NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TALJINDER SINGH GILL, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 13-74454 

Agency No. A200-236-147 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 14, 2019

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, TASHIMA, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Taljinder Singh1is a citizen of India who entered the United 

States in 2011. Singh expressed fear of returning to India in removal proceedings 

and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture 

(CAT) protection. The Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Singh had not 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1 There are discrepancies in the record between whether Petitioner’s 

surname is “Singh” or “Gill.” We refer to him as “Singh” following the use in the 

briefs.

FILED

MAR 22 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

suffered persecution or demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution, 

that he could relocate within India if necessary, and that it was not more likely than 

not that he would be tortured if he returned to India. The IJ accordingly denied 

Singh all relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed, and Singh 

petitioned this court for review. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and 

we deny the petition.

All three of Singh’s claims arise from the harm he suffered in the Punjab 

region of India because he is a Sikh and member of the Sikh-driven Mann Party. In 

2009, rival Congress Party members stopped Singh’s motorbike, pushed him, 

punched him, and threatened to kill him if he continued supporting the Mann Party. 

Singh was regularly harassed after this event, and the following year he was again 

severely beaten and threatened by Congress Party members. When Singh raised 

these attacks to the police, they criticized him, told him not to report the attacks, 

and suggested he join the Congress Party. The Board concluded that these events, 

separately or cumulatively, did not establish past persecution that would make 

Singh eligible for asylum. We review for substantial evidence, and “may reverse 

the decision of the Board only if the applicant shows that the evidence compels the 

conclusion that the asylum decision was incorrect.” Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 

1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original).

We conclude that these facts did not compel the Board to find that Singh had 
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been persecuted. The attacks were almost a year apart, despite Singh’s consistent 

public support for the Mann Party, and did not require significant medical 

attention. Thus, while Singh is correct that “[p]hysical violence ordinarily meets 

the requirement of severity that characterizes persecution as opposed to mere 

discrimination,” Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003), the 

use of force in this case was not so extreme as to necessarily rise to the level of 

past persecution. Cf. Gu, 454 F.3d at 1020 (holding that violence against petitioner 

did not amount to persecution); Hoxha, 319 F.3d at 1182 (same); Prasad v. INS, 47 

F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (same). Additionally, because Singh did not 

demonstrate past persecution, he was not entitled to a presumption of future 

persecution, and he did not otherwise demonstrate a well-founded fear of future 

persecution. Singh’s asylum claim therefore fails, and with it his withholding 

claim. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

As for Singh’s CAT claim, the same failures in Singh’s asylum claim show

that the Board was not compelled to find that Singh would be tortured within the 

meaning of CAT if returned to India. Singh’s CAT claim therefore fails.

We therefore deny Singh’s petition on all three grounds. Because Singh 

never prevailed on his initial burden of showing past persecution, the burden never 

shifted to the government to show that he could safely and reasonably relocate. See 

Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2010). We thus do not reach whether 
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the Board erred in its analysis of Singh’s ability to relocate, including whether its 

relocation analysis was sufficient under Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 

2019).

PETITION DENIED.