1

Filed 12/30/21 Ortega v. Contreras-Magana CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

ELIZABETH ORTEGA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAMON CONTRERAS-MAGANA,

Defendant and Appellant.

C092714

(Super. Ct. No. 20DV01381)

Ramon Contreras-Magana appeals from the trial court’s order granting respondent 

Elizabeth Ortega’s petition for a restraining order after hearing. Appellant contends there 

was insufficient evidence to support the restraining order and he was denied due process. 

On this record, we are required to affirm the judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all 

intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage 

of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) “This presumption has special significance 

when . . . the appeal is based upon the clerk’s transcript.” (Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 
2

126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154.) Accordingly, we adopt all intendments and inferences to 

affirm the judgment or order unless the record expressly contradicts them. (See Brewer 

v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 583.)

It is the burden of the party challenging a judgment on appeal to provide an 

adequate record to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) 

The appellate record here does not include a reporter’s transcript. We must, therefore, 

treat this as an appeal “ ‘ “on the judgment roll.” ’ ” (Kucker v. Kucker (2011) 

192 Cal.App.4th 90, 93.) Accordingly, we are required to conclusively presume the 

evidence admitted at trial is ample to sustain the trial court’s findings; our review is 

limited to determining whether any error “ ‘ ‘appears on the face of the record.” ’ ”

(Ibid.; see Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324-325.)

Here, the limited record we have establishes that on June 11, 2020, respondent 

petitioned the trial court for a domestic violence restraining order, protecting her fouryear-old son from appellant. In support of her petition, respondent alleged appellant 

touched her son’s genitals and told her son that “this is how he shows his love.” 

To her declaration, respondent attached reports from physicians who examined the 

minor child and her report to the police. The police report included a statement from the 

minor child that appellant touched his genitals on two separate occasions and told the 

child that “this was how him [sic] loves me.” 

On June 30, 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on respondent’s petition over 

Zoom. Appellant and respondent were both present, both were sworn in, and both 

testified. The court found sufficient evidence to support the granting of a domestic 

violence order and granted the order “for five years.” 

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s order 

granting respondent’s petition. In a judgment roll appeal, however, “ ‘[the] question of 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings is not open.’ ” (Allen v. Toten
3

(1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082.) We do not presume the record contains all matters 

material to a determination of the points on appeal unless the asserted error “appears on 

the face of the record.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.163; National Secretarial Service, 

Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521.) “[I]f any matters could have been 

presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it 

will be presumed that such matters were presented.” (Riley v. Dunbar (1942) 

55 Cal.App.2d 452, 455.) On the face of this record we find no errors.

Appellant also contends the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence in 

support of respondent’s petition. We presume the court performed its duty and admitted 

evidence in compliance with the evidence code. (Evid. Code, § 664.) Without a 

reporter’s transcript, there is nothing on this record to overcome that presumption.

Appellant also notes that a court reporter was not present at the hearing on 

respondent’s petition for a restraining order. The local rules make it clear, however, that 

appellant bears the burden of requesting a court reporter in advance of the hearing and 

paying the reporter’s fees. (See Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Local Rules, rule 1.12.) 

Nothing in the record indicates appellant satisfied those requirements.

Finally, appellant contends he was denied due process in the manner in which the 

hearing on respondent’s petition was held. We disagree. As an initial matter, appellant 

fails to support his contention with any citations to the record. On this ground alone, 

appellant has forfeited his claim on appeal. (See Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 

101 Cal.App.4th 728, 743; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)

Even were the issue preserved, however, due process requires only that appellant 

be given reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard. (Horn v. County of Ventura 

(1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612.) It is evident from this record that appellant was present at 

the hearing, he was sworn in, and he testified. Thus, he was given the process he was 

due. In addition, because he was present at the hearing, appellant’s claim that he was 

precluded from presenting relevant evidence to the trial court fails. On a judgment roll 
4

appeal we must presume appellant was, at a minimum, given the opportunity to present 

all the evidence he deemed relevant to support his position. (See Riley v. Dunbar, supra, 

55 Cal.App.2d at p. 455.) 

In sum, on this record, we must affirm the court’s order granting respondent’s 

petition.

III. DISPOSITION

The order granting respondent’s request for a restraining order against appellant is 

affirmed. Appellant shall pay respondent’s costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

/S/

 

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

 

MAURO, Acting P. J.

/S/

 

DUARTE, J.