COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CANOVA ELECTRICAL CONTRACTING, INC., 

 and ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record Nos. 0157-96-2 and JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 0221-96-2 JUNE 18, 1996 

LMI INSURANCE COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Benjamin J. Trichilo (Trichilo, Bancroft, 

McGavin, Horvath & Judkins, P.C., on briefs), 

for appellants. 

 William F. Karn (Cathie W. Howard; Williams & 

Pierce, on briefs), for appellee. 

 These appeals arise from the commission's denial of motions 

to dismiss two separate petitions for review. Canova Electrical 

Contracting, Inc. and Royal Insurance Company of America contend 

that the commission erred in denying the motions to dismiss 

because the commission lacked jurisdiction to consider a dispute 

solely involving coverage between insurers. For the reasons that 

follow, we dismiss the appeals. 

 I. 

 The evidence proved that Canova contracted to provide 

electrical contracting services for a building project in 

Alexandria, Virginia. In January 1994, Canova entered into an 

agreement with Tower Electric Co., in which Tower agreed to 

provide electricians to work at the building project at a rate 

specified in the agreement. Canova agreed to provide all 
- 2 - 

supervision of the electricians at the building project and 

further agreed not to hire any Tower employees before one year 

after completion of the building project. 

 James Foley began working for Tower in May 1994. He 

sustained an injury by accident on July 10, 1994, while working 

at the building project. Foley filed a worker's compensation 

claim against Tower and its insurer, LMI Insurance Co. Later, at 

Foley's request, the commission added Canova and its insurer, 

Royal, to the claim as defendants. Foley alleged that he was 

working for Canova on loan from Tower at the time of the 

accident. 

 Carlos Real was employed by Tower in February 1994. He 

sustained an injury by accident on June 21, 1994, while working 

at the building project and filed a worker's compensation claim 

against Tower. Contending that Canova was Real's statutory 

employer at the time of the accident, Tower requested that Canova 

be included as a defendant to the claim. The commission granted 

the request. 

 Following separate evidentiary hearings on these two claims, 

a deputy commissioner ruled in each case that "it was the 

parties' intent that Tower employees would continue to be 

employees of Tower and not the servants of Canova." The deputy 

commissioner entered awards on behalf of "Foley against Tower 

Electric Co. and LMI Insurance Co." and "Real against Tower 

Electric Co. and LMI Insurance Co." 
- 3 - 

 LMI filed requests for review from both decisions. Canova 

filed motions to dismiss the requests for review, alleging, in 

part, that LMI was acting on its own behalf, that "no appeal has 

been filed on behalf of the insured of LMI Insurance Company, 

Tower Electric Company," and that "LMI Insurance Company has no 

standing to file an appeal where there is an adjudication by the 

commission that its insured, Tower Electric Company, is obligated 

under a final Order of the commission to pay compensation 

benefits." 

 In denying the motions to dismiss, the commission issued 

separate opinions containing identical language. In pertinent 

part, the commission ruled as follows: 

 An award of the commission is at issue in the 

current proceeding because the Deputy 

Commissioner has decided which of two named 

defendant employers is responsible for the 

payment of benefits. In the present appeal, 

fundamental issues of liability are still at 

issue since a decision of the Commission is 

not final until all appeals have been 

exhausted or until the time for appeal has 

passed. As a result of this consideration 

regarding finality, there has been no final 

determination regarding the employer in the 

present matter. Therefore, the issue before 

the Commission affects the employee's 

 rights. . . . [T]he matter before the 

Commission is not solely a contest between 

two compensation carriers. 

 In addition, Code of Virginia § 65.2-101 

provides a definition of an employer as 

follows: 

 (i) any person, the Commonwealth or 

any political subdivision thereof 

and any individual, firm, 

association or corporation, or the 

receiver or trustee of the same, or 
- 4 - 

the legal representative of a 

deceased employer, using the 

service of another to pay for (ii) 

any volunteer fire company or 

volunteer lifesaving or rescue 

squad electing to be included and 

maintaining coverage as an employer 

under this title. If the employer 

is insured, it includes his insurer 

so far as applicable. 

 (emphasis added). 

 Even though LMI's Petition for Review to the 

full Commission did not name the employer, 

given the statutory inclusion of an insurer 

in the definition of employer found in 

 § 65.2-101, in a workers' compensation 

proceeding, the identities of an employer and 

insurer are by their nature intertwined. 

Therefore, Tower Electric Company is 

necessarily a party to the review. 

 Canova appeals to this Court from that ruling by the 

commission denying Canova's motion to dismiss. 

 II. 

 The Court of Appeals of Virginia is a court of limited 

jurisdiction. West v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 456, 457, 445 

S.E.2d 159, 159 (1994), appeal dismissed, 249 Va. 241, 455 S.E.2d 

15 (1995). Unless a statute confers jurisdiction in this Court, 

we are without power to review an appeal. Polumbo v. Polumbo, 13 

Va. App. 306, 307, 411 S.E.2d 229, 229 (1991). Code 

§ 17-116.05(2) grants this Court the authority to hear "[a]ny 

final decision of the Industrial Commission of Virginia." 

(Emphasis added). 

 In this case, Canova and Royal appealed the commission's 

denial of their motions to dismiss two companion cases. Although 
- 5 - 

the commission initially expressed its intent to decide the 

motions to dismiss contemporaneously with its review of the 

deputy commissioner's decisions upon the merits, the commission, 

instead, at the request of the parties, first ruled upon the 

motion to dismiss. It overruled the motions to dismiss prior to 

reviewing the merits of the deputy commissioner's opinion. 

Indeed, the record contains no indication that the commission has 

reviewed the merits of the case. A decision denying a motion to 

dismiss is not a final order. See West, 249 Va. at 242-43, 455 

S.E.2d at 1-2 (the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal 

charge is not a final judgment); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review 

§ 165 (1995 & Supp. 1996). Thus, this appeal does not meet the 

requirement of Code § 17-116.05(2). 

 This Court may also review, however, "[a]ny interlocutory 

decree or order . . . (i) granting, dissolving, or denying an 

injunction or (ii) adjudicating the principles of a cause" in a 

case over which this Court has jurisdiction. Code 

§ 17-116.05(4); West, 18 Va. App. at 457, 445 S.E.2d at 159, 

appeal dismissed, 249 Va. at 241, 455 S.E.2d at 1. This appeal 

does not involve an injunction. Furthermore, an order 

adjudicates the principles of a cause only if it determines the 

rights of the parties and affects the final order in the case. 

Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 851, 407 S.E.2d 339, 341 

(1991). 

 "The [order] must determine that 'the rules 

or methods by which the rights of the parties 

are to be finally worked out have been so far 
- 6 - 

determined that it is only necessary to apply 

those rules or methods to the facts of the 

case in order to ascertain the relative 

rights of the parties, with regard to the 

subject matter of the suit.'" 

Id. (citation omitted). 

 In ruling upon the motions to dismiss, the commission did 

not resolve any factual or legal issues concerning the merits of 

the cases. The commission's denial of the motions will not 

affect its final decision of the cases. Except in those 

instances defined by Code § 17-116.05(4), no provisions of Code 

§ 17-116.05 or any other statute allow this Court to review 

interlocutory appeals. Thus, lacking jurisdiction, we dismiss 

the appeals. 

 Dismissed.