Testimony

Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:30 a.m.,

Wednesday, October 17, 2001 COMBATING TERRORISM

Considerations for

Investing Resources in

Chemical and Biological

Preparedness

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-02-162T
Page 1 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO’s work on

efforts to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological terrorist

attacks. With the coordinated terrorist attacks against the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the threat of terrorism

rose to the top of the country’s national security and law enforcement

agendas. With the current investigations into anthrax incidents, the threat

remains at the top of those agendas. My comments are based upon four of

our recent reports.1

 The first report was on the West Nile Virus outbreak in

New York City and its implications for public health preparedness. The

second was on federal teams that could respond to chemical, biological,

radiological, or nuclear terrorist attacks. The third was on federal research

and preparedness programs specific to biological terrorism. And finally,

the fourth report summarized our overall work on combating terrorism

over the last 5 years. In these reports, and the earlier work that preceded

them, we have taken a detailed look at programs to prepare for and

respond to terrorism, including chemical and biological terrorism.2

My statement, after providing some background, will first discuss the

growing uncertainties regarding the terrorist threat and the need for a risk

management approach. Next, I will discuss some of the specific federal

programs to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological agents or

weapons. Third, I will discuss some of the problems identified in

evaluations of chemical and biological preparedness. Finally, I will make

some suggestions for the Congress to consider for investing resources in

chemical and biological preparedness.

In summary, the nature of the terrorist threat appears to be more

uncertain since the September 11 attacks. Preparing for all possible

contingencies is not practical, so a risk management approach should be

used. This would include a threat assessment to determine which chemical

or biological agents are of most concern. The federal government has a

 1

The four reports discussed are West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health

Preparedness (GAO/HEHS-00-180, Sept. 11, 2000); Combating Terrorism: Federal

Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve

Coordination (GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000); Bioterrorism: Federal Research and

Preparedness Activities (GAO-01-915, Sept. 28, 2001); and Combating Terrorism: Selected

Challenges and Related Recommendations (GAO-01-822, Sept. 20, 2001).

2

A more complete list of GAO products related to terrorism appears at the end of this

statement.
Page 2 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

variety of programs to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological

terrorism, including response teams, support laboratories, training and

equipment programs, and research efforts. Evaluations of chemical and

biological preparedness have identified a number of problems and their

solutions. Some of these solutions to improve the response to chemical

and biological terrorism have broad applicability across a variety of

contingencies while other response requirements are applicable to only a

specific type of attack. For example, efforts to improve public health

surveillance would be useful in any disease outbreak, whereas efforts to

provide vaccines for smallpox would be useful only if terrorists used

smallpox in a biological attack. The Congress faces competing demands

for spending as it seeks to invest resources to better prepare our nation for

chemical and biological terrorism. Funding to combat terrorism, which

was originally budgeted to be less than $13 billion, may exceed $50 billion

for fiscal year 2002, including supplemental emergency contingency

funding. Given the uncertainty of the chemical and biological threat, the

Congress may want to initially invest resources in efforts with broad

applicability over those that are only applicable under a specific type of

chemical or biological attack. As threat information becomes more

certain, it may be more appropriate to invest in efforts only applicable to

specific chemical or biological agents.

Federal programs to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological

terrorist attacks operate under an umbrella of various policies and

contingency plans. Federal policies on combating terrorism are laid out in

a series of presidential directives and implementing guidance.3

 These

documents divide the federal response to terrorist attacks into two

categories—crisis management and consequence management. Crisis

management includes efforts to stop a terrorist attack, arrest terrorists,

and gather evidence for criminal prosecution. Crisis management is led by

the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All

federal agencies and departments, as needed, would support the

Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on-scene

commander. Consequence management includes efforts to provide

medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from

dangerous areas, and restore government services. Consequence

 3

For a compendium of relevant federal policy and planning documents for combating

terrorism, see app. I of GAO-01-822. In addition to documents mentioned in that report, the

President signed Executive Order 13228 on Oct. 8, 2001, which established a new Office of

Homeland Security.

Background on

Federal Policies,

Plans, and

Coordination

Problems
Page 3 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

management activities of the federal government are led by the Federal

Emergency Management Agency in support of state and local authorities.

Unlike crisis management, the federal government does not have primary

responsibility for consequence management; state and local authorities do.

Crisis and consequence management activities may overlap and run

concurrently during the emergency response and are dependent upon the

nature of the incident.

In a chemical or biological terrorist incident, the federal government

would operate under one or more contingency plans. The U.S.

Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan

establishes conceptual guidelines for assessing and monitoring a

developing threat, notifying appropriate agencies concerning the nature of

the threat, and deploying necessary advisory and technical resources to

assist the lead federal agency in facilitating interdepartmental

coordination of crisis and consequence management activities. In the

event that the President declares a national emergency, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency also would coordinate the federal

response using a generic disaster contingency plan called the Federal

Response Plan. This plan—which has an annex specific for terrorism—

outlines the roles of federal agencies in consequence management during

terrorist attacks. More specifically, the plan outlines the planning

assumptions, policies, concept of operation, organizational structures, and

specific assignment of responsibilities to lead departments and agencies in

providing federal assistance. The plan categorizes the types of assistance

into specific “emergency support functions.” Examples of emergency

support functions include mass care and health and medical services. In

addition, several individual agencies have their own contingency plans or

guidance specific to their activities.4

Our September 20, 2001, report found significant coordination and

fragmentation problems across the various federal agencies that combat

terrorism.5

 In May 1998, the President established a National Coordinator

within the National Security Council to better lead and coordinate these

federal programs; however, the position’s functions were never detailed in

 4

An example of agency-specific guidance would be the U.S. Coast Guard’s Interim

Guidance Regarding Coast Guard Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents of

June 2000. For a list of additional plans and guidance by individual agencies, see app. II of

GAO-01-822.

5

GAO-01-822, pp. 31-43.
Page 4 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

either an executive order or legislation. Many of the overall leadership and

coordination functions that we had identified as critical were not given to

the National Coordinator. In fact, several agencies performed interagency

functions that we believed would have been performed more appropriately

above the level of individual agencies. The interagency roles of these

various agencies were not always clear and sometimes overlapped, which

led to a fragmented approach. For example, the Department of Justice, the

National Security Council, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the

Federal Emergency Management Agency all had been developing or

planning to develop potentially duplicative national strategies to combat

terrorism. In a more recent report and testimony, we provide additional

examples of coordination difficulties specific to biological terrorism.6

To improve overall leadership and coordination of federal efforts to

combat terrorism, the President announced the creation of an Office of

Homeland Security on September 20, 2001, and specified its functions in

Executive Order 13228 on October 8, 2001. These actions represent

potentially significant steps toward improved coordination of federal

activities and are generally consistent with our recent recommendations.7

Some questions that remain to be addressed include how this new office

will be structured, what authority the Director will have, and how this

effort can be institutionalized and sustained over time.

There appears to be additional uncertainties about the terrorist threat in

general since the September 11 attacks. Before those attacks, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation had identified the largest domestic threat to be the

“lone wolf” terrorist—an individual who operated alone. U.S. intelligence

agencies had reported an increased possibility that terrorists would use

chemical or biological weapons in the next decade. However, terrorists

would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges

to successfully produce and release chemical or biological agents of

sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people

 6

For example, fragmentation is evident in the different threat lists of biological agents

developed by federal departments and agencies (see GAO-01-915, p.18). Our recent

testimony, Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO-02-141T, Oct. 9,

2001) also included a graphic representation of the complicated coordination networks

involved (see its app. III, fig. 1).

7

Our recent summary report highlighted a number of important characteristics and

responsibilities necessary for a single focal point, such as the Office of Homeland Security,

to improve coordination and accountability (see GAO-01-822, pp. 41-42).

New Uncertainties

Regarding

the Terrorist Threat
Page 5 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

without substantial assistance from a foreign government sponsor. In most

cases, specialized knowledge is required in the manufacturing process and

in improvising an effective delivery device for most chemical and nearly all

biological agents that could be used in terrorist attacks. Moreover, some of

the required components of chemical agents and highly infective strains of

biological agents are difficult to obtain. Finally, terrorists may have to

overcome other obstacles to successfully launch an attack that would

result in mass casualties, such as unfavorable meteorological conditions

and personal safety risks.

On September 11, terrorists redefined the term “weapon of mass

destruction.” Up to that point, that term generally referred to chemical,

biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. As clearly shown on

September 11, a terrorist attack would not have to fit that definition to

result in mass casualties, destruction of critical infrastructures, economic

losses, and disruption of daily life nationwide. The attack increased the

uncertainties regarding the threat, although terrorists would still face the

technical challenges described above in conducting chemical or biological

attacks. The uncertainty has increased because the attacks on the World

Trade Center and the Pentagon were conducted by a large group of

conspirators rather than one individual. In addition, the terrorists were

executing a long-planned coordinated attack, showing a level of

sophistication that may not have been anticipated by the Federal Bureau

of Investigation—the agency responsible for monitoring national security

threats within the United States. Also, the terrorists were willing to

commit suicide in the attacks, showing no concern for their own personal

safety, which was considered one of the barriers to using chemical or

biological agents. And most recently, the threat of anthrax has gone from a

series of hoaxes to actual cases under investigation by the Federal Bureau

of Investigation.

Given the uncertainty about the threat, we continue to believe that a risk

management approach is necessary to enhance domestic preparedness

against terrorist threats. Risk management is a systematic and analytical

process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset,

individual, or function and to identify actions to reduce the risk and

mitigate the consequences of an attack. While the risk cannot be

eliminated entirely, enhancing protection from known or potential threats

can reduce the risk. This approach includes three key elements: a threat

assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criticality assessment

(assessing the importance or significance of a target). This approach

would include a threat assessment to determine which chemical or

biological agents are of most concern. Without the benefits that a risk
Page 6 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

management approach provides, many agencies have been relying on

worst case chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear scenarios to

generate countermeasures or establish their programs. By using worst

case scenarios, the federal government is focusing on vulnerabilities

(which are unlimited) rather than credible threats (which are limited). As

stated in our recent testimony, a risk management approach could help

the United States prepare for the threats it faces and allow us to focus

finite resources on areas of greatest need.8

A terrorist attack using chemical or biological weapons presents an array

of complex issues to state and local first responders. These responders

would include police, firefighters, emergency medical services, and

hazardous material technicians. They must identify the agent used so as to

rapidly decontaminate victims and apply appropriate medical treatments.

If the incident overwhelms state and local response capabilities, they may

call on federal agencies to provide assistance. To provide such assistance,

the federal government has a variety of programs to prepare for and

respond to chemical and biological terrorism, including response teams,

support laboratories, training and equipment programs, and research

efforts, as follows.

• Federal agencies have special teams that can respond to terrorist incidents

involving chemical or biological agents or weapons. These teams perform

a wide variety of functions, such as hands-on response; providing

technical advice to state, local, or federal authorities; or coordinating the

response efforts of other federal teams. Figure 1 shows selected federal

teams that could respond to a chemical or biological terrorist incident.9

• Federal agencies also have laboratories that may support response teams

by performing tests to analyze and test samples of chemical and biological

agents. In some incidents, these laboratories may perform functions that

enable federal response teams to perform their role. For example, when a

diagnosis is confirmed at a laboratory, response teams can begin to treat

victims appropriately.

• Federal agencies also have programs to train and equip state and local

authorities to respond to chemical and biological terrorism. The programs

 8

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach (GAO-02-150T, Oct.

12, 2001).

9

For a more detailed description of these federal teams, including their mission, authority,

personnel, and response times, see GAO-01-14, app. I.

Federal Programs to

Respond to

Chemical and

Biological Terrorism
Page 7 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

have improved domestic preparedness by training and equipping over

273,000 first responders. The programs also have included exercises to

allow first responders to interact with themselves and federal responders.

• Finally, federal agencies have a number of research and development

projects underway to combat terrorism. Examples of recently developed

and fielded technologies include products to detect and identify chemical

and biological weapons. Additional research and/or development projects

include chemical monitoring devices and new or improved vaccines,

antibiotics, and antivirals.

Figure 1: Federal Response Teams for Chemical and Biological Terrorism

Note: This figure includes federal teams for both crisis and consequence management in a terrorist

incident involving chemical or biological agents. Federal agencies have additional teams not shown

that might be used in conventional, radiological, or nuclear incidents.

Source: GAO analysis.
Page 8 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

There are a variety of chemical agents potentially used by terrorists. These

chemical agents could be dispersed as a gas, vapor, liquid, or aerosol. A

chemical agent could be disseminated by explosive or mechanical

delivery. Some chemicals disperse rapidly and others remain toxic for

days or weeks and require decontamination and clean up. Rapid exposure

to a highly concentrated agent would increase the number of casualties.

Federal, state, and local officials generally agree that a chemical terrorist

incident would look like a major hazardous material emergency.

According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs, over 600 local

and state hazardous material teams will be the first to respond to a

chemical incident. If local responders are unable to manage the situation

or are overwhelmed, the incident commander has access to state and

federal assets. A variety of federal teams could be deployed to provide

assistance.10

Terrorists also can potentially use a variety of biological agents. Biological

agents must be disseminated by some means that infects enough

individuals to initiate a disease epidemic. According to a wide range of

experts in science, health, intelligence, and biological warfare and a

technical report, the most effective way to disseminate a biological agent

is by aerosol. This method allows the simultaneous respiratory infection of

a large number of people. A few biological agents (e.g., plague and

smallpox) are communicable and can be spread beyond those directly

affected by the weapon or dissemination device. The release of a

biological agent or weapon may not be known for several days until

victims present themselves to medical personnel in doctors’ offices,

clinics, and emergency rooms where the symptoms might easily be

confused with influenza or other less virulent illnesses. Accordingly, the

critical detection of the biological agent begins with the public health

infrastructure that detects outbreaks of illness, identifies the sources and

modes of transmission, and performs rapid agent laboratory identification.

Once diagnosis of a biological agent is confirmed, treating victims may

require the use of federal consequence management teams and the items

from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. Again, a variety of federal

teams could be deployed to provide assistance.11

 10For a detailed discussion of what teams would perform what functions in a chemical

terrorist incident, see GAO-01-14, app. III.

11For a detailed discussion of what teams would perform what functions in a biological

terrorist incident, see GAO-01-14, app. IV.

Characteristics of

Chemical Terrorism

Characteristics of

Biological Terrorism
Page 9 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

We have identified a number of problems that require solutions in order to

improve preparedness for chemical and biological terrorism. Some of

these are included in our recent reports and testimony. For example, our

report on the West Nile Virus outbreak identified specific weaknesses in

the public health system that need to be addressed to improve

preparedness for biological terrorism.

12 Our recent report on biological

terrorism examined evaluations of the effectiveness of federal programs to

prepare state and local authorities.

13 For this statement, we also conducted

an analysis of federal exercise evaluations to identify problems associated

with chemical and biological terrorism that needed to be solved. In doing

this, we examined 50 evaluations representing 40 separate exercises with

chemical or biological scenarios.

Based upon our review, the problems and their solutions fell into two

categories. These categories were (1) generic problems and solutions that

are generally applicable to any type of terrorist incident, major accident,

or natural disaster, and (2) problems and solutions that are applicable to

both chemical and biological terrorist events. Specific examples of each

category follow.

The first category of problems and their solutions are generally applicable

to any type of terrorist incident. These would apply not only to chemical

and biological terrorism but also to all hazards including emergencies

unrelated to terrorism, such as major accidents or natural disasters.

• Command and control. The roles, responsibilities, and the legal authority

to plan and carry out a response to a weapon of mass destruction terrorist

incident are not always clear, which could result in a delayed and

inadequate response.

• Planning and operations. State and local emergency operations plans do

not always conform to federal plans. The operational procedures for

requesting federal assistance are not always compatible with state and

local procedures.

• Resource management and logistics. State and local governments can be

overwhelmed with the resource management and logistical requirements

of managing a large incident, particularly after the arrival of additional

state and federal assets. For example, state and local officials could have

 12See GAO/HEHS-00-180.

13See GAO-01-915.

Problems Identified in

Preparing for

Chemical and

Biological Terrorism
Page 10 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

difficulty providing support to numerous military units that might be

needed.

• Communication. Interoperability difficulties exist at the interagency and

intergovernmental levels. Also, the public health community lacks robust

communication systems, protocols, equipment, and facilities.

• Exercises. Many exercises focus primarily on crisis management, which

often ends in a successful tactical resolution of the incident and do not

include more likely scenarios where terrorist attacks are successful,

requiring a consequence management exercise component.

• Mass casualties. Overall planning and integration among agencies are

needed for mass casualty management, including conventional terrorist

incidents. Also, medical surge capacity for any type of weapon of mass

destruction event may be limited. Disposition of bodies would also be an

issue.

The second category of problems and their solutions are applicable to

chemical or biological incidents. They would not be relevant in a

conventional, radiological, or nuclear terrorist incident; however, they

would be relevant in other chemical or biological events not related to

terrorism, such as an accidental release of chemicals or a natural outbreak

of a disease. They vary in their level of applicability, with some only being

applicable to specific chemical or biological agents.

• Public health surveillance. Basic capacity for public health surveillance is

lacking. Improved public health-coordinated surveillance for biological

terrorism and emerging infectious diseases is an urgent preparedness

requirement at the local level.

• Detection and risk assessment. The capability of first responders and

specialized response teams to rapidly and accurately detect, recognize,

and identify chemical or biological agents and assess the associated health

risks can be slow. Also, following the release of a chemical or biological

agent, emergency hazardous material teams do not always conduct a

downwind analysis of the toxic cloud, which could delay a decision to

evacuate potentially affected populations.

• Protective equipment and training. First responders often lack special

personal protective equipment (level-A protective clothing and masks) to

safeguard them from chemical or biological agents and could become

contaminated themselves. Training curricula deal with the technical level

of response, such as treatment protocols, but do not describe operational

guidelines and strategies for responding to large-scale public health

emergencies. Physicians sometimes lack adequate training to recognize

chemical and biological agents.
Page 11 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

• Chemical and biological-specific planning. Emergency operations plans

and “all-hazard” plans do not adequately address the response to a largescale chemical or biological terrorism event. Plans often do not address

chemical or biological incidents.

• Hospital notification and decontamination. Delays could occur in the

notification of local hospitals that a biological incident has occurred. By

the time the hospitals are notified, they could become contaminated by

self-referred patients, have to close, and not treat other victims. First

responders could become victims themselves and contaminate emergency

rooms.

• Distribution of pharmaceuticals. State and local health officials have found

it difficult to break down and distribute tons of medical supplies contained

in push-packages from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.

• Vaccines and pharmaceuticals. Some pharmaceuticals, such as antibiotics,

are generic and can be used to treat several different biological agents,

whereas others, such as vaccines, are agent-specific. An example would

be the smallpox vaccine, which would only be useful if terrorists used

smallpox in an attack.

• Laboratories. Even a small outbreak of an emerging disease would strain

resources. There is a need for broadening laboratory capabilities,

ensuring adequate staffing and expertise, and improving the ability to deal

with surges in testing needs.

• Medical and veterinary coordination. Problems exist in communication

between public health officials and veterinary officials. The local and state

veterinary disaster response plan may not adequately address the impact

of a biological incident on the animal population, which could have

dramatic health, economic, and public relations implications.

• Quarantine. Quarantine would be resource-intensive and would require a

well-planned strategy to implement and sustain. Questions that have to be

addressed include implementation authority, enforcement, logistics,

financial support, and the psychological ramifications of quarantine.

The Congress may want to consider several factors before investing

resources in the rapidly growing budget for combating terrorism. Even

before September 11, funding to combat terrorism had increased 78

percent from the fiscal year 1998 level of about $7.2 billion to the proposed

fiscal year 2002 budget of about $12.8 billion. After September 11, the

Congress approved the President’s request for $20 billion in emergency

assistance and provided an additional $20 billion to supplement existing

contingency funds. Thus, terrorism-related funding in fiscal year 2002 may

exceed $50 billion. Further, a number of additional funding proposals have

been introduced in the Congress that could further raise that amount.

Suggestions to

Consider for

Investing Resources
Page 12 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

The challenge facing the Congress and the nation is to invest new

resources where they will make the most difference in protecting people

and responding to terrorist attacks, including those involving chemical and

biological agents or weapons. The terrorist attacks of September 11 have

profoundly changed the management agendas of the Congress, the White

House, federal agencies, and state and local governments. However, as we

respond to the urgent priorities and the enduring requirements of

combating terrorism, our nation still must address the short-term and longterm fiscal challenges that were present before September 11 and that

remain today. It is important to remember that the long-term pressures on

the budget from competing programs have not lessened. In fact, long-term

pressures have increased due to the slowing economy and the spending

levels expected for fiscal year 2002. As a result, the ultimate task of

addressing today’s urgent needs without unduly exacerbating our longrange fiscal challenges has become more difficult.

As discussed above, the nature of the threat appears to have become more

uncertain since the September 11 attacks. Despite this uncertainty,

preparing for all possible contingencies is not practical because

vulnerabilities are unlimited, so a risk management approach is needed to

help focus resource investments. Efforts to better prepare for chemical

and biological attacks include solutions that have broad applicability

across a variety of contingencies and solutions that are applicable to only

a specific type of attack. For example, efforts to improve public health

surveillance would be useful in any disease outbreak, whereas efforts to

provide vaccines for smallpox would be useful only if terrorists used

smallpox in a biological attack. Given the uncertainty of the chemical and

biological terrorist threat and continued fiscal concerns, the Congress may

want to initially invest resources in efforts with broad applicability rather

than those that are only applicable under a specific type of chemical or

biological attack. As threat information becomes more certain, it may be

more appropriate to invest in efforts only applicable to specific chemical

or biological agents. This approach would focus finite resources on areas

of greatest need using a risk management approach.

As stated initially, this testimony is based largely upon recent GAO

reports. In addition, we sought to determine what types of problems might

arise in responding to chemical and biological terrorist attacks. To do so,

we analyzed after-action reports and other evaluations from federal

exercises that simulated chemical and biological terrorist attacks. The

scope of this analysis was governmentwide. Our methodology initially

identified and catalogued after-action reports and evaluations from federal

Scope and

Methodology
Page 13 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

exercises over the last 6 fiscal years (fiscal years 1996 to 2001). The

analysis was limited to those 50 after-action reports (representing 40

different exercises) that had a chemical and/or biological terrorism

component. The analysis did not include exercises involving radiological

and/or nuclear agents, and it does not represent all federal after-action

reports for combating terrorism exercises during that period. We then

identified specific problems and issues associated with chemical and

biological terrorism exercises. We compared those specific problems and

solutions to determine which ones were specific to chemical and to

biological incidents.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions you or other members of the Committee may

have.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)

512-4300. For information specifically on biological terrorism please

contact Janet Heinrich at (202) 512-7250. Stephen L. Caldwell, Mark A.

Pross, James C. Lawson, Harry L. Purdy, Jason G. Venner, and M. Jane

Hunt made key contributions to this statement.
Page 14 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach

(GAO-02-150T, Oct. 12, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs

(GAO-02-149T, Oct. 10, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO-02-141T,

Oct. 9, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness (GAO-02-129T, Oct. 5,

2001).

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities

(GAO-01-915, Sept. 28, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related

Recommendations (GAO-01-822, Sept. 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s

Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness (GAO-01-555T, May 9,

2001).

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs

Further Improvement (GAO-01-666T, May 1, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal

Response (GAO-01-660T, Apr. 24, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs

Further Improvement (GAO-01-463, Mar. 30, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and

National Strategy (GAO-01-556T, Mar. 27, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in

Coordinating Preparedness and Response (GAO-01-15, Mar. 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination

(GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000).

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness

(GAO/HEHS-00-180, Sept. 11, 2000).

Related GAO Products
Page 15 GAO-02-162T Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Nonmedical Chemical

and Biological R&D Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-130, Mar. 22, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of

Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are

Poorly Managed (GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-59, Mar. 8, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are

Poorly Managed (GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 29, 1999).

Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to

Deliberate Contamination (GAO/RCED-00-3, Oct. 27, 1999).

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