PHL_A #2017297 v1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PETER HOCK, :

:

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

: NO. 04-CV-4517

v. :

:

COUNTY OF BUCKS AND BUCKS COUNTY :

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, :

:

Defendants. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this _____ day of ____________, 2005, upon consideration of the 

Motion of Defendants County of Bucks and Bucks County Department of Corrections for 

Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and Plaintiff’s response thereto, it is 

hereby

ORDERED and DECREED that the Motion is GRANTED, and judgment is 

granted in favor of Defendants County of Bucks and Bucks County Department of 

Corrections and against Plaintiff Peter Hock.

BY THE COURT:

 J.

Case 2:04-cv-04517-MMB Document 10 Filed 08/01/05 Page 1 of 18
PHL_A #2017297 v1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PETER HOCK, :

:

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

: NO. 04-CV-4517

v. :

:

COUNTY OF BUCKS AND BUCKS COUNTY :

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, :

:

Defendants. :

MOTION OF DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF BUCKS AND

BUCKS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 56

Defendants County of Bucks and Bucks County Department of Corrections (collectively, 

the “Defendants”), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby move for summary 

judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support thereof, Defendants aver 

the following:

1. On September 23, 2004, Plaintiff Peter Hock (“Hock” or “Plaintiff”) filed a 

Complaint alleging that Defendants terminated his employment in violation of his First 

Amendment rights. 

2. The pleadings, depositions and discovery of record show that Hock cannot 

produce evidence of facts essential to his cause of action.

3. Hock’s First Amendment retaliation claim fails because Hock cannot establish 

that he engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment. 

4. Hock’s claim for municipal liability fails because he has not established an 

unlawful “policy, practice, or custom,” of retaliating against Corrections Officers for their 

exercise of First Amendment rights.

Case 2:04-cv-04517-MMB Document 10 Filed 08/01/05 Page 2 of 18
PHL_A #2017297 v1 2

5. In support of this Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants incorporate herein 

by reference the attached Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

WHEREFORE, Defendants County of Bucks and Bucks County Department of 

Corrections request that this Court grant judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff Peter Hock 

and dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. 

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: August 1, 2005 s/

Frank A. Chernak (I.D. No. 57602)

BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS &

INGERSOLL, LLP

1735 Market Street, 51st Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599

(215) 665-8500

Attorneys for Defendants

County of Bucks and Bucks County

Department of Corrections

Case 2:04-cv-04517-MMB Document 10 Filed 08/01/05 Page 3 of 18
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PETER HOCK, :

:

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

: NO. 04-CV-4517

v. :

:

COUNTY OF BUCKS AND BUCKS COUNTY :

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, :

:

Defendants. :

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF BUCKS AND

BUCKS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants County of Bucks and Bucks County Department of Corrections 

(collectively, the “Defendants”), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby 

submit this Brief in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a First Amendment retaliation case that arises out of the Plaintiff’s 

discharge from employment as a probationary corrections officer with the Bucks County 

Correctional Facility. Plaintiff’s claim fails because (1) the Plaintiff’s speech – two 

internal reports to shift command describing incidents with inmates – falls outside the 

protection of the First Amendment or (2) the Plaintiff cannot establish an unlawful 

policy, practice, or custom of retaliating against employees for exercising their First 

Amendment rights.

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2

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS1

A. The Parties

Defendant County of Bucks is a municipal entity that maintains offices in 

Doylestown, PA. (Compl. at ¶ 2). Defendant Bucks County Department of Corrections 

is a County funded and operated criminal justice agency, part of the executive branch of 

county government. (See description of Department of Corrections at Bucks County 

Government website, attached hereto as Exhibit “A”). The Department of Corrections 

services all municipal and state law enforcement authorities via the Bucks County Court 

of Common Pleas and 18 local District Courts. (Ex. A). The Department of Corrections 

is the single largest criminal justice agency within Bucks County, employing 328 people 

in various types of jobs. (Ex. A). The Bucks County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”) is a 

facility that houses medium to maximum security classified pre-trial detainees and 

convicted prisoners. (Ex. A).

Plaintiff Peter Hock (“Hock”) worked as a probationary Corrections Officer in the 

BCCF for a little less than six months, from April 8, 2002 through September 30, 2002. 

(See excerpted pages of the deposition of Peter Hock (“Hock dep.”), dated July 27, 2005, 

attached hereto as Exhibit “B,” at 101-102, 115). Hock understood that he (1) was a 

probationary employee for his first six months of employment; (2) would receive 

evaluations after 90, 120, and 150 days to determine whether his performance was 

acceptable to continue employment; and (3) was not part of the union until he completed 

his probationary period. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 101-102). As a Corrections Officer, 

 

1

For purposes of this motion only, Defendants accept the “evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmovant, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the 

evidence.” Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1995)(citations omitted).

Case 2:04-cv-04517-MMB Document 10 Filed 08/01/05 Page 5 of 18
3

Hock was responsible for maintaining security and discipline in the BCCF. An important 

task of a Corrections Officer is writing and understanding reports. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. 

at 19, 24, 111-12; see also Job Description of Corrections Officer for the County of 

Bucks, attached hereto as Exhibit “C”).

B. Writing Incident Reports Is A Critical Function of the Corrections 

Officers within the BCCF.

Writing incident reports is an important duty of a Corrections Officer at the 

BCCF. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 19, 24). Hock received a few days of training in the 

writing of reports. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 19-20). In the event that a Corrections 

Officer witnessed an incident, the BCCF required a Corrections Officer to complete an 

incident report. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 23). In fact, a Corrections Officer usually had 

to complete a written report before the Corrections Officer could leave work after 

completion of his or her shift. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 23-24). Corrections Officers 

could be disciplined if they did not write an incident report in a timely manner. (See Ex. 

B, Hock dep. at 24). Hock sought to include all important facts in the incident reports 

that he completed. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 20).

C. Hock Writes Two Incident Reports In The Course Of His Duties As A 

Corrections Officer That He Now Claims Are Protected By The First 

Amendment. 

Hock wrote only two incident reports that form the basis for his complaint. (See

Ex. B, Hock dep. at 10-11; see also Compl. at ¶ 29). The first report occurred on August 

8, 2002, when Hock completed an incident report describing his observations of a “Code 

99” F block incident involving an inmate that occurred on August 6, 2002. (See Ex. B, 

Hock dep. at 11-26; see also Incident Report From Corrections Officer Hock to Shift 

Command, dated August 8, 2002, attached hereto as Exhibit “D”). Hock wrote that “[i]t 

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4

seemed that the inmates where [sic] tring [sic] to get storys [sic] straight. I saw a lot of 

them whispering about it and telling each other what I/M Herder thought happened.” 

(See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 11-26; see also Ex. D).2 Hock turned the report into shift 

command and did not provide a copy to anyone else. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 13). Hock 

did not verbally report anything that was not in his written report. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. 

at 10-12). Hock had a responsibility as a Corrections Officer to complete this report. 

(See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 23). No one told Hock to change or rewrite his report. (See Ex. 

B, Hock dep. at 13-14). 

The second report occurred on September 10, 2002, when Hock submitted an 

internal incident report to shift command describing his observation of a Code 99 

incident in the reception area. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 45-49, 69-70; see also Incident 

Report From Officer Hock to Shift Command, dated September 10, 2002, attached hereto 

as Exhibit “E”). Hock did not submit the incident report to anyone else. (See Ex. B, 

Hock dep. at 69-70). Hock wrote that an inmate came and informed Officer Baehser that 

another inmate should not be on the same block. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 46; see also

Ex. E at Bucks/Hock 0005). He also wrote that the inmate had to be forcibly taken off 

the block. 3 (See Ex. E at Bucks/Hock 0006). 

 

2 Hock alleges in his Complaint that “he reported first-hand observations that inmates fabricated a 

version of events involving an incident of excessive force where the Defendants elected to pursue 

charges against the officers involved . . . .” (Compl. at ¶ 29). Hock also alleged in the Complaint 

that he reported that he witnessed the inmates contriving or rehearsing a version of the incident to 

support the inmate involved. (Compl. at ¶ 13). These averments are not supported by Hock’s 

incident report. (See Ex. D). Under either version of the report, Hock fails to establish that his 

speech was on a matter of public concern.

3 Hock alleges in the Complaint that “he reported a still unexplained security breach by the 

Defendants which Defendants twisted into an allegation of excessive force by the plaintiff in order 

to justify his termination.” (Compl. at ¶ 29). Hock also alleged in the Complaint that he reported 

“his observations of the incident and his immediate recognition of the error in the system – that the 

inmate (a violent offender who was allowed by that error to attack the inmate/cousin of a man he 

(continued...)

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Two other officers (Officer Vegvary and Officer Baehser) also completed reports 

of this incident, which were similar to Hock’s report. Officer Baehser wrote that an 

inmate approached him and told him that he could not be on the same block as another 

inmate. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 49-51; see also Incident Report From Officer Baehser 

to Shift Command, dated September 10, 2002, attached hereto as Exhibit “F”). 

Corrections Officer Vegvary wrote that he and Hock had to restrain an inmate and place 

him on the ground. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 51-53; see also Incident Report From 

Corrections Officer Vegvary to S/C, dated September 10, 2002, attached hereto as 

Exhibit “G”). Neither Baehser nor Vegvary were disciplined for the incident or 

submitting reports of the incident. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 51-52).

D. Hock’s Discharge From Employment

On September 30, 2002, Captain Brown gave Hock a 150 day evaluation showing 

that he had received a 59 percent average. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 83; see also

Captain’s Review Form Probationary Employee Evaluation attached hereto as Exhibit 

“H”). Hock needed 60 percent or above to pass his probationary period. (See Ex. B, 

Hock dep. at 60; see also Ex. H). Brown also wrote that “[s]upervisors have reported that 

Officer Hock lacks IPC skills and has been overly aggressive with inmates. I counseled 

him about this on 9/9/02. On 9/10/02 Officer Hock was again involved in excessive use 

of force on an inmate. Therefore, I am recommending termination at this time.” (See Ex. 

H; Compl. at ¶ 23).

________________________

(...continued)

murdered) should not have been mixed with the general prison population.” (Compl. at ¶ 22). 

The averments in the Complaint are not supported by Hock’s incident report. (See Ex. E). 

Neither of these versions of the report are on a matter of public concern.

Case 2:04-cv-04517-MMB Document 10 Filed 08/01/05 Page 8 of 18
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On September 30, 2002, the County of Bucks terminated Hock’s probationary 

employment. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 114-16; see also County of Bucks Record of 

Disciplinary Action attached hereto as Exhibit “I”). Hock responded that “[s]upervisors 

need to step up to the plate.” (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 116; see also Ex. I). Hock meant 

that some of the supervisors that he viewed as being sloppy or not following procedure 

had to improve their performance. (See Ex. B, Hock dep. at 116). Hock did not write 

anything about the two incident reports of August 8, 2002 or September 10, 2002 or his 

First Amendment rights in response to his termination.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Summary Judgment Standard Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 

Inc., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986). In making this determination, a court must draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 

720 F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983). Summary judgment should be granted if no 

reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party. See id.; Radich v. Goode, 

886 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3d Cir. 1989).

B. Hock Has Failed To State A Claim For Retaliation Under The First 

Amendment.

Hock alleges that the County terminated his employment in retaliation for 

exercising his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

(Compl. at ¶ 6). His alleged protected speech consists of two internal reports to shift 

Case 2:04-cv-04517-MMB Document 10 Filed 08/01/05 Page 9 of 18
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command of his observations of inmates in the BCCF, both of which he was required to 

make per department guidelines. (Compl. at ¶¶ 8-22). 

A First Amendment retaliation claim is governed by a three-step analysis: 

• First, the plaintiff must prove he engaged in activity protected by 

the First Amendment. 

• Second, the plaintiff must show that the speech “was a substantial 

or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action.” 

• Third, if the plaintiff meets these burdens, defendants “have an 

opportunity to defeat [the] claim by demonstrating that they would 

have taken the same action absent the protected conduct.” 

See Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Here, Hock’s claim fails because the alleged speech is not protected by the First 

Amendment.

1. Hock’s Reports To Shift Command Of His Observations Of 

Inmates Fall Outside The Protection Of The First Amendment.

To qualify as speech protected by the First Amendment, the alleged speech must 

satisfy the United States Supreme Court’s test set forth in Pickering v. Board of 

Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See Curinga, 357 F.3d at 310. The test first requires 

that the speech be on a “matter of public concern.” Id. Second, the public interest 

favoring the plaintiff’s expression must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could 

cause to the employer’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 

performs through its employees. Id.

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(1) Hock’s Internal Reports To Shift Command Do Not 

Constitute Speech On A Matter Of Public Concern.

The First Amendment does not protect speech that is purely personal and does not 

raise any issues of public concern. See Curinga, 357 F.3d at 313. “A public employee’s 

speech involves a matter of public concern if it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to 

any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’” Id. (citations 

omitted). In analyzing whether the speech is on a matter of public concern, the court 

must examine the content, form, and context of the speech. See Brennan v. Norton, 350 

F.3d 399, 413 (3d Cir. 2003). The primary concern is whether the plaintiff’s speech

enhances the process of self-governance. See Azzaro v. City of Phila., 110 F.3d 968, 977 

(3d Cir. 1997).

In Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court of the United States found that an 

employee’s speech expressing disagreement or criticism of an internal employment issue 

was not speech “on a matter of public concern.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 

(1983). In Connick, an assistant district attorney circulated a questionnaire to co-workers 

regarding office transfer policies, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, their 

level of confidence in their supervisors, and whether they felt pressured to work on 

political campaigns. Id. at 141. The Court held that only the question regarding political 

campaigns dealt with a matter of public concern, and that the other questions merely 

reflected the employee’s opposition to being transferred. See id. The Court held that the 

questionnaire, “if released to the public, would convey no information other than the fact 

that a single employee is upset with the status quo.” Id. The Court found significant that 

the plaintiff had not sought “to inform the public that the District Attorney’s Office was 

not discharging its governmental responsibilities” or “to bring to light actual or potential 

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wrongdoing or breach of the public trust.” Id. Rather, the plaintiff’s “speech” concerned 

only her “dissatisfaction with a transfer.” Id.

Similarly, in Connor v. Clinton County Prison, the district court found that a 

prison employee’s speech was not on a matter of public concern, even though the speech 

involved an alleged impropriety in connection with the work release of an inmate. See

Connor v. Clinton County Prison, 963 F. Supp. 442, 446-50 (M.D. Pa. 1997). In Connor, 

the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was based on her private log of workplace events, 

including an incident in which she was asked to prepare a work release without proper 

documentation. Id. The court wrote:

The concern expressed in Connor’s log is that, in one 

instance, the Deputy Warden wanted her to prepare a work 

release for an inmate when she did not have proper 

documentation that the inmate was to be so released. This 

is not a discussion of a practice or policy of the Clinton 

County Prison; it is a complaint that Connor feels that she 

is being blamed for doing something wrong when she only 

followed the proper procedure. There is no indication that 

Connor intended to make the issue one for public debate, or 

was even expressing any opinion as to whether formal 

documentation of work release requests is proper or 

necessary. To paraphrase Connick: The issue of whether 

Connor should be disciplined for not preparing a work 

release . . . is not a matter of interest to the community 

upon which it is essential that public employees be able to 

speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal.

See id. at 449.

Federal courts have consistently granted summary judgment where the speech 

involves a personal dispute or disagreement over an internal employment issue. See Muti 

v. Schmidt, No. 03-1206, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 7933 at *15 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2004) 

(Non-Precedential) (ruling that a letter from plaintiff to several county officials 

expressing plaintiff’s objection to the purchase of real property and his opinion that an 

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expansion of “investigative and legal staffing was a waste of public resources” was not 

protected speech); see also Myers v. Wilkes-Barre Twp., 204 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (M.D. 

Pa. 2002) (granting summary judgment for defendant ruling that an internal 

memorandum expressing dissatisfaction with the conduct of a superior was not protected 

speech); Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 881 F. Supp. 188, 194 (E.D. Pa. 

1995) (granting summary judgment because the comments regarding the police chief’s 

disciplinary procedures were not intended to “unearth official misconduct,” and 

comments over “[i]nternal office procedures that do not evidence any official 

wrongdoing have consistently been held not to be on a matter of public concern”). 

Here, Hock’s internal reports to his shift command were not on any matter of 

public concern. Rather, Hock simply followed department guidelines in submitting a 

report to his shift command on two incidents that involved inmates at the BCCF. Hock’s 

incident reports do not express dissatisfaction with the Department of Corrections or its 

policies, nor do they raise issues of public trust. See Myers v. Wilkes-Barre Twp., 204 F. 

Supp. 2d at 826. Hock merely reports his observation of incidents involving inmates 

during his normal course of duties. Hock’s First Amendment theory would turn every 

internal incident report in the BCCF into a federal constitutional case. Hock’s speech 

was not a matter of public concern.

(2) The Balancing Of Interests Favors The Defendants.

If the court determines that the speech was on a matter of public concern, it must 

engage in the Pickering balancing test. That is, for speech to be protected, the 

employee’s interest in the speech must exceed the public agency’s interest, as an 

employer, in running an efficient and effective workplace. See Curinga, 357 F.3d at 309. 

In doing this balancing, the court should consider (1) whether the statement impairs 

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discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, (2) has a detrimental impact on 

close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or 

(3) impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular 

operation of the enterprise. See id. (citations omitted). The employer need only show a 

significant potential disruption caused by the alleged speech, rather than actual 

disruption. See Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 896 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Waters 

v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994)); see also Green v. Philadelphia Hous. 

Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that if the plaintiff’s speech could 

potentially disrupt the work of the department, and this potential for injury outweighs the 

public’s interest in the plaintiff’s speech, then judgment for the defendant is proper).

Here, Defendants’ interest in maintaining an efficient workplace outweighs 

Hock’s interest, if any, in his internal reports to his shift command. If granted protection, 

Hock’s theory could turn every internal report in the prison into a First Amendment case. 

This would impact the BCCF’s ability to manage its workforce and provide for safety and 

security in the prison. It would allow any disgruntled former employee to turn his 

discharge into federal court litigation, or force the County to incur costs in discovery, 

simply by claiming that his job-related report to his superiors constituted speech on a 

matter of public concern. As a result, Hock’s claim fails under the First Amendment 

balancing test.

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C. Hock Has Not Established An Unlawful “Policy, Practice, Or

Custom” Sufficient To Prove Municipal Liability Under Section 1983.

Hock has likewise failed to raise any evidence of a “policy, practice or custom” 

sufficient to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 

Under Section 1983, a municipality may be held liable only if the municipality, 

through a policy, practice, or custom, causes a deprivation of a constitutional right. See

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978); see also

Chernavsky v. Township of Holmdel Police Dept., No. 04-3621, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 

11173, at *5-7 (3d Cir. June 14, 2005) (Non-Precedential) (affirming grant of summary 

judgment in favor of defendants because plaintiff failed to prove a policy or custom of 

retaliation against officers for exercising their First Amendment rights); Cavicchia v. 

Philadelphia Housing Auth., No. 03-0116, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20311, at *37-45 

(granting summary judgment on claim of municipal liability against PHA because 

plaintiff failed to show a constitutional violation, a pattern of viola tions, a need for 

different training, or deliberate indifference on behalf of PHA’s policymakers); aff’d, 

No. 04-2344, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12722 (3d Cir. June 27, 2005). A municipal 

custom may be established only by evidence that a practice, although not authorized by 

law, is so permanent and well-settled as to virtually constitute law. See Beck v. City of 

Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). To prove a “custom,” the plaintiff must 

establish “that policymakers were aware of similar unlawful conduct in the past, but 

 

4 Hock failed to raise Monell allegations in the Complaint. Thus, all claims against the municipal 

defendants should be dismissed. Even if Hock raised Monell claims in the Complaint, Hock fails 

to establish a policy, practice, or custom of retaliating against Corrections Officers for exercising 

their First Amendment rights. 

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failed to take precautions against future violations, and that this failure . . . led to 

plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at 972.

Further, the plaintiff must show that the alleged “policy, practice, or custom” was 

the “moving force” behind any violation of her constitutional rights. See Grazier v. City 

of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that plaintiffs must prove “that 

the City’s inadequate training policies were the ‘moving force’ behind their injuries,” and 

that plaintiffs had failed to meet this “causation requirement”) (citations omitted). 

Here, Hock’s claim for municipal liability fails because he has not established 

“deliberate indifference” in support of a “policy, practice, or custom,” causation, or any 

underlying constitutional violation. Hock has not identified the County of Bucks’ 

policymakers, shown a pattern of violations, shown that the County’s “policymakers” 

acted with deliberate indifference, or shown that the alleged “policy, practice, or custom” 

was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of Hock’s constitutional rights. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants County of Bucks and Bucks County 

Department of Corrections respectfully request that this Court grant this motion, grant 

judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, and enter any further relief deemed 

just and appropriate by the Court.

Date: August 1, 2005 s/

Frank A. Chernak (I.D. No. 57602)

BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS &

INGERSOLL, LLP

1735 Market Street, 51st Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599

(215) 665-8500

Attorneys for Defendants

County of Bucks and Bucks County 

Department of Corrections

Case 2:04-cv-04517-MMB Document 10 Filed 08/01/05 Page 17 of 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Frank A. Chernak, hereby certify that on the 1st day of August, 2005, a true and 

correct copy of the foregoing Motion of Defendants County of Bucks and Bucks County 

Department of Corrections for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. Civ. R. P. 56, and 

Brief in support thereof has been filed electronically and is available for viewing and 

downloading from the ECF system. I further certify that I caused a true and correct copy 

of same to be served upon the following counsel via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, 

addressed as follows:

David P. Bateman

Bateman & Caliendo, LLC

420A Dresher Road

Mezzanine Level

Horsham, PA 19044

Date: August 1, 2005 s/

Frank A. Chernak

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