclear material excess to defense needs; 

bilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation and the New Independent 

States (NIS) on nuclear materials security; a bilateral agreement between the 

U.S. and Russia on cessation of plutonium production for weapons; efforts 

related to the disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

designated as no longer required for defense purposes, the management of the 

civil uses of plutonium; the management of HEU in research and test reactors; 

and the management of spent fuel of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea. 

6

 The Conference on Disarmament (CD), established in 1979 as the single 

multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, 

was a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations 

General Assembly held in 1978. It succeeded other Geneva-based negotiating 

fora, which include the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the 

Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68), and the Conference 

of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78). 

As originally constituted, the CD had 40 members. Subsequently its 

membership was expanded to 66 countries. While not technically a part of the 

United Nations Organization, its budget and personnel are included in the UN 

organizational structure. The Conference conducts its work by consensus, and 

its terms of reference include practically all multilateral arms control and 

disarmament problems. 

7

 William Cohen, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington D.C.: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 1997), iii. 
53

 

8

 See J. Carson Mark et al., "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?,: in Paul 

Leventhal & Yonah Alexander, eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

(Lexington MA: Lexington Books 1987), 60-62; J. Carson Mark, ReactorGrade plutonium's Explosive Properties (Nuclear Control Institute, August 

1990); "U.N. Official: Iraq Worked on Radiological Arms," The Washington 

Post, 8 November 1995, 25. 

9

 For a comprehensive assessment of this problem see Graham Allison, et al., 

Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996); Guy 

Roberts, “Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of 

Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials,” INSS Occasional Paper 8, (US Air 

Force Academy, Co: INSS, 1996). 

10 Adam Bernstein, "Getting Burnt by Weapons Plutonium: Security 

Implications of US Disposition Options," The Nonproliferation Review 4:2 

(Winter 1997): 72. 

11 Blending down HEU is essentially the process of diluting uranium-235. This 

involves mixing HEU with LEU so that the concentration of uranium-235 is 

low enough that the resulting uranium is not suitable for weapons. HEU may 

be blended down into LEU that is usable in power-generating reactors, but not 

suitable for weapons. The process of blending HEU down into LEU is 

relatively simple, but the process of getting HEU back again is very difficult: 

LEU would have to be enriched all over again to obtain HEU. 

12 John H. Gibbons, “Plutonium and International Security,” Statement before 

the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, May 

26, 1994, 3. 

13 David Albright, Frans Berkhout, William Walker, World Inventory of 

Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1992, (Stockholm; SIPRI, 1993). 

See Table 12.1, page 197 and Table 12.8, page 205 which show that separated 

weapons-usable plutonium in civil fuel cycles is projected to exceed the 

amount in the world's military stockpiles by the turn of the century. 

14 Albright, Berkhart, Walker, supra note 13, at 327. 

15 The intent here is simply to highlight the potentially much more severe and 

global problem of reactor-grade plutonium and HEU. Addressing the 

stockpiles of plutonium from civil reactors is a problem that is dot being 

addressed initially by the proposed FMCT where the focus is on capping the 

production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. However, since civilian 

reactors are producing so much more plutonium, it is not worthwhile to invest 

significant resources in safeguarding these materials "unless and until society 

is also prepared to reduce further the accessibility of civilian plutonium in 
54

 

spent fuel." Bette Hileman, "Nuclear Arms Dismantling: NAS urges steps to 

safeguard plutonium," Chemical & Engineering News, 31 January 1994, 6. 

16 According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, the total plutonium 

inventory is approximately 100 tons, of which 86 tons are weapons grade. 

According to the Department of Energy, the United States produced 994 tons 

of HEU between 1945 and 1992. See Thomas B. Cochran, “Dismantlement of 

Nuclear Weapons and Disposal of Fissile Material from Weapons,” paper 

presented to the 45th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 

Hiroshima, Japan, July 23-29, 1995, 4-5. 

17 Paul Leventhal and Daniel Horner, "NPT Extension Should Not Ignore the 

Dangers of Plutonium," Disarmament Times, 22 November 1994, 1. 

18 Approximately twenty-two countries possess or control separated plutonium 

either for military or commercial use. See David Albright, Frans Berkhout and 

William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 

19 Noboru Oi, “Plutonium Challenges: Changing Dimensions of Global 

Cooperation” at 

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull401/article3.html.

20 Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile 

Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, U.S. 

Department of Energy Report DOE/NN-ooo7, January 1997, 38-39. 

21 Arms Control Today 25:3 (March 1995): 23; White House Fact Sheet on 

Excess Fissile Material, Office of the Press Secretary, March 3, 1995. 

22 Diana Cipollone, The Fissile Material Cut-Off Debate: A Bibliographical 

Survey, (New York: UNIDIR: 1996) p. xvi. As the title suggests, this book is 

an excellent bibliographical survey of all aspects of the fissile material cutoff 

debate up to the first half of 1996. 

23 See Undersecretary of State John Holum’s Statement, “Holum Outlines 

U.S.-Russian Non-Proliferation Efforts” at Department of State Washington 

file website http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/ stories/00060905.htm. 

24 David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and 

Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies

(Oxford: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1997), 455. 

25 It is beyond the scope of this discussion to discuss all of the many ongoing 

measures and initiatives to prevent fissile material proliferation. For a detailed 
55

 

report on these ongoing initiatives, see David Albright, "Making the Grade? 

International Fissile Material Control Efforts," in David Albright and Kevin 

O'Neill, ed., The Challenges of Fissile Material Control, Institute for Science 

and International Security Report, 1999, 5; DOE (undated) “Megatons to 

Megawatts: Implementing HEU Transparency Measures, at 

http://www.nn.doe.gov/pubs/megaton_watt.pdf; IAEA (1999) “IAEA 

Verification of Weapon-origin Fissile Material in the Russian Federation and 

the United States,” Press Release, September 27,1999 at 

http://www.iaea.org/GC/gc43_pr/gcpr9910.html; White House Background 

Briefing (2000) on bilateral initiatives reported at 

http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/00060403.htm; William Walker 

and Frans Berkhout, Fissile Material Stocks: Characteristics, Measures and 

Policy Options,(Geneva: UNIDIR 1999). 

26 The trilateral group has met several times over the last three years (the last 

being in August 2000 in Vienna) to address the scope and purpose of IAEA 

verification; technologies that might be capable of performing verification and 

monitoring objectives without disclosing sensitive information; and options for 

funding and providing a legal framework for IAEA verification measures. In 

conjunction with its efforts, a verification agreement has been produced that 

will enable the IAEA to verify that hundreds of tons of fissile materials 

removed from U.S. and Russian military stockpiles never again return to 

nuclear weapons. It is expected that the agreement will be submitted to the 

IAEA Board of Governors when it meets in December 2000. See Energy 

Secretary Richardson’s Statement to the 44th General Assembly of the IAEA, 

18 September 2000 at website 

http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/00091907.htm. 

27 Department of State Washington File News Release, “Gore Signs U.S.-

Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement,” 1 September 2000 at website 

http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/ stories/00090108.htm.

28 Department of State Washington File News Release, “Gottemoeller Outlines 

Expanded Threat Reduction 

Initiative to Senate Subcommittee,” 07 March 2000 at website 

http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/ stories/00030701.htm. 

29 International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular INFCIRC/549 

(1998) contains the texts of the Guidelines for each of the nine countries as 

well as recent reports on their plutonium stocks 

30 Interviews with State Department Officials 9 July 2000, U.S. Delegation to 

CD, 23 August 2000. See also Statement by Steve Aoki, National Security 

Council Staff, at a public forum by the White House Office of Science and 

Technology, March 30, 1995. 
56

 

31 A naturally occurring, colorless, radioactive gaseous isotope of hydrogen 

used to enhance the effects of thermonuclear weapons. It is produced 

commercially from Lithium-6 by slow neutron bombardment in nuclear 

reactors. It also poses a radiation hazard from inhalation, as particles in the 

lungs may be a long-term carcinogenic hazard. 

32 State Department Interview, 9 July 2000. 

33 F. McGoldrick, "US Fissile Material Initiatives: Implications for the IAEA," 

IAEA Bulletin, vol. 37, no.1; interviews with DOD officials 12 July 2000. 

34 See M. Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed Steps to Control Warheads 

and Fissile Materials (New York: Carnegie Endowment 2000), 54. 

35 The NPT acknowledges the five states that have developed nuclear weapons 

before the Treaty entered into force, but as a condition of the parties 

acceptance of this special privilege the five Nuclear Weapons States agreed to 

work towards the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. This is known 

as the NWS's Article VI obligation under the NPT. 

36 U.S. Ambassador Grey statement to conference on disarmament , 28 June 

1998, USIA Press Release 6/28 , 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/docs/98062502_ppo.html 

37 Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, “A Step-by-Step Approach to a Fissile 

Cutoff,” Arms Control Today 25:8. 

38 Interviews with DOE officials 9 July 2000, State Department officials 19 

July 200, DOD officials 12 July 2000. 

39 NPT/CONF.1995/32/Decision 2, "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," par. 4(b). 

40 Text of Speech may be found at Department of State website 

http://usinfo.state.gov/ topical/pol/arms/stories/grey.htm. 

41 Almost all state members of the CD have voiced their support for a FMCT 

in one forum or another. See for example, statements contained in CD press 

releases DCF/327, 9 Mar 98; DCF/326, 26 Feb 98; DCF/325, 19 Feb 98; DCF 

324, 13 Feb 98; and DCF 322, 3 Feb 98. 

42 Lewis A. Dunn, "A Nuclear Weapons Materials Production Cutoff: An Idea 

Whose Time Has Come," in UNIDIR Research Paper No. 31, Halting the 
57

 

Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons (New York; UNIDIR: 

1994), 16. 

43 Permanent Mission of India to International Organizations in Geneva, Press 

Statement, dated "New Delhi, 11 May, 1998." Pakistan, remains reticent even 

with India's statement that it would be "happy to participate in," such 

negotiations.

44 J.M. Taylor, Restricting Production of Fissionable Material as an Arms 

Control Measure - An Updated Historical Overview, SAND87-0901, Sandia 

National laboratories, Oct. 1988, 37. 

45 For an excellent account of the origins and recent history of the FMCT 

proposal, see Annette Schaper, A Treaty on the Cutoff of Fissile Material for

Nuclear Weapons-What to Cover? How to Verify? (Frankfurt, Germany: Peace 

Research Institute Frankfurt Report 48, 1997), 5-18. 

46 For a brief history of the Acheson-Lilienthal report and the Baruch plan, see 

George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the 

Russians (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 59-61. 

47 U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959 

(Washington D.C.: GPO 1960) Vol. 1, Document No. 4, 7-16. 

48 See John M. Taylor, Restricting Production as an Arms Control Measure: 

An Historical Overview, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, 

December 9, 1983. 

49 Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control (London; PRIO: 1994), 31-32. 

50 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India, called for a 

"Standstill Agreement" in April 1954. The proposal was repeated at the UN 

General Assembly by Krishna Menon, in October 1954. 

51 UN General Assembly, 37th Session, Resolution 37/100A. 

52 United Nations General Assembly, 44th Session, Resolution 44/117D. 

53 General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), session 8, plenary mtg 470th; 

December 8, 1953, 450. 

54 Goldblat, n. 4, p. 32. For a detailed explanation and history of the IAEA See 

Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World 

Nuclear Order (Washington D.C.: resources for the Future, 1987). 
58

 

55 See, for example W. Epstein, "A Ban on the Production of Fissionable 

Material for Weapons," Scientific American, 243:1 (1980): 43-51; F. Von 

Hippel, et al., "Stopping the Production of Fissile Material for Weapons," 

Scientific American, 253:3 (1985): 40-47. 

56 Fact Sheet, "Nonproliferation Initiative," The White House, Office of the 

Press Secretary, July 13, 1992. 

57 Public Papers of the Presidents: 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1091, Sept. 

27, 1993. 

58 GA Res. A/RES/48/75L 

59 Public Papers of the Presidents: 30 Weekly Comp., Pres. Doc. 80, January 

14, 1994. 

60 Oleg Bukharin, "The Future of Russia's Plutonium Cities" International 

Security 21:4 (Spring 1997): 131-32 

61 "Gorbachev's Address at Guildhall," Tass News Agency, April 7, 1989, 1. 

62 Ahmed Kamal, Pakistan's representative to the CD; speech to the conference 

plenary, June 9, 1994, CD/PV.681. 

63 Conference on Disarmament, "Final Record of the Seven Hundred and Third 

Plenary Meeting," CD/PV 703; March 23, 1995, 17, See Annex B. See also, 

March 28, 1998 Speech by Grey on FMCT at 

Http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/docs/98032604_ppo.html

64 Rebecca Johnson, Nuclear Nonproliferation News, no. 29, July 11, 1995, 2. 

65 See for example, C. Raja Mohan, “India Losing Ground on N-Option, The 

Hindu, March 6, 1995. 

66 The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 1995, vol. 29, (New York: UN: 

1996), 93 

67 USIS Fact Sheet, November 7, 1996, New Delhi. See also Diana Cipollone, 

The Fissile Material Cut-Off Debate: A Bibliographical Survey, (New York: 

UNIDIR: 1996) xvi. As the title suggests, this book is an excellent 

bibliographical survey of all aspects of the fissile material cutoff debate up to 

the first half of 1996. 

68 Quoted in n. 2, page 612, C.5. 
59

 

69 USIS Fact Sheet, November 7, 1996, New Delhi. 

70 Fetter and Von Hippel, supra note 4, at 8. 

71 Ministry of Defense, French Policy: Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation (MOD Pub., 2000), 50-2. 

72 INFCIRC/549, Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium signed by 

Belgium China, France, Germany, Japan, The Russian Federation, 

Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States and deposited with the 

IAEA, 1 December 1997. India did not participate since it is not a member of 

the NPT. Located at http://www.iaea.org/cgibin/byteserver.pl/worldatom/infcircs/infcirc549.pdf 

73 Interviews with DOE officials, 9 July 2000. 

74 Interviews with State official, 19 July 2000, US CD Del Officials, 24 

August 2000. 

75 See Chinese and Russian Letter to the Conference on Disarmament, 

CD/1605, 27 January 2000 (copy on file with the author). 

76 Jenni Rissanen, Geneva Update, Disarmament Diplomacy, March 2000, 25. 

77 Chinese and Russian Joint Letter to the CD, CD/1605, of 27 January 2000, 

supra, note 71. 

78 U.S. Ambassador Robert Grey, Statement to the CD, February 17, 2000, 

CD/PV.842. 

79 Russian Ambassador Vasily Sidorov, Statement to the CD, March 23, 2000. 

80 Interviews with State Department officials 19 July 2000; Interview with 

Professor Ephraim Asculai, 29 June 2000; S. Schmemann, "Israel Clings to 

'Nuclear Ambiguity'," The New York Times, June 27, 1998, A6. See also S. 

Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge: 

MIT Press, 1996). 

81 J. Brilliant, "Israel Agrees to Discuss Nuclear Treaty," United Press 

International, August 11, 1998, found at web.lexis-nexis.com. 

82 Times of India, February 17, 1997. 

83 Times of India, June 1, 1997. 
60

 

84 India’s continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is complicated but 

probably is the result of a combination of four factors: India's quest for 

prestige and status in the international order, concerns over China’s nuclear 

weapons capability, the rise of the jingoistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and 

its more muscular view of Indian defense policy, and possibly the culmination 

of a bureaucratic-scientific-technological momentum. See Sumit Ganguly, 

“Slouching toward Pokhran II: Three Explanations of India's Quest for the 

Bomb,” Disarmament Diplomacy 38 (June 1999); V. R. Raghaven, “A 

debatable Nuclear Doctrine, Times of India, August 24, 1999. 

85 Times of India, June 2, 1997. 

86 Dunbar Lockwood in Arms Control Today 25:2 (March 1995): 30. 

87 Conference on Disarmament to meet informally next week on creating ad 

hoc committee on banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, 

Press Release DCF/343, 31 July 98. 

88 Ambassador Munir Akram's statement in the Conference on Disarmament 

on CTBT, FMCT issues, 30 July 1998.

89 Interviews with U.S. CD delegation, 23 August 2000. 

90 G-21 Statement in the Conference on Disarmament. 11 August 1998, at 

website http://www.acronym.org.uk/fmctdesc.htm. 

91 U.S. Ambassador Grey called China’s demands unrealistic by “employing 

these tactics may actually intend to produce utter paralysis, for the sake of 

blocking negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.” See Department of 

State Washington File, “Grey Says Calls for Outer Space Treaty Talks Are 

‘Unwise,’” at website 

http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/00091501.htm. 

92 Measures include information about and inspector access to all aspects of 

States' nuclear fuel cycle; information about, and inspection mechanisms for, 

fuel cycle-related research and development; information on, and short-notice 

inspector access to, all buildings on a nuclear site; information on the 

manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies and 

inspection mechanisms for manufacturing and import locations; collection of 

environmental samples beyond declared locations when deemed necessary by 

the IAEA; and improved administrative arrangements to provide access to 

sites by inspectors. See INFCIR/154 at the IAEA website: 

http://www.iaea.org. 
61

 

93 The IAEA has held a number of meetings on this very topic. See IAEA 

Verification of Weapon-Origin Fissile Materials, Third Joint Working Group 

Progress and Future Work Plan to Ministers and The Director General, 

September 1999. 

94 There are a number of different types of safeguards agreements and 

implementing arrangements. Examples and details on the various types of 

agreements are published in IAEA annual reports and are available on the 

IAEA web site: http://www.iaea.org. 

 

95 The basic safeguards agreement, denominated as INFCIR/153, is focused on 

declared facilities and nuclear materials. The Additional Protocol, 

denominated as INFCIR/540, now authorizes managed access to sensitive 

locations and access to the full range of possible activities related to the 

development of nuclear weapons. 

96 See Thomas E. Shea, "Reconciling IAEA Safeguards Requirements in a 

Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Use in Nuclear Weapons 

or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices," Disarmament Forum 2 (1999): 57-71. 

97 Interviews with State Department Officials, 9 July 2000; Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency Fact Sheet, Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty 

(FMCT) Negotiations, March 27, 1997. 

98 Frank N. Nov Hippel, “The FMCT and Cuts in Fissile Material Stockpiles,” 

Disarmament Forum 2 (1999): 38. 

99 A Cut-off Treaty and Associate Costs, IAEA Secretariat working paper 

presented at the Workshop on A Cut-Off Treaty, Toronto, Canada, 17-18 

January 1995, on file with the author. The use of remote monitoring and new 

technologies to reduce the need for on-site inspections and the fact that some 

facilities in the nuclear weapons states are already under IAEA safeguards due 

to “voluntary offers” and other arrangements probably reduced the estimated 

costs stated in this paper. 

100 IAEA, Annual Report for 2000, table at 

http://www.iaea.org/GC/gc43/documents/gc43-6.html. 

101 Stephen I. Schwartz 9ed.), Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of 

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 

Press, 1998), 560-61. 

102 Interview with Director General Mohamed Elbaradei, 24 August 2000. See 

also William Drozdiak, “U.N. Atomic Agency is Threatened by Financial 

Crisis,” The Washington Post, August 8, 2000, 1. 
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103 The IAEA has readily acknowledged that they are unable to "physically 

prevent diversion of nuclear materials or the setting up of an undeclared or 

clandestine nuclear weapons program." See IAEA Publication, The IAEA 

Safeguards System: Ready for the 21st Century, IAEA Division of Public 

Information, September 1997, 15. 

104 The expert on options for the scope of the FMCT was Annette Schaper. See 

her paper for the conference entitled "Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons 

and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices." This was based on A. Schaper, "A 

Treaty on the Cutoff of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons—What to 

Cover? How to Verify?" (Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute 

Frankfurt Report 48, 1997). See also Schaper, "The Case for Universal FullScope Safeguards on Nuclear Material," The Nonproliferation Review 5 

(Winter 1998), 91. 

105 See Hiroyoshi Kurihara, "Chairman's Summary, Seminar Conference on 

Technical Issues for a FMCT" Geneva, May 11-12, 3-4. 

106 Ibid. 

107 Id. At p. 5; Statement of John B. Campbell, Head of Australian Delegation, 

April 30, 1998, to the 1998 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, 3. 

108 Working Paper Elements of an Approach To Dealing With Stocks of Fissile 

Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, CD/1578 

18 March 1999. 

109 See the discussion Electronic Conference, "The Future of the Conference 

on Disarmament" 

January 12-23 at http://www.stimson.org/zeronuke/forum/cd1.htm#pl0112. 

110 Statement of Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan, to the CD, 11 August 

1998. Available on the web at http://acronym.org.uk/fmctdesc.htm. 

111 Ambassador Robert Grey, Speech to the CD, 17 February 2000, U.S. 

Information Service Washington File at web site: www.usinfo.state.gov. 

112 The classic definition of arms control is "all the forms of military 

cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the 

likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and 

economic costs of being prepared for it." Thomas Schelling and Morton 

Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), 

2. The authors argue that "Adjustments in military postures and doctrines that 

induce reciprocal adjustments by a potential opponent can be of mutual benefit 
63

 

if they reduce the danger of a war that neither side wants, or contain its 

violence, or otherwise serve the security of the nation." Id. at 143. 

113 Quoted in David Fromkin, "The Latest Arms-Control Failure. . ." Wall 

Street Journal, October 12, 1999, 26. 

114 See R.J. Rummel, Death by Government (New York: University Press 

1994). 
64