2017 UT App 59

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JP’S LANDSCAPING AND AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE,

Petitioners,

v.

LABOR COMMISSION AND ALBERTO MONDRAGON,

Respondents.

Opinion

No. 20150898-CA

Filed March 30, 2017

Original Proceeding in this Court

Mark R. Sumsion and Cody G. Kesler, Attorneys

for Petitioners

Jaceson R. Maughan and William Barlow, Attorneys

for Respondent Labor Commission

JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

ROTH, Judge:

¶1 JP’s Landscaping (JPL) requests review of the Labor 

Commission’s award for workers’ compensation benefits arising 

out of an industrial accident that occurred in May 2012 involving 

one of JPL’s employees. We decline to disturb the Commission’s 

decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On May 22, 2012, the first day of his employment, JPL

employee Alberto Mondragon suffered an injury. The accident 

occurred as Mondragon, “almost running,” pushed a 

wheelbarrow full of gravel over uneven ground. Mondragon 

slipped, and as he did, the wheelbarrow “tipped over.”
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Mondragon claimed that, as the wheelbarrow tipped, its 

“handles [took] hold of him in different directions,” which 

caused “pressure on his [right] knee.” At that point, Mondragon 

claims “he felt a sudden pop in the knee.” Although he did not 

“fall to the ground” and was instead “able to catch himself,” 

Mondragon reported that the inside area of his right knee—both 

front and back—began to immediately swell.

¶3 Mondragon reported the incident to his supervisor when 

she arrived at the site, and, within three hours of the incident, he 

reported to a WorkMed clinic. The physician who examined 

him, Dr. Britt, noted Mondragon’s explanation that the injury 

involved a wheelbarrow full of gravel that tilted and caused 

pressure on Mondragon’s right knee and that there was a 

“sudden pop” in that knee. Dr. Britt then noted that there was 

“no visible bruising” but that there “may be slight swelling 

above the joint line medially” and that Mondragon had “diffuse 

tenderness . . . around the medial joint line area.” He also noted 

that, although Mondragon was able to extend and flex the knee, 

“[a]ny attempts at rotation and extension cause[d] [Mondragon] 

to have marked pain.” Dr. Britt diagnosed Mondragon with a 

right knee sprain and stated that the sprain was the “result of the 

industrial injury/exposure described.” He prescribed a knee 

support and pain medication. He also referred Mondragon to an 

orthopedic specialist for further evaluation and released him to 

light-duty work. Because JPL did not have light-duty work 

available, it terminated Mondragon’s employment. Mondragon 

was out of work until July 15, 2012, when he began working for 

another employer.

¶4 In August 2012, Mondragon requested a hearing before 

an administrative law judge (the ALJ) to determine his 

entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits related to the 

accident. Mondragon represented himself at the hearing. When 

asked to explain how the accident occurred, he explained that he 

was “almost running” while pushing a wheelbarrow full of 
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gravel and that the wheelbarrow tipped to the side, catching his 

knee between the two handles. He testified that he “felt [his]

knee popping and twisting to the side” or that “maybe only 

nerves got twisted,” and that there was immediate swelling 

around his right knee. He also testified that Dr. Britt later 

informed him that he had suffered a “severe sprain.” On crossexamination, however, JPL demonstrated that the mechanism of 

injury Mondragon had described—that his right knee became 

caught between the two handles of the wheelbarrow—was 

physically impossible. Specifically, counsel for JPL asked 

Mondragon to demonstrate how his accident had occurred using 

a comparable wheelbarrow that JPL produced at the hearing. It 

became obvious that Mondragon’s knee could not have been 

caught between the two handles, because as the wheelbarrow 

tipped, the left handle would have been significantly higher than 

his right knee and could not have caught his right knee or struck 

it. Mondragon stated, however, that even if he did not know 

“how [the wheelbarrow] caught [his knee],” his right knee still 

“got caught . . . and the wheelbarrow tipped over to the side”

and that the right handle “was the one that hit [him],” which 

was when he felt his “[right] knee kind of popping towards the 

outside.”

¶5 In her interim findings of fact and conclusions of law 

issued after the hearing, the ALJ concluded that although “[t]he 

exact mechanism of injury is unclear” and Mondragon 

mistakenly “believed that one of the handles of the wheel 

barrow hit his right knee,” Mondragon had nevertheless 

suffered an injury that “arose out of an industrial accident.” The 

ALJ also concluded that there were conflicting opinions 

regarding the medical cause of Mondragon’s continuing knee 

problems, with Mondragon’s treating physicians stating that the 

accident caused Mondragon’s injury and the need for further 

treatment, while an independent medical examiner that JPL

hired had concluded that, at most, the accident aggravated 

preexisting knee conditions. The ALJ therefore referred the case 
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to a medical panel to consider the question of medical causation. 

In the charging letter, the ALJ asked the panel to answer whether 

there was “a medically demonstrable causal connection between 

[Mondragon’s] medical problem and the industrial accident as 

described in [the] Interim Order”; to “identify the medical care 

necessary to treat [Mondragon’s] problems caused by the

industrial accident”; and to “identify any and all future medical 

care . . . that will be necessary in treating [Mondragon’s] 

problems caused by the industrial accident.”

¶6 The ALJ found in her interim order that Mondragon 

could not have been injured by “one of the handles of the wheel 

barrow hit[ting] his right knee” and advised the medical panel in 

her charging letter that the panel was “bound by” the findings 

and conclusions in the interim order. In its report, the medical 

panel characterized Mondragon’s injury as a “twisting type 

injury” and described the accident as occurring when the 

wheelbarrow’s “handle caught [Mondragon’s] right leg” as it 

tipped over and Mondragon “twisted to free himself from the 

flipped wheel barrow.” On this basis, the medical panel

concluded that there was a “causal connection between the 

injury suffered in 2012 and the ongoing knee problem.” The 

panel had examined Mondragon and reviewed his medical 

history and determined that the type of pain he experienced—

“mostly medial side pain” along with “recurrent swelling” in the 

joint—was consistent with meniscal knee injuries. It also noted 

that, although Mondragon had suffered a number of knee 

injuries in the past, “all previous injuries to the right knee were 

diagnosed contusions” that “improved in less than four months” 

with “no residual symptoms.” Further, although arthritis could 

have been a cause of similar symptoms, the panel noted that 

radiographic images of the knee “show[ed] healthy joint weight 

bearing surfaces, with minimal arthritic changes consistent with 

age and heavy use” and opined that “the excellent joint space 

seen on [Mondragon’s] radiographs” would weigh against a 

conclusion that arthritis was the cause. The medical panel 
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concluded that “the twisting type injury with medial pain, the 

prolonged nature of the medial joint line pain and swelling, the 

findings on physical examination of medial pain, . . . all suggest 

an injury to the meniscus” from the accident, which “seldom 

heal[s] with time.” As a consequence, the panel opined that 

Mondragon required further medical care to treat his knee 

injury, including an operation to repair the meniscal tear, followup physical therapy and medication, and other associated 

medical care.

¶7 JPL objected to the medical panel report, arguing that the 

case should have been dismissed before referral to the panel 

because Mondragon “did not meet his burden of proving that an 

accident occurred.” JPL also argued that the panel’s report 

should not be admitted in any event, because the medical panel 

“relied upon a mechanism of injury which did not occur” when 

it described the accident as involving the wheelbarrow’s 

“handle” catching Mondragon’s right leg as the wheelbarrow

tipped over. The ALJ responded to JPL’s contentions in her 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, reiterating and further 

explaining her conclusion that Mondragon had suffered an 

industrial accident on the day in question. In particular, the ALJ 

stated that she found Mondragon’s “testimony regarding his 

work day to be believable and truthful.” Although Mondragon’s 

“description [of the accident] is flawed in the details,” she said, 

what “remained quite clear was that [Mondragon] did use his 

legs and body to try and keep control of the wheel barrow” and 

that “when the heavy load tipped” Mondragon was “jerked and 

tousled.” She further explained that even though Mondragon 

might have had a “flawed recollection of the details . . . the case 

can be made that an accident took place from the facts known

before and after the moment of injury,” which included “the 

nature of the heavy work being done, the pace of the work, the 

loss of control over the wheel barrow[,] and the resultant pain 

and injury.” The ALJ concluded that that evidence “proved that 

an industrial accident of substantial exertion took place.” In 
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addition, the ALJ rejected JPL’s contention that the medical 

panel had relied on facts inconsistent with the “in court 

demonstration done with the wheel barrow,” in other words, 

that the panel had relied on Mondragon’s discredited original 

description of the mechanism of injury. She therefore declined to 

hold a hearing on JPL’s objection to the medical panel report and 

admitted it. The ALJ then ordered JPL to pay Mondragon’s “past 

and future medical bills related to the necessary care 

of . . . Mondragon’s right knee injury consistent with the medical 

panel’s opinion.”

¶8 JPL sought review of the ALJ’s decision with the 

Commission. The Commission concluded, as had the ALJ, that

Mondragon had suffered a right knee injury as a result of the

work-site accident with the wheelbarrow. The Commission 

explained that, while the “exact mechanism of injury is 

somewhat unclear, . . . that uncertainty is not fatal” to 

Mondragon’s claim, particularly where it was clear that 

Mondragon’s “knee was subject to stress while the fully loaded 

wheelbarrow tipped over.” Nonetheless, the Commission agreed 

with JPL that the medical panel’s opinion was, at least in part, 

based “on a mechanism involving the wheelbarrow handles that 

is inaccurate.” The Commission concluded that the panel needed 

to “reassess [Mondragon’s] right knee injury in light of the 

Commission’s and [the ALJ’s] findings regarding the accident 

rather than [Mondragon’s] inaccurate description” and then 

readdress whether the accident was a medical cause of the 

injury.

¶9 In her second charging letter, the ALJ advised the panel 

that the matter was being remanded “for further review by the 

medical panel” because the Commission had determined that 

the report “may have been based on facts which were not 

consistent with the [interim order] issued after the hearing.” 

Specifically, the ALJ explained that the panel had described the 

accident as occurring when the tipping wheelbarrow’s handle 
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“caught [Mondragon’s] right leg, and [Mondragon] twisted to 

free himself,” but that “[t]here is no evidence that Mr. 

Mondragon was caught in the wheelbarrow or that he twisted to 

free himself.” Again advising the panel that it was bound by the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in her order, the ALJ 

requested that the panel answer four questions, including the 

following question most pertinent to the issues in this review:

Assuming that the exact mechanism of injury is not 

clear but that Mr. Mondragon’s right knee was 

subject to stress while a fully loaded wheelbarrow 

tipped over[,] please determine if Mr. Mondragon’s 

right knee problems were medically caused by the 

work accident or whether his current right knee 

problems are a continuation of his pre-existing 

condition and the transient pain he has 

experienced in the past?

¶10 The medical panel reconsidered the matter accordingly, 

and, in better alignment with the ALJ’s interim findings, 

disclaimed its previous description of the accident, i.e., that 

Mondragon’s knee had “been caught in the wheelbarrow or that 

he twisted to free himself.” Instead, the panel now 

acknowledged that the “exact mechanism of injury was unclear”

and that it had not been aware in the first evaluation that there 

was a controversy surrounding the “exact mechanism of injury.” 

The panel further noted that “the interpretation of a twisting 

type injury” was the panel’s conclusion, not Mondragon’s. The 

medical panel again determined, however, that the industrial 

accident medically caused Mondragon’s knee injury, that his 

condition had not yet stabilized, and that he would need 

additional treatment. With regard to the relationship between 

the known facts of the accident and injury, the panel explained 

that, due to the anatomical configuration of the meniscus, 

persons who suffer a meniscus tear often report “a sudden pop 

within the joint” and “often feel[] that [they have] been struck by 
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something,” consistent with Mondragon’s description. The 

person generally suffers “immediate pain on the side of the 

meniscus and swelling within the joint,” and it is “often difficult 

to extend the knee or place pressure on it,” just as Mondragon 

had reported right after the event. The panel further concluded 

that while Mondragon had suffered previous knee injuries, those 

injuries did not involve the same symptoms he exhibited after 

the May 2012 accident. The medical panel therefore rejected the 

suggestion that Mondragon’s injury was caused by a preexisting 

knee condition. And the panel concluded, as it had before, that 

Mondragon’s injury was consistent with a meniscal tear. After 

reviewing the medical panel’s second report, the ALJ reaffirmed 

her previous order awarding benefits to Mondragon stemming 

from the May 2012 accident.

¶11 JPL sought review by the Commission’s Appeals Board. 

The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and denied JPL’s request 

for reconsideration. JPL asks that we set aside the Board’s 

decision and the award of benefits in Mondragon’s favor.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶12 JPL argues that the Commission erred in awarding 

benefits to Mondragon. The Commission’s decision to award 

benefits is a mixed question of fact and law. Danny’s Drywall v. 

Labor Comm’n, 2014 UT App 277, ¶ 9, 339 P.3d 624. “The 

standard of review we apply when reviewing a mixed question 

can be either deferential or non-deferential” depending upon 

whether the question is more fact-like or law-like. Jex v. Labor 

Comm’n, 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, “[d]ue to the fact-intensive 

inquiry involved at the agency level” in determining whether it 

is appropriate to award benefits, including credibility 

determinations that an appellate court is “in an inferior position 

to review,” “this case does not lend itself to consistent resolution 

by a uniform body of appellate precedent.” See Carbon County v. 
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Workforce Appeals Board, 2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). This decision is therefore 

more fact-like, and deference to the Commission’s decision is 

warranted. See id.

¶13 The Commission is the ultimate fact finder in workers’ 

compensation claims. See e.g., Danny’s Drywall, 2014 UT App 277, 

¶ 14 (“[T]he ALJ/Commission is always the ultimate fact finder.” 

(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). We will uphold the Commission’s “factual findings if 

such findings are supported by substantial evidence based upon 

the record as a whole.” Ernest Health, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2016 

UT App 48, ¶ 10, 369 P.3d 462 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Substantial evidence exists when the findings 

are supported by “more than a mere scintilla of evidence,” and 

“[a]n administrative law decision meets the substantial evidence 

test when a reasonable mind might accept as adequate the 

evidence supporting the decision.” Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 

Plus, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 35, 164 P.3d 384 (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶14 “In order to determine whether a decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, the reviewing court must consider the 

whole record before the lower court,” which includes “evidence 

in support of the administrative finding, as well as evidence that 

detracts from the finding.” Id. ¶ 36. However, “[i]t is not this 

court’s place to substitute its judgment as between two 

reasonably conflicting views.” EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of 

Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 43, ¶ 16, 157 P.3d 334 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, it is the “province of 

the [Commission], not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting 

evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from 

the same evidence, it is for the [Commission] to draw the 

inferences.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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¶15 JPL also contends that the Commission improperly 

denied its request to conduct discovery into the claims history of 

Mondragon’s wife and adult son. “[T]he Commission is afforded 

broad discretion in determining how best to conduct its inquiry 

into each case,” and we will not disturb the Commission’s 

discovery decision unless it “exceed[s] the bounds of the 

Commission’s discretion.” See Ernest Health, 2016 UT App 48, 

¶¶ 6–7; see also Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i) (LexisNexis 

2014) (explaining that an appellate court “shall grant relief only 

if, on the basis of the agency’s record, it determines that a person 

seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced 

by . . . an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by 

statute”); id. § 34A-2-802(1) (2015) (explaining that an ALJ and 

the Commission “may make its investigation in such manner as 

in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial 

rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit” of the

Workers’ Compensation Act).

ANALYSIS

¶16 JPL on appeal essentially contends that, once it disproved 

the precise mechanism of injury that Mondragon described, 

Mondragon’s credibility was destroyed, but that the Commission 

then created an alternative theory of the accident on its own that 

has no basis in the evidence to support its award of benefits. As 

a consequence, JPL claims that it was deprived of fair notice and 

an opportunity to defend against Mondragon’s claims. JPL also 

contends that it was foreclosed from pursuing its theory that 

Mondragon’s claim was fraudulent when the ALJ, and later the 

Commission, denied its requests to conduct discovery on the 

claims history of Mondragon’s wife and adult son.

I. The Award of Benefits

¶17 To recover workers’ compensation, an employee must 

demonstrate that he or she has been “injured . . . by accident 
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arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employment.” 

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1) (LexisNexis 2015). “This section 

sets forth two prerequisites to recovery.” Smith’s Food & Drug, 

Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2011 UT App 67, ¶ 7, 250 P.3d 1008 (citing 

Allen v. Industrial Comm’n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986)). First, the 

employee must show that the claimed injury occurred by 

accident. Id. Second, the employee must show that there is “‘a 

causal connection between the injury and the employment.’” Id.

(quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at 18). In other words, the “by accident” 

element is distinct from the “causal connection” element. See id.

¶18 JPL argues that the award of benefits was based upon 

factual findings that do not have support in the evidence 

submitted by Mondragon—both as to the injury itself and 

causation. Instead, according to JPL, the Commission improperly 

determined that Mondragon had been injured in an industrial 

accident by inferring that he was merely mistaken about the 

mechanism of injury, which it claims has no basis in the 

evidence. And JPL contends that the Commission then 

improperly advocated for Mondragon by creating an alternative 

theory of injury—the significant stress theory—that also had no 

support in the evidence, and then relied on the subsequent 

reports from the medical panel to justify awarding benefits on 

that basis. In JPL’s view, the physical mechanism described by 

Mondragon constituted the theory of injury under which he 

submitted his claim. Once JPL disproved the theory of 

mechanism at the hearing, the case should have been dismissed 

because Mondragon had failed to establish that an industrial 

accident had even occurred. JPL also contends that because it 

disproved Mondragon’s description of the mechanism of injury, 

the doctors’ reports submitted by Mondragon were necessarily 

rendered “foundationless,” because the doctors had relied upon 

that mechanism in making their professional assessments. As a 

result, the doctors’ reports could not have provided evidence 

that there was a dispute about medical causation sufficient to 
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refer the case to the medical panel. Thus, according to JPL, 

Mondragon did not establish medical causation.

¶19 In this section, we first address whether the evidence 

supported the Commission’s determination that Mondragon 

suffered an industrial accident. Next, we address whether the 

Commission improperly created a theory of injury to support its 

award of benefits, thereby advocating on behalf of Mondragon. 

Finally, we address whether the medical panel referrals were 

proper.

A. The Industrial Accident

¶20 JPL attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

Commission’s determination that Mondragon suffered injury 

from an industrial accident. JPL argues that by disproving 

Mondragon’s description of the precise mechanism of injury, it 

also disproved Mondragon’s claim that an accident occurred at 

all. Therefore, JPL reasons, the Commission had no basis to 

conclude that Mondragon was confused about the mechanism of 

injury. Rather, according to JPL, the Commission sua sponte 

created an alternate theory of injury—what JPL characterizes as 

“the significant stress theory”—which had no basis in the 

evidence. In essence, JPL contends that the evidence 

demonstrated Mondragon was lying about the entire incident 

and that the Commission had no basis for believing his story 

about a workplace accident.

¶21 The Commission recognized that, because of the 

demonstration with the wheelbarrow at the hearing, the 

industrial accident could not have occurred in exactly the way 

Mondragon described. Nonetheless, the Commission found that 

Mondragon was “believable and truthful” regarding the 

occurrence of an accident and that although his description of 

the mechanism of injury was “flawed in the details,” at the time 

the “full wheelbarrow tilted” and fell over, Mondragon 

experienced “significant stress on his right knee,” which resulted 
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in “a sudden ‘pop’ and pain in his right knee.” The Commission 

noted that, even if “the specific action that result[ed] in 

[Mondragon’s] internal injury” was “unclear,” Mondragon had 

“consistently described that he experienced a sudden onset of 

pain” as the wheelbarrow tipped, a description corroborated by 

Dr. Britt’s assessment three hours after the accident. Thus, on the 

basis of both Mondragon’s testimony and Dr. Britt’s report, the 

Commission concluded that Mondragon “did suffer a right-knee 

injury” as a result of the industrial accident.

¶22 We will uphold the ALJ’s and the Commission’s factual 

findings that Mondragon suffered an injury through an 

industrial accident if we determine that there is substantial 

evidence to do so. See Ernest Health, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2016 

UT App 48, ¶ 10, 369 P.3d 462. And with regard to the credibility 

determination here, “[i]t is not our role to judge the relative 

credibility of witnesses.” Davis v. Department of Workforce Servs., 

2012 UT App 158, ¶ 6, 280 P.3d 442 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Rather, “when the evidence is 

disputed, as it was here, we defer to the Board’s assessment of 

credibility and resolution of conflicting evidence.” Id. (brackets, 

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carbon 

County v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2013 UT 41, ¶ 6, 308 P.3d 477 

(explaining that we give deference to the fact finder “because it 

stands in a superior position from which to evaluate and weigh 

the evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of 

witnesses’ recollections” (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

¶23 As the Commission noted, Mondragon testified at the 

hearing that he was injured when he slipped while “almost 

running” with a wheelbarrow full of gravel which tipped to the 

side. He stated that as the wheelbarrow fell, his “knee was 

caught between the two handles,” and that he “felt [his] knee 

popping and twisting to the side,” or “maybe only nerves got 

twisted.” He testified that, immediately after he felt the popping, 
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the inside of his right knee began to swell. Dr. Britt’s report

corroborated the core aspects of this account. He indicated that 

Mondragon told him that “he was at work pushing a 

wheelbarrow full of gravel” when he “slipped,” and that “as the 

wheelbarrow tilted the handles [took] hold of him in different 

directions,” which “caused pressure” on his right knee, 

whereupon Mondragon “felt a sudden pop in the knee.” 

Importantly, he also noted that “[t]here was no impact on the 

knee,” as Mondragon “did not fall to the ground but was 

[instead] able to catch himself when this occurred.” Dr. Britt’s

examination notes state that he observed a “diffuse 

tenderness . . . around the medial joint line area,” that there was 

possibly “slight swelling,” and that Mondragon was not able to 

adequately perform a McMurray test1 because he experienced 

“significant pain” with “[a]ny attempts at rotation and 

extension” of the knee. Dr. Britt diagnosed a right knee sprain 

and opined that the industrial accident that Mondragon 

described caused the injury.

¶24 This is “a quantum and quality of relevant evidence that 

is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support [the]

conclusion” that Mondragon experienced an industrial injury. 

See Provo City v. Labor Comm’n, 2015 UT 32, ¶ 8, 345 P.3d 1242

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, 

Mondragon’s testimony and Dr. Britt’s report constituted 

evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to 

suggest that Mondragon was in fact injured during the workrelated accident he described. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 

Plus, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 35, 164 P.3d 384 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

 

1. A McMurray test is “used to evaluate individuals for tears in 

the meniscus of the knee.” McMurray Test, Wikipedia.org, 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McMurray_test [https://perma.cc/

58TT-52PT].
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¶25 Moreover, this evidence supports the Commission’s 

characterization of the incident as involving “significant stress” 

on Mondragon’s knee. JPL appears to argue that Mondragon 

was required to have described a precise mechanism of injury to 

explain the occurrence of “significant stress” to his knee different 

from the disproved rotating handles mechanism in order for the 

Commission to have determined that such stress had actually 

occurred, and that, because he did not, the Commission’s 

conclusion amounted to an impermissible alternate theory of 

injury. We do not agree. “In conducting a substantial evidence 

review, we do not reweigh the evidence and independently 

choose which inferences we find to be the most reasonable. 

Instead, we defer to [the Commission’s] finding because when 

reasonably conflicting views arise, it is the [fact-finder’s] 

province to draw the inferences and resolve these conflicts.”

Danny’s Drywall v. Labor Comm’n, 2014 UT App 277, ¶ 11, 339 

P.3d 624 (second alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, because the evidence at the 

hearing presented a conflict regarding the precise mechanism of 

injury, it was within the Commission’s prerogative to weigh the 

evidence as a whole and to draw the inferences it found to be the 

most reasonable.

¶26 While JPL is correct that Mondragon did not use the exact 

words “significant stress” in his description of the event, the fact 

that he felt his right knee pop and experienced immediate pain 

as the wheelbarrow tipped over permits a reasonable inference 

that the knee was subject to significant stress in those moments. 

Further, Dr. Britt’s report supports the Commission’s 

“significant stress” determination. In his notes, Dr. Britt related 

that Mondragon had told him that his right knee was subjected 

to “pressure” as he attempted to “catch himself” when “he 

slipped and the wheelbarrow tilted,” which resulted in the 

“sudden pop” Mondragon reported feeling in his right knee. Dr. 
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Britt also confirmed that there was indeed an injury.2 Thus,

Mondragon’s testimony and Dr. Britt’s report support an 

inference that Mondragon’s right knee was subject to stress as 

the wheelbarrow tipped, even if Mondragon was mistaken about 

the physical dynamics that led to the injury. As a consequence, 

the Commission did not, as JPL contends, sua sponte create an 

alternate theory of injury. The “significant stress” theory of 

injury was already present in the evidence submitted, and the 

Commission’s characterization of the accident is more properly 

viewed as arising from reasonable inferences drawn from the 

potentially conflicting evidence surrounding how Mondragon’s 

internal knee injury occurred as the wheelbarrow began to tip 

over. See EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT 

App 43, ¶ 16, 157 P.3d 334 (explaining that it is the “province of 

the [Commission], not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting 

evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from 

the same evidence, it is for the [Commission] to draw the 

inferences” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶27 Nonetheless, JPL essentially contends that the precise 

mechanism of injury was the lynchpin to Mondragon’s entire 

story and that, because JPL disproved that mechanism, the 

Commission could not have found the surrounding details of 

Mondragon’s testimony to be credible. But JPL has provided no 

 

2. We note, too, that other than asserting that Mondragon 

fabricated the entire incident, JPL has not pointed us toward any 

medical report that denies that Mondragon was injured in some 

way on the day in question. Indeed, even JPL’s independent 

medical evaluator, Dr. Fotheringham, conceded that the accident 

“could possibly have aggravated” what he characterized as 

“preexisting degenerative changes” and that the treatment that 

Mondragon received through Dr. Britt at the WorkMed clinic 

“was appropriate” to resolve the injury he believed Mondragon 

incurred.
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authority for the proposition it asserts—that once the precise 

mechanism of internal injury is shown to be impossible, the 

claimant’s recounting of events is necessarily unworthy of belief 

as a matter of law. Instead, JPL supports its argument by arguing 

its own assessment of the evidence and claiming that, in its view, 

the evidence was at least as likely that Mondragon fabricated the 

entire incident. It also suggests that Dr. Britt’s report could fairly 

be read as evidence that Mondragon’s injury was actually 

preexisting. But JPL cannot persuade us that the Commission 

erred in its assessment of the evidence or its credibility 

determination by rearguing on appeal “the facts that [it claims]

support its version of the events,” see Carbon County v. 

Department of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 4, ¶ 5, 269 P.3d 969, 

or by attempting to persuade us to reweigh the evidence, see 

Provo City, 2015 UT 32, ¶ 8 (“In conducting a substantial 

evidence review, we do not reweigh the evidence and 

independently choose which inferences we find to be the most 

reasonable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶28 More importantly, while JPL demonstrated that the 

precise mechanism Mondragon described was physically 

impossible, JPL has not shown on appeal that the accident as a 

whole was physically impossible or that the surrounding 

circumstances could not have led to the injury Mondragon 

described. See Ernest Health, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2016 UT App 

48, ¶ 10, 369 P.3d 462 (explaining that we assess the 

Commission’s findings based upon the record “as a whole”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Certainly, it is 

not beyond reason that a person who loses control of a 

wheelbarrow full of gravel while running with it can injure a 

knee while trying to “catch himself” from falling as the loaded 

wheelbarrow goes over—or that afterward he might inaccurately 

describe the precise mechanism of injury.

¶29 Nor has JPL shown that Mondragon’s testimony about 

the incident as a whole was necessarily incredible. Even 
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assuming that Mondragon’s recounting of the mechanism of 

injury constitutes a type of inconsistency in his testimony, the 

precise mechanism of internal injury is merely one element in 

the series of events comprising the industrial incident. See id.

And apart from the mechanism of injury, Mondragon recounted 

the other material aspects of the event consistently. He reported 

at the hearing and to Dr. Britt that he was pushing the 

wheelbarrow, that he lost control of it, that as it tipped over he 

felt his knee pop, and that he suffered swelling and pain 

immediately afterward. And the Commission did not need to 

merely rely on Mondragon’s testimony given at the hearing; as 

explained, the objective components of Dr. Britt’s report support 

a conclusion that Mondragon had suffered a knee injury.

¶30 Thus, even assuming that Mondragon’s testimony and the 

circumstances surrounding the accident might have permitted 

the Commission to infer that Mondragon had fabricated the 

incident, it is “the province of the [Commission], not appellate 

courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent 

inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the 

[Commission] to draw the inferences.” EAGALA, 2007 UT App 

43, ¶ 16 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord 

Carbon County, 2013 UT 41, ¶ 6. The ALJ found, and the 

Commission affirmed, that Mondragon was credible, and we 

will not disturb that determination. See Prosper Team, Inc. v. 

Department of Workforce Servs., 2011 UT App 246, ¶ 4 n.2, 262 P.3d 

462 (“[W]e never enter into the realm of credibility; the 

[Commission] is simply in a much better position to judge the 

credibility of a witness than this court.”).

¶31 Finally, although JPL contends that the Commission did 

not have sufficient evidence to determine that Mondragon was 

merely confused about the mechanism of injury as opposed to 

fabricating the incident, the Commission’s determination that 

Mondragon was mistaken about the exact mechanism is more 

properly characterized as an inference, one that is also inherently 
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bound up in its credibility determination. Provo City, 2015 UT 32, 

¶ 8 (“Instead, we defer to an administrative agency’s findings 

because when reasonably conflicting views arise, it is the 

agency’s province to draw inferences and resolve those 

conflicts.” (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks 

omitted)). When JPL disproved the mechanism of injury at the 

hearing, the Commission was required to decide whether 

Mondragon was nonetheless credible—that is, whether the 

evidence as a whole suggested that he was lying or was merely 

mistaken about the exact mechanism about the whole incident.

While the Commission acknowledged that Mondragon’s 

description of the precise mechanism of injury was not possible,

it determined that Mondragon was generally credible as to the 

events of the day—i.e., that he was not lying. See EAGALA, 2007 

UT App 43, ¶ 16. As a result, our conclusion that there was 

substantial evidence to support the Commission’s credibility 

determination necessarily resolves the question of whether there 

was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s inference 

that Mondragon was mistaken about the events of the accident 

rather than dishonest. See Provo City, 2015 UT 32, ¶ 8.

¶32 In sum, where “the underlying and dispositive 

circumstances of the accident were established in the record 

even though the precise mechanism of injury was not,” we 

conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the 

Commission’s determination that Mondragon was injured 

through an industrial accident. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 

Plus, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 35, 164 P.3d 384.

B. The Commission as an Advocate

¶33 Relying on Acosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67, 44 

P.3d 819, JPL contends that the ALJ and the Commission 

improperly advocated on Mondragon’s behalf by creating a 

“new theory of accident” to support the award of benefits—

namely, the “significant stress” theory. It argues that, in doing 
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so, the Commission “improperly awarded benefits on a 

theory . . . against which JPL had no opportunity to defend.” For 

reasons similar to those already discussed above, we conclude 

that our decision in Acosta does not require a different result.

¶34 In Acosta, we upheld the Commission’s determination 

that the ALJ had improperly awarded benefits based on a theory 

of legal causation not presented by the claimant. Id. ¶¶ 31–33. 

The claimant, a licensed nurse, asserted that, while working in 

the maternity unit of a medical center, “she felt pain in her back” 

when she lifted an eight-pound infant from a crib-like structure 

and “turned to hand the child to its mother.” Id. ¶ 2. The pain 

grew worse. She based her claim for temporary workers’ 

compensation benefits on this discrete incident, and the 

employer countered that her accident did not amount to the sort 

of “unusual or extraordinary exertion” required to justify an 

award of compensation in the face of her preexisting back 

condition under Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 

1986). See Acosta, 2002 UT App 67, ¶ 32. In concluding that the 

claimant satisfied the legal causation requirement, however, the 

ALJ “relied on a cumulative trauma theory that he raised sua 

sponte” rather than on the discrete trauma identified by the 

claimant as the basis for her claim. Id. ¶ 4. In particular, the ALJ 

determined that, while a “single lift of an eight pound 

baby, . . . considered alone” would not satisfy the extraordinary 

exertion test, nonetheless the “totality of the circumstances in 

Acosta’s case include much more than this single event, for she 

had five babies and their respective mothers to care for.” Id. ¶ 31

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ 

concluded that “Acosta has shown by a preponderance of the 

evidence that her aggregated workplace duties caused her injury 

and exceeded the Allen test.” Id. (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Commission reversed, concluding in part 

that “it was improper for the ALJ to raise the cumulative trauma 

theory on his own because doing so denied [the respondents] the 

opportunity to present evidence and challenge [a cumulative 
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trauma theory] type of claim.” Id. ¶ 33 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Commission reversed the award 

of benefits, concluding that the “single lift of one eight pound 

infant is not enough to satisfy the Allen test,” which we affirmed.

Id. ¶¶ 33–35.

¶35 The circumstances here are different. In Acosta, the ALJ 

sua sponte raised a completely new theory of causation to meet 

that necessary element of Acosta’s claim—he decided that, while 

a single discrete instance of lifting one child could not meet the 

legal causation requirement, the “totality of the circumstances” 

in the claimant’s case would. Thus, he crafted a new theory of 

legal causation to substitute for the theory the claimant had 

advanced. And, in doing so, the ALJ made it impossible for the 

respondents to prepare an effective defense. In contrast, here, the 

Commission did not need to create a new theory of accident for 

Mondragon; even if the precise mechanism of injury was 

unclear, the circumstances of the incident as a whole, as well as 

the medical evidence that Mondragon provided, supported an 

inference that Mondragon’s right knee was injured when the 

wheelbarrow tipped over. Indeed, the ALJ and the Commission 

determined that, even though the mechanism of injury 

Mondragon described—the handles hitting and catching his 

leg—could not have occurred, he was nevertheless injured by 

the accident. Thus, unlike Acosta, the ALJ and the Commission 

did not have to look beyond the claim and the supporting 

evidence that Mondragon actually presented to determine that 

he had suffered an injury through an industrial accident. This 

case would resemble Acosta if the Commission had rested its 

decision not on the wheelbarrow incident alone, but also on 

other events that Mondragon did not claim caused his injury. 

But the Commission did not.

¶36 As a result, we reject JPL’s contention that the 

Commission impermissibly advocated on Mondragon’s behalf. 

The Commission does not act as an advocate by making 
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inferences supported by substantial evidence and judgments 

about the credibility of a claimant in fulfillment of its fact finding 

responsibility. Because the evidence permitted a fair inference 

that Mondragon’s knee was subject to stress as the wheelbarrow 

tipped over and that Mondragon was credible despite his 

mistake about the precise mechanism of injury, the 

Commission’s determination that Mondragon had been injured 

in the incident as a result of “significant stress” resulting from 

the established events did not amount to advocacy.

¶37 For the same reasons, we are not persuaded that JPL was 

deprived of fair notice to defend against Mondragon’s 

allegations. From the beginning, Mondragon alleged that his 

right knee injury occurred when he lost control of the tipping 

wheelbarrow. And, indeed, JPL defended against Mondragon’s 

claim by asserting that his claim was fraudulent and could not 

have occurred. In addition, JPL contended, with the support of 

an independent medical examination, that Mondragon’s knee 

problems were the result of a preexisting condition, not an injury 

at work. Thus, JPL has not persuaded us that it was unfairly 

impeded in its defense in this case.

C. Medical Support and the Medical Panel Referrals

¶38 In addition to arguing that the evidence did not support 

the Commission’s determination that Mondragon had been 

injured through the industrial accident he described, JPL argues 

that medical causation was not established where the 

Commission improperly referred the case to a medical panel. It 

contends that the Commission sent the case to the medical panel 

on the basis of the “significant stress” theory, but asserts that,

because the medical reports Mondragon submitted relied upon a 

“rotation-type injury” rather than a stress theory and the 

rotation-type injury he described was shown to be impossible, 

those medical reports were “rendered foundationless and cannot 

be relied upon” to support the Commission’s determination that 
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there was a dispute in the medical evidence regarding medical 

causation sufficient to refer the case to the panel. JPL claims that,

“[b]ecause [the rotation-type injury] theory was disproved, 

Mondragon’s medical support for that theory was invalidated” 

and that, apart from the medical panel’s ultimate conclusions, 

“[Mondragon] lacked medical support for any other theory of 

accident.” On that basis, JPL claims that those reports therefore 

could not have supported the Commission’s determination that 

there was a dispute in the medical evidence sufficient to justify 

referral to a medical panel or that medical causation had been 

established.

¶39 An ALJ is authorized to “refer the medical aspects of a 

case . . . to a medical panel.” Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(1)(a) 

(LexisNexis 2015). The regulations regarding use of medical 

panels provide that “[a medical] panel will be utilized by the 

Administrative Law Judge where one or more significant 

medical issues may be involved,” which include “[c]onflicting 

medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease.” 

Utah Admin. Code R602-2-2(A)(1). At issue here is whether there 

was a dispute in the medical evidence regarding medical 

causation. “Whether there are conflicting medical reports is a 

question of fact. We must uphold the Commission’s factual 

findings if such findings are supported by substantial evidence 

based upon the record as a whole.” Resort Retainers v. Labor 

Comm’n, 2010 UT App 229, ¶ 24, 238 P.3d 1081 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

¶40 As discussed above, this case was twice referred to a 

medical panel. After initially determining that Mondragon had 

suffered an industrial injury, the ALJ referred the case to a 

medical panel based upon a determination that there was a 

conflict in the medical evidence about whether the injury was 

“the direct result of the accident” and whether further treatment 

was necessary. The ALJ noted that, while the independent 

medical examiner that JPL retained believed that Mondragon’s 
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current symptoms resulted from “preexisting degenerative 

changes” and were not “the direct result of the accident at 

issue,” Mondragon’s treating physicians “are recommending 

treatment and indicate the accident is industrial.” On that basis, 

the ALJ determined that “there are conflicting medical opinions 

regarding medical causation” and referred the case to the 

medical panel. After extensively reviewing Mondragon’s 

medical history and examining him, the initial panel report 

opined that “all [the evidence it reviewed] suggest[ed] an injury 

to the meniscus.” It concluded that “[t]here is a causal 

connection between the injury suffered in 2012 and the ongoing 

knee problem” and that Mondragon needed further treatment, 

including a “right knee arthroscopy.”

¶41 The Commission determined on review that “the panel’s 

reasoning [was] based in part” “on a mechanism of injury 

involving wheelbarrow handles that is inaccurate”—i.e., that the 

wheelbarrow handles somehow twisted Mondragon’s knee. 

Noting that the record established that “Mr. Mondragon’s right 

knee was subject to stress while the fully loaded wheelbarrow 

tipped over,” the Commission referred the case back to the 

medical panel to “reconsider the medical aspects of Mr. 

Mondragon’s claim in light of the fact that his right knee was not 

caught and twisted between the wheelbarrow handles.” The 

medical panel’s second report again concluded that “Mr. 

Mondragon’s right knee problems suffered since May 2012 were 

caused by the described industrial accident” and explained that

“[t]he nature of the injury is consistent with those causing 

meniscal injury.” In particular, the panel noted that Mondragon 

reported that he “felt that he had been hit in the knee,” that he 

“felt a pop inside of the medial knee,” and that he experienced 

“medial tenderness, swelling, and medial pain” after the 

accident. The panel explained that, as a general matter, “[t]he 

unfortunate individual suffering [a meniscal] tear reports a 

sudden pop within the joint, often feeling that he has been struck 

by something” along with “immediate pain on the side of the 
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meniscus and swelling within the joint.” It also noted that a torn 

meniscus “seldom heals” on its own and “either has to be 

removed or repaired.” And the panel opined that the kind of 

accident Mondragon suffered—involving “abnormal,” shearing 

stress placed upon the knee while trying to keep a full 

wheelbarrow from falling over—is the kind of “mechanism that 

causes a meniscus to tear.” It concluded that the “violent 

stressful motion type injury,” “the prolonged nature” of the 

pain, and “the findings [and test results] on physical 

examination” “all suggest [that Mondragon suffered] an injury 

to the meniscus.” As it did in the first report, the panel also 

stated that further treatment was needed, including an

“[a]rthroscopic evaluation.”

¶42 To begin with, we are not persuaded that the medical 

reports Mondragon submitted were rendered foundationless or 

invalidated simply because, as JPL claims, he reported a precise 

mechanism of injury to his doctors that was later proven to be 

impossible. JPL asserts that the dispute in the medical records as 

to medical causation “was premised wholly upon the 

presumption of Mondragon’s physicians that the mechanism he 

reported had actually occurred.” But JPL provides no support 

for this assertion; it simply characterizes the alleged mechanism 

as somehow forming the entire backbone of each medical report, 

without explaining why. JPL also cites no authority for its 

proposition that, because one portion of a medical report is 

drawn into question, the entire report is necessarily “rendered 

foundationless.” And JPL has not even identified in what sense 

the medical records were rendered foundationless other than 

simply making the loose assertion that they were because 

Mondragon had apparently described the mechanism of injury 

in a way later found to be mistaken. Indeed, the second medical 

panel report noted that, even if the wheelbarrow handles were 

not the cause, an injury like Mondragon’s was consistent with 

the sort of strain that could result from the event he described—

suggesting that aspects of Mondragon’s description of the 
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injury’s mechanism were perhaps not, in fact, wholly mistaken. 

As a result, JPL has failed to persuade us that the foundation of 

the medical reports dissolved once Mondragon’s wheelbarrowhandles description of the injury was proved mistaken. See Red 

Bridge Capital, LLC v. JAR Family Inv. Co., 2014 UT App 21, ¶ 8, 

319 P.3d 754 (explaining that the Utah Rules of Appellate 

Procedure require “citation to authority [as well as] 

development of that authority and reasonable analysis based on 

that authority” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶43 In any event, as we have discussed at length, this question 

is the kind that the Commission is uniquely positioned to

resolve. See EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2007 

UT App 43, ¶ 16, 157 P.3d 334. Like Mondragon’s testimony, the 

medical records are pieces of evidence that the Commission may 

choose to weigh as it deems appropriate. See Hutchings v. Labor 

Comm’n, 2016 UT App 160, ¶ 29, 378 P.3d 1273 (explaining that it 

is the Commission’s responsibility to assess the medical evidence 

to make its medical causation determination). And, at best, 

Mondragon’s mistaken description of the precise injury 

mechanism created a question regarding the extent to which 

Mondragon’s medical records could be relied upon. Certainly, 

the Commission could have decided that Mondragon’s error 

undermined the value of the medical opinions, but JPL has not 

demonstrated that such a determination involved more than the 

sort of weighing of evidence that is the Commission’s particular 

province.

¶44 In this regard, as we have explained above, there was 

substantial evidence—apart from the medical panel report 

itself—to suggest that the accident actually occurred and that an 

injury occurred due to stress being placed on Mondragon’s right 

knee as the full wheelbarrow tilted over, even if Mondragon was 

mistaken regarding exactly how it happened. As a result, we 

also necessarily reject JPL’s contention that the medical panel 

report provided the only medical support for the Commission’s 
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medical causation finding. While Mondragon’s impression of 

how the injury occurred was mistaken in the details he 

described, both treating physicians nonetheless treated him 

based upon the overarching theory that his right knee was 

injured when the full wheelbarrow he was pushing tipped over, 

which was consistently reported to his physicians. Dr. Britt’s 

report went further, stating that Mondragon reported that he 

was injured as the wheelbarrow tipped over and put “pressure” 

on his right knee. Further, neither physician simply relied upon 

Mondragon’s description of the mechanism of injury in making 

their assessments or conclusions as to causation or whether 

further treatment was required. For example, Dr. Britt conducted 

objective tests, such as the McMurray test, and examined the 

knee for swelling, bruising, or other signs of injury, which he 

found. Likewise, another treating physician, Dr. Andruss

performed an examination of Mondragon’s knee and also 

reviewed x-rays and Mondragon’s medical history before 

making his assessment. In other words, neither physician’s 

report was premised entirely upon Mondragon’s own 

description of the mechanism of injury he described. Rather, 

both physicians formulated their assessment based upon the 

entire picture presented to them. Cf. Ernest Health, Inc. v. Labor 

Comm’n, 2016 UT App 48, ¶ 10, 369 P.3d 462 (explaining that the 

evidence should be reviewed based upon the record “as a 

whole” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). And to 

the extent that the medical records repeated Mondragon’s 

mistaken mechanism of injury, as we have explained, whatever 

question that may have raised about their reliability was for the 

Commission to resolve. See EAGALA, 2007 UT App 43, ¶ 16.

¶45 In sum, we conclude that there was substantial evidence 

supporting the Commission’s determination that Mondragon 

was injured in the industrial accident he described, and, 

notwithstanding the lack of clarity about the precise mechanism 

of injury, we decline to disturb the Commission’s determination 

that Mondragon was credible. We also conclude that the 
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Commission did not sua sponte create its own theory of accident 

and that it did not improperly advocate on behalf of Mondragon. 

Finally, we conclude that the ALJ’s referral of the case to the 

medical panel was not improper and that the medical panel’s 

report did not form the sole support for the Commission’s 

medical causation finding.

¶46 We now proceed to address JPL’s remaining argument 

that the Commission improperly denied its discovery requests 

into the claims history of Mondragon’s wife and adult son.

II. Discovery

¶47 JPL finally contends that the Commission abused its 

discretion when it refused to allow JPL additional discovery into 

the claims history of Mondragon’s wife and adult son. JPL

contends that the Commission denied the discovery because JPL

“had not submitted the very evidence on fraud and credibility 

that [it] sought to obtain through the requested discovery.” JPL

seems to suggest that its “speculation of fraud, based upon the 

circumstantial evidence,” which included the claims history as 

well as the circumstances of the accident itself, should be 

sufficient to “cast[] . . . doubt upon the Commission’s 

assumption of Mondragon’s confusion.” And JPL contends that 

the Commission’s decision “deprived [JPL] of its rights to 

conduct discovery into this centrally relevant matter.”

¶48 The Commission “is afforded broad discretion in 

determining how best to conduct its inquiry into each case.” 

Ernest Health, 2016 UT App 48, ¶ 6. In this regard, the 

Commission “may make its investigation in such manner as in 

its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights 

of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the [Workers’ 

Compensation Act].” Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802(1)

(LexisNexis 2015). It may also “receive as evidence and use as 

proof of any fact in dispute all evidence considered material and 

relevant.” Id. § 34A-2-802(2). The Commission’s discovery 
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decisions fit within this broad grant of discretion. See id. (listing 

the various types of evidence the Commission may choose to 

receive). Accordingly, we will not disturb the Commission’s 

decision not to permit further discovery unless its decision 

“exceeded the bounds of [its] discretion.” Ernest Health, 2016 UT 

App 48, ¶ 7.

¶49 During the proceedings, JPL repeatedly asserted that 

Mondragon fabricated his claim of injury. It based this assertion 

upon its characterization of the circumstances surrounding the 

accident and upon a claims history report it had generated. JPL

generated the claims report from, as it states, “a broad search” 

that included claims filed under “similar names,” from the same 

address, and of the same loss type. It also included claims filed 

under other types of policies, such as personal automobile 

policies. And it included only basic information on any matching 

claim, such as the identification information of the insuring 

company implicated; the date of loss; the claimant’s identifying 

information; the applicable policy type, such as “personal 

automobile” or “workers compensation”; the coverage and loss 

type; the injury type (such as, “inflammation knee” or 

“contusion to right index finger”); and any other involved party, 

such as an insured business. It did not include any information 

about how much was paid out or how each claim had been 

resolved or any details or notes describing the circumstances of 

each matched claim. In fact, the report itself did not even 

identify the potential familial relationships between Mondragon 

and the other persons whose claims matched based upon the 

selected criteria—that is, other than the dates of birth or the 

matching addresses and last names, nothing in the report 

identified any other persons as actually being Mondragon’s 

adult son or wife. JPL argues that this report raised a sufficient 

question regarding the veracity of Mondragon’s claim to justify 

additional discovery into the claims history of Mondragon’s wife 

and adult son. Indeed, it contends that the claims report showed 

that Mondragon and his adult son “had demonstrated a pattern 
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of filing numerous workers’ compensation claims at the same 

successive prior employers.”

¶50 JPL therefore filed a motion early in the proceedings to 

compel Mondragon to, among other things, provide signed 

information releases from his adult son and wife. In its motion, 

JPL did not explain why the releases for Mondragon’s wife and 

son were necessary for resolution of the case. Instead, JPL simply 

requested that the ALJ compel Mondragon to provide them, 

along with other discovery responses, such as Mondragon’s own 

release and the initial interrogatories and request for production

that JPL served. While the ALJ granted the motion as to 

Mondragon’s release, she refused to compel Mondragon’s adult 

son and wife to provide the information and records releases 

requested, explaining that there had “been no showing of 

relevancy,” and Mondragon’s adult son and wife “are not 

subject to the jurisdiction of this court.” In seeking review of the 

ALJ’s final order awarding Mondragon benefits, JPL attempted 

to discredit Mondragon by asserting that the claims history 

search it had conducted revealed that Mondragon and his “adult 

son had demonstrated [a] pattern of filing workers’ 

compensation claims for multiple same prior employers.” JPL

stated that it desired “to conduct additional discovery into the 

veracity of [Mondragon’s] claim” because, in its view, the 

circumstances of the accident along with the “questionable claim 

history” suggested that Mondragon had “fabricated” the 

accident. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s order, and JPL

then filed a motion for reconsideration in which it renewed its 

request for discovery into the claims history of Mondragon’s 

adult son and wife. JPL argued that its request for discovery 

from Mondragon’s family members was “wholly relevant and 

necessary” in light of the fact that, in its view, the ALJ awarded 

benefits to Mondragon “on the basis of [the] faulty assumption 

of [his] credibility.”
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¶51 In its order denying the request for reconsideration, the 

Board stated that it had reviewed the claims history and the 

related materials “and found there to be no actual evidence of 

fraud on Mr. Mondragon’s part.” It concluded that Mondragon 

had suffered an injury to his right knee based upon “the medical 

evidence that Mr. Mondragon sustained a twisting-type injury to 

his right knee consistent with the strain of carrying a 

wheelbarrow on the date in question.” And it concluded that the 

“assertion that Mr. Mondragon is not credible and may be 

committing fraud is no more than speculation.” It therefore 

denied the request for reconsideration.

¶52 We decline to disturb the Commission’s decision. JPL

essentially argues that the claims history report it submitted 

combined with its characterization of the circumstances of the 

accident—including the fact that Mondragon was “allegedly 

injured within hours of beginning his employment with [JPL],” 

that the accident was “unwitnessed,” and that Mondragon 

returned to “similar employment” after his injury—cast enough 

doubt on the veracity of Mondragon’s own claim to justify 

discovery into the claims of his adult son and wife, both 

nonparties to the claim. And, according to JPL, the Commission 

abused its discretion by not allowing JPL to do so. But because 

we have affirmed the Commission’s determination that 

Mondragon was credible and that Mondragon was injured in the 

accident, we do not address that aspect of this argument further. 

As we explained, the Commission was entitled to view the 

evidence about the accident as a whole and make its own 

inferences and credibility determinations. The Commission also 

determined that, even including the claims report, JPL had not 

shown anything more than speculative evidence of fraud. JPL

has not demonstrated that this decision exceeded the 

Commission’s discretion. Indeed, the claims report JPL

submitted is merely a bare list of claims, identifying only basic 

information, with no notes describing details of the accidents or 

the resolutions of the claims.
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¶53 Thus, the Commission did not abuse its discretion by 

concluding that JPL provided “no more than speculation 

without evidence” that Mondragon “may be committing fraud.”

The Commission’s refusal to order discovery on nonparties 

under such circumstances is well within its broad discretion. See 

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802(1) (LexisNexis 2015) (“The 

commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its 

judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of 

the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the chapter.”). 

Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Commission’s decision to 

deny JPL’s request for additional discovery into the claims 

history of Mondragon’s adult son and wife—two nonparties—on 

the basis of thinly-supported speculation about a potential 

pattern of fraudulent workers’ compensation claims.

CONCLUSION

¶54 We conclude that there was substantial evidence to 

support the Commission’s determination that Mondragon 

suffered an industrial accident, that the Commission did not sua 

sponte create its own theory of accident or improperly advocate 

on behalf of Mondragon, and that the referral of the case to the 

medical panel was not improper. We also conclude that the 

Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied JPL’s 

requests to conduct discovery into the claims history of 

Mondragon’s adult son and wife. Accordingly, we decline to 

disturb the Commission’s decision.