The Helsinki Summit: Arms

Control Triumph or Tragedy?

Volume 1, Issue 3 May 1997

National Security Report

Background and Perspective on Important National Security and Defense Policy Issues,

Written and Produced by

From the Chairman...

 The Helsinki Summit

Background Brief

Dear Mr. President,

As you head to

the summit

with President

Boris Yeltsin in

Helsinki, we write

to voice our strong

opposition to U.S.-

Russian negotiations which would restrict U.S. theater

missile defense systems.

Reports indicate that the

Administration has put forward

proposals which would limit

development and deployment of key

theater missile defense systems. We

believe such limits would impose

unacceptable constraints on our ability

to protect U.S. troops from ballistic

missile attack and undermine national

security interests. Members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff have expressed similar

concerns.

The proposals reportedly put forth by

the Administration, if agreed to, would

constitute substantive changes to the

ABM Treaty. If an agreement were

eventually reached, it would by law

require congressional review and

approval. We would not look favorably

on any agreement to expand the ABM

Treaty and thereby jeopardize U.S.

security interests.

Rather than using the summit to

continue negotiations on theater missile

defense limitations, we urge you not to

initiate discussions that will limit either

nation’s ability to defend its forces against

newly emerging threats.

—Letter to the President from

Chairman Spence and other

Members of Congress

Chairman, House National Security Committee

At their recent summit in Helsinki,

President Clinton and Russian

President Yeltsin reached

agreement on several arms control issues.

Two of the most significant involve the

relationship between the 1972 U.S.-Soviet

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and

theater missile defenses (TMD) and

further reductions in strategic nuclear

weapons.

Theater Missile Defenses and

the ABM Treaty

The White House described the TMD

agreement as a “major breakthrough.”

However, outside observers, including

many in Congress, believe the deal struck

in Helsinki may

hinder the U.S.

ability to develop

and deploy advanced theater

missile defense

systems to protect

U.S. troops abroad

from ballistic missile attacks —

attacks like the

Iraqi SCUD missile

that killed 28

American soldiers

during the 1991

Gulf War. The

Helsinki agreement

has also been criticized by some as

placing significant obstacles in the path

of the development and deployment of

an effective missile defense system to

protect the American people from the

threat of ballistic missile attack.

In the March 21, 1997 Joint Statement

issued by both Presidents, they declare

it is their “common task to preserve the

ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of

it, and enhance its viability.” The Joint

Statement declares the treaty, which was

crafted twenty five years ago to prevent

the deployment by the United States and

Soviet Union of missile defenses for their

own populations, to be “a cornerstone of

strategic stability.” Much of the missile

defense debate in Congress over the past

several years has focused on whether the

ABM Treaty, negotiated during the

height of the Cold War, has become

obsolete in light of the evolving nature

of both technology and post-Cold War

threats.

The ABM Treaty restricts the

development, testing, and deployment of

a defense against long-range “strategic”

ballistic missiles. It has never limited

defenses against

shorter-range

“theater” ballistic

missiles (i.e.,

theater missile defenses). However,

as technology has

improved, the line

between “strategic” and “theater”

systems has

blurred. Consequently, for several years the

Clinton Administration has

sought to negotiate

a demarcation

agreement with

Russia that would clarify the distinction

between permitted and prohibited missile

defenses. However, the agreement

reached in Helsinki goes beyond ABM

Treaty clarification and imposes, for the

first time, restraints on theater missile

defense systems designed to protect U.S.

military personnel abroad. In essence,

the agreement expands the treaty into

areas and technologies never envisioned

twenty five years ago.
2 National Security Report

START Accountable Weapons

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

Jul-96 2001 2003 2007

U.S.

Russia

8,106

8,586

6,000

3,000-3,500

2,000-2,500

** Due to START III parameters agreed upon at Helsinki which extend time for dismantlement

of missiles and launchers, START accountable weapons may exceed the numbers shown here.

START I

START II**

START III

Although the United States and Russia

concluded an agreement on slower TMD

systems last year, the Russians refused

to sign it until an agreement was reached

on faster, more advanced systems. This

was the focus, therefore, of the Helsinki

TMD agreement. The Joint Statement

issued in Helsinki reiterates the elements

of last year’s agreement on slower TMD

systems and sets forth principles for

agreement on future faster TMD systems.

These principles include a joint

understanding that target missiles will not

travel faster than 5 kilometers per second,

nor have a range in excess of 3,500

kilometers; a commitment not to develop,

test, or deploy, space-based TMD

systems; and a pledge to exchange

detailed information on TMD plans and

programs on an annual basis. In addition,

the statement declares that disputes over

TMD activities will be resolved in the

Standing Consultative Commission, a

forum established to discuss ABM Treaty

compliance issues.

Many in Congress have reacted to the

Helsinki agreement with concern. In a

letter to the President prior to the Helsinki

summit, House Speaker Newt Gingrich,

Majority Leader Dick Armey, and several

committee chairmen stated their “strong

opposition to U.S.-Russian negotiations

which would restrict U.S. theater missile

defense systems.” Another letter, signed

by the House Republican leadership,

warned that limitations on theater missile

defenses “would gravely compromise our

ability to protect U.S. citizens, troops, and

allies from terrorist missile attacks.”

Administration spokesmen contend

that the TMD agreement will not restrict

ongoing U.S. TMD programs. However,

critics of the accord point to several key

restrictions that could impede the

capability of future U.S. TMD systems.

In particular, the prohibition on spacebased TMD systems may foreclose

promising future missile defense

technologies. In addition, the agreement

reiterates an earlier understanding that the

“number and geographic scope” of TMD

deployments “will be consistent with” the

theater ballistic missile threat faced by

both sides. This could lead to restrictions

on where U.S. theater missile defense

systems may be based and, therefore,

who they will and will not be able to

defend.

Importantly, the Helsinki agreement

also has major implications for defending

the American people. For example, the

commitment in Helsinki to “prevent

circumvention” of the ABM Treaty and

“enhance its viability” reflects the

Administration’s belief that Americans

are best protected from ballistic missile

attack by arms control agreements and

not by actual defenses. A corollary

agreement with Russia reached last year

to “multilateralize” the ABM Treaty by

including other former Soviet states as

legal parties to it will make defending the

American people more difficult in the

future, since amendments to the treaty

require the unanimous consent of the

parties. Without the ability to revise the

treaty, revisions that will now require the

consent of numerous countries mean that

the U.S. national missile defense program

is unlikely ever to lead to deployment of

a system, thus leaving Americans

vulnerable to ballistic missile attack

indefinitely.

While the Administration has agreed

that the TMD demarcation agreement is

a substantive change to the ABM Treaty,

and therefore to submit the final accord

to the Senate for its advice and consent,

it has declared its intent to implement

unilaterally, without Congressional

review or approval, any agreement on

multilateralization of the ABM treaty. The

Administration asserts that adding more

signatories to the treaty is an issue of

treaty succession, not a substantive

amendment, and that it is “a function of

the Executive Branch.” However, critics

see the Administration’s action as an

attempt to bypass Congress’ legitimate

treaty-related prerogatives.

Strategic Arms Reductions

The White House also described as a

major breakthrough the Helsinki “Joint

Statement On Parameters On Future

Reductions In Nuclear Forces.” The Joint

Statement outlines the main provisions

of a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START III), to be negotiated in detail if

Russia’s legislative body (the Duma)

ratifies START II. Since the START II

treaty was signed in 1993, the Duma has

refused to ratify it.

To encourage Russian START II

ratification, in Helsinki the Administration

agreed to give the Russians more time to

dismantle their multiple-warhead

intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs). The Duma has complained

about the cost of dismantling missiles and

nuclear weapons within the START II time

constraints. The Administration also

agreed to further reductions in strategic

nuclear weapons from the START II levels

of 3,000-3,500 to 2,000-2,500 under START

III, a goal Moscow has sought for years.

The Duma has also complained that

dismantling multiple-warhead ICBMs will

reduce Russia’s number of strategic

nuclear weapons below START II levels,

“We would not look

favorably on any

agreement to expand the

ABM Treaty and thereby

jeopardize U.S. security

interests.”

—Speaker Gingrich, Majority

Leader Armey, and HNSC

Chairman Floyd Spence,

3/19/97 Letter to President Clinton
National Security Report 3

Issues & Analysis

compelling Russia to spend scarce

resources on new strategic missiles and

warheads in order to “build up” to START

II levels. Reducing to START III levels,

the Administration argues, will lessen the

need for strategic forces modernization

programs that Moscow continues to

pursue nonetheless.

By agreeing in advance to the

parameters of START III in an effort to

persuade the Duma to ratify START II,

critics contend that the Administration has

for all practical purposes re-negotiated the

START II Treaty and made significant,

unreciprocated concessions to the

Russians. These concessions could

dilute important achievements of START

II, such as Russia’s agreement to eliminate

its multiple-warhead SS-18 ICBM. The SS18 is generally regarded as Russia’s most

powerful missile. It is also considered

highly destabilizing because its basing in

vulnerable silos could press Moscow to

“use or lose” these missiles in a crisis.

At Helsinki, President Clinton agreed

to allow the Russians an extra year to

“deactivate” the SS-18s by removing their

warheads “or taking other jointly agreed

steps,” and an extra four years to eliminate

the SS-18 missiles themselves. This raises

the possibility that SS-18s with warheads

could remain in the Russian inventory

for an extra four years (until December

31, 2007) beyond dates dictated by

START II. Administration spokesmen

insist that the burden of proof is on the

Russians to demonstrate that SS-18s

armed with warheads past 2003 are in fact

deactivated. But skeptics suggest the

Russians will argue that their missiles can

be “deactivated” without removing the

warheads and that the Administration

may agree to less verifiable deactivation

measures that can be more easily

manipulated by the Russians.

More fundamentally, the longer Russia

is allowed to retain SS-18s, the greater is

the possibility that some future Russian

regime may decide that this unique

weapon system is indispensable to

Russia’s superpower status and security.

This argument is already being articulated

by members of the Russian Duma and

the Russian military.

Some have also questioned whether

further reducing nuclear weapons below

START II levels will in fact enhance

stability and reduce the nuclear threat.

Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter,

former national security advisors to

Presidents Bush and Ford, stated in a

recent article: “It is not at all clear that

reducing strategic forces would

enhance stability. On the contrary,

current force levels provide a kind of

buffer because they are high enough

to be relatively insensitive to imperfect

intelligence and modest force

changes....But as force levels go down,

the balance of nuclear power can

become increasingly delicate and

vulnerable...”

In a January 1997 interview, U.S.

Strategic Command’s Commander in

Chief, General Eugene Habiger, raised

similar concerns that reductions in

strategic weapons below START II

might prove destabilizing. James

Scouras, an independent strategic

analyst for several Washington-area

think tanks and government agencies,

concluded in a recent study, “Thinking

Beyond START II,” that START II and

START III reductions may cut too

deeply into the retaliatory capabilities

of each side and increase incentives for

striking first in a crisis or conflict.

Scouras notes asymmetries in U.S. and

Russian threat perceptions, nuclear

doctrine, and strategic force structures

that could make the future strategic

balance under START II and III less

stable and more dangerous than was

even the case during the Cold War.

Beyond the issues raised by the Helsinkiagreements on missile defenses and

strategic force reductions, there has been little discussion

about the broader issues and implications of these arms control

agreements in a changing post-Cold War world. For example:

1. The TMD agreement prohibits the deployment by either

side of TMD systems directed against the other. This will

deny NATO members an important defensive benefit under

Article V of the NATO charter. Russia may seek to raise

objections to U.S. TMD systems deployed in Western Europe

or Asia on the grounds that such deployment would constitute

an illegal defense against Russian missiles. Such a development

would undermine ongoing U.S. efforts to build an allied

consensus on the need for TMD and could even leave U.S.

forces defenseless in some circumstances.

2. The TMD agreement committing the sides to “exchange

detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs”

may provide Russia with sensitive information regarding U.S.

TMD programs. It is also likely to give Moscow an opportunity

to object to future U.S. missile defense programs early in their

research and development phase.

3. The commitment to “making the current START treaties

unlimited in duration” reflects a U.S. willingness to be bound

permanently to treaty restrictions that were negotiated in a

U.S.-Soviet context. However, China is

currently developing a more modern nuclear

arsenal with Russian technical assistance. By making the

limitations in the START treaties permanent, the United States

will be less able to respond to a possible Chinese deployment

of multiple-warhead ICBMs in the future.

4. When and if the United States and Russia draw down their

strategic offensive weapons to START III levels, Russia’s

unilateral possession of key missile defense capabilities —

such as the world’s only operational ABM system and a vast

network of nuclear blast shelters — could confer increasingly

important operational advantages over the United States.

5. START III’s lower weapon levels are unlikely to slow the

current aggressive pace of Russian nuclear modernization

programs, which include development of a new ICBM, a new

submarine-launched ballistic missile, and an advanced cruise

missile. Recent commentary by Russian political and military

leaders indicates that these new programs are being pursued,

not because of a requirement to “build up” to START II levels,

but to support a new military doctrine that relies heavily on

nuclear weapons in the face of Russia’s deteriorating

conventional forces. Consequently, START III will lead to a

smaller, yet more modern and capable, Russian strategic nuclear

force. The United States, in contrast, is currently not

developing any new nuclear weapons.
4 National Security Report

Update

 In Bosnia... In the United States...

 In Russia...

The National Security Report is archived on the world wide web site of the House National Security Committee at: http://www.house.gov/nsc/. Additional background information

may be obtained from Tom Donnelly (x65372), David Trachtenberg (x60532), or Will Marsh (x56045) on the committee staff.

A study prepared by a Defense

Science Board Task Force concludes

that American ground troops in Bosnia

have been burdened by an

overabundance of relatively useless

intelligence information. The report

praises improvements in intelligence

operations in Bosnia, but notes that “we

need to make sure that we don’t saturate

the warrior with data while starving him

of useful information.” The Task Force

also notes that “human intelligence is not

available to the warfighter in a timely

fashion” and “does not flow easily up

the chain of command.”

•

Western and Bosnian sources state

that indicted Bosnian Serb war

criminal Radovan Karadic is making

millions of dollars through the operation

of two companies he controls with

Momcilo Krajisnik, the Bosnian Serb

member of the country’s rotating

presidency. Revenue from the enterprises

is reportedly used to augment the salaries

of the Bosnian Serb police and does not

flow into the Bosnian government

treasury.

•

Three Bosnian Muslims and one

Bosnian Croat go on trial at the

Hague for war crimes. The four are

charged with committing more than a

dozen murders and other atrocities that

are believed to have occurred at a prison

camp in Celebici, southwest of Sarajevo.

The trial is expected to last for several

months.

•

United Nations officials express

concern over Germany’s plan to

repatriate Bosnian refugees. Some

300,000 refugees are in Germany and

international relief officials contend that

their return to Bosnia would inflame

ethnic tensions and lead to increased

violence.

House National Security CommitteeChairman Floyd Spence (R-SC)

releases a detailed report identifying

deficiencies in the current state of U.S.

military readiness. He notes that “years

of declining defense budgets, a smaller

force structure, fewer personnel and

aging equipment coupled with an

increase in the number of peacekeeping

and humanitarian operations are

stretching U.S. military forces to the

breaking point.”

•

House Republican leaders criticize theHelsinki summit agreement reached

by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin

regarding theater missile defense

limitations. Curt Weldon, Chairman of the

House National Security Committee R&D

Subcommitee, says the agreement “will

inevitably result in the dumbing down of

theater missile defense systems, putting

the lives of our soldiers at greater risk.”

Bob Livingston, Chairman of the House

Appropriations Committee, notes that

“we had no idea they [Clinton and Yeltsin]

would sign off on agreements to virtually

leave us defenseless against anyone

who’s not a party to them.”

•

The United States suspends foreignassistance – including so-called

Nunn-Lugar aid – to the former Soviet

republic of Belarus as a result of human

rights violations.

•

The United States Senate approvesthe Chemical Weapons Convention,

days before the treaty enters into force.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin andBelarussian President Alexander

Lukashenko sign an agreement providing

for a closer union between the two states

in matters of domestic and foreign policy.

The agreement calls for stronger

integration of the two countries’

economic policies, harmonized

legislation, and greater cooperation in

defense policy and border protection.

•

The Duma, Russia’s lower house ofparliament, creates an anti-NATO

commission to review issues related to

NATO’s eastward expansion and to

promote anti-NATO activities by the

Duma. The commission consists of 15

Duma members representing all of

Russia’s various political factions.

•

According to Western reports, Russiahas developed three new deadly

nerve agents from chemical ingredients

not banned by the Chemical Weapons

Convention. In addition, a more lethal

anthrax toxin – said to be completely

resistant to antibiotics – has also been

developed by Moscow. One day after

the U.S. Senate approves the Chemical

Weapons Convention, the Russian Duma

refuses to do so. Vladimir Lukin, Chairman

of the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee,

explains Russia’s reluctance to destroy

its chemical weapons stockpile by stating,

“It’s simple. There’s a lack of cash.”

•

The head of Russia’s main arms exportagency, Rosvooruzhenie, says that

Russian arms exports this year will reach

$4 billion, an increase over last year’s $3.5

billion.

 In Canada...

Canadian authorities arrest a suspect

in the bombing of the Khobar Towers

complex in Saudi Arabia last year. Hani

Abdel Rahim al-Sayegh, a Saudi national,

is said by Canadian authorities to be a

member of the Saudi Hezbollah dissident

group and is thought to have been the

driver of the getaway vehicle used in the

terrorist attack.