IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CIVIL No. 11-1264

:

v. : CRIMINAL No. 05-32-2

:

ALEXIS VILLEGAS :

MEMORANDUM

Juan R. Sánchez, J. March 22, 2012

Defendant Alexis Villegas asks this Court to vacate his guilty plea and sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255. Villegas, whose first language is Spanish, argues his trial counsel was ineffective

in failing to have an interpreter present during meetings with Villegas and in failing to provide

Villegas with written Spanish translations of the Guilty Plea Agreement, the Presentence

Investigation Report, and other case-related documents. FindingVillegas’s arguments meritless, this

Court will deny his request for relief.

FACTS

In January 2005, Villegas was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit hostage taking,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a); one count of hostage taking and aiding and abetting, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203(a) and 2; one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to

a crime of violence and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2; and one count

of possession of a firearm by an alien, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). The charges arose

out of an October 2004 incident in which Villegas and two codefendants kidnapped a victim from

his home at gunpoint and then held him hostage for several days while demanding $1 million in

ransom from the victim’s parents. A superseding indictment was returned in April 2005, charging

Villegas with the same crimes.
On May 23, 2005, Villegas pleaded guilty to these charges pursuant to a cooperation plea

agreement with the Government. In the Guilty Plea Agreement, Villegas agreed to waive “all rights

to appeal or collaterally attack [his] conviction, sentence, or any other matter relating to this

prosecution, whether such a right to appeal or collateral attack arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, 28

U.S.C. § 1291, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or any other provision of law.” Guilty Plea Agreement ¶ 10. 1

At the change of plea hearing, an interpreter was present to assist Villegas, and Villegas

initially testified through the interpreter. Because it quickly became apparent to this Court—itself

a nativeSpanish speaker—that Villegas could understand the Court’s questions in English, however,

the Court inquired into Villegas’s ability to speak and understand English. Villegas testified he was 2

able to speak, understand, and write English; could understand the Court’s questions; and generally

had a “pretty good” understanding of English. Plea Hr’g Tr. 9-10. When asked whether he needed

an interpreter, Villegas explained he would need the interpreter only for “some words.” Id. at 10. 

Based on these statements—and with Villegas’s agreement—this Court conducted the balance of

the plea hearing in English on the understanding that Villegas would notify the Court if there was

anything he did not understand, in which case the Court would afford Villegas an opportunity to

consult with the interpreter and his counsel. Id. at 10-11.

After again confirming Villegas could understand the Court and could speak English, the

The appellate waiver provision of the Guilty Plea Agreement permitted Villegas to appeal only if 1

(1) the Government appealed his sentence, (2) the sentence imposed on any count of conviction

exceeded the statutorymaximum for that count, or (3) the Court unreasonably departed upward from

the otherwise applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. Guilty Plea Agreement ¶ 10.

This Court’s initial questions to Villegas concerned how long he had been in the United States and 2

whether he had attended any schools in this country. Villegas explained he had come to the United

States from Mexico in 1997 and had attended elementary, middle, and high school here, before

dropping out in tenth grade. Plea Hr’g Tr. 8-9, May 23, 2005.

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Court verified that Villegas had reviewed the Guilty Plea Agreement with his counsel at the Federal

Detention Center and had also read the agreement on his own. Id. at 17-20. Although an interpreter

was not present when Villegas reviewed the plea agreement with his counsel, Villegas testified he

“read it, too[,] and [he] underst[oo]d it.” Id. at 18. This Court thereafter reviewed the Guilty Plea

Agreement with Villegas in detail, including the statutory maximum sentence on each count, the

mandatoryminimum sentence on the firearms charge, and the possible deportation consequences of

the plea. E.g., id. at 27-30. The Court also reviewed the appellate waiver provision with Villegas,

explaining Villegas would be permitted to appeal his sentence only if the Government appealed, if

the Court imposed a sentence greater than the statutory maximum, or if the Court unreasonably

departed from the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. 43-44. At the conclusion of the colloquy, the

Court accepted Villegas’s guilty plea, finding Villegas

alert, competent and I think that he is capable of making an informed decision as to

whether to plead guilty or not guilty.

I am satisfied that he understands sufficient English to be able to respond to

my questions and has done so on this record quite well.

I am satisfied that there is an independent basis in fact for the plea and I’m

confident that he understands the charges, the maximum penalty, the minimum

mandatories that apply and that he’s giving up some basic and fundamental rights to

a trial.

Id. at 52-53.

In September 2008, pursuant to the terms of the Guilty Plea Agreement, in which he agreed

to cooperate with the Government, Villegas testified as a Government witness at the trial of Jose

Antonio Santiago, one of his codefendants. At the outset of his testimony, Villegas explained that

while he was “not completely” fluent in English, he did not have a problem understanding English. 

Trial Tr. 4-5, Sept. 4, 2008. Villegas then proceeded to testify for a full day and a half in English,

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without the assistance of an interpreter.

On May 1, 2009, Villegas appeared before this Court for sentencing. At the sentencing

hearing, this Court granted the Government’s motion for a downward departure from the Guidelines

sentencing range and the mandatory minimum sentence, and sentenced Villegas to 204 months of

imprisonment, a sentence well below the effective advisory Guidelines range of 294-346 months.3

Although Villegas had testified in English at the change of plea hearing and at his codefendant’s

trial, he addressed the Court through an interpreter at the sentencing hearing. Sentencing Hr’g Tr.

30, May 1, 2009.

Notwithstanding the appellate waiver in the Guilty Plea Agreement, Villegas filed a direct

appeal. On January 19, 2010, the Third Circuit granted the Government’s motion to enforce the

appellate waiver and for summary affirmance. Thereafter, Villegas filed the instant § 2255 motion

seeking to vacate his guilty plea and sentence on the ground his counsel was ineffective for not

ensuring Villegas received legal advice in Spanish, his native language.4

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in federal custody may seek to have his sentence

vacated, set aside, or corrected if it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

Based on an offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of I, Villegas’s advisory Guidelines 3

range was 210-262 months. Because the firearms charge carried a seven-year mandatory minimum

consecutive sentence, however, Villegas’s effective advisoryGuidelines range was 294-346 months.

Villegas also argues enforcement of the appellate waiver in the Guilty Plea Agreement in this case 4

would work a miscarriage of justice in light of his counsel’s failure to ensure the appellate waiver

was explained to Villegas in Spanish. Although the Government disputes Villegas’s contention he

did not understand the appellate waiver, Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s § 2255 Mot. 5-6, the Government

does not argue Villegas’s § 2255 motion should be denied based on the waiver, but instead addresses

the merits of Villegas’s ineffective assistance claim. As a result, this Court need not address

Villegas’s argument that the waiver should not be enforced in this case.

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United States or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. Id. § 2255(a). Where, as here, a defendant

seeks relief pursuant to § 2255 based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant

must satisfy the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The defendant

must show (1) his “counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. To be considered deficient, counsel’s performance must have

fallen below “an objective standard of reasonableness” that is measured against “prevailing

professional norms.” Id. at 688. To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694. In the context of a guilty plea, “to satisfy the ‘prejudice’

requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 645 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding

the prejudice inquiry in an ineffective assistance claim regarding a guilty plea “must focus on

whether [the defendant] . . . could have reasonably chosen to go to trial”).

Although Villegas argues his counsel was ineffective for not having an interpreter present

during meetings and for not providing him with Spanish translations of the Guilty Plea Agreement

and other documents, the record refutes Villegas’s contention he does not understand English and

did not understand the Guilty Plea Agreement. At the change of plea hearing, this Court expressly

found Villegas could speak and understand sufficient English to respond to the Court’s questions in

English, subject to his right to consult with the interpreter and his counsel regarding any aspect of

the proceeding he did not understand. Plea Hr’g Tr. 10-11, 17-18, 52-53. This Court made this

finding based on its personal observation of Villegas’s ability to speak and understand English, and

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after questioning Villegas about his language abilities. In response to this Court’s questions,

Villegas confirmed he had been in the United States since 1997; had attended school here until the

tenth grade; and could speak, understand, and write English. Id. at 8-9. During the hearing,

moreover, Villegas demonstrated a good understanding of English, as is apparent from both the

transcript and the audio recording of the hearing. For example, after the Government summarized

the factual basis for the plea in English, Villegas stated he understood what the prosecutor had said

and then proceeded to correct the Government’s account, stating, “[a]ctually, I didn’t enter—I didn’t

enter the United States in 2002, I entered in ‘97.” Id. at 37-38.5

As for Villegas’s understanding of the Guilty Plea Agreement, Villegas testified he had

reviewed the agreement with his counsel and had read it on his own, and stated he felt he understood

the nature of the agreement and had no questions about it. Id. at 19-20. Villegas does not allege he

everrequested awritten translation oftheGuiltyPlea Agreement or anyother case-related document. 

To the contrary, his testimony at the change of plea hearing suggests he felt a translation was

unnecessary: when asked whether an interpreter was present when he reviewed the agreement with

his counsel, Villegas responded, “[n]o,” but then volunteered that he had read the agreement himself

and understood it. Id. at 18. Villegas likewise indicated he understood the plea agreement when this

Court reviewed its terms with him orally at the hearing. See id. at 20-44. Significantly, the

interpreter remained available to Villegas throughout the change of plea hearing, and the record 6

While not dispositive of Villegas’s English abilities at the time of his guilty plea in 2005, it bears

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mention that when Villegas testified at his codefendant’s trial in 2008, he did so in English, without

the assistance of an interpreter.

Before proceeding with the hearing in English, this Court specifically advised Villegas he could 6

consult with the interpreter and his counsel “if there is a word that you do not understand or a

concept that you do not understand.” Id. at 10.

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reflects Villegas was afforded the opportunity to consult with the interpreter and his counsel when

necessary during the hearing. See id. at 13, 18-19 (brief discussion with interpreter), 16 (brief

discussion with counsel).

Because the record demonstrates Villegas could speak and understand English, and had read

and understood the Guilty Plea Agreement at the time of the change of plea hearing, this Court

concludes Villegas’s counsel was not deficient in failing to provide an interpreter for meetings and

failing to provide written translations of the GuiltyPlea Agreement and other documents. SeeGalloVasquez v. United States, 402 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding counsel was not ineffective for

failing to bring an interpreter to out-of-court meetings where defendant’s claim of a language barrier

was refuted by the record, including defendant’s testimony that he spoke some English, his

translation of some of his own answers from Spanish to English at trial, and his failure to raise the

language barrier issue at any time prior to his § 2255 petition); Soto v. Klopotoski, No. 08-1641,

2008 WL 5381357, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2008) (rejecting claim defense counsel was ineffective

for failing to request the assistance of a Spanish interpreter during plea discussions where, at a posttrial hearing, petitioner testified he was comfortable speaking and understanding English and

testified in English); United States v. Martinez, 120 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514-15 (W.D. Pa. 2000)

(holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to ensure an interpreter was present during meetings

with defendant, and for not providing defendant with written translations of court documents, where

record reflected defendant’s ability to communicate and comprehend the proceedings in English);

De La Rosa v. United States, No. 94-7623, 1995 WL 251302, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1995) (holding

counsel was not ineffective for failing to provide the petitioner a written Spanish translation of his

plea agreement where petitioner, who had never requested a written translation, testified he had

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reviewed the plea agreement with his counsel, and where an interpreter translated the plea agreement

orally at the plea hearing).

Moreover, even if Villegas could show his counsel’s performance was deficient, he has not

even alleged—much lessshown—that “there is a reasonable probabilitythat, but for counsel’s errors,

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59;

see In re Sealed Case, No. 09-3116, 2011 WL 6118561, at *5-6 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 2011) (rejecting

defendant’s claims his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because he was not

provided a written Spanish translation of the plea agreement and because his counsel was ineffective

where defendant did not assert that, but for the court’s or his counsel’s errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty); cf.Orocio, 645 F.3d at 644-45 (holding petitioner’s affidavit stating he “‘would have

taken his case to trial’ if he could not have secured a plea agreement that would avoid a removal

consequence” was sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim (record citation omitted)).

Because Villegas has not satisfied either prong of the Strickland test, his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim fails, and his § 2255 motion will therefore be denied. Moreover, because

the record conclusively refutes the factual basis for Villegas’s claim, the motion will be denied

without an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (directing a district court to hold a hearing

on a § 2255 motion “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that

the prisoner is entitled to no relief”). Villegas argues an evidentiary hearing is necessary regarding

(1) “trial counsel’s and Defendant’s language skills,” (2) “whether a translator was required,” (3)

“whether the trial court was aware that a translator was not provided,” and (4) “broadly, whethertrial

counsel was ineffective by failing to assure that his client . . . received legal advice in a language he

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understood.” Def.’s § 2255 Mot. 4. As set forth above, this Court addressed most of these issues

at the change of plea hearing. Specifically, this Court found Villegas spoke and understood

sufficient English to participate in the plea colloquy without an interpreter and to understand the

Guilty Plea Agreement, even though an interpreter had not been present when he reviewed the plea

agreement with his counsel. In these circumstances, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. See 7

United States v. Padilla-Castro, 426 F. App’x 60, 63-64 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding defendant was not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing about whether he understood the terms of his plea agreement where

the record conclusively showed defendant “did not lack necessary information”); United States v.

Chun, 399 F. App’x 669, 671-72 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on his ineffective assistance claim where district court’s conclusion that defendant and his

counsel could communicate without an interpreter was supported by the trial record and the district

court’s own firsthand observations).

For the reasons set forth above, Villegas’s § 2255 motion will be denied. An appropriate

order follows.

While this Court did not make any finding regarding defense counsel’s Spanish language skills, it 7

was unnecessary to address the issue given the Court’s findings regarding Villegas’s English

language abilities. 

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BY THE COURT:

 /s/ Juan R. Sánchez 

Juan R. Sánchez, J.

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