### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00030- CR

Da vid Wa yne Ca se y, Jr ., App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE CRIM INAL DISTRICT CO URT OF DALLAS COUNTY NO. F- 0036 978- SH , HO NORAB LE JANICE L. WARDER, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N Appellant David Way

ne Casey , J r., and codefe ndant Scott Cannon were jointly tried for sexual a ssault a g g ravated by the administration of g amma hy droxy buty rate (GHB ), a “ date r ape” drug
. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 22.021( a)( 1)(A) (i), (2) (A)( vi) (West Su p p . 2 004-05). The jury found Cannon not g uilty

and convic ted appe llant of the lesser included offe nse of sexual assault, for which it assessed a

twenty -y ear

prison term. Se e id . § 22.011(a) (1)( A). We hold that the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually s u ff

i ci en t t o sustain the jury ’s ver dict, but that the trial court e rre d by
a dmi tti ngc e rt a in p ho tog ra ph s in e vid e nc e and

by c omm e nti ngon

the we ig ht of the e vid e nc e in i ts jur y c ha rg e . We wi ll r e ve rs e the c on vic tio n a nd re mand fo r a ne w tri a l.2 Backg ro und The c omplainant, K.T., wa s employ ed as a “shot g irl” at a

Dallas t o p l es s bar. She
was at the bar on the night of April 24, 2000, but no t wo rk i n g. Ar o u n d 7:30 p.m., she called appellant, with w hom she was acqua inted, to a sk what he was doing that night. Abo u t t wo h o urs later, a ppellant ar

rived at the club with his friend Cannon. K.T ., appellant, a nd Cannon rema ined at the bar for an hour. All thr ee wer e drinking , but K .T. testified that s h e w as n o t i ntox icated. Ap pe lla nt t old K. T. that he and

Cann on we re pla nn ing to g o to a

pp e lla nt’ s h ou se to w a tc h v ide os , and he invited he r to join them. She acc epted the invitation, and she f ollowed in her ow n car

as they drove to a ppellant’s house. The thre e ar

rived at appellant’s house at about 11:00 p.m. and wer e soon joined by
a p p e l l an t ’ s h o u s e m a t e , J e s s i e D i a z , w h o ar r i v e d w i t h a f

e m a l e c o mp an i o n i d e n t i f

i e d o n l y a s B r a n dy. K. T. , a pp e lla nt, and Cann on we re dr ink ingbe e r, bu t so me on e su g g e ste d th a t th e y drink s ho ts. L eavin g K.T. alone in the living room, the othe rs went to the kitche n to prepa re the shots. K.T. te sti fi e d th a t by

thi s tim e , sh e wa s be g inn ing to fe e l un c omf or ta ble and pla nn e d to le a ve a t th e fi rs t op po rt un ity . T he g ro up re tur

ne d fr om the kit c he n and Di a z ha nd e d h e r a

sh ot o f v odka . K .T . d id not car e for

vodka, but she de cided t o d ri n k t h e shot and then leave. Moments af ter drinking the vodka, howe ver, K .T. beg an to fe el strang e. When she tried to stand, her vision became blurr ed and sh e pa sse d o ut. K.T.’s memory of the ne x t severa l hours was sketc hy , as she dr ifted in and out of consciousne s s. She remembe red vomiting and def eca ting on he rself, a

nd being moved from the living room to the hallway
. She rec alled people standing over he r and he aringappellant a nd Cannon3

discuss what to do with he r. At one point, she beca me awa re that she wa s naked a

nd that appellant was be tween he r leg s penetra ting he r with his pe nis. Cannon was walking back a nd forth, as if he had a c amcor der. K.T. t estified that she also reme mbere d Cannon penetr ating her w hile appellant
watc he d. She re c a lle d f

la sh e s th a t c a

us e d h e r t o s qu int

he r e y e s. K.T. re g ained f

ull consciousness at 4:30 a.m. She was naked and ly ing on the floor of appe llant’s bedroom. She we nt to the bathroom, which woke up appellant. He told her that she had thrown up on he rself a nd that he had w ashed he r clothes. He r shirt wa s s t i ll wet, so she borrowe d a shirt from a

ppellant. K.T. g ot dressed a nd left the house. She sa

w no one e lse there
. K. T. te sti fi e d th a t sh e sti ll f e lt s ic k a nd “ fo g g y .” She mana g e d to dr ive to C hr is Nunn ’s ho us e . N un n w a s K .T .’ s o n- a g a in, of f- a g a in b oy fr ie nd
. Nun n had int ro du c e d K .T . to appellant a

nd Cannon, but had later advised he r to avoid them. K.T. ha d been told by appellant that Nunn c a lle d w hil e sh e wa s a sle e p a nd kn e w that sh e sp e nt the nig ht at a pp e lla nt’ s h ou se . K .T . to ld Nunn wh a t ha d h a

pp e ne d to he r. Nunn c a lle d the po lic e and the n d ro ve K. T. to P ark land

Ho sp ita l. Se me n r e c ov e re d duri ng K. T. ’s ph y sic a l e xami natio n c on ta ine d a pp e lla nt’ s D NA . N o D NAlin k to Cannon was f

ound. No trac e of G HB was found in K.T .’s blood or urine, but a tox icolog ist testified that the drughas a ha lf-life in the body of only twenty minutes to an hour. A warrant to sear ch appellant’s hous e was executed on J une 25, 2000, the day afte r the alleg ed assa

ult. A s oft drink bottle containing six ty -four g rams of a li quid identified as GHB was found in the re frig erator’s fr eezer compar tment. A Polaroid came ra and four Polaroid photog raphs
o f K
. T
. w e r e f

o u n d i nt h e k i t c h e n . O n e o f t h e s e p h o t o g r a p h s s h o w s K
. T
. l yi n g n a k e d i n t h e h a l l w a y,
an d t he other s are closeups of K .T.’s vag inal are a. Two 35 mm. ca mera s were found in Diaz’s4

bedroom. One of these c amer as conta ined exposed film t h at , wh en deve loped, showed: (1) photogr aphs of a

n unidentified, nake d woman; (2) p h o t o graphs of Cannon vomiting; (3) a photogr aph of D iaz having se x ual interc ourse with an unide ntified woman; (4) a photog raph of appellant makinga hand sig n and another showing him ur inating; and (5) photogr aphs of Cannon ly ing on a bed with an unidentified naked woman and a n unidentified man. No c amcor der w as found in the house. Cann on

te sti fi e d in

his ow n b e ha lf

. H e sa id t

hat K.T . h a d b e e n “ ve ry

fr ie nd ly ” wi th appellant at the bar, sitting ne x t to him and resting her hand on his shoulder. When they arr ived at appellant’ s residenc e, Cannon noticed that K.T. took a soda bottle with her into the house. K .T. sat
n ex t t o ap p el l an t o n t h e co u ch as t h ey wa t ch ed v i d eo s . Ac co rd i n g t o C an n o n , “T h ey we re t o u ch i n g, fee ling, just kind of half kissing ty pe thing .” Diaz and his compa nion arr ived, and Dia z later poured sh ots of vo dk a fo r e ve ryon e . K .T . d

ra nk he r s ho t w ithno a

pp are nt ill e ff

e c ts, bu t sh e did

a pp e a r t o be “kind of

buzz ed” a

nd she “bec ame more ag g ressively touching and fee ling.” After about an hour,
a pp e lla nt a nd K. T. we nt t o a

pp e lla nt’ s b e dr oo m. Cannon testified that he w as too intox icated to drive, so he dec ided to spend the nig ht in appellant’s spa

re be droom. As he pa ssed t h e h al f-ope ned door to a ppellant’s bedr oom, he saw appellant a

nd K.T. embra cing . Cannon said he wa s awakened in the midd l e o f t he nig ht by the sound of K.T. vomiting in the ha ll. Canno n wi p ed the vomit from K.T.’ s fac e with a towe l, then woke a ppellant, told him to t ake c are of K.T., a nd went bac k to be d. Cannon testified that he did not take a ny photogr aphs or videos of K.T., and that he did not see a ny one el s e d o s o . He de nied touching K.T. “in a

ny sexual way .”5 Sufficiency of

the Evidence When the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to sustain a criminal conviction is challeng ed, we must deter

mine whether

a rational trier of f

act c ould have f

ound th e es sential eleme nts of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. Jacks on v. V irgin ia , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (le g al
su ff ic ie nc y ); Gr iff in v . S tat e , 614 S.W .2d 155, 158-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (leg al suffic iency ); Zun iga v . S

tat e , 144 S.W .2d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (fa ctual sufficie ncy ). I n a lega l
su ff ic ie nc y re vie w, we loo k a t a ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t and

a ssume that th e tr ie r of fa c t re so lve d c on fl ic ts in the te sti mony , w e ig he d th e e vid e nc e , a nd dr e w r e a so na

ble i n fe re n ce s in a manner

that supports the verdic t. Gr iff in , 6 1 4 S
. W
. 2 d

at 1 5 9 (c i t i n g Jack

son , 443 U.S. at 318-19)) . I n a fa ctual suff iciency revie w, we look at the evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht and consider the testimony of defense witnesses and the e x istence of alternative hy

potheses. Orona v. Sta te , 8 36 S.W. 2d 31 9, 32 1 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 92 , no pe t.) . A lth ou g h d ue de fe re nc e sti ll mus t be a c c or de d th e fa c t f

ind e r’ s d e te rm inatio ns , p art ic ula rl y tho se c on c e rn ingthe we ig ht a nd c re dib ili ty of the e vidence , we may disag ree with the result in order to preve nt a manife st injust ice. Johnson

v . S tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The evidenc e will be deeme d fac tually insufficient to s us ta in t

he c on vic tio n if

the pr oo f of

g uil t is too we ak o r t

he c on tr ary

e vid e nc e is t oo str on g to support a finding of g uilt beyond a rea sonable doubt. Zuniga , 1 44 S.W. 3d a t 48 4- 85 ; see J

ohnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11.

Appellant ar g ues that bec ause the jury did not c o nvict him of ag g ravated sexual assault, the jury nece ssarily found t hat he did not administer GHB to K.T. He the n asser ts without
c itatio n of a

uth or ity that “ if K. T. re a lly wa s un de r the inf lue nc e of GH B , sh e vo lun tari ly ing e ste d it ,6

and the a utomatic statutory

consent element is e liminated.” But as the jury was c orre ctly

instructed by the trial cour

t, a sexual assault is without consent if the ot her person has not consente d and the acto r kn o w s th e o th e r

p e r s o nis u n c o n s c io u s o r p h y s ic a ll y

u n a b le to r e s is t. T e x. Pe n . Co d e Ann. § 2 2. 01 1( b) (3 ). Unde r s e c tio n 2 2. 01 1( b) (3 ), se xua l in te rc ours e is w ith ou t c on se nt w he n a sse nt i n fac t is not given a

nd the ac tor knows that the victim’s impai rm en t i s s u ch t hat re sistance is not
rea sonably

to be expected. El lio tt v . S tat e , 858 S.W .2d 478, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) . I n El lio tt , the evidenc e wa s held sufficie nt to prove lack of consent whe re the victim of the sexual assault was unconscious due to voluntar y intox ication. Id
. Ap pe lla nt a lso ur g e s th a t K .T . h a d a mot ive to l ie a

bo ut h e r c on du c t on

the nig ht i n question. H e p o in ts to K
. T
. ’ s te s ti mo n y th a t s h e an d

N u n nh a d

b e e nd a ti n g f

o r s o me ti me , that marria g e had be en discussed, a nd that she still loved Nunn even thoug h they had broken up. K.T. acknow ledg ed duringcross-e x amination that Nunn “wouldn’ t be happy” if he lear ned that she ha d sexual int erc ourse with appe llant. Appellant s ug g ests that K.T. fa lsely acc used him of assaulting her in order to pr eser

ve her hopes of r euniting w ith Nunn. The jury , howeve r, is the exclusive judge of t h e cr ed i b i lity

of the witnesse s and the we ight to be g iven their testimony
. See T e x. C o d e Cr im. Proc. Ann. a

rt. 38.04 (West 1979) ; B on ha m v . S tat e , 680 S.W .2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Cas te lla no v . S

tat e , 81 0 S.W. 2d

80 0, 80 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 91 , n o p e t.) . D ue de fe re nc e mus t be g iven to the jury ’s decision to c redit K.T.’ s testimony insofar a s she denied c onsenting to sex ual int e rc ours e wi th a

pp e lla nt. Viewingthe evidenc e in t he lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, we hold that the jury
cou ld r a ti o n a ll y f

in d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a

b le d o u b t th a t a p p e ll an t h a d s e xu a l in te r c o u r s e with K.T.7

wi tho ut h e r c on se nt i n f

a c t and wh en he kn e w tha

t K .T . w a s unc on sc iou s o r p hy sic a lly un a ble to resist. We further

hold that the jury ’s verdic t is not ma nifestly unjust e ven when a ll the evidence , including Ca

nnon’s def

ensive testimony , is considere d in a neutra l light. A d ec i sion is not
man if e s tl y u n ju s t me r e ly b e c a

u s e th e f a c t- f in d e r r e s o lv e d c o n f

li c ti n g v ie w s o f th e e v id e n c e in the State’s favor. Ro isev . S

tat e , 7 S.W .3d 225, 233 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. re f’d) . Point of error three is overrule d.
Pho tog ra phs I n his first point of error , appellant c o n t en ds that twenty -seve n photogr aphs we re
e rr on e ou sly

a dmi tte d in e vid e nc e . Ap pe lla nt argue s that no fo un datio n wa s la id fo r t he ph oto g ra

ph s, they wer e not prope rly

authenticated, most of them had no rele vance other than to prove c hara cter confor mity , and the da

ng er of unfair pr ejudice a

rising f ro m t h e admission of the photog raphs substantially

outweig hed any

probative va lue they

might have had. See Tex. R. Evid. 403, 404(b), 90 1. Th e State ’s br ie f d oe s n ot spe c if ic a lly a dd re ss the a dmi ssi bil ity of any of the ph oto g ra

ph s in question. I nstead, the State broadly asser ts that all the photogr aphs we re pr operly admitted to prove the manner , means, a

nd circ umstances of

the alleg ed off

ense. The trial c ourt’s dec ision to admit or exclude evide nce i s revie wed f or an a buse of discretion. Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’ g ). As
a g e ne ra l r ule , a ph oto g ra ph is admi ssi ble if

it i s r e le va

nt t o a ma te ri a l is su e and

is a n a c c ur a te
re p resentation of its subject as of a g iven time. De

Lun a v . S tat e , 7 1 1 S
. W
. 2 d 4 4 , 46 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1986).8 The re quirement of a

uth e nti c a ti o n a s a c o n d it io n p r e c e d e nt t o admissibili ty is satisfied by e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt to su

pp or t a fi nd ing that the ma tte r in qu e sti on is wh a t it s p ro po ne nt c la ims
. Tex. R. Evi d. 901(a) . A photog raph ma y be authe nticated by

any witnes s wh o h as persona l knowledg e that it a ccur ately repr esents the scene or event it purports to portra y . Ke ph ar t v . S

tat e , 87 5 S. W.2d 31 9, 32 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Dr on e v . S tat e , 9 0 6 S. W. 2 d

6 0 8 , 6 1 1 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1995, pet. ref ’d). Evidence of other crimes, wrong s, or acts is not admissible to prove the de fenda nt’s
c ha ra c te r i n o rd e r t o s ho w a c tio n in c on fo rm ity

to t hat c ha ra c te r. Te x. R. E vid . 4 04 (b ). Th is r ule inc or po rate s th e fu

nd a me nta l te ne t of our c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m th a t an a c c us e d ma y be tr ie d o nly for th e o ff

ense of which he is a ccuse d and not for his c riminal propensities. Ra nk in v . S tat e , 974 S.W. 2d 70 7, 71 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). A d e fe nd ant m ay no t be tri e d f

or so me c oll a te ra l c ri me or for being a cr iminal ge nera lly
. W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 662 S.W .2d 344, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)
. Relevant e vidence may

be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. T ex. R . Evid. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicia l when it has an undue te ndency

to sugg est that a de cision be made on an i m proper basis, commonly , but not
nece ssarily , an em o t i o n al one. Va sq ue z v . S tat e , 67 S.W .3d 229, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Fa ctors that should be c onsidered in a pply ing rule 403 are the probative va lue of the e vidence , the potential of the e vidence to impress the jury in some irrational way , the t ime neede d to develop the evidenc e, and the proponent’s ne ed for the evidenc e. Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 389-90. In the
c o n te xt o f th e a d mi s s io n o f p h o to g r a p h s , c o u rts a ls o c o n s id e r

th e nu mb e r

o f p h o to g r a p h s , th e ir s iz e and deta il, whether th ey ar e in color or black- and-w hite, whether they are g ruesome, a

nd whetherTh e a pp e llate re c or d c on ta ins bla c k- and -w hit e ph oto c op ie s o f a ll the ph oto g ra ph ic e xhibi ts. 1 I t is otherwise cle ar f

rom the re cord that the actua l exhi bits were in c olor. Appellant does not challenge the admis sibili ty of these thr ee photogr aphs under r ule 404(b). 2 9 any bodies are clothed, nake d, or alter ed by autopsy
. Narv aiz

v . S tat e , 8 4 0 S. W. 2 d 4 1 5 , 4 2 9 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1992).
State’s exhibits 13, 14, and 15

During the sea

rch of appellant’ s house, pol ice found four Pol aroid photogra phs in the kitchen. One of these photog raphs, State’ s exhi bit 16, shows K.T. ly ing unconscious on the f loor in the hallway of t he house. She is naked, and there is a towel next to her head. A ppellant does not complain of the a dmission of thi s photogr aph, to which there was no trial objection. The other three Polaroid photogr aphs ar e close -ups of a woman’s g enital ar ea. K .T. identified the photog raphs a s “[m] y clitoris a nd pretty much my vag ina.” Eig ht-by -eig ht enlarg ements of these three photogr aphs
wer e admitted as State’ s exhi bits 13, 14, and 15. 1

Appellant conc edes that these phot og raphs were identified by K.T. Ne verthe less, he
c on te nd s th a t a

pr op e r f ound a tio n w a s n ot l a id f

or the e xhibi ts be c a

us e the y we re no t c on ne c te d to him. That is, there is no evidenc e that appe llant took the photogr aphs or knew t hat t hey wer e made
. Appellant also urg es that any probative va lue these photogr aphs may have had was outwe ighe d by their unfa irly

prejudicia l nature. 2 K.T.’s testimony

reg ardingher me mory

of a c amcor der a

n d f la s h es sug g ested that she was photog raphe d by

appellant a

nd Cannon on the nig ht i n q uestion. I t is reasona ble to conclude that exhibi ts 13, 14, and 15 wer e take n at or a bout the time e x hibit 16 was taken. Evidence that K.T.10

w a s p h o to g r a

p h e d w h il e s h e w a s n a k e d an d u n c o n s c io u s w a s e s s e n ti a l t o u n d e r s ta n d in g th e c o n te xt and circ umstances of the alleg ed assault. I t w as, in othe r words, same transac tion co n text ual evidenc e. Se e Cam ac ho v . S tat e , 8 64 S.W. 2d

52 4, 53 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Ma y es v . S tat e , 816 S.W. 2d 79 , 8 6 n .4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). Al tho ug h th e re is n o e vid e nc e that a pp e lla nt p e rs on a lly took the photogr aphs in question, they wer e found in ope n view in his kitchen on the day afte r the offe nse and thus tende d to confirm K.T.’ s testimony . The trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion by concludingthat an ade quate f oundation for a dmission of the photogra phs wa s l ai d and that the photogr aphs we re r eleva

nt. A lthough the c lose-up photog raphs of K.T.’s g enitals wer e tastele ss and the introduction of all three photogr aphs was repe titive, we cannot state under the circ umstances that the trial cour

t abused its discretion by concludingth at t h e p ro bative value of the photog raphs outweig hed the da

ng er of unfair pr ejudice.
State’s exhibits 71 throu gh 76 and 78 The other photogr aphs at issue w er e o n a roll of film taken fr om a 35 mm. camer a found in Diaz’s bedroom. Exhibit s 74, 75, and 76 show a y oung woman lying na ked on a c ouch or b e d
. S h e a

p p e ar s t o b e a s l e e p o r

u n c o n s c i o u s . E x h i b i t7 1 i s a c l o s e - u p o f t h e w o m an ’ s g e n i t a l s . In exhibi t 72, a man is inserting a long obj ect into the woman’s vag ina. I n exhibi t 73, the same man is pushing a dr ink can into the wom an’s va g ina. I n exhibi t 78, a diffe rent man is per forming cunnilingus on the woman. There is no evidenc e reg arding the identities of the woman an d m en sh ow n in the se ph oto g ra

ph s. Th e re a lso is n o evid ence a s to wh e re , w he n, or by wh om t he se photogr aphs we re taken, althoug h there is indirect e vidence (discussed be low) that the photog raphs11

wer e rece nt. Comments made dur ing a hear ing on the admissibili ty of the photog raphs sug g est that the y we re take n in

Di a z’s be dr oo m. At trial, the State ar gu ed that these photog raphs we re a dmissibl e to “show the motivation, to keep a photogra ph of a woman who is naked and who the y are sexually

assaulting .” The c ourt admitted the photog raphs without spec ify ing a g round. T h e co urt did state that the photogr aphs show “w hat appe ars to be an unconsc ious girl be ing se x ually abused in the D efe ndant’s house,” that they

“appe ar to have bee n taken in Jessie Diaz’ r oom w ho was there at the time of the offe nse that we were [si c] try ing,” and that they “ar e of a simil ar nature” to the Polaroid photogr aphs of K.T. pr eviously admitted in e vidence
. We inf er that the cour

t determined that these photog raphs
wer e admissible to prove that appellant and his c odefen d an t administered GHB to K.T. or, as the State argued, to prove their motive for ha ving done so. Evidence that appellant or Cannon had drug g ed and se x ually assaulted a

nother
woman wa s not admissibl e under rule 404(b) so le ly

to p ro ve a

pr op e ns ity

fo r s uc h c on du c t. Mo re ov e r, the re is n o e viden ce th at the se ph oto g ra ph s are wh a t th e State c la ime d th e m to be —p ho tog ra

ph s o f a wo man w ho ha d b e e n d ru g g e d b y

a pp e lla nt o r C ann on , a

nd the n s e xua lly assaulted. See Tex. R. Evi d. 901(a) . Even if it is assumed that these photogr aphs wer e not posed and the woman pictured is unconscious, there i s no evidenc e that she had been g iven GHB or any other drug , nor is there any evidenc e that either

appellant or

Cannon wer e in any way responsible for her intoxi cation. And e ven if the photog raphs wer e taken in D iaz’s bedroom in appe llant’s house, there is no evidence that either a ppellant or Cannon took the photog raphs or knew of their existence.12

Thus, the photog raphs wer e not pr obative evidenc e that either a ppellant or Cannon ha d drug g ed K.T. for the pur

pose of makingsexually

expli cit photogr aphs of he r. These photog raphs, pa

rticularly those s h owing the man insertingobjects into the woman’s va g ina, ar e lewd, vulg ar, a nd disgusting . Remarks by the court during the trial show that the photog raphs e licited a strong , neg at i v e, emotional reac tion among the jurors. B eca use the photogr aphs had no r eleva nce be y ond proving the bad chara cter of the unidentified me n in the photogr aphs and of

the unidentified pe rson who took them, we must conc l u d e t h at t he probative value of the photogr aphs was far exceede d by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice a

nd that the trial cour

t abused its discre tion by

overr uling a ppellant’s rule 403 objection.
State’s exhibits 77 and 82 th rough 97

The re maining photog raphs f ound on the exposed roll of film were introduced as State’s exhibit s 77 and 82 th ro u gh 9 7
. E x hibit 77 was identified as a photogr aph of D iaz having sexual int erc ourse with an unidentified woman, probably in Diaz’s bedroom. There is no evide nce as to when or

by whom the photog raph w as take n. E x h i b i t s 8 2 t h r o u g h 9 2 ar e p h o t o g r a p h s o f C an n o nt a k e ni na

p ar k i n g l o to r dr i v e w a y, pe rh aps ou ts id e app e lla

nt’ s h ou se . D ia z al so a pp e ars in o ne of

the ph oto g ra

ph s. Cann on

is ob vio us ly ill , a nd in m os t of

the ph oto g ra

ph s he i s si tti ng , ly

ing , o r c ra

wl ingon the g ro un d. Som e of the photog raphs show him vomiting. Cannon testified that he b el i ev ed that these photogr aphs
we re take n o n th e nig ht o f h is b ir thd ay in O c tob e r 1 99 9, wh e n he be c a me ve ry int oxic a te d a

nd ill
. The photog raphe r wa s not identified.13 Ex hibits 95, 96, and 97 show Cannon ly ing in a bed. The rec ord sug g est s t h at t he loc a tio n w a s p ro ba

bly Di a z’s be dr oo m. Cann on is w e ari ngon ly

his un de rw e ar. An oth e r m an is a lso
on the be d, and

a wo man is ly in g b etw e e n th e tw o me n. Th e wo man is nake d a nd is d e lib e rate ly
e xpos inghe r v a g ina

fo r t he c a me ra . Ca

nn on te sti fi e d tha t the wo man w a s a da nc e r n a me d Cr

y sta l; the other ma

n he identified only

as Adrian. Cannon believed that these photogr aphs we re a lso taken on the nig ht of his birthday , while he wa s intox icated. Once ag ain, there is no evidence as to who too k th e ph oto g ra

ph s. Ex hibits 93 and 94 are photogr aphs of appellant. I n exhibi t 93, he is shown standing in h is k itc he n ma

kin g a ha nd g e sture that w a s d e sc ri be d a s a g angsig n. I n e xhibi t 94 , a pp e lla nt i s urinating on the side of a

building, per

haps his house. Ther e is no evidenc e as to when or by whom the photog raphs we re taken.

These se ventee n photogr aphs we re of fer ed and admitted as a gr oup. The State urg ed their admission on the g round that they connec ted appellant and Cannon to the photogr aphs of the
un c on sc iou s w oma

n th a t ha d p re vio us ly be e n int ro du c e d a s e xhibi ts 71 thr ou g h 76 and 78 , a nd to show when the latter photogra phs had been t aken. The State re asoned that beca use the photog raphs of the un c on sc iou s wom an we re the la st expo sure s on the ro ll, the y mus t ha ve be e n ma de re c e ntl y beca use in the proff

ere d photogr aphs appe llant and Cannon appe are d much the same as they did at trial. The c ourt ruled that the p h o t og raphs we re a dmissibl e to show appe llant’s and Cannon’s “knowledg e of what is on the roll of film ” and to show the relationship betwee n appellant, Cannon,
an d D ia z. The sequenc e of the photogr aphs on the roll of film ma y show that the photog raphs of the unc onscious woman wer e rec ent. B ut the mere fac t that photogr aphs of a ppellant and Cannon14

wer e on the same roll of film doe s not tend to prove that e ither appe llant or Cannon was a war e of the ph oto g ra

ph s o f the un c on sc iou s w oma n o r t o c onne c t e ith e r o f t

he m to the a c tiv iti e s d e pic te d in those photog raphs. The fac t that Cannon and Diaz are both in one of the photog raphs doe s not tend to prove that a

ppellant t ook that photogr aph, much less that he took any of t he other photogr aphs on the ro ll o f f

ilm
. Aside fr om the one photogr aph of Cannon and Diaz tog ether , these photog raphs a re not probative of the relationship between appellant, Cannon, a nd Diaz. I n any

event, that relationship was not a contested issue at the trial. The evidenc e was undisputed that appellant a nd Cannon wer e fr i en ds, that Diaz was appe llant’s housemate, a nd that appellant, Cannon, a nd Diaz
wer e at the house with K.T. on the nig ht in question.

Proof of t h e eve nts depicted in these se ventee n photogr aphs—Diaz having sexual intercour se, Cannon intox icated and vomiting, Cannon in be d with an obviously consenting woman, appellant ur inating a g ainst a wa ll and flashing a g angsign—did not have any tendenc y to make the exis tence of a fact of

conseque nce in this ca

use more or

less probable
. See Tex. R. Evi d. 401. The admission of these photogr aphs improper ly encour ag ed the jury

to convict appe llant on the basis of his, his codefe ndant’s, and his housemate’s deba uched c hara cter
. The admissi on of t he exhibits was an abuse of the trial c ourt’s discre tion. See Tex. R. Evi d. 403, 404(b).
Har m The S tate asserts that any err or i n the admission of the cha lleng ed photog raphs wa s harmless, but it offe rs no argument in support of this assertion. Given the numbe r and nature of the photogr aphs, the a

bsence of any

probative va l u e beyond char acte r conf ormity , and the ve ry

rea l15

dang er of unfair pr ejudice, w e hold that the err oneous admission of State’s exhibi ts 71 throug h 78 and 82 throug h 97 aff

ecte d appellant’ s substantial rig hts. Tex. R . App. P. 44.2(b). Point of err or one is s us ta ine d in

pa rt
. Jury Char ge I n point of err or two, appe llant contends the trial c ourt err oneously co m m ented on the weig ht of the evidenc e in its jury char g e. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.14 (West Supp. 2004-05). The complained- of er ror oc curr ed in the applicatio n p ar agr ap h for a g g ravated sexual
a s s a u l t , i nw h i c h t h e c o u rti n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y: Now if y ou find from the e vidence b ey o n d a re asonable doubt that . . . [ap pe ll an t ], a c t i n g a l o n e o r a s a p art y , d i d

. . . kn o w i n g l y

o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y

c a u se penetr ation of the fe male sexual o rga n o f [K.T.], wit hout the consent of [K.T.], by

. . . th e se xua l or g an o f [a pp e lla nt], and [ appel lant], a c tin g a lon e or a s a pa rt y , d id administer or provide a drug , namely : [ GHB ] t o [K.T.] , thev ic tim of theoff e ns e , w ith the intent of fa cilitating the c ommissi on of the off ense , then y ou will find the de fe nd ant guil ty

of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult , a s c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt. (Emphasis adde d.) Appe llant’s objection to the emphasized phrase was ove rruled. T he cha rg e we nt
on to i ns tr uc t th e jur

y that if it f ound a pp e lla nt n ot guil ty

of a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult , it wa s to consider w hether

he wa s g uilty

of sexua l as s au lt. The cha rg e conta ined a se cond application para g raph f

or the lesse r off

ense. A cha rg e that assumes the t ruth of a c ontroverte d issue is a comment on the we ight of the e vidence and is err oneous. W ha le y v. Sta te , 717 S.W .2d 26, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Th e re we re tw o s e ri ou sly c on tr ov e rt e d iss ue s in thi s c a us e : di d K .T . c on se nt t o s e xua l in te rc ours e with appellant and did a

ppellant administer GHB to K.T. Appellant c ontends that the application16

para g raph, by

ref err ing to K.T
. as the victim, errone ously assumed that K.T. did not conse nt to the intercour se. Tal

k ing ton v . S

tat e , 682 S.W .2d 674, 675 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1984, pet. r ef’ d). Th e State argue s th a t Talkington is disti ng uishable bec ause the only contested issue in that case was c onsent. Her e, the jury had to decide both the conse nt issue and the drugissue. The State argues that the a

pplication para g raph w as structure d in such a way as to requir e the jury to find a lac k of consent to sexual intercour se before it deter mined whether the drug had been a dminist ere d, and p o in ts o u t t

h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e to K
. T
. a s th e v ic ti m o c c u r r e d in th a t p o rti o no f

th e application para g raph de aling with the latter issue. The State rea sons t h at b ef o re reac hing that point in t he application par ag raph, the jury would have a lrea dy

found that K.T. wa s the vict i m of a se x ual assault, and ther efor e the r efe renc e to her as a vic tim was not error
. I n deter mining whe ther a

n instruction is a comment on the weig ht of the evide nce, we must co nsider the c ourt’s cha rg e as a whole. Ru sse ll v . S

tat e , 7 49 S.W. 2d

77 , 7 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1988). The State’s argument ignor es the fa ct that the cha rg e conta ined two sepa

rate application para g raphs. T h e fi rs t , at i ssue her e, only asked the jury

to decide w hether

appellant wa s g uilty

of ag g rava ted s e xu a l a s s a

u lt
. T h e s e c o n d , to b e r e a c h e d if th e ju r y f o u n d a p p e ll an t n o t g u il ty o f

the g re a te r o ff

e ns e , a sk e d the jur

y to d e c ide wh e the r a

pp e lla nt w a s g uil ty

of se xua l a ssa

ult . B y the tim e the jury rea ched this sec ond application para g raph, which it c lear ly did be cause it found appellant g uilty of the lesser i ncluded offense , it had been effec tively instructed by the court that K.T. was the vic timof a se xua l a ssa

ult
. We hold that the trial court’s char g e commented on the w eig ht of the evide nce a nd that a pp e lla nt’ s o bje c tio n w a s e rr on e ou sly ov e rr ule d. The c ha

rg e e rr or wa s c le arl y

c a lc ulate d to17

injure appe llant’s ri g hts and was ther efor e har mful. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.19 (West 1981); Al

ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g ). Point of er ror two is sustained.
Conclu sion

Be cause of our disposition of points of error one, two, and thr ee, w e d o not rea ch
a pp e lla nt’ s r e ma ini ngpo int s o f e rr or . T he jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n is re ve rs e d an d th e c a us e is
re mand e d to the dis tr ic t c ou rt fo r a ne w tri a l.

__________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Reverse d and Remande d Filed: De cembe r 2, 2004 Pub lis h