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*********************************************** 
TARA S. v. CHARLES J.*

(AC 39284)

Lavine, Prescott and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for personal

injuries she allegedly sustained in connection with his sexual assaults

of her when she was four years old. The plaintiff, who was thirty-six

years old, filed an application for a prejudgment remedy, seeking to

attach certain of the defendant’s real property. In response, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the application and the underlying action.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss

and granted a prejudgment remedy in the amount of $150,000 in favor

of the plaintiff, determining that she had shown that there was probable

cause that she would obtain a judgment against the defendant in that

amount. Thereafter, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that

the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because the

applicable statute of limitations (§ 52-577d), which permits a minor

victim of sexual abuse to bring an action for damages against the perpetrator of the abuse no later than thirty years from the date that the

victim attains the age of majority, was unconstitutional as applied to

him for a number of reasons. Specifically, he claimed that the statute

was unconstitutional as applied to him because the plaintiff allegedly

did not repress memories of the sexual assaults, and the legislative

purpose behind extending the limitations period was to allow victims

of childhood sexual abuse to recall memories of the abuse that had

been repressed. Held that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s

motion to dismiss the application for a prejudgment remedy and the

underlying action; the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous

in that it allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to bring a claim for

damages against the perpetrator of the abuse no later than thirty years

from the date upon which the victim attains the age of majority, and does

not mention or require repressed memories, nor does it bar plaintiffs

who have not repressed memories of the abuse from relying on it, the

application of § 52-577d, as a statute of limitations, did not impact any

constitutionally protected conduct or any property right of the defendant, and the defendant’s claims that the application of § 52-577d violated

his rights to a speedy trial, to confrontation and to protection against

double jeopardy were unavailing, as those constitutional provisions were

applicable only in criminal settings.

Argued October 10—officially released December 12, 2017

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for sexual assault, and

for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Middlesex, where the court, Aurigemma, J., granted the plaintiff’s application for a prejudgment remedy and denied the defendant’s motion

to dismiss the application and the action, and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Bryan P. Fiengo, with whom, on the brief, was Eric

W. Callahan, for the appellant (defendant).

Karen K. Clark, with whom, on the brief, was Timothy L. O’Keefe, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

BEAR, J. The defendant, Charles J., appeals from the

trial court’s judgment (1) denying his motion to dismiss

the application for a prejudgment remedy filed by the

plaintiff, Tara S., and the underlying action,1 and (2)

granting a prejudgment attachment of $150,000 in favor

of the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claims that

the court improperly denied his motion to dismiss

because, as applied to him, General Statutes § 52-577d

is unconstitutional in that the plaintiff did not repress

memories of the sexual assault and, therefore, knew of

her potential claim against him for more than thirty

years. The defendant also argues that § 52-577d violates

his right to a speedy trial, his protection against double

jeopardy, and his right to confrontation provided by

both the United States and Connecticut constitutions.

Finally, the defendant argues that § 52-577d is unconstitutionally overbroad and improperly deprives him of a

property interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

The relevant facts are set forth in the court’s memorandum of decision on the motion to dismiss and the

application for a prejudgment remedy. ‘‘The plaintiff is

a victim of sexual abuse at the hand of her father,

the defendant . . . who was the subject of a criminal

prosecution, the appeal of which resulted in a case of

first impression [in our Supreme Court] concerning the

use of videotaped testimony of minor victims . . . .

‘‘At the hearing on the prejudgment remedy application, the plaintiff . . . testified that she had reviewed

the [Supreme Court] decision and other documents

relating to the prosecution shortly before she testified.

Her testimony about the events surrounding the sexual

assaults [was] nearly identical to the facts as recited

by the court . . . . The plaintiff was four years old at

the time of the assault and, although she claimed to

have memory of the assaults, the court finds that the

memory is largely based on a recent reading of the

accounts of the events and extensive discussion with

family members.

‘‘The plaintiff, now [thirty-six] years of age, testified

that she and her mother and brother moved away from

Middletown when she was [five] years old. She stated

that she thought she had received some counseling, but

had not received regular medical checkups as a child.

The plaintiff played sports and an instrument in high

school, where she was on the honor roll. She was never

suspended in school for any misconduct. The plaintiff

received her bachelor’s degree from the University of

North Carolina at Asheville, where she was on the

dean’s list, and a master’s degree from the University

of Oregon. She married in 2010, had a child, and

divorced in 2015.

‘‘The plaintiff testified that she had never been diag-
nosed with depression by any medical professional.

However, she stated that she diagnosed herself with

depression and obtained antidepression medication

from her primary care physician. She last took the antidepression medication in 2013. . . .

‘‘The plaintiff testified that the main effect that the

sexual assaults had on her life was that she grew up

only knowing her mother’s side of the family, she felt

guilty about her [the defendant’s] prosecution and was

embarrassed when people asked her where her father

was. When asked why she decided to bring this lawsuit

now, after the passage of so many years, the plaintiff

testified she struggled everyday and also, learned that

the case against [the defendant] had considerable

notoriety.’’

General Statutes § 52-577 provides that ‘‘[n]o action

founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three

years from the date of the act or omission complained

of.’’ Section 52-577d, upon which the plaintiff relies to

establish the timeliness of this litigation, provides that

‘‘[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no

action to recover damages for personal injury to a

minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual

abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be

brought by such person later than thirty years from

the date such person attains the age of majority.’’2 The

defendant makes several arguments challenging the

constitutionality of § 52-577d as applied to him. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s claim does

not satisfy the legislative purpose behind extending the

limitations period for victims of childhood sexual abuse

because the plaintiff allegedly did not repress any memories of the sexual assaults. The defendant further

argues that this civil litigation is of a ‘‘quasi-criminal’’

nature and infringes upon certain constitutional protections typically afforded criminal defendants, namely,

the right to a speedy trial, the protection against double

jeopardy, and the right to confrontation under the

United States and Connecticut constitutions. The defendant also claims that § 52-577d is unconstitutionally

overbroad and infringes upon a property interest of the

defendant. We disagree.

‘‘In considering an application for a prejudgment remedy [t]he trial court’s function is to determine whether

there is probable cause to believe that a judgment will

be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in a trial on the

merits. . . . Appellate review of the granting of a [prejudgment remedy] is extremely narrow and focused. In

determining probable cause, the trial court is vested

with wide discretion and our role in reviewing the trial

court’s action is limited to determining whether the

court’s conclusion was reasonable. . . . Accordingly,

the trial court’s determination in a [prejudgment remedy] proceeding should not be disturbed unless it is

clearly erroneous. . . . Furthermore, we are entitled
to presume that the trial court acted properly and considered all the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Giordano v. Giordano, 39 Conn. App. 183,

206, 664 A.2d 1136 (1995). On appeal, the defendant does

not, separately from or in addition to his constitutional

claims, contest the court’s finding of probable cause or

its granting of or the amount of the prejudgment

remedy.

‘‘Determining the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.

. . . It [also] is well established that a validly enacted

statute carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, [and that] those who challenge its constitutionality must sustain the heavy burden of proving its

unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

The court will indulge in every presumption in favor of

the statute’s constitutionality . . . . Therefore, [w]hen

a question of constitutionality is raised, courts must

approach it with caution, examine it with care, and

sustain the legislation unless its invalidity is clear.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford

Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 405,

119 A.3d 462 (2015).

We first address the defendant’s claim that § 52-577d

is unconstitutional as applied to him because the plaintiff allegedly did not repress memories of the sexual

assaults perpetrated by the defendant.3 Relying on certain pieces of legislative history to support his claim,

the defendant argues that the purpose behind extending

the limitations period was to allow victims of childhood

sexual abuse time to recall memories of the abuse that

they had repressed. When § 52-577d is read in light of

General Statutes § 1-2z,4 however, we are compelled to

conclude that, whether the plaintiff did or did not

repress memories of the sexual abuse is irrelevant, as

§ 52-577d does not mention or require repressed memories, nor does it bar plaintiffs who have not repressed

memories of the abuse from relying on it. As our

Supreme Court has recognized, the language of § 52-

577d is clear and unambiguous in that it allows a victim

of childhood sexual abuse to bring a claim for damages

against the perpetrator of the abuse no later than thirty

years from the date upon which the victim attains the

age of majority. See Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic

Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207, 214, 901 A.2d 673 (2006)

(‘‘[t]he meaning of § 52-577d . . . is plain and unambiguous because it is susceptible of only one reasonable

interpretation, namely, that a minor victim of sexual

assault may bring a civil action no later than thirty years

from the date that he or she attains the age of majority

. . . .’’) Because the meaning of § 52-577d is plain and

unambiguous, we do not consider the legislative history

that the defendant relies on and conclude that its language permitted the plaintiff to bring an action against

the defendant regardless of whether she had or had not

repressed her memories of the sexual assaults.
We next address the defendant’s constitutional challenges regarding the alleged ‘‘quasi-criminal’’ nature of

this civil litigation. The defendant argues that application of § 52-577d violates his constitutional right to a

speedy trial,5 his protection against double jeopardy,6

and his right to confrontation.7 Each constitutional provision at issue, however, is applicable only in criminal

settings. See, e.g., U.S. Const., amend. VI (‘‘[i]n all criminal proceedings . . .’’); Conn. Const., art. 1, § 8 (same);

U.S. Const., amend. V (‘‘[n]o person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy

of life or limb . . .’’); cf. In re Ceana R., 177 Conn. App.

758, 772, A.3d (2017) (noting that constitutional

protections of sixth amendment to United States constitution and article first, § 8, of state constitution do not

extend to parents in neglect proceeding, which is

civil proceeding).8

Finally, we address the defendant’s arguments that

§ 52-577d is unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally infringes upon a property interest. ‘‘A clear

and precise enactment may . . . be overbroad if in its

reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.’’

State v. Cook, 287 Conn. 237, 244–45, 947 A.2d 307, cert.

denied, 555 U.S. 970, 129 S. Ct. 464, 172 L Ed. 2d 328

(2008). Section 52-577d permits victims of childhood

sexual abuse to bring claims against perpetrators of the

abuse not later than thirty years after reaching the age

of majority. The statute, as a statute of limitations, does

not impact any constitutionally protected conduct. See

Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra,

317 Conn. 412–13 (‘‘[t]he Supreme Court [has] characterized statutes of limitations as restrictions only on

that remedy, and emphasized that [the] authorities . . .

show that no right is destroyed when the law restores a

remedy which has been lost’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]). Application of the statute also does not

impact any property right of the defendant. See Doe v.

Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 317

Conn. 412 (citing two United States Supreme Court

cases that hold ‘‘that a defendant does not have a vested

property right in a statute of limitations defense such

that a legislative change reviving an otherwise time

barred cause of action violates the defendant’s rights

under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution’’); see also

Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483, 492, 619 A.2d 844

(1993) (‘‘[t]his court, however, has never recognized a

vested right in the lapsing of a statute of limitations’’).

Our Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 52-577d, albeit for different reasons

than those presented in this case. In Roberts v. Caton,

supra, 224 Conn. 494, the Supreme Court held that it

was permissible to apply § 52-577d retroactively. In so

holding, the court stated: ‘‘Although statutes of limitation generally operate to prevent the unexpected
enforcement of stale claims . . . one object of § 52-

577d is to afford the plaintiff sufficient time to recall

and come to terms with traumatic childhood events

before he or she must take action. The defendant’s

assertion that he is now unexpectedly exposed to liability was an express purpose of the statute.’’ (Citation

omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 493–94.

More recently, in Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic

Diocesan Corp., supra, 317 Conn. 405, our Supreme

Court concluded: ‘‘[T]he application of § 52-577d retroactively to revive a time barred cause of action does not

violate a defendant’s substantive right to due process

under the Connecticut constitution because it is a

rational response by the legislature to the exceptional

circumstances and potential for injustice faced by

adults who fell victim to sexual abuse as a child.’’

This court has also had occasion to rule on the issue.

In Giordano v. Giordano, supra, 39 Conn. App. 193,

195, this court determined that § 52-577d did not violate

either the equal protection clause or the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution. We also stated that ‘‘[t]he state has

a legitimate interest both in deterring the sexual abuse

of children and in providing a means for the victims of

childhood sexual abuse to recall the traumatic events

and understand the harm done to them before seeking

redress.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 193. This court consequently upheld the granting of a prejudgment remedy

in the amount of $225,000. Id., 216.

We, accordingly, must reject the defendant’s argument that, because the plaintiff allegedly did not repress

her memories of the sexual assault, § 52-577d is unconstitutional as applied to him. We also reject the defendant’s argument that this civil litigation is ‘‘quasicriminal’’ in nature, and thus a civil action brought

within the permitted time frame of § 52-577d implicates

certain constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants. Additionally, the defendant has not, on nonconstitutional grounds in this appeal, challenged or offered

proof of clear error in the court’s ruling that the plaintiff

has shown probable cause of obtaining a judgment

against the defendant in the amount of $150,000. We

thus affirm the court’s judgment denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the application for a prejudgment remedy and the underlying action, and granting

a prejudgment remedy in the amount of $150,000 in

favor of the plaintiff.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of sexual abuse, we decline to use the party’s full names or to

identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be

ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

1 A ruling denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory ruling that does

not usually constitute a final judgment. Sasso v. Aleshin, 197 Conn. 87,

89–90, 495 A.2d 1066 (1985). Because we determine, however, that the
defendant’s claim relating to the denial of his motion to dismiss is encompassed in the issues presented by the prejudgment remedy granted to the

plaintiff, we have jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s claim. See Canty

v. Otto, 304 Conn. 546, 555–56, 41 A.3d 280 (2012). An order granting a

prejudgment remedy after a hearing under General Statutes § 52-278d is a

final judgment for purposes of appeal. General Statutes § 52-278l.

2 The defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff’s complaint was served

on him within thirty years after she reached the age of majority.

3 The court rejected the defendant’s factual premise for this claim: ‘‘The

plaintiff was four years old at the time of the assault and, although she

claimed to have a memory of the assaults, the court finds that the memory

is largely based on a recent reading of the events and extensive discussion

with family members.’’ Although this finding is sufficient for us to reject

the claim because the defendant did not offer proof of the plaintiff’s memory

of the events in addition to her statements that the court did not believe

to be accurate, we, nevertheless, consider it on its merits.

4 General Statutes § 1-2z provides: ‘‘The meaning of a statute shall, in the

first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and

does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the

meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’

5 See U.S. Const., amend. VI; see also Conn. Const., art. 1, § 8.

6 See U.S. Const., amend. V; see also Conn. Const. art. 1, § 8.

7 See U.S. Const., amend. VI; see also Conn. Const., art. 1, § 8.

8 The United States Supreme Court has stated that double jeopardy applies

only to criminal punishments. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,

98–99, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1997) (‘‘We have long recognized

that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all

sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment.

. . . The [double jeopardy] [c]lause protects only against the imposition of

multiple criminal punishments . . . .’’ [Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.]).

Our Supreme Court has not decided whether the confrontation clause

applies in civil cases, but it has noted that the right to confrontation is

limited to criminal prosecutions. See Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542,

549, 534 A.2d 888 (1987) (‘‘the right of cross-examination does have a constitutional basis in the confrontation clause of our federal and state constitutions. . . . These provisions, however, are expressly limited to criminal

prosecutions.’’ [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]); see also In re Ceana

R., supra, 177 Conn. App. 772.

Courts also have stated that the right to a speedy trial is reserved for

criminal cases. See, e.g., Caesar v. Sessions, 698 Fed.Appx. 655 (2d Cir.

2017) (concluding no ‘‘colorable speedy trial claim [existed] because the

Sixth Amendment does not apply in immigration proceedings, which are

classified as civil rather than criminal’’); Akande v. Warden, Corrigan Correctional Institution, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:08-CV-882

(AWT) 2009 WL 3838836 (D. Conn. November 16, 2009) (‘‘[t]he right to a

speedy trial . . . applies to an accused in a criminal case and does not

apply to litigants in civil actions’’).