United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private

Property, and Nuclear Safety, Commmittee on

Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate

For Release

on Delivery

Expected at

9 a.m. EST

Thursday

February 4, 1999

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Strategy Needed to Develop

a Risk-Informed Safety

Approach

Statement of Ms. Gary L. Jones, Associate Director,

Energy, Resources, and Science Issues,

Resources, Community, and Economic

Development Division

GAO/T-RCED-99-71

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are here to testify about the actions that the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) has taken to move from its traditional regulatory

approach to an approach that considers risk in conjunction with

engineering analyses and operating experience—termed risk-informed

regulation. NRC believes that a risk-informed approach would reduce

unnecessary regulatory burden and costs, without reducing safety.

Our testimony today is based on ongoing work we are conducting for

Senators Lieberman and Biden. Specifically, our testimony discusses the

(1) issues that NRC needs to resolve to implement a risk-informed

regulatory approach and (2) status of NRC’s efforts to make two of its

oversight programs—overall plant safety assessments and

enforcement—risk-informed. In addition, in January 1999, we provided the

Congress with our views on the major management challenges that NRC

faces.1 Our testimony discusses these challenges and their relationship to

NRC’s efforts to consider risk in its regulatory activities.

In summary, we are finding that:

• Since July 1998, NRC has accelerated some activities needed to implement

a risk-informed regulatory approach and has established and set

milestones for others. However, NRC has not resolved the most basic of

issues; that is, that some utilities do not have current and accurate design

information for their nuclear power plants, which is needed for a

risk-informed approach. Also, neither NRC nor the nuclear utility industry

have standards or guidance that define the quality or adequacy of the risk

assessments that utilities use to identify and measure the risks to public

health and the environment.2

 Furthermore, NRC has not determined if

compliance with risk-informed regulations will be voluntary or mandatory

for the nuclear utility industry. More fundamentally, NRC has not developed

a comprehensive strategy that would move its regulation of the safety of

nuclear power plants from its traditional approach to an approach that

considers risk.

• In January 1999, NRC released for comment a proposed process to assess

the overall safety of nuclear power plants. The process would establish

1

Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (GAO/OCG-99-19, Jan. 1999).

2

Risk assessments systematically examine complex technical systems to attempt to quantify the

probabilities that a potential accident will occur and the resulting consequences. By their nature, risk

assessments are statements of uncertainty that identify and assign probabilities to events that rarely

occur.

Page 1 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
generic and plant-specific safety thresholds and indicators to help NRC

assess overall plant safety. NRC expects to phase in the new process over

the next 2 years and evaluate it by June 2001, at which time NRC would

propose any adjustments or modifications needed. In addition, NRC has

been examining the changes needed to its enforcement program to make it

consistent with, among other things, the proposed plant safety assessment

process. For many years, the nuclear industry and public interest groups

have criticized the enforcement program as subjective. In the spring of

1999, NRC staff expect to provide the Commission recommendations for

revising the enforcement program.

• In January 1999, we identified major management challenges that limit

NRC’s effectiveness. The challenges include the lack of a definition of

safety and lack of aggressiveness in requiring utilities to comply with

safety regulations. NRC’s revised plant safety assessment and enforcement

initiatives may ultimately help the agency address these management

challenges and carry out its safety mission more effectively and efficiently.

Background NRC is responsible for ensuring that the nation’s 103 operating commercial

nuclear power plants pose no undue risk to public health and safety. Now,

however, the electric utility industry is faced with an unprecedented,

overarching development: the economic restructuring of the nation’s

electric power system, from a regulated industry to one driven by

competition. According to one study, as many as 26 of the nation’s nuclear

power plant sites are vulnerable to shutdown because production costs

are higher than the projected market prices of electricity.3

 As the electric

utility industry is deregulated, operating and maintenance costs will affect

the competitiveness of nuclear power plants. NRC acknowledges that

competition will challenge it to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden

while ensuring that safety margins are not compromised by utilities’

cost-cutting measures.

Since the early 1980s, NRC has been considering the role of risk in the

regulatory process, and in August 1995, NRC issued a policy statement that

advocated certain changes in the development and implementation of its

regulations through an approach more focused on risk assessment. Under

such an approach, NRC and the utilities would give more emphasis to those

structures, systems, and components deemed more significant to safety.

The following example illustrates the difference between NRC’s existing

and a risk-informed approach. One particular nuclear plant has about 635

valves and 33 pumps that the utility must operate, maintain, and

3

World Energy Service: U.S. Outlook (Standard & Poor’s, Apr. 1998).

Page 2 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
periodically replace according to NRC’s existing regulations. Under a

risk-informed approach, the utility found that about 515 valves and 12

pumps presented a low safety risk. The utility identified 25 components

that were a high risk but would have been treated the same as other

components under the existing regulations. If the utility concentrated on

the 120 valves, 21 pumps, and 25 components that have been identified as

having a high safety risk, it could reduce its regulatory compliance burden

and costs.

NRC Has Not

Resolved Many Issues

Needed to Implement

a Risk-Informed

Regulatory Approach

NRC staff estimate that it could take 4 to 8 years to implement a

risk-informed regulatory approach and are working to resolve many issues

to ensure that the new approach does not endanger public health and

safety. Although NRC has issued guidance for utilities to use risk

assessments to meet regulatory requirements for specific activities and

has undertaken many activities to implement a risk-informed approach,

more is needed to

• ensure that utilities have current and accurate documentation on the

design of the plant and structures, systems, and components within it and

final safety analysis reports that reflect changes to the design and other

analyses conducted after NRC issued the operating license.

• ensure that utilities make changes to their plants based on complete and

accurate design and final safety analysis information.

• determine whether, how, and what aspects of NRC’s regulations to change.

• develop standards on the scope and detail of the risk assessments needed

for utilities to determine that changes to their plants’ design will not

negatively effect safety.

• determine whether compliance with risk-informed regulations should be

mandatory or voluntary.

Furthermore, NRC has not developed a comprehensive strategy that would

move its regulation of nuclear plant safety from its traditional approach to

an approach that considers risk.

Utilities Do Not Have

Accurate and Reliable

Design Information for

Some Plants

Design information provides one of the basis for NRC’s safety regulation.

Yet, for more than 10 years, NRC has questioned whether utilities had

accurate design information for their plants. Inspections of 26 plants that

NRC completed early in fiscal year 1999 confirmed that for some plants

(1) utilities had not maintained accurate design documentation, (2) NRC did

not have assurance that safety systems would perform as intended at all

Page 3 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
times, and (3) NRC needed to clarify what constitutes design information

subject to NRC’s regulations. As of November 1998, NRC had taken escalated

enforcement actions for violations found at five plants—Three Mile Island,

Perry, H.B. Robinson, Vermont Yankee, and D.C. Cook. NRC took these

actions because it did not have assurance that the plants’ safety systems

would perform as intended. One utility, American Electric Power, shut

down its D.C. Cook plant as a result of the inspection findings.

NRC does not plan additional design team inspections because it concluded

that the industry did not have serious safety problems. NRC’s Chairman

disagreed with this broad conclusion, noting that (1) the inspection results

for the five plants indicate the importance of maintaining current and

accurate design and facility configuration information, (2) the inspections

did not apply to the industry as a whole but to only certain utilities and

plants within the industry, and (3) other NRC inspections identified design

problems at other such nuclear power plants as Crystal River 3, Millstone,

Haddam Neck, and Maine Yankee. The Commissioners and staff agreed

that NRC would oversee design information issues using such tools as

safety system engineering inspections.

The 26 inspections also identified a need for NRC to better define the

elements of a plant’s design that are subject to NRC’s regulations. NRC staff

acknowledge that the existing regulation is a very broad, general

statement that has been interpreted differently among NRC staff and among

utility and industry officials. According to NRC staff, it is very difficult to

develop guidance describing what constitutes adequate design

information. Therefore, NRC has agreed that the Nuclear Energy Institute

(NEI) would provide explicit examples of what falls within design

parameters.4 NEI plans to draft guidance that will include examples of

design information and provide it to NRC in January 1999. Concurrently,

NRC is developing regulatory guidance on design information. NRC staff

expect to recommend to the Commission in February 1999 that it endorse

either NRC’s or NEI’s guidance and seek approval to obtain public

comments in March or April 1999. NRC staff could not estimate when the

agency would complete this effort.

4

NEI has members from all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear plants in the United States

as well as nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities,

materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.

NEI establishes unified nuclear industry policy on such matters as generic operational and technical

issues.

Page 4 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
NRC Does Not Have

Confidence That Safety

Analysis Reports Reflect

Current Plant Designs

At the time NRC licenses a plant, the utility prepares a safety analysis

report; NRC regulations require the utility to update the report to reflect

changes to the plant design and the results of analyses that support

modifying the plants without prior NRC approval. As such, the report

provides one of the foundations to support a risk-informed approach. Yet,

NRC does not have confidence that utilities make the required updates,

which results in poor documentation of the safety basis for the plants.

NRC published guidance for the organization and contents of safety

analysis reports in June 1966 and updated the guidance in December 1980.

NRC acknowledges that the guidance is limited, resulting in poorly

articulated staff comments on the quality of the safety analysis reports and

a lack of understanding among utilities about the specific aspects of the

safety analysis reports that should be updated. On June 30, 1998, NRC

directed its staff to continue working with NEI to finalize the industry’s

guidelines on safety analysis report updates, which NRC could then

endorse. Once the agency endorses the guidelines, it will obtain public

comments and revise them, if appropriate. NRC expects to issue final

guidelines in September 1999.

Erroneous Evaluations

Can Erode Design and

Safety Margins

According to NRC documents, if a utility does not have complete and

accurate design information, the evaluations conducted to determine

whether it can modify a plant without prior NRC approval can lead to

erroneous conclusions and jeopardize safety. For more than 30 years,

NRC’s regulations have provided a set of criteria that utilities must use to

determine whether they may change their facilities (as described in the

final safety analysis report) or procedures or conduct tests and

experiments without NRC’s prior review and approval.

However, in 1993, NRC became aware that Northeast Nuclear Energy

Company had refueled Millstone Unit 1 in a manner contrary to that

allowed in the updated final safety analysis and its operating license. This

led NRC to question the regulatory framework that allows licensees to

change their facilities without prior NRC approval. As a result, NRC staff

initiated a review to identify the short- and long-term actions needed to

improve the process. For example, in October 1998, NRC published a

proposed regulation regarding plant changes in the Federal Register for

comment; the comment period ended on December 21, 1998. NRC

requested comments on criteria for identifying changes that require a

license amendment and on a range of options, several of which would

allow utilities to make changes without prior NRC approval despite a

Page 5 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
potential increase in the probability or consequences of an accident. NRC

expects to issue a final regulation in June 1999.

In addition, in February 1999, NRC staff expect to provide their views to the

Commission on changing the scope of the regulation to consider risk. NRC’s

memorandum that tracks the various tasks related to a risk-informed

approach and other initiatives did not show when NRC would resolve this

issue.

Making Its Regulations

Risk-Informed Will Be a

Challenge to NRC and the

Industry

Until recently, NRC did not consider whether and to what extent the agency

should revise all its regulations pertaining to commercial nuclear plants to

make them risk-informed. Revising the regulations will be a formidable

task because, according to NRC staff, inconsistencies exist among the

regulations and because a risk-informed approach focuses on the potential

risk of structures, systems, or components, regardless of whether they are

located in the plant’s primary (radiological) or secondary

(electricity-producing) systems. With one exception, NRC has not

attempted to extend its regulatory authority to the secondary systems.

NRC staff and NEI officials agree that the first priority in revising the

regulations will be to define their scope as well as the meaning of such

concepts as “important to safety” and “risk significant” and integrating the

traditional and risk-informed approaches into a cohesive regulatory

context. In October 1998, NEI proposed a phased approach to revise the

regulations. Under the proposal, by the end of 1999, NRC would define

“important to safety” and “risk significant.” By the end of 2000, NRC would

use the definitions in proposed rulemakings for such regulations as

definition of design information and environmental qualification for

electrical equipment. By the end of 2003, NEI proposes that NRC address

other regulatory issues, such as the change process, the content of

technical specifications, and license amendments. After 2003, NEI proposes

that NRC would address other regulations on a case-by-case basis.

NRC staff agreed that the agency must take a phased approach when

revising its regulations. The Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research, said that, if NRC attempted to revise all provisions of the

regulations simultaneously, it is conceivable that the agency would

accomplish very little. The Director said that NRC needs to address one

issue at a time while concurrently working on longer-term actions. He

cautioned, however, that once NRC starts, it should be committed to

completing the process. At a January 1999 meeting, NRC’s Chairman

Page 6 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
suggested a more aggressive approach that would entail risk informing all

regulations across the board. NRC’s memorandum that tracks the various

tasks related to a risk-informed approach and other initiatives did not

show when the agency would resolve this issue.

NRC Does Not Have a

Standard for the Content

of Risk Assessments

NRC and the industry view risk assessments as one of the main tools to be

used to identify and focus on those structures, systems, or components of

nuclear plant operations having the greatest risk. Yet, neither NRC nor the

industry has a standard or guidance that defines the quality, scope, or

adequacy of risk assessments. NRC staff are working with the American

Society of Mechanical Engineers to develop such a standard.

However, this issue is far from being resolved. The Society is developing

the standard for risk assessments in two phases (internal events and

emergency preparedness). NRC staff estimate that the agency would have a

final standard on the first phase by June 2000 but could not estimate when

the second phase would be complete. To ensure consistency with other

initiatives, in December 1998, NRC staff requested the Commission’s

direction on the quality of risk assessments needed to implement a

risk-informed approach. Since it may be several years until NRC has a

standard, the Commission should also consider the effect that the lack of a

standard could have on its efforts to implement a risk-informed regulatory

approach.

NRC Has Not Determined

Whether Compliance With

Risk-Informed Regulations

Would Be Mandatory or

Voluntary

NRC has not determined whether compliance with revised risk-informed

regulations would be mandatory or voluntary for utilities. In December

1998, NRC’s staff provided its recommendations to the Commission. The

staff recommended that implementation be voluntary, noting that it would

be very difficult to show that requiring mandatory compliance will

increase public health and safety and could create the impression that

current plants are less safe. In its analysis, the staff did not provide the

Commission with information on the number of plants that would be

interested in such an approach. In January 1999, the Commissioners

expressed concern about a voluntary approach, believing that it would

create two classes of plants operating under two different sets of

regulations.

Utilities may be reluctant to shift to a risk-informed regulatory approach

for various reasons. First, the number of years remaining on a plant’s

operating license is likely to influence the utility’s views. NRC

Page 7 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
acknowledged that if a plant’s license is due to expire in 10 years or less,

then the utility may not have anything to gain by changing from the

traditional approach. Second, the costs to comply may outweigh the

benefits of doing so. Considering the investment that will be needed to

develop risk-informed procedures and operations and identify

safety-significant structures, systems, or components, utilities question

whether a switch will be worth the reduction in regulatory burden and

cost savings that may result. Third, design differences and age disparities

among plants make it difficult for NRC and the industry to determine how,

or to what extent, a standardized risk-informed approach can be

implemented across the industry. Although utilities built one of two types

of plants—boiling water or pressurized water—each has design and

operational differences. Thus, each plant is unique, and a risk-informed

approach would require plant-specific tailoring.

NRC Has Not Developed a

Strategic Plan to

Implement a

Risk-Informed Approach

Since the early 1980s, NRC has considered applying risk to the regulatory

process. NRC staff estimate that it will be at least 4 to 8 years before the

agency implements a risk-informed approach. However, NRC has not

developed a strategic plan that includes objectives, time lines, and

performance measures for such an approach.

Rather, NRC has developed an implementation plan, in conjunction with its

policy statement on considering risk, that is a catalog of about 150

separate tasks and milestones for their completion. It has also developed

guidance for some activities, such as pilot projects in the four areas where

the industry wanted to test the application of a risk-informed approach. In

one case, NRC approved a pilot project for Houston Lighting and Power

Company at its South Texas plant, and the utility found that it could not

implement it because the pilot project would conflict with other NRC

regulations.

Given the complexity and interdependence of NRC’s requirements, such as

regulations, plant design, and safety documents and the results of ongoing

activities, it is critical that NRC clearly articulate how the various initiatives

will help achieve the goals set out in the 1995 policy statement. Although

NRC’s implementation plan sets out tasks and expected completion dates, it

does not ensure that short-term efforts are building toward NRC’s

longer-term goals; does not link the various ongoing initiatives; does not

help the agency determine appropriate staff levels, training, skills, and

technology needed and the timing of those activities to implement a

risk-informed approach; does not provide a link between the day-to-day

Page 8 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
activities of program managers and staff and the objectives set out in the

policy statement; and does not address the manner in which it would

establish baseline information about the plants to assess the safety impact

of a risk-informed approach.

In a December 1998 memorandum, NRC staff said that once the

Commission provides direction on whether and how to risk-inform the

regulations and guidance on the quality of risk assessments to support

their decisions for specific regulations, they would develop a plan to

implement the direction provided. The staff did not provide an estimated

time frame for completing the plan.

The Status of NRC’s

Assessment and

Enforcement

Processes: Many

Unanswered Issues

Remain

For many years, the nuclear industry and public interest groups have

criticized NRC’s plant assessment and enforcement processes because they

lacked objectivity, consistency, and predictability. In January 1999, NRC

proposed a new process to assess overall plant performance based on

generic and plant-specific safety thresholds and performance indicators.

NRC is also reviewing its enforcement process to ensure consistency with

the staff’s recommended direction for the assessment process and other

programs.

NRC Is Trying to Make Its

Plant Assessment Process

More Objective and

Transparent

In 1997 and 1998, we noted that NRC’s process to focus attention on plants

with declining safety performance needed substantial revisions to achieve

its purpose as an early warning tool and that NRC did not consistently apply

the process across the industry.5

 We also noted that this inconsistency has

been attributed, in part, to the lack of specific criteria, the subjective

nature of the process, and the confusion of some NRC managers about their

role in the process. NRC acknowledged that it should do a better job of

identifying plants deserving increased regulatory attention and said that it

was developing a new process that would be predictable, nonredundant,

efficient, and risk-informed.

In January 1999, NRC proposed a new plant assessment process that

includes seven “cornerstones.”6

 For each cornerstone, NRC will identify the

desired result, important attributes that contribute to achieving the desired

result, areas to be measured, and the various ways that exist to measure

5

Nuclear Regulation: Preventing Problem Plants Requires More Effective NRC Action

(GAO/RCED-97-145, May 30, 1997) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Preventing Problem Plants

Requires More Effective Action by NRC (GAO/T-RCED-98-252, July 30, 1998).

6

The seven cornerstones are: initiating events, mitigation systems, barrier integrity, emergency

preparedness, and public, occupational, and physical protection.

Page 9 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
the identified areas. Three issues cut across the seven cornerstones:

human performance, safety conscious work environment, and problem

identification and resolution. As proposed, NRC’s plant assessment process

would use performance indicators, inspection results, other such

information as utility self-assessments, and clearly defined, objective

decision thresholds. The process is anchored in a number of principles,

including that: (1) a level of safety performance exists that could warrant

decreased NRC oversight, (2) performance thresholds should be set high

enough to permit NRC to arrest declining performance, (3) NRC must assess

both performance indicators and inspection findings, and (4) NRC will

establish a minimum level of inspections for all plants (regardless of

performance). Although some performance indicators would be generic to

the industry, others would be plant-specific based, in part, on the results

that utilities derive from their risk assessments. However, the quality of

risk assessments and number of staff devoted to maintain them vary

considerably among utilities.

NRC expects to use a phased approach to implement the revised plant

assessment process. Beginning in June 1999, NRC expects to pilot test the

use of risk-informed performance indicators at eight plants, by

January 2000 to fully implement the process, and by June 2001 to complete

an evaluation and propose any adjustments or modifications needed.

Between January 1999 and January 2001, NRC expects to work with the

industry and other stakeholders to develop a comprehensive set of

performance indicators to more directly assess plant performance relative

to the cornerstones. For those cornerstones or aspects of cornerstones

where it is impractical or impossible to develop performance indicators,

NRC would use its inspections and utilities’ self assessments to reach a

conclusion about plant performance. NRC’s proposed process illustrates an

effort by the current Chairman and other Commissioners to improve NRC’s

ability to help ensure safe operations of the nation’s nuclear plants as well

as address industry concerns regarding excessive regulation. NRC’s

ensuring consistent implementation of the process ultimately established

would further illustrate the Commissioners’ commitment.

NRC’s Enforcement

Process Continues to Be in

a State of Flux

NRC has revised its enforcement policy more than 30 times since its

implementation in 1980. Although NRC has attempted to make the policy

more equitable, the industry has had longstanding problems with it.

Specifically, NEI believes that the policy is not safety-related, timely, or

objective. Among the more contentious issues are NRC’s practice of

Page 10 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
aggregating lesser violations into an enforcement action that results in

civil penalties and its use of the term “regulatory significance.”

To facilitate a discussion about the enforcement program, including the

use of regulatory significance and the practice of aggregating lesser

violations, at NRC’s request, NEI and the Union of Concerned Scientists

reviewed 56 enforcement actions taken by the agency during fiscal year

1998. For example, NEI reviewed the escalated enforcement actions based

on specific criteria, such as whether the violation that resulted in an

enforcement action could cause an offsite release of radiation, onsite or

offsite radiation exposures, or core damage. From an overall perspective,

the Union concluded that NRC’s actions are neither consistent nor

repeatable and that the enforcement actions did not always reflect the

severity of the offense. According to NRC staff, they plan to meet with

various stakeholders in January and February 1999 to discuss issues

related to the enforcement program.

Another issue is the use of the term “regulatory significance” by NRC

inspectors. NRC, according to NEI and the Union of Concerned Scientists,

uses “regulatory significance” when inspectors cannot define the safety

significance of violations. However, when the use of regulatory

significance results in financial penalties, neither NRC nor the utility can

explain to the public the reasons for the violation. As a result, the public

cannot determine whether the violation presented a safety concern.

NEI has proposed a revised enforcement process. NRC is reviewing the

proposal as well as other changes to the enforcement process to ensure

consistency with the draft plant safety assessment process and other

changes being proposed as NRC moves to risk-informed regulation. NRC’s

memorandum of tasks shows that the staff expect to provide

recommendations to the Commission in March 1999 that address the use

of the term regulatory significance and in May 1999 on considering risk in

the enforcement process.

Major Management

Challenges and

Program Risks

In January 1999, we provided the Congress with our views on the major

management challenges that NRC faces. We believe that the management

challenges we identified have limited NRC’s effectiveness. In summary, we

reported that:

• NRC lacks assurance that its current regulatory approach ensures safety.

NRC assumes that plants are safe if they operate as designed and follow

Page 11 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
NRC’s regulations. However, NRC’s regulations and other guidance do not

define, for either a licensee or the public, the conditions necessary for a

plant’s safety; therefore, determining a plant’s safety is subjective.

• NRC’s oversight has been inadequate and slow. Although NRC’s indicators

show that conditions throughout the nuclear energy industry have

generally improved, they also show that some nuclear plants are

chronically poor performers. At three nuclear plants with long-standing

safety problems that we reviewed, NRC did not take aggressive action to

ensure that the utilities corrected the problems. As a result of NRC’s

inaction, the conditions at the plants worsened, reducing safety margins.

• NRC’s culture and organizational structure have made the process of

addressing concerns with the agency’s regulatory approach slow and

ineffective. Since 1979, various reviews have concluded that NRC’s

organizational structure, inadequate management control, and inability to

oversee itself have impeded its effectiveness.

Some of the initiatives that NRC has underway have the potential to address

the first two management challenges. However, the need to ensure that

NRC’s regulatory programs work as effectively as possible is extremely

important, particularly in light of major changes taking place in the

electric utility industry and in NRC. Yet changing NRC’s culture will not be

easy. In a June 1998 report, the Office of the Inspector General noted that

NRC’s staff had a strong commitment to protecting public health and safety.

However, the staff expressed high levels of uncertainty and confusion

about the new directions in regulatory practices and challenges facing the

agency. The employees said that, in their view, they spend too much time

on paperwork that may not contribute to NRC’s safety mission. The

Inspector General concluded that without significant and meaningful

improvement in management’s leadership, employees’ involvement, and

communication, NRC’s current climate could eventually erode the

employees’ outlook and commitment to doing their job. This climate could

also erode NRC’s progress in moving forward with a risk-informed

regulatory approach. According to staff, NRC recognizes the need to

effectively communicate with its staff and other stakeholders and is

developing plans to do so.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our

statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions you may

have.

(141286) Page 12 GAO/T-RCED-99-71
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